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ENGLISH SYNONYMES

EXPLAINED,

IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER;

WITH

COPIOUS ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXAMPLES

DRAWN FROM THE BEST WRITERS.



BY

GEORGE CRABB,
OF MAGDALEN HALL, OXFORD.



SECOND EDITION,

GREATLY ENLARGED AND CORRECTED.



Sed cum idem frequentissimè plura significant, quod synonymia vocatur, jam sunt aliis alia honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora, vocaliora.

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TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

A REPRINT of this Work being found necessary, the Author has availed himself of the occasion to make such additions and corrections as were considered adviseable; confidently hoping that, in its present improved state, it will obtain a still greater share of the Public Patronage.

Sept. 10, 1818.

PREFACE.

IT may seem surprising that the English, who have employed their talents successfully in every branch of literature, and in none more than in that of philology, should yet have fallen below other nations in the study of their synonymes: it cannot however be denied that, whilst the French and Germans have had several considerable works on the subject, we have not a single writer who has treated it in a scientific manner adequate to its importance: not that I wish by this remark to depreciate the labors of those who have preceded me; but simply to assign it as a reason why I have now been induced to come forward with an attempt to fill up what is considered a chasm in English literature.

In the prosecution of my undertaking, I have profited by every thing which has been written in any language upon the subject; and although I always pursued my own train of thought, yet whenever I met with any thing deserving of notice I adopted it, and referred it to the author in a note. I had not proceeded far before I found it necessary to restrict myself in the choice of my materials; and accordingly laid it down as a rule not to compare any words together which were sufficiently distinguished from each other

the views of many who may be competent to decide on its literary merits. I write not to please or displease any description of persons; but I trust that what I have written according to the dictates of my mind will meet the approbation of those whose good opinion I am most solicitous to obtain. Should any object to the introduction of morality in a work of science, I beg them to consider, that a writer, whose business it was to mark the nice shades of distinction between words closely allied, could not do justice to his subject without entering into all the relations of society, and showing, from the acknowledged sense of many moral and religious terms, what has been the general sense of mankind on many of the most important questions which have agitated the world. My first object certainly has been to assist the philological inquirer in ascertaining the force and comprehension of the English language; yet I should have thought my work but half completed had I made it a mere register of verbal distinctions. While others seize every opportunity unblushingly to avow and zealously to propagate opinions destructive of good order, it would ill become any individual of contrary sentiments to shrink from stating his convictions, when called upon as he seems to be by an occasion like that which has now offered itself. As to the rest, I throw myself on the indulgence of the public, conscious that this work will call for it in no small degree. Although I have obtained their approbation on other occasions, yet it is not without some degree of diffidence that I appear before them on the present; notwithstanding the favorable sentence which private friends have passed upon my work. Conscious,

however, that I have used every endeavour to deserve their approbation, and satisfied that in such case no one makes his appeal to their candor in vain, I leave my cause in their hands, fully assured that it will meet with all the attention that it deserves.

London, March 8, 1816.

ENGLISH SYNONYMES

EXPLAINED.

TO ABANDON, DESERT, FORSAKE, RELINQUISH.

THE idea of leaving or separating one's self from an object is common to these terms, which differ in the circumstances or modes of leaving. The two former are more solemn acts than the two latter.

ABANDON, from the French *abandonner*, is a concretion of the words *donner à ban*, to give up to a public ban or outlawry. To *abandon* then is to expose to every misfortune which results from a formal and public denunciation; to set out of the protection of law and government; and to deny the privileges of citizenship.

DESERT, in Latin *desertus*, participle of *desero*, that is, *de* privative and *sero* to sow, signifying unsown, unplanted, cultivated no longer. To *desert* then is to leave off cultivating; and as there is something of idleness and improvidence in ceasing to render the soil productive, ideas of disapprobation accompany the word in all its metaphorical applications. He who leaves off cultivating a farm usually removes from it; hence the idea of removal and blameworthy removal, which usually attaches to the term.

FORSAKE, in Saxon *forsecan*, is compounded of the primitive *for* and *sake*, *seek*, *secan*, signifying to seek no more, to leave off seeking that which has been an object of search.

RELINQUISH, in Latin *relinquo*, is compounded of *re* or *retro* behind and *linguo* to leave, that is, to leave what we would fain take with us, to leave with reluctance.

To *abandon* is totally to withdraw ourselves from an object; to lay aside

all care and concern for it; to leave it altogether to itself: to *desert* is to withdraw ourselves at certain times when our assistance or co-operation is required, or to separate ourselves from that to which we ought to be attached: to *forsake* is to withdraw our regard for and interest in an object, to keep at a distance from it: to *relinquish* is to leave that which has once been an object of our pursuit.

Abandon and *desert* are employed for persons or things; *forsake* for persons or places; *relinquish* for things only.

With regard to persons these terms express moral culpability in a progressive ratio downwards: *abandon* comprehends the violation of the most sacred ties; *desert*, a breach of honour and fidelity; *forsake*, a rupture of the social bond.

We *abandon* those who are entirely dependent for protection and support; they are left in a helpless state exposed to every danger; a child is *abandoned* by its parent: we *desert* those with whom we have entered into coalition; they are left to their own resources; a soldier *deserts* his comrades; a partisan *deserts* his friends: we *forsake* those with whom we have been in habits of intimacy; they are deprived of the pleasures and comforts of society; a man *forsakes* his companions; a lover *forsakes* his mistress.

We are bound by every law human and divine not to *abandon*; we are called upon by every good principle not to *desert*; we are impelled by every kind feeling not to *forsake*.

Few animals except man will *abandon* their young until they are enabled to provide for themselves. Interest,

A humane commander will not *abandon* a town to the rapine of the soldiers. The motives for *resignations* are various. Discontent, disgust, and the love of repose, are the ordinary inducements for men to *resign* honourable and lucrative employments. Men are not so ready to *renounce* the pleasures that are within their reach, as to seek after those which are out of their reach. The *abdication* of a throne is not always an act of magnanimity, it may frequently result from caprice or necessity.

Charles the Fifth *abdicated* his crown, and his minister *resigned* his office on the very same day, when both *renounced* the world with its allurements and its troubles.

The passive Gods beheld the Greeks defile
Their temples, and *abandon* to the spoil
Their own abodes. DRYDEN.

It would be a good appendix to "the art of living and dying," if any one would write "the art of growing old," and teach men to *resign* their pretensions to the pleasures of youth.

STEELE.

For ministers to be silent in the cause of Christ is to *renounce* it, and to fly is to desert it.

SOUTH.

Much gratitude is due to the Nine from their favoured poets, and much hath been paid: for even to the present hour they are invoked and worshipped by the sons of verse, whilst all the other deities of Olympus have either *abdicated* their thrones, or been dismissed from them with contempt.

CUMBERLAND.

We *abandon* nothing but that over which we have had an entire and lawful control; we *abdicate* nothing but that which we have held by a certain right; but we may *resign* or *renounce* that which may be in our possession only by an act of violence. A usurper cannot *abandon* his people, because he has no people over whom he can exert a lawful authority; still less can he *abdicate* a throne, because he has no throne to abdicate, but he may *resign* supreme power, because power may be unjustly held; or he may *renounce* his pretensions to a throne, because pretensions may be fallacious or extravagant.

Abandon and *resign* are likewise used in a reflective sense; the former express an involuntary or culpable action, the latter that which is voluntary and proper. The soldiers of Hannibal *abandoned* themselves to

effeminacy during their winter quarters at Cumæ.

It is the part of every good man's religion to *resign* himself to God's will. CUMBERLAND.

TO ABANDON, *v.* To give up, *abandon*.

ABANDONED, *v.* Profligate.

TO ABASE, HUMBLE, DEGRADE, DISGRACE, DEBASE.

TO ABASE expresses the strongest degree of self-humiliation, from the French *abaisser*, to bring down or make low, which is compounded of the intensive syllable *a* or *ad* and *baisser* from *bas* low, in Latin *basis* the base, which is the lowest part of a column. It is at present used principally in the Scripture language, or in a metaphorical style, to imply the laying aside all the high pretensions which distinguish us from our fellow creatures, the descending to a state comparatively low and mean.

TO HUMBLE, in French *humilier*, from the Latin *humilis* humble, and *humus* the ground, naturally marks a prostration to the ground, and figuratively a lowering the thoughts and feelings.

According to the principles of Christianity whoever *abaseth* himself shall be exalted, and according to the same principles whoever reflects on his own littleness and unworthiness will daily *humble* himself before his Maker.

TO DEGRADE, in French *dégrader*, from the Latin *gradus* a step, signifies to bring a step lower; figuratively, to lower in the estimation of others. It supposes already a state of elevation either in outward circumstances or in public opinion.

DISGRACE is compounded of the privative *dis* and the noun *grace* or favour. To *disgrace* properly implies to put out of favour, which is always attended more or less with circumstances of ignominy, and reflects contempt on the object.

DEBASE is compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and the adjective *base*, signifying to make very base or low.

The modest man *abases* himself by not insisting on the distinctions to

connected with the operations of the mind. We may *abstain* from the thing we desire, or forbear to do the thing which we wish to do; but we can never *refrain* from any action without in some measure losing our desire to do it.

We *abstain* from whatever concerns our food and clothing; we *forbear* to do what we may have particular motives for doing; *refrain* from what we desire to do, or have been in the habits of doing.

It is a part of the Mahometan faith to *abstain* from the use of wine; but it is a Christian duty to *forbear* doing an injury even in return for an injury; and to *refrain* from all swearing and evil speaking.

Abstinence is a virtue when we *abstain* from that which may be hurtful to ourselves or injurious to another; *forbearance* is essential to preserve peace and good will betwixt man and man. Everyone is too liable to offend; not to have motives for *forbearing* to deal harshly with the offences of his neighbour. If we *refrain* from uttering with the lips the first dictates of an angry mind, we shall be saved much repentance in future.

Though a man cannot *abstain* from being weak, he may from being vicious. ADDISON.

By *forbearing* to do what may be innocently done, we may add hourly new vigour and resolution, and secure the power of resistance when pleasure or interest shall lend their charms to guilt. JOHNSON.

If we conceive a being, created with all his faculties and senses, to open his eyes in a most delightful plain, to view for the first time the serenity of the sky, the splendour of the sun, the verdure of the fields and woods, the glowing colours of the flowers, we can hardly believe it possible that he should *refrain* from bursting into an ecstasy of joy, and pouring out his praises to the Creator of those wonders.

SIR WILLIAM JONES.

ABSTEMIOUS, *v.* *Abstinent*.

ABSTINENCE, FAST.

ABSTINENCE is a general term, applicable to any object from which we abstain; FAST is a species of abstinence, namely, an abstaining from food: the general term is likewise used in the particular sense, to imply a partial *abstinence* from particular food; but *fast* signifies an abstinence from food altogether.

* Vide Trussler: "Sober, temperate, abstemious."

Fridays are appointed by the Church as days of *abstinence*; and Good Friday as a day of *fast*. TAYLOR.

I am verily persuaded that if a whole people were to enter into a course of *abstinence*, and eat nothing but water gruel for a fortnight, it would abate the rage and animosity of parties.

Such a *fast* would have the natural tendency to the procuring of those ends for which a *fast* is proclaimed. ADDISON.

ABSTINENT, SOBER, ABSTEMIOUS, TEMPERATE.

THE first of these terms is generic, the rest specific.

ABSTINENT (*v.* *To abstain*) respects every thing that acts on the senses, and in a limited sense applies particularly to solid food.

SOBER, from the Latin *sobrius*, or *sebrus*, that is, *sine ebrius*, not drunk, implies an abstinence from excessive drinking.

ABSTEMIOUS, from the Latin *abstemius*, compounded of *abs* and *temenium* wine, implies the abstaining from wine or strong liquor in general.

TEMPERATE, in Latin *temperatus*, participle of *tempero* to moderate or regulate, implies a well regulated abstinence in all manner of sensual indulgence.

We may be *abstinent* without being *sober*, *sober* without being *abstemious*, and all together without being *temperate*.

An *abstinent* man does not eat or drink so much as he could enjoy; a *sober* man may drink much without being affected.* An *abstemious* man drinks nothing strong. A *temperate* man enjoys all in a due proportion.

A particular passion may cause us to be *abstinent* either partially or totally: *sobriety* may often depend upon the strength of the constitution, or be prescribed by prudence: necessity may dictate *abstemiousness*, but nothing short of a well disciplined mind will enable us to be *temperate*. Diogenes practised the most rigorous *abstinence*: some men have unjustly obtained a character for *sobriety*, whose habit of body has enabled them to resist the force of strong liquor even when taken to excess: it is not uncommon for persons to practise *abstemiousness* to that degree, as not to drink any thing but water all their lives: Cyrus was

as distinguished by his *temperance* as his other virtues; he shared all hardships with his soldiers, and partook of their frugal diet.

Unlimited *abstinence* is rather a vice than a virtue, for we are taught to enjoy the things which Providence has set before us: *sobriety* ought to be highly esteemed among the lower orders, where the *abstinence* from vice is to be regarded as positive virtue: *abstemiousness* is sometimes the only means of preserving health; but habitual *temperance* is the most efficacious means of keeping both body and mind in the most regular state.

To set the mind above the appetites is the end of *abstinence*, which one of the fathers observes to be not a virtue, but the groundwork of virtue.

JOHNSON.

Cratæus carried his love of wine to such an excess, that he got the name of φῖλος, launching out in praise of drinking, and rallying all *sobriety* out of countenance, CUMBERLAND.

The strongest oaths are straw
To th' fire I' th' blood; be more *abstemious*,
Or else good night your vow. SHAKESPEARE.

If we consider the life of these ancient sages, a great part of whose philosophy consisted in a *temperate* and *abstemious* course of life, one would think the life of a philosopher and the life of a man were of two different dates.] ADDISON.

TO ABSTRACT, SEPARATE, DISTINGUISH.

ABSTRACT, *v. Absent.*

SEPARATE, in Latin *separatus*, participle of *separo*, is compounded of *se* and *paro* to dispose apart, signifying to put things asunder, or at a distance from each other.

DISTINGUISH, in French *distinquer*, Latin *distinguo*, is compounded of the separative preposition *dis* and *tingo* to tinge or colour, signifying to give different marks by which they may be known from each other.

Abstract is used in the moral sense only: *separate* mostly in a physical sense: *distinguish* either in a moral or physical sense: we *abstract* what we wish to regard particularly and individually; we *separate* what we wish not to be united; we *distinguish* what we wish not to confound. The mind performs the office of *abstraction* for itself; *separating* and *distinguishing* are exerted on external objects. * Arrangement, place, time, and circum-

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Distinguer, separer."

stances serve to *separate*: the ideas formed of things, the outward marks attached to them, the qualities attributed to them, serve to *distinguish*.

By the operation of *abstraction* the mind creates for itself a multitude of new ideas: in the act of *separation* bodies are removed from each other by distance of place: in the act of *distinguishing* objects are discovered to be similar or dissimilar. Qualities are *abstracted* from the subjects in which they are inherent: countries are *separated* by mountains or seas: their inhabitants are *distinguished* by their dress, language, or manners. The mind is never less *abstracted* from one's friends than when *separated* from them by immense oceans: it requires a keen eye to *distinguish* objects that bear a great resemblance to each other. Volatile persons easily *abstract* their minds from the most solemn scenes to fix them on trifling objects that pass before them: an unsocial temper leads some men to *separate* themselves from all their companions: an absurd ambition leads others to *distinguish* themselves by their eccentricities.

We ought to *abstract* our minds from the observation of an excellence in those we converse with, till we have received some good information of the disposition of their minds. STANLEY.

Fontenelle, in his panegyric on Sir Isaac Newton, closes a long enumeration of that philosopher's virtues and attainments with an observation that he was not *distinguished* from other men by any singularity either natural or affected.

It is an eminent instance of Newton's superiority to the rest of mankind that he was able to *separate* knowledge from those weaknesses by which knowledge is generally disgraced. JOHNSON.

ABSTRACT, *v. Abridgement.*

ABSTRACTED, *v. Absent.*

ABSURD, *v. Irrational.*

ABUNDANT, *v. Plentiful.*

TO ABUSE, MISUSE.

ABUSE, in Latin *abusus*, participle of *abutor*, compounded of *ab* from and *utor* to use, signifies to use away or wear away with using; in distinction from MISUSE, which signifies to use amiss.

Every thing is *abused* which receives any sort of injury; it is *misused*, if not

used at all, or turned to a wrong use. Young people are too prone to *abuse* books for want of setting a proper value on their contents; they do not always avoid *misusing* them in their riper years, when they read for amusement only instead of improvement. Money is *abused* when it is clipped, or its value any way lessened; it is *misused* when it is spent in excess and debauchery.

I know no evil so great as the *abuse* of the understanding, and yet there is no one vice more common. STEELE.

God requires not men to wrong or *misuse* their faculties for him, nor to lie to others or themselves for his sake. LOCKE.

ABUSE, INVECTIVE.

ABUSE (*v. To abuse*) is here taken in the metaphorical application for ill-treatment of persons.

INVECTIVE, from the Latin *in-vecho*, signifies to bear upon or against. Harsh and unseemly censure is the idea common to these terms; but the former is employed more properly against the person, the latter against the thing.

Abuse is addressed to the individual, and mostly by word of mouth: *invective* is communicated mostly by writing. *Abuse* is dictated by anger, which throws off all constraint, and violates all decency: *invective* is dictated by party spirit, or an intemperate warmth of feeling in matters of opinion. *Abuse* is always resorted to by the vulgar in their private quarrels: *invective* is the ebullition of zeal and ill nature in public concerns.

The more rude and ignorant the man, the more liable he is to indulge in *abuse*: the more restless and opinionated the partisan, whether in religion or politics, the more ready he is to deal in *invective*. We must expect to meet with *abuse* from the vulgar whom we offend; and if in high stations, our conduct will draw forth *invective* from busy bodies whom spleen has converted into oppositionists.

At an entertainment given by Plautus to some of his intimates, Thrasippus, a man of violent passion and inflamed with wine, took some occasion, not recorded, to break out into the most violent *abuse* and insult. CUMERLAND.

This is the true way of examining a libel; and when men consider that no man living thinks the better of their heroes and patrons for the pangs-

ric given them, none can think themselves lessened by their *invective*. STEELE.

ABUSIVE, *v. Reproachful.*

ABYSS, *v. Gulf.*

ACADEMY, *v. School.*

TO ACCEDE, CONSENT, COMPLY, ACQUIESCE, AGREE.

ACCEDE, in Latin *accedo*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *cedo* to go or come, signifies to come or fall into a thing.

CONSENT, in French *consentir*, Latin *consentio*, compounded of *con* together and *sentio* to feel, signifies to feel in unison with another.

COMPLY comes probably from the French *complaire*, Latin *complaceo*, signifying to be pleased in unison with another.

ACQUIESCE, in French *acquiescer*, Latin *acquiesco*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *quiesco*, signifies to be easy about or contented with a thing.

AGREE, in French *agréer*, is most probably derived from the Latin *gruo*, in the word *congruo*, signifying to accord or suit.

We *accede* to what others propose to us by falling in with their ideas: we *consent** to what others wish by authorising it: we *comply* with what is asked of us by allowing it, or not hindering it: we *acquiesce* in what is insisted by accepting it, and conforming to it: we *agree* to what is proposed by admitting and embracing it.

We object to those things to which we do not *accede*: we refuse those things to which we do not *consent*, or with which we will not *comply*: we oppose those things in which we will not *acquiesce*: we dispute that to which we will not *agree*.

To *accede* is the unconstrained action of an equal; it is a matter of discretion: *consent* and *comply* suppose a degree of superiority, at least the power of preventing; they are acts of good-nature or civility: *acquiesce* implies a degree of submission, it is a matter of prudence or necessity: *agree* indicates an aversion to disputes; it respects the harmony of social intercourse.

Members of any community ought to be willing to *accede* to what is the

* Vide Abbé Giffard: "Consentir, acquiescer, adhærere, tomber d'accord."

Accidents may sometimes be remedied; *chances* can never be controlled: *accidents* give rise to sorrow, they mostly occasion mischief; *chances* give rise to hope; they often produce disappointment; it is wise to dwell upon neither.

That little *accident* of Alexander's taking a fancy to bathe himself caused the interruption of his march; and that interruption gave occasion to that great victory that founded the third monarchy of the world. SOUTH.

Surely there could not be a greater *chance* than that which brought to light the Powder-Treason. SOUTH.

ACCIDENT, CONTINGENCY, CASUALTY.

ACCIDENT, *v. Accident, chance.*

CONTINGENCY, in French *contingence*, Latin *contingens*, participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango*, to touch one another, signifies the falling out or happening together; or the thing that happens in conjunction with another.

CASUALTY, in French *casualté*, from the Latin *casualis*, and *cado* to fall or happen, signifies the thing that happens in the course of events.

All these words imply whatever takes place independently of our intentions. *Accidents* express more than *contingencies*; the former comprehend events with their causes and consequences; the latter respect collateral actions, or circumstances appended to events; *casualties* have regard simply to circumstances. *Accidents* are frequently occasioned by carelessness, and *contingencies* by trivial mistakes; but *casualties* are altogether independent of ourselves.

The overturning a carriage is an *accident*; our situation in a carriage, at the time, is a *contingency*, which may occasion us to be more or less hurt; the passing of any one at the time is a *casualty*. We are all exposed to the most calamitous *accidents*; and our happiness or misery depends upon a thousand *contingencies*: the best concerted scheme may be thwarted by *casualties*, which no human foresight can prevent.

This natural impatience to look into futurity, and to know what *accidents* may happen to us hereafter, has given birth to many ridiculous arts and inventions. ADDISON.

Nothing less than infinite wisdom can have an

absolute command over fortune; the highest degree of it which man can possess is by no means equal to fortuitous events, and to such *contingencies* as may rise in the prosecution of our affairs. ADDISON.

Men are exposed to more *casualties* than women, as battles, sea-voyages, with several dangerous trades and professions. ADDISON.

ACCIDENT, *v. Event.*

ACCIDENTAL, INCIDENTAL, CASUAL, CONTINGENT.

ACCIDENTAL, *v. Accident.*

INCIDENTAL, from *incident*, in Latin *incidens* and *incido* or *in* and *cado* to fall upon, signifies belonging to a thing by chance.

CASUAL, *v. Casualty.*

CONTINGENT, *v. Contingency.*

Accidental is opposed to what is designed or planned, *incidental* to what is premeditated, *casual* to what is constant and regular, *contingent* to what is definite and fixed. A meeting may be *accidental*, an expression *incidental*, a look, expression, &c. *casual*, an expense or circumstance *contingent*. We do not expect what is *accidental*; we do not suspect or guard against what is *incidental*; we do not heed what is *casual*; we are not prepared for what is *contingent*. Many of the most fortunate and important occurrences in our lives are *accidental*; many remarks, seemingly *incidental*, do in reality conceal a settled intent; a *casual* remark in the course of conversation will sometimes make a stronger impression on the minds of children than the most eloquent and impressive discourse or repeated counsel; in the prosecution of any plan we ought to be prepared for the numerous *contingencies* which we may meet with to interfere with our arrangements.

This book fell *accidentally* into the hands of one who had never seen it before. ADDISON.

Savage lodged as much by *accident*, and passed the night sometimes in mean houses, which are set open at night to any *casual* wanderers. JOHNSON.

The distempers of the mind may be figuratively classed under the several characters of those maladies which are *incidental* to the body. CUMBERLAND.

We see how a *contingent* event baffles man's knowledge and evades his power. SOUTH.

ACCLAMATION, *v. Applause.*

TO ACCOMMODATE, *v. To fit.*

phenomena, and whatever is remarkable. *Reckoning*, as a particular term, is more partial in its use : it is mostly confined to the dealings of men with one another ; in which sense it is superseded by the preceding term, and now serves to express only an explanatory enumeration, which may be either verbal or written. *Bill*, as implying something charged or engaged, is used not only in a mercantile, but a legal sense : hence we speak of a *bill* of lading ; a *bill* of parcels ; a *bill* of exchange ; a *bill* of indictment, or a *bill* in parliament.

At many times I brought in my *accounts*,
Laid them before you ; you would throw them off,
And say you found them in my honesty.

SHAKESPEARE.

Merchant with some rudeness demanded a room, and was told that there was a good fire in the next parlour, which the company were about to leave, being then paying their *reckoning*.

JOHNSON.

Ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's estate, and ordered to the best, that the *bill* may be less than the estimation abroad.

BACON.

ACCOUNT, NARRATIVE, DESCRIPTION.

ACCOUNT, *v.* *Account*, *reckoning*.

NARRATIVE, from *narrate*, is in Latin *narratus*, participle of *narro* or *gnaro*, which signifies to make known.

DESCRIPTION, from *describe*, in Latin *describo* or *de* and *scribo*, signifies to write down.

Account is the most general of these terms ; whatever is noted as worthy of remark is an *account* : *narrative* is an account narrated : *description*, an account described. *Account* has no reference to the person giving the account ; a *narrative* must have a narrator ; a *description* must have a describer. An *account* may come from one or several quarters, or no specified quarter ; but a *narrative* and *description* bespeak themselves as the production of some individual. An *account* may be the statement of a single fact only ; a *narrative* must always consist of several connected incidents ; a *description*, of several unconnected particulars respecting some common object. An *account* and a *description* may be communicated either verbally or in writing ; a *narrative* is mostly written. An *account* may be given of

political events, natural phenomena, and domestic occurrences ; as the signing of a treaty, the march of an army, the death and funeral of an individual : a *narrative* is mostly personal, respecting the adventures, the travels, the dangers, and the escapes of some particular person : a *description* does not so much embrace occurrences, as characters, appearances, beauties, defects, and attributes in general. *Accounts* from the armies are anxiously looked for in time of war : whenever a *narrative* is interesting, it is a species of reading eagerly sought after : the *descriptions* which are given of the eruptions of volcanoes are calculated to awaken a strong degree of curiosity. An *account* may be false or true ; a *narrative* clear or confused ; a *description* lively, or dull.

A man of business, in good company, who gives an *account* of his abilities and dispatches, is hardly more insupportable than her they call a notable woman.

STEELE.

Few *narratives* will, either to men or women, appear more incredible than the histories of the Amazons.

JOHNSON.

Most readers, I believe, are more charmed with Milton's *description* of Paradise than of hell.

ADDISON.

ACCOUNT, *v.* *Sake*.

ACCOUNTABLE, *v.* *Answerable*.

TO ACCUMULATE, *v.* *To heap*.

ACCURATE, EXACT, PRECISE.

ACCURATE, in French *accurate*, Latin *accuratus*, participle of *accuro*, compounded of the intensive *ac* or *ad* and *curo* to take care of, signifying done with great care.

EXACT, in French *exacte*, Latin *exactus*, participle of *exigo* to finish or complete, denotes the quality of completeness, the absence of defect.

PRECISE, in French *précis*, Latin *præcisus*, participle of *præcido* to cut by rule, signifies the quality of doing by rule.

A man is *accurate* when he avoids faults ; *exact*, when he attends to every minutia, leaves nothing undone ; *precise*, when he does it according to a certain measure. These epithets, therefore, bear a comparative relation to each other ; *exact* expresses more than *accurate*, and *precise* more than *exact*. An *account* is *accurate* in

torical acquaintance; we are made intimate with their habits and manners. CUMBERLAND.

The frequency of envy makes it so familiar, that it escapes our notice. JOHNSON.

TO ACQUIESCE, *v.* *To accede.*

TO ACQUIRE, OBTAIN, GAIN, WIN, EARN.

ACQUIRE, in French *acquiescer*, Latin *acquiro*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *quero* to seek, signifying to seek or get to one's self.

OBTAIN, in French *obtenir*, Latin *obtineo*, is compounded of *ob* and *teneo* to hold, signifying to lay hold or secure within one's reach.

GAIN and WIN are derived from the same source; namely, the French *gagner*, German *gewinnen*, Saxon *winnen*, from the Latin *vinco*, Greek *νικω* or *νικω* to conquer, signifying to get the mastery over, to get into one's possession.

EARN comes from the Saxon *thar-nan*, German *erndten*, Friezlandish *arnan* to reap, which is connected with the Greek *αρπάζω* to take or get.

The idea of getting is common to these terms, but the circumstances of the action vary. We *acquire* by our own efforts; we *obtain* by the efforts of others, as well as ourselves; we *gain* or *win* by striving; we *earn* by labour. Talents and industry are requisite for *acquiring*; what we *acquire* comes gradually to us in consequence of the regular exercise of our abilities; in this manner, knowledge, honour, and reputation, are *acquired*. Things are *obtained* by all means, honest or dishonest; whatever comes into our possession agreeable to our wishes is *obtained*; favours and requests are always *obtained*. Fortune assists in both *gaining* and *winning*, but particularly in the latter case: a subsistence, a superiority, a victory or battle, is *gained*; a game or a prize in the lottery is *won*. A good constitution and full employment are all that is necessary for *earning* a livelihood. Fortunes are *acquired* after a course of years; they are *obtained* by inheritance, or *gained* in trade; they are sometimes *won* at the gaming table, but seldom *earned*.

What is *acquired* is solid, and produces lasting benefit: what is *obtained*

may often be injurious to one's health, one's interest, or one's morals: what is *gained* or *won* is often only a partial advantage, and transitory in its nature; it is *gained* or *won* only to be lost: what is *earned* serves only to supply the necessity of the moment; it is hardly got and quickly spent. Scholars *acquire* learning, *obtain* rewards, *gain* applause, and *win* prizes, which are often hardly *earned* by the loss of health.

It is Sallust's remark upon Cato, that the less he coveted glory, the more he *acquired* it.

ANDERSON.

Were not this desire of fame very strong, the difficulty of *obtaining* it, and the danger of losing it when *obtained*, would be sufficient to deter a man from so vain a pursuit. ANDERSON.

He whose mind is engaged by the acquisition or improvement of a fortune, not only escapes the insipidity of indifference and the tediousness of inactivity, but *gains* enjoyments wholly unknown to those who live lazily on the toils of others. JOHNSON.

Where the danger ends, the hero comes: when he has won an empire, or gained his mistress, the rest of his story is not worth relating.

STEELE.

An honest man may freely take his own;
The goat was mine, by singing fairly won.

DRYDEN.

They who have earned their fortune by a laborious and industrious life are naturally tedious of what they have painfully *acquired*.

BLAIR.

TO ACQUIRE, ATTAIN.

ACQUIRE, *v.* *To acquire, obtain.*

ATTAIN, in Latin *attineo*, is compounded of *ab* or *ad* and *teneo* to hold, signifying to rest at a thing.

To *acquire* is a progressive and permanent action; to *attain* is a perfect and finishing action: we always go on *acquiring*; but we stop when we have *attained*. What is *acquired* is something got into the possession; what is *attained* is the point arrived at. We *acquire* a language; we *attain* to a certain degree of perfection.

By abilities and perseverance we may *acquire* a considerable fluency in speaking several languages; but we can scarcely expect to *attain* to the perfection of a native in any foreign language. Ordinary powers coupled with diligence will enable a person to *acquire* whatever is useful; but we cannot *attain* to superiority without extraordinary talents and determined perseverance. *Acquirements* are all

The air-pump, the barometer, the quadrant, and the like inventions, were thrown out to those busy spirits (politicians), as tubs and barrels are to a whale, that he may let the ship sail on without disturbance. ADDISON.

I was forced to quit my first lodgings by reason of an *effacious* landlady, that would be asking me every morning how I had slept. ADDISON.

ACTOR, AGENT.

THESE terms vary according to the different senses of the verb from which they are drawn.

ACTOR is used for one who acts a part, or who represents the actions and characters of others, whether real or feigned. AGENT is said of those who simply act for or in the stead of another.

Actors require the power of imitating actions; *agents* the power of performing them. *Actors* serve for the diversion of others; *agents* are employed for the benefit of others.

Of all the patriarchal histories, that of Joseph and his brethren is the most remarkable, for the characters of the *actors*, and the instructive nature of the events. BLAIR.

I expect that no pagan *agent* shall be introduced into the poem, or any fact related which a man cannot give credit to with a good conscience. ADDISON.

ACTOR, PLAYER.

THE ACTOR and PLAYER both perform on a stage; but the former is said in relation to the part that is acted, the latter to the profession that is followed. We may be *actors* occasionally without being players professionally, but we may be *players* without deserving the name of *actors*. Those who personate characters for their amusement are *actors* but not *players*: those who do the same for a livelihood are *players* as well as *actors*; hence we speak of a company of *players*, not *actors*. So likewise in the figurative sense, whoever acts a part real or fictitious, that is, on the stage of life, or the stage of a theatre, is an *actor*; but he only is a *player* who performs the fictitious part; hence the former is taken* in a bad or good sense, according to circumstances; but the *player* is always taken in a less favourable sense, from the artificiality which attaches to his profession.

Cicero is known to have been the intimate friend of Roscius the actor. HUGHES.

* Vide Girard: "Acteur, comedien."

Our orators (says Cicero) are as it were the *actors* of truth itself; and the *players* the imitators of truth. HUGHES.

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely *players*. SHAKESPEARE.

ACTUAL, REAL, POSITIVE.

ACTUAL, in French *actuel*, Latin *actualis*, from *actio* a deed, signifies belonging to the thing done.

REAL, in French *reel*, Latin *realis*, from *res*, signifies belonging to the thing as it is.

POSITIVE, in French *positif*, Latin *positivus*, from *pono* to place or fix, signifies the state or quality of being fixed, established.

What is *actual* has proof of its existence within itself, and may be exposed to the eye; what is *real* may be satisfactorily proved to exist; and what is *positive* precludes the necessity of a proof. *Actual* is opposed to the suppositious, conceived or reported; *real* to the feigned, imaginary; *positive* to the uncertain, doubtful.

Whatever is the condition of a thing for the time being is the *actual* condition; sorrows are *real* which flow from a substantial cause; proofs are *positive* which leave the mind in no uncertainty. The *actual* state of a nation is not to be ascertained by individual instances of poverty, or the reverse; there are but few, if any, *real* objects of compassion among common beggars; many *positive* facts have been related of the deception which they have practised. By an *actual* survey of human life, we are alone enabled to form just opinions of mankind; it is but too frequent for men to disguise their *real* sentiments, although it is not always possible to obtain *positive* evidence of their insincerity.

The very notion of any duration being past implies that it was once present; for the idea of being once present is *actually* included in the idea of its being past. ADDISON.

We may and do converse with God in person *really*, and to all the purposes of giving and receiving, though not visibly. SOUTH.

Dissimulation is taken for a man's *positive* professing himself to be what he is not. SOUTH.

TO ACTUATE, IMPEL, INDUCE.

ACTUATE, from the Latin *actum* an action, implies to call into action.

TO ADDUCE, ALLEDGE, ASSIGN,
ADVANCE.

ADDUCE, in Latin *adduco*, compounded of *ad* and *duco* to lead, signifies to bring forwards, or for a thing.

ALLEDGE, in French *alleguer*, in Latin *allego*, compounded of *al* or *ad* and *lego*, in Greek *λεγω* to speak, signifies to speak for a thing.

ASSIGN, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *signo* to sign or mark out, signifies to set apart for a purpose.

ADVANCE comes from the Latin *advenio*, compounded of *ad* and *venio* to come, or cause to come, signifying to bring forward a thing.

An argument is *adduced*; a fact or a charge is *alleged*; a reason is *assigned*; a position or an opinion is *advanced*. What is *adduced* tends to corroborate or invalidate; what is *alleged* tends to criminate or exculpate; what is *assigned* tends to justify; what is *advanced* tends to explain and illustrate. Whoever discusses disputed points must have arguments to *adduce* in favour of his principles: censures should not be passed where nothing improper can be *alleged*: a conduct is absurd for which no reason can be *assigned*: those who *advance* what they cannot maintain expose their ignorance as much as their folly.

The reasoner *adduces* facts in proof of what he has *advanced*. The accuser *alleges* circumstances in support of his charge. The philosophical investigator *assigns* causes for particular phenomena.

We may controvert what is *adduced* or *advanced*; we may deny what is *alleged*, and question what is *assigned*.

I have said that Celsus *adduces* neither oral nor written authority against Christ's miracles.
CUMBERLAND.

The criminal *alleged* in his defence, that what he had done was to raise mirth, and to avoid ceremony.
ADDISON.

If we consider what providential reasons may be *assigned* for these three particulars, we shall find that the numbers of the Jews, their dispersion and adherence to their religion, have furnished every age, and every nation of the world, with the strongest arguments for the Christian faith.
ADDISON.

I have heard of one that, having *advanced* some erroneous doctrines of philosophy, refused

to see the experiments by which they were confuted.
JOHNSON.

ADEQUATE, *v. Proportionate.*

TO ADHERE, ATTACH.

ADHERE, from the French *adherer*, Latin *adhæreo*, is compounded of *ad* and *hæreo* to stick close to.

ATTACH, in French *attacher*, is compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tach* or *touch*, both which come from the Latin *tango* to touch, signifying to come so near as to touch.

A thing is *adherent* by the union which nature produces; it is *attached* by arbitrary ties which keep it close to another thing. Glutinous bodies are apt to *adhere* to every thing they touch: a smaller building is sometimes *attached* to a larger by a passage, or some other mode of communication.

What *adheres* to a thing is closely joined to its outward surface; but what is *attached* may be fastened to it by the intervention of a third body. There is an universal *adhesion* in all the particles of matter one to another: the sails of a vessel are *attached* to a mast by means of ropes.

In a figurative sense the analogy is kept up in the use of these two words. *Adherence* is a mode of conduct; *attachment* a state of feeling. We *adhere* to opinions which we are determined not to renounce; we are *attached* to opinions for which our feelings are strongly prepossessed. It is the character of obstinacy to *adhere* to a line of conduct after it is proved to be injurious: some persons are not to be *attached* by the ordinary ties of relationship or friendship.

The firm *adherence* of the Jews to their religion is no less remarkable than their numbers and dispersion.
ADDISON.

The play which this pathetic prologue was *attached* to was a comedy, in which Laberius took the character of a slave.
CUMBERLAND.

The conqueror seems to have been fully apprized of the strength which the new government might derive from a clergy more closely *attached* to himself.
TYRWHITT.

ADHERE, *v. To stick.*

ADHERENCE, *v. Adhesion.*

ADHERENT, *v. Follower.*

ADHESION, ADHERENCE.

THESE terms are both derived from

the verb *adhere*, one expressing the proper or figurative sense, and the other the moral sense or acceptation.

There is a power of *adhesion* in all glutinous bodies; a disposition for *adherence* in steady minds.

We suffer equal pain from the pertinacious *adhesion* of unwelcome images, as from the evanescence of those which are pleasing and useful. JOHNSON.

Shakespeare's *adherence* to general nature has exposed him to the censure of critics, who form their judgements upon narrower principles. JOHNSON.

ADJACENT, ADJOINING, CONTIGUOUS.

ADJACENT, in Latin *adjiciens*, participle of *adjicio*, is compounded of *ad* and *jacio* to lie near.

ADJOINING, as the words imply, signifies being joined together.

CONTIGUOUS, in French *contigu*, Latin *contiguus*, comes from *conting* or *con* and *tango*, signifying to touch close.

What is *adjacent* may be separated altogether by the intervention of some third object; what is *adjoining* must touch in some part; and what is *contiguous* must be fitted to touch entirely on one side. Lands are *adjacent* to a house or a town; fields are *adjoining* to each other; and houses *contiguous* to each other.

They have been beating up for volunteers at York, and the towns *adjacent*; but nobody will list. GRANVILLE.

As he happens to have no estate *adjoining* equal to his own, his oppressions are often borne without resistance. JOHNSON.

We arrived at the utmost boundaries of a wood which lay *contiguous* to a plain. STERNE.

ADJECTIVE, *v. Epithet.*

ADJOINING, *v. Adjacent.*

TO ADJOURN, *v. To prorogue.*

TO ADJUST, *v. To fit.*

TO ADMINISTER, *v. To minister.*

ADMINISTRATION, *v. Government.*

ADMIRATION, *v. Wonder.*

TO ADMIRE, *v. To wonder.*

ADMISSION, *v. Admittance.*

TO ADMIT,* **RECEIVE.**

ADMIT, in French *admettre*, Latin

admitto, compounded of *ad* and *mitto*, signifies to send or suffer to pass into.

RECEIVE, in French *recevoir*, Latin *recipio*, compounded of *re* and *capio*, signifies to take back or to one's self.

To *admit* is a general term, the sense of which depends upon what follows; to *receive* has a complete sense in itself: we cannot speak of *admitting*, without associating with it an idea of the object to which one is *admitted*; but *receive* includes no relative idea of the *receiver* or the *received*.

Admitting is an act of relative importance; *receiving* is always a positive measure: a person may be *admitted* into a house, who is not prevented from entering; he is *received* only by the actual consent of some individual.

We may be *admitted* in various capacities; we are *received* only as guests, friends, or inmates. Persons are *admitted* to the tables, into the familiarity or confidence of others; they are hospitably *received* by those who wish to be their entertainers.

We *admit* willingly or reluctantly; we *receive* politely or rudely. Foreign ambassadors are *admitted* to an audience, and *received* at court. It is necessary to be cautious not to *admit* any one into our society, who may not be agreeable and suitable companions; but still more necessary not to *receive* any one into our houses whose character may reflect disgrace on ourselves.

Whoever is *admitted* as a member of any community should consider himself as bound to conform to its regulations: whoever is *received* into the service of another should study to make himself valued and esteemed. A winning address, and agreeable manners, gain a person *admittance* into the genteel circles: the talent for affording amusement procures a person a good *reception* among the mass of mankind.

The Tyrian train, *admitted* to the feast,
Approach, and on the painted couches rest.

DRYDEN.

He star'd and roll'd his haggard eyes around;
Then said, Alas! what earth remains, what seat
Is open to receive unhappy me.

DRYDEN.

Somewhat is sure design'd by fraud or force;
Trust not their presents, nor admit the horse.

DRYDEN.

* Grant: "Admittere, receiver."

against the commission of any offence ; we *warn* him against danger ; we *caution* him against any misfortune.

Admonitions and *warnings* are given by those who are superior in age and station ; *cautions* by any who are previously in possession of information. Parents give *admonitions* ; ministers of the gospel give *warnings* ; indifferent persons give *cautions*. It is necessary to *admonish* those who have once offended to abstain from a similar offence ; it is necessary to *warn* those of the consequences of sin who seem determined to persevere in a wicked course ; it is necessary to *caution* those against any false step who are going in a strange path.

Admonitions are given by persons only ; *warnings* and *cautions* are given by things. The young are *admonished* by the old ; the death of friends or relatives serve as a *warning* to the survivors ; the unfortunate accidents of the careless serve as a *caution* to others to avoid the like error. *Admonitions* should be given with mildness and gravity ; *warnings* with impressive force and warmth ; *cautions* with clearness and precision. The young require frequent *admonitions* ; the ignorant and self-deluded solemn *warnings* ; the inexperienced timely *cautions*.

Admonitions ought to be listened to with sorrowful attention ; *warnings* should make a deep and lasting impression ; *cautions* should be borne in mind : but *admonitions* are too often rejected, *warnings* despised, and *cautions* slighted.

At the same time that I am talking of the cruelty of urging people's faults with severity. I cannot but bewail some which men are guilty of for want of *admonition*. STEELE.

Not e'en Philander had bespoke his shroud,
Nor had he cause—a *warning* was denied. YOUNG.

You *caution'd* me against their charms,
But never gave me equal arms ;
Your lessons sound the weakest part,
Aim'd at the head, but reach'd the heart. SWIFT.

TO ADORE, WORSHIP.

ADORE, in French *adorer*, Latin *adoro*, that is *ad* and *oro* to pray to.

WORSHIP, in Saxon *weorthscype*, is contracted from *worthship*, implying either the object that is worth, or the

worth itself ; whence it has been employed to designate the action of doing suitable homage to the object which has worth, and, by a just distinction, of paying homage to our Maker by religious rites.

Adoration is the service of the heart towards a Superior Being, in which we acknowledge our dependence and obedience, by petition and thanksgiving : *worship* consists in the outward form of showing reverence to some supposed superior being. *Adoration* can with propriety be paid only to the one true God ; but *worship* is offered by heathens to stocks and stones.

We may *adore* our Maker at all times and in all places, whenever the heart is lifted up towards him ; but we *worship* him only at stated times, and according to certain rules. Outward signs are but secondary in the act of *adoration* ; and in divine *worship* there is often nothing existing but the outward form. We seldom *adore* without *worshipping* ; but we too frequently *worship* without *adoring*.

Menander says, that " God, the Lord and Father of all things, is alone worthy of our humble *adoration*, being at once the maker and giver of all blessings." CUMBERLAND.

By reason man a Godhead can discern,
But how he should be *worshipp'd* cannot learn. DRYDEN.

TO ADORE, REVERENCE, VENERATE, REVERE.

ADORE, *v.* To *adore*, *worship*.

REVERENCE, in Latin *reverentia* reverence or awe, implies to show reverence, from *revereor* to stand in awe of.

VENERATE, in Latin *veneratus*, participle of *veneror*, probably from *venere* beauty, signifying to hold in very high esteem for its superior qualities.

REVERE is another form of the same verb.

Adoration has been before considered only in relation to our Maker ; it is here employed in an improper and extended application to express in the strongest possible manner the devotion of the mind towards sensible objects.

Reverence is equally engendered by the contemplation of superiority in a

site principles interrupt the harmony of society.

The periodical winds which were then set in were distinctly *adverse* to the course which Pizarro proposed to steer. ROBERTSON.

As I should be loth to offer none but instances of the abuse of prosperity, I am happy in recollecting one very singular example of the contrary sort. CUMBERLAND.

And as Ægeon, when with heav'n he strove,
Stood opposite in arms to mighty Jove. DRYDEN.

ADVERSE, INIMICAL, HOSTILE, REPUGNANT.

ADVERSE, *v. Adverse*.

INIMICAL, from the Latin *inimicus* an enemy, signifies belonging to an enemy.

HOSTILE, in Latin *hostilis*, from *hostis* an enemy, signifies the same.

REPUGNANT, in Latin *repugnans*, from *repugna*, or *re* and *pugno* to fight against, signifies warring with.

Adverse may be applied to either persons or things; *inimical* and *hostile* to persons or things personal; *repugnant* to things only: a person is *adverse* or a thing is *adverse* to an object; a person, or what is personal, is either *inimical* or *hostile* to an object; one thing is *repugnant* to another. We are *adverse* to a proposition; or circumstances are *adverse* to our advancement. Partizans are *inimical* to the proceedings of government, and *hostile* to the possessors of power. Slavery is *repugnant* to the mild temper of christianity.

Adverse expresses simple dissent or opposition; *inimical* either an acrimonious spirit or a tendency to injure; *hostile* a determined resistance; *repugnant* a direct relation of variance. Those who are *adverse* to any undertaking will not be likely to use the endeavours which are essential to ensure its success. Those who dissent from the establishment, are *inimical* to its forms, its discipline or its doctrine: many of them are so *hostile* to it as to aim at its subversion. The restraints which it imposes on the wandering and licentious imagination is *repugnant* to the temper of their minds.

Sickness is *adverse* to the improvement of youth. The dissensions in the Christian world are *inimical* to the interests of religion, and tend to produce many *hostile* measures. De-

mocracy is *inimical* to good order, the fomentor of *hostile* parties, and *repugnant* to every sound principle of civil society.

Only two soldiers were killed on the side of Cortes, and two officers with fifteen privates of the *adverse* faction. ROBERTSON.

God hath shown himself to be favourable to virtue, and *inimical* to vice and guilt. BLAIR.
Then with a purple veil involve your eyes,
Lest *hostile* faces blast the sacrifice. DRYDEN.

The exorbitant jurisdiction of the (Scotch) ecclesiastical courts were founded on maxims *repugnant* to justice. ROBERTSON.

ADVERSE, AVERSE.

ADVERSE (*v. Adverse*), signifying turned against or over against, denotes simply opposition of situation. AVERSE, from *a* and *versus*, signifying turned from or away from, denotes an active removal or separation from. *Adverse* is therefore as applicable to inanimate as to animate objects, *averse* only to animate objects. When applied to conscious agents *adverse* refers to matters of opinion and sentiment, *averse* to those affecting. We are *adverse* to that which we think wrong; we are *averse* to that which opposes our inclinations, our habits, or our interests. Sectarians profess to be *adverse* to the doctrines and discipline of the establishment, but the greater part of them are still more *averse* to the wholesome restraints which it imposes on the imagination.

Before you was a tyrant I was your friend, and am now no otherwise your enemy than every Athenian must be who is *adverse* to your usurpation. CUMBERLAND.

Men relinquish ancient habits slowly, and with reluctance. They are *averse* to new experiments, and venture upon them with timidity. ROBERTSON.

ADVERSITY, DISTRESS.

ADVERSITY, *v. Adverse*.

DISTRESS, from the Latin *distringo*, compounded of *dis* twice, and *stringo* to bind, signifies that which binds very tight, or brings into a great strait.

Adversity respects external circumstances; *distress* regards either external circumstances or inward feelings. *Adversity* is opposed to prosperity; *distress* to ease.

Adversity is a general condition, *distress* a particular state. Distress is

properly the highest degree of adversity. When a man's affairs go altogether contrary to his wishes and hopes, when accidents deprive him of his possessions or blunt his prospects, he is said to be in adversity; but when in addition to this he is reduced to a state of want, deprived of friends and all prospect of relief, his situation is that of real distress.

Adversity is trying, *distress* is overwhelming. Every man is liable to adversity, although few are reduced to distress but by their own fault.

The other extreme which these considerations should arm the heart of a man against, is utter despondency of mind in a time of passing adversity.

SCOTT.

Most men, who are at length delivered from any great distress, indeed, find that they are so by ways they never thought of.

SCOTT.

TO ADVERTISE, PUBLISH.

ADVERTISE, from the Latin *advertito*, compounded of *ad* and *verto* to turn to, signifies to turn the attention to a thing.

PUBLISH, in Latin *publico*, that is, *facere publicum*, signifies to make public.

Advertise denotes the means, and *publish* the end. To *advertise* is to direct the public attention to any event, by means of a printed circular; *publish* is to make known either by oral or a printed communication.

We *publish* by *advertising*, but we do not always *advertise* when we *publish*. Mercantile and civil transactions are conducted by means of *advertisements*. Extraordinary circumstances are speedily *published* in a neighbourhood by circulating from mouth to mouth.

Every man that *advertises* his own excellence should write with some consciousness of a character which dares to call the attention of the public.

JOHNSON.

The criticisms which I have hitherto *published*, have been made with an intention rather to discover beauties and excellences in the writers of my own time, than to *publish* any of their faults and imperfections.

ADAMSON.

ADVICE, COUNSEL, INSTRUCTION.

ADVICE, *v.* To admonish.

COUNSEL, in French *counsel*, Latin *consilium*, comes from *consilio*, compounded of *con* and *salio* to leap together, signifying to run or act in

accordance; and in an extended sense implies deliberation, or the thing deliberated upon, determined, and prescribed.

INSTRUCTION, in French *instruction*, Latin *instructio*, comes from *in* and *struo* to dispose or regulate, signifying the thing laid down.

The end of all the actions implied by these words is the communication of knowledge, and all of them include the accessory idea of superiority, either of age, station, knowledge, or talent. *Advice* flows from superior professional knowledge, or an acquaintance with things in general; *counsel* regards superior wisdom, or a superior acquaintance with moral principles and practice; *instruction* respects superior local knowledge in particular transactions. A medical man gives *advice* to his patient; a father gives *counsel* to his children; a counsellor gives *advice* to his client in points of law; he receives *instructions* from him in matters of fact.

Advice should be prudent and cautious; *counsel*, sage and deliberative; *instructions*, clear and positive. *Advice* is given on all the concerns of life, important, or otherwise; *counsel* is employed for grave and weighty matters; *instruction* is used on official occasions. Men of business are best able to give *advice* in mercantile transactions. In all measures that involve our future happiness, it is prudent to take the *counsel* of those who are more experienced than ourselves. An ambassador must not act without *instructions* from his court.

A wise king will not act without the *advice* of his ministers. A considerate youth will not take any serious step without the *counsel* of his better informed friends. All diplomatic persons are guided by particular *instructions* in carrying on negotiations.

Advice and *counsel* are often given unasked and undesired, but *instructions* are always required for the regulation of a person's conduct in an official capacity.

In what manner can one give *advice* to a youth in the pursuit and possession of pleasure?

SCOTT.

Young persons are commonly inclined to slight the remarks and *counsels* of their elders.

JOHNSON.

Some convey their instructions to us in the best chosen words. ADDISON.

ADVICE, *v.* Information.

TO ADVISE, *v.* To admonish.

ADVOCATE, *v.* Defender.

ÆRA, *v.* Time.

AFFABLE, COURTEOUS.

AFFABLE, in French *affable*, Latin *affabilis*, from *af* or *ad*, and *for* to speak, signifies a readiness to speak to any one.

COURTEOUS, in French *courtois*, from the word court, signifies after the refined manner of a court.

We are *affable* by a mild and easy address towards all, without distinction of rank, who have occasion to speak to us: we are *courteous* by a refined and engaging air to our equals or superiors who address themselves to us. The *affable* man invites to inquiry, and is ready to gratify curiosity: the *courteous* man encourages to a communication of our wants, and discovers in his manners a willingness to relieve them. *Affability* results from good nature, and *courteousness* from fine feeling. It is necessary to be *affable* without familiarity, and *courteous* without officiousness.

After a short pause, Augustus appeared, looking around him with an *affable* countenance.

Whereat the Elin knight with speeches gent
Him first saluted, who, well as he might,
Him fair salutes again, as seemeth *courteous*
knight. WARR.

AFFAIR, BUSINESS, CONCERN.

AFFAIR, in French *affaire*, is compounded of *af* or *ad* and *faire*, in Latin *facio* to make or do, signifying the thing that makes, does, or takes place for a person.

BUSINESS, from *busy* (*v.* Active), signifies the thing that makes or interests a person, or with which he is busy or occupied.

CONCERN, in French *concerner*, Latin *concerno*, compounded of *con* and *cerno* to look, signifies the thing looked at, thought of, or taken part in.

An *affair* is what happens; a *business* is what is done; a *concern* is what is felt. An *affair* is general; it respects one, many, or all: every *business* and *concern* is an *affair*, though not *vice versa*. *Business* and *concern*

are personal; *business* is that which engages the attention; *concern* is that which interests the feelings, prospects, and condition, advantageously or otherwise. An *affair* is interesting; a *business* is serious; a *concern* momentous. The usurpation of power is an *affair* which interests a nation; the adjusting a difference is a *business* most suited to the ministers of religion; to make our peace with our Maker is the *concern* of every individual.

Affairs are administered; *business* is transacted; *concerns* are managed. The *affairs* of the world are administered by a Divine Providence. Those who are in the practice of the law require peculiar talents to fit them for transacting the complicated *business*, which perpetually offers itself. Some men are so involved in the *affairs* of this world, as to forget the *concerns* of the next, which ought to be nearest and dearest to them.

I remember in Tully's epistle, in the recommendation of a man to an *affair* which had no manner of relation to money, it is said, you may trust him, for he is a frugal man. STEELE.

We may indeed say that our part does not suit us, and that we could perform another better; but this, says Epictetus, is not our *business*. ADDISON.

The sense of other men ought to prevail over us in things of less consideration; but not in *concerns* where truth and honour are engaged. STEELE.

TO AFFECT, CONCERN.

AFFECT, in French *affecter*, Latin *affectum*, participle of *afficio*, compounded of *ad* and *facio* to do or act, signifies to act upon.

CONCERN, *v.* *Affair*.

Things *affect* us which produce any change in our outward circumstances; they *concern* us if only connected with our circumstances in any shape.

Whatever *affects* must *concern*; but all that *concerns* does not *affect*. The price of corn *affects* the interest of the seller; and therefore it *concerns* him to keep it up, without regard to the public good or injury.

Things *affect* either persons or things; but they *concern* persons only. Rain *affects* the hay or corn; and these matters *concern* every one more or less.

Affect and *concern* have an analogous meaning likewise, when taken for

Greek *φίλος* dear, signifies the state of holding a person dear.

These words express two sentiments of the heart which do honour to human nature; they are the bonds by which mankind are knit to each other. Both imply good will: but *affection* is a tender sentiment that dwells with pleasure on the object; *love* is a tender sentiment accompanied with longing for the object: we cannot have *love* without *affection*, but we may have *affection* without *love*.

Love is the natural sentiment between near relations: *affection* subsists between those who are less intimately connected, being the consequence either of relationship, friendship, or long intercourse; it is the sweetener of human society, which carries with it a thousand charms, in all the varied modes of kindness which it gives birth to; it is not so active as *love*, but it diffuses itself wider, and embraces a larger number of objects.

Love is powerful in its effects, awakening vivid sentiments of pleasure or pain; it is a passion exclusive, restless, and capricious. *Affection* is a chastened feeling under the control of the understanding; it promises no more pleasure than it gives, and has but few alloys. Marriage may begin with *love*; but it ought to terminate in *affection*.

But thou, whose years are more to mine allied,
No fate my vow'd *affection* shall divide
From thee, heroic youth! DRYDEN.

The poets, the moralists, the painters, in all their descriptions, allegories, and pictures, have represented *love* as a soft torment, a bitter sweet, a pleasing pain, or an agreeable distress.

ADDISON.

AFFECTION, *v.* Attachment.

AFFECTIONATE, KIND, FOND.

AFFECTIONATE, from *affection* (*v.* *Affection*), denotes the quality of having *affection*.

KIND, from the word *kind* kindred or family, denotes the quality or feeling engendered by the family tie.

FOND, from the Saxon *fandian* to gape, and the German *finden* to find or seek, denotes a vehement attachment to a thing.

Affectionate and *fond* characterise feelings; *kind* is an epithet applied to outward actions, as well as inward

feelings: a disposition is *affectionate* or *fond*; a behaviour is *kind*.

Affection is a settled state of the mind; *kindness* a temporary state of feeling, mostly discoverable by some outward sign: both are commendable and honourable, as to the nature of the feelings themselves, the objects of the feelings, and the manner in which they display themselves; the understanding always approves the *kindness* which *affection* dictates, or that which springs from a tender heart. *Fondness* is a less respectable feeling; it is sometimes the excess of *affection*, or an extravagant mode of expressing it, or an attachment to an inferior object.

A person is *affectionate*, who has the object of his regard strongly in his mind, who participates in his pleasures and pains, and is pleased with his society. A person is *kind*, who expresses a tender sentiment, or does any service in a pleasant manner. A person is *fond*, who caresses an object, or makes it a source of pleasure to himself.

Relatives should be *affectionate* to each other: we should be *kind* to all who stand in need of our *kindness*: children are *fond* of whatever affords them pleasure, or of whoever gives them indulgences.

Our salutations were very hearty on both sides, consisting of many *kind* shakes of the hand, and *affectionate* looks which we cast upon one another. ADDISON.

Riches expose a man to pride and luxury, a foolish elation of heart, and too great *fondness* for the present world. ADDISON.

AFFINITY, *v.* Alliance.

AFFINITY, *v.* Kindred.

TO AFFIRM, ASSEVERATE, ASSURE, VOUCH, AVER, PROTEST.

AFFIRM, in French *affirmer*, Latin *affirmo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *firmo* to strengthen, signifies to give strength to what has been said.

ASSEVERATE, in Latin *asseveratus*, participle of *assevero*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *severus*, signifies to make strong and positive.

ASSURE, in French *assurer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *as* or *ad* and *surv*, signifying to make sure.

VOUCH is probably changed from *tau*.

AVÉR, in French *avérer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *a* or *ad* and *verus* true, signifying to bear testimony to the truth.

PROTEST, in French *protester*, Latin *protesto*, is compounded of *pro* and *testor* to call to witness, signifying to call others to witness as to what we think about a thing.

All these terms indicate an expression of a person's conviction.

In one sense, to *affirm* is to declare that a thing is in opposition to denying or declaring that it is not; in the sense here chosen it signifies to declare a thing as a fact on our credit. To *asseverate* is to declare it with confidence. To *vouch* is to rest the truth of another's declaration on our own responsibility. To *aver* is to express the truth of a declaration unequivocally. To *protest* is to declare a thing solemnly, and with strong marks of sincerity.

Affirmations are made of the past and present; a person *affirms* what he has seen and what he sees. *Asseverations* are strong *affirmations*, made in cases of doubt to remove every impression disadvantageous to one's sincerity. *Assurances* are made of the past, present, and future; they mark the conviction of the speaker as to what has been, or is, and his intentions as to what shall be; they are appeals to the estimation which another has in one's word. *Vouching* is an act for another; it is the supporting of another's *assurance* by our own. *Averring* is employed in matters of fact; we *aver* as to the accuracy of details; we *aver* on positive knowledge that sets aside all question. *Protestations* are stronger than either *asseverations* or *assurances*; they are accompanied with every act, look, or gesture, that can tend to impress conviction on another.

Affirmations are employed in giving evidence, whether accompanied with an oath or not: liars deal much in *asseverations* and *protestations*. People *asseverate* in order to produce a conviction of their veracity; they *protest* in order to obtain a belief of their innocence; they *aver* where they expect to be believed. *Assurances* are

altogether personal; they are always made to satisfy some one of what they wish to know and believe. We ought to be sparing of our *assurances* of regard for another, as we ought to be suspicious of such *assurances* when made to ourselves. Whenever we *affirm* any thing on the authority of another, we ought to be particularly cautious not to *vouch* for its veracity if it be not unquestionable.

An infidel and fear?
Fear what? a dream? a fable?—How thy dread,
Unwilling evidence, and therefore strong,
Affords my cause an undesign'd support!
How disbelief *affirms* what it denies! YOUNG.

I judge in this case as Charles the Second
victualled his navy, with the bread which one of
his dogs chose of several pieces thrown before
him rather than trust to the *asseverations* of the
victuallers. STANLEY.

My learned friend *assured* me that the earth
had lately received a shock from a comet that
crossed its vertex. STANLEY.

All the great writers of the Augustan age, for
whom singly we have so great an esteem, stand
up together as *vouchers* for one another's reputation.
ADDISON.

Among ladies, he positively *averred* that nonsense
was the most prevailing part of eloquence,
and had so little complaisance as to say, "a woman
is never taken by her reason, but always by
her passion." STANLEY.

TO AFFIRM, ASSERT.

AFFIRM, *v.* To *affirm*, *asseverate*.

ASSERT, in Latin *assertus*, participle of *asserto*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sero* to connect, signifies to connect words into a proposition.

To *affirm* is said of facts; to *assert*, of opinions: we *affirm* what we know; we *assert* what we believe.

Whoever *affirms* what he does not know to be true is guilty of falsehood; whoever *asserts* what he cannot prove to be true is guilty of folly.

We contradict an *affirmation*; we confute an *assertion*.

That this man, wise and virtuous as he was,
passed always unentangled through the snares of
life, it would be prejudice and temerity to *affirm*.
JOHNSON'S LIFE OF COLLINS.

It is *asserted* by a tragic poet, that "est miser
nemo nisi comparatus,"—"no man is miserable,
but as he is compared with others happier
than himself." This position is not strictly and
philosophically true. JOHNSON.

TO AFFIX, SUBJOIN, ATTACH, ANNEX.

AFFIX, in Latin *affixus*, participle

of *affigo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *figo* to fix, signifies to fix to a thing.

SUBJOIN is compounded of *sub* and *join*, signifying to join to the lower or farther extremity of a body.

ATTACH, *v.* To adhere.

ANNEX, in Latin *annerus*, participle of *annecto*, compounded of *an* or *ad* and *necto* to knit, signifies to knit or tie to a thing.

To *affix* is to put any thing as an essential to any whole; to *subjoin* is to put any thing as a subordinate part to a whole: in the former case the part to which it is put is not specified; in the latter the syllable *sub* specifies the extremity as the part: to *attach* is to make one thing *adhere* to another as an accompaniment; to *anner* is to bring things into a general connexion with each other.

A title is *affixed* to a book; a few lines are *subjoined* to a letter by way of postscript; we *attach* blame to a person; a certain territory is *annexed* to a kingdom.

Letters are *affixed* to words in order to modify their sense: it is necessary to *subjoin* remarks to what requires illustration: we are apt from prejudice or particular circumstances to *attach* disgrace to certain professions, which are not only useful but important: papers are *annexed* by way of appendix to some important transaction.

It is improper to *affix* opprobrious epithets to any community of persons on account of their religious tenets. Men are not always scrupulous about the means of *attaching* others to their interest, when their ambitious views are to be forwarded. Every station in life, above that of extreme indigence, has certain privileges *annexed* to it, but none greater than those which are enjoyed by the middling classes.

He that has settled in his mind determined ideas, with names *affixed* to them, will be able to discern their differences one from another.

LOCKE.

In justice to the opinion which I would wish to impress of the amiable character of Pisistratus, I *subjoin* to this paper some explanation of the word tyrant.

CUMBERLAND.

As our nature is at present constituted, *attached* by so many strong connexions to the world of sense, and enjoying a communication so feeble and distant with the world of spirits, we need fear no danger from cultivating intercourse with the latter as much as possible.

BLAIR.

The evils inseparably *annexed* to the present condition are numerous and afflictive. JOHNSON.

TO AFFLICT, DISTRESS,
TROUBLE.

AFFLICT, in Latin *afflictus*, participle of *affligo* compounded of *af* or *ad* and *fligo*, in Greek *βλιβω* to press hard, signifies to bear upon any one.

DISTRESS, *v.* Adversity.

TROUBLE signifies to cause a tumult, from the Latin *turba*, Greek *ταραχή* or *δορυβή*, a tumult.

When these terms relate to outward circumstances, the first expresses more than the second, and the second more than the third.

People are *afflicted* with grievous maladies. The mariner is *distressed* for want of water in the midst of the wide ocean, or an embarrassed tradesman is *distressed* for money to maintain his credit. The mechanic is *troubled* for want of proper tools, or the head of a family for want of good domestics.

When they respect the inward feelings, *afflict* conveys the idea of deep sorrow; *distress* that of sorrow mixed with anxiety; *trouble* that of pain in a smaller degree.

The death of a parent *afflicts*; the misfortunes of our family and friends *distress*; crosses in trade and domestic inconveniences *trouble*.

In the season of *affliction* prayer affords the best consolation and surest supports. The assistance and sympathy of friends serve to relieve *distress*. We may often help ourselves out of our *troubles*, and remove the evil by patience and perseverance.

Afflictions may be turned to benefits if they lead a man to turn inwardly into himself, and examine the state of his heart and conscience in the sight of his Maker. The *distresses* of human life often serve only to enhance the value of our pleasures when we regain them. Among the *troubles* with which we are daily assailed, many of them are too trifling for us to be *troubled* by them.

We last night received a piece of ill-news at our club which very sensibly *afflicted* every one of us. I question not but my readers themselves will be *troubled* at the hearing of it. To keep them no longer in suspense, Sir Roger de Coverly is dead.

APPELON.

While the mind contemplates *distress*, it i

acted upon and never acts, and by indulging in this contemplation it becomes more and more unfit for action. CRAIG.

AFFLICTION, GRIEF, SORROW.

AFFLICTION, *v.* To afflict.

GRIEF from *grieve*, in German *grämen*, Swedish *gramga*, &c.

SORROW, in German *sorge*, &c. signifies care, as well as sorrow.

All these words mark a state of suffering which differs either in the degree or the cause, or in both.

Affliction is much stronger than *grief*; it lies deeper in the soul, and arises from a more powerful cause; the loss of what is most dear, the continued sickness of our friends, or a reverse of fortune, will all cause *affliction*: the misfortunes of others, the failure of our favourite schemes, the troubles of our country, will occasion us *grief*.

Sorrow is less than *grief*; it arises from the untoward circumstances which perpetually arise in life. A disappointment, the loss of a game, our own mistake, or the negligences of others, cause *sorrow*.

Affliction lies too deep to be vehement; it discovers itself by no striking marks in the exterior; it is lasting, and does not cease when the external causes cease to act: *grief* may be violent, and discover itself by loud and indecorous signs; it is transitory, and ceases even before the cause which gave birth to it: *sorrow* discovers itself by a simple expression; it is still more transient than *grief*, not existing beyond the moment in which it is produced.

A person of a tender mind is *afflicted* at the remembrance of his sins; he is *grieved* at the consciousness of his fallability and proneness to error; he is *sorry* for the faults which he has committed.

Affliction is allayed: *grief* subsides: *sorrow* is soothed.

It is indeed wonderful to consider how men are able to raise *affliction* to themselves out of every thing. ADDISON.

The melancholy silence that follows bereavement, and continues until he has recovered himself enough to reveal his mind to his friend, raises in the spectators a *grief* that is inexpressible.

ADDISON.

The most agreeable objects recall the *sorrow* for her, with whom he used to enjoy them.

ADDISON.

AFFLUENCE, *v.* Riches.

TO AFFORD, YIELD, PRODUCE.

AFFORD is probably changed from *affferred*, and comes from the Latin *affero*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *fero*, signifying to bring to a person.

YIELD, in Saxon *geldan*, German *gelten* to pay, restore, or give the value, is probably connected with the Hebrew *ilad* to breed, or bring forth.

PRODUCE, in Latin *produco*, compounded of *pro* forth and *duco* to bring, signifies to bring out or into existence.

With *afford* is associated the idea of communicating a part, or property of some substance, to a person: meat *affords* nourishment to those who make use of it; the sun *affords* light and heat to all living creatures.

To *yield* is the natural operation of any substance to give up or impart the parts or properties inherent in it; it is the natural surrender which an object makes of itself: trees *yield* fruit; the seed *yields* grain; some sorts of grain do not *yield* much in particular soils.

Produce conveys the idea of one thing causing another to exist, or to spring out of it; it is a species of creation, the formation of a new substance: the earth *produces* a variety of fruits; confined air will *produce* an explosion.

Afford and *produce* have a moral application; but not *yield*: nothing *affords* so great a scope for ridicule as the follies of fashion; nothing *produces* so much mischief as the vice of drunkenness. The history of man does not *afford* an instance of any popular commotion that has ever *produced* such atrocities and atrocious characters as the French revolution.

Religion is the only thing that can *afford* true consolation and peace of mind in the season of affliction, and the hour of death. The recollection of past incidents, particularly those which have passed in our infancy, *produces* the most pleasurable sensations in the mind.

The generous man in the ordinary acceptation, without respect of the demands of his family, will soon find upon the foot of his account that he has sacrificed to fools, knaves, flatterers, or the

deservedly unhappy, all the opportunities of *affording* any future assistance where it ought to be.

STEELE.

Their vines a shadow to their race shall yield,
And the same hand that sowed shall reap the field.

POPE.

Their sharpen'd ends in earth their footing place,
And the dry poles produce a living race.

DRYDEN.

TO AFFORD, SPARE.

AFFORD, *v.* To afford, yield.

SPARE, in German *sparen*, Latin *parco*, Hebrew *perek* to preserve, signifies here to lay apart for any particular use.

The idea of deducting from one's property with convenience is common to these terms; but *afford* respects solely expences which are no more than commensurate with our income; *spare* is said of things in general, which we may part with without any sensible diminution of our comfort.

There are few so destitute that they cannot *afford* something for the relief of others, who are more destitute. He who has two things of a kind may easily *spare* one.

Accept what'er Æneas can afford,
Untouch'd thy arms, untaken be thy sword.

DAYDEN.

How many men, in the common concerns of life, lend sums of money which they are not able to *spare*.

ADDISON.

TO AFFORD, *v.* To give.

AFFRAY, *v.* Quarrel.

AFFRONT, INSULT, OUTRAGE.

AFFRONT, in French *affronte*, from the Latin *ad* and *frons* a forehead, signifies flying in the face of a person.

INSULT, in French *insulte*, comes from the Latin *insulto* to dance or leap against. The former of these actions marks defiance, the latter scorn and triumph.

OUTRAGE is compounded of *out* or *utter* and *rage* or *violence*, signifying an act of extreme violence.

An *affront* is a mark of reproach shown in the presence of others; it piques and mortifies: an *insult* is an attack made with insolence; it irritates and provokes: an *outrage* combines all that is offensive; it wounds and injures. An intentional breach of politeness is an *affrant*: if coupled

with any external indication of hostility it is an *insult*: if it break forth into personal violence it is an *outrage*.

Captious people construe every innocent freedom into an *affront*. When people are in a state of animosity, they seek opportunities of offering each other *insults*. Intoxication or violent passion impel men to the commission of *outrages*.

The person thus conducted, who was Hannibal, seemed much disturbed, and could not forbear complaining to the board of the *affronts* he had met with among the Roman historians.

ADDISON.

It may very reasonably be expected that the old draw upon themselves the greatest part of those *insults* which they so much lament, and that age is rarely despised but when it is contemptible.

JOHNSON.

This is the round of a passionate man's life; he contracts debts when he is furious, which his virtue, if he has virtue, obliges him to discharge at the return of reason. He spends his time in *outrage* and reparation.

JOHNSON.

AFFRONT, *v.* Offence.

AFRAID, FEARFUL, TIMOROUS, TIMID.

AFRAID is changed from *afear'd*, signifying in a state of fear.

FEARFUL, as the words imply, signifies full of fear.

TIMOROUS and TIMID come from the Latin *timidus* fearful, *timor* fear, and *timeo* to fear.

The first denotes a temporary state, the three last a habit of the mind.

Afraid may be used either in a physical or moral application, either as it relates to ourselves only or to others; *fearful* and *timorous* are only applied physically and personally; *timid* is mostly used in a moral sense.

It is the character of the *fearful* or *timorous* person to be *afraid* of what he imagines would hurt himself; it is not necessary for the prospect of danger to exist in order to awaken fear in such a disposition: it is the characteristic of the *timid* person to be *afraid* of offending or meeting with something painful from others; such a disposition is prevented from following the dictates of its own mind.

Between *fearful* and *timorous* there is little distinction, either in sense or application, except that we say *fearful* of a thing, not *timorous* of a thing.

To be always *afraid* of losing life is, indeed.

aggravate, to aggravate, to make more severe, to make more painful.

Aggravate, to make more severe, to make more painful, to make more distressing.

There is a great deal of aggravation in the world.

Butter.

The more we are aggravated, the more we are distressed.

Johnson.

AFTER, BEHIND.

AFTER, *posterior*; **BEHIND**, *posterior*. One man after a person, or stands behind his chair.

After is used either figuratively or literally; behind is used only literally.

Men hunt after amusement; misfortune comes after one another: a garden lies behind a house; a thing is concealed behind a bush.

Good after ill, and after pain delight, Alternate, like the waves of day and night.

Deity.

He led, and close behind him followed she, For such was Prometheus's wretched fate.

Deity.

AGE, *n.* Generation.

AGE, *n.* Time, period.

AGED, *n.* Elderly.

AGENCY, *n.* Action, agency.

AGENT, *n.* Actor.

AGENT, *n.* Minister.

AGENT, *n.* Factor.

TO AGGRAVATE, IRRITATE, PROVOKE, EXASPERATE, TANTALIZE.

AGGRAVATE, in Latin *aggravatus*, participle of *aggravo*, compounded of the intensive syllable *ag* or *ad* and *gravo* to make heavy, signifies to make very heavy.

IRRITATE, in Latin *irritatus*, participle of *irrito*, which is a frequentative from *ira*, signifies to excite anger.

PROVOKE, in French *provoquer*, Latin *provoco*, compounded of *pro* forth, and *roco* to call, signifies to challenge or defy.

EXASPERATE, Latin *exasperatus*, participle of *exaspero*, is compounded

of the intensive syllable *ex* and *aspero* to make sharp, to make things sharp, to make things rough.

TANTALIZE, in French *tantaliser*, Greek *tantalis*, from *Tantalus*, a king of Phrygia, who, having offended the gods, was punished by way of punishment to stand by the side of water with a piece of meat hanging over his head, but of which, as he approached to eat it, it vanished and thence, the term has arisen.

All these words, except the first, refer to the feelings of the mind, and in familiar discourse that also bears the same signification; but otherwise respects the outward circumstances.

The crime of robbery is aggravated by any circumstances of cruelty; whatever comes across the feelings irritates; whatever awakens anger provokes; whatever heightens this anger extraordinarily exasperates; whatever raises hopes in order to frustrate them tantalizes.

An appearance of unconcern for the offence and its consequences aggravates the guilt of the offender: a grating harsh sound irritates if long continued and often repeated: angry words provoke, particularly when spoken with an air of defiance; when to this be added bitter taunts and multiplied provocations, they exasperate: the weather by its frequent changes tantalizes those who depend upon it for amusement.

Wicked people aggravate their transgression by violence: susceptible and nervous people are most easily irritated; proud people are quickly provoked; hot and fiery people are soonest exasperated: those who wish for much, and wish for it eagerly, are oftenest tantalized.

As if nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are continually adding grief to grief, and aggravating the common calamity by our cruel treatment of one another.

He irritated many of his friends in London so much by his letters, that they withdrew their contributions.

The animadversions of critics are commonly such as may easily provoke the sedatest writer to some quickness of resentment.

Opposition retards, censure exasperates, or neglect depresses.

Can we think that religion was designed only for a contradiction to nature; and with the great-

out and most irrational tyranny in the world to
tantalisce ? SOUTH.

TO AGGRAVATE, *v.* *To heighten.*

AGGRESSOR, ASSAILANT.

AGGRESSOR, in Latin *aggressus*, participle of *aggredior*, compounded of *ag* or *ad*, and *gredior* to step, signifies to step up to, fall upon, or attack.

ASSAILANT, from *assail*, in French *assailer*, compounded of *as* or *ad*, and *salio* to leap upon, signifies to leap up or attack any one vehemently.

The characteristic idea of *aggressor* is that of one going up to another in a hostile manner, and by a natural extension of the sense commencing an attack: the characteristic idea of *assailant* is that of one committing an act of violence.

An *aggressor* offers to do some injury either by word or deed; an *assailant* actually commits some violence: the former commences a dispute, the latter carries it on with a vehement and direct attack.

An *aggressor* is blameable for giving rise to quarrels; an *assailant* is culpable for the mischief he does.

Were there no *aggressors* there would be no disputes; were there no *assailants* those disputes would not be serious.

An *aggressor* may be an *assailant*, or an *assailant* may be an *aggressor*, but they are as frequently distinct.

Where one is the *aggressor* and in pursuance of his first attack kills the other, the law supposes the action, however sudden, to be malicious.

JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

What ear so fortified and barr'd
 Against the tuneful force of vocal charms,
 But would with transport to such sweet *assail-*
ants
 Surrender its attention ? MASON.

AGILE, *v.* *Active, Brisk.*

TO AGITATE, *v.* *To shake, agitate.*

AGITATION, EMOTION, TREPIDATION, TREMOR.

AGITATION, in Latin *agitatio*, from *agito*, signifies the state of being agitated.

EMOTION, in Latin *emotio*, from *emotus*, participle of *moveo*, compounded of *e* out of and *moveo* to move,

signifies the state of being moved out of rest or put in motion.

TREPIDATION, in Latin *trepidatio*, from *trepido* to tremble, compounded of *tremo* and *pede* to tremble with the feet, signifies the condition of trembling in all one's limbs from head to foot.

TREMOR, from the Latin *tremor*, signifies originally the same state of trembling.

Agitation refers either to body or mind, *emotion* to the mind only, *trepidation* and *tremor* to the body only.

Agitation of mind is a vehement struggle between contending feelings; *emotion* is the awakening but one feeling; which in the latter case is not so vehement as in the former.

Distressing circumstances produce *agitation*; affecting and interesting circumstances produce *emotions*.

Agitations have but one character, namely that of violence: *emotions* vary with the object that awakens them; they are either *emotions* of pain and pleasure, of tenderness or anger; they are either gentle or strong, faint or vivid.

With regard to the body, an *agitation* is more than a *trepidation*, and that than a *tremor*: the two former attract the notice of the bystander; the latter is scarcely visible.

Agitations of the mind sometimes give rise to distorted and extravagant *agitations* of the body; *emotions* of terror or horror will throw the body into a *trepidation*; those of fear will cause a *tremor* to run through the whole frame.

The seventh book affects the imagination like the ocean in a calm, and fills the mind of the reader without producing in it any thing like tumult or *agitation*. ADDISON ON MILTON.

The description of Adam and Eve as they first appeared to Satan, is exquisitely drawn, and sufficient to make the fallen angel gaze upon them with all those emotions of envy in which he is represented. ADDISON ON MILTON.

His first action of note was in the battle of Lepanto, where the success of that great day, in such *trepidation* of the state, made every man meritorious. WOTTON.

He fell into a universal *tremor* of all his joints, that when going his legs trembled under him. HEAVY.

AGONY, *v.* *Distress.*

AGONY, *v.* *Pain.*

TO AGREE, *v.* *To accede.*

TO AGREE, COINCIDE, CONCUR.

In the former section *agree* is compared with terms that are employed only for things; in the present case it is compared with words as they are applied to persons only.

AGREE implies a general sameness.

COINCIDE, from *co* together and the Latin *incido* to fall, implies a meeting in a certain point.

CONCUR, from *con* together and *carro* to run, implies a running in the same course, an acting together on the same principles.

Agree denotes a state of rest; *coincide* and *concur* a state of motion, either towards or with another.

Agreement is either the voluntary or involuntary act of persons in general; *coincidence* is the voluntary but casual act of individuals, the act of one falling into the opinion of another; *concurrence* is the intentional positive act of individuals; it is the act of one authorizing the opinions and measures of another.

Men of like education and temperament *agree* upon most subjects: people cannot expect others to *coincide* with them, when they advance extravagant positions: the wiser part of mankind are backward in *concurring* in any schemes which are not warranted by experience.

Since all agree, who both with judgment read,
Tis the same sun, and does himself succeed.

TATE.

There is not perhaps any couple whose dispositions and relish of life are so perfectly similar as that their wills constantly *coincide*.

HAWKSWORTH.

The plan being thus concerted, and my cousin's concurrence obtained, it was immediately put in execution.

HAWKSWORTH.

AGREEMENT, CONTRACT, COVENANT, COMPACT, BARGAIN.

AGREEMENT signifies what is agreed to (*vide To agree*).

CONTRACT, in French *contracte*, from the Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho* to bring close together or bind, signifies the thing thus contracted or bound.

COVENANT, in French *covenante*, Latin *conventus*, participle of *convenio*

to meet together at a point, signifies the point at which several meet, that is, the thing agreed upon by many.

COMPACT, in Latin *compactus*, participle of *compingo* to bind close, signifies the thing to which people bind themselves close.

BARGAIN, from the Welsh *bargan* to contract or deal for, signifies the act of dealing, or the thing dealt for.

An *agreement* is general, and applies to transactions of every description, but particularly such as are made between single individuals; in cases where the other terms are not so applicable; a *contract* is a binding *agreement* between individuals; a simple *agreement* may be verbal, but a *contract* must be written and legally executed: *covenant* and *compact* are *agreements* among communities; the *covenant* is commonly a national and public transaction; the *compact* respects individuals as members of a community, or communities with each other: the *bargain*, in its proper sense, is an *agreement* solely in matters of trade; but applies figuratively in the same sense to other objects.

The simple consent of parties constitutes an *agreement*; a seal and signature are requisite for a *contract*; a solemn engagement on the one hand, and faith in that engagement on the other hand, enter into the nature of a *covenant*; a tacit sense of mutual obligation in all the parties gives virtue to a *compact*; an assent to stipulated terms of sale may form a *bargain*.

Friends make an *agreement* to meet at a certain time; two tradesmen enter into a *contract* to carry on a joint trade; the people of England made a *covenant* with King Charles I. entitled the solemn covenant: in the society of Freemasons, every individual is bound to secrecy by a solemn *compact*: the trading part of the community are continually striking *bargains*.

Frog had given his word that he would meet the abovementioned company at the Salutation, to talk of this *agreement*.

ARBUTHNOT'S HISTORY OF JOHN BULL.

It is impossible to see the long scrolls in which every *contract* is included, with all their appendages of seals and attestations, without wondering at the depravity of those beings, who are

be restrained from violation of promise, by such formal and public evidences. JONSON.

These flashes of blue lightning gave the sign
Of covenants broke; three peals of thunder join.
DRYDEN.

In the beginnings and first establishment of speech, there was an implicit compact amongst men, founded upon common use and consent, that such and such words or voices, actions or gestures, should be means or signs whereby they would express or convey their thoughts one to another. BOURN.

We see men frequently dexterous and sharp enough in making a bargain, who, if you reason with them about matters of religion, appear perfectly stupid. LOCKE.

AGRICULTURIST, *v.* Farmer.

TO AID, *v.* To help.

AIM, OBJECT, END.

AIM is in all probability a variation of *home*, in old German *haim*. It is the *home* which the marksman wishes to reach; it is the thing aimed at; the particular point to which one's efforts are directed; which is had always in view, and which every thing is made to bend to the attainment of.

OBJECT is more vague, from the Latin *objectus*, participle of *ob* and *jacio* to lie in the way; it signifies the thing that lies before us; we pursue it by taking the necessary means to obtain it; it becomes the fruit of our labour.

END in the improper sense of *end* is still more general, signifying the thing that ends one's wishes and endeavours; it is the result not only of action, but of combined action; it is the consummation of a scheme; we must take the proper measures to arrive at it.

It is the *aim* of every good Christian to live in peace; it is a mark of dulness or folly to act without an *object*; every scheme is likely to fail, in which the means are not adequate to the *end*.

We have an *aim*; we propose to ourselves an *object*; we look to the *end*. An *aim* is attainable, an *object* worthy, an *end* important.

Cunning has only private, selfish aims, and sticks at nothing which may make them succeed. ADDISON.

We should sufficiently weigh the objects of our hope, whether they be such as we may reasonably expect from them what we propose in their fruition. ADDISON.

Liberty and truth are not in themselves desirable, but only as they relate to a farther end. RUSSELL.

TO AIM, POINT, LEVEL.

AIM, signifying to take aim (*v.* Aim), is to direct one's view towards a point.

POINT, from the noun *point*, signifies to direct the point to any thing.

LEVEL, from the adjective *level*, signifies to put one thing on a level with another.

Aim expresses more than the other two words, in as much as it denotes a direction towards some minute point in an object, and the others imply direction towards the whole objects themselves. We *aim* at a bird; we *point* a cannon against a wall; we *level* a cannon at a wall. *Pointing* is of course used with most propriety in reference to instruments that have points; it is likewise a less decisive action than either *aiming* or *levelling*. A stick or a finger may be *pointed* at a person, merely out of derision; but a blow is *levelled* or *aimed* with an express intent of committing an act of violence.

The same analogy is kept up in their figurative application.

The shafts of ridicule are but too often *aimed* with little effect against the follies of fashion: remarks which seem merely to *point* at others, without being expressly addressed to them, have always a bad tendency: it has hitherto been the fate of infidels to *level* their battery of sneers, declamation, and sophistry against the Christian Religion only to strengthen the conviction of its sublime truths in the minds of mankind at large.

Their heads from aiming blows they bear afar,
With clashing gauntlets then provoke the war.

DRYDEN.

The story silly *points* at you. CUMBERLAND.

He calls on Bacchus, and propounds the prize:
The groom his fellow groom at bats defies,
And bends his bow, and *levels* with his eyes.

DRYDEN.

TO AIM, ASPIRE.

AIM (*v.* Aim) includes efforts as well as views, in obtaining an object.

ASPIRE, from *as* or *ad* to or after and *spiro* to breathe, comprehends views, wishes, and hopes to obtain an object.

We *aim* at a certain proposed point,

by endeavouring to gain it; we *aspire* after that, which we think ourselves entitled to, and flatter ourselves with gaining.

Many men *aim* at riches and honour: it is the lot of but few to *aspire* to a throne.

We *aim* at what is attainable by ordinary efforts; we *aspire* after what is great and unusual.

An emulous youth *aims* at acquiring the esteem of his teachers; he *aspires* to excel all his competitors in literary attainments.

Whether zeal or moderation be the point we *aim* at, let us keep fire out of the one, and frost out of the other. Addison.

The study of those who in the time of Shakspeare *aspired* to plebeian learning was laid upon adventures, giants, dragons, and enchantments. Johnson.

TO AIM, *v.* To endeavour.

AIM, *v.* Tendency.

AIR, MANNER.

AIR, in Latin *aer*, Greek *αἴρ*, comes from the Hebrew *aor*, because it is the vehicle of light; hence in the figurative sense, in which it is here taken, it denotes an appearance.

MANNER, in French *manière*, comes probably from *mener* to lead or direct, signifying the direction of one's movements.

An *air* is inherent in the whole person; a *manner* is confined to the action or the movement of a single limb. A man has the *air* of a common person; it discovers itself in all his *manners*. An *air* has something superficial in its nature; it strikes at the first glance: *manner* has something more solid in it; it develops itself on closer observation. Some people have an *air* about them which displeases; but their *manners* afterwards win upon those who have a farther intercourse with them. Nothing is more common than to suffer ourselves to be prejudiced by a person's *air*, either in his favour or otherwise: the *manners* of a man will often contribute to his advancement in life, more than his real merits.

An *air* is indicative of a state of mind; it may result either from a natural or habitual mode of thinking: a *manner* is indicative of the education; it is produced by external circumstances. An *air* is noble or simple, it

marks an elevation or simplicity of character: a *manner* is rude, rustic, or awkward, for want of culture, good society, and good example. We assume an *air*, and affect a *manner*. An assumed *air* of importance exposes the littleness of the assumer, which might otherwise pass unnoticed: the same *manners* which are becoming when natural, render a person ridiculous when they are affected. A prepossessing *air* and engaging *manners* have more influence on the heart than the solid qualities of the mind.

The *air* she gave herself was that of a romping girl. Steele.

The boy is well fashioned, and will easily fall into a graceful *manner*. Steele.

AIR, MIEN, LOOK.

AIR, *v.* Air.

MIEN, in German *miene*, comes, as Adelung supposes, from *mähen* to move or draw, because the lines of the face which constitute the mien in the German sense are drawn together.

LOOK signifies properly a mode of looking or appearing.

The exterior of a person is comprehended in the sense of all these words.

Air depends not only on the countenance, but the stature, carriage, and action: *mien* respects the whole outward appearance, not excepting the dress: *look* depends altogether on the face and its changes. *Air* marks any particular state of the mind: *mien* denotes any state of the outward circumstances: *look* any individual movement of the mind. We may judge by a person's *air*, that he has a confident and fearless mind: we may judge by his sorrowful *mien*, that he has substantial cause for sorrow; and by sorrowful *looks*, that he has some partial or temporary cause for sorrow.

We talk of doing any thing with a particular *air*; of having a *mien*; of giving a *look*. An innocent man will answer his accusers with an *air* of composure; a person's whole *mien* sometimes bespeaks his wretched condition; a *look* is sometimes given to one who acts in concert by way of intimation.

The truth of it is, the *air* is generally nothing else but the inward disposition of the mind made visible. Addison.

How sleek their *looks*, how goodly is their *mien*,
When big they strut behind a double chin.

DRYDEN.

Edward Harold and the Duke of Normandy is told so differently by ancient writers, that there are few important passages of the English history liable to so great uncertainty. HUME.

ALL, EVERY, EACH.

ALL is collective; EVERY single or individual; EACH distributive.

All and *every* are universal in their signification; *each* is restrictive: the former are used in speaking of great numbers; the latter is applicable to small numbers. *All* men are not born with the same talent, either in degree or kind; but *every* man has a talent peculiar to himself: a parent divides his property among his children, and gives to *each* his due share.

Harold by his marriage broke *all* measures with the Duke of Normandy. HUME.

Every man's performances, to be rightly estimated, must be compared to the state of the age in which he lived. JOHNSON.

Taken singly and individually, it might be difficult to conceive how *each* event wrought for good. They must be viewed in their consequences and effects. BLAIR.

TO ALLAY, SOOTH, APPEASE, ASSUAGE.

To ALLAY is compounded of *al* or *ad*, and *lay* to lay to or by, signifying to lay a thing to rest, to abate it.

SOOTH probably comes from *sweet*, which is in Swedish *söt*, low German, &c. *süt*, and is doubtless connected with the Hebrew *sot* to allure, invite, compose.

APPEASE, in French *appaier*, is compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *pair* peace, signifying to quiet.

ASSUAGE is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *suage*, from the Latin *suasi* perfect of *suadeo* to persuade, signifying to treat with gentleness, or to render easy.

All these terms indicate a lessening of something painful. In a physical sense a pain is *allayed* by an immediate application; it is *soothed* by affording ease and comfort in other respects, and diverting the mind from the pain. Extreme heat or thirst is *allayed*; extreme hunger is *appeased*.

In a moral sense one *allays* what is fervid and vehement; one *soothes* what is distressed; one *appeases* what is tumultuous and boisterous; one *assuages* grief or afflictions. Nothing is so calculated to *allay* the fervour

of a distempered imagination, as prayer and religious meditation: religion has every thing in it which can *soothe* a wounded conscience by presenting it with the hope of pardon, that can *appease* the angry passions by giving us a sense of our own sinfulness and need of God's pardon, and that can *assuage* the bitterest griefs by affording us the brightest prospects of future bliss.

Without expecting the return of hunger, they eat for an appetite, and prepare dishes not to *allay*, but to excite it. ANDERSON.

Nature has given all the little arts of *soothing* and *blanching* to the female. ANDERSON.

Charon is no sooner *appeased*, and the triple headed dog laid asleep, but Æneas makes his entrance into the dominions of Pluto. ANDERSON.

If I can any way *assuage* private inflammations, or *allay* public ferment, I shall apply myself to it with the utmost endeavours. ANDERSON.

TO ALLEDGE, *v.* To adduce.

ALLEGORICAL, *v.* Figurative.

ALLEGORY, *v.* Parable.

TO ALLEVIATE, RELIEVE.

ALLEVIATE, in Latin *alleviatus*, participle of *allevio*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad*, and *levo* to lighten, signifying to lighten by making less.

RELIEVE, from the Latin *relevo*, is *re* and *levo* to lift up, signifying to take away or remove.

A pain is *alleviated* by making it less burdensome; a necessity is *relieved* by supplying what is wanted. *Alleviate* respects our internal feelings only; *relieve* our external circumstances. That *alleviates* which affords ease and comfort; that *relieves* which removes the pain. It is no *alleviation* of sorrow to a feeling mind, to reflect that others undergo the same suffering; a change of position is a considerable *relief* to an invalid, wearied with confinement.

Condolence and sympathy tend greatly to *alleviate* the sufferings of our fellow creatures; it is an essential part of the Christian's duty to *relieve* the wants of his indigent neighbour.

Half the misery of human life might be extinguished, would men *alleviate* the grievances they lie under, by mutual offices of passion, benevolence, and humanity. AUSTIN.

TO ALLOT, ASSIGN, APPORTION, DISTRIBUTE.

ALLOT is compounded of the Latin *al* or *ad* and the word *lot*, which owes its origin to the Saxon and other northern languages. It signifies literally to set apart as a particular lot.

ASSIGN, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *signo* to sign, or mark to, or for, signifying to mark out for any one.

APPORTION is compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *portion*, signifying to *portion* out for a purpose.

DISTRIBUTE, in Latin *distributus*, participle of *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow or portion out to several.

To *allot* is to dispose on the ground of utility for the sake of good order; to *assign* is to communicate according to the merit of the object; to *apportion* is to regulate according to the due proportion; to *distribute* is to give in several distinct portions.

A portion of one's property is *allotted* to charitable purposes, or a portion of one's time to religious meditation; a prize is *assigned* to the most meritorious, or an honourable post to those whose abilities entitle them to distinction; a person's business is *apportioned* to the time and abilities he has for performing it; his alms are *distributed* among those who are most indigent.

When any complicated undertaking is to be performed by a number of individuals, it is necessary to *allot* to each his distinct task. It is the part of a wise prince to *assign* the highest offices to the most worthy, and to *apportion* to every one of his ministers an employment suited to his peculiar character and qualifications: the business of the state thus *distributed* will proceed with regularity and exactitude.

Every one that has been long dead, has a due proportion of praise *allotted* him, in which, whilst he lived, his friends were too profuse, and his enemies too sparing. ANDERSON.

I find by several hints in ancient authors, that when the Romans were in the height of power and luxury they *assigned* out of their vast domains an island called Anticyra, as an habitation for madmen. STEELE.

Of the happiness and misery of our present condition, part is *distributed* by nature, and

part is in a great measure *apportioned* by ourselves. JOHNSON.

From thence the cup of mortal man he fills,
Blessings to these, to those *distributes* ill.

POPE.

TO ALLOT, APPOINT, DESTINE.

ALLOT, *v.* To *allot*, assign.

APPOINT, in French *appointer*, Latin *appono*, that is, *ap* or *ad* and *pono* to place, signifies to put by.

DESTINE, Latin *destino*, of *de* and *stino*, *sto* or *sisto*, signifies to place apart.

Allot is used only for things, *appoint* and *destine* for persons or things. A space of ground is *allotted* for cultivation; a person is *appointed* as steward or governor; a youth is *destined* for a particular profession. *Allotments* are mostly made in the time past or present; *appointments* respect either the present or the future; *destinations* always respect some distant purposes, and include preparatory measures. A conscientious man *allots* a portion of his annual income to the relief of the poor: when public meetings are held it is necessary to *appoint* a particular day for the purpose: our plans in life are defeated by a thousand contingencies: the man who builds a house is not certain he will live to use it for the purpose for which it was *destined*.

It is unworthy a reasonable being to spend any of the little time *allotted* us without some tendency, direct or oblique, to the end of our existence. JOHNSON.

Having notified to my good friend, Sir Roger, that I should set out for London the next day, his horses were ready at the *appointed* hour.

STEELE.

Look round and survey the various beauties of the globe, which Heaven has *destined* for man, and consider whether a world thus exquisitely framed could be meant for the abode of misery and pain. JOHNSON.

TO ALLOW, GRANT, BESTOW.

ALLOW, *v.* To *admit*, *allow*.

GRANT is probably changed from *guarantee*, in French *garantir*, signifying to assure any thing to a person by one's word or deed.

BESTOW is compounded of *be* and *stow*, which in English, as well as in the northern languages, signifies to place; hence to *bestow*, signifies to dispose according to one's wishes and convenience.

Several persons, out of a salary of five hundred pounds, have always lived at the rate of two thousand.
SWIFT.

The peasant and the mechanic, when they have received the wages of the day, and procured their strong beer and supper, have scarce a wish unsatisfied.
HAWKSWORTH.

I have five hundred crowns,
The thrifty hire I sav'd under your father.
SHAKESPEARE.

Come on, brave soldiers, doubt not of the day;
And that once gotten, doubt not of large pay.
SHAKESPEARE.

TO ALLUDE, REFER, HINT,
SUGGEST.

ALLUDE, in Latin *alludo*, is compounded of *al* or *ad* and *ludo* to sport, that is, to say any thing in a cursory manner.

REFER, in Latin *refero*, signifies to bring back, that is, to bring back a person's recollection to any subject by mentioning it.

HINT may very probably be changed from *hind* or *behind*, in German *hinten*, signifying to convey from behind, or in an obscure manner.

SUGGEST, in Latin *suggestus*, participle of *suggero*, is compounded of *sub* and *gero* to bring under or near, and signifies to bring forward in an indirect or casual manner.

To *allude* is not so direct as to *refer*, but it is more clear and positive than either *hint* or *suggest*.

We *allude* to a circumstance by introducing something collaterally allied to it; we *refer* to an event by expressly introducing it into one's discourse; we *hint* at a person's intentions by darkly insinuating what may possibly happen; we *suggest* an idea by some poetical expressions relative to it.

There are frequent *allusions* in the Bible to the customs and manners of the east. It is necessary to *refer* to certain passages of a work when we do not expressly copy them. It is mostly better to be entirely silent upon a subject, than to *hint* at what cannot be entirely explained. Many improvements have owed their origin to some ideas casually *suggested* in the course of conversation.

Allude and *refer* are always said with regard to things that have positively happened, and mostly such as are indifferent; *hint* and *suggest* have

mostly a personal relation to things that are precarious. The whole drift of a discourse is sometimes unintelligible for want of knowing what is *alluded* to; although many persons and incidents are *referred* to with their proper names and dates. It is the part of the slanderer to *hint* at things discreditable to another, when he does not dare to speak openly; and to *suggest* doubts of his veracity which he cannot positively charge.

I need not inform my reader that the author of *Hudibras* *alludes* to this strange quality in that cold climate, when speaking of abstracted notions clothed in a visible shape, he adds that apt simile,

"Like words congeal'd in northern air."

ANDERSON.

Every remarkable event, every distinguished personage under the law, is interpreted in the New Testament, as bearing some reference to Christ's death.

BLAIR.

It is *hinted* that Augustus had in mind to restore the commonwealth.

CUMBERLAND.

This image of misery, in the punishment of Tantalus, was perhaps originally *suggested* to some poet by the conduct of his patron.

JOHNSON.

TO ALLUDE TO, *v.* To glance at.

TO ALLURE, TEMPT, SEDUCE,
ENTICE, DECOY.

ALLURE is compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad* and *lure*, in French *leurre*, in German *luder*, a *lure*, or *tempting* bait, signifying to hold a bait in order to catch animals, and figuratively to present something to please the senses.

TEMPT, in French *tenter*, Latin *tento* to try, comes from *tentus*, participle of *tendo* to stretch, signifying by efforts to impel to action.

SEDUCE, in French *seducire*, Latin *seduco*, is compounded of *se* apart, and *duco* to lead, signifying to lead any one aside.

ENTICE is probably, *per metathesis*, changed from *incite*.

DECOY is compounded of the Latin *de* and *coy*, in Dutch *koy*, German, &c. *koi*, a cage or enclosed place for birds, signifying to draw into any place for the purpose of getting them into one's power.

We are *allured* by the appearances of things; we are *tempted* by the words of persons as well as the appearances of things; we are *enticed*

ALONE, SOLITARY, LONELY.

ALONE, compounded of *all* and *one*, signifies altogether one, or single; that is, by one's self.

SOLITARY, in French *solitaire*, Latin *solitarius*, from *solus* alone, signifies the quality of being *alone*.

LONELY, or *lone* or *ly*, signifies in the manner of *alone*.

Alone marks the state of a person; *solitary* the quality of a person or thing; *lonely* the quality of a thing only. A person walks *alone*, or takes a *solitary* walk in a *lonely* place.

Whoever likes to be much *alone* is of a *solitary* turn: wherever we can be most and oftenest *alone*, that is a *solitary* or *lonely* place.

Here we stand *alone*,
As in our firm distinct, pre-eminent. YOUNG.

I would wish no man to deceive himself with
opinions which he has not thoroughly reflected
upon in his solitary hours. CUMBERLAND.

Within an ancient forest's ample verge
There stands a *lonely*, but a healthful dwelling,
Built for convenience, and the use of life. ROWE.

ALSO, LIKEWISE, TOO.

ALSO, compounded of *all* and *so*, signifies literally all in the same manner.

LIKEWISE, compounded of *like* and *wise* or manner, signifies in like manner.

TOO, a variation of the numeral *two*, signifies what may be added or joined to another thing from its similarity.

These adverbial expressions obviously convey the same idea of including or classing certain objects together upon a supposed ground of affinity. *Also* is a more general term, and has a more comprehensive meaning, as it implies a sameness in the whole; *likewise* is more specific and limited in its acceptation; *too* is still more limited than either, and refers only to a single object.

"He *also* was among the number" may convey the idea of totality both as respects the person and the event: "he writes *likewise* a very fine hand" conveys the idea of similar perfection in his writing as in other qualifications: "he said *so too*" signifies he said so in addition to the others; he said it *likewise* would imply that he

said the same thing, or in the same manner.

Let us only think for a little of that reproach of modern times, that gulf of time and fortune, the passion for gaming, which is so often the refuge of the idle sons of pleasure, and often *also* the last resource of the ruined. BLAIR.

Long life is of all others the most general, and seemingly the most innocent object of desire. With respect to this, *too*, we so frequently err, that it would have been a blessing to many to have had their wish denied. BLAIR.

All the duties of a daughter, a sister, a wife, and a mother, may be well performed, though a lady should not be the finest woman at an opera. They are *likewise* consistent with a moderate share of wit, a plain dress, and a modest air. STERLE.

TO ALTER, *v.* *To change, alter.*

ALTERCATION, *v.* *Difference, dispute, altercation, quarrel.*

ALTERNATE, *v.* *Successive.*

ALWAYS, AT ALL TIMES, EVER.

ALWAYS, compounded of *all* and *ways*, is the same as under all circumstances, through all the ways of life, that is, uninterruptedly.

AT ALL TIMES, that is, without distinction of time.

EVER, that is, for a perpetuity, without end.

A man must be *always* virtuous, that is, whether in adversity or prosperity; and *at all times* virtuous, that is, in his going in and coming out, his rising up and his lying down, by day and by night; he will then be *ever* happy, that is, in this life, and the life to come.

Human life never stands still for any long time. It is by no means a fixed and steady object, like the mountain or the rock, which you *always* find in the same situation. BLAIR.

Among all the expressions of good nature, I shall single out that which goes under the general name of charity, as it consists in relieving the indigent; that being a trial of this kind which offers itself to us almost *at all times*, and in every place. ADDISON.

Have you forgotten all the blessings you have continued to enjoy, *ever* since the day that you came forth a helpless infant into the world? BLAIR.

TO AMASS, *v.* *To heap.*

TO AMAZE, *v.* *To admire.*

**AMBASSADOR, ENVOY, PLENI-
POTENTIARY, DEPUTY.**

AMBASSADOR is supposed to

heart; you bestow indeed the materials of enjoyment, but you deprive him of the ability to extract. Hence prosperity is so often an equivocal word, denoting merely affluence of possession, but unjustly applied to the possessor.

BLAIR.

Shakespeare is not long soft and pathetic, without some idle conceit or contemptible equivocation.

JOHNSON.

AMENABLE, *v. Answerable.*

TO AMEND, CORRECT, REFORM, RECTIFY, EMEND, IMPROVE, MEND, BETTER.

AMEND, in Latin *emendo*, from *mendo* the fault of a transcriber, signifies to remove this fault.

CORRECT, in Latin *correctus*, participle of *corrigo*, compounded of *con* and *rego*, signifies to set in order, to set to rights.

REFORM, compounded of *re* and *form*, signifies to form afresh, or put into a new form.

RECTIFY, in Latin *rectifico*, compounded of *rectus* and *facio*, signifies to make or put right.

EMEND is the immediate derivative of the Latin *emendo*.

IMPROVE comes from the Latin *in* and *probo* to prove or try, signifying to make good, or better than it was, by trials or after experiments.

MEND is a contraction of *emend*.

BETTER is properly to make better.

To *amend*, *correct*, *rectify*, and *emend*, imply the lessening of evil; to *improve*, *reform*, and *better*, the increase of good. We *amend* the moral conduct, *correct* errors, *reform* the life, *rectify* mistakes, *emend* the readings of an author, *improve* the mind, *mend* or *better* the condition. What is *amended* is mostly that which is wrong in ourselves: what is *reformed* or *corrected* is that which is faulty in ourselves or in others; what is *rectified* is mostly wrong in that which has been done; that which is *improved* may relate either to an individual, or to indifferent objects.

To *mend* and *better* are common terms, employed only on familiar occasions, corresponding to the terms *amend* and *improve*. Whatever is wrong must be *amended*; whatever is faulty must be *corrected*; whatever is altogether insufficient for the purpose

must be *reformed*; whatever error escapes by an oversight must be *rectified*; whatever is obscure or incorrect must be *amended*. What has been torn may be *mended*, and what admits of change may be *improved*, or *bettered*. When a person's conduct is any way culpable, it ought to be *amended*; when his habits and principles are vicious, his character ought to be *reformed*; when he has any particular faulty habit, it ought to be *corrected*; when he commits mistakes he should not object to have them *rectified*: the *emendations* of critics frequently involve an author in still greater obscurity: whoever wishes to advance himself in life must endeavour to *improve* his time and talents.

The first step to *amendment* is a consciousness of error in ourselves; busy politicians are ever ready to propose a *reform* in the constitution of their country, but they forget the *reformation* which is requisite in themselves: the *correction* of the temper is of the first moment, in order to live in harmony with others: in order to avoid the necessity of *rectifying* what has been done amiss, we must strive to do every thing with care: critics *emend* the productions of the pen, and ingenious artists *improve* the inventions of art.

The interest which the corrupt part of mankind have in hardening themselves against every motive to *amendment*, has disposed them to give to contradictions, when they can be produced against the cause of virtue, that weight which they will not allow them in any other case. JOHNSON.

Presumption will be easily corrected; but timidity is a disease of the mind more obstinate and fatal.

JOHNSON.

Indolence is one of the vices from which those whom it once infects are seldom reformed.

JOHNSON.

That sorrow which dictates no caution, that fear which does not quicken our escape, that austerity which fails to *rectify* our affections, are vain and unavailing.

JOHNSON.

Some had read the manuscript, and *rectified* its inaccuracies.

JOHNSON.

That useful part of learning which consists in *emendations*, knowledge of different readings, and the like, is what in all ages persons extremely wise and learned have had in great veneration.

ADDISON.

While a man, infatuated with the promises of greatness, wastes his hours and days in attendance and solicitation, the honest opportunities of *improving* his condition pass by without his notice.

ANDERSON.

contemptuous sense: an indiscriminate and dishonourable attachment to the fair sex characterizes the *amorous* man; an overweening and childish attachment to any object marks the *loving* and *fond* person.

Loving is less dishonourable than *fond*: men may be *loving*; the children and the brutes may be *fond*. Those who have not a well regulated affection for each other will be *loving* by fits and starts; children and animals who have no control over their appetites will be apt to be *fond* of those who indulge them. An *amorous* temper should be suppressed; a *loving* temper should be regulated; a *fond* temper should be checked.

I shall range all old *amorous* dotards under the denomination of grinders. STEELE.

This place may seem for shepherds' leisure made,
So *lovingly* these elms unite their shade.

PHILLIPS.

My impatience for your return, my anxiety for your welfare, and my *fondness* for my dear Ulysses, were the only distempers that preyed upon my life. ADDISON.

AMPLE, SPACIOUS, CAPACIOUS.

AMPLE, in French *ample*, Latin *amplus*, probably comes from the Greek *αμπλός*; full.

SPACIOUS, in French *spacieux*, Latin *spaciosus*, comes from *spatium* a space, implying the quality of having space.

CAPACIOUS, in Latin *capax*, from *capio* to hold, signifies the quality of being able to hold.

These epithets convey the analogous ideas of extent in quantity, and extent in space. *Ample* is figuratively employed for whatever is extended in quantity; *spacious* is literally used for whatever is extended in space; *capacious* is literally and figuratively employed to express extension in both quantity and space. Stores are *ample*, room is *ample*, an allowance is *ample*: a room, a house, a garden is *spacious*: a vessel or hollow of any kind is *capacious*; the soul, the mind, and the heart are *capacious*.

Ample is opposed to scanty, *spacious* to narrow, *capacious* to small. What is *ample* suffices and satisfies; it imposes no constraint: what is *spacious* is free and open, it does not confine: what is *capacious* readily receives and contains; it is *spacious*, liberal,

and generous. Although sciences, arts, philosophy, and languages, afford to the mass of mankind *ample* scope for the exercise of their mental powers without recurring to mysterious or fanciful researches, yet this world is hardly *spacious* enough for the range of the intellectual faculties: the *capacious* minds of some are no less capable of containing than they are disposed for receiving whatever spiritual food is offered them.

The pure consciousness of worthy actions, abstracted from the views of popular applause, is to a generous mind an *ample* reward, HOSKIN.

These mighty monarchies, that had o'erspread
The *spacious* earth, and stretched their con-
q'ring arms

From pole to pole, by ensnaring charms
Were quite consumed. MAY.

Down sunk, a hollow bottom broad and deep
Capacious bed of waters. MILTON.

AMPLE, v. *Plentiful*.

TO AMUSE, DIVERT, ENTERTAIN.

To AMUSE is to occupy the mind lightly, from the Latin *musa* a song, signifying to allure the attention by any thing as light and airy as a song.

DIVERT, in French *divertir*, Latin *diverto*, is compounded of *di* and *verto* to turn aside, signifying to turn the mind aside from an object.

ENTERTAIN, in French *entretenir*, compounded of *entre*, *inter*, and *tenir*, *teneo* to keep, signifies to keep the mind fixed in a thing.

We *amuse* or *entertain* by engaging the attention on some present occupation; we *divert* by drawing the attention from a present object; all this proceeds by the means of that pleasure which the object produces, which in the first case is less vivid than in the second, and in the second case is less durable than in the third. Whatever *amuses* serves to kill time, to lull the faculties, and banish reflection; it may be solitary, sedentary, and lifeless: whatever *diverts* causes mirth, and provokes laughter; it will be active, lively, and tumultuous: whatever *entertains* acts on the senses, and awakens the understanding; it must be rational, and is mostly social. The bare act of walking and changing place may *amuse*; the tricks of animals *divert*; conversation *entertains*. We sit down to a card table to be *amused*; we go to a comedy or pantomime

We cry for mercy to the next amusement.
The next amusement mortgages our fields.

YOUNG.

The stage might be made a perpetual source of the most noble and useful entertainments, were it under proper regulations.

ANDERSON.

When I was some years younger than I am at present, I used to employ myself in a more laborious *diversion*, which I learned from a Latin treatise of exercises that is written with great erudition; it is there called the *exomachia*, or the fighting with a man's own shadow.

ANDERSON.

With great respect to country sports, I may say this gentleman could pass his time agreeably, if there were not a fox or a hare in his country.

STEELE.

Pleasure and recreation of one kind or other are absolutely necessary to relieve our minds and bodies from too constant attention and labour: where therefore public *diversions* are tolerated, it behoves persons of distinction, with their power and example, to preside over them.

STEELE.

Your microscope brings to sight shoals of living creatures in a spoonful of vinegar; but we, who can distinguish them in their different magnitudes, see among them several huge Leviathans that terrify the little fry of animals about them, and take their pastime as in an ocean.

ANDERSON.

ANATHEMA, *v.* Curse.

ANCESTORS, *v.* Forefathers.

ANCIENT, *v.* Former.

ANCIENT, *v.* Old.

ANCIENTLY, *v.* Formerly.

ANCIENT TIMES, *v.* Formerly.

ANECDOTE, STORY.

ANECDOTE, *v.* Anecdote.

STORY, like history, comes from the Greek *ιστοριαν* to relate.

An *anecdote* has but little incident, and no plot; a *story* may have many incidents, and an important catastrophe annexed to it: there are many *anecdotes* related of Dr. Johnson, some of which are of a trifling nature, and others characteristic; *stories* are generally told to young people of ghosts and visions, which are calculated to act on their fears.

An *anecdote* is pleasing and pretty; a *story* is frightful or melancholy: an *anecdote* always consists of some matter of fact; a *story* is founded on that which is real. *Anecdotes* are related of some distinguished persons; displaying their characters or the circumstances of their lives: *stories* from life, however striking and won-

derful, will seldom impress so powerfully as those which are drawn from the world of spirits: *anecdotes* serve to amuse men, *stories* to amuse children.

How admirably Rapin, the most popular among the French critics, was qualified to sit in judgment upon Homer and Thucydides, Demosthenes and Plato, may be gathered from an *anecdote* preserved by Menage, who affirms upon his own knowledge that Le Fevre and Saumar furnished this assuming critic with the Greek passages which he had to cite, Rapin himself being totally ignorant of that language.

WARTON.

This story I once intended to omit, as it appears with no great evidence; nor have I met with any confirmation but in a letter of Farquhar, and he only relates that the funeral of Dryden was tumultuary and confused.

JOHNSON.

ANÉCDOTES, MEMOIRS,
CHRONICLES, ANNALS.

ANECDOTE, from the Greek *ανέκδοτος*, signifies what is communicated in a private way.

MEMOIRS, in French *memoires*, from the word *memory*, signifies what serves to help the memory.

CHRONICLE, in French *chronicle*, from the Greek *χρονος* time, signifies an account of the times.

ANNALS, from the French *annales*, from the Latin *annus*, signifies a detail of what passes in the year.

All these terms mark a species of narrative more or less connected, that may serve as materials for a regular history.

Anecdotes consist of personal or detached circumstances of a public or private nature, involving one subject or more. *Anecdotes* may be either moral or political, literary or biographical; they may serve as characteristics of any individual, or of any particular nation or age.

Memoirs may include *anecdotes*, as far as they are connected with the leading subject on which they treat; *memoirs* are rather connected than complete; they are a partial narrative respecting an individual, and comprehending matter of a public or private nature; they serve as *memorials* of what ought not to be forgotten, and lay the foundation either for a history or a life.

Chronicle and *annals* are altogether of a public nature; and approach the nearest to the regular and genuine his-

ther unconnected with moral displeasure. *Indignation* is a sentiment awakened by the unworthy and atrocious conduct of others; as it is exempt from personality, it is not irreconcilable with the temper of a Christian: a warmth of constitution sometimes gives rise to sallies of *anger*; but depravity of heart breeds *resentment*: unbending pride is a great source of *wrath*; but *indignation* flows from a high sense of honor and virtue.

Moralists have defined *anger* to be a desire of revenge for some injury offered. STEELE.

The temperately revengeful have leisure to weigh the merits of the cause, and thereby either to smother their secret resentments, or to seek adequate reparations for the damages they have sustained. STEELE.

Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, Heavenly Goddess sing.
POPE.

The prophet spoke: when with a gloomy frown
The monarch started from his shining throne;
Black choler fill'd his breast that boll'd with fire,
And from his eye-balls flash'd the living fire.
POPE.

It is easily not to be observed without indignation, that men may be found of minds mean enough to be satisfied with this treatment; wretches who are proud to obtain the privileges of madmen. JOHNSON.

ANGER, CHOLER, RAGE, FURY.

ANGER, *v.* *Anger*, *resentment*

CHOLER, in French *colere*, Latin *cholera*, Greek *χολη*, comes from *χολη* bile, because the overflowing of the bile is both the cause and consequence of *choler*.

RAGE, in French *rage*, Latin *rabies* madness, and *rabio* to rave like a madman, comes from the Hebrew *ragas* to tremble or shake with a violent madness.

FURY, in French *furie*, Latin *furor*, comes probably from *fero* to carry away, because one is carried or hurried by the emotions of *fury*.

These words have a progressive force in their signification. *Choler* expresses something more sudden and virulent than *anger*; *rage* is a vehement ebullition of *anger*; and *fury* is an excess of *rage*. *Anger* may be so stifled as not to discover itself by any outward symptoms; *choler* is discoverable by the paleness of the visage; *rage* breaks forth into extravagant expressions and violent distortions; *fury* takes away the use of the understanding.

Anger is an infirmity incident to human nature; it ought, however, to be suppressed on all occasions: *choler* is a malady too physical to be always corrected by reflection: *rage* and *fury* are distempers of the soul, which nothing but religion and the grace of God can cure.

The maxim which Pericles of Corinth, one of the seven sages of Greece, left as a memorial of his knowledge and benevolence, was *χαλὸν κέσταιν*, be master of thy *anger*. JOHNSON.
Must I give way to your rash *choler*?
Shall I be frighted when a madman stares.
SHAKESPEARE.

Oppose not *rage*, while *rage* is in its force,
But give it way awhile and let it waste.
SHAKESPEARE.

Of this kind is the *fury* to which many men
give away among their servants and dependants.
JOHNSON.

ANGER, *v.* *Displeasure*, *anger*:

ANGLE, *v.* *Corner*.

ANGRY, PASSIONATE, HASTY.

ANGRY, signifies either having *anger*, or prone to *anger*.

PASSIONATE signifies prone to *passion*.

HASTY signifies prone to excess of *haste* from intemperate feeling.

Angry denotes a particular state or emotion of the mind; *passionate* and *hasty* express habits of the mind. An *angry* man is in a state of *anger*; a *passionate* or *hasty* man is habitually prone to be *passionate* or *hasty*. The *angry* has less that is vehement and impetuous in it than the *passionate*; the *hasty* has something less vehement, but more sudden and abrupt in it than either.

The *angry* man is not always easily provoked, nor ready to retaliate; but he often retains his *anger* until the cause is removed: the *passionate* man is quickly roused, eager to repay the offence, and speedily appeased by the infliction of pain of which he afterwards probably repents: the *hasty* man is very soon offended, but not ready to offend in return; his *angry* sentiment spends itself in *angry* words.

It is told by Prior, in a panegyric on the Duke of Dorset, that his servants used to put themselves in his way when he was *angry*, because he was sure to recompense them for any indignities which he made them suffer. JOHNSON.

There is in the world a certain class of mortals

Some would be apt to say, he is a conjurer; for he has found, that a republic is not made up of every body of *animals*, but is composed of men only and not of horses. **STEELE.**

As nature has framed the several species of beings as it were in a chain, so man seems to be placed as the middle link between angels and brutes. **ADDISON.**

Whom e'en the savage beasts had spar'd, they kill'd,
And strow'd his mangled limbs about the field. **DRYDEN.**

TO ANIMATE, INSPIRE, ENLIVEN, CHEER, EXHILARATE.

ANIMATE, in Latin *animatus*, from *animus* the mind, and *anima* the soul or vital principle, signifies in the proper sense to give life, and in the moral sense to give spirit.

INSPIRE, in French *inspirer*, Latin *inspiro*, compounded of *in* and *spiro*, signifies to breathe life or spirit into any one.

ENLIVEN, from *en* or *in* and *live*, has the same sense.

CHEER, in French *chère*, Flemish *cière* the countenance, Greek *χαρά* joy, signifies the giving joy or spirit.

EXHILARATE, in Latin *exhilaratus*, participle of *exhilaro*, from *hilaris*, Greek *ελας* joyful, Hebrew *עלה* to exult or leap for joy, signifies to make glad.

Animate and *inspire* imply the communication of the vital or mental spark; *enliven*, *cheer*, and *exhilarate*, signify actions on the mind or body. To be *animated* in its physical sense is simply to receive the first spark of animal life in however small a degree; for there are *animated* beings in the world possessing the vital power in an infinite variety of degrees and forms: to be *animated* in the moral sense is to receive the smallest portion of the sentient or thinking faculty; which is equally varied in thinking beings: *animation* therefore never conveys the idea of receiving any strong degree of either physical or moral feeling. To *inspire*, on the contrary, expresses the communication of a strong moral sentiment or passion: hence to *animate* with courage is a less forcible expression than to *inspire* with courage: we likewise speak of *inspiring* with emulation or a thirst for knowledge; not of *animating* with emulation or a thirst for knowledge. To *enliven* re-

spects the mind; *cheer* relates to the heart; *exhilarate* regards the spirits, both animal and mental; they all denote an action on the frame by the communication of pleasurable emotions: the mind is *enlivened* by contemplating the scenes of nature; the imagination is *enlivened* by the reading of poetry; the benevolent heart is *cheered* by witnessing the happiness of others; the spirits are *exhilarated* by the convivialities of social life: conversation *enlivens* society; the conversation of a kind and considerate friend *cheers* the drooping spirits in the moments of trouble; unexpected good news is apt to *exhilarate* the spirits.

Through subterranean cells
Where searching sunbeams scarce can find a way,
Earth *animated* heaves. **THOMSON.**

Each gentle beast with kindly warmth she moves,

Inspires new flames, revives extinguished loves.

DRYDEN ON MAY.

To grace each subject with *enlivening* wit.

ADDISON.

Every eye bestows the *cheering* look of approbation upon the humble man. **CUMBERLAND.**

Nor rural sights alone, but rural sounds

Exhilarate the spirit.

COWPER.

TO ANIMATE, *v.* To encourage.

ANIMATION, LIFE, VIVACITY, SPIRIT.

ANIMATION and **LIFE** do not differ either in sense or application, but the latter is more in familiar use. They express either the particular or general state of the mind.

VIVACITY and **SPIRIT** express only the habitual nature and state of the feelings.

A person of no *animation* is divested of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature, which is mind: a person of no *vivacity* is a dull companion: a person of no *spirit* is unfit to associate with others.

A person with *animation* takes an interest in every thing: a *vivacious* man catches at every thing that is pleasant and interesting: a *spirited* man enters into plans, makes great exertions, and disregards difficulties.

A speaker may address his audience with more or less *animation* according to the disposition in which he finds it: a man of a *vivacious* temper diffuses

The blackbird whistles from the thorny brake,
The mallow bullfinch answers from the grove.

THOMSON.

He again took some time to consider, and civilly replied "I do."—"If you do agree with me," rejoined I, "in acknowledging the complaint, tell me if you will concur in promoting the cure."

CUMBERLAND.

Lacedemon, always disposed to control the growing consequence of her neighbours, and sensible of the bad policy of her late measures, had opened her eyes to the folly of expelling Hipplias on the forged responses of the Pythia.

CUMBERLAND.

ANSWERABLE, RESPONSIBLE,
ACCOUNTABLE, AMENABLE.

ANSWERABLE, from *answer*, signifies ready or able to *answer* for.

RESPONSIBLE, from *respondeo* to *answer*, has a similar meaning in its original.

ACCOUNTABLE, from *account*, signifies able or ready to give an *account*.

AMENABLE, from the French *amener* to lead, signifies able or ready to be led.

We are *answerable* for a demand; *responsible* for a trust; *accountable* for our proceedings; and *amenable* to the laws. When a man's credit is firmly established he will have occasions to be *answerable* for those in less flourishing circumstances: every one becomes *responsible* more or less in proportion to the confidence which is reposed in his judgment and integrity: we are all *accountable* beings, either to one another, or at least to the great Judge of all; when a man sincerely wishes to do right, he will have no objection to be *amenable* to the laws of his country.

An honest man will not make himself *answerable* for any thing which it is above his ability to fulfil: a prudent man will avoid a too heavy *responsibility*; an upright man never refuses to be *accountable* to any who are invested with proper authority; a conscientious man makes himself *amenable* to the wise regulations of society.

That he might render the execution of justice strict and regular, Alfred divided all England into counties, these counties he subdivided into hundreds, and the hundreds into tithings. Every householder was *answerable* for the behaviour of

his family and his slaves, and even of his guests if they lived above three days in his house.

HUME.

As a person's *responsibility* bears respect to his reason, so do human punishments bear respect to his *responsibility*; infants and boys are chastised by the hand of the parent or the master; rational adults are *amenable* to the laws.

CUMBERLAND.

We know that we are the subjects of a Supreme Righteous Governor, to whom we are *accountable* for our conduct.

BLAIR.

ANTAGONIST, *v. Enemy.*

ANTECEDENT, PRECEDING,
FOREGOING, PREVIOUS, ANTE-
RIOR, PRIOR, FORMER.

ANTECEDENT, in Latin *antecedens*, that is *ante* and *cedens* going before.

PRECEDING, in Latin *præcedens* going before.

FOREGOING, literally going before.

PREVIOUS, in Latin *prævious*, that is *præ* and *via* making a way before.

ANTERIOR the comparative of the Latin *ante* before.

PRIOR, in Latin *prior*, comparative of *primus* first.

FORMER in English the comparative of first.

Antecedent, *preceding*, *foregoing*, *previous*, are employed for what goes or happens before; *anterior*, *prior*, *former*, for what is, or exists before.

**Antecedent* marks priority of order, place, and position, with this peculiar circumstance, that it denotes the relation of influence, dependance, and connexion established between two objects: thus, in logic the premises are called the *antecedent*, and the conclusion the consequent; in theology or politics, the *antecedent* is any decree or resolution which influences another decree or action; in mathematics, it is that term from which any induction can be drawn to another; in grammar, the *antecedent* is that which requires a particular regimen from its subsequent.

Antecedent and *preceding* both denote *priority* of time, or the order of events; but the former in a more vague and indeterminate manner than the latter. A *preceding* event is that

* Vide Roubaud: "Antérieur, antécédent, précédent."

pounded of *ex* and *culpa*, signifies to get out of a fault.

EXCUSE, in French *excuser*, Latin *excuso*, compounded of *ex* and *causa*, signifies to get out of any cause or affair.

PLEAD, in French *plaider*, may either come from *placitum* or *placendum*, or be contracted from *appellatum*.

There is always some * imperfection supposed or real which gives rise to an *apology*; with regard to persons it presupposes a consciousness of impropriety, if not of guilt; we *apologize* for an error by acknowledging ourselves guilty of it: a *defence* presupposes a consciousness of innocence more or less; we *defend* ourselves against a charge by proving its fallacy: a *justification* is founded on the conviction not only of entire innocence, but of strict propriety; we *justify* our conduct against any imputation by proving that it was blameless: *exculpation* rests on the conviction of innocence with regard to the fact; we *exculpate* ourselves from all blame by proving that we took no part in the transaction: *excuse* and *plea* are not grounded on any idea of innocence; they are rather appeals for favour resting on some collateral circumstance which serves to extenuate; a *plea* is frequently an idle or unfounded *excuse*, a frivolous attempt to lessen displeasure; we *excuse* ourselves for a neglect by alledging indisposition; we *plead* for forgiveness by solicitation and entreaty.

An *apology* mostly respects the conduct of individuals with regard to each other as equals, it is a voluntary act springing out of a regard to decorum, or the good opinion of others. To avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to *apologize* for any omission that wears the appearance of neglect. A *defence* respects matters of higher importance; the violation of laws or public morals; judicial questions decided in a court, or matters of opinion which are offered to the decision of

the public: no one *defends* himself, but he whose conduct or opinions are called in question. A *justification* is applicable to all moral cases in common life, whether of a serious nature or otherwise: it is the act of individuals towards each other according to their different stations: no one can demand a *justification* from another without a sufficient authority, and no one will attempt to *justify* himself to another whose authority he does not acknowledge: men *justify* themselves either on principles of honour, or from the less creditable motive of concealing their imperfections from the observation and censure of others. An *exculpation* is the act of an inferior, it respects the violations of duty towards the superior; it is dictated by necessity, and seldom the offspring of any higher motive than the desire to screen one's self from punishment: *exculpation* regards offences only of commission; *excuse* is employed for those of omission as well as commission: we *excuse* ourselves oftener for what we have not done, than for what we have done; it is the act of persons in all stations, and arises from various motives dishonourable or otherwise: a person may often have substantial reasons to *excuse* himself from doing a thing, or for not having done it; an *excuse* may likewise sometimes be the refuge of idleness and selfishness. To *plead* is properly a judicial act, and extended in its sense to the ordinary concerns of life; it is mostly employed for the benefit of others, rather than ourselves.

Excuse and *plea*, which are mostly employed in an unfavourable sense, are to *apology*, *defence*, and *exculpation*, as the means to an end: an *apology* is lame when, instead of an honest confession of an unintentional error, an idle attempt is made at *justification*: a *defence* is poor when it does not contain sufficient to invalidate the charge: a *justification* is nugatory when it applies to conduct altogether wrong: an *excuse*

* According to the vulgar acceptation of the term, this imperfection is always presumed to be real in the thing for which we *apologize*; but the Bishop of Llandaff did not use the term in this sense when he wrote his "*Apology for the Bible*;" by which, bearing in mind the original meaning of the word, he wished to imply an attempt to do away the alledged imperfections of the Bible, or to do away the objections made to it. Whether the learned Prelate might not have used a less classical, but more intelligible expression for such a work is a question which happily for mankind it is not necessary now to decide.

to fall in, signifies the quality of being so near that it can be laid hold of by the hand.

These words agree in expressing various degrees in the capability of seeing; but *visible* is the only one used purely in a physical sense; *apparent*, *clear*, *plain*, and *obvious*, are used physically and morally; *evident* and *manifest* solely in a moral acceptation. That which is simply an object of sight is *visible*; that of which we see only the surface is *apparent*: the stars themselves are *visible* to us; but their size is *apparent*: the rest of these terms denote not only what is to be seen, but what is easily to be seen: they are all applied as epithets to objects of mental discernment.

What is *apparent* appears but imperfectly to view; it is opposed to that which is real: what is *clear* is to be seen in all its bearings; it is opposed to that which is obscure: what is *plain* is seen by a plain understanding; it requires no deep reflection nor severe study; it is opposed to what is intricate: what is *obvious* presents itself readily to the mind of every one; it is seen at the first glance and is opposed to that which is abstruse: what is *evident* is seen forcibly, and leaves no hesitation on the mind; it is opposed to that which is dubious: *manifest* is a greater degree of the *evident*; it strikes on the understanding and forces conviction; it is opposed to that which is dark.

A contradiction may be *apparent*; on closer observation it may be found not to be one: a case is *clear*; it is decided on immediately: a truth is *plain*; it is involved in no perplexity; it is not multifarious in its bearings: a falsehood is *plain*; it admits of no question: a reason is *obvious*; it flows out of the nature of the case: a proof is *evident*; it requires no discussion, there is nothing in it that clashes or contradicts; the guilt or innocence of a person is *evident* when every thing serves to strengthen the conclusion: a contradiction or absurdity is *manifest*, which is felt by all as soon as it is perceived.

The business men are chiefly conversant in does not only give a certain cast or turn to their minds, but is very *apparent* in their outward behaviour.

BOSWELL.

The *visible* and present are for brutes:
A slender portion, and a narrow bound. YOUNG.

It is *plain* that our skill in literature is owing to the knowledge of Greek and Latin, which that they are still preserved among us, can be ascribed only to a religious regard. BEAKLEY.

It is *obvious* to remark that we follow nothing heartily unless carried to it by inclination.

GAOYE.

It is *evident* that fame, considered merely as the immortality of a name, is not less likely to be the reward of bad actions than of good.

JOHNSON.

Among the many inconsistencies which folly produces in the human mind, there has often been observed a *manifest* and striking contrariety between the life of an author and his writings.

JOHNSON.

APPARITION, *v.* *Vision*.

TO APPEAR, *v.* *To look, appear*.

TO APPEAR, *v.* *To seem*.

APPEARANCE, AIR, ASPECT.

APPEARANCE signifies the thing that *appears*.

AIR, *v.* *Air, manner*.

ASPECT, in Latin *aspectus*, from *aspicio* to look upon, signifies the thing that is looked upon or seen.

Appearance is the generic, the rest specific terms. The whole external form, figure, or colours, whatever is visible to the eye, is its *appearance*: *air* is a particular *appearance* of any object as far as it is indicative of its quality or condition; an *air* of wretchedness or poverty: *aspect* is the partial *appearance* of a body as it presents one of its sides to view; a gloomy or cheerful *aspect*.

It is not safe to judge of any person or thing altogether by *appearances*: the *appearance* and reality are often at variance: the *appearance* of the sun is that of a moving body, but astronomers have satisfactorily proved that it has no motion round the earth: there are particular towns, habitations, or rooms which have always an *air* of comfort, or the contrary: this is a sort of *appearance* the most to be relied on: politicians of a certain stamp are always busy in judging for the future from the *aspect* of affairs; but their predictions, like those of astrologers who judge from the *aspect* of the heavens, turn out to the discomfiture of the prophet.

customer *orders* a commodity from his tradesman: a master gives his *orders* to his servant. To *prescribe* is the act of one who is superior by virtue of his knowledge: a physician *prescribes* to his patient. To *ordain* is an act emanating from the highest authority: kings and councils *ordain*; but their *ordinances* must be conformable to what is *ordained* by the Divine Being.

Appointments are made for the convenience of individuals or communities; but they may be altered or annulled at the pleasure of the contracting parties. *Orders* are dictated by the superior only, but they presuppose a discretionary obligation on the part of the individual to whom they are given. *Prescriptions* are binding on none but such as voluntarily admit their authority: but *ordinances* leave no choice to those on whom they are imposed to accept or reject them: the *ordinances* of man are not less binding than those of God, so long as they do not expressly contradict the divine law.

Appointments are kept, *orders* executed or obeyed, *prescriptions* followed, *ordinances* submitted to. It is a point of politeness or honour, if not of direct moral obligation, to keep the *appointments* which we have made. Interest will lead men to execute the *orders* which they receive in the course of business: duty obliges them to obey the *orders* of their superiors. It is a nice matter to *prescribe* to another without hurting his pride: this principle leads men often to regard the counsels of their best friends as *prescriptions*: with children it is an unquestionable duty to follow the *prescriptions* of those whose age, station, or experience, authorize them to *prescribe*. God has *ordained* all things for our good; it rests with ourselves to submit to his *ordinances* and be happy.

Majestic months

Set out with him to their *appointed* race. DRYDEN.

The whole course of things is so ordered, that we neither by an irregular and precipitate education become men too soon; nor by a fond and trifling indulgence be suffered to continue children for ever. BLAIR.

Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to *prescribe* to his reader a poem or a prospect, where he parti-

cularly dissuades him from knotty and subtle disquisitions. ARNOLD.

It was perhaps *ordained* by providence to hinder us from tyrannizing over one another, that no individual should be of such importance as to cause by his retirement or death any chaos in the world. JOHNSON

TO APPORTION, *v.* To allot.

TO APPRAISE, OR APPRECIATE, ESTIMATE, ESTEEM.

APPRAISE, APPRECIATE, from *apprecio* and *appreciatus*, participle of *apprecio*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *pretio* or *pretium* a price, signifies to set a price or value on a thing.

ESTIMATE comes from *estimatus*, participle of *estimo* to value.

To ESTEEM is a variation of *estimate*.

Appraise and *appreciate* are used in precisely the same sense for setting a value on any thing according to relative circumstances; but the one is used in the proper, and the other in the figurative sense: a sworn *appraiser* *appraises* goods according to the condition of the article, and its saleable property; the characters of men are *appreciated* by others when their good and bad qualities are justly put in a balance. To *estimate* a thing is to get the sum of its value by calculation; to *esteem* any thing is to judge its actual and intrinsic value.

Estimate is used either in a proper or a figurative acceptation; *esteem* only in a moral sense: the expense of an undertaking, losses by fire, gains by trade, are *estimated* at a certain sum; the *estimate* may be too high or too low: the moral worth of men is often *estimated* above or below the reality according to the particular bias of the *estimator*; but there are individuals of such an unquestionable worth that they need only be known in order to be *esteemed*.

To the finishing of his course, let every one direct his eye: and let him now *appreciate* life according to the value it will be found to have when summed up at the close. BLAIR.

The extent of the trade of the Greeks, how highly soever it may have been *estimated* in ancient times, was in proportion to the low condition of their marine. ROBERTSON.

If a lawyer were to be *esteemed* only as he uses his parts in contending for justice, were immediately despicable when he apper-

in a cause which he could not but know was an unjust one, how honourable would his character be. STEELE.

TO APPRECIATE, *v.* *To appraise.*

TO APPREHEND, FEAR, DREAD.

APPREHEND, in French *apprehender*, Latin *apprehendo*, compounded of *ap* and *prehendo* to lay hold of; in a moral sense it signifies to seize with the understanding.

FEAR comes in all probability through the medium of the Latin *pavor* and *vereor*, from the Greek *φύσσω* to feel a shuddering.

DREAD, in Latin *territo*, comes from the Greek *ταράσσω* to trouble, signifying to fear with exceeding trouble.

These words rise progressively in their import; they mark a sentiment of pain at the prospect of evil: but the sentiment of *apprehension* is simply that of uneasiness; that of *fear* is anxiety; that of *dread* is wretchedness.

We *apprehend* an unpleasant occurrence; we *fear* a misfortune; we *dread* a calamity. What is possible is *apprehended*; what is probable is *feared*; the symptom or prognostic of an evil is *dreaded* as if the evil itself were present. *Apprehend* respects things only; *fear* and *dread* relate to persons as well as things: we *fear* the person who has the power of inflicting pain or disgrace; we *dread* him who has no less the will than the power.

Fear is a salutary sentiment in society, it binds men together in their several relations and dependencies, and affords the fullest scope for the exercise of the benevolent feelings; it is the sentiment of a child towards its parent or instructor; of a creature to its Creator; it is the companion of love and respect towards men, of adoration in erring and sinful mortals towards their maker. *Dread* is altogether an irksome sentiment; with regard to our fellow creatures it arises out of the abuse of power: we *dread* the tyrant who delights in punishing and tormenting; his image haunts the breast of the unhappy subject, his shadow awakens terror as the approach of some direful misfortune: with regard to our Maker it springs from a consciousness

of guilt, and the prospect of a severe and adequate punishment; the wrath of God may justly be *dreaded*.

Our natural sense of right and wrong produces an *apprehension* of merited punishment, when we have committed a crime. BLAKE.

That which is *feared* may sometimes be avoided: but that which is regretted to-day may be regretted again to-morrow. JOHNSON.

All men think all men mortal but themselves, *Themselves*, when some alarming shock of fate strikes through their wounded hearts the sudden *dread*. YOUNG.

TO APPREHEND, *v.* *To conceive, apprehend.*

TO APPRIZE, *v.* *To be aware.*

TO APPRIZE, *v.* *To inform.*

TO APPROACH, APPROXIMATE.

APPROACH, in French *approcher*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *proche* or *prope*, signifies to come near.

APPROXIMATE, compounded of *ap* and *proximus* to come nearest or next, signifies either to draw near or bring near.

To *approach* is intransitive only; a person *approaches* an object. To *approximate* is both transitive and intransitive; a person *approximates* two objects.

Lambs push at those that *approach* them with their horns before the first bedding of a horn appears. ANON.

Shakespeare *approximates* the remote and far. JOHNSON.

To *approach* denotes simply the moving of an object towards another, but to *approximate* denotes the gradual moving of two objects towards each other: that which *approaches* may come into immediate conjunction; but bodies may *approximate* for some time before they form a junction, or may never form a junction.

An equivocation *approaches* to a lie. Minds *approximate* by long intercourse.

Comets, in their *approaches* towards the earth, are imagined to cause diseases, famines, and other such like judgments of God. DERHAM.

The *approximations* and recesses of some of the little stars I speak of, suit not with the observations of some very ancient astronomers. DERHAM.

APPROBATION, *v.* *Assent.*

TO APPROPRIATE, USURP,
ARROGATE, ASSUME, ASCRIBE.

APPROPRIATE, in French *approprié*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *propriatus*, participle of *proprio* an old verb, from *proprius* proper or own, signifies to make one's own.

USURP, in French *usurper*, Latin *usurpo* from *usus* use, is a frequentative of *utor*, signifying to make use of as if it were one's own.

ARROGATE, in Latin *arrogatus*, participle of *arrogo*, signifies to ask or claim to for one's self.

ASSUME, in French *assumer*, Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo* to take, signifies to take to one's self.

ASCRIBE, in Latin *ascribo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *scribo* to write, signifies here to write down to one's own account.

The idea of taking something to one's self by an act of one's own, is common to all these terms.

Appropriate respects natural objects: we *appropriate* the money, goods, or lands of another to ourselves when we enjoy the fruit of them. *Usurp* respects power and authority: one *usurps* a government, when one exercises the functions of a ruler without a legitimate sanction. *Appropriation* is a matter of convenience; it springs from a selfish concern for ourselves, and a total unconcern for others: *usurpation* is a matter of self indulgence; it springs from an inordinate ambition that is gratified only at the expense of others. *Appropriation* seldom requires an effort: one *appropriates* that which casually falls into his hands. *Usurpation* mostly takes place in a disorganized state of society; when the strongest prevail, the most artful and the most vicious individual invests himself with the supreme authority. *Appropriation* is generally an act of injustice: *usurpation* is always an act of violence.

Arrogate, *assume*, and *ascribe*, denote the taking to one's self, but do not, like *appropriate* and *usurp*, imply taking from another. *Arrogate* is a more violent action than *assume*, and *assume* than *ascribe*. *Arrogate* and *assume* are employed either in the proper or figurative sense, *ascribe* only

in the figurative sense. We *arrogate* distinctions, honours, and titles; we *assume* names, rights, privileges.

In the moral sense we *arrogate* pre-eminence, *assume* importance, *ascribe* merit. To *arrogate* is a species of moral *usurpation*; it is always accompanied with haughtiness and contempt for others: that is *arrogated* to one's self to which one has not the smallest title: an *arrogant* temper is one of the most odious features in the human character; it is a compound of folly and insolence. To *assume* is a species of moral *appropriation*; its objects are of a less serious nature than those of *arrogating*; and it does less violence to moral propriety: we may *assume* in trifles, we *arrogate* only in important matters. To *ascribe* is oftener an act of vanity than of injustice: many men are entitled to the merit which they *ascribe* to themselves; but by this very act they lessen the merit of their best actions.

Arrogating as an action, or *arrogance* as a disposition, is always taken in a bad sense: the former is always dictated by the most preposterous pride; the latter is associated with every unworthy quality. *Assumption* as an action varies in its character according to circumstances; it may be either good, bad, or indifferent: it is justifiable in certain exigencies to *assume* a command where there is no one else able to direct; it is often a matter of indifference what name a person *assumes* who does so only in conformity to the will of another; but it is always bad to *assume* a name as a mask to impose upon others.

As a disposition *assumption* is always bad, but still not to the same degree as *arrogance*. An *arrogant* man renders himself intolerable to society; an *assuming* man makes himself offensive: *arrogance* is the characteristic of men; *assumption* is peculiar to youths: an *arrogant* man can be humbled only by silent contempt; an *assuming* youth must be checked by the voice of authority.

A conscientious man will *appropriate* nothing to himself which he cannot unquestionably claim as his own. *Usurpers*, who violate the laws both of God and man, are as much to be pitied as dreaded: they generally pay the

Latin *disputo*, compounded of *dis* and *pato*, signifies to think differently, in an extended sense, to assert a different opinion.

DEBATE, in French *debattre*, compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and *battre* to beat or fight, signifies to contend for and against.

To *argue* is to defend one's self; *dispute* to oppose another; to *debate* to *dispute* in a formal manner. To *argue* on a subject is to explain the reasons or proofs in support of an assertion; to *argue* with a person is to defend a position against him: to *dispute* a thing is to advance objections against a position; to *dispute* with a person is to start objections against his positions, to attempt to refute them: a *debate* is a *disputation* held by many. To *argue* does not necessarily suppose a conviction on the part of the *arguer* that what he defends is true; nor a real difference of opinion in his opponent; for some men have such an itching propensity for an *argument*, that they will attempt to prove what nobody denies: to *dispute* always supposes an opposition to some person, but not a sincere opposition to the thing; for we may *dispute* that which we do not deny for the sake of holding a *dispute* with one who is of different sentiments: to *debate* presupposes a multitude of clashing or opposing opinions. Men of many words *argue* for the sake of talking: men of ready tongues *dispute* for the sake of victory: men in parliament often *debate* for the sake of opposing the ruling party, or from any other motive than the love of truth.

Argumentation is a dangerous propensity, and renders a man an unpleasant companion in society; no one should set such a value on his opinions as to obtrude the defence of them on those who are uninterested in the question: *disputation*, as a scholastic exercise, is well fitted to exert the reasoning powers and awaken a spirit of inquiry: *debating* in Parliament is by some converted into a trade; he who talks the loudest, and makes the most vehement opposition, expects the greatest applause.

Of good and evil much they *argued* then.

MARSH.

Thus Rodmond, train'd by this unhallow'd crew,
The sacred social passions never knew:
Unskill'd to *argue*, in *dispute* yet loud,
Bold without caution, without honours proud.

FALCONER.

The murmur ceased: then from his lofty throne
The king invol'd the gods, and thus began:
I wish, ye Latins, what ye now *debate*
Had been resolv'd before it was too late.

DRYDEN.

TO ARGUE, EVINCE, PROVE.

ARGUE, *v.* To *argue*, *dispute*.

EVINCE, in Latin *evinco*, is compounded of *vinco* to *prove* or make out, and *e* forth, signifies to bring to light, to make to appear clear.

PROVE, in French *prouver*, in Latin *probo*, from *probus* good, signifies to make good, or make to appear good.

These terms in general convey the idea of *evidence*, but with gradations: *argue* denotes the smallest degree, and *prove* the highest degree. To *argue* is to serve as an indication amounting to probability; to *evince* denotes an indication so clear as to remove doubt; to *prove* marks an *evidence* so positive as to produce conviction.

It *argues* a want of candor in any man to conceal circumstances in his statement which are any ways calculated to effect the subject in question: the tenor of a person's conversation may *evince* the refinement of his mind and the purity of his taste: when we see men sacrificing their peace of mind and even their integrity of character to ambition, it *proves* to us how important it is even in early life to check this natural and in some measure laudable, but still insinuating and dangerous passion.

It is not the being singular, but being singular for something, that *argues* either extraordinary endowments of nature or benevolent intentions to mankind, which draws the admiration and esteem of the world.

BERKELEY.

The nature of the soul itself, and particularly its immateriality, has I think been *evinced* almost to a demonstration.

AMMON.

What object, what event the moon beneath,
But *argues* or endears an after-scene?
To reason *proves*, or weds it to desire? YOUNG.

ARGUMENT, REASON, PROOF.

ARGUMENT from *argue* (*v.* To *argue*), signifies either the thing that *argues*, or that which is brought forward in *arguing*.

SPRING, in German *springen*, comes from *riener* to run like water, and is connected with the Greek *βρῆναι* to pour out.

FLOW, in Saxon *flowan*, low German *flogan*, high German *fliessen*, Latin *fluo*, &c. all from the Greek *βλῆναι* or *βλῆζειν*, which is an onomatopœia expressing the murmur of waters.

EMANATE, in Latin *emanatus*, participle of *emano*, compounded of *mano* to flow, from the Hebrew *mim* and Chaldee *min* waters, expressing the motion of waters.

The idea of one object coming out of another is expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the circumstances of the action. What comes up out of a body and rises into existence is said to *arise*, as the mist which *arises* out of the sea: what comes forth as it were gradually into observation is said to *proceed*; thus the light *proceeds* from a certain quarter of the heavens, or from a certain part of a house: what comes out from a small aperture is said to *issue*; thus perspiration *issues* through the pores of the skin; water *issues* sometimes from the sides of rocks: what comes out in a sudden or quick manner, or comes from some remote source, is said to *spring*; thus blood *springs* from an artery which is pricked; water *springs* up out of the earth: what comes out in quantities or in a stream is said to *flow*; thus blood *flows* from a wound: to *emanate* is a species of *flowing* by a natural operation, when bodies send forth, or seem to send forth, particles of their own composition from themselves; thus light *emanates* from the sun.

This distinction in the signification of these terms is kept up in their moral acceptation, where the idea of one thing originating from another is common to them all; but in this case *arise* is a general term, which simply implies the coming into existence; but *proceed* conveys also the idea of a progressive movement into existence. Every object therefore may be said to *arise* out of whatever produces it; but it *proceeds* from it only when it is gradually produced: evils are continually *arising* in human society for which there is no specific remedy: in com-

plicated disorders it is not always possible to say precisely from what the complaint of the patient *proceeds*. *Issue* is seldom used but in application to sensible objects; yet we may say, in conformity to the original meaning, that words *issue* from the mouth: the idea of the distant source or origin is kept up in the moral application of the term *spring*, when we say that actions *spring* from a generous or corrupt principle: the idea of a quantity and a stream is preserved in the moral use of the terms *flow* and *emanate*; but the former may be said of that which is not inherent in the body; the latter respects that only which forms a component part of the body: God is the *spring* whence all our blessings *flow*: all authority *emanates* from God, who is the supreme source of all things: theologians, when speaking of God, say that the Son *emanates* from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, and that grace *flows* upon us incessantly from the inexhaustible treasures of Divine mercy.

From roots hard hazels, and from acorns rise
Tall ash, and taller oak that mates the skies.

DRYDEN.

The greatest misfortunes men fall into *arise*
from themselves. STEELE.

Teach me the various labours of the moon,
And whence *proceed* the eclipses of the sun.

DRYDEN.

But whence *proceed* these hopes, or whence this
dread,

If nothing really can affect the dead? JENYNS.

As when some huntsman with a flying spear
From the blind thicket wounds a stately deer,
Down his cleft side while fresh the blood distils,
He bounds aloft and scuds from hills to hills,
Till life's warm vapour *issuing* through the
wound

Wild mountain wolves the fainting beast sur-
round. POPE.

As light and heat *flow* from the sun as their
centre, so bliss and joy *flow* from the Deity.

BLAIR.

Providence is the great sanctuary to the af-
flicted who maintain their integrity; and often
there has *issued* from this sanctuary the most
seasonable relief. BLAIR.

All from utility this law approve,
As every private bliss must *spring* from social
love. JENYNS.

As in the next world so in this, the only solid
blessings are owing to the goodness of the mind,
not the extent of the capacity; friendship here is
an *emanation* from the same source as beatitude
there. POPE.

ARMS, WEAPONS.

ARMS from the Latin *arma*, is now properly used for instruments of offence, and never otherwise except by a poetic license of *arms* for armour; but *weapons* from the German *waffen*, may be used either for an instrument of offence or defence. We say fire *arms*, but not fire *weapons*; and *weapons* offensive or defensive, not *arms* offensive or defensive. *Arms* likewise, agreeably to its origin, is employed for whatever is intentionally made as an instrument of offence; *weapon*, according to its extended and indefinite application, is employed for whatever may be accidentally used for this purpose: guns and swords are always *arms*; stones, and brickbats, and pitchforks, may be occasionally *weapons*.

Louder, and yet more loud, I hear th' alarms
Of human cries distinct and clashing *arms*.

DRYDEN.

The cry of Talbot serves me for a sword;
For I have loaded me with many spoils,
Using no other weapon than his name.

SHAKESPEARE.

ARMY, HOST.

AN ARMY is an organized body of armed men; a HOST, from *hostis* an enemy, is properly a body of hostile men.

An *army* is a limited body; a *host* may be unlimited, and is therefore generally considered a very large body.

The word *army* applies only to that which has been formed by the rules of art for purposes of war: *host* has been extended in its application not only to bodies, whether of men or angels, that were assembled for purposes of offence, but also in the figurative sense to whatever rises up to assail.

No more applause would on ambition wait,
And lying waste the world be counted great:
But our goodnatured act more praises gain,
Than armies overthrown and thousands slain.

JENYNS.

He it was whose galle,
Stir'd up with envy and revenge, deceiv'd
The mother of mankind, what time his pride
Had cast him out of heav'n with all his host
(Of rebel angels).

MILTON.

Yet true it is, survey we life around,
While hosts of ill on every side are found.

JENYNS.

TO ARRAIGN, *v.* To accuse.

TO ARRANGE, *v.* To dispose.

TO ARRANGE, *v.* To class.

TO ARRIVE, *v.* To come.

ARROGANCE, PRESUMPTION.

ARROGANCE, in French *arrogance*, Latin *arrogantia*, signifies the disposition to *arrogate* (*v.* To appropriate).

PRESUMPTION, from *presume*, Latin *presumo*, compounded of *pre* before, and *sumo* to take or put, signifies the disposition to put one's self forward.

Arrogance is the act of the great; *presumption* that of the little: the *arrogant* man takes upon himself to be above others; the *presumptuous* man strives to be on a level with those who are above him. *Arrogance* is commonly coupled with haughtiness; *presumption* with meanness: men *arrogantly* demand as a right the homage which has perhaps before been voluntarily granted; the creature *presumptuously* arraigns the conduct of the Creator, and murmurs against the dispensations of his providence.

I must confess I was very much surprised to see so great a body of editors, critics, commentators, and grammarians, meet with so very ill a reception. They had formed themselves into a body, and with a great deal of *arrogance* demanded the first station in the column of knowledge; but the goddess, instead of complying with their request, clapped them into liveries.

ADDISON.

In the vanity and *presumption* of youth, it is common to allege the consciousness of innocence as a reason for the contempt of censure.

HAWKSWORTH.

TO ARROGATE, *v.* To appropriate.

ART, CUNNING, DECEIT.

ART, in Latin *ars*, probably comes from the Greek *εἰς* to fit or dispose, Hebrew *harcsh* to contrive, in which action the mental exercise of *art* principally consists.

CUNNING is in Saxon *cuning*, German *kennend* knowing, in which sense the English word was formerly used.

DECEIT, in Latin *deceptum*, participle of *decipio* or *de* and *capio*, signifies to take by surprise or unawares.

Art implies a disposition of the

mind, to use circumvention or artificial means to attain an end: *cunning* marks the disposition to practise disguise in the prosecution of a plan: *deceit* leads to the practice of dissimulation and gross falsehood, for the sake of gratifying a desire. *Art* is the property of a lively mind; *cunning* of a thoughtful and knowing mind; *deceit* of an ignorant, low, and weak mind.

Art is practised often in self-defence; as a practice therefore it is even sometimes justifiable, although not as a disposition: *cunning* has always self in view; the *cunning* man seeks his gratification without regard to others; *deceit* is often practised to the express injury of another; the *deceitful* man adopts base means for base ends. Animals practise *art* when opposed to their superiors in strength; but they are not *artful*, as they have not that versatility of power which they can habitually exercise to their own advantage like human beings: animals may be *cunning* in as much as they can by contrivance and concealment seek to obtain the object of desire, but no animal is *deceitful* except man: the wickedest and stupidest of men have the power and the will of *deceiving* and practising falsehood upon others, which is unknown to the brutes.

It has been a sort of maxim that the greatest *art* is to conceal *art*; but I know not how, among some people we meet with, their greatest *cunning* is to appear *cunning*. STEELE.

Cunning can in no circumstance imaginable be a quality worthy a man, except in his own defence, and merely to conceal himself from such as are so, and in such cases it is wisdom. STEELE.

Though the living man can wear a mask and carry on *deceit*, the dying Christian cannot counterfeit. CUMBERLAND.

ART, *v.* Business, trade.

ARTFUL, ARTIFICIAL,
FICTITIOUS.

ARTFUL, compounded of *art* and *ful*, marks the quality of being full of *art* (*v.* *Art*).

ARTIFICIAL, in Latin *artificialis*, from *ars* and *facio* to do, signifies done with *art*.

FICTITIOUS, in Latin *fictitius*, from *finco* to feign, signifies the quality of being *feigned*.

Artful respects what is done with art or design; *artificial* what is done by the exercise of workmanship; *fictitious* what is made out of the mind. *Artful* and *artificial* are used either for natural or moral objects; *fictitious* always for those that are moral: *artful* is opposed to what is *artless*, *artificial* to what is natural, *fictitious* to what is real: the ringlets of a lady's hair are disposed in an *artful* manner; the hair itself may be *artificial*: a tale is *artful* which is told in a way to gain credit; manners are *artificial* which do not seem to suit the person adopting them: a story is *fictitious* which has no foundation whatever in truth, and is the invention of the narrator.

Children sometimes tell their stories so *artfully* as to impose on the most penetrating and experienced. Those who have no character of their own are induced to take an *artificial* character in order to put themselves on a level with their associates. Beggars deal in *fictitious* tales of distress in order to excite compassion.

I was much surprised to see the anti' nest, which I had destroyed, very *artfully* repaired.

ADAMSON.

If we compare two nations in an equal state of civilization, we may remark that where the greater freedom obtains, there the greater variety of *artificial* wants will obtain also.

CUMBERLAND.

Among the numerous stratagems by which pride endeavours to recommend folly to regard, there is scarcely one that meets with less success than affectation, or a perpetual disguise of the real character by *fictitious* appearances.

JOHNSON.

ARTICLE, CONDITION, TERM.

ARTICLE, in French *article*, Latin *articulus* a joint or a part of a member.

CONDITION, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo* to build or form, signifies properly the thing framed.

TERM, in French *terme*, Latin *terminus* a boundary, signifies the point to which one is fixed.

These words agree in their application to matters of compact, or understanding between man and man. *Article* and *condition* are used in both numbers; *terms* only in the plural in this sense: the former may be used for any point individually; the latter for all the points collectively: *article*

have coined the word. Military operations are sometimes considerably forwarded by well concerted and well-timed *stratagems* to surprise the enemy.

An *artifice* may be perfectly innocent when it serves to afford a friend an unexpected pleasure. A *trick* is childish which only serves to deceive or amuse children. *Stratagems* are allowable not in war only; the writer of a novel or a play may sometimes adopt a successful *stratagem* to cause the reader a surprise. *Finesse* is never justifiable; it carries with it too much of concealment and dissimulation to be practised but for selfish and unworthy purposes.

Among the several *artifices* which are put in practice by the poets, to fill the minds of an audience with terror, the first place is due to thunder and lightning. ADDISON.

Where men practice falsehood and show tricks with one another, there will be perpetual suspicion, evil surmises, doubts, and jealousies. SOUTH.

On others practise thy Egyptian arts,
The stratagems and tricks of little hearts
Are lost on me. DRYDEN.

Another can't forgive the paltry arts,
By which he makes his way to shallow hearts,
More pieces of *finesse*, traps for applause. CHURCHILL.

One of the most successful *stratagems*, whereby Mahomet became formidable, was the assurance that impostor gave his votaries; that whoever was slain in battle should be immediately conveyed to that luxurious paradise his wanton fancy had invented. STEELE.

ARTIFICE, v. Artist.

ARTIFICER, v. Artist.

ARTIFICIAL, v. Artful.

ARTISAN, v. Artist.

ARTIST, ARTISAN, ARTIFICER, MECHANIC.

ARTIST is the practiser of the fine arts.

ARTISAN is the practiser of the vulgar arts.

ARTIFICER, from *ars* and *facio*, is the doer or maker according to art.

MECHANIC is an *artisan* in the mechanic arts.

The *artist* ranks higher than the *artisan*: the former requires intellectual refinement in the exercise of his art; the latter requires nothing but to know the general rules of his art. The musician, painter, and sculptor,

are *artists*; the carpenter, the sign painter, and the blacksmith, are *artisans*. The *artificer* is an intermediate term betwixt the *artist* and the *artisan*: manufacturers are *artificers*; and South, in his sermons, calls the author of the universe the great *Artificer*. The *mechanic* is that species of *artisan* who works at arts purely *mechanical*, in distinction from those which contribute to the completion and embellishment of any objects; on this ground a shoemaker is a *mechanic*, but a common painter is a simple *artisan*.

If ever this country saw an age of *artists*, it is the present; her painters, sculptors, and engravers, are now the only schools properly so called. CUMBERLAND.

The merchant, tradesman, and *artisan* will have their profit upon all the multiplied wants, comforts, and indulgences of civilized life. CUMBERLAND.

Man must be in a certain degree the *artificer* of his own happiness; the tools and materials may be put into his hands by the bounty of providence, but the workmanship must be his own. CUMBERLAND.

The concurring assent of the world in preferring gentlemen to *mechanics* seems founded in that preference which the rational part of our nature is entitled to above the animal. BARTHELEMY.

TO ASCEND, v. To arise, rise, mount, climb, scale.

ASCENDENCY, v. Influence.

TO ASCRIBE, ATTRIBUTE, IMPUTE.

ASCRIBE, v. To appropriate.

ATTRIBUTE, in Latin *attributus*, participle of *attribuo*, compounded of *ad* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow upon, or attach to a thing what belongs to it.

IMPUTE, compounded of *im* or *in* and *pate*, Latin *pato* to think, signifies to think or judge what is in a thing.

To *ascribe* is to assign any thing to a person as his property, his possession, or the fruit of his labour; to *attribute* is to assign things to others as their causes; to *impute* is to assign qualities to persons. Milton *ascribes* the first use of artillery to the rebel angels; the loss of a vessel is *attributed* to the violence of the storm: the conduct of the captain is *imputed* to his want of firmness. The *h* of Junius have been falsely *asc*

a condescension which is sometimes not unbecoming, but on ordinary occasion *request* is with more propriety substituted in its place.

Let him pursue the promis'd Latian shoe,
A short delay is all I ask him now,
A pause of grief, an interval from woe.

DRYDEN.

But we must beg our bread in climes unknown,
Beneath the scorching or the frozen zone.

DRYDEN.

But do not you my last request deny,
With you perfidious man your int'rest try.

DRYDEN.

TO ASK, OR ASK FOR, CLAIM,
DEMAND.

ASK, *v.* To ask, beg.

CLAIM, in French *claimer*, Latin *clamo* to cry after, signifies to express an imperious wish for.

DEMAND, in French *demandeur*, Latin *demando*, compounded of *de* and *mando*, signifies to call for imperatively.

Ask, in the sense of *beg*, is confined to the expression of wishes on the part of the *asker*, without involving any obligation on the part of the person *asked*; all granted in this case is voluntary, or complied with as a favour: but *ask for* in the sense here taken is involuntary, and springs from the forms and distinctions of society. *Ask* is here, as before, generic or specific; *claim* and *demand* are specific: in its specific sense it conveys a less peremptory sense than either *claim* or *demand*. To *ask for* denotes simply the expressed wish to have what is considered as due; to *claim* is to assert a right, or to make it known; to *demand* is to insist on having without the liberty of a refusal.

Asking respects obligation in general, great or small; *claim* respects obligations of importance. *Asking for* supposes a right, not questionable; *claim* supposes a right hitherto unacknowledged; *demand* supposes either a disputed right, or the absence of all right, and the simple determination to have: a tradesman *asks for* what is owing to him as circumstances may require; a person *claims* the property he has lost; people are sometimes pleased to make *demands*, the legality of which cannot be proved. What is lent must be *asked for* when it is wanted; whatever has been lost and

is found must be recovered by a *claim*; whatever a selfish person wants, he strives to obtain by a *demand*, whether just or unjust.

Virtue, with them, is only to abstain
From all that nature asks, and covet pain.

JENYNS.

My country *claims* me all, *claims* ev'ry passion.

MARTIN.

Even mountains, vales,
And forests, seem impatient to demand
The promis'd sweetness.

THOMSON.

TO ASK, INQUIRE, QUESTION,
INTERROGATE.

ASK, *v.* To ask, beg.

INQUIRE, Latin *inquiro*, compounded of *in* and *quero*, signifies to search after.

QUESTION, in French *questionner*, signifies to put a question, from the Latin *questio* and *quero* to seek or search, to look into.

INTERROGATE, Latin *interrogatus*, participle of *interrogo*, compounded of *inter* and *rogo*, signifies to *ask* alternately, or an asking between different persons.

We perform all these actions in order to get information: but we *ask* for general purposes of convenience; we *inquire* from motives of curiosity; we *question* and *interrogate* from motives of discretion. To *ask* respects simply one thing; to *inquire* respects one or many subjects; to *question* and *interrogate* is to *ask* repeatedly, and in the latter case more authoritatively than in the former.

Indifferent people *ask* of each other whatever they wish to know: learners *inquire* the reasons of things which are new to them: masters *question* their servants, or parents their children, when they wish to ascertain the real state of any case: magistrates *interrogate* criminals when they are brought before them. It is very uncivil not to answer whatever is *asked* even by the meanest person: it is proper to satisfy every *inquiry*, so as remove doubt: *questions* are sometimes so impertinent that they cannot with propriety be answered: *interrogations* from unauthorized persons are little better than insults.

Upon my *asking* her who it was, she told:
It was a very grave elderly gentleman, - but she
she did not know his name.

ANON.

fraction : if I publish any thing openly that injures his reputation, I am a *defamer* : if I communicate to others the reports that are in circulation to his disadvantage, I am a *slanderer* : if I fabricate any thing myself and spread it abroad, I am a *calumniator*.

It is certain, and observed by the wisest writers, that there are women who are not nicely chaste, and men not generally honest, in all families; therefore let those who may be apt to raise aspersions upon ours, please to give us an impartial account of their own, and we shall be satisfied. STEELE.

What made their civility the more entertaining to all the rest of their sex was, that in their description from each other, neither could fall upon terms which did not hit herself as much as her adversary. STEELE.

What shall we say of the pleasure a man takes in a defamatory libel. Is it not a heinous sin in the sight of God? ANDERSON.

Slander, that worst of poisons, ever finds An easy entrance to ignoble minds. HENRY.

The way to silence calumny, says Blas, is to be always exercised in such things as are praiseworthy. ANDERSON.

TO ASPIRE, *v.* To aim, *aspire*.

TO ASSAIL, *v.* To attack.

ASSAILANT, *v.* Aggressor.

TO ASSASSINATE, *v.* To kill.

TO ASSAULT, *v.* To attack, *assail*.

TO ASSAULT, *v.* To attack, *assault*.

ASSEMBLAGE, *v.* Assembly.

TO ASSEMBLE, MUSTER, COLLECT.

ASSEMBLE, in French *assemble*, Latin *adsimulare*, or *assimulare*, from *similis* like and *simul* together, signifies to make alike or bring together.

MUSTER, in German *mustern* to set out for inspection, in Latin *monstror* to show or display.

COLLECT, in Latin *collectus*, participle of *colligo*, compounded of *col* or *con* and *lego* to bind, signifies to bring together, or into one point.

Assemble is said of persons only; *muster* and *collect* of persons or things. To *assemble* is to bring together by a call or invitation; to *muster* is to bring together by an act of authority, into one point of view, at one time, and from one quarter; to *collect* is to bring

together at different times, and from different quarters: the Parliament is *assembled*; soldiers are *mustered* every day in order to ascertain their numbers; an army is *collected* in preparation for war: a king *assembles* his council in order to consult with them on public measures; a general *musters* his forces before he undertakes an expedition, and *collects* more troops if he finds himself too weak.

Collect is used for every thing which can be brought together in numbers; *muster* is used figuratively for bringing together, for an immediate purpose, whatever is in one's possession: books, coins, curiosities, and the like, are *collected*; a person's resources, his strength, courage, resolution, &c. are *mustered*: some persons have a pleasure in *collecting* all the pieces of antiquity which fall in their way; on a trying occasion it is necessary to *muster* all the fortitude of which we are master.

Assemble all in choir, and with their notes, Salute and welcome up the rising sun. ORWELL.
Oh! thou hast set my busy brain at work!
And now she *musters* up a train of images.

ROWE.

Each leader now his scatter'd force conjoins
In close array, and forms the deep'ning lines;
Not with more ease, the skilful shepherd swain
Collects his flock, from thousands on the plain.

Pope.

TO ASSEMBLE, CONVENE, CONVOKE.

ASSEMBLE, *v.* To assemble, *muster*.

CONVENE, in Latin *convenio*, signifies to come or bring together.

CONVOKE, in Latin *convoco*, signifies to call together.

The idea of collecting many persons into one place, for a specific purpose, is common to all these terms. *Assemble* conveys this sense without any addition; *convene* and *convoke* include likewise some collateral idea: people are *assembled*, therefore, whenever they are *convened* or *convoked*, but not *vice versa*. *Assembling* is mostly by the wish of one; *convening* by that of several: a crowd is *assembled* by an individual in the streets; a meeting is *convened* at the desire of a certain number of persons: persons are *assembled* either on public or private business; they are always *convened* on a public occasion. A

TO ASSERT, MAINTAIN, VINDICATE.

TO ASSERT, *v.* To affirm, assert.

MAINTAIN, in French *maintenir*, from the Latin *manus* and *teneo*, signifies to hold by the hand, that is, closely and firmly.

VINDICATE, in Latin *vindicatus*, participle of *vindico*, compounded of *vin* and *dico*, signifies to pronounce a violent or positive sentence.

To *assert* is to declare a thing as our own; to *maintain* is to abide by what we have so declared; to *vindicate* is to stand up for that which concerns ourselves or others. We *assert* any thing to be true; we *maintain* it by adducing proofs, facts, or arguments; we *vindicate* our own conduct or that of another when it is called in question. We *assert* boldly or impudently; we *maintain* steadily or obstinately; we *vindicate* resolutely or insolently. A right or claim is *asserted*, which is avowed to belong to any one; it is *maintained* when attempts are made to prove its justice, or regain its possession; the cause of the *asserter* or *maintainer* is *vindicated* by another. Innocence is *asserted* by a positive declaration; it is *maintained* by repeated *assertions* and the support of testimony; it is *vindicated* through the interference of another.

The most guilty persons do not hesitate to *assert* their innocence with the hope of inspiring credit; and some will persist in *maintaining* it, even after their guilt has been pronounced; but the really innocent man will never want a friend to *vindicate* him when his honor or his reputation is at stake. *Assertions* which are made hastily and inconsiderately are seldom long *maintained* without exposing a person to ridicule; those who attempt to *vindicate* a bad cause expose themselves to as much reproach as if the cause were their own.

When the great soul buoyed up to this high point,
Leaving gross nature's sediments below,
Then, and then only, Adam's offspring quits
The sage and hero of the fields and woods,
Asserts his rank, and rises into man. YOUNG.

Sophocles also, in a fragment of one of his tragedies, asserts the unity of the Supreme Being.

CUMBERLAND.

I am willing to believe that Dryden wanted

rather skill to discover the right, than virtue to maintain it. JOHNSON.

'Tis just that I should *vindicate* alone
The broken truce, or for the breach atone.

DAYTON.

TO ASSERT, *v.* To affirm, assert.

ASSESSMENT, *v.* Tax.

TO ASSEVERATE, *v.* To affirm.

ASSIDUOUS, *v.* Active, diligent.

ASSIDUOUS, *v.* Sedulous.

TO ASSIGN, *v.* To adduce.

TO ASSIGN, *v.* To allot, assign.

TO ASSIST, *v.* To help.

ASSISTANT, *v.* Coadjutor.

ASSOCIATE, COMPANION.

ASSOCIATE, in Latin *associatus*, participle of *associo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *socio* to ally, signifies one united with a person.

COMPANION, from company, signifies one that bears company (*v.* To accompany).

Associates are habitually together: *companions* are only occasionally in company.

As our habits are formed from our *associates*, we ought to be particular in our choice of them: as our *companions* contribute much to our enjoyments, we ought to choose such as are suitable to ourselves.

Many men may be admitted as *companions*, who would not altogether befit as *associates*.

We see many struggling single about the world, unhappy for want of an *associate*, and pining with the necessity of confining their sentiments to their own bosoms. JOHNSON.

There is a degree of want by which the freedom of agency is almost destroyed, and long association with fortuitous *companions* will at last relax the strictness of truth, and abate the fervor of sincerity. JOHNSON.

An *associate* may take part with us in some business, and share with us in the labour: a *companion* takes part with us in some concern, and shares with us in the pleasure or the pain.

Addison contributed more than a fourth part (of the last volume of the Spectator), and the other contributors are by no means unworthy of appearing as his *associates*. JOHNSON.

Thus while the cordage stretch'd ashore may guide

Our brave *companions* thro' the swelling tide;

seek a *shelter*. The fatigues and toils of life make us seek a *retreat*.

It is the part of a Christian to afford an *asylum* to the helpless orphan and widow. The terrified passenger takes refuge in the first house he comes to, when assailed by an evil disposed mob. The vessel shattered in a storm takes shelter in the nearest haven. The man of business, wearied with the anxieties and cares of the world, disengages himself from the whole, and seeks a *retreat* suited to his circumstances.

The adventurer knows he has not far to go before he will meet with some fortress that has been seized by sophistry for the *asylum* of error.

HAWKSWORTH.

Superstition, now retiring from Rome, may yet find refuge in the mountains of Tibet.

CUMBERLAND.

In rapt gaze
The cattle stand, and on the scowling heavens
Cast a deploring eye, by man forsaken;
Who to the crowded cottage hies his fast,
Or seeks the shelter of the downward cave.

THOMSON.

For this, this only favor let me sue,
If pity can to conquer'd foes be due:
Rescue it not, but let my body have
The last relief of human kind, a grave.

DRYDEN.

AT ALL TIMES, *v.* *Always*.

AT LAST, *v.* *Lastly*.

AT LENGTH, *v.* *Lastly*.

TO ATONE FOR, EXPIATE.

ATONE, or at one, signifies to be at peace or good friends.

EXPIATE, in Latin *expiatorius*, participle of *expiare*, compounded of *ex* and *pio*, signifies to put out or make clear by an act of piety.

Both these terms express a satisfaction for an offence; but *atone* is general, *expiate* is particular. We may *atone* for a fault by any species of suffering; we *expiate* a crime only by suffering a legal punishment. A female often sufficiently *atones* for her violation of chastity by the misery she entails on herself; there are too many unfortunate wretches in England who *expiate* their crimes on a gallows.

Neither *atonement* nor *expiation* always necessarily require punishment or even suffering from the offender. The nature of the *atonement* depends on the will of the individual who is offended;

expiations are frequently made by means of performing certain religious rites or acts of piety. Offences between man and man are sometimes *atoned* for by an acknowledgment of error; but offences towards God require an *expiatory* sacrifice, which our Saviour has been pleased to make of himself, that we, through Him, might become partakers of eternal life. *Expiation*, therefore, in the religious sense, is to *atonement* as the means to the end: *atonement* is often obtained by an *expiation*, but there may be *expiations* where there is no *atonement*.

Atonement replaces in a state of favor; *expiation* produces only a real or supposed exemption from sin and its consequences. Among the Jews and heathens there was *expiation*, but no *atonement*; under the Christian dispensation there is *atonement* as well as *expiation*.

O let the blood, already spilt, *atone*
For the past crimes of cur'd Laomedon.

DRYDEN.

I would earnestly desire the story-teller to consider, that no wit or mirth at the end of a story can *atone* for the half hour that has been lost before they come at it.

STEELE.

How sacred ought kings' lives be held,
When but the death of one
Demands an empire's blood for *expiation*. LAM.

TO ATTACH, *v.* *To affix*.

TO ATTACH, *v.* *To adhere*.

ATTACHMENT, AFFECTION,
INCLINATION.

ATTACHMENT (*v.* *To adhere*) respects persons and things: AFFECTION (*v.* *Affection*) regards persons only: INCLINATION has respect to things mostly.

Attachment, as it regards persons, is not so powerful or solid as *affection*.

Children are *attached* to those who will minister to their gratifications; they have an *affection* for their nearest and dearest relatives.

Attachment is sometimes a tender sentiment between the persons of different sexes; *affection* is an affair of the heart without distinction of sex.

The passing *attachments* of young people are seldom entitled to serious notice; although sometimes they may ripen by long intercourse into a land-

able and steady *affection*. Nothing is so delightful as to see *affection* among brothers and sisters.

Attachment, as it respects things, is more powerful than *inclination*; the latter is a rising sentiment, the forerunner of *attachment*, which is positive and fixed.

We strive to obtain that to which we are *attached*; but an *inclination* seldom leads to any effort for possession.

Little minds are always betraying their *attachment* to trifles. It is the character of indifference not to show an *inclination* to any thing.

Attachments are formed; *inclinations* arise of themselves.

Interest, similarity of character, or habit, give rise to *attachment*; a natural warmth of temper gives birth to various *inclinations*.

Suppress the first *inclination* to gaming, lest it grows into an *attachment*.

Though devoted to the study of philosophy, and a great master in the early science of the times, Solon mixed with cheerfulness in society, and did not hold back from those tender ties and *attachments* which connect a man to the world.

CUMBERLAND.

When I was sent to school, the gaiety of my look, and the liveliness of my loquacity, soon gained me admission to hearts not yet fortified against *affection* by artifice or interest.

JOHNSON.

I am glad that he whom I must have loved from duty, whatever he had been, is such a one as I can love from *inclination*.

STEELE.

TO ATTACK, ASSAIL, ASSAULT, ENCOUNTER.

ATTACK, in French *attaquer*, changed from *attacher*, in Latin *attac-tum*, participle of *attingo*, signifies to bring into close contact.

ASSAIL, ASSAULT, in French *assailir*, Latin *assilio*, *assaltum*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *salio*, signifies to leap upon.

ENCOUNTER, in French *rencontre*, compounded of *en* or *in* and *contre*, in Latin *contra* against, signifies to run or come against.

Attack is the generic, the rest are specific terms. To *attack* is to make an approach in order to do some violence to the person; to *assail* or *assault* is to make a sudden and vehement *attack*; to *encounter* is to meet

the *attack* of another. One *attacks* by simply offering violence without necessarily producing an effect; one *assails* by means of missile weapons; one *assaults* by direct personal violence; one *encounters* by opposing violence to violence.

Men and animals *attack* or *encounter*; men only, in the literal sense, *assail* or *assault*. Animals *attack* each other with the weapons nature has bestowed upon them: those who provoke a multitude may expect to have their houses or windows *assailed* with stones, and their persons *assaulted*: it is ridiculous to attempt to *encounter* those who are superior in strength and prowess.

They are all used figuratively. Men *attack* with reproaches or censures; they *assail* with abuse; they are *assaulted* by temptations; they *encounter* opposition and difficulties. A fever *attacks*; horrid shrieks *assail* the ear; dangers are *encountered*. The reputations of men in public life are often wantonly *attacked*; they are *assailed* in every direction by the murmurs and complaints of the discontented; they often *encounter* the obstacles which party spirit throws in the way, without reaping any solid advantage to themselves.

The women might possibly have carried this Gothic building higher, had not a famous monk, Thomas Conecte by name, *attached* it with great zeal and resolution.

ADDISON.

Not truly penitent, but chief to try
Her husband, how far urg'd his patience bore,
His virtue or weakness which way to *assail*.

MILTON.

It is sufficient that you are able to *encounter* the temptations which now *assault* you: when God sends trials he may send strength.

TAYLOR.

ATTACK, ASSAULT, ENCOUNTER, ONSET, CHARGE.

ATTACK, ASSAULT, ENCOUNTER (*v. To attack*), denote the act of *attacking*, *assaulting*, *encountering*.

ONSET signifies a setting on or to, a commencing.

CHARGE (*v. To accuse*) signifies pressing upon.

An *attack* and *assault* may be made upon an unresisting object: *encounter*, *onset*, and *charge*, require at least two opposing parties. An *attack* may be slight or indirect; an *assault* must always be direct and mostly vigorous.

An *attack* upon a town need not be attended with any injury to the walls or inhabitants; but an *assault* is commonly conducted so as to affect its capture. *Attacks* are made by robbers upon the person or property of another; *assaults* upon the person only.

An *encounter* generally respects an informal casual meeting between single individuals; *onset* and *charge* a regular *attack* between contending armies; *onset* is employed for the commencement of the battle; *charge* for an *attack* from a particular quarter. When knight-errantry was in vogue, *encounters* were perpetually taking place between the knights and their antagonists, who often existed only in the imagination of the combatants: *encounters* were, however, sometimes fierce and bloody, when neither party would yield to the other while he had the power of resistance. The French are said to make impetuous *onsets*, but not to withstand a continued *attack* with the same perseverance and steadiness as the English. A furious and well-directed *charge* from the cavalry will sometimes decide the fortune of the day.

There is one species of diversion which has not been generally condemned, though it is produced by an *attack* upon those who have not voluntarily entered the lists; who find themselves buffeted in the dark, and have neither means of defence nor possibility of advantage.

HAWKESWORTH.

We do not find the meekness of a lamb in a creature so armed for battle and assault as the lion.

ADDISON.

And such a frown

Each cast at th' other, as when two black clouds,
With heav'n's artillery fraught, come rattling on
Hovering a space, till winds the signal blow,
To join their dark encounter in mid air.

MILTON.

Onsets in love seem best like those in war,
Fierce, resolute, and done with all the force.

TATE.

O my Ontario! I'm all on fire;
My soul is up in arms, ready to charge,
And bear amidst the foe with conqu'ring troops.

CONGREVE.

TO ATTACK, *v.* To impugn.

TO ATTAIN, *v.* To acquire,
attain.

ATTEMPT, TRIAL, ENDEAVOUR,
ESSAY, EFFORT.

ATTEMPT, in French *attenter*,

Latin *attento*, from *at* or *ad* and *tento*, signifies to *try* at a thing.

TRIAL from *try*, in French *tenter*, Hebrew *tur* to stretch, signifies to stretch the power.

ENDEAVOUR, compounded of *en* and the French *devoir* to owe, signifies to try according to one's duty.

ESSAY, in French *essayer*, comes probably from the German *ersuchen*, compounded of *er* and *suchen* to seek, written in old German *suahhen*, and is doubtless connected with *sehen* to see or look after, signifying to aspire after, to look up to.

EFFORT, in French *effort*, from the Latin *effert*, present tense of *effero*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *fero*, signifies a bringing out or calling forth the strength.

To *attempt* is to set about a thing with a view of affecting it; to *try* is to set about a thing with a view of seeing the result. An *attempt* respects the action with its object; a *trial* is the exercise of power. We always act when we *attempt*; we use the senses and the understanding when we *try*. We *attempt* by *trying*, but we may *try* without *attempting*: when a thief *attempts* to break into a house he first *tries* the locks and fastenings to see where he can most easily gain admittance.

Men *attempt* to remove evils; they *try* experiments. *Attempts* are perpetually made by quacks, whether in medicine, politics, or religion, to recommend some scheme of their own to the notice of the public; which are often nothing more than *trials* of skill to see who can most effectually impose on the credulity of mankind. Spirited people make *attempts*; persevering people make *trials*; players *attempt* to perform different parts; and *try* to gain applause.

An *endeavour* is a continued *attempt*. *Attempts* may be fruitless; *trials* may be vain; *endeavours*, though unavailing, may be well meant. Many *attempts* are made which exceed the abilities of the *attempter*; *trials* are made in matters of speculation, the results of which are uncertain; *endeavours* are made in the moral concerns of life. People *attempt* to write books; they *try* various methods; and *endeavour* to obtain a livelihood.

Attractions lead or draw; *allurements* win or entice; *charms* seduce or captivate. The human heart is always exposed to the power of female *attractions*; it is guarded with difficulty against the *allurements* of a coquette; it is incapable of resisting the united *charms* of body and mind.

Females are indebted for their *attractions* and *charms* to a happy conformation of features and figure; but they sometimes borrow their *allurements* from their toilet. *Attractions* consist of those ordinary graces which nature bestows on women with more or less liberality; they are the common property of the sex: *allurements*, of those cultivated graces formed by the aid of a faithful looking glass and the skilful hand of one anxious to please: *charms*, of those singular graces of nature which are granted as a rare and precious gift; they are the peculiar property of the individual possessor.

Defects unexpectedly discovered tend to the diminution of *attractions*; *allurements* vanish when the artifice is discovered; *charms* lose their effect when time or habit have rendered them too familiar, so transitory is the influence of mere person. *Attractions* assail the heart and awaken the tender passion; *allurements* serve to complete the conquest, which will however be but of short duration if there be not more solid though less brilliant *charms* to substitute affection in the place of passion.

When applied as these terms may be to other objects beside the personal endowments of the female sex, *attractions* and *charms* express whatever is very amiable in themselves; *allurements* on the contrary whatever is hateful and congenial to the baser propensities of human nature. A courtesan who was never possessed of *charms*, and has lost all personal *attractions*, may by the *allurements* of dress and manners, aided by a thousand meretricious arts, still retain the wretched power of doing incalculable mischief.

An *attraction* springs from something remarkable and striking; it lies in the exterior aspect, and awakens an interest towards itself: a *charm* acts by a secret, all-powerful, and irre-

sistible impulse on the soul; it springs from an accordance of the object with the affections of the heart; it takes hold of the imagination, and awakens an enthusiasm peculiar to itself: an *allurement* acts on the senses; it flatters the passions; it enslaves the imagination. A musical society has *attractions* for one who is musically inclined; for music has *charms* to soothe the troubled soul: fashionable society has too many *allurements* for youth, which are not easily withstood.

The music, the eloquence of the preacher, or the crowds of hearers, are *attractions* for the occasional attendants at a place of worship: the society of cultivated persons, whose character and manners have been attempered by the benign influence of Christianity, possess peculiar *charms* for those who have a congeniality of disposition; the present lax and undisciplined age is however but ill-fitted for the formation of such society, or the susceptibility of such *charms*: people are now more prone to yield to the *allurements* of pleasure and licentious gratification in their social intercourse. A military life has powerful *attractions* for adventurous minds; glory has irresistible *charms* for the ambitious: the *allurements* of wealth predominate in the minds of the great bulk of mankind.

This cæsus was a fine party-coloured girdle, which, as Homer tells us, had all the *attractions* of the sex wrought into it.

ADDISON.

How justly do I fall a sacrifice to sloth and luxury in the place where I first yielded to those *allurements* which seduced me to deviate from temperance and innocence.

JOHNSON.

Juno made a visit to Venus, the deity who presides over love, and begged of her as a particular favour, that she would lend her for a while those *charms* with which she subdued the hearts of gods and men.

ADDISON.

TO ATTRIBUTE, v. To ascribe.

ATTRIBUTE, v. Quality.

AVAIL, USE, SERVICE.

AVAIL, compounded of *a* or *ad*, and the French *valoir*, Latin *valeo*, to be strong, that is, to be strong for a purpose.

USE, in Latin *usus*, participle of *utor* to use, signifies the capacity to be used.

SERVICE, in French *service*, Latin *servitium*, from *servio*, signifies the property or act of serving.

These terms are, properly speaking, epithets applied to things to characterise their fitness for being employed to advantage. Words are of no *avail* when they do not influence the person addressed; endeavours are of no *use* which do not effect the thing proposed; people are of no *service* who do not contribute their portion of assistance. When entreaties are found to be of no *avail*, females sometimes try the force of tears: prudence forbids us to destroy any thing that can be turned to a *use*: economy enjoins that we should not throw aside a thing so long as it is fit for *service*.

The intercession of a friend may be *available* to avert the resentment of one who is offended: *useful* lessons of experience may be drawn from all the events of life: whatever is of the best quality will be found most *serviceable*.

What does it *avail*, though Seneca had taught as good morality as Christ himself from the mount? CUMBERLAND.

A man with great talents, but void of discretion, is like Polyphemus in the fable, strong and blind, endued with an irresistible force, which for want of sight is of no use to him. ANDERSON.

The Greeks in the heroic age seem to have been unacquainted with the use of iron, the most *serviceable* of all the metals. ROBERTSON.

TO AVAIL, *v.* To signify.

AVARICIOUS, MISERLY, PARSIMONIOUS, NIGGARDLY.

AVARICIOUS, from the Latin *avere* to desire, signifies in general longing for, but by distinction longing for money.

MISERLY signifies like a *miser* or *miserable man*, for none are so miserable as the lovers of money.

PARSIMONIOUS, from the Latin *parco* to spare or save, signifies literally saving.

NIGGARDLY is a frequentative of nigh or close, signifies very nigh.

The *avaricious* man and the *miser* are one and the same character, with this exception, that the *miser* carries his passion for money to a still greater excess. An *avaricious* man shows his love of money in his ordinary dealings;

but the *miser* lives upon it, and suffers every deprivation rather than part with it. An *avaricious* man may sometimes be indulgent to himself, and generous to others; the *miser* is dead to every thing but the treasure which he has amassed.

Parsimonious and *niggardly* are the subordinate characteristics of *avarice*. The *avaricious* man indulges his passion for money by *parsimony*, that is, by saving out of himself, or by *niggardly* ways in his dealings with others. He who spends a farthing on himself, where others with the same means spend a shilling, does it by *parsimony*; he who looks to every farthing in the bargains he makes, gets the name of a *niggard*. *Avarice* sometimes clokes itself under the name of prudence: it is, as Goldsmith says, often the only virtue which is left a man at the age of seventy-two. The *miser* is his own greatest enemy, and no man's friend; his ill-gotten wealth is generally a curse to him by whom it is inherited. A man is sometimes rendered *parsimonious* by circumstances; he who first saves from necessity but too often ends with saving from inclination. The *niggard* is an object of contempt, and sometimes hatred; every one fears to lose by a man who strives to gain from all.

Though the apprehensions of the aged may justify a cautious frugality, they can by no means excuse a sordid *avarice*. BLAIR.

As some lone *miser* visiting his store,
Bends at his treasure, counts, recounts it o'er;
Hoards after hoards his rising raptures fill,
Yet still he sighs, for hoards are wanting still.
Thus to my breast alternate passions rise,
Pleas'd with each bliss that Heav'n to man supplies.

Yet oft a sigh prevails and sorrows fall,
To see the hoard of human bliss so small.

GOLDSMITH.

Armstrong died in September 1779, and to the surprise of his friends left a considerable sum of money, saved by great *parsimony* out of a very moderate income. JOHNSON.

I have heard Dodsley, by whom Akenside's "*Pleasures of the Imagination*" was published, relate, that when the copy was offered him, he carried the work to Pope, who, having looked into it, advised him not to make a *niggardly* offer, for this was no every day writer.

JOHNSON.

AVARICIOUS, *v.* Covetous.

TO AVENGE, REVENGE,
VINDICATE.

AVENGE, REVENGE, and VINDICATE, all spring from the same source, namely, the Latin *vindico*, the Greek *ἐνδικάζω*, compounded of *ἐν* in and *δικάζω* justice, signifying to pronounce justice or put justice in force.

The idea common to these terms is that of taking up some one's cause.

To *avenge* is to punish in behalf of another; to *revenge* is to punish for one's self; to *vindicate* is to defend another.

The wrongs of a person are *avenged* or *revenged*; his rights are *vindicated*.

The act of *avenging*, though attended with the infliction of pain, is oftentimes an act of humanity, and always an act of justice; none are the sufferers but such as merit it for their oppression; whilst those are benefitted who are dependant for support: this is the act of God himself, who always *avenges* the oppressed who look up to him for support; and it ought to be the act of all his creatures, who are invested with the power of punishing offenders and protecting the helpless. *Revenge* is the basest of all actions, and the spirit of *revenge* the most diametrically opposed to the Christian principles of forgiving injuries, and returning good for evil; it is gratified only with inflicting pain without any prospect of advantage. *Vindication* is an act of generosity and humanity; it is the production of good without the infliction of pain: the claims of the widow and orphan call for *vindication* from those who have the time, talent, or ability, to take their cause into their own hands: England can boast of many noble *vindicators* of the rights of humanity, not excepting those which concern the brute creation.

The day shall come, that great avenging day,
When Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay.

Pope.

By a continued series of loose, though apparently trivial gratifications, the heart is often as thoroughly corrupted, as by the commission of any one of those enormous crimes which spring from great ambition, or great revenge. BLAIR.

Injured or oppressed by the world, the good man looks up to a judge who will *vindicate* his cause. BLAIR.

TO AVER, v. To asseverate.

AVERSE, v. Adverse.

AVERSE, UNWILLING, BACKWARD, LOATH, RELUCTANT.

AVERSE, in Latin *aversus*, participle of *averto*, compounded of *verto* to turn, and *a* from, signifies the state of having the mind turned from a thing.

UNWILLING literally signifies not willing.

BACKWARD signifies having the will in a *backward* direction.

LOATH, from *loath*, denotes the quality of loathing.

RELUCTANT, from the Latin *re* and *lucto* to struggle, signifies struggling with the will against a thing.

Averse is positive, it marks an actual sentiment of dislike; *unwilling* is negative, it marks the absence of the will; *backward* is a sentiment betwixt the two, it marks a leaning of the will against a thing; *loath* and *reluctant* mark strong feelings of *aversion*. *Aversion* is an habitual sentiment; *unwillingness* and *backwardness* are mostly occasional; *loath* and *reluctant* always occasional.

Aversion must be conquered; *unwillingness* must be removed; *backwardness* must be counteracted, or urged forward; *loathing* and *reluctance* must be overpowered. One who is *averse* to study will never have recourse to books; but a child may be *unwilling* or *backward* to attend to his lessons from partial motives, which the authority of the parent or master may correct; he who is *loath* to receive instruction will always remain ignorant; he who is *reluctant* in doing his duty will always do it as a task.

A miser is *averse* to nothing so much as to parting with his money; he is even *unwilling* to provide himself with necessaries, but he is not *backward* in disposing of his money when he has the prospect of getting more; friends are *loath* to part who have had many years' enjoyment in each other's society; we are *reluctant* in giving unpleasant advice. Lazy people are *averse* to labour: those who are not paid are *unwilling* to work; and those who are paid less than others are *backward* in giving their services: every one is *loath* to give up a favourite pursuit, and when

compelled to it by circumstances they do it with *reluctance*.

Of all the race of animals, alone,
The bees have common cities of their own ;
But (what's more strange) their modest appetites,
Averse from Venus, fly the nuptial rites.

DRYDEN.

I part with thee,
As wretches that are doubtful of hereafter
Part with their lives, *unwilling*, *loath*, and fear-
ful,
And trembling at futurity.

ROWE.

All men, even the most depraved, are subject
more or less to compunctions of conscience ; but
backward at the same time to resign the gains of
dishonesty, or the pleasures of vice.

BLAIR.

E'en thus two friends condemn'd
Embrace, and kiss, and take ten thousand
leaves,
Loather a hundred times to part than die.

SHAKESPEARE.

From better habitations spurn'd,
Reluctant dost thou rove,
Or grieve for friendship unreturn'd,
Or unregarded love ?

GOLDSMITH.

AVERSION, ANTIPATHY, DISLIKE, HATRED, REPUGNANCE.

AVERSION denotes the quality of being averse (*v. Averse*).

ANTIPATHY, in French *antipathie*, Latin *antipathia*, Greek *αντιπαθεια*, compounded of *αντι* against, and *παθεια* feeling, signifies a feeling against.

DISLIKE, compounded of the privative *dis* and *like*, signifies not to like or be attached to.

HATRED, in German *hass*, is supposed by Adelung to be connected with *heiss* hot, signifying heat of temper.

REPUGNANCE, in French *repugnance*, Latin *repugnantia* and *repugno*, compounded of *re* and *pugno*, signifies the resistance of the feelings to an object.

Aversion is in its most general sense the generic term to these and many other similar expressions, in which case it is opposed to attachment: the former denoting an alienation of the mind from an object ; the latter a knitting or binding of the mind to objects: it has, however, more commonly a partial acceptation, in which it is justly comparable with the above words. *Aversion* and *antipathy* apply more properly to things ; *dislike* and *hatred* to persons ; *repugnance* to actions, that is, such actions as one is called upon to perform.

Aversion and *antipathy* seem to be less dependent on the will, and to have their origin in the temperament or natural taste, particularly the latter, which springs from causes that are not always visible ; it lies in the physical organization. *Antipathy* is in fact a natural *aversion* opposed to sympathy : *dislike* and *hatred* are on the contrary voluntary, and seem to have their root in the angry passions of the heart ; the former is less deep-rooted than the latter, and is commonly awakened by slighter causes : *repugnance* is not an habitual and lasting sentiment, like the rest ; it is a transitory but strong *dislike* to what one is obliged to do.

An unfitness in the temper to harmonize with an object produces *aversion* : a contrariety in the nature of particular persons and things occasions *antipathies*, although some pretend that there are no such mysterious incongruities in nature, and that all *antipathies* are but *aversions* early engendered by the influence of fear and the workings of imagination ; but under this supposition we are still at a loss to account for those singular effects of fear and imagination in some persons which do not discover themselves in others : a difference in the character, habits, and manners, produces *dislike* : injuries, quarrels, or more commonly the influence of malignant passions, occasion *hatred* : a contrariety to one's moral sense, or one's humours, awakens *repugnance*.

People of a quiet temper have an *aversion* to disputing or argumentation ; those of a gloomy temper have an *aversion* to society : *antipathies* mostly discover themselves in early life, and as soon as the object comes within the view of the person affected : men of different sentiments in religion or politics, if not of amiable temper, are apt to contract *dislikes* to each other by frequent irritation in discourse : when men of malignant tempers come in collision, nothing but a deadly *hatred* can ensue from their repeated and complicated aggressions towards each other : any one who is under the influence of a misplaced pride is apt to feel a *repugnance* to acknowledge himself in an error.

Aversions produce an anxious desire for the removal of the object *disliked*: *antipathies* produce the most violent physical revulsion of the frame, and vehement recoiling from the object; persons have not unfrequently been known to faint away at the sight of insects for whom this *antipathy* has been conceived: *dislikes* too often betray themselves by distant and uncourteous behaviour: *hatred* assumes every form which is black and horrid: *repugnance* does not make its appearance until called forth by the necessity of the occasion.

Aversions will never be so strong in a well regulated mind, that they cannot be overcome when the cause for them is removed, or they are found to be ill-grounded; sometimes they lie in a vicious temperament formed by nature or habit, in which case they will not easily be destroyed; a slothful man will find a difficulty in overcoming his *aversion* to labour, or an idle man his *aversion* to steady application. *Antipathies* may be indulged or resisted: people of irritable temperaments, particularly females, are liable to them in the most violent degree; but those who are fully persuaded of their fallacy may do much by the force of conviction to diminish their violence. *Dislikes* are often groundless, or have their origin in trifles, owing to the influence of caprice or humour: people of sense will be ashamed of them, and the true Christian will stifle them in their birth, lest they grow into the formidable passion of *hatred*, which strikes at the root of all peace, which is a mental poison that infuses its venom into all the sinuosities of the heart, and pollutes the sources of human affection. *Repugnance* ought always to be resisted whenever it prevents us from doing what either reason, honour, or duty require.

Aversions are applicable to animals as well as men: dogs have a particular *aversion* to beggars, most probably from their suspicious appearance; in certain cases likewise we may speak of their *antipathies*, as in the instance of the dog and the cat: according to the schoolmen there existed also *antipathies* between certain plants and vegetables; but these are

not borne out by facts sufficiently strong to warrant a belief of their existence. *Dislike* and *hatred* are sometimes applied to things, but in a sense less exceptionable than in the former case: *dislike* does not express so much as *aversion*, and *aversion* not so much as *hatred*: we ought to have a *hatred* for vice and sin, an *aversion* to gossiping and idle talking, and a *dislike* to the frivolities of fashionable life.

I cannot forbear mentioning a tribe of egotists, for whom I have always had a mortal *aversion*; I mean the authors of memoirs who are never mentioned in any works but their own. AMBISON.

There is one species of terror which those who are unwilling to suffer the reproach of cowardice have wisely dignified with the name of *antipathy*. A man has indeed no dread of harm from an insect or a worm, but his *antipathy* turns him pale whenever they approach him.

JOHNSON.

Every man whom business or curiosity has thrown at large into the world, will recollect many instances of fondness and *dislike*, which have forced themselves upon him without the intervention of his judgment.

JOHNSON.

One punishment that attends the lying and deceitful person is the *hatred* of all those whom he either has, or would have deceived. I do not say that a Christian can lawfully hate any one, and yet I affirm that some may very worthily deserve to be *hated*.

SOUTH.

In this dilemma Aristophanes conquered his *repugnance*, and determined upon presenting himself on the stage for the first time in his life.

CUMBERLAND.

AUGMENTATION, *v.* Increase.

TO AUGUR, PRESAGE, FOREBODE, BETOKEN, PORTEND.

AUGUR, in French *augurer*, Latin *augurium*, comes from *avis* a bird, as an *augury* was originally, and at all times, principally drawn from the song, the flight, or other actions of birds.

PRESAGE, in French *présage*, from the Latin *præ* and *sagio* to be instinctively wise, signifies to be thus wise about what is to come.

FOREBODE is compounded of *fore* and the Saxon *bodian* to declare, signifying to pronounce on futurity.

BETOKEN signifies to serve as a token.

PORTEND, in Latin *portendo*, compounded of *por* for *pro* and *tendo*, signifies to set or show forth.

Augur signifies either to serve or make use of as an *augury*; to *forebode*,

ESCHEW and **SHUN** both come from the German *scheuen*, Swedish *sky*, &c. when it signifies to fly.

ELUDE, in French *eluder*, Latin *eludo*, compounded of *e* and *ludo*, signifies to get one's self out of a thing by a trick.

Avoid is both generic and specific; we *avoid* in *eschewing* or *shunning*, or we *avoid* without *eschewing* or *shunning*. Various contrivances are requisite for *avoiding*; *eschewing* and *shunning* consist only of going out of the way, of not coming in contact; *eluding*, as its derivation denotes, has more of artifice in it than any of the former. We *avoid* a troublesome visitor under real or feigned pretences of ill-health, prior engagement, and the like; we *eschew* evil company by not going into any but what we know to be good; we *shun* the sight of an offensive object by turning into another road; we *elude* a punishment by getting out of the way of those who have the power of inflicting it.

Prudence enables us to *avoid* many of the evils to which we are daily exposed: nothing but a fixed principle of religion can enable a man to *eschew* the temptations to evil which lie in his path: fear will lead us to *shun* a mad man, whom it is not in our power to bind: a want of all principle leads a man to *elude* his creditors, whom he wishes to defraud.

The best means of *avoiding* quarrels is to *avoid* giving offence. The surest preservative of our innocence is to *eschew* evil company, and the surest preservative of our health is to *shun* every intemperate practice. Those who have no evil design in view will have no occasion to *elude* the vigilance of the law.

We speak of *avoiding* a danger, and *shunning* a danger: but to *avoid* it is in general not to fall into it; to *shun* it is with care to keep out of the way of it.

Having thoroughly considered the nature of this passion, I have made it my study how to *avoid* the envy that may accrue to me from these my speculations. STERLE.

Thus Brute this realm into his rule subdued
And reigned long in great felicity,
Lov'd of his friends, and of his foes *eschew'd*.

SPENCER.

Of many things, some few I shall explain;
Teach thee to *shun* the dangers of the main,
And how at length the promis'd shore to gain.
DARWIN.

The wary Trojan, bending from the blow,
Eludes the death, and disappoints his foe. POPE.

TO AVOW, *v.* To acknowledge.

AUSPICIOUS, PROPITIOUS.

AUSPICIOUS, from *auspice*, in Latin *auspicium* and *ausper*, compounded of *avis* and *spicio* to behold, signifies favourable according to the inspection of birds.

PROPITIOUS, in Latin *propitius*, probably from *prope* near, because the heathens always solicited their deities to be near or present to give their aid in favour of their designs; hence *propitious* is figuratively applied in the sense of favourable.

Auspicious is said only of things; *propitious* is said only of persons or things personified. Those things are *auspicious* which are casual, or only indicative of good; persons are *propitious* to the wishes of another who listen to their requests and contribute to their satisfaction. A journey is undertaken under *auspicious* circumstances, where every thing incidental, as weather, society, and the like, bid fair to afford pleasure; it is undertaken under *propitious* circumstances when every thing favours the attainment of the object for which it was begun. Whoever has any request to make ought to seize the *auspicious* moment when the person of whom it is asked is in a pleasant frame of mind; a poet in his invocation requests the muse to be *propitious* to him, or the lover conjures his beloved to be *propitious* to his vows.

Still follow where *auspicious* fates invite,
Care's the happy, and the wretched sight.
Sooner shall jarring elements unite,
Than truth with gain, than interest with right.

LAWR.

Who loves a garden loves a greenhouse too:
Unconscious of a less *propitious* clime,
There blooms exotic beauty. COWPER.

AUSTERE, RIGID, SEVERE,
RIGOROUS, STERN.

AUSTERE, in Latin *austerus* sour or rough, from the Greek *aus sicco* to dry, signifies rough or harsh, from drought.

wait, comes from *währen* to see or look after.

EXPECT, in Latin *expecto* or *expecto*, compounded of *ex* and *specto*, signifies to look out after.

All these terms have a reference to futurity, and our actions with regard to it.

Await, *wait for*, and *look for*, mark a calculation of consequences and a preparation for them; and *expect* simply a calculation: we often *expect* without *awaiting*, *waiting*, or *looking for*, but never the reverse.

Await is said of serious things; *wait* and *look for* are terms in familiar use; *expect* is employed either seriously or otherwise. A person *expects* to die, or *awaits* the hour of his dissolution; he *expects* a letter, *waits* for its coming, and *looks for* it when the post is arrived.

Await indicates the disposition of the mind; *wait for*, the regulation of the outward conduct as well as that of the mind; *look for* is a species of *waiting* drawn from the physical action of the eye, and may be figuratively applied to the mind's eye, in which latter sense it is the same as *expect*. It is our duty, as well as our interest, to *await* the severest trials without a murmur: prudence requires us to *wait* patiently for a suitable opportunity, rather than be premature in our attempts to obtain any object: when children are too much indulged and caressed, they are apt to *look for* a repetition of caresses at inconvenient seasons: it is in vain to *look for* or *expect* happiness from the conjugal state, which is not founded on a cordial and mutual regard.

This said, he sat, and expectation held
His looks suspense, *awaiting* who appeared
To second, or oppose, or undertake
The perilous attempt. MILTON.

Not less resolv'd, Antenor's valiant heir
Confronts Achilles, and *awaits* the war. POPE.

Wait till thy being shall be unfolded. BLAIR.

If you *look for* a friend, in whose temper there
is not to be found the least inequality, you *look
for* a pleasing phantom. BLAIR.

We are not to *expect*, from our intercourse
with others, all that satisfaction which we fondly
wish. BLAIR.

TO AWAKEN, EXCITE, PROVOKE,
ROUSE, STIR UP.

To AWAKEN is to make *awake*
or alive.

EXCITE, in Latin *excito*, compounded of the intensive syllables *ex* and *cito*, in Hebrew *sut* to move, signifies to move out of a state of rest.

PROVOKE, *v.* To aggravate.

To ROUSE is to cause to rise.

STIR, in German *stören* to move, signifies to make to move upwards.

To *excite* and *provoke* convey the idea of producing something; *rouse* and *stir up* that of only calling into action that which previously exists; to *awaken* is used in either sense.

To *awaken* is a gentler action than to *excite*, and this is gentler than to *provoke*. We *awaken* by a simple effort; we *excite* by repeated efforts or forcible means; we *provoke* by words, looks, or actions. The tender feelings are *awakened*; affections or the passions in general are *excited*; the angry passions are commonly *provoked*. Objects of distress *awaken* a sentiment of pity; competition among scholars *excites* a spirit of emulation; taunting words *provoke* anger.

Awaken is applied only to the individual and what passes within him; *excite* is applicable to the outward circumstances of one or many; *provoke* is applicable to the conduct or temper of one or many. The attention is *awakened* by interesting sounds that strike upon the ear; the conscience is *awakened* by the voice of the preacher, or by passing events: a commotion, a tumult, or a rebellion, is *excited* among the people by the active efforts of individuals; laughter or contempt is *provoked* by preposterous conduct.

To *awaken* is in the moral, as in the physical sense, to call into *consciousness* from a state of *unconsciousness*; to *rouse* is forcibly to bring into action that which is in a state of inaction; and *stir up* is to bring into a state of agitation or commotion. We are *awakened* from an ordinary state by ordinary means; we are *roused* from an extraordinary state by extraordinary means; we are *stirred up* from an ordinary to an extraordinary state. The mind of a child is *awakened* by the action on its senses as soon as it is born; there are however some persons who are not *roused* from the stupor in which they were, by any thing but the most awful events; and there are others whose passions, par-

beyond this single one, of our being conscious to ourselves that we do not deserve them. ADDISON.

AWE, REVERENCE, DREAD.

AWE, probably from the German *achten*, conveys the idea of regarding.

REVERENCE, in French *révérence*, Latin *reverentia*, comes from *reverere* to fear strongly.

DREAD, in Saxon *dread*, comes from the Latin *terrere* to frighten, and Greek *ταράσσειν* to trouble.

Awe and *reverence* both denote a strong sentiment of respect, mingled with some emotions of fear; but the former marks the much stronger sentiment of the two: *dread* is an unmingled sentiment of fear for one's personal security. *Awe* may be awakened by the help of the senses and understanding; *reverence* by that of the understanding only; and *dread* principally by that of the imagination.

Sublime, sacred, and solemn objects awaken *awe*; they cause the beholder to stop and consider whether he is worthy to approach them any nearer; they rivet his mind and body to a spot, and make him cautious, lest by his presence he should contaminate that which is hallowed: exalted and noble objects produce *reverence*; they lead to every outward mark of obedience and humiliation which it is possible for him to express: terrific objects excite *dread*; they cause a shuddering of the animal frame, and a revulsion of the mind which is attended with nothing but pain.

When the creature places himself in the presence of the Creator; when he contemplates the immeasurable distance which separates himself, a frail and finite mortal, from his infinitely perfect Maker; he approaches with *awe*: even the sanctuary where he is accustomed thus to bow before the Almighty acquires the power of awakening the same emotions in his mind. Age, wisdom, and virtue, when combined in one person, are never approached without *reverence*; the possessor has a dignity in himself that checks the haughtiness of the arrogant, that silences the petulance of pride and self-conceit, that stills the noise and giddy mirth of the young, and communicates to all around a sobriety of mien and aspect.

A grievous offender is seldom without *dread*; his guilty conscience pictures every thing as the instrument of vengeance, and every person as denouncing his merited sentence.

The solemn stillness of the tomb will inspire *awe*, even in the breast of him who has no *dread* of death. Children should be early taught to have a certain degree of *reverence* for the Bible as a book, in distinction from all other books.

It were endless to enumerate all the passages, both in the sacred and profane writers, which establish the general sentiment of mankind concerning the inseparable union of a sacred and reverential awe with our ideas of the Divinity.

BURKE,

If the voice of universal nature, the experience of all ages, the light of reason, and the immediate evidence of my senses, cannot awake me to a dependence upon my God, a reverence for his religion, and an humble opinion of myself, what a lost creature am I.

CUMFERTLAND.

To Phœbus next my trembling steps be led,
Full of religious doubts and awful dread.

DRYDEN.

AWKWARD, CLUMSY.

AWKWARD, in Saxon *awerd*, compounded of *a* or *æ* adversative and *ward*, from the Teutonic *wâren* to see or look, that is, looking the opposite way, or being in an opposite direction, as *toward* signifies looking the same way, or being in the same direction.

CLUMSY, from the same source as *clump* and *lump*, in German *lumpisch*, denotes the quality of heaviness and unseemliness.

These epithets denote what is contrary to rule and order, in form or manner. *Awkward* respects outward deportment; *clumsy* the shape and make of the object: a person has an *awkward* gait, is *clumsy* in his whole person.

Awkwardness is the consequence of bad education; *clumsiness* is mostly a natural defect. Young recruits are *awkward* in marching, and *clumsy* in their manual labour.

They may be both employed figuratively in the same sense, and sometimes in relation to the same objects: when speaking of *awkward* contrivances, or *clumsy* contrivances, the latter expresses the idea more strongly than the former.

AXIOM, MAXIM, APHORISM, APOPHTHEGM, SAYING, ADAGE, PROVERB, BYE-WORD, SAW.

AXIOM, in French *axiome*, Latin *axioma*, comes from the Greek *ἀξίον* to think worthy, signifying the thing valued.

MAXIM, in French *maxime*, in Latin *maximus* the greatest, signifies that which is most important.

APHORISM, from the Greek *ἀφορισμός* a short sentence, and *ἀφορίζω* to distinguish, signifies that which is set apart.

APOPHTHEGM, in Greek *ἀποφθέγμα*, from *ἀποφθεγγόμεναι* to speak pointedly, signifies a pointed saying.

SAYING signifies literally what is said, that is, said habitually.

ADAGE, in Latin *adagium*, probably compounded of *ad* and *ago*, signifies that which is fit to be acted upon.

PROVERB, in French *proverbe*, Latin *proverbium*, compounded of *pro* and *verbum*, signifies that expression which stands for something particular.

BYE-WORD signifies a word by the bye, or by the way, in the course of conversation.

SAW is but a variation of say, put for saying.

A given sentiment conveyed in a specific sentence, or form of expression, is the common idea included in the signification of these terms. The *axiom* is a truth of the first value; a self-evident proposition which is the basis of other truths. A *maxim* is the truth of the first moral importance for all practical purposes. An *aphorism* is a truth set apart for its pointedness and excellence. *Apophthegm* is, in respect to the ancients, what *saying* is in regard to the moderns; it is a pointed sentiment pronounced by an individual, and adopted by others. *Adage* and *proverb* are vulgar sayings, the former among the ancients, the latter among the moderns. The *bye-word* is a casual saying, originating in some local circumstance. The *saw*, which is a barbarous corruption of *saying*, is the saying formerly current among the ignorant.

Axioms are in science what *maxims* are in morals; self-evidence is an essential characteristic in both; the *axiom* presents itself in so simple and undeniable a form to the understanding as to exclude doubt, and the necessity for reasoning. The *maxim*, though not so definite in its expression as the *axiom*, is at the same time equally parallel to the mind of man, and of such general application, that it is acknowledged by all moral agents who are susceptible of moral truth; it comes home to the common sense of all mankind. * “Things that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other,”—“Two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time,” are *axioms* in mathematics and metaphysics. “Virtue is the true source of happiness,”—“The happiness of man is the end of civil government,” are *axioms* in ethics and politics. “To err is human, to forgive divine,”—“When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we leave them,” are among the number of *maxims*. Betwixt *axioms* and *maxims* there is this obvious difference to be observed; that the former are unchangeable both in matter and manner, and admit of little or no increase in number; but the latter may vary with the circumstances of human life, and admit of considerable extension.

Aphorism is a speculative principle, either in science or morals, which is presented in a few words to the understanding; it is the substance of a doctrine, and many *aphorisms* may contain the abstract of a science. Of this description are the *aphorisms* of Hippocrates, and those of Lavater in physiognomy.

Sayings and *apophthegms* differ from the preceding, in as much as they always carry the mind back to the person speaking; there is always one who says when there is a *saying* or an *apophthegm*, and both acquire a value as much from the person who utters them, as from the thing that is uttered: when Leonidas was asked why brave men prefer honour to life, his answer became an *apophthegm*; namely, that they hold life by fortune, and honour by virtue: of this description are the *apophthegms* com-

* Vide Roubaud: “*Axiome, maxime, apophthegme, aphorisme.*”

desire to display her volubility; the former cares not whether he is understood; the latter cares not if she be but heard.

Chatting is harmless, if not respectable: the winter's fire-side invites neighbours to assemble and *chat* away many an hour which might otherwise hang heavy on hand, or be spent less inoffensively: *chatting* is the practice of adults; *prattling* and *prating* that of children, the one innocently, the other impertinently: the *prattling* of babes has an interest for every feeling mind, but for parents it is one of their highest enjoyments; *prating*, on the contrary, is the consequence of ignorance and childish assumption: a *prattler* has all the unaffected gaiety of an uncontaminated mind; a *prater* is forward, obtrusive, and ridiculous.

To stand up and babble to a crowd in an assembly, till silence is commanded by the stroke of a hammer, is as low an ambition as can talent the human mind. HAWKSWORTH.

Some birds there are who, prone to noise,
Are hild to silence wisdom's voice;
And shild to chatter out the hour,
Bliss by their emptiness to power. MOORE.

Sometimes I dream, with women sit,
And chat away the gloomy fit. GREEN.

Now blows the early north, and chills throughout
The stiff'ning regions: while by stronger charms
Than Circe e'er, or fell Medea brew'd,
Each brook that wont to prattle to its banks
Lies all bestill'd. ARMSTRONG.

My prudent counsels prop the state,
Muggles were never known to prate. MOORE.

BACK, BACKWARD, BEHIND.

BACK and BACKWARD are used only as adverbs; BEHIND either as an adverb or a preposition. To go *back* or *backward*, to go *behind* or *behind* the wall.

Back denotes the situation of being, and the direction of going; *backward*, simply the manner of going: a person stands *back*, who does not wish to be in the way; he goes *backward*, when he does not wish to turn his *back* to an object.

Back marks simply the situation of a place, *behind* the situation of one object with regard to another: a person stands *back*, who stands in the *back* part of any place; he stands *behind*, who has any one in the front of him: the *back* is opposed to the front, *behind* to before.

So rag'd Tydides, boundless in his ire,
Drove armies back, and made all Troy retire. POPE.

Whence many wearied e'er they had o'erpass'd
The middle stream (for they in vain have tried)
Again return'd astounded and aghast,
No one regardful look would ever backward cast. GILBERT WERT.

Forth flew this hated fiend, the child of Rome,
Driv'n to the verge of Albion, lingered there:
Then, with her James receding, cast behind
One angry frown, and sought more servile climes. SHENSTONE ON CRUELTY.

BACKWARD, *v.* *Back*.

BACKWARD, *v.* *Averse*.

BAD, WICKED, EVIL.

BAD, in Saxon *bad*, *baed*, in German *bös*, probably connected with the Latin *pejus* worse, and the Hebrew *bosch*.

WICKED is probably changed from *witched* or *bewitched*, that is, possessed with an evil spirit.

Bad respects moral and physical qualities in general; *wicked* only moral qualities.

EVIL, in German *übel*, from the Hebrew *chebel* pain, signifies that which is the prime cause of pain; *evil* therefore, in its full extent, comprehends both *badness* and *wickedness*.

Whatever offends the taste and sentiments of a rational being is *bad*: food is *bad* when it disagrees with the constitution; the air is *bad* which has any thing in it disagreeable to the senses or hurtful to the body; books are *bad* which only inflame the imagination or the passions. Whatever is *wicked* offends the moral principles of a rational agent: any violation of the law is *wicked*, as law is the support of human society; an act of injustice or cruelty is *wicked*, as it opposes the will of God and the feelings of humanity. *Evil* is either moral or natural, and may be applied to every object that is contrary to good; but the term is employed only for that which is in the highest degree *bad* or *wicked*.

When used in relation to persons, both refer to the morals, but *bad* is more general than *wicked*; a *bad* man is one who is generally wanting in the performance of his duty; a *wicked* man is one who is chargeable with actual violations of the law, human or

Divine ; such an one has an *evil* mind. A *bad* character is the consequence of immoral conduct ; but no man has the character of being *wicked* who has not been guilty of some known and flagrant vices : the inclinations of the best are *evil* at certain times.

Whatever we may pretend, as to our belief, it is the strain of our actions that must show whether our principles have been good or bad.

BLAIR.

For when th' impenitent and wicked die,
Loaded with offences and infamy ;
If any sense at that sad time remains,
They feel amazing terror, mighty pains.

POMFRET.

And what your bounded view, which only saw
A little part, deem'd *evil*, is no more ;
The storms of wintry time will quickly pass,
And one unbounded spring encircle all.

THOMSON.

BADGE, *v.* *Mark*.

BADLY, *ILL*.

BADLY, in the manner of *bad* (*v.* *Bad*).

ILL, in Swedish *ill*, Iceland *illur*, Danish *ill*, &c. is supposed by Adeling, and with some degree of justice, not to be a contraction of evil, but to spring from the Greek *ουλος* destructive, and *αλλω* to destroy.

These terms are both employed to modify the actions or qualities of things, but *badly* is always annexed to the action, and *ill* to the quality : 'as to do any thing *badly*, the thing is *badly* done ; an *ill* judged scheme, an *ill* contrived measure, an *ill* disposed person.

TO BAFFLE, DEFEAT, DISCONCERT, CONFOUND.

BAFFLE, in French *baffler*, from *buffle* an ox, signifies to lead by the nose as an ox, that is, to amuse or disappoint.

DEFEAT, in French *defait*, participle of *defaire*, is compounded of the privative *de* and *faire* to do, signifying to undo.

DISCONCERT is compounded of the privative *dis* and *concert*, signifying to throw out of concert or harmony, to put into disorder.

CONFOUND, in French *confondre*, is compounded of *con* and *fondre* to melt or mix together in general disorder.

When applied to the derangement

of the mind or rational faculties, *baffle* and *defeat* respect the powers of argument, *disconcert* and *confound* the thoughts and feelings : *baffle* expresses less than *defeat* ; *disconcert* less than *confound* : a person is *baffled* in argument who is for the time discomposed and silenced by the superior address of his opponent : he is *defeated* in argument if his opponent has altogether the advantage of him in strength of reasoning and justness of sentiment : a person is *disconcerted* who loses his presence of mind for a moment, or has his feelings any way discomposed ; he is *confounded* when the powers of thought and consciousness become torpid or vanish.

A superior command of language or a particular degree of effrontery will frequently enable one person to *baffle* another who is advocating the cause of truth : ignorance of the subject, or a want of ability, may occasion a man to be *defeated* by his adversary, even when he is supporting a good cause : assurance is requisite to prevent any one from being *disconcerted* who is suddenly detected in any disgraceful proceeding : hardened effrontery sometimes keeps the daring villain from being *confounded* by any events, however awful.

When applied to the derangement of plans, *baffle* expresses less than *defeat* ; *defeat* less than *confound* ; and *disconcert* less than all. Obstinacy, perseverance, skill, or art, *baffles* ; force or violence *defeats* ; awkward circumstances *disconcert* ; the visitation of God *confounds*. When wicked men strive to obtain their ends, it is a happy thing when their adversaries have sufficient skill and address to *baffle* all their arts, and sufficient power to *defeat* all their projects ; but sometimes when our best endeavours fail in our own behalf, the devices of men are *confounded* by the interposition of heaven.

It frequently happens even in the common transactions of life that the best schemes are *disconcerted* by the trivial casualties of wind and weather. The obstinacy of a disorder may *baffle* the skill of the physician ; the imprudence of the patient may *defeat* the object of his prescriptions : the unexpected arrival of a superior may

disconcert the unauthorised plan of those who are subordinate: the miraculous destruction of his army *confounded* the project of the King of Assyria.

New shepherds! To your helpless charge be kind,

Baffle the raging year, and fill their pens

With food at will. THOMSON.

He that could withstand conscience is frightened at infamy, and shame prevails when reason is defeated. JOHNSON.

She looked in the glass while she was speaking to me, and without any confusion adjusted her tucker: she seemed rather pleased than *disconcerted* at being regarded with earnestness.

HAWKSWORTH.

I could not help inquiring of the clerks if they knew this lady, and was greatly *confounded* when they told me with an air of secrecy that she was my cousin's mistress. HAWKSWORTH.

BALANCE, *v. Poise.*

BALL, *v. Globe.*

BAND, COMPANY, CREW,
GANG.

BAND, in French *bande*, in German, &c. *band* from *binden* to bind, signifies the thing bound.

COMPANY, *v. To accompany.*

CREW, from the French *cru*, participle of *croître*, and the Latin *creasco* to grow or gather, signifies the thing grown or formed into a mass.

GANG, in Saxon, German, &c. *gang* a walk, from *gehen* to go, signifies a body going the same way.

All these terms denote a small association for a particular object: a *band* is an association where men are bound together by some strong obligation, whether taken in a good or bad sense, as a *band* of soldiers, a *band* of robbers. A *company* marks an association for convenience without any particular obligation, as a *company* of travellers, a *company* of strolling players. *Crew* marks an association collected together by some external power, or by coincidence of plan and motive; in the former case it is used for a ship's *crew*; in the latter and bad sense of the word it is employed for any number of evil minded persons met together from different quarters, and co-operating for some bad purpose.

Gang is always used in a bad sense for an association of thieves, murder-

ers, and depredators in general; for such an association is rather a casual meeting from the similarity of pursuits, than an organized body under any leader; it is more in common use than *band*: the robbers in Germany used to form themselves into *bands* that set the government of the country at defiance: housebreakers and pickpockets commonly associate now in *gangs*.

Behold a ghastly band,

Each a toreb in his hand!

These are Grecian ghosts that in battle were slain,

And unbury'd remain,

Inglorious in the plains. DAYTON.

Chaucer supposes in his prologue to his tales that a company of pilgrims going to Canterbury assemble at an inn in Southwark, and agree that for their common amusement on the road each of them shall tell at least one tale in going to Canterbury, and another in coming back from thence. TYRWHITT.

The clowns, a bolst'rous, rude, ungovern'd crew,
With furious haste to the loud summons flew.

DAYTON.

Others again who form a gang,

Yet take due measures not to hang;

In magazines their forces join,

By legal methods to purloin.

MALLET.

BAND, *v. Chain.*

BANE, PEST, RUIN.

BANE, in its proper sense, is the name of a poisonous plant.

PEST, in French *peste*, Latin *pestus* a plague, from *pastum* participle of *pasco* to feed upon or consume.

RUIN, in French *ruine*, Latin *ruina*, from *ruo* to rush, signifies the falling into a ruin, or the cause of ruin.

These terms borrow their figurative signification from three of the greatest evils in the world; namely, poison, plague, and destruction. *Bane* is said of things only; *pest* of persons only: whatever produces a deadly corruption is the *bane*; whoever is as obnoxious as the plague is a *pest*: luxury is the *bane* of civil society; gaming is the *bane* of all youth; sycophants are the *pests* of society.

Bane when compared with *ruin* does not convey so strong a meaning; the former in its positive sense is that which tends to mischief; *ruin* is that which actually causes *ruin*: a love of pleasure is the *bane* of all young men whose fortune depends on the exer-

TO BANTER, v. To deride.

BARBAROUS, v. Cruel.

BARE, NAKED, UNCOVERED.

BARE, in Saxon *bare*, German *bar*, Hebrew *parak* to lay bare, and *bar* pure.

NAKED, in Saxon *naced*, German *nacket* or *nakt*, low German *naakt*, Swedish *nakot*, Danish *nogen*, &c. comes from the Latin *nudus*, compounded of *ne* not and *datus* or *indatus* clothed, and the Greek *nu* to clothe.

Bare marks the condition of being without some necessary appendage; *naked* simply the absence of an external covering; *bare* is therefore often substituted for *naked*, although not *vice versa*: we speak of *bare-headed*, *barefoot*, to expose the *bare* arm; but a figure is *naked*, or the body is *naked*.

When applied to other objects, *bare* conveys the idea of want in general; *naked* simply the want of something exterior: when we speak of sitting upon the *bare* ground, of laying any place *bare*, of *bare* walls, a *bare* house, the idea of want in essentials is strongly conveyed; but *naked* walls, *naked* fields, a *naked* appearance, all denote something wanting to the eye: *bare* in this sense is frequently followed by the object that is wanted; *naked* is mostly employed as an adjunct: a tree is *bare* of leaves; this constitutes it a *naked* tree.

They preserve the same analogy in their figurative application: a *bare* sufficiency is that which scarcely suffices; the *naked* truth is that which has nothing about it to intercept the view of it from the mind.

Naked and *uncovered* bear a strong resemblance to each other; to be *naked* is in fact to have the body *uncovered*, but many things are *uncovered* which are not *naked*: nothing is said to be *naked* but what in the nature of things, or according to the usages of men, ought to be covered; every thing is *uncovered* from which the covering is removed. According to our natural sentiments of decency, or our acquired sentiments of propriety, we expect to see the *naked* body covered with clothing, the *naked* tree covered with leaves; the *naked* walls

covered with paper or paint; and the *naked* country covered with verdure or habitations: on the other hand, plants are left *uncovered* to receive the benefit of the sun or rain; furniture or articles of use or necessity are left *uncovered* to suit the convenience of the user: or a person may be *uncovered*, in the sense of *bare-headed*, on certain occasions.

The story of *Æneas*, on which Virgil founded his poem, was very *bare* of circumstances.

ANDERSON.

Why turn'st thou from me? I'm alone already;
Methinks I stand upon a *naked* beach,
Sighing to winds, and to the seas complaining.

OSWAY.

In the eye of that Supreme Being to whom
our whole internal frame is *uncovered*, dispositions
hold the place of actions.

BLAIR.

BARE, SCANTY, DESTITUTE.

BARE, v. Bare, naked.

SCANTY, from to *scant*, signifies the quality of *scanting*: *scant* is most probably changed from the Latin *scindo* to clip or cut.

DESTITUTE, in Latin *destitutus*, participle of *destituo*, compounded of *de* privative and *statuo* to appoint or provide for, signifies unprovided for or wanting.

All these terms denote the absence or deprivation of some necessary. *Bare* and *scanty* have a relative sense: *bare* respects what serves for ourselves; *scanty* that which is provided by others. A subsistence is *bare*; a supply is *scanty*. An imprudent person will estimate as a *bare* competence what would supply an economist with superfluities. A hungry person will consider as a *scanty* allowance what would more than suffice for a moderate eater.

Bare is said of those things which belong to the corporeal sustenance; *destitute* is said of one's outward circumstances in general. A person is *bare* of clothes or money; he is *destitute* of friends, of resources, or of comforts.

Christ and the Apostles did most earnestly inculcate the belief of his Godhead, and accepted men upon the *bare* acknowledgment of this.

SCOTT.

No *scanty* is our present allowance of happiness, that in many situations life could scarcely be supported, if hope were not allowed to relieve the present hour, by pleasures borrowed from the future.

JOHNSON.

ing some preparation: *combat* is only particular, and sometimes unexpected. Thus the action which took place between the Carthaginians and the Romans, or Cæsar and Pompey, were *battles*; but the action in which the Horatii and the Curiatii, decided the fate of Rome, as also many of the actions in which Hercules was engaged, were *combats*. The battle of Almanza was a decisive action between Philip of France and Charles of Austria, in their contest for the throne of Spain; in the *combat* between Menelaus and Paris, Homer very artfully describes the seasonable interference of Venus to save her favourite from destruction.

The word *combat* has more relation to the act of fighting than that of *battle*, which is used with more propriety simply to denominate the action. In the *battle* between the Romans and Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, the *combat* was obstinate and bloody; the Romans seven times repulsed the enemy, and were as often repulsed in their turn. In this latter sense *engagement* and *combat* are analogous, but the former has a specific relation to the agents and parties *engaged*, which is not implied in the latter term. We speak of a person being present in an *engagement*; wounded in an *engagement*; or having fought desperately in an *engagement*: on the other hand; to *engage* in a *combat*; to challenge to single *combat*: *combats* are sometimes begun by the accidental meeting of avowed opponents; in such *engagements* nothing is thought of but the gratification of revenge.

Battles are fought between armies only; they are gained or lost: *combats* are entered into between individuals, whether of the brute or human species, in which they seek to destroy or excel: *engagements* are confined to no particular member, only to such as are *engaged*: a general *engagement* is said of an army when the whole body is *engaged*; partial *engagements* respect only such as are fought by small parties or companies of an army. History is mostly occupied with the details of *battles*: in the history of the Greeks and Romans, we

have likewise an account of the *combats* between men or wild beasts, which formed their principal amusement. It is reported of the German women, that whenever their husbands went to *battle* they used to go into the thickest of the *combat* to carry them provisions, or dress their wounds; and that sometimes they would take part in the *engagement*.

A battle bloody fought,
Where darkness and surprise made conquest
cheap. DRYDEN.

This brave man, with long resistance,
Held the combat doubtful. ROWE.

The relation of events becomes a moral lecture,
when the *combat* of honour is rewarded with
virtue. HAWKESWORTH.

The Emperor of Morocco commanded his
principal officers, that if he died during the *en-*
gagement, they should conceal his death from
the army. ADDISON.

TO BE, EXIST, SUBSIST.

BE, with its inflections, is to be traced through the northern and Oriental languages to the Hebrew *hovah*.

EXIST, in French *exister*, Latin *existo*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *sisto*, signifies to place or stand by itself or of itself. From this derivation of the latter verb arises the distinction in the use of the two words. The former is applicable either to the accidents of things, or to the substances or things themselves; the latter only to substances or things that stand or *exist* of themselves.

* We say of qualities, of forms, of actions, of arrangement, of movement, and of every different relation, whether real, ideal, or qualificative, that they *are*; we say of matter, of spirit, of body, and of all substances, that they *exist*. Man is man, and will *be* man under all circumstances and changes of life: he *exists* under every known climate and variety of heat or cold in the atmosphere.

Being and *existence* as nouns have this farther distinction, that the former is employed not only to designate the abstract action of *being*, but is metaphorically employed for the sensible object that *is*; the latter is confined altogether to the abstract sense. Hence we speak of human *beings*; *beings* animate or inanimate; the Supreme *Being*: but the *existence* of a

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Être, exister, subsister."

ably compounded of *con* and *veho* to carry with one.

TRANSPORT, in French *transporter*, Latin *transporto*, compounded of *trans* over, and *porto* to carry, signifies to carry to a distance.

To bear is simply to put the weight of any substance upon one's self; to carry is to remove that weight from the spot where it was: we always bear in carrying, but we do not always carry when we bear. Both may be applied to things as well as persons: whatever receives the weight of any thing bears it; whatever is caused to move with any thing carries it. That which cannot be easily borne must be burdensome to carry: in extremely hot weather it is sometimes irksome to bear the weight even of one's clothing; Virgil praises the pious Æneas for having carried his father on his shoulders in order to save him from the sacking of Troy. Weak people or weak things are not fit to bear heavy burdens; lazy people prefer to be carried rather than to carry any thing.

Since bear is confined to personal service it may be used in the sense of carry; when the latter implies the removal of any thing by means of any other body. The bearer of any letter or parcel is he who carries it in his hand; the carrier of parcels is he who employs a conveyance. Hence the word bear is often very appropriately substituted for carry, as Virgil praises Æneas for bearing his father on his shoulders. Convey and transport are species of carrying.

Carry in its particular sense is employed either for personal exertions or actions performed by the help of other means; convey and transport are employed for such actions as are performed not by immediate personal intervention or exertion: a porter carries goods on his knot; goods are conveyed in a waggon or a cart; they are transported in a vessel.

Convey expresses simply the mode of removing; transport annexes to this the idea of the place and the distance. Merchants get the goods conveyed into their warehouses which they have had transported from distant countries. Pedestrians take no more with them than what they can conveniently carry:

could armies do the same, one of the greatest obstacles to the indulgence of human ambition would be removed; for many an incursion into a peaceful country is defeated for the want of means to convey provisions sufficient for such numbers; and when mountains or deserts are to be traversed, another great difficulty presents itself in the transportation of artillery.

It is customary at funerals for some to bear the pall and others to carry wands or staves; the body itself is conveyed in a hearse, unless it has to cross the ocean, in which case it is transported in a vessel.

In hollow wood they floating armies bear.

DRYDEN.

A whale, besides those seas and oceans in the several vessels of his body which are filled with innumerable shoals of little animals, carries about him a whole world of inhabitants.

ANDERSON.

Love cannot, like the wind, itself convey
To all two sails, though both are spread one way.

HOWARD.

It is to navigation that men are indebted for the power of transporting the superfluous stock of one part of the earth to supply the wants of another.

ROBERTSON.

TO BEAR, *v.* To suffer.

TO BEAR DOWN, *v.* To overbear.

BEAST, *v.* Animal.

TO BEAT, STRIKE, HIT.

BEAT, in French *battre*, Latin *batus*, comes from the Hebrew *habat* to beat.

STRIKE, in Saxon *strican*, Danish *stricker*, &c. from *strictum*, participle of *stringo* to bind.

HIT, in Latin *ictus*, participle of *ico*, comes from the Hebrew *acat* to strike.

To beat is to redouble blows; to strike is to give one single blow; but the bare touching in consequence of an effort constitutes hitting. We never beat but with design, nor hit without an aim, but we may strike by accident. It is the part of the strong to beat; of the most vehement to strike; of the most sure sighted to hit.

Notwithstanding the declamations of philosophers as they please to style themselves, the practice of beating cannot altogether be discarded from the military or scholastic discipline. The master who strikes his pupil hastily is oftener impelled by the force of pas-

of paying a particular worship to a *beatified* object.

In the act of CANONIZATION, the Pope speaks as a judge after a judicial examination on the state, and decides the sort of worship which ought to be paid by the whole church.

BEATITUDE, *v.* *Happiness.*

BEAU, *v.* *Gallant.*

BEAUTIFUL, FINE, HANDSOME, PRETTY.

BEAUTIFUL, or full of *beauty*, in French *beauté*, comes from *beau*, *belle*, in Latin *bellus* fair, and *bonus* or *bonus* good.

FINE, in French *fin*, German *fein*, &c. not improbably comes from the Greek φαῖος bright, splendid, and φαῖος to appear, because what is *fine* is by distinction clear.

HANDSOME, from the word *hand*, denotes a species of *beauty* in the body, as *handy* denotes its agility and skill.

PRETTY, in Saxon *præte* adorned, German *prächtigt*, Swedish *praktigt* splendid, which is connected with our words, parade and pride.

Of these epithets, which denote what is pleasing to the eye, *beautiful* conveys the strongest meaning; it marks the possession of that in its fullest extent, of which the other terms denote the possession in part only. *Fineness*, *handsomeness*, and *prettiness*, are to *beauty* as parts to a whole. When taken in relation to persons, a woman is *beautiful* who in feature and complexion possesses a grand assemblage of graces; a woman is *fine*, who with a striking figure unites shape and symmetry; a woman is *handsome*, who has good features, and *pretty* if with symmetry of feature be united delicacy.

The *beautiful* is determined by fixed rules; it admits of no excess or defect; it comprehends regularity, proportion, and a due distribution of colour, and every particular which can engage the attention: the *fine* must be coupled with grandeur, majesty, and strength of figure; it is incompatible with that which is small; a little woman can never be *fine*: the *handsome* is a general assemblage of

what is agreeable; it is marked by no particular characteristic, but the absence of all deformity: *prettiness* is always coupled with simplicity, it is incompatible with that which is large: a tall woman with masculine features cannot be *pretty*.

Beauty will always have its charms; they are, however, but attractions for the eye; they please and awaken ardent sentiments for awhile; but the possessor must have something else to give her claims to lasting regard: this is, however, seldom the case: Providence has dealt out his gifts with a more even hand. Neither the *beautiful*, nor the *fine* woman has in general those durable attractions which belong either to the *handsome* or the *pretty*, who with a less inimitable tint of complexion, a less unerring proportion in the limbs, a less precise symmetry of feature, are frequently possessed of a sweetness of countenance, a vivacity in the eye, and a grace in the manner, that wins the beholder and inspires affection.

Beauty is peculiarly a female perfection, in the male sex it is rather a defect: a *beautiful* man will not be respected, because he cannot be respectable; the possession of *beauty* deprives him of his manly characteristics, boldness and energy of mind, strength and robustness of limb: but though a man may not be *beautiful* or *pretty*, he may be *fine* or *handsome*.

When relating to other objects, *beautiful*, *fine*, *pretty*, have a strong analogy; but *handsome* differs too essentially from the rest to admit of comparison. With respect to the objects of nature, the *beautiful* is displayed in the works of creation, and wherever it appears it is marked by elegance, variety, harmony, proportion; but above all, that softness which is peculiar to female *beauty*: the *fine*, on the contrary, is associated with the grand, and the *pretty* with the simple. The sky presents either a *beautiful* aspect, or a *fine* aspect; but not a *pretty* aspect. A rural scene is *beautiful* when it unites richness and diversity of natural objects with superior cultivation; it is *fine* when it presents the bolder and more impressive features of nature, consisting of rocks and mountains; it is *pretty*, when di-

have drawn the exact line between the decent and indecent, although fashion may sometimes draw females aside from this line: *fitness* varies with the seasons, or the circumstances of persons; what is *fit* for the winter is *unfit* for the summer, or what is *fit* for dry weather is *unfit* for the wet; what is *fit* for town is not *fit* for the country; what is *fit* for a healthy person is not *fit* for one that is infirm: *suitableness* accommodates itself to the external circumstances and conditions of persons; the house, the furniture, the equipage of a prince, must be *suitable* to his rank; the retinue of an ambassador must be *suitable* to the character which he has to maintain, and to the wealth, dignity, and importance of the nation, whose monarch he represents.

Gravity *becomes* a judge, or a clergyman, at all times: an unassuming tone is *becoming* in a child when he addresses his superiors. Decency requires a more than ordinary gravity when we are in the house of mourning or prayer; it is *indecent* for a child on the commission of a fault to affect a careless unconcern in the presence of those whom he has offended. There is a *fitness* or *unfitness* in persons for each other's society: education *fits* a person for the society of the noble, the wealthy, the polite, and the learned. There is a *suitableness* in people's tempers for each other; such a *suitability* is particularly requisite for those who are destined to live together: selfish people, with opposite taste and habits, can never be *suitable* companions.

Nothing ought to be held laudable or *becoming*, but what nature itself should prompt us to think so. STARR.

A Gothic bishop, perhaps, thought it proper to repeat such a form in such particular shoes or slippers; another fancied it would be very *decent* if such a part of public devotions were performed with a mitre on his head. ANDERSON.

To the wiser judgement of God it must be left to determine what is *fit* to be bestowed, and what to be withheld. BLAIR.

Raphael, amidst his tenderness and friendship for man, shows such a dignity and condescension in all his speech and behaviour, as are *suitable* to a superior nature. ANDERSON.

BECOMING, COMELY, GRACEFUL.

BECOMING, *v. Becoming, decent.*

COMELY, or *come* like, signifies coming or appearing as one would have it.

GRACEFUL signifies full of grace.

These epithets are employed to mark in general what is agreeable to the eye. *Becoming* denotes less than *comely*, and this less than *graceful*: nothing can be *comely* or *graceful* which is *unbecoming*; although many things are *becoming* which are neither *comely* or *graceful*.

Becoming respects the decorations of the person, and the exterior deportment; *comely* respects natural embellishments; *graceful* natural or artificial accomplishments: manner is *becoming*; figure is *comely*; air, figure, or attitude, is *graceful*.

Becoming is relative; it depends on taste and opinion; on accordance with the prevailing sentiments or particular circumstances of society: *comely* and *graceful* are absolute; they are qualities felt and acknowledged by all.

What is *becoming* is confined to no rank; the highest and the lowest have alike, the opportunity of doing or being, that which *becomes* their station: what is *comely* is seldom associated with great refinement and culture; what is *graceful* is rarely to be discovered apart from high rank, noble birth, or elevation of character.

The care of doing nothing *unbecoming* has accompanied the greatest minds to their last moments. Thus Cæsar gathered his robe about him that he might not fall in a manner *unbecoming* of himself. SPECTATOR.

The *comeliness* of person, and the decency of behaviour, add infinite weight to what is pronounced by any one. SPECTATOR.

To make the acknowledgement of a fault in the highest manner *graceful*, it is lucky when the circumstances of the offender place him above any ill-consequences from the resentment of the person offended. STERLE.

TO BE CONSCIOUS, *v. To feel.*

TO BE DEFICIENT, *v. To fail.*

TO BEDEW, *v. To sprinkle.*

TO BEG, DESIRE.

BEG, *v. To ask, beg.*

DESIRE, in French *desir*, Latin *desidero*, comes from *desido* to fix the mind on an object.

To *beg*, marks the wish; to *desire*, the will and determination.

pounded of cor the heart, and do to give, signifies also giving the heart.

TRUST is connected with the old word *trow*, in Saxon *treowian*, German *trauen*, old German *thrawân*, *thruwen*, &c. to hold true, and probably from the Greek *thaptein* to have confidence, signifying to depend upon as true.

FAITH, in Latin *fides* from *fido* to confide, signifies also dependance upon as true.

Belief is the generic term, the others specific; we *believe* when we *credit* and *trust*, but not always vice versa. *Belief* rests on no particular person or thing; but *credit* and *trust* rest on the authority of one or more individuals. Every thing is the subject of *belief* which produces one's assent: the events of human life are credited upon the authority of the narrator: the words, promises, or the integrity of individuals are *trusted*: the power of persons and the virtue of things are objects of *faith*.

Belief and *credit* are particular actions, or sentiments: *trust* and *faith* are permanent dispositions of the mind. Things are entitled to our *belief*; persons are entitled to our *credit*: but people repose a *trust* in others; or have a *faith* in others.

Our *belief* or *unbelief* is not always regulated by our reasoning faculties or the truth of things: we often *believe* from prejudice and ignorance, things to be true which are very false. With the bulk of mankind, assurance goes farther than any thing else in obtaining *credit*: gross falsehoods, pronounced with confidence, will be *credited* sooner than plain truths told in an unvarnished style. There are no disappointments more severe than those which we feel on finding that we have *trusted* to men of base principles. Ignorant people have commonly a more implicit *faith* in any nostrum recommended to them by persons of their own class, than in the prescriptions of professional men regularly educated.

Oh! I've heard him talk
Like the first-born child of love, when every word
Spoke in his eyes, and wept to be *believ'd*,
And all to ruin me. SOUTHERN.

Oh! I will *credit* my Scamandra's tears!
Nor think them drops of chance like other
women's. LEE.

Capricious man! To good or ill inconstant:
Too much to fear or trust is equal weakness.

JOHNSON.

For *faith* repos'd on seas and on the star'ring sky,
Thy naked corpse is doom'd on shores unknown
to lie. DRYDEN.

Belief, *trust*, and *faith*, have a religious application, which *credit* has not. *Belief* is simply an act of the understanding; *trust* and *faith* are active moving principles of the mind in which the heart is concerned. *Belief* does not extend beyond an assent of the mind to any given proposition; *trust* and *faith* are lively sentiments which impel to action. *Belief* is to *trust* and *faith* as cause to effect: there may be *belief* without either *trust* or *faith*; but there can be no *trust* or *faith* without *belief*: we *believe* that there is a God, who is the creator and preserver of all his creatures; we therefore *trust* in him for his protection of ourselves: we *believe* that Jesus Christ died for the sins of men; we have therefore *faith* in his redeeming grace to save us from our sins.

Belief is common to all religions: *trust* is peculiar to the *believers* in Divine revelation: *faith* is employed by distinction for the Christian *faith*. *Belief* is purely speculative; and *trust* and *faith* are operative: the former operates on the mind; the latter on the outward conduct. *Trust* in God serves to dispel all anxious concern about the future. "*Faith*," says the Apostle, "is dead without works." Theorists substitute *belief* for *faith*; enthusiasts mistake passion for *faith*. True *faith* must be grounded on a right *belief*, and accompanied with a right practice.

The Epicureans contented themselves with the denial of a Providence, asserting at the same time the existence of gods in general: because they would not shock the common *belief* of mankind. ADDISON.

What can be a stronger motive to a firm *trust* and reliance on the mercies of our Maker, than the giving us his Son to suffer for us? ADDISON.

The *faith* or persuasion of a Divine revelation is a divine *faith*, not only with respect to the object of it, but likewise in respect of the author of it, which is the Divine Spirit. TILLOTSON.

TO BELIEVE, *v.* To think.

BELoved, *v.* Amiable.

BELOW, *v.* Under.

TO BEMOAN, *v.* *To bewail.*

BEND, BENT,

BOTH abstract nouns from the verb *to bend*: the one to express its proper, and the other its moral application: a stick has a BEND; the mind has a BENT.

A *bend* in any thing that should be straight is a defect; a *bent* of the inclination that is not sanctioned by religion is detrimental to a person's moral character and peace of mind. For a vicious *bend* in a natural body there are various remedies; but nothing will cure a corrupt *bent* of the will except religion.

His coward lips did from their colour fly,
And that same eye whose bend does awe the
world,
Did lose his lustre.

SHAKESPEARE.

The soul does not always care to be in the same *bent*. The faculties relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional pleasure from the novelty of those objects about which they are conversant.

ADDISON.

TO BEND, *v.* *To lean.*

TO BEND, *v.* *To turn.*

BENEATH, *v.* *Under.*

BENEFACTION, DONATION.

BENEFACTION, from the Latin *benefacio*, signifies the thing well done, or done for the good of others.

DONATION, from *dono* to give or present, signifies the sum presented.

Both these terms denote an act of charity, but the former comprehends more than the latter: a *benefaction* comprehends acts of personal service in general towards the indigent; *donation* respects simply the act of giving and the thing given. *Benefactions* are for private use; *donations* are for public service. A *benefactor* to the poor does not confine himself to the distribution of money; he enters into all their necessities, consults their individual cases, and suits his *benefactions* to their exigencies; his influence, his counsel, his purse, and his property, are employed for their good: his *donations* form the smallest part of the good which he will do.

The light and influence that the heavens bestow upon this lower world, though the lower world cannot equal their *benefaction*, yet with

a kind of grateful return, it reflects those rays that it cannot recompense.

SOUTH.

Temples and lands given to God are never, and plates, vestments, and other sacred utensils, are seldom consecrated: yet certain it is that after the *donation* of them to the church, it is as really a sacrilege to steal them as it is to pull down a church.

SOUTH.

BENEFICE, *v.* *Living.*

BENEFICENCE, *v.* *Benevolence.*

BENEFICENT, BOUNTIFUL, OR
BOUNTEOUS, MUNIFICENT,
GENEROUS, LIBERAL.

BENEFICENT, from *benefacio* (*v.* *Benefaction*).

BOUNTIFUL signifies full of bounty or goodness, from the French *bonté*, Latin *bonitas*.

MUNIFICENT, in Latin *munificus*, from *munus* and *facio*, signifies the quality of making presents.

GENEROUS, in French *généreux*, Latin *generosus*, of high blood, noble extraction, and consequently of a noble character.

LIBERAL, in French *libéral*, Latin *liberalis* from *liber* free, signifies the quality of being like a free man in distinction from a bondman, and by a natural association being of a free disposition, ready to communicate.

Beneficent respects every thing done for the good of others: *bounty*, *munificence*, and *generosity*, are species of *beneficence*: *liberality* is a qualification of all. The first two denote modes of action: the latter three either modes of action or modes of sentiment. The sincere well-wisher to his fellow-creatures is *beneficent* according to his means; he is *bountiful* in providing for the comfort and happiness of others; he is *munificent* in dispensing favours; he is *generous* in imparting his property; he is *liberal* in all he does.

Beneficence and *bounty* are characteristics of the Deity as well as of his creatures: *munificence*, *generosity*, and *liberality* are mere human qualities. *Beneficence* and *bounty* are the peculiar characteristics of the Deity: with him the will and the act of doing good are commensurate only with the power: he was *beneficent* to us as our Creator, and continues his *beneficence* to us by his daily preservation and protection; to some, however, he has

been more *bountiful* than to others, by providing them with an unequal share of the good things of this life.

The *beneficence* of man is regulated by the *bounty* of Providence: to whom much is given, from him much will be required. Instructed by his word, and illumined by that spark of benevolence which was infused into their souls with the breath of life, good men are ready to believe that they are but stewards of all God's gifts, holden for the use of such as are less *bountifully* provided. They will desire, as far as their powers extend, to imitate this feature of the Deity by bettering with their *beneficent* counsel and assistance the condition of all who require it, and by gladdening the hearts of many with their *bountiful* provisions.

Princes are *munificent*, friends are *generous*, patrons *liberal*. *Munificence* is measured by the quality and quantity of the thing bestowed; *generosity* by the extent of the sacrifice made; *liberality* by the warmth of the spirit discovered. A monarch displays his *munificence* in the presents which he sends by his ambassadors to another monarch. A *generous* man will wave his claims, however powerful they may be, when the accommodation or relief of another is in question. A *liberal* spirit does not stop to inquire the reason for giving, but gives when the occasion offers.

Munificence may spring either from ostentation or a becoming sense of dignity; *generosity* may spring either from a generous temper, or an easy unconcern about property; *liberality* of conduct is dictated by nothing but a warm heart and an expanded mind. *Munificence* is confined simply to giving, but we may be *generous* in assisting, and *liberal* in rewarding.

The most *beneficent* of all beings is he who hath an absolute fulness of perfection in himself, who gave existence to the universe, and so cannot be supposed to want that which he communicated.

GROVE.

Hail! Universal Lord, be *bounteous* still
To give us only good.

MILTON.

I esteem a habit of benignity greatly preferable to *munificence*.

STEELE AFTER CICERO.

We may with great confidence and equal truth affirm, that since there was such a thing as mankind in the world, there never was any heart truly great and generous, that was not also tender and compassionate.

SCOTT.

The citizen, above all other men, has opportunities of arriving at the highest fruit of wealth, to be *liberal* without the least expense of a man's own fortune.

STEELE.

BENEFIT, FAVOUR, KINDNESS, CIVILITY.

BENEFIT signifies here that which benefits (*v. Advantage, benefit*).

FAVOUR, in French *faueur*, Latin *favor* and *faveo* to bear good will, signifies the act flowing from good will.

KINDNESS signifies an action that is kind (*v. Affectionate*).

CIVILITY signifies that which is civil (*v. Civil*).

The idea of an action gratuitously performed for the advantage of another is common to these terms.

Benefits and *favours* are granted by superiors; *kindnesses* and *civilities* pass between equals.

Benefits serve to relieve actual wants: the power of conferring and the necessity of receiving, constitute the relative difference in station between the giver and the receiver: *favours* tend to promote the interest or convenience: the power of giving and the advantage of receiving are dependant on local circumstances, more than on difference of station. *Kindnesses* and *civilities* serve to afford mutual accommodation by a reciprocity of kind offices on the many and various occasions which offer in human life: they are not so important as either *benefits* or *favours*, but they carry a charm with them which is not possessed by the former. *Kindnesses* are more endearing than *civilities*, and pass mostly between those who are known to each other: *civilities* may pass between strangers.

Dependance affords an opportunity for conferring *benefits*; partiality gives rise to *favours*: *kindnesses* are the result of personal regard; *civilities*, of general benevolence. A master confers his *benefits* on such of his domestics as are entitled to encouragement for their fidelity. Men in power distribute their *favours* so as to increase their influence. Friends, in their intercourse with each other, are perpetually called upon to perform *kindnesses* for each other. There is no man so mean that he may not have it in his power to show *civilities* to those who are above him.

Benefits tend to draw those closer to each other who by station of life are set at the greatest distance from each other: affection is engendered in him who *benefits*; and devoted attachment in him who is *benefited*: *favours* increase obligation beyond its due limits; if they are not asked and granted with discretion, they may produce servility on the one hand, and haughtiness on the other. *Kindnesses* are the offspring and parent of affection; they convert our multiplied wants into so many enjoyments: *civilities* are the sweets which we gather in the way as we pass along the journey of life.

I think I have a right to conclude that there is such a thing as *generosity* in the world. Though if I were under a mistake in this, I should say as Cicero in relation to the immortality of the soul, I willingly err; for the contrary notion naturally teaches people to be ungrateful by possessing them with a persuasion concerning their benefactors, that they have no regard to them in the *benefits* they bestow. GROVE.

A *favour* well bestowed is almost as great an honour to him who confers it, as to him who receives it. What, indeed, makes for the superior reputation of the patron in this case is, that he is always surrounded with specious pretences of unworthy candidates. STEELE.

Ingratitude is too base to return a *kindness*, and too proud to regard it. SOUTH.

A common *civility* to an impertinent fellow often draws upon one a great many unforeseen troubles. STEELE.

BENEFIT, SERVICE, GOOD OFFICE.

BENEFIT, *v. Benefit, favour.*

SERVICE, *v. Advantage, benefit.*

OFFICE, in French *office*, Latin *officium* duty, from *officio* or *efficio* to effect, signifies the thing *effected*.

These terms, like the former (*v. Benefit, favour*), agree in denoting some action performed for the good of another, but they differ in the principle on which the action is performed.

A *benefit* is perfectly gratuitous, it produces an obligation: a *service* is not altogether gratuitous; it is that at least which may be expected, though it cannot be demanded: a *good office* is between the two; it is in part gratuitous, and in part such as one may reasonably expect.

Benefits flow from superiors, and *services* from inferiors or equals; but

good offices are performed by equals only.

Princes confer *benefits* on their subjects; subjects perform *services* for their princes: neighbours do *good offices* for each other.

Benefits are sometimes the reward of *services*: *good offices* produce a return from the receiver.

Benefits consist of such things as serve to relieve the difficulties, or advance the interests, of the receiver: *services* consist in those acts which tend to lessen the trouble, or increase the ease and convenience, of the person served: *good offices* consist in the employ of one's credit, influence, and mediation for the advantage of another; it is a species of voluntary service.

Humanity leads to *benefits*; the zeal of devotion or friendship renders *services*; general good will dictates *good offices*.

It is a great *benefit* to assist an embarrassed tradesman out of his difficulty: it is a great *service* for a soldier to save the life of his commander, or for a friend to open the eyes of another to see his danger: it is a *good office* for any one to interpose his mediation to settle disputes, and heal divisions.

It is possible to be loaded with *benefits* so as to affect one's independence of character. *Services* are sometimes a source of dissatisfaction and disappointment when they do not meet with the remuneration or return which they are supposed to deserve. *Good offices* tend to nothing but the increase of good will. Those who perform them are too independent to expect a return, and those who receive them are too sensible of their value not to seek an opportunity for making a return.

I have often pleased myself with considering the two kinds of *benefits* which accrue to the public from these my speculations, and which, were I to speak after the manner of logicians, I should distinguish into the material and formal.

ADAMSON.

Cicero, whose learning and *services* to his country are so well known, was inflamed by a passion for glory to an extravagant degree.

HUGHES.

There are several persons who have many pleasures and entertainments in their possession which they do not enjoy. It is therefore a kind

and good office to acquaint them with their own happiness. GROVE.

BENEFIT, v. Advantage.

BENEFIT, v. Good, benefit.

BENEVOLENCE, BENEFICENCE.

BENEVOLENCE is literally well willing. **BENEFICENCE** is literally well doing. The former consists of intention, the latter of action: the former is the cause, the latter the result. *Benevolence* may exist without *beneficence*: but *beneficence* always supposes *benevolence*: a man is not said to be *beneficent* who does good from sinister views. The *benevolent* man enjoys but half his happiness if he cannot be *beneficent*; yet there will still remain to him an ample store of enjoyment in the contemplation of others' happiness: that man who is gratified only with that happiness of which he himself is the instrument of producing, is not entitled to the name of *benevolent*.

As *benevolence* is an affair of the heart, and *beneficence* of the outward conduct, the former is confined to no station, no rank, no degree of education or power: the poor may be *benevolent* as well as the rich, the unlearned as the learned, the weak as well as the strong: the latter on the contrary is controuled by outward circumstances, and is therefore principally confined to the rich, the powerful, the wise, and the learned.

The pity which arises on sight of persons in distress, and the satisfaction of mind which is the consequence of having removed them into a happier state, are instead of a thousand arguments to prove such a thing as a disinterested *benevolence*. GROVE.

He that banishes gratitude from among men, by so doing stops up the stream of *beneficence*: for though, in conferring kindness, a truly generous man doth not aim at a return, yet he looks to the qualities of the person obliged. GROVE.

BENEVOLENCE, BENIGNITY, HUMANITY, KINDNESS, TENDERNESS.

BENEVOLENCE, v. Benevolence.

BENIGNITY, in Latin *benignitas*, from *bene* and *gigno*, signifies the quality or disposition for producing good.

HUMANITY, in French *humanité*,

Latin *humanitas* from *humanus* and *homo*, signifies the quality of belonging to a man, or having what is common to man.

KINDNESS from *kind* (v. *Affectionate*).

TENDERNESS, from *tender*, is in Latin *tener*, Greek *τὸ τενερόν*.

Benevolence and *benignity* lie in the will; *humanity* lies in the heart; *kindness* and *tenderness* in the affections: *benevolence* indicates a general good will to all mankind; *benignity* a particular good will, flowing out of certain relations; *humanity* is a general tone of feeling; *kindness* and *tenderness* are particular modes of feeling.

Benevolence consists in the wish or intention to do good; it is confined to no station or object: the *benevolent* man may be rich or poor, and his *benevolence* will be exerted wherever there is an opportunity of doing good: *benignity* is always associated with power, and accompanied with condescension.

Benevolence in its fullest sense is the sum of moral excellence, and comprehends every other virtue; when taken in this acceptation, *benignity*, *humanity*, *kindness*, and *tenderness*, are but modes of *benevolence*.

Benevolence and *benignity* tend to the communicating of happiness; *humanity* is concerned in the removal of evil. *Benevolence* is common to the Creator and his creatures; it differs only in degree; the former has the knowledge and power as well as the will to do good; man often has the will to do good without having the power to carry it into effect. *Benignity* is ascribed to the stars, to heaven, or to princes; ignorant and superstitious people are apt to ascribe their good fortune to the *benign* influence of the stars rather than to the gracious dispensations of Providence. *Humanity* belongs to man only; it is his peculiar characteristic, and ought at all times to be his boast; when he throws off this his distinguishing badge, he loses every thing valuable in him; it is a virtue that is indispensable in his present suffering condition: *humanity* is as universal in its application as *benevolence*; wherever there is distress, *humanity* flies

[illegible]

circumstances or situations which preclude the exercise of it. Next to the pleasure of being happy, the *beneficence* of seeing them so: the influence of a *benevolent* prince reaches to the remotest corners of his dominions: *benignity* is a necessary attribute for a prince, when he is called upon to sanction vice or to punish it: it is highly to be applauded in him as far as it renders him indulgent of minor offences, grateful to those who are deserving of his favour, and ready to afford a gratification to whom it is in his power to do so. The multiplied misfortunes to which men are exposed afford many opportunities for the exercise of *humanity*, which in consequence of the unequal distribution of wealth, power, and rank is peculiar to no situation of life: even the profession of arms does not exclude *humanity* from the conduct of its followers; and when we observe men's habits of thinking in various situations, we may remark that the soldier, with arms by his side, is commonly more *humane* than the partisan with arms in his hand. *Kindness* is always an amiable quality, and in a grateful mind it begets *kindness*; but it is sometimes ill bestowed upon selfish persons who requite it by making excessive exactions: *tenderness* is frequently little better than an amiable weakness, when directed to a wrong object, and fixed on an improper object; the *tenderness* of parents has been the ruin of children.

nor need say, that Pope Clement XI.

never passes through the people, who always kneel in crowds and ask his benediction, but the tears are seen to flow from his eyes. This must proceed from an imagination that he is the father of all these people, and that he is touched with so extensive a *benerolence*, that it breaks out into a passion of tears. STERIE.

A constant *benignity* in commerce with the rest of the world, which ought to run through all a man's actions, has effects more useful to those whom you oblige, and is less ostentation in yourself.

STEELE.

The greatest wits I have conversed with are men eminent for their *humanity*. Anonox.

Benevolence, would the followers of Epicurus say, is all founded in weakness ; and whatever be pretended, the *kindness* that passeth between men and men is by every man directed to himself. This it must be confessed is of a piece with that hopeful philosophy which, having patched man up out of the four elements, attributes his being to chance.

GROVE.

Dependence is a perpetual call upon *humanity*, and a greater incitement to *tenderness* and *pity* than any other motive whatsoever.

ADDISON.

BENIGNITY, v. *Benevolence.*

**BENT, CURVED, CROOKED,
AWRY.**

BENT, from *bend*, in Saxon *bendan*, is a variation of *wind*, in the sea phraseology *wend*, in German *winden*, &c. from the Hebrew *onad* to wind or turn.

CURVED is in Latin *curvus*, in Greek *καρτός*, Æolice *καϊτός*.

CROOKED, v. *Awkward.*

AWRY is a variation of **writhed**, *v.*
To turn.

Bent is here the generic term, all the rest are but modes of the *bent*: what is *bent* is opposed to that which is straight; things may therefore be *bent* to any degree, but when *curved* they are *bent* only to a small degree; when *crooked* they are *bent* to a great degree: a stick is *bent* any way; it is *curved* by being *bent* one specific way; it is *crooked* by being *bent* different ways.

Things may be *bent* by accident or design ; they are *curved* by design, or according to some rule ; they are *crooked* by accident or in violation of some rule : a stick is *bent* by the force of the hand ; a line is *curved* so as to make a mathematical figure ; it is *crooked* so as to lose all figure : *wavy* marks a species of *crookedness*, but *crooked* is applied as an

pathet, and *awry* is employed to characterise the action; hence we speak of a *crooked* thing, and of sitting or standing *awry*.

And when too closely press'd, she quits the ground,
From her *bent* bow she sends a backward wound.
DRYDEN.

Another thing observable in and from the spots is that they describe various paths or lines over the sun, sometimes straight, sometimes curved towards one pole of the sun.
DERHAM.

It is the ennobling office of the understanding to correct the fallacious and mistaken reports of the senses, and to assure us that the staff in the water is straight, though our eye would tell us it is *crooked*.
BOOTH.

Preventing fate directs the lance *awry*,
Which glancing only mark'd Achates' thigh.
DRYDEN.

BENT, BIAS, INCLINATION, PREPOSSESSION.

BENT, *v. Bend, bent*.

BIAS, in French *biais*, signifies a weight fixed on one side of a bowl in order to turn its course that way towards which the *bias* leans, from the Greek *βίαι* force.

INCLINATION, in French *inclination*, Latin *inclinatio*, from *inclino*, signifies a leaning towards.

PREPOSSESSION, compounded of *pre* and *possession*, signifies the taking *possession* of the mind previously, or beforehand.

All these terms denote a preponderating influence on the mind. *Bent* is applied to the wills, affections, and powers in general; *bias* solely to the judgement; *inclination* and *prepossession* to the state of the feelings. The *bent* includes the general state of the mind, and the object on which it fixes a regard: *bias*, the particular influential power which sways the judging faculty: the one is absolutely considered with regard to itself; the other relatively to its results and the object it acts upon.

Bent is sometimes with regard to *bias*, as cause is to effect; we may frequently trace in the particular *bent* of a person's likes and dislikes the principal *bias* which determines his opinions. *Inclination* is a faint kind of *bent*; *prepossession* is a weak species of *bias*: an *inclination* is a state of something, namely, a state of the

feelings; *prepossession* is an actual something, namely, the thing that *prepossesses*.

We may discover the *bent* of a person's mind in his gay or serious moments; in his occupations, and in his pleasures; in some persons it is so strong, that scarcely an action passes which is not more or less influenced by it, and even the exterior of a man will be under its control: in all disputed matters the support of a party will operate more or less to *bias* the minds of men for or against particular men, or particular measures: when we are attached to the party that espouses the cause of religion and good order, this *bias* is in some measure commendable and salutary: a mind without *inclination* would be a blank, and where *inclination* is, there is the ground-work for *prepossession*. Strong minds will be strongly *bent*, and labour under a strong *bias*; but there is no mind so weak and powerless as not to have its *inclinations*, and none so perfect as to be without its *prepossessions*: the mind that has virtuous *inclinations* will be *prepossessed* in favour of every thing that leans to virtue's side; well for mankind were this the only *prepossession*; but in the present mixture of truth and error, it is necessary to guard against *prepossessions* as dangerous anticipations of the judgement; if their object be not perfectly pure, or their force be not qualified by the restrictive powers of the judgement, much evil springs from their abuse.

Servile *inclinations*, and gross love,
The guilty *bent* of vicious appetite.
HAYWARD.

The choice of man's will is indeed uncertain, because in many things free; but yet there are certain habits and principles in the soul that have some kind of sway upon it, apt to bias it more one way than another.
BOOTH.

I take it for a rule, that in marriage the chief business is to acquire a *prepossession* in favour of each other.
STEELE.

'Tis not indulging private *inclination*,
The selfish passions, that sustains the world,
And lends its ruler grace.
THOMSON.

BENT, *v. Bend*.

BENT, *v. Turn*.

BENUMB, *v. Numb*.

BEQUEATH, *v. Devise*.

TO BEREAVE, DEPRIVE, STRIP.

BEREAVE, in Saxon *beresian*, German *berauben*, &c. is compounded of *be* and *reave* or *rob*, Saxon *reafian*, German *rauben*, low German *roofen*, &c. Latin *rapina* and *rapio* to catch or seize, signifying to take away contrary to one's wishes.

DEPRIVE, compounded of *de* and *prive*, French *priver*, Latin *privo*, from *privus* private, signifies to make that one's own which was another's.

STRIP is in German *streifen*, low German *streipen*, *stroepen*, Swedish *ströfva*, probably changed from the Latin *surrupio* to snatch by stealth.

To *bereave* expresses more than *deprive*, but less than *strip*, which in this sense is figurative, and denotes a total *bereavement*: one is *bereaved* of children, *deprived* of pleasures, and *stripped* of property: we are *bereaved* of that on which we set most value; the act of *bereaving* does violence to our inclination: we are *deprived* of the ordinary comforts and conveniences of life; they cease to be ours: we are *stripped* of the things which we most want; we are thereby rendered as it were naked. *Deprivations* are preparatory to *bereavements*; if we cannot bear the one patiently, we may expect to sink under the other; common prudence should teach us to look with unconcern on our *deprivations*: Christian faith should enable us to consider every *bereavement* as a step to perfection; that when *stripped* of all worldly goods we may be invested with those more exalted and lasting honours which await the faithful disciple of Christ.

We are *bereaved* of our dearest hopes and enjoyments by the dispensations of Providence: casualties *deprive* us of many little advantages or gratifications which fall in our way: men are active in *stripping* each other of their just rights and privileges.

O first created Being, and thou great Word,
Let there be light, and light was over all;
Why am I thus bereav'd thy prime decree?

MILTON.

Too daring bard! whose unsuccessful pride
Th' immortal muses in their art defied;
Th' avenging muses of the light of day
Depriv'd his eyes, and snatch'd his voice away.

PORR.

From the uncertainty of life, moralists have endeavoured to sink the estimation of its pleasures, and if they could not *strip* the seductions of vice of their present enjoyment, at least to load them with the fear of their end.

MACKENZIE.

TO BE RESPONSIBLE, *v.* To guarantee.

TO BE SECURITY, *v.* To guarantee.

TO BE SENSIBLE, *v.* To fear.

TO BESEECH, *v.* To beg.

BESIDES, MOREOVER.

BESIDES, that is, by the *side*, next to, marks simply the connexion which subsists between what goes before and what follows.

MOREOVER, that is, more than all else, marks the addition of something particular to what has already been said.

Thus in enumerating the good qualities of an individual, we may say, "he is *besides* of a peaceable disposition." On concluding any subject of question we may introduce a farther clause by a *moreover*: "*Moreover* we must not forget the claims of those who will suffer by such a change."

Now, the best way in the world for a man to seem to be any thing, is really to be what he would seem to be. *Besides*, that it is many times as troublesome to make good the pretence of a good quality as to have it. TILLOTSON.

It being granted that God governs the world, it will follow also that he does it by means suitable to the natures of the things that he governs; and *moreover* man being by nature a free, moral agent, and so capable of deviating from his duty, as well as performing it, it is necessary that he should be governed by laws. SEWAL.

BESIDES, EXCEPT.

BESIDES (*v.* *Moreover*), which is here taken as a preposition, expresses the idea of addition. **EXCEPT** expresses that of exclusion.

There were many there *besides* ourselves; no one *except* ourselves will be admitted.

Besides impiety, discontent carries along with it as its inseparable concomitants, several other sinful passions. BLAIR.

Neither jealousy nor envy can dwell with the Supreme Being. He is a rival to none, he is an enemy to none, *except* to such as, by rebellion against his laws, seek enmity with him. BLAIR.

TO BESTOW, *v.* To allow, grant.

TO BESTOW, *v.* To confer.

TO BESTOW, *v.* To give.

BETIMES, *v.* Soon.

TO BETOKEN, *v.* To augur.

TO BETTER, *v.* To amend.

TO BEWAIL, BEMOAN, LAMENT.

BEWAIL is compounded of *be* and *wail*, which is probably connected with the word *woe*, signifying to express sorrow.

BEMOAN compounded of *be* and *moun*, signifies to indicate grief with *moans*.

LAMENT, in French *lamente*, Latin *lamentor* or *lamentum*, probably from the Greek *κλαυμα* and *κλαιω* to cry out with grief.

All these terms mark an expression of pain by some external sign. *Bewail* is not so strong as *bemoan*, but stronger than *lament*; *bewail* and *bemoan* are expressions of unrestrained grief or anguish: a wretched mother *bewails* the loss of her child; a person in deep distress *bemoans* his hard fate: *lamentation* may arise from simple sorrow or even imaginary grievances: a sensualist *laments* the disappointment of some expected gratification.

Bewail and *bemoan* are always indecorous if not sinful expressions of grief, which are inconsistent with the profession of a Christian; they are common among the uncultivated, who have not a proper principle to restrain the intemperance of their feelings. There is nothing temporal which is so dear to any one that he ought to *bewail* its loss; nor any condition of things so distressing or desperate as to make a man *bemoan* his lot. *Lamentations* are sometimes allowable: the miseries of others, or our own infirmities and sins, may justly be *lamented*.

TO BEWITCH, *v.* To charm.

BEYOND, *v.* Above.

BIAS, PREPOSSESSION, PREJUDICE.

BIAS, *v.* Bent, bias.

PREPOSSESSION, *v.* Bent, bias.

PREJUDICE, in French *prejudice*,

Latin *prejudicium*, compounded of *præ* before, and *judicium* judgment, signifies a judgment before hand, that is, before examination.

Bias mark the state of the mind; *prepossession* applies either to the general or particular state of the feelings; *prejudice* is employed only for opinions. Children may receive an early *bias* that influences their future character and destiny: *prepossessions* spring from casualties; they do not exist in young minds: *prejudices* are the fruits of a contracted education. Physical infirmities often give a strong *bias* to serious pursuits: *prepossessions* created by outward appearances are not always fallacious: it is at present the fashion to brand every thing with the name of *prejudice*, which does not coincide with the lax notions of the age. A *bias* may be overpowered, a *prepossession* overcome, and a *prejudice* corrected or removed.

We may be *biassed* for or against; we are always *prepossessed* in favour, and mostly *prejudiced* against.

It should be the principal labour of moral writers to remove the *bias* which inclines the mind rather to prefer natural than moral endowments.

HAWKSWORTH.

A man in power, who can, without the ordinary *prepossessions* which stop the way to the true knowledge and service of mankind, overlook the little distinctions of fortune, raise obscure merit, and discountenance successful indolence, has, in the minds of knowing men, the figure of an angel rather than a man.

STEELE.

It is the work of a philosopher to be every day subduing his passions, and laying aside his *prejudices*. I endeavour at least to look upon men and their actions only as an impartial spectator.

SPECTATOR.

BIAS, *v.* Bent.

TO BID, *v.* To call.

TO BID, *v.* To offer.

TO BID ADIEU, *v.* To leave, take leave.

TO BID FAREWELL, *v.* To leave, take leave.

BILL, *v.* Account.

BILLOW, *v.* Wave.

TO BIND, TIE.

BIND, in Saxon *binden*, German, &c. *binden*, comes from Latin *vincio*, Greek *σφινγω*, and is connected with the word *wind*.

the catholic religion is not recognized, it is a *bishopric*, but not a *diocese*. On the other hand, the *bishopric* of Rome or that of an archbishop comprehends all the *dioceses* of the subordinate bishops. Hence it arises that when we speak of the ecclesiastical distribution of a country, we term the divisions *bishoprics*; but when we speak of the actual office, we term it a *diocese*. England is divided into a certain number of *bishoprics*, not *dioceses*. Every bishop visits his *diocese*, not his *bishopric*, at stated intervals.

TO BLAME, REPROVE, REPROACH, UPBRAID, CENSURE, CONDEMN.

BLAME, in French *blamer*, probably from the Greek *βιβλαμμαι*, perfect of the verb *βλαπτω* to hurt, signifying to deal harshly with.

REPROVE, comes from the Latin *reptobo*, which signifies the contrary of *probo* to approve.

REPROACH, in French *reprocher*, compounded of *re* and *proche*, *proximus* near, signifies to bring near or cast back upon a person.

UPBRAID, compounded of *up* or *upon* and *braid*, signifies to hatch against one.

CENSURE, *v.* To accuse, censure.

CONDEMN, in French *condamner*, Latin *condemno*, compounded of *con* and *damno*, from *damnum* a loss or penalty, signifies to sentence to some penalty.

The expression of one's disapprobation of a person, or of that which he has done, is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but to *blame* expresses less than to *reprove*. We simply charge with a fault in *blaming*; but in *reproving* severity is mixed with the charge. *Reproach* expresses more than either; it is to *blame* acrimoniously. We need not hesitate to *blame* as occasion may require; but it is proper to be cautious how we deal out *reproof* where the necessity of the case does not fully warrant it; and it is highly culpable to *reproach* without the most substantial reason.

To *blame* and *reprove* are the acts of a superior; to *reproach*, *upbraid*, that of an equal: to *censure* and *condemn* leave the relative condition of

the agent and the sufferer undefined. Masters *blame* or *reprove* their servants; parents, their children; friends and acquaintances *reproach* and *upbraid* each other; persons of all conditions may *censure* or be *censured*, *condemn* or be *condemned*, according to circumstances.

Blame and *reproof* are dealt out on every ordinary occasion; *reproach* and *upbraid* respect personal matters, and always that which affects the moral character; *censure* and *condemnation* are provoked by faults and misconduct of different descriptions. Every fault, however trivial, may expose a person to *blame*, particularly if he perform any office for the vulgar, who are never contented. Intentional errors, however small, seem necessarily to call for *reproof*, and yet it is a mark of an imperious temper to substitute *reproof* in the place of admonition, when the latter might possibly answer the purpose. There is nothing which provokes a *reproach* sooner than ingratitude, although the offender is not entitled to so much notice from the injured person. Mutual *upbraidings* commonly follow between those who have mutually contributed to their misfortunes. The defective execution of a work is calculated to draw down *censure* upon its author, particularly if he betray a want of modesty. The mistakes of a general, or a minister of state, will provoke *condemnation*, particularly if his integrity be called in question.

Blame, *reproof*, and *upbraiding*, are always addressed directly to the individual in person; *reproach*, *censure*, and *condemnation*, are sometimes conveyed through an indirect channel, or not addressed at all to the party who is the object of them. When a master *blames* his servant, or a parent *reproves* his child, or one friend *upbraids* another, he directs his discourse to him to express his disapprobation. A man will always be *reproached* by his neighbours for the vices he commits, however he may fancy himself screened from their observation: writers *censure* each other in their publications: the conduct of individuals is sometimes *condemned* by the public at large.

Blame, *reproach*, *upbraid*, and

speck is a small *spot* ; and a *flaw*, which is confined to hard substances, mostly consists of a faulty indenture on the outer surface. A *blemish* tarnishes ; a *stain* spoils ; a *spot*, *speck*, or *flaw*, disfigures. A *blemish* is rectified, a *stain* wiped out, a *spot* or *speck* removed.

Blemish, *stain*, and *spot*, are employed figuratively. Even an imputation of what is improper in our moral conduct is a *blemish* in our reputation : the failings of a good man are so many *spots* in the bright hemisphere of his virtue : there are some vices which affix a *stain* on the character of nations, as well as of the individuals who are guilty of them. A *blemish* or a *spot* may be removed by a course of good conduct, but a *stain* is mostly indelible : it is as great a privilege to have an *unblemished* reputation, or a *spotless* character, as it is a misfortune to have the *stain* of bad actions affixed to our name.

It is impossible for authors to discover beauties in one another's works ; they have eyes only for *spots* and *blemishes*. ADDISON.

By length of time,
The scarf is worn away of each committed crime ;
No *speck* is left of their habitual *stains*,
But the pure ether of the soul remains. DRYDEN.

There are many who applaud themselves for the singularity of their judgment, which has searched deeper than others, and found a *flaw* in what the generality of mankind have admired. ADDISON.

BLEMISH, DEFECT, FAULT.

BLEMISH, *v.* *Blemish*, *stain*.

DEFECT, in Latin *defectus*, participle of *deficio* to fall short, signifies the thing falling short.

FAULT, from *fail*, in French *faute*, from *faillir*, in German *gefehlt*, participle of *fehlen*, probably comes from the Latin *falsus* false, *fallo* to deceive or be wanting, and the Hebrew *repal* to fall or decay, signifying what is wanting to truth or propriety.

Blemish respects the exterior of an object ; *defect* consists in the want of some specific propriety in an object ; *fault* conveys the idea not only of something wrong, but also of its relation to the author. There is a *blemish* in fine china ; a *defect* in the springs of a clock ; and a *fault* in the contrivance. An accident may cause a *blemish* in a fine painting ; the course of nature may occasion a *defect* in a

person's speech ; but the carelessness of the workman is evinced by the *faults* in the workmanship. A *blemish* may be easier remedied than a *defect* is corrected, or a *fault* repaired.

There is another particular which may be reckoned among the *blemishes*, or rather the false beauties, of our English tragedy : I mean those particular speeches which are commonly known by the name of *rants*. ADDISON.

It has been often remarked, though not without wonder, that a man is more jealous of his natural, than of his moral qualities ; perhaps it will no longer appear strange, if it be considered that natural *defects* are of necessity, and moral of choice. HAWKSWORTH.

The resentment which the discovery of a *fault* or folly produces must bear a certain proportion to our pride. JOHNSON.

TO BLEND, *v.* *To mix*.

BLESSEDNESS, *v.* *Happiness*.

BLIND, *v.* *Cloak*.

BLISS, *v.* *Happiness*.

BLOODY, *v.* *Sanguinary*.

BLOODTHIRSTY, *v.* *Sanguinary*.

TO BLOT OUT, EXPUNGE, RASE OR ERASE, EFFACE, CANCEL, OBLITERATE.

BLOT is in all probability a variation of *spot*, signifying to cover over with a *blot*.

EXPUNGE, in Latin *expungo*, compounded of *ex* and *pungo* to prick, signifies to put out by pricking with the pen.

ERASE, in Latin *erasus*, participle of *erado*, that is, *e* and *rado* to scratch out.

EFFACE, in French *effacer*, compounded of the Latin *e* and *facio* to make, signifies literally to make or put out.

CANCEL, in French *canceller*, Latin *cancello*, from *cancelli* lattice-work, signifies to strike out with cross lines.

OBLITERATE, in Latin *obliteratus*, participle of *oblitero*, compounded of *ob* and *litera*, signifies to cover over letters.

All these terms obviously refer to characters that are impressed on bodies ; the first three apply in the proper sense only to that which is written with the hand, and bespeak the manner in which the action is

a long instrument, like a stick. *Blows* may be given with the flat part of a sword, and *strokes* with a stick.

Blow is seldom used but in the proper sense; *stroke* sometimes figuratively, as a *stroke* of death, or a *stroke* of fortune.

The advance of the human mind towards any object of laudable pursuit may be compared to the progress of a body driven by a *blow*.

JOHNSON.

Penetrated to the heart with the recollection of his behaviour, and the unmerited pardon he had met with, Thrasippus was proceeding to execute vengeance on himself, by rushing on his sword, when Phistratus again interposed, and seizing his hand, stopped the *stroke*.

CUMBERLAND.

This declaration was a *stroke* which Evander had neither skill to elude, nor force to resist.

HAWKESWORTH.

BLUNDER, *v.* Error, mistake.

TO BOAST, *v.* To glory.

BOATMAN, *v.* Waterman.

BODILY, *v.* Corporeal.

BODY, CORPSE, CARCASE.

BODY is here taken in the improper sense for a dead *body*.

CORPSE, from the Latin *corpus* a body, has also been turned from its derivation, to signify a dead body.

CARCASE, in French *carcasse*, is compounded of *caro* and *cassa vita*, signifying flesh without life.

Body is applicable to either men or brutes, *corpse* to men only, and *carcase* to brutes only, unless when taken in a contemptuous sense. When speaking of any particular person who is deceased, we should use the simple term *body*; the *body* was suffered to lie too long unburied: when designating its condition as lifeless, the term *corpse* is preferable; he was taken up as a *corpse*: when designating the *body* as a lifeless lump separated from the soul, it may be characterized (though contemptuously) as a *carcase*; the fowls devour the *carcase*.

A *ghost*, as of a troubled ghost renew'd
My fright, and then these dreadful words ensued:
Why dost thou thus my buried *body* rend,
O! spare the *corpse* of thy unhappy friend.

DAYDEN.

On the bleak shore now lies th' abandon'd king,
A headless *carcase*, and a nameless thing.

DAYDEN.

BOISTEROUS, *v.* Violent.

BOLD, FEARLESS, INTREPID,
UNDAUNTED.

BOLD, *v.* Audacity.

FEARLESS signifies without fear (*v.* To apprehend).

INTREPID, compounded of *in* privative and *trepidus* trembling, marks the total absence of fear.

UNDAUNTED, of *un* privative and *daunted*, from the Latin *domitatus*, participle of *domitare* to impress with fear, signifies unimpressed or unmoved at the prospect of danger.

Boldness is positive; *fearlessness* is negative; we may therefore be *fearless* without being *bold*, or *fearless* through *boldness*: *fearlessness* is a temporary state: we may be *fearless* of danger at this, or at that time; *fearless* of loss, and the like: *boldness* is a characteristic; it is associated with constant *fearlessness*. *Intrepidity* and *undauntedness* denote a still higher degree of *fearlessness* than *boldness*: *boldness* is confident, it forgets the consequences; *intrepidity* is collected, it sees the danger, and faces it with composure; *undauntedness* is associated with unconquerable firmness and resolution; it is awed by nothing: the *bold* man proceeds on his enterprise with spirit and vivacity; the *intrepid* man calmly advances to the scene of death and destruction; the *undaunted* man keeps his countenance in the season of trial, in the midst of the most terrifying and overwhelming circumstances.

These good qualities may, without great care, degenerate into certain vices to which they are closely allied.

Of the three, *boldness* is the most questionable in its nature, unless justified by the absolute urgency of the case: in maintaining the cause of truth against the persecution of influence and power, it is an essential quality, but it may easily degenerate into insolent defiance and contempt of superiors; it may lead to the provoking of resentment and courting of persecution. *Intrepidity* may become rashness if the contempt of danger lead to an unnecessary exposure of the life and person. *Undauntedness*, in the presence of a brutal tyrant, may serve to baffle all his malignant purposes of revenge; but the same

spirit may be employed by the hardened villain to preserve himself from detection.

Such unheard of prodigies hang o'er us,
As make the boldest tremble. Young.

The careful hen
Calls all her chirping family around,
Fed and defended by the fearless cock.
Thomson.

A man who talks with intrepidity of the monsters of the wilderness, while they are out of sight, will readily confess his antipathy to a mole, a weasel, or a frog. Thus he goes on without any reproach from his own reflections. Johnson.

His party, press'd with numbers, soon grew faint,
And would have left their charge an easy prey;
Whilst he alone undaunted at the odds,
Though hopeless to escape, fought well and bravely. Rowe.

BOLD, *v.* Daring.

BOLD, *v.* Strenuous.

BOLDNESS, *v.* Audacity.

BOMBASTIC, *v.* Turgid.

BONDAGE, *v.* Servitude.

BOOTY, SPOIL, PREY.

THESE words mark a species of capture.

BOOTY, in French *butin*, Danish *bythe*, Dutch *buyt*, Teutonic *beute*, probably comes from the Teutonic *bat* a useful thing, denoting the thing taken for its use.

SPOIL, in French *depouillè*, Latin *spolium*, in Greek *σπυλον*, signifying the things stripped off from the dead, from *σπυλαα*, Hebrew *salal* to spoil.

PREY, in French *proie*, Latin *præda*, is not improbably changed from *prædo*, *prædo*, or *præhendo* to lay hold of, signifying the thing seized.

The first two are used as military terms or in attacks on an enemy, the latter in cases of particular violence. The soldier gets his *booty*; the combatant his *spoils*; the carnivorous animal his *prey*. *Booty* respects what is of personal service to the captor; *spoils* whatever serves to designate his triumph; *prey* includes whatever gratifies the appetite and is to be consumed. When a town is taken, soldiers are too busy in the work of destruction and mischief to carry away much *booty*; in every battle the arms and personal property of the slain enemy are the

lawful *spoils* of the victor; the hawk pounces on his *prey*, and carries him up to his nest.

Greediness stimulates to take *booty*; ambition produces an eagerness for *spoils*; a ferocious appetite impels to a search for *prey*. Among the ancients the prisoners of war who were made slaves constituted a part of their *booty*; and even in later periods such a capture was good *booty*, when ransom was paid for those who could liberate themselves. Among some savages the head or limb of an enemy constituted part of their *spoils*. Among cannibals the prisoners of war are the *prey* of the conquerors.

Booty and *prey* are often used in an extended and figurative sense. Plunderers obtain a rich *booty*; the diligent bee returns loaded with its *booty*.* It is necessary that animals should become a *prey* to man, in order that man may not become a *prey* to them; every thing in nature becomes a *prey* to another thing, which in its turn falls a *prey* to something else. All is change but order. Man is a *prey* to the diseases of his body or his mind, and after death to the worms.

When they (the French National Assembly) had finally determined on a state resource from church *booty*, they came on the 14th of April, 1790, to a solemn resolution on the subject.

BUNN.

'Twas in the dead of night, when sleep repairs
Our bodies worn with toils, our minds with
cares,

When Hector's ghost before my sight appears:
A bloody shroud he seem'd, and bath'd in tears,
Unlike that Hector who return'd from toils
Of war, triumphant in Æneas' spoils. Dryden.

The wolf, who from the nightly fold
Forth drags the bleating prey, ne'er drank her
milk,

Nor wore her warming fleece. Thomson.

BORDER, EDGE, RIM OR BRIM,
BRINK, MARGIN, VERGE.

BORDER, in French *bord* or *bordure*, Teutonic *bord*, is probably connected with *bret*, and the English *board*, from *brytan*, in Greek *σπῆλαι* to split.

EDGE, in Saxon *ege*, low German *egge*, high German *ecke* a point, Latin *acies*, Greek *ακμῆ* sharpness, signifies a sharp point.

RIM, in Saxon *rima*, high German

* Vide Roubaud: "Prole, butin."

rimmen a frame, *riemen* a thong, Greek *κύμα* a tract, from *κυω* to draw, signifies a line drawn round.

BRIM, BRINK, are but variations of *rim*.

MARGIN, in French *margin*, Latin *margo*, probably comes from *maris* the sea, as it is mostly connected with water.

VERGE, from the Latin *virga*, signifies a rod, but is here used in the improper sense for the extremity of an object.

Of these terms *border* is the least definite point, *edge* the most so; *rim* and *brink* are species of *edge*; *margin* and *verge* are species of *border*. A *border* is a stripe, an *edge* is a line. The *border* lies at a certain distance from the *edge*; the *edge* is the exterior termination of the surface of any substance. Whatever is wide enough to admit of any space round its circumference may have a *border*; whatever comes to a narrow extended surface has an *edge*. Many things may have both a *border* and an *edge*; of this description are caps, gowns, carpets, and the like; others have a *border* but no *edge*, as lands; and others have an *edge* but no *border*, as a knife or a table.

A *rim* is the *edge* of any vessel; the *brim* is the exterior *edge* of a cup; a *brink* is the *edge* of any precipice or deep place; a *margin* is the *border* of a book or a piece of water; a *verge* is the extreme *border* of a place.

So the pure limpid stream, when with foul stains
Of rushing torrents and descending rains,
Works itself clear, and as it runs refines,
Till by degrees the crystal mirror shines,
Reflects each flower that on its border grows.

ADDISON.

Met thought the shilling that lay upon the table
reared itself upon its edge, and turning its face
towards me opened its mouth.

ADDISON.

But Merion's spear o'ertook him as he flew,
Deep in the belly's rim an entrance found
Where sharp the pang, and mortal is the wound.

Pope.

As I approach the precipice's brink,
So steep, so terrible, appears the depth.

LANDSLOWNE.

By the sea's margin on the watery strand
Thy monument, Themistocles, shall stand.

CUMBERLAND.

To the earth's utmost verge I will pursue him;
No place, though e'er so holy, shall protect him.

Rowe.

BORDER, BOUNDARY, FRONTIER, CONFINES, PRECINCTS.

BORDER, *v.* *Border*, *edge*.

BOUNDARY, from *to bound* (*v.* *To bound*), expresses what *bounds*, *binds*, or *confines*.

FRONTIER, French *frontière*, from the Latin *frons* a forehead, signifies the forepart, or the commencement of the country.

CONFINES, in Latin *confinis*, compounded of *con* or *cum* and *finis* an end, signifies an end next to an end.

PRECINCT, in Latin *precinctum*, participle of *præcingo*, that is, *præ* and *cingo* to enclose, signifies any enclosed place.

All these terms are applied to land, except the latter, which may apply to space in general. *Border* marks the extremities of one country in relation to another, as the *borders* of Scotland; *boundary* respects the prescribed limits of any place, as the *boundaries* of a village; *frontiers* denote the commencement of a country, as the *frontiers* of Germany or France; and *confines* those parts adjoining, or lying contiguous to any given place or district.

Borders and *frontiers* are said of a country only; *boundary* and *confines* of any smaller political division. The inhabitants who lived on the *borders* of England and Scotland were formerly called *borderers*, and distinguished themselves by their perpetual broils and mutual animosities, which now happily exist nowhere but in the pages of the historian: the *boundaries* of kingdoms, countries, and provinces, are distinguished on general maps; those of towns and villages on particular maps: it is common on the *frontiers* of continental kingdoms to require a pass from every one who wishes to enter the country: we may speak of the *confines* between Germany and Holland, but with more propriety of the *confines* between the different states of Germany, as also in former times of the *confines* betwixt the Sabines, the Æqui, Volsci, and other small communities which existed in Italy previous to the establishment of the Roman empire.

we *limit* and *confine*, but we may *re-strict* without *limiting* or *confining*: to *limit* and *confine* are the acts of things upon persons, or persons upon persons; but *restrict* is only the act of persons upon persons: we are *limited* or *confined* only to a certain degree, but we may be *restricted* to an indefinite degree: the *limiting* and *confining* depend often on ourselves; the *restriction* depends upon the will of others: a person *limits* himself to so many hours' work in a day; an author *confines* himself to a particular branch of a subject; a person is *restricted* by his physician to a certain portion of food in the day: to be *confined* to a certain spot is irksome to one who has always had his liberty; but to be *restricted* in all his actions would be intolerable.

Our greatest happiness consists in *bounding* our desires to our condition: it is prudent to *limit* our exertions, when we find them prejudicial to our health: it is necessary to *confine* our attention to one object at a time: it is unfortunate to be *circumscribed* in our means of doing good: it is painful to be *restricted* in the enjoyment of innocent pleasure.

Bounded is opposed to *unbounded*, *limited* to *extended*, *confined* to *expanded*, *circumscribed* to *ample*, *restricted* to *unshackled*.

The operations of the mind are not, like those of the hands, *limited* to one individual object, but at once extended to a whole species.

BARTELET.

Mechanical motions or operations are *confined* to a narrow circle of low and little things.

BARTELET.

My passion is too strong
In reason's narrow bounds to be confin'd.

WANDERFORD.

It is much to be lamented that among all denunciations of Christians, the uncharitable spirit has prevailed of unwarrantably *circumscribing* the terms of Divine grace within a narrow circle of their own drawing.

BLAIR.

It is not necessary to teach men to thirst after power; but it is very expedient that by moral instructions they should be taught, and by their civil institutions they should be compelled to put many *restrictions* upon the immoderate exercise of it.

BLACKSTONE.

BOUNDLESS, UNBOUNDED,

UNLIMITED, INFINITE.

BOUNDLESS, or without *bounds*, is applied to infinite objects which

admit of no *bounds* to be made or conceived by us.

UNBOUNDED, or not *bounded*, is applied to that which might be *bounded*.

UNLIMITED, or not *limited*, applies to that which might be *limited*.

INFINITE, or not *finite*, applies to that which in its nature admits of no *bounds*.

The ocean is a *boundless* object so long as no *bounds* to it have been discovered; desires are often *unbounded* which ought always to be *bounded*; and power is sometimes *unlimited* which is always better *limited*; nothing is *infinite* but that Being from whom all *finite* beings proceed.

And see the country far diffus'd around
One *boundless* blush, one white empurpled
shower

Of mingled blossoms.

THOMSON.

The soul requires enjoyments more sublime,
By space *unbounded*, undestroy'd by time.

JENYNS.

Gray's curiosity was *unlimited*, and his judgment cultivated.

JOHNSON.

In the wide fields of nature the sight wanders up and down without *confinement*, and is fed with an *infinite* variety of images.

ADAMSON.

BOUNDS, BOUNDARY.

BOUNDS and BOUNDARY, from the verb *bound* (*v. To bound*), signify the line which sets a *bound*, or marks the extent to which any spot of ground reaches.

Bounds is employed to designate the whole space including the outer line that *confines*: *boundary* comprehends only this outer line. *Bounds* are made for a local purpose; *boundary* for a political purpose: the master of a school prescribes the *bounds* beyond which the scholar is not to go; the parishes throughout England have their *boundaries*, which are distinguished by marks; fields have likewise their *boundaries*, which are commonly marked out by a hedge or a ditch.

Bounds are temporary and changeable; *boundaries* permanent and fixed: whoever has the authority of prescribing *bounds* for others, may in like manner contract or extend them at pleasure; the *boundaries* of places are seldom altered, but in consequence of great political changes.

In the figurative sense *bound* or *bounds* is even more frequently used

brave the dangers which threaten them with evil; they *defy* the angry will which is set up to do them harm.

To *dare* and *challenge* are both direct and personal; but the former consists either of actions, words, or looks; the latter of words only. We *dare* a number of persons indefinitely; we *challenge* an individual, and very frequently by name.

Daring arises from our contempt of others; *challenging* arises from a high opinion of ourselves: the former is mostly accompanied with unbecoming expressions of disrespect as well as aggravation; the latter is mostly divested of all angry personality. Metius the Tuscan *dared* Titus Manlius Torquatus, the son of the Roman consul, to engage with him in contradiction to his father's commands: Paris was persuaded to *challenge* Menelaus in order to terminate the Grecian war.

We *dare* only to acts of violence; we *challenge* to any kind of contest in which the skill or the power of the parties are to be tried. It is folly to *dare* one of superior strength if we are not prepared to meet with the just reward of our impertinence: whoever has a confidence in the justice of his cause, need not fear to *challenge* his opponent to a trial of their respective merits.

Joining in proper union the amiable and the estimable qualities: in one part of our character we shall resemble the flower that smiles in spring; in another the firmly-rooted tree, that *braves* the winter storm.

BLAIR.

The soul, secur'd in her existence, smiles
At the drawn dagger, and *defies* its point.

ANSON.

Troy sunk in flames I saw (nor could prevent),
And litum from its old foundations rent—
Rant like a mountain ash, which *dar'd* the winds,
And stood the sturdy strokes of lab'ring winds.

DRYDEN.

The Platos and Ciceros among the ancients; the Bacon, Boyle, and Locke, among our own countrymen; are all instances of what I have been saying, namely, that the greatest persons in all ages have conformed to the established religion of their country; not to mention any of the divines, however celebrated, since our adversaries *challenge* all those as men who have too much interest in this case to be impartial evidences.

BUDDELL.

BRAVERY, COURAGE, VALOUR.

BRAVERY denotes the abstract quality of *brave* (v. *Brave*).

COURAGE, in French *courage*, comes from *cœur*, in Latin *cor* the heart, which is the seat of *courage*.

VALOUR, in French *valeur*, Latin *valor*, from *valeo* to be strong, signifies by distinction strength of mind.

Bravery lies in the blood; *courage* lies in the mind: the former depends on the reason; the latter on the physical temperament: the first is a species of instinct; the second is a virtue: a man is *brave* in proportion as he is without thought; he has *courage* in proportion as he reasons or reflects.

Bravery seems to be something involuntary, a mechanical movement that does not depend on one's self: *courage* requires conviction, and gathers strength by delay; it is a noble and lofty sentiment: the force of example, the charms of music, the fury and tumult of battle, the desperation of the conflict, will make cowards *brave*; the *courageous* man wants no other incentives than what his own mind suggests.

Bravery is of utility only in the hour of attack or contest; *courage* is of service at all times and under all circumstances: *bravery* is of avail in overcoming the obstacle of the moment; *courage* seeks to avert the distant evil that may possibly arrive. *Bravery* is a thing of the moment that is or is not as circumstances may favour; it varies with the time and season: *courage* exists at all times and on all occasions. The *brave* man who fearlessly rushes to the mouth of the cannon may tremble at his own shadow as he passes through a churchyard, or turn pale at the sight of blood: the *courageous* man smiles at imaginary dangers, and prepares to meet those that are real.

It is as possible for a man to have *courage* without *bravery* as to have *bravery* without *courage*: Cicero betrayed his want of *bravery* when he sought to shelter himself against the attacks of Cataline; he displayed his *courage* when he laid open the treasonable purposes of this conspirator to the whole senate, and charged him to his face with the crimes of which he knew him to be guilty.

Valour is a higher quality than either *bravery* or *courage*, and seems to partake of the grand characteristics

sion wide *breaches* in families. The death of relatives often produces a sad *chasm* in the enjoyments of individuals.

A mighty *breach* is made: the rooms conceal'd
Appear, and all the palace is reveal'd. **DAYDEN.**

Considering probably, how much Homer had been disfigured by the arbitrary compilers of his works, Virgil, by his will, obliged Tucca and Varius to add nothing, nor so much as fill up the *breaks* he had left in his poem. **WALSH.**

Or if the order of the world below
Will not the gap of one whole day allow,
Give me that minute when she made her vow.

DAYDEN.

The whole *chasm* in nature, from a plant to a man, is filled up with diverse kinds of creatures.

ADDISON.

When *breach* of faith join'd hearts does dis-
engage,

The calmest temper turns to wildest rage. **LAR.**

TO BREAK, RACK, REND, TEAR.

BREAK, in Saxon *breacan*, Danish and Low German *breken*, High German *brechen*, Latin *frango*, Greek *σπνμι*, *σπνμι*, Chaldee *perak* to separate.

RACK comes from the same source as *break*; it is properly the root of this word, and an onomatopœia, conveying a sound correspondent with what is made by *breaking*: *rak* in Swedish, and *racco* in Icelandish signifies a *breaking* of the ice.

REND is in Saxon *hrendan*, *hredan*, low German *ritan*, high German *reissen* to split, Greek *incen*, Hebrew *rangnak* to break in pieces.

TEAR, in Saxon *taeran*, low German *tiren*, high German *zerren*, is an intensive verb from *ziehen* to pull, Greek *τινν τινν* to bruise, Hebrew *zor* to split, divide, or cleave.

The forcible division of any substance is the common characteristic of these terms.

Break is the generic term, the rest specific: every thing *racked*, *rent*, or *torn*, is broken, but not *vice versa*. *Break* has however a specific meaning, in which it is comparable with the others. *Breaking* requires less violence than either of the others: brittle things may be *broken* with the slightest touch, but nothing can be *racked* without intentional violence of an extraordinary kind. Glass is quickly *broken*; a table is *racked*. Hard substances only are *broken* or *racked*; but every thing of a soft texture and composition may be *rent* or *torn*.

Breaking is performed by means of a blow; *racking* by that of a violent concussion; but *rending* and *tearing* are the consequences of a pull. Any thing of wood or stone is *broken*; any thing of a complicated structure, with hinges and joints, is *racked*; cloth is *rent*, paper is *torn*. *Rend* is sometimes used for what is done by design; a *tear* is always faulty. Cloth is sometimes *rent* rather than cut when it is wanted to be divided; but when it is *torn* it is injured.

But out affection

All bond and privilege of nature break.

SHAKESPEARE.

Long has this secret struggl'd in my breast:

Long has it rack'd and rent my tortur'd bosom.

SMITH.

The people rend the skies with loud applause,
And heaven can hear no other name but yours.

DAYDEN.

She sigh'd, she sobb'd, and furious with despair,
She rent her garments, and she tore her hair.

DAYDEN.

Who would not bleed with transport for his
country,

Tear every tender passion from his heart?

THOMSON.

**TO BREAK, BRUISE, SQUEEZE,
POUND, CRUSH.**

BREAK, *v.* To break, rack.

BRUISE, in French *briser*, Saxon *brysed*, not improbably from the same source as press.

SQUEEZE, in Saxon *cwysin*, low German *quietsen*, *quoesen*, Swedish *quasa*, Latin *quatio* to shake, or produce a concussion.

POUND, in Saxon *puniar*, is not improbably derived by a change of letters from the Latin *tundo* to bruise.

CRUSH, in French *ecraser* is most probably only a variation of the word *squeeze*, like *crash*, or *squash*.

Break always implies the separation of the component parts of a body; *bruise* denotes simply the destroying the continuity of the parts. Hard brittle substances, as glass, are *broken*; soft pulpy substances, as flesh or fruits, are *bruised*.

The operation of *bruising* is performed either by a violent blow or by pressure; that of *squeezing* by compression only. Metals, particularly lead and silver, may be *bruised*; fruits may be either *bruised* or *squeezed*. In this latter sense *bruise* applies to the harder substances, or indicates a

brectan, is probably connected with *braten* to roast, being an operation principally performed by fire or heat.

ENGENDER, compounded of *en* and *gender*, from *genitus* participle of *gigno*, signifies to lay or communicate the seeds for production.

These terms are figuratively employed for the act of procreation.

To *breed* is to bring into existence by a slow operation: to *engender* is to be the author or prime cause of existence. So in the metaphorical sense, frequent quarrels are apt to *breed* hatred and animosity: the levelling and inconsistent conduct of the higher classes in the present age serves to *engender* a spirit of insubordination and assumption in the inferior order.

Whatever *breeds* acts gradually; whatever *engenders* produces immediately as cause and effect. Uncleanliness *breeds* diseases of the body; want of occupation *breeds* those of the mind: playing at chance games *engenders* a love of money.

The strong desire of fame *breeds* several vicious habits in the mind. ADDISON.

Eve's dream is full of those high conceits *engendering* pride, which, we are told, the Devil endeavoured to instil into her. ADDISON.

BREED, *v.* Race.

BREEDING, *v.* Education.

BREEZE, GALE, BLAST, GUST, STORM, TEMPEST, HURRICANE.

ALL these words express the action of the wind, in different degrees and under different circumstances.

BREEZE, in Italian *brezza*, is in all probability an onomatopœia for that kind of wind peculiar to southern climates.

GALE is probably connected with *call* and *yell*, denoting a sonorous wind.

BLAST, in German *geblasen*, participle of *blasen*, signifies properly the act of blowing, but by distinction it is employed for any strong effort of blowing.

GUST is immediately of Icelandic origin, and expresses the phenomena which are characteristic of the Northern climates; but in all probability

it is a variation of *gush*, signifying a violent stream of wind.

STORM, in German *sturm*, from *stören* to put in commotion, like *gust*, describes the phenomenon of Northern climates.

TEMPEST, in Latin *tempestas*, or *tempus* a time or season, describes that season or sort of weather which is most remarkable, but at the same time most frequent, in Southern climates.

HURRICANE has been introduced by the Spaniards into European languages from the Caribee Islands; where it describes that species of *tempestuous* wind most frequent in tropical climates.

A *breeze* is gentle; a *gale* is brisk, but steady: we have *breezes* in a calm summer's day; the mariner has favourable *gales* which keep the sails on the stretch. A *blast* is impetuous: the exhalations of a trumpet, the breath of bellows, the sweep of a violent wind, are *blasts*. A *gust* is sudden and vehement: *gusts* of wind are sometimes so violent as to sweep every thing before them while they last.

Storm, *tempest*, and *hurricane*, include other particulars besides wind.

A *storm* throws the whole atmosphere into commotion; it is a war of the elements, in which wind, rain, hail, and the like, conspire to disturb the heavens. *Tempest* is a species of *storm* which has also thunder and lightning to add to the confusion. *Hurricane* is a species of *storm* which exceeds all the rest in violence and duration.

Gust, *storm*, and *tempest*, which are applied figuratively, preserve their distinction in this sense. The passions are exposed to *gusts* and *storms*, to sudden bursts, or violent and continued agitations; the soul is exposed to *tempests* when agitated with violent and contending emotions.

Gradual slaks the breeze
Into a perfect calm. THOMSON.

What happy gale
Blows you to Padua here from old Verona? SHAKESPEARE.

As when fierce Northern blasts from th' Alps
descend,
From his firm roots with struggling gusts to rend
An aged sturdy oak, the rustling sound
Grows loud. DENHAM.

bring it; to *fetch* therefore is a species of *bringing*: whatever is near at hand is *brought*; whatever is at a distance must be *fetch*ed: the porter at an inn *brings* a parcel, the servant *fetches* it.

Bring always respects motion towards the place in which the speaker resides; *fetch*, a motion both to and from; *carry*, always a motion directly from the place or at a distance from the place. A servant *brings* the parcel home which his master has sent him to *fetch*; he *carries* a parcel from home. A *carrier carries* parcels to and from a place, but he does not *bring* parcels to and from any place.

Bring is an action performed at the option of the agent; *fetch* and *carry* are mostly done at the command of another. Hence the old proverb, "He who will *fetch* will *carry*," to mark the character of the gossip and tale-bearer, who reports what he hears from two persons in order to please both parties.

What appeared to me wonderful was that some of the ants came home without *bringing* something. ADDISON.

I have said before that those ants which I did so particularly consider, *fetch*ed their corn out of a garret. ADDISON.

How great is the hardship of a poor ant, when she *carries* a grain of corn to the second story, climbing up a wall with her head downwards. ADDISON.

BRINK, *v.* Border.

BRISK, *v.* Active.

BRITTLE, *v.* Fragile.

BROAD, *v.* Large.

BROIL, *v.* Quarrel.

TO BRUISE, *v.* To break, bruise.

BRUTAL, *v.* Cruel.

BRUTE, *v.* Animal.

BUD, *v.* Sprout.

BUFFOON, *v.* Fool, idiot.

TO BUILD, ERECT, CONSTRUCT.

BUILD, in Saxon *bytljan*, French *bâtir*, German *bauen*, Gothic *boan*, *bua*, *byggja*, to erect houses, from the Hebrew *bajit* a habitation.

ERECT, in French *eriger*, Latin *erectus*, participle of *erigo*, com-

pounded of *e* and *rego*, from the Greek *εργον* to stretch or extend.

CONSTRUCT, in Latin *constructus*, participle of *construo*, compounded of *con* together, and *struo* to put, in Greek *συνωμναι*, *σπειν* to strew, in Hebrew *okrah* to dispose or put in order, signifies to form together into a mass.

The word *build* by distinction expresses the purpose of the action; *erect* indicates the mode of the action; *construct* indicates contrivance in the action. What is *built* is employed for the purpose of receiving, retaining, or confining; what is *erected* is placed in an elevated situation; what is *constructed* is put together with ingenuity.

All that is *built* may be said to be *erected* or *constructed*; but all that is *erected* or *constructed* is not said to be *built*; likewise what is *erected* is mostly *constructed*, though not *vice versa*. We *build* from necessity; we *erect* for ornament; we *construct* for utility and convenience. Houses are *built*, monuments *erected*, machines are *constructed*.

Montesquieu wittily observes, that by *building* professed madhouses, men tacitly insinuate that all who are out of their senses are to be found only in those places. WARTON.

It is as rational to live in caves till our own hands have *erected* a palace, as to reject all knowledge of architecture which our understandings will not supply. JOHNSON.

From the raft or canoe, which first served to carry a savage over the river, to the *construction* of a vessel capable of conveying a numerous crew with safety to a distant coast, the progress in improvement is immense. ROBERTSON.

BUILD, *v.* To found.

BULK, *v.* Size.

BULKY, MASSIVE.

BULKY denotes having *bulk*, which is connected with our words, belly, body, bilge, bulge, &c. and the German *balg*.

MASSIVE, in French *massif* from *mass*, signifies having a *mass* or being like a *mass*, which through the German *masse*, Latin *massa*, Greek *μαζα* dough, comes from *μασσω* to knead, signifying made into a solid substance.

Whatever is *bulky* has a prominence of figure; what is *massive* has compactness of matter. The *bulky* therefore, though larger in size, is not so weighty as the *massive*.

any thing else ; an *avocation* calls off or prevents us from doing what we wish.

Every tradesman has a *business*, on the diligent prosecution of which depends his success in life ; every mechanic has his daily *occupation*, by which he maintains his family ; every labourer has an *employment* which is fixed for him.

Business and *occupation* always suppose a serious object. *Business* is something more urgent and important than *occupation* : a man of independent fortune has no occasion to pursue *business*, but as a rational agent he will not be contented to be without an *occupation*.

Employment, *engagement*, and *avocation*, leave the object undefined. An *employment* may be a mere diversion of the thoughts, and a wasting of the hours in some idle pursuit ; a child may have its *employment*, which may be its play in distinction from its *business* : an *engagement* may have no higher object than that of pleasure ; the idlest people have often the most *engagements* ; the gratification of curiosity, and the love of social pleasure, supply them with an abundance of *engagements*. *Avocations* have seldom a direct trifling object, although it may sometimes be of a subordinate nature, and generally irrelevant : numerous *avocations* are not desirable ; every man should have a regular pursuit, the *business* of his life, to which the principal part of his time should be devoted : *avocations* therefore of a serious nature are apt to divide the time and attention to a hurtful degree.

A person who is *busy* has much to attend to, and attends to it closely : a person who is *occupied* has a full share of *business* without any pressure ; he is opposed to one who is idle : a person who is *employed* has the present moment filled up ; he is not in a state of inaction : the person who is *engaged* is not at liberty to be otherwise *employed* ; his time is not his own ; he is opposed to one at leisure.

The materials are no sooner wrought into paper, but they are distributed among the pressmen, where they again set innumerable artists at work, and furnish *business* to another mystery.

ADDISON.

How little must the ordinary occupations of

men seem to one who is engaged in so noble a pursuit as the assimilation of himself to the Deity.

BRADLEY.

I would recommend to every one of my readers the keeping a journal of their lives for one week, and setting down punctually their whole series of *employments* during that space of time.

ADDISON.

Mr. Barretti being a single man, and entirely clear from all *engagements*, takes the advantage of his independence.

JOHNSON.

Sorrow ought not to be suffered to increase by indulgence, but must give way after a stated time to social duties and the common *avocations* of life.

JOHNSON.

BUSINESS, TRADE, PROFESSION, ART.

BUSINESS, *v.* *Business*, *occupation*.

TRADE signifies that which employs the time by way of *trade*.

PROFESSION signifies that which one professes to do.

ART signifies that which is followed in the way of the *arts*.

These words are synonymous in the sense of a calling, for the purpose of a livelihood : *business* is general, *trade* and *profession* are particular ; all *trade* is *business*, but all *business* is not *trade*.

Buying and selling of merchandize is inseparable from *trade* ; but the exercise of one's knowledge and experience, for purposes of gain, constitutes a *business* ; when learning or particular skill is required, it is a *profession* ; and when there is a peculiar exercise of *art*, it is an *art* : every shop-keeper and retail dealer carries on a *trade* ; brokers, manufacturers, bankers, and others, carry on *business* ; clergymen, medical, or military men, follow a *profession* ; musicians and painters follow an *art*.

Those who are determined by choice to any particular kind of *business* are indeed more happy than those who are determined by necessity.

ADDISON.

Some persons, indeed, by the privilege of their birth and quality, are above a common *trade* and *profession*, but they are not hereby exempted from all *business*, and allowed to live unprofitably to others.

TILLOMAN.

No one of the sons of Adam ought to think himself exempt from labour or industry ; those to whom birth or fortune may seem to make such an application unnecessary, ought to find out some calling or *profession*, that they may not lie as a burthen upon the species.

ADDISON.

The painter understands his *art*. SWIFT.

The characteristic idea of *buying* is that of expending money according to a certain rule, and for a particular purpose; that of *purchasing* is the procuring the thing: the propensity of *buying* whatever comes in one's way is very injurious to the circumstances of some people; what it is not convenient to procure for ourselves, we may commission another to *purchase* for us.

Buying implies simply the exchange of one's money for a commodity; *bargaining* and *cheapening* have likewise respect to the price: to *bargain* is to make a specific agreement as to the price; to *cheapen* is not only to lower the price asked, but to deal in such things as are *cheap*: trade is supported by *buyers*; *bargainers* and *cheapeners* are not acceptable customers: mean people are prone to *bargaining*; poor people are obliged to *cheapen*.

It gives me very great scandal to observe, wherever I go, how much skill, in *buying* all manner of things, there is necessary to defend yourself from being cheated. STEELE.

Pirates may make cheap pennyworths of their pillage,

And purchase friends. SHAKESPEARE.

So York must sit, and fret, and bite his tongue,
While his own lands are bargain'd for, and sold. SHAKESPEARE.

You may see many a smart rhetorician turning what is in his hands, moulding it into several different coats, examining sometimes the lining, and sometimes the button, during the whole course of his language. A deaf man would think he was keeping a heaver, when perhaps he is talking of the fate of the British nation. ADDISON.

BY-WORD, *v. Axiom.*

C.

CABAL, *v. Combination.*

TO CAJOLE, *v. To Coax.*

CALAMITY, DISASTER, MISFORTUNE, MISCHANCE, MISHAP.

CALAMITY, in French *calamité*, Latin *calamitas*, from *calamus* a stalk; because hail or whatever injured the stalks of corn was termed a *calamity*.

DISASTER, in French *désastre*, is compounded of the privative *des* or *dis* and *astre*, in Latin *astrum* a star, signifying what came from the adverse influence of the stars.

MISFORTUNE, MISCHANCE, and MISHAP, naturally express what comes amiss.

The idea of a painful event is common to all these terms, but they differ in the degree of importance.

A *calamity* is a great disaster or *misfortune*; a *misfortune* a great *mischance* or *mishap*: whatever is attended with destruction is a *calamity*; whatever occasions mischief to the person, defeats or interrupts plans, is a *disaster*; whatever is accompanied with a loss of property, or the deprivation of health, is a *misfortune*; whatever diminishes the beauty or utility of objects is a *mischance* or *mishap*: the devastation of a country by hurricanes or earthquakes, or the desolation of its inhabitants by famine or plague, are great *calamities*; the overturning of a carriage, or the fracture of a limb, are *disasters*; losses in trade are *misfortunes*; the spoiling of a book is, to a greater or less extent, a *mischance* or *mishap*.

A *calamity* seldom arises from the direct agency of man; the elements, or the natural course of things, are mostly concerned in producing this source of misery to men; the rest may be ascribed to chance, as distinguished from design: *disasters* mostly arise from some specific known cause, either the carelessness of persons, or the unfitness of things for their use; as they generally serve to derange some preconceived scheme or undertaking, they seem as if they were produced by some secret influence: *misfortune* is frequently assignable to no specific cause, it is the bad fortune of an individual; a link in the chain of his destiny; an evil independent of himself, as distinguished from a fault: *mischance* and *mishap* are *misfortunes* of comparatively so trivial a nature, that it would not be worth while to inquire into their cause, or to dwell upon their consequences. A *calamity* is dreadful; a *disaster* melancholy; a *misfortune* grievous or heavy; a *mischance* or *mishap* slight or trivial.

A *calamity* is either public or private, but more frequently the former: a *disaster* is rather particular than private; it affects things rather than

been erected: tradesmen *reckon* their profits and losses. Children begin by *counting* on their fingers, one, two, three.

An almanack is made by *calculation*, *computation*, and *reckoning*. The rising and setting of the heavenly bodies are *calculated*; from given astronomical tables is *computed* the moment on which any celestial phenomenon may return; and by *reckoning* are determined the days on which holidays, or other periodical events, fall.

Buffon, in his moral arithmetic, has *calculated* tables as guides to direct our judgements in different situations, where we have only vague probability, on which to draw our conclusions. By this we have only to *compute* what the fairest gain must cost us; how much we must lose in advance from the most favourable lottery; how much our hopes impose upon us, our cupidity cheats us, and our habits injure us.

Calculate and *reckon* are employed in a figurative sense; *compute* and *count* in an extended application of the same sense.

Calculate, *reckon*, and *count*, respect mostly the future; *compute*, the past.

Calculate is rather a conjectural deduction from what is, as to what may be; *computation* is a rational estimate of what has been, from what is; *reckoning* is a conclusive conviction, a complacent assurance that a thing will happen; *counting* indicates an expectation. We *calculate* on a gain; *compute* any loss sustained, or the amount of any mischief done; we *reckon* on a promised pleasure; we *count* the hours and minutes until the time of enjoyment arrives.

A spirit of *calculation* arises from the cupidity engendered by trade; it narrows the mind to the mere prospect of accumulation and self-interest.

Computations are inaccurate that are not founded upon exact numerical calculations. Inconsiderate people are apt to *reckon* on things that are very uncertain, and then lay up to themselves a store of disappointments. Children who are uneasy at school *count* the hours, minutes, and moments for their return home. Those who

have experienced the instability of human affairs, will never *calculate* on an hour's enjoyment beyond the moment of existence. It is difficult to *compute* the loss which an army sustains upon being defeated, especially if it be obliged to make a long retreat. Those who know the human heart will never *reckon* on the assistance of professed friends in the hour of adversity. A mind that is ill at ease seeks a resource and amusement in *counting* the moments as they fly; but this is often an unhappy delusion that only adds to the bitterness of sorrow.

In this bank of same, by an exact *calculation*, and the rules of political arithmetic, I have allotted ten hundred thousand shares; five hundred thousand of which is the due of the general; two hundred thousand I assign to the general officers; and two hundred thousand more to all the commissioned officers, from the colonels to ensigns; the remaining hundred thousand must be distributed among the non-commissioned officers and private men; according to which *computation*, I find serjeant Hall is to have one share and a fraction of two fifths. STEELE.

The time we live ought not to be *computed* by the number of years, but by the use that has been made of it. ADDISON.

Men *reckon* themselves possessed of what their genius inclines them to, and so bend all their ambition to excel in what is out of their reach. SPECTATOR.

Applause and admiration are by no means to be *counted* among the necessities of life. JOHNSON.

CALENDAR, ALMANACK, EPHEMERIS.

CALENDAR comes from *calenda*, the Roman name for the first days of every month.

ALMANACK, that is *al* and *mana*, signifies properly the reckoning or thing reckoned, from the Arabic *mana* and Hebrew *manack* to reckon.

EPHEMERIS, in Greek *ἐφημερίς* from *ἐπι* and *ἡμέρα* the day, implies that which happens by the day.

These terms denote a date-book, but the *calendar* is a book which registers events under every month: the *almanack* is a book which registers times, or the divisions of the year: and an *ephemeris* is a book which registers the planetary movements every day. An *almanack* may be a *calendar*, and an *ephemeris* may be both an *almanack* and a *calendar*; but every *almanack* is not a *calendar*, nor every

CALM, COMPOSED, COLLECTED.

CALM, *v.* *To appease.*

COMPOSED, from the verb *compose*, marks the state of being *composed*; and **COLLECTED**, from *collect*, the state of being *collected*.

These terms agree in expressing a state; but *calm* respects the state of the feelings, *composed* the state of the thoughts and feelings, and *collected* the state of the thoughts more particularly.

Calmness is peculiarly requisite in seasons of distress, and amidst scenes of horror: *composure*, in moments of trial, disorder, and tumult: *collectedness*, in moments of danger. *Calmness* is the companion of fortitude; no one can have strength to bear whose spirits are easily disturbed: *composure* is an attendant upon clearness of understanding; no one can express himself with perspicuity whose thoughts are any way deranged: *collectedness* is requisite for a determined promptitude of action; no one can be expected to act promptly who cannot think fixedly.

It would argue a want of all feeling to be *calm* on some occasions, when the best affections of our nature are put to a severe trial. *Composedness* of mind associated with the detection of guilt, evinces a hardened conscience, and an insensibility to shame. *Collectedness* of mind has contributed in no small degree to the preservation of some persons' lives, in moments of the most imminent peril.

'Tis godlike magnanimity to keep,
When most provok'd, our reason *calm* and clear.
TROWSON.

A moping lover would grow a pleasant fellow
by that time he had rid thrice about the island
(Antecyra); and a hare-brained rake, after a
short stay in the country, go home again a *composed*, grave, worthy gentleman. STEELE.

Collected in his strength, and like a rock,
Pois'd on his base, Mezentius stood the shock.
DRYDEN.

CALM, PLACID, SERENE.

CALM, *v.* *To appease.*

PLACID, in Latin *placidus*, from *placeo* to please, signifies the state of being pleased, or free from uneasiness.

SERENE, Latin *serenus*, comes most probably from the Greek *εἰρήνη* peace, signifying a state of peace.

Calm and *serene* are applied to the elements; *placid* only to the mind. *Calmness* respects only the state of the winds, *serenity* that of the air and heavens: the weather is *calm* when it is free from agitation; it is *serene* when free from noise and vapour. *Calm* respects the total absence of all perturbation; *placid* the ease and contentment of the mind; *serene* the clearness and composure of the mind.

As in the natural world a particular agitation of the wind is succeeded by a *calm*, so in the mind of man, when an unusual effervescence has been produced, it commonly subsides into a *calm*: *placidity* and *serenity* have more that is even and regular in them; they are positively what they are. *Calm* is a partial state of the feelings; *placid* and *serene* are habits of the mind. We speak of a *calm* state; but a *placid* and *serene* temper. *Placidity* is more of a natural gift; *serenity* is acquired: people with not very ardent desires or warmth of feeling will evince *placidity*; they are pleased with all that passes inwardly or outwardly: nothing contributes so much to *serenity* of mind as a pervading sense of God's good providence, which checks all impatience, softens down every asperity of humour, and gives a steady current to the feelings.

French patience to the sea, when jarring winds
Throw up the swelling billows to the sky!
And if your reasons mitigate her fury,
My soul will be as *calm*. SMITH.

Placid and soothing is the remembrance of a
life passed with quiet, innocence, and elegance.
STEELE.

Every one ought to fence against the temper of
his climate or constitution, and frequently to
indulge in himself those considerations which
may give him a *serenity* of mind. ADDISON.

TO CALM, *v.* *To appease.*

CALM, *v.* *Peace.*

TO CALUMNIATE, *v.* *To asperse.*

CAN, MAY.

CAN, in the Northern languages *können*, &c. is derived most probably from *kennen* to know, from the natural intimacy which subsists between knowledge and power.

MAY is in German *mögen*, to wish, Greek *μᾶλλον* to desire, *fre*

is in Saxon *freatan*, comes from the Latin *fricatus*, participle of *frico* to wear away with rubbing.

PETULANT, in Latin *petulans*, from *peto* to seek, signifies seeking or catching up.

All these terms indicate an unamiable working and expression of temper. *Captious* marks a readiness to be offended: *cross* indicates a readiness to offend: *peevish* expresses a strong degree of *crossness*: *fretful* a complaining impatience: *petulant* a quick or sudden impatience. *Captiousness* is the consequence of misplaced pride; *crossness* of ill humour; *peevishness* and *fretfulness* of a painful irritability; *petulance* is either the result of a naturally hasty temper or of a sudden irritability: adults are most prone to be *captious*; they have frequently a self-importance which is in perpetual danger of being offended: an undisciplined temper, whether in young or old, will manifest itself on certain occasions by *cross* looks and words towards those with whom they come in connexion: spoiled children are most apt to be *peevish*; they are seldom thwarted in any of their unreasonable desires, without venting their ill humour by an irritating and offending action: sickly children are most liable to *fretfulness*; their unpleasant feelings vent themselves in a mixture of crying complaints and *crossness*: the young and ignorant are most apt to be *petulant* when contradicted.

Captiousness and jealousy are easily offended; and to him who studiously looks for an affront, every mode of behaviour will supply it.

JOHNSON.

I was so good humour'd, so cheerful and gay,
My heart was as light as a feather all day.
But now I so cross and so peevish am grown,
So strangely uneasy as never was known. BYRON.

Peevish displeasure, and suspicions of mankind, are apt to persecute those who withdraw themselves altogether from the haunts of men.

BLAIR.

By indulging this *fretful* temper, you both aggravate the uneasiness of age, and you alienate those on whose affections much of your comfort depends.

BLAIR.

TO CAPTIVATE, *v.* To charm.

TO CAPTIVATE, *v.* To enslave.

CAPTIVITY, *v.* Confinement.

CAPTURE, SEIZURE, PRIZE.

CAPTURE, in French *capture*,

Latin *captura*, from *captus*, participle of *capio* to take, signifies either the act of taking, or the thing taken, but mostly the former.

SEIZURE, from *seize*, in French *saisir*, signifies only the act of *seizing*.

PRIZE, in French *prise*, from *pris* participle of *prendre* to take, signifies only the thing taken.

Capture and *seizure* differ in the mode: a *capture* is made by force of arms; a *seizure* by direct and personal violence. The *capture* of a town or an island requires an army; the *seizure* of property is effected by the exertions of an individual. A *seizure* always requires some force, which a *capture* does not. A *capture* may be made on an unresisting object; it is merely the taking into possession: a *seizure* supposes much eagerness for possession on the one hand, and reluctance to yield on the other. Merchant vessels are *captured* which are not in a state to make resistance; contraband goods are *seized* by the police officers.

A *capture* has always something legitimate in it; it is a public measure flowing from authority: a *seizure* is a private measure, frequently as unlawful and unjust as it is violent; it depends on the will of the individual. A *capture* is general, it respects the act of taking: a *prize* is particular, it regards the object taken, and its value to the *captor*: many *captures* are made by sea which never become *prizes*.

The late Mr. Robert Wood, in his essay on the original genius and writings of Homer, inclines to think the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were finished about half a century after the *capture* of Troy.

CUMBERLAND.

Many of the dangers imputed of old to exorbitant wealth are now at an end. The rich are neither waylaid by robbers, nor watched by informers: there is nothing to be dreaded from proscriptions or *seizures*.

JOHNSON.

Sensible of their own force, and allured by the prospect of so rich a *prize*, the northern barbarians, in the reign of Arcadius and Honorius, assailed at once all the frontiers of the Roman empire.

HUME.

CARCASE, *v.* Body.

CARE, SOLICITUDE, ANXIETY.

CARE, in Latin *cura*, comes probably from the Greek *κυρος* power, be-

it comprehends personal labour: *charge* involves responsibility: *management* includes regulation and order.

A gardener has the *care* of a garden; a nurse has the *charge* of children; a steward has the *management* of a farm: we must always act in order to take *care*; we must look in order to take *charge*; we must always think in order to *manage*.

Care is employed in menial occupations; *charge* in matters of trust and confidence; *management* in matters of business and experience: the servant has the *care* of the cattle; an instructor has the *charge* of youth; a clerk has the *management* of a business.

Care: a father's right—a pleasing right,
From which he labours with a home-felt joy.

SHIRLEY.

I can never believe that the repugnance with which Tibullus took the charge of the government upon him was wholly feigned.

CUMBERLAND.

The woman, to whom her husband left the whole management of her lodgings, and who presided in her purpose, soon found an opportunity to put it into execution.

HAWKSWORTH.

CARE, *v.* Heed.

CAREFUL, CAUTIOUS, PROVIDENT.

CAREFUL signifies full of *care* (*v.* *Care*, *solicitude*).

CAUTIOUS is in Latin *cautus*, participle of *caveo*, which comes from *cavis* hollow, or a cave, which was originally a place of security; hence the epithet *cautious* in the sense of seeking security.

PROVIDENT, Latin *providens*, signifies foreseeing or looking to beforehand, from *pro* and *video*.

We are *careful* to avoid mistakes; *cautious* to avoid danger; *provident* to avoid straits and difficulties: *care* is exercised in saving and retaining what we have; *caution* must be used in guarding against the evils that may be; *providence* must be employed in supplying the good, or guarding against the contingent evils of the future.

Care consists in the use of means, in the exercise of the faculties for the attainment of an end; a *careful* person omits nothing: *caution* consists rather in abstaining from action; a

cautious person will not act where he ought not: *providence* respects the use of things; it is both *care* and *caution* in the management of property; a *provident* person acts for the future, by abstaining for the present.

There's not that work
Of *careful* nature, or of cunning art,
How strong, how beautiful, or how rich it be,
But falls in time to ruin.

SHAKESPEARE.

Flush'd by the spirit of the genial year,
Be greatly *cautious* of your sliding hearts.

THOMSON.

Blest above men if he perceives and feels
The blessings he is heir to: He! to whom
His *provident* forefathers have bequeathed
In this fair district of their native isle
A free inheritance.

CUMBERLAND.

CAREFUL, *v.* Attentive.

CARELESS, *v.* Indolent.

CARELESS, *v.* Negligent.

TO CARESS, FONDLE.

BOTH these terms mark a species of endearment.

CARESS, like *cherish*, comes from the French *chérir*, and *chère*, Latin *carus* dear, signifying the expression of a tender sentiment.

FONDLE, from *fond*, is a frequentative verb, signifying to become *fond* of, or express one's *fondness* for.

We *caress* by words or actions; we *fondle* by actions only: *caresses* are not always unsuitable; but *fondling*, which is the extreme of *caressing*, is not less unfit for the one who receives than for the one who gives: animals *caress* each other, as the natural mode of indicating their affection; *fondling*, which is the expression of perverted feeling, is peculiar to human beings, who alone abuse the faculties with which they are endowed.

CARGO, *v.* Freight.

CARNAGE, SLAUGHTER, MASSACRE, BUTCHERY.

CARNAGE, from the Latin *caro* *carnis* flesh, implies properly a collection of dead flesh, that is, the reducing to the state of dead flesh.

SLAUGHTER, from *slay*, is the act of taking away life.

MASSACRE, in French *massacre*, comes from the Latin *mactare* to kill for sacrifice.

BUTCHERY, from *to butcher*, signifies the act of *butchering*; in French *boucherie*, from *bouche* the mouth, signifies the killing for food.

Carnage respects the number of dead bodies made; it may be said either of men or animals, but more commonly of the former: *slaughter* respects the act of taking away life, and the circumstances of the agent: *massacre* and *butchery* respect the circumstances of the objects who are the sufferers of the action; the latter three are said of human beings only.

Carnage is the consequence of any impetuous attack from a powerful enemy; soldiers who get into a besieged town, or a wolf who breaks into a sheepfold, commonly make a dreadful *carnage*: *slaughter* is the consequence of warfare; in battles the *slaughter* will be very considerable where both parties defend themselves pertinaciously: a *massacre* is the consequence of secret and personal resentment between bodies of people; it is always a stain upon the nation by whom it is practised, as it cannot be effected without a violent breach of confidence, and a direct act of treachery; of this description was the *massacre* of the Danes by the original Britons, and the *massacre* of the Huguenots in France: *butchery* is the general accompaniment of a *massacre*; defenceless women and children are commonly *butchered* by the savage furies who are most active in this work of blood.

The *carnage* Juno from the skies survey'd,
And, touch'd with grief, bespoke the blue-ey'd
maid. POPE.

Yet, yet a little, and destructive *slaughter*
Shall rage around and mar this beauteous pro-
spect. ROWE.

Our groaning country bled at every vein;
When murders, rapes, and *massacres* prevail'd.
ROWE.

Let us be sacrificers, but not *butchers*.
SHAKESPEARE.

TO CARR, *v. To censure*.

CARRIAGE, GAIT, WALK.

CARRIAGE from the verb *to carry* (*v. To bear, carry*) signifies the act of *carrying* in general, but here that of *carrying* the body.

GAIT, from *go*, signifies the manner of going.

WALK signifies the manner of *walking*.

Carriage is here the most general term; it respects the manner of *carrying* the body, whether in a state of motion or rest: *gait* is the mode of *carrying* the limbs and body whenever we move: *walk* is the manner of *carrying* the body when we move forward to *walk*.

A person's *carriage* is somewhat natural to him; it is often an indication of character, but admits of great change by education; we may always distinguish a man as high or low, either in mind or station, by his *carriage*: *gait* is artificial; we may contract a certain *gait* by habit; the *gait* is therefore often taken for a bad habit of going, as when a person has a limping *gait*, or an unsteady *gait*: *walk* is less definite than either, as it is applicable to the ordinary movements of men; there is a good, a bad, or an indifferent *walk*; but it is not a matter of indifference which of these kinds of *walk* we have; it is the great art of the dancing-master to give a good *walk*.

Upon her nearer approach to Hercules, she
stepped before the other lady, who came forward
with a regular composed *carriage*. ADDISON.

Lifeless her *gait*, and slow, with seeming pain,
She dragg'd her loit'ring limbs along the plain.
SHAKESPEARE.

In length of train descends her sweeping gown,
And by her graceful *walk*, the queen of love is
known. DRYDEN.

CARRIAGE, v. Behaviour.

TO CARRY, v. To bear.

TO CARRY, v. To bring.

CAROUSAL, v. Feast.

CASE, CAUSE.

CASE, in Latin *casus*, from *cado* to fall, chance, happen, signifies the thing falling out.

CAUSE, in French *cause*, Latin *causa*, is probably changed from *case*, and the Latin *casus*.

The *case* is matter of fact; the *cause* is matter of question: a *case* involves circumstances and consequences; a *cause* involves reasons and arguments: a *case* is something to be learned; a *cause* is something to be decided.

A *case* needs only to be stated; a *cause* must be defended; a *cause* may

include *cases*, but not *vice versa*: in all *causes* that are to be tried, there are many legal *cases* that must be cited: whoever is interested in the *cause* of humanity will not be heedless of those *cases* of distress which are perpetually presenting themselves.

There is a double praise due to virtue, when it is lodged in a body that seems to have been prepared for the reception of vice; in many such *cases* the soul and body do not seem to be fellows.

ADDISON.

I was myself an advocate so long, that I never mind what advocates say, but what they prove, and I can only examine proofs in *causes* brought before me.

SIR WILLIAM JONES.

CASE, *v.* Situation.

CASE, *v.* Frame.

CASH, *v.* Money.

TO CAST, THROW, HURL.

CAST probably comes from *casus*, participle of *cado* to fall, signifying to make or to let fall.

THROW, in Saxon *throwan*, is most probably a variation of *thrust*, in Latin *trudo*, Chaldee *terad* to thrust repeatedly.

HURL, like the word *whirl*, comes from the Saxon *hirsiven*, *hiveorsian*, German, &c. *wirbel*, Teutonic *wirvel*, Danish *hirroel*, *hiroler*, Latin *verto*, *gyro*, which are all derived from the Hebrew *orgal* round, signifying to turn round.

Cast conveys simply the idea of laying aside, or putting from one's self; *throw* and *hurl* designate more specifically the mode of the action: *cast* is an indifferent action, whether it respects ourselves or others; *throw* always marks a direct motive of dislike or contempt. What is not wanted is *cast* off; clothes which are no longer worn are *cast* off: what is worthless or hurtful is *thrown* away; the dross is separated from the wheat and *thrown* away; bad habits cannot be *thrown* off too soon.

Cast, as it respects others, is divested of all personalities; but nothing is *thrown* at any one without an intention of offending or hurting: a glance is *cast* at a person, or things are *cast* before him; but insinuations are *thrown* out against a person; things are *thrown* at him with the view of striking.

Cast requires no particular effort; it amounts in general to no more than let fall or go: *throw* is frequently accompanied with violence. Money is *cast* into a bag; stones are *thrown* from a great distance: animals *cast* their young at stated periods; the horse *throws* his rider; a lawless man *throws* off constraint.

Hurl is a violent species of *throwing* employed only on extraordinary occasions, expressive of an unusual degree of vehemence in the agent, and an excessive provocation on the part of the sufferer: the *hurler*, the thing *hurled*, and the cause of *hurling*, correspond in magnitude; a mighty potentate is *hurled* from his throne by some power superior to his own; Milton represents the devils as *hurled* from Heaven by the word of the Almighty; the heathen poets have feigned a similar story of the giants who made war against Heaven, and were *hurled* by the thunderbolts of Jupiter down to the earth.

As far as I could *cast* my eyes
Upon the sea, something methought did rise
Like bluish mists.

DRYDEN.

O war, thou son of bell!
Whom angry heavens do make their minister,
Throw in the frozen bosoms of our part,
Hot coals of vengeance!

SHAKESPEARE.

Wreath my head
With flaming meteors, load my arms with thunder,

Which as I nimbly cut my cloudy way
I'll *hurl* on this ungrateful earth.

TATE.

CAST, TURN, DESCRIPTION.

CAST, from the verb to *cast* (*v.* To *cast*), signifies that which is *cast*, and here by an extension of the sense, the form in which it is *cast*.

TURN, from the verb to *turn*, signifies also the act of *turning*, or the manner of *turning*.

DESCRIPTION signifies the act of *describing*, or the thing which is to be *described*.

What is *cast* is artificial; what *turns* is natural: the former is the act of some foreign agent; the latter is the act of the subject itself: hence the *cast*, as applicable to persons, respects that which they are made by circumstances; the *turn*, that which they are by themselves: thus there are religious *casts* in India, that is, men *cast* in a certain form of religion,

people that is a motive to good as to be encouraged. ADDISON.

SE, OCCASION, CREATE.

USE, from the substantive Case), naturally signifies to use of.

SION, from the noun occasion, signifies to be the occasion of.

TE, in Latin *creatus*, participle, comes from the Greek *κρᾶνω* to per-

is caused seems to follow nature; what is occasioned follows nature; what is created receives its nature arbitrarily. A wound is an accident; accidents occasion delay; lies create mischief.

Misfortunes of the children are an affliction to the parents;

occasions a person's late arrival at a place; disputes and misunderstandings create animosity. The cause of a person's misdeeds may often be traced to his misconduct: the improper conduct of one person may occasion to ask for an explanation: errors are created in the minds of men by an unnecessary reserve of opinion.

War is ill to human life belongs, our follies cause, or mutual wrongs.

JENNINGS.

War has the terrors of conscience occasioned by misdeeds, or violent agitations of the mind.

BLAIR.

As the powers or abilities which are exerted in a sphere of action remote from ours, and not brought into action with talents of the same kind to which we have pretensions, they create no jealousy.

BLAIR.

CAUTION, *v.* Admonition.

CAUTIOUS, *v.* Careful.

CAUTIOUS, WARY, CIRCUMSPECT.

CAUTIOUS, *v.* Careful.

WARY, from the same as *aware* (to be aware of), signifies ready to be aware of.

CIRCUMSPECT, in Latin *circumspectus*, participle of *circumspicio* to look about, signifies ready to look on all sides.

These epithets denote a peculiar readiness to avoid evil; but *cautious* expresses less than the other two; it is only to be cautious at all times;

to be *wary* in cases of peculiar danger; to be *circumspect* in matters of peculiar delicacy and difficulty.

Caution is the effect of fear; *waryness* of danger; *circumspection* of experience and reflection. The *cautious* man reckons on contingencies, he guards against the evil that may be, by pausing before he acts: the *wary* man looks for the danger which he suspects to be impending, and seeks to avoid it: the *circumspect* man weighs and deliberates; he looks around and calculates on possibilities and probabilities; he seeks to attain his end by the safest means. A tradesman must be *cautious* in his dealings with all men; he must be *wary* in his intercourse with designing men; he must be *circumspect* when transacting business of particular importance and intricacy. The traveller must be *cautious* when going a road not familiar to him; he must be *wary* when passing over slippery and dangerous places; he must be *circumspect* when going through obscure, uncertain, and winding passages.

A person ought to be *cautious* not to give offence; he ought to be *wary* not to entangle himself in ruinous litigations; he ought to be *circumspect* not to engage in what is above his abilities to complete. It is necessary to be *cautious* not to disclose our sentiments too freely before strangers; to be *wary* in one's speech before busy bodies and calumniators; to be *circumspect* whenever we speak on public matters, respecting either politics or religion.

The strong report of Arthur's death has worse effect on them, than on the common sort;

The vulgar only shake their cautious heads, Or whisper in the ear wisely suspicious. COWPER.

Let not that wary caution, which is the fruit of experience, degenerate into craft. BLAIR.

No pious man can be so circumspect in the care of his conscience, as the covetous man is in that of his pocket. STERNE.

TO CEASE, LEAVE OFF, DISCONTINUE.

CEASE, in French *cesser*, Latin *cesso*, from *cessi* perfect of *cedere* to yield, signifies to give up, or to end to.

LEAVE is in Saxon *helifa* to remain, in Swedish *lifwa*, to low.

but the former, from the Latin *caelestium*, signifies belonging to the *heaven* of heathens; the latter, which has its origin among believers in the true God, has acquired a superior sense, in regard to *heaven* as the habitation of the Almighty. This distinction is pretty faithfully observed in their application: *celestial* is applied mostly in the natural sense of the *heavens*; *heavenly* is employed more commonly in a spiritual sense. Hence we speak of the *celestial* globe as distinguished from the terrestrial, of the *celestial* bodies, of Olympus as the *celestial* abode of Jupiter, of the *celestial* deities; but on the other hand, of the *heavenly* habitation, of *heavenly* joys or bliss, of *heavenly* spirits and the like. There are doubtless many cases in which *celestial* may be used for *heavenly* in the moral sense, but there are cases in which *heavenly* cannot so properly be substituted for *celestial*.

'Twice warn'd by the *celestial* messenger,
The pious prince arose, with hasty fear. DRYDEN.
But now he sol'd his Bricks' *heav'nly* charms,
And of my valour's prize defrauds my arms.

POPE.

Unhappy son! (fair Thetis thus replies,
While tears *celestial* trickle from her eyes).

POPE.

Thus having said, the hero bound his brows
With leafy branches, then perform'd his vows;
Adorning first the genius of the place,
Then Earth, the mother of the *heavenly* race.

DRYDEN.

TO CENSURE, ANIMADVERT,
CRITICISE.

CENSURE, *v.* To accuse.

ANIMADVERT, *v.* Animadversion.

CRITICISE, *v.* Animadversion.

To *censure* expresses less than to *animadvert* or *criticise*; one may always *censure* when one *animadverts* or *criticises*.

To *censure* and *animadvert* are both personal, the one direct, the other indirect; *criticism* is directed to things, and not to persons only.

Censuring consists in finding some fault real or supposed; it refers mostly to the conduct of individuals. *Animadvert* consists in suggesting some error or impropriety; it refers mostly to matters of opinion and dispute; *criticism* consists in minutely examining the intrinsic characteristics and

appreciating the merits of each individually or the whole collectively; it refers to matters of science and learning.

To *censure* requires no more than simple assertion; its justice or propriety often rests on the authority of the individual: *animadversions* require to be accompanied with reasons; those who *animadvert* on the proceedings or opinions of others must state some grounds for their objections.

Criticism is altogether argumentative and illustrative; it takes nothing for granted, it analyses and decomposes, it compares and combines, it asserts and supports the assertions. The office of the *censurer* is the easiest and least honourable of the three; it may be assumed by ignorance and impertinence, it may be performed for the purpose of indulging an angry or imperious temper. The task of *animadverting* is delicate; it may be resorted to for the indulgence of an overweening self-conceit. The office of a *critic* is both arduous and honourable; it cannot be filled by any one incompetent for the charge without exposing his arrogance and folly to merited contempt.

Many an author has been dejected at the *censure* of one whom he has looked upon as an idiot.

ADDISON.

I wish, Sir, you would do us the favour to *animadvert* frequently upon the false taste the town is in, with relation to the plays as well as operas.

STEELE.

It is ridiculous for any man to *criticise* on the works of another, who has not distinguished himself by his own performances.

ADDISON.

TO CENSURE, CARP, CAVIL.

CENSURE, *v.* To accuse.

CARP, in Latin *carpo*, signifies to pluck.

CAVIL, in French *caviller*, Latin *cavillor*, from *cavillum* a hollow man, and *cavus* hollow, signifies to be unsound or unsubstantial in speech.

To *censure* respects positive errors; to *carp* and *cavil* have regard to what is trivial or imaginary: the former is employed for errors in persons; the latter for supposed defects in things. *Censures* are frequently necessary from those who have the authority to use them; a good father will *censure* his children when their conduct is *censurable*. *Carping* and *cavilling* are resorted to only to indulge ill-nature

getting riches will find no rest for his mind or body; he will labour without intermission oftentimes only to heap troubles on himself.

Who then would court the pomp of giddy power,

When the mind sickens at the weary show,
And flies to temporary death for ease?

When half our life's cessation of our being.

STEELE.

In all those motions and operations which are incessantly going on throughout nature, there is no stop nor interruption.

BLAIR.

The refreshing rest and peaceful night are the portion of him only who lies down weary with honest labour.

JOHNSON.

Whether the time of intermission is spent in company or in solitude, in necessary business or involuntary levities, the understanding is equally abstracted from the object of inquiry. JOHNSON.

CHACE, *v.* Forest.

CHACE, *v.* Hunt.

TO CHAFE, *v.* To rub.

CHAGRIN, *v.* Vexation.

CHAIN, FETTER, BAND,
SHACKLE.

CHAIN, in French *chaîne*, Latin *catena*, probably contracted from *cap-tens* and *capio*, signifies that which takes or holds.

FETTER, in German *fessel*, comes from *fassen* to lay hold of.

BAND, from *bind*, signifies that which binds.

SHACKLE, in Saxon *scacul*, signifies that which makes a creature shake or move irregularly by confining the legs.

All these terms designate the instrument by which animals or men are confined. *Chain* is general and indefinite; all the rest are *chains*: but there are many *chains* which do not come under the other names; a *chain* is indefinite as to its make; it is made generally of iron rings, but of different sizes and shapes: *fetters* are larger, they consist of many stout *chains*: *bands* are in general any thing which confines the body or the limbs; they may be either *chains* or even cords: *shackle* is that species of *chain* which goes on the legs to confine them; malefactors of the worst order have *fetters* on different parts of their bodies, and *shackles* on their legs.

These terms may all be used figu-

ratively. The substantive *chain* is applied to whatever hangs together like a *chain*, as a *chain* of events; but the verb to *chain* signifies to confine as with a *chain*: thus the mind is *chained* to rules, according to the opinions of the free-thinkers, when men adhere strictly to rule and order; and to represent the slavery of conforming to the establishment, they tell us we are *fettered* by systems. *Band* in the figurative sense is applied, particularly in poetry, to every thing which is supposed to serve the purpose of a *band*; thus love is said to have its silken *bands*. *Shackle*, whether as a substantive or a verb, retains the idea of controlling the movements of the person, not in his body only, but also in his mind and in his moral conduct: thus a man who commences life with a borrowed capital is *shackled* in his commercial concerns by the interest he has to pay, and the obligations he has to discharge.

Almighty wisdom never acts in vain,
Nor shall the soul, on which it has betow'd
Such powers, e'er perish like an earthly clod;
But purg'd at length from foul corruption's stain,
Freed from her prison, and unbound her chain,
She shall her native strength and native skies
regain.

JERVIS.

Legislators have no rules to bind them but the great principles of justice and equity. These they are bound to obey and follow; and rather to enlarge and enlighten law by the liberality of legislative reason than to *fetter* their higher capacity by the narrow constructions of subordinate artificial justice.

BURKE.

Break his bands of sleep asunder,
And rouse him like a rattling peal of thunder.

DRYDEN.

It is the freedom of the spirit that gives worth and life to the performance. But a servant commonly is less free in mind than in condition; his very will seems to be in bonds and shackles.

SOUR.

TO CHALLENGE, *v.* To brave.

CHAMPION, *v.* Combatant.

CHANCE, FORTUNE, FATE.

CHANCE (*v.* Accident) is here considered as the cause of what falls out.

FORTUNE, in French *fortune*, Latin *fortuna*, from *fors* chance, in Hebrew *gar*.

FATE, in Latin *fatum*, from *fatum* participle of *for* to speak or decree

signifies that which is decreed, or the power of decreeing.

These terms have served at all times as cloaks for human ignorance, and before mankind were favoured by the light of Divine Revelation, they had an imaginary importance which has now happily vanished.

Believers in Divine Providence no longer conceive the events of the world as left to themselves, or as under the control of any unintelligent or unconscious agent, but ascribe the whole to an overruling mind, which, though invisible to the bodily eye, is clearly to be traced by the intellectual eye, wherever we turn ourselves. In conformity, however, to the preconceived notions attached to these words, we now employ them in regard to the agency of secondary causes. But how far a Christian may use them without disparagement to the majesty of the Divine Being, it is not so much my business to inquire, as to define their ordinary acceptation.

In this ordinary sense *chance* is the generic, *fortune* and *fate* are specific terms: *chance* applies to all things personal or otherwise; *fortune* and *fate* are mostly said of that which is personal.

Chance neither forms orders or designs; neither knowledge or intention is attributed to it; its events are uncertain and variable: *fortune* forms plans and designs, but without choice; we attribute to it an intention without discernment; it is said to be blind: *fate* forms plans and chains of causes; intention, knowledge, and power are attributed to it; its views are fixed, its results decisive. A person goes as *chance* directs him when he has no express object to determine his choice one way or other; his *fortune* favours him, if without any expectation he gets the thing he wishes; his *fate* wills it, if he reaches the desired point contrary to what he intended.

Men's success in their undertakings depends oftener on *chance* than on their ability; we are ever ready to ascribe to ourselves what we owe to our good *fortune*; it is the *fate* of some men to fail in every thing they undertake.

When speaking of trivial matters,

this language is unquestionably innocent, and any objection to their use must spring from an over scrupulous conscience.

If I suffer my horse to direct me in the road I take to London, I may fairly attribute it to *chance* if I take the right instead of the left; and if in consequence I meet with an agreeable companion by the way I shall not hesitate to call it my good *fortune*; and if in spite of any previous intention to the contrary, I should be led to take the same road repeatedly, and as often to meet with an agreeable companion, I shall immediately say that it is my *fate* to meet with an agreeable companion whenever I go to London.

Some there are who utterly proscribe the name of *chance* as a word of impious and profane signification: and indeed if it be taken by us in that sense in which it was used by the heathens, so as to make any thing casual in respect of God himself, their exception ought to be admitted. But to say a thing is a *chance* or casualty as it relates to second causes is not profaneness, but a great truth.

SOURN.

Chance aids their daring with unhop'd success.

DAYTON.

We should learn that none but intellectual possessions are what we can properly call our own. All things from without are but borrowed. What *fortune* gives us is not ours, and whatever she gives she can take away.

SHAKS.

Since *fate* divides then, since I must lose thee,
For pity's sake, for love's, oh! suffer me,
Thus languishing, thus dying, to approach thee;
And sigh my last adieu upon thy bosom. TASP.

CHANCE, PROBABILITY.

CHANCE, *v.* Accident, *chance*.

PROBABILITY, in French *probabilité*, Latin *probabilitas*, from *probabilis* and *probo* to prove, signifies the quality of being able to be proved or made good.

These terms are both employed in forming an estimate of future events; but the *chance* is either for or against, the *probability* is always for a thing. *Chance* is but a degree of *probability*; there may in this latter case be a *chance* where there is no *probability*. A *chance* affords a possibility; many *chances* are requisite to constitute a *probability*.

What has been once may, under similar circumstances, be again; for that there is a *chance*; what has

fallen to one man may fall to another; so far he has a *chance* in his favour; but in all the *chances* of life there will be no *probability* of success, where a man does not unite industry with integrity. *Chance* cannot be calculated upon; it is apt to produce disappointment: *probability* justifies hope; it is sanctioned by experience.

Thus equal deaths are dealt with equal chance,
By turns they quit their ground, by turns advance.
DRYDEN.

'There never appear,' says Swift, 'more than five or six men of genius in an age, but if they were waited the world could not stand before them.' It is happy therefore for mankind that of this union there is no *probability*. JOHNSON.

CHANCE, HAZARD.

CHANCE, *v.* Accident, chance.

HAZARD comes from the oriental *zar* and *tzar*, signifying any thing bearing an impression, particularly the dice used in *chance* games, which is called by the Italians *xara*, and by the Spaniards *azar*.

Both these terms are employed to mark the course of future events, which is not discernible by the human eye. With the Deity there is neither *chance* nor *hazard*; his plans are the result of omniscience: but the designs and actions of men are all dependant on *chance* or *hazard*.

Chance may be favourable or unfavourable, more commonly the former; *hazard* is always unfavourable; it is properly a species of *chance*. There is a *chance* either of gaining or losing: there is a *hazard* of losing.

In most speculations the *chance* of succeeding scarcely outweighs the *hazard* of losing.

Against ill chances men are ever merry,
But heaviness foretells the good event.

SHAKESPEARE.

Though wit and learning are certain and habitual perfections of the mind, yet the declaration of them, which alone brings the repute, is subject to a thousand *hazards*. SOUTH.

CHANCE, *v.* Accident.

TO CHANGE, *v.* To happen.

TO CHANGE, ALTER, VARY.

CHANGE, in French *changer*, is probably derived from the middle Latin *cambio* to *exchange*, signifying to take one thing for another.

ALTER, from the Latin *alter* ano-

ther, signifies to make a thing otherwise.

VARY, in Latin *vario* to make various, comes in all probability from *varus* a spot or speckle, which is of all things the most various.

We *change* a thing by putting another in its place; we *alter* a thing by making it different from what it was before; we *vary* it by *altering* it in different manners and at different times. We *change* our clothes whenever we put on others: the tailor *alters* the clothes which are found not to fit; and he *varies* the fashion of making them whenever he makes new. A man *changes* his habits, *alters* his conduct, and *varies* his manner of speaking and thinking, according to circumstances.

A thing is *changed* without *altering* its kind; it is *altered* without destroying its identity; and it is *varied* without destroying the similarity. We *change* our habitation, but it still remains a habitation; we *alter* our house, but it still remains the same house; we *vary* the manner of painting and decoration, but it may strongly resemble the manner in which it has been before executed.

The general remedy of those who are uneasy without knowing the cause, is *change* of place.
JOHNSON.

All things are but *alter'd*, nothing dies;
And here and there th' unbodied spirit flies;
By time, or force, or sickness, disposess'd,
And lodges, where it lights, in man or beast.
DRYDEN.

In every work of the imagination, the disposition of parts, the insertion of incidents, and use of decorations, may be varied a thousand ways with equal propriety.
JOHNSON.

TO CHANGE, EXCHANGE, BARTER, SUBSTITUTE.

CHANGE, *v.* To change, alter.

EXCHANGE is compounded of *e* or *ex* and *change*, signifying to *change* in the place of another.

BARTER is supposed to come from the French *barater*, a sea term for indemnification, and also for circumvention; hence it has derived the meaning of a mercenary exchange.

SUBSTITUTE, in French *substitut*, Latin *substitutus*, from *sub* and *status*, signifies to place one thing in the room of another.

The idea of putting one thing in

of a painful nature are less dangerous than those which elevate men to an unusual state of grandeur. By the former they are brought to a sense of themselves; by the latter they are carried beyond themselves.

How strangely are the opinions of men altered by a change in their condition. BLAIR.

One of the company affirmed to us he had actually inclosed the liquor, found in a coquette's heart, in a small tube made after the manner of a weather-glass; but that instead of acquainting him with the variations of the atmosphere, it showed him the qualities of those persons who entered the room where it stood. ADDISON.

Ficissitude wheels round the motley crowd,
The rich grow poor, the poor become purse-proud.

CHANGEABLE, MUTABLE, VARIABLE, INCONSTANT, FICKLE, VERSATILE.

CHANGEABLE, *v.* To change, alter.

MUTABLE, from the Latin *muto* to change, is the same as changeable.

VARIABLE, *v.* To change.

INCONSTANT, compounded of the privative *in* and *constant*, in Latin *constans* or *con* and *sto* to stand together or remain the same, signifies an incapacity to remain the same for any long continuance.

FICKLE is most probably changed from the Latin *facilis* easy.

VERSATILE, in Latin *versatilis* from *verto* to turn, signifies easy to be turned.

Changeable is said of persons or things; *mutable* is said of things only: human beings are *changeable*, human affairs are *mutable*. *Changeable* respects the sentiments and opinions of the mind; *variable*, the state of the feelings; *inconstant*, the affections; *fickle*, the inclinations and attachments; *versatile* the application of the talents. A *changeable* person rejects what he has once embraced in order to take up something new; a *variable* person likes and dislikes alternately the same thing; an *inconstant* person likes nothing long; a *fickle* person likes many things successively or at the same time; a *versatile* person has a talent for whatever he likes.

Changeableness arises from a want of fixed principles; *variableness* from a predominance of humour; *incon-*

stancy from a selfish and unfeeling temper; *fickleness* from a lightness of mind; *versatility* from a flexibility of mind. Men are the most *changeable* and *inconstant*; women are the most *variable* and *fickle*: the former offend from an indifference for objects in general, or a diminished attachment for any object in particular; the latter from an excessive warmth of feeling that is easily biassed and ready to seize new objects. People who are *changeable* in their views and plans are particularly unfit for the government of a state; those who are *variable* in their humours are unsuitable as masters; people of an *inconstant* character ought to be shunned as lovers; those of a *fickle* disposition ought not to be chosen as friends.

Changeable, *variable*, *inconstant*, and *fickle*, as applied to persons, are taken in the bad sense; but *versatility* is a natural gift, which may be employed advantageously.

I have no taste
Of popular applause: the noisy praise
Of giddy crowds as *changeable* as winds.

DRYDEN.

With respect to the other alterations which the Saxon language appears to have undergone, we have no need to inquire minutely how far they have proceeded from the natural *mutability* of human speech, especially among an unlearned people.

TYRWHITT.

With God there is no *variableness*, with man there is no stability. Hence he is *changeable* in his designs, *fickle* in his friendships, fluctuating in his whole character.

BLAIR.

The dew, the blossoms of the tree,

With charms *inconstant* shine;

Their charms were his, but woe to me,

Their constancy was mine.

GOLDENITH.

Lord North was a man of admirable parts; of general knowledge, of a *versatile* understanding, fitted for every sort of business, of infinite wit and pleasantry, and of a delightful temper.

BURKE.

CHARACTER, LETTER.

CHARACTER comes from the Greek *χαρακτηρ*, signifying an impression or mark, from *χαρασσω* to imprint or stamp.

LETTER, in French *lettre*, Latin *litera*, is probably contracted from *legitera*, signifying what is legible.

Character is to *letter* as the genus to the species: every *letter* is a *character*; but every *character* is *letter*. *Character* is any printed that serves to designate something

cinating power in their eyes, by which they can kill the animals on whom they have fixed them.

Fascinate, as well as the others, is taken in the improper sense: *charm*, *enchant*, and *fascinate*, are employed to describe moral as well as natural operations; *enrapture* and *captivate* describe effects on the mind only: to *charm*, *enchant*, *fascinate*, and *enrapture*, designate the effects produced by physical and moral objects; *captivate* designates those produced by physical objects only: we may be *charmed*, or *enchanted*, or *enraptured*, with what we see, hear, and learn; we may be *fascinated* with what we see or learn; we are *captivated* only with what we see: a fine voice, a fine prospect, or a fine sentiment, *charms*, *enchants*, or *enraptures*; a fine person *fascinates*, or the conversation of a person is *fascinating*; beauty, with all its accompaniments, *captivates*. When applied to the same objects, *charm*, *enchant*, and *enrapture*, rise in sense: what *charms* produces sweet but not tumultuous emotions; in this sense music in general *charms* a musical ear: what *enchants* rouses the feelings to a high pitch of tumultuous delight; in this manner the musician is *enchanted* with the finest compositions of Handel when performed by the best masters; or a lover of the country is *enchanted* with Swiss scenery: to *enrapture* is to absorb all the affections of the soul; it is of too violent a nature to be either lasting or frequent; it is a term applicable only to persons of an enthusiastic character.

What *charms*, *enchants*, and *enraptures*, only affords pleasure for the time; what *fascinates* and *captivates* rivets the mind to the object: the former three convey the idea of a voluntary movement of the mind, as in the proper sense; the latter two imply a species of forcible action on the mind, which deprives a person of his free agency; the passions, as well as the affections, are called into play whilst the understanding is passive, which, with regard to *fascinate*, may be to the injury of the subject: a loose woman may have it in her power to *fascinate*, and a modest woman to *captivate*.

So fair a landscape charm'd the wond'ring knight.
GILBERT WERT.

Music has charms to soothe the savage breast.
CONGREVE.

Trust not too much to that *enchanted* face:
Beauty's a *charm*; but soon the *charm* will
pam.
DRYDEN.

One would think there was some kind of *fascination* in the eyes of a large circle of people, when darting altogether upon one person.
ADDISON.

He play'd so sweetly, and so sweetly sung,
That on each note th' enraptur'd audience hung.
SIR WM. JONES.

Her form the patriot's robe conceal'd,
With studied blandishments she bow'd,
And drew the captivated crowd.
MOORE.

CHARM, *v.* Grace.

CHARM, *v.* Pleasure.

CHARMING, *v.* Delightful.

CHARMS, *v.* Attractions.

CHASM, *v.* Breach.

TO CHASTEN, TO CHASTISE.

CHASTEN, CHASTISE, both come through the French *châtier*, from the Latin *castigo*, which is compounded of *castus* and *ago* to make pure.

Chasten has most regard to the end, *chastise* to the means; the former is an act of the Deity, the latter a human action: God *chastens* his faithful people to cleanse them from their transgressions; parents *chastise* their children to prevent the repetition of faults: afflictions are the means which he adopts for *chastening* those whom he wishes to make more obedient to his will; stripes are the means by which offenders are *chastised*.

By repairing sometimes to the house of mourning, you would *chasten* the looseness of fancy.
BLAIR.

Bad characters are dispersed abroad with profusion; I hope for example's sake, and (as punishments are designed by the civil power) more for the delivering the innocent, than the *chastising* the guilty.
HOODS.

CHASTITY, CONTINENCE.

CHASTITY, in French *chastité*, Latin *castitas*, comes from *castus* pure, and the Hebrew *kedish* sacred.

CONTINENCE, in French *continence*, Latin *continentia*, from *contineo* and *contineo*, signifies the act of keeping one's self within bounds.

These two terms are equally ployed in relation to the pleasu

people ought always to be *checked* whenever they discover a too forward temper in the presence of their superiors or elders; it is necessary to *curb* those who are of an impetuous temper, and to keep youth under *control*, until they have within themselves the restrictive power of judgement to *curb* their passions, and *control* their inordinate appetites.

Unlimited power cannot with propriety be entrusted to any individual, or limited body of individuals; there ought in every state to be a legitimate means of *checking* any one who shows a disposition to exercise an undue authority; but to invest the people with this office is in fact giving back, into the hands of the community, that which for the wisest purposes was taken from them by the institution of government: it is giving a restraining power to those who themselves are most in want of being restrained; whose ungovernable passions require to be *curbed* by the iron arm of power, whose unruly wills require all the influence of wisdom and authority to *control*.

Devotion, when it does not lie under the check of reason, is apt to degenerate into enthusiasm.

ANDERSON.

The point of honour has been deem'd of use,
To teach good manners, and to curb abuse;
Admitt it true, the consequence is clear,
Our polished manners are a mask we wear.

COWPER.

When ever private views and passions plead,
No cause can justify so black a deed;
Then, when the angry tempest clouds the soul,
May sober reason and her course control.

THOMSON.

TO CHECK, CHIDE, REPRIMAND,
REPROVE, REBUKE.

CHECK, *v.* To check, curb.

CHIDE is in Saxon *cidan*, probably connected with *cyldan* to scold.

REPRIMAND is compounded of the privative syllable *re* and *mand*, in Latin *mando* to commend, signifying not to commend.

REPROVE, in French *reprover*, Latin *reprobo*, is compounded of the privative syllable *re* and *probo*, signifying to find the contrary of good, that is, to find bad, to blame.

REBUKE is compounded of *re* and *buke*, in French *bouche* the mouth, signifying to stop the mouth.

The idea of expressing one's disapprobation of a person's conduct is common to all these terms.

A person is *checked* that he may not continue to do what is offensive; he is *chidden* for what he has done that he may not repeat it: impertinent and forward people require to be *checked*, that they may not become intolerable; thoughtless people are *chidden* when they give hurtful proofs of their carelessness.

People are *checked* by actions and looks, as well as words; they are *chidden* by words only: a timid person is easily *checked*; the want even of due encouragement will serve to damp his resolution: the young are perpetually falling into irregularities which require to be *chidden*.

To *chide* marks a stronger degree of displeasure than *reprimand*, and *reprimand* than *reprove* or *rebuke*; a person may *chide* or *reprimand* in anger, he *reproves* and *rebukes* with coolness: great offences call forth for *chidings*; omissions or mistakes occasion or require a *reprimand*; irregularities of conduct give rise to *reproof*; and improprieties of behaviour demand *rebuke*.

Chiding and *reprimanding* are employed for offences against the individual, and in cases where the greatest disparity exists in the station of the parties; a child is *chid* by his parent; a servant is *reprimanded* by his master.

Reproving and *rebuking* have less to do with the relation or station of the parties, than with the nature of the offence: wisdom, age, and experience, or a spiritual mission, give authority to *reprove* or *rebuke* those whose conduct has violated any law, human or divine: the prophet Nathan *reproved* king David for his heinous offences against his Maker; our Saviour *rebuked* Peter for his presumptuous mode of speech.

But if a clam'rous vile plebeian rose,
Him with *reproof* he *check'd*, or tam'd with
blows.

Pope.

His house was known to all the vagrant train,
He *chid* their wanderings, but reliev'd their pain.

GOLDSMITH.

This sort of language was very severely *reprimanded* by the Censor, who told the criminal "that he spoke in contempt of the court."

ANDERSON AND STEELE.

there is more buoyancy; *gaiety* comprehends *mirth* and indulgence. A *cheerful* person smiles; the *merry* person laughs; the *sprightly* person dances; the *gay* person takes his pleasure.

The *cheerful* countenance remains *cheerful*; it marks the contentment of the heart, and its freedom from pain: the *merry* face will often look sad; a trifle will turn *mirth* into sorrow: the *sprightliness* of youth is often succeeded by the listlessness of bodily infirmity, or the gloom of despondency: *gaiety* is as transitory as the pleasures upon which it subsists; it is often followed by sullenness and discontent.

Cheerfulness is an habitual state of the mind; *mirth* is an occasional elevation of the spirits; *sprightliness* lies in the temperature and flow of the blood; *gaiety* depends altogether on external circumstances. Religion is the best promoter of *cheerfulness*; it makes its possessor pleased with himself and all around him; company and wine are but too often the only promoters of *mirth*; youth and health will naturally be attended with *sprightliness*; a succession of pleasures, an exemption from care, and the banishment of thought, will keep *gaiety* alive.

Sprightliness and *mirth* are seldom employed but in the proper sense as respects persons: but *cheerful* and *gay* are extended to different objects; as a *cheerful* prospect, a *cheerful* room, *gay* attire, a *gay* scene, *gay* colours, &c.

I have always preferred *cheerfulness* to *mirth*: the latter I consider as an act, the former as an habit of the mind. *Mirth* is short and transient; *cheerfulness* fixed and permanent.

ADDISON.

Mankind may be divided into the *merry* and the serious, who both of them make a very good figure in the species so long as they keep their respective humours from degenerating into the neighbouring extreme.

ADDISON.

But Venus, anxious for her son's affairs,
New counsels tries, and new designs prepares:
That Cupid should assume the shape and face
Of sweet Ascanus, and the *sprightly* grace.

DRYDEN.

To kinder skies, where gentler manners reign,
I turn: and France displays her bright domain.
Gay, *sprightly* land of *mirth* and social ease,
Pleas'd with thyself, whom all the world can
please.

GOLDSMITH.

CHEERFUL, *v.* Glad.

TO CHERISH, *v.* To foster.

TO CHERISH, *v.* To nourish.

TO CHIDE, *v.* To check.

CHIEF, PRINCIPAL, MAIN.

CHIEF, in French *chef*, from the Latin *caput* the head, signifies belonging to the uppermost part.

PRINCIPAL, in French *principal*, Latin *principalis*, comes from *princeps* a chief or prince, signifying belonging to a prince.

MAIN, from the Latin *magnus*, signifies to a great degree.

Chief respects order and rank; *principal* has regard to importance and respectability; *main* to degree or quantity. We speak of a *chief* clerk; a commander in *chief*; the *chief* person in a city: but the *principal* people in a city; the *principal* circumstances in a narrative, and the *main* object.

The *chief* cities, as mentioned by geographers, are those which are classed in the first rank; the *principal* cities generally include those which are the most considerable for wealth and population; these, however, are not always technically comprehended under the name of *chief* cities: the *main* end of men's exertions is the acquirement of wealth.

What is man,
If his *chief* good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more!

SHAKESPEARE.

The right which one man has to the actions of another, is generally borrowed, or derived from one or both of these two great originals, production or possession, which two are certainly the *principal* and most undoubted rights that take place in the world.

SMITH.

To the accidental or adventitious parts of Paradise Lost, some slight exceptions may be made; but the main fabric is immovably supported.

JOHNSON.

CHIEF, LEADER, CHIEFTAIN,
HEAD.

CHIEF and CHIEFTAIN signify he who is *chief* (*v.* *Chief*).

LEADER, from to *lead*, and HEAD from the *head*, sufficiently designate their own signification.

Chief respects precedency in civil matters; *leader* regards the direction of enterprises: *chieftain* is employed for the superior in military rank; and

species: we always *choose* in *ing*, but we do not always *pre-choosing*. To *choose* is to take one thing instead of another; to *prefer* is to take one thing before or rather than another. We sometimes *choose* from the bare necessity of *choosing*; but we never *prefer* without making a positive and voluntary

as we *choose* from a specific *choice*, the acts of *choosing* and *preferring* differ in the nature of the motive. The former is absolute, the latter is relative. We *choose* a thing for what it is, or what we esteem it to be; we *prefer* a thing for what it is, or what we suppose it has, superior to another.

Utility or convenience are grounds of *choosing*; comparative merit occasions *preference*: we *choose* somewhat is good, and are contented until we see something better than we *prefer*.

We calculate and pause in *choosing*; we decide in *preferring*; the judge determines in making the *choice*; the law determines in giving the *preference*. We *choose* things from an estimate of their merits or their fitness for a purpose proposed; we *prefer* from their accordance with our habits, and pursuits. Books are *chosen* by those who wish to read; romances and works of fiction are *preferred* by general readers; learned works by the scholar.

Who wants instruction *chooses* a teacher, but he will mostly *prefer* a teacher whom he knows to a perfect teacher. Our *choice* is good or bad according to our knowledge; our *preference* is just or unjust, according as it is actioned by reason.

Choice may be directed by our own experience or that of others; our *preference* must be guided by our own. We make our *choice*; we *prefer* *preference*: the first is the determination of the mind, it fixes the object; the latter is the inclination of the will, it yields to the object. *Choosing* must be employed in all important concerns of life; *preference* is admissible in subordinate concerns only. There is but one thing right, and that ought to be chosen when it is discovered: there

are many indifferent things that may suit our tastes and inclinations; these we are at liberty to *prefer*. But to *prefer* what we ought not to *choose* is to make our reason bend to our will. Our Saviour said of Mary that she *chose* the better part: had she consulted her feelings she would have *preferred* the part she had rejected. The path of life should be *chosen*; but the path to be taken in a walk may be *preferred*. It is adviseable for a youth in the *choice* of a profession to consult what he *prefers*, as he has the greatest chance of succeeding when he can combine his pleasure with his duty. A friend should be *chosen*: a companion may be *preferred*. A wife should be *chosen*; but unfortunately lovers are most apt to give a *preference* in a matter where a good or bad *choice* may determine one's happiness or misery for life. A wise prince is careful in the *choice* of his ministers; but a weak prince has mostly favourites whom he *prefers*.

There is nothing of so great importance to us, as the good qualities of one to whom we join ourselves for life. When the *choice* is left to friends, the chief point under consideration is an estate; where the parties *choose* for themselves, their thoughts turn most upon the person.

ADDISON.

When a man has a mind to venture his money in a lottery, every figure of it appears equally alluring; and no manner of reason can be given why a man should *prefer* one to the other before the lottery is drawn.

ADDISON.

Judgement was wearied with the perplexity of *choice* where there was no motive for *preference*.

JOHNSON.

TO CHOOSE, PICK, SELECT.

CHOOSE, *v.* To choose, *prefer*.

PICK, in German *picken*, or *bicken*, French *bicquer*, Dutch *becken*, Icelandic *picka*, Swedish *piacka*, comes very probably from the old German *bag*, *bich* to stick, corresponding to the Latin *figo* to fix.

SELECT, Latin *selectus*, participle of *seligo*, that is *lego* to gather or put, and *se* apart.

Choose is as in the former case the generic; the others are specific terms: *pick* and *select* are expressly different modes of *choosing*. We always *choose* when we *pick* and *select*; but we do not always *pick* and *select* when we *choose*.

To *choose* may be applied to two or

any ball, like the ball of the earth, may be represented as a *globe*.

Might I from fortune's bounteous hand receive
Each boon, each blessing in her power to give;
E're at this mighty price I'd not be bound
To tread the same dull *circle* round and round.
The soul requires enjoyments more sublime,
By space unbounded, undestroyed by time.

JENYNS.

Or if some stripes from Providence we feel,
He strikes with pity, and but wounds to heal;
Kindly, perhaps, sometimes afflicts us here,
To guide our views to a sublimer sphere.

JENYNS.

Thousands of suns beyond each other blaze,
Orbs roll o'er orbs, and glow with mutual rays.

JENYNS.

Thus roaming with adventurous wing the globe,
From scene to scene excursive, I behold
In all her workings, bounteous, great, or new,
Fair nature.

MALLEY.

CIRCUIT, TOUR, ROUND.

CIRCUIT, in French *circuit*, Latin *circuitus*, participle of *circumeo*, signifies either the act of going round, or the extent gone.

TOUR is but a variation of turn, signifying a mere turn of the body in travelling.

ROUND marks the track *round*, or the space gone *round*.

A *circuit* is made for a specific end of a serious kind; a *tour* is always made for pleasure; a *round*, like a *circuit*, is employed in matters of business, but of a more familiar and ordinary kind. A judge goes his *circuit* at particular periods of time: gentlemen, in times of peace, consider it as an essential part of their education to make what is termed the grand *tour*: tradesmen have certain *rounds* which they take on certain days.

We speak of making the *circuit* of a place; of taking a *tour* in a given county; or going a particular *round*. A *circuit* is wide or narrow; a *tour* and a *round* is great or little. A *circuit* is prescribed as to extent; a *tour* is optional; a *round* is prescribed or otherwise. *Circuit* is seldom used but in a specific sense; *tour* is seldom employed but in regard to travelling; *round* may be taken figuratively, as when we speak of going one's *round* of pleasure.

Th' unbind'd commanders and the martial train,
First make the *circuit* of the sandy plain.

DAYDEN.

Goldsmith's *tour* through Europe we are told
was made for the most part on foot.

JOHNSON.

'Tis night! the season when the happy take
Repose, and only wretches are awake;
Now discontented ghosts begin their rounds,
Haunt ruin'd buildings and unwholesome grounds.

OTWAY.

Savage had projected a perpetual *round*, or innocent pleasure in Wales, of which he suspected no interruption from pride, or ignorance, or brutality.

JOHNSON.

TO CIRCULATE, *v.* To spread.

TO CIRCUMSCRIBE, INCLOSE.

CIRCUMSCRIBE, from the Latin *circum* about, and *scribo* to write, marks simply the surrounding with a line.

INCLOSE, from the Latin *inclusus*, participle of *includo*, compounded of *in* and *claudo* to shut, marks a species of confinement.

The extent of any place is drawn out to the eye by a *circumscription*; its extent is limited to a given point by an *inclosure*. A garden is *circumscribed* by any ditch, line, or posts, that serve as its boundaries; it is *inclosed* by wall or fence. An *inclosure* may serve to *circumscribe*, but that which barely *circumscribes* will seldom serve to *inclose*.

Who can imagine that the existence of a creature is to be *circumscribed* by time whose thoughts are not?

ADDISON.

Remember on that happy coast to build,
And with a trench *inclose* the fruitful field.

DRYDEN.

TO CIRCUMSCRIBE, *v.* To bound.

CIRCUMSPECT, *v.* Cautious.

CIRCUMSTANCE, SITUATION.

CIRCUMSTANCE, in Latin *circumstantia*, from *circum* and *sto*, signifies what stands about a thing, or belongs to it as its accident.

SITUATION, in French *situation*, comes from the Latin *situs*, and the Hebrew *sot* to place, signifying what is placed in a certain manner.

Circumstance is to *situation* as a part to a whole; many *circumstances* constitute a *situation*; a *situation* is an aggregate of *circumstances*. A person is said to be in *circumstances* of affluence who has an abundance of every thing essential for his comfort: he is in an easy *situation* when nothing exists to create uneasiness.

Circumstance respects that which

minutus, participle of *minuo* to diminish, signifies diminished or reduced to a very small point.

Circumstantial expresses less than *particular*, and that less than *minute*. A *circumstantial* account contains all leading events; a *particular* account includes every event and movement however trivial; a *minute* account omits nothing as to person, time, place, figure, form, and every other trivial *circumstance* connected with the events. A narrative may be *circumstantial*, *particular*, or *minute*; an inquiry, investigation, or description may be *particular* or *minute*, a detail may be *minute*. An event or occurrence may be *particular*, a *circumstance* or *particular* may be *minute*. We may be generally satisfied with a *circumstantial* account of ordinary events; but whatever interests the feelings cannot be detailed with too much *particularity* or *minuteness*.

Thompson's wide expansion of general views and his enumeration of *circumstantial* varieties, would have been obstructed and embarrassed by the frequent interruptions of the verses which are the necessary effects of the rhyme. JOHNSON.

I am extremely troubled at the return of your *demotion*; you cannot be too *particular* in the *enumeration* of your health to me. FORB.

When Pope's letters were published and avowed, as they had relation to recent facts and persons either then living or not yet forgotten, they *nearly* be supposed to have found readers, but as these facts were *obscure*, and the characters little known, or little regarded, they awakened no popular kindness or resentment. JOHNSON.

TO CITE, QUOTE.

CITE and **QUOTE** are both derived from the same Latin verb *cito* to move, and the Hebrew *sat* to stir up, signifying to put into action.

To *cite* is employed for persons or things; to *quote* for things only: authors are *cited*, passages from their works are *quoted*: we *cite* only by authority; we *quote* for general purposes of convenience. Historians ought to *cite* their authority in order to strengthen their evidence and inspire confidence; controversialists must *quote* the objectionable passages in those works which they wish to confute: it is prudent to *cite* no one whose authority is questionable; it is superfluous to *quote* any thing that can be easily perused in the original.

The great work of which Justinian has the credit, consists of texts collected from law books of approved authority; and those texts are digested according to a scientific analysis; the names of the original authors and the titles of their several books being constantly *cited*.

SIR Wm. JONES.

Let us consider what is truly glorious according to the author I have to-day quoted in the front of my paper. STEELE.

TO CITE, SUMMON.

CITE, *v.* To cite, quote.

SUMMON, in French *sommer*, Latin *summoneo* or *submoneo*, compounded of *sub* and *moneo*, signifies to give a private intimation.

The idea of calling a person authoritatively to appear, is common to these terms. *Cite* is used in a general sense, *summon* in a particular and technical sense: a person may be *cited* to appear before his superior; he is *summoned* to appear before a court: the station of the individual gives authority to the act of *citing*; the law itself gives authority to that of *summoning*.

When *cite* is used in a legal sense, it is mostly employed for witnesses, and *summon* for every occasion: a person is *cited* to give evidence, he is *summoned* to answer a charge. *Cite* is seldomer used in the legal sense than in that of calling by name, in which general acceptance it is employed with regard to authors, as specified in the preceding article: the legal is the ordinary sense of *summon*; it may however be extended in its application to any call for which there may be occasion; as when we speak of the *summons* which is given to attend the death bed of a friend, or figuratively, death is said to *summon* mortals from this world.

E'en social friendship duns his ear
And *cites* him to the public sphere. SHERIDAN.
The sly enchantress *summon'd* all her trains,
Alluring Venus, queen of vagrant love,
The boon companion Bacchus, loud and vain,
And tricking Hermer, God of fraudulent gain.

WALT.

CIVIL, POLITE.

CIVIL, in French *civile*, Latin *civilis* from *civis* a citizen, signifies belonging to or becoming a citizen.

POLITE, in French *poli*, Latin *politus* participle of *polio* to polish.

These two epithets are employed to

denote different modes of acting in social intercourse: *polite* expresses more than *civil*; it is possible to be *civil* without being *polite*: *politeness* supposes *civility* and something in addition.

Civility is confined to no rank, age, condition, or country; all have an opportunity with equal propriety of being *civil*, but not so with *politeness*, that requires a certain degree of equality, at least the equality of education; it would be contradictory for masters and servants, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, to be *polite* to each other.

Civility is a Christian duty; there are times when all men ought to be *civil* to his neighbour: *politeness* is rather a voluntary devotion of ourselves to others: among the inferior orders *civility* is indispensable; an *uncivil* person in a subordinate station is an obnoxious member of society: among the higher orders *politeness* is often a substitute; and where the form and spirit are combined, it supersedes the necessity of *civility*: *politeness* is the sweetener of human society; it gives a charm to every thing that is said and done.

Civility is contented with pleasing when the occasion offers: *politeness* seeks the opportunity to please, it prevents the necessity of asking by anticipating the wishes; it is full of delicate attentions, and is an active benevolence in the minor concerns of life.

Civility is anxious not to offend, but it often gives pain from ignorance or error: *politeness* studies all the circumstances and situations of men; it enters into their characters, suits itself to their humours, and even yields indulgently to their weaknesses; its object is no less to avoid giving pain than to study to afford pleasure.

Civility is dictated by the desire of serving, *politeness* by that of pleasing: *civility* often confines itself to the bare intention of serving; *politeness* looks to the action and its consequences: when a peasant is *civil* he often does the reverse of what would be desired of him; he takes no heed of the wants and necessities of others: *politeness* considers what is due to others and from others; it does nothing superfluously; men of good breeding think before they speak, and

move before they act. It is necessary to be *civil* without being troublesome, and *polite* without being affected.

Civility requires nothing but goodness of intention; it may be associated with the coarsest manners, the grossest ignorance, and the total want of all culture: *politeness* requires peculiar properties of the head and the heart, natural and artificial; much goodness and gentleness of character, an even current of feelings, quickness and refined delicacy of sentiment, a command of temper, a general insight into men and manners, and a thorough acquaintance with the forms of society.

Civility is not incompatible with the harshest expressions of one's feelings; it allows the utterance of all a man thinks without regard to person, time, or season; it lays no restraint upon the angry passions: *politeness* enjoins upon us to say nothing to another which we would not wish to be said to ourselves; it lays at least a temporary constraint on all the angry passions, and prevents all turbulent commotions.

Civility is always the same; whatever is once *civil* is always so, and acknowledged as such by all persons: *politeness* varies with the fashions and times; what is *polite* in one age or in one country may be *unpolite* in another.

If *civility* be not a splendid virtue, it has at least the recommendation of being genuine and harmless, having nothing artificial in it; it admits of no gloss, and will never deceive; it is the true expression of good will, the companion of respect in inferiors, of condescension in superiors, of humanity and kindness in equals: *politeness* springs from education, is the offspring of refinement, and consists much in the exterior; it often rests with the bare imitation of virtue, and is distinguished into true and false; in the latter case it may be abused for the worst of purposes, and serve as a mask to conceal malignant passions under the appearance of kindness; hence it is possible to be *polite* in form without being *civil*, or any thing else that is good.

He has good nature,

And I have good manners,

His sons too are *civil* to me, because

I do not pretend to be wiser than they. OTWAY.

I heard a mermaid on a dolphin's back,
Uttering such dulcet and harmonious sounds,
That the rude sea grew civil at her song.

SHAKESPEARE.

The true effect of genuine politeness seems to
be rather ease than pleasure. JOHNSON.

A *polite* country squire shall make you as
many bows in half an hour as would serve a
courtier for a week. ADDISON.

CIVIL, OBLIGING, COMPLAISANT.

CIVIL, *v. Civil, polite.*

OBLIGING, from *oblige*, signifies
either doing what *oblige*s, or ready to
oblige.

COMPLAISANT, in French *com-
plaisant*, comes from *complaire* to
please, signifying ready to please.

Civil is more general than *obliging*;
one is always *civil* when one is *oblig-
ing*, but one is not always *obliging*
when one is *civil*: *complaisance* is
more than either, it refines upon both;
it is a branch of *politeness* (*v. Civil,
polite*).

Civil regards the manner as well as
the action, *obliging* respects the
action, *complaisant* includes all the
circumstances of the action: to be
civil is to please by any word or
action; to be *obliging* is to perform
some actual service; to be *complai-
sant* is to do that service in the time
and manner that is most suitable and
reasonable: *civility* requires no effort;
to be *obliging* always costs the agent
some trouble; *complaisance* requires
attention and observation: a person is
civil in his reply, *obliging* in lending
assistance, *complaisant* in his atten-
tion to his friends.

One is habitually *civil*; *obliging*
in disposition; *complaisant* from
education and disposition: it is ne-
cessary to be *civil* without being free,
to be *obliging* without being officious,
to be *complaisant* without being af-
fected.

It is never more offensive than when it
attempts to be *civil*. CUMBERLAND.

The shepherd home
Merry-hearted, and by turns relieves
The ruddy milkmaid of her brimming pail,
The beauty whom perhaps his witless heart
Secretly loves, by that best language shown
Of cordial glances, and obliging deeds.

THOMSON.

I seem'd so pleas'd with what every one said,
and smil'd with so much complaisance at all
their pretty fancies, that though I did not put

one word into their discourse, I have the vanity
to think they look'd upon me as very agreeable
company. ADDISON.

CIVILITY, *v. Benefit.*

CIVILIZATION, *v. Cultivation.*

TO CLAIM, *v. To ask for.*

CLAIM, *v. Pretension.*

CLAIM, *v. Right.*

CLAMOROUS, *v. Loud.*

CLAMOUR, *v. Noise.*

CLANDESTINE, SECRET.

CLANDESTINE, in Latin *clan-
destinus*, comes from *clàm* secretly.

SECRET, in French *sécre*, Latin
secretus participle of *secerno* to se-
parate, signifies remote from observa-
tion.

Clandestine expresses more than
secret.

To do a thing *clandestinely* is to
elude observation; to do a thing *se-
cretly* is to do it without the know-
ledge of any one: what is *clandestine*
is unallowed, which is not necessarily
the case with what is *secret*.

With the *clandestine* must be a
mixture of art; with *secrecy*, caution
and management are requisite: a
clandestine marriage is effected by a
studied plan to escape notice; a
secret marriage is conducted by the
forbearance of all communication:
conspirators have many *clandestine*
proceedings and *secret* meetings: an
unfaithful servant *clandestinely* con-
veys his master's property from the
premises of his master; a thief *secretly*
takes a purse from the pocket of the
bystanders.

I went to this *clandestine* lodging, and found
to my amazement all the ornaments of a
fine gentleman, which he has taken upon credit.

JOHNSON.

Ye boys who pluck the flowers, and spoil the
spring,

Beware the *secret* snake that shoots a sting.

DRYDEN.

TO CLASP, HUG, EMBRACE.

To CLASP, from the noun *clasp*,
signifies to lay hold of like a *clasp*.

HUG, in Saxon *hogan*, comes from
the German *hügen*, which signifies to
enclose with a hedge, and figuratively
to cherish or take special care of.

EMBRACE, in French *embrasser*,

The general qualities and attributes of things are to be considered in *classing*; their fitness to stand by each other must be considered in *arranging*; their capacity for forming a line is the only thing to be attended to in *ranging*.

Classification serves the purposes of science; *arrangement* those of decoration and ornament; *ranging* those of general convenience: men are *classed* into different bodies according to some certain standard of property, power, education, occupation, &c.; furniture is *arranged* in a room according as it answers either in colour, shade, convenience of situation, &c.; men are *ranged* in order whenever they make a procession: *classification* is concerned with mental objects; *arrangement* with either physical or mental objects; *ranging* altogether with physical objects: knowledge, experience, and judgement, are requisite in *classing*; taste and practice are indispensable in *arranging*; care only is wanted in *ranging*. When applied to spiritual objects, *arrangement* is the ordinary operation of the mind, requiring only methodical habits: *classification* is a branch of philosophy which is not attainable by art only; it requires a mind peculiarly methodical by nature, that is capable of distinguishing things by their generic and specific differences; not separating things that are alike; nor blending things that are different: books are *classified* in a catalogue according to their contents; they are *arranged* in a shop according to their size or price; they are *ranged* in a counter for convenience: ideas are *classed* by the logician into simple and complex, abstract and concrete: they are *arranged* by the power of reflection in the mind of the thinker: words are *classified* by the grammarian into different parts of speech; they are suitably *arranged* by the writer in different parts of a sentence; a man of business *arranges* his affairs so as to suit the time and season for every thing; a shopkeeper *arranges* his goods so as to have a place for every thing, and to know its place; he *ranges* those things before him, of which he wishes to command a view: a general

arranges his men for the battle; a drill serjeant *ranges* his men when he makes them exercise.

We are all ranked and *classed* by him who seeth into every heart. **BLAIR.**

In vain you attempt to regulate your expenses if into your amusements, or your society, disorder has crept. You have admitted a principle of confusion which will defeat all your plans, and perplex and entangle what you sought to *arrange*. **BLAIR.**

A noble writer should be born with this faculty (a strong imagination) so as to be well able to receive lively ideas from outward objects, to retain them long, and to *range* them together in such figures and representations as are most likely to hit the fancy of the reader. **ANSTON.**

CLEAN, CLEANLY, PURE.

CLEAN and CLEANLY is in Saxon *claene*.

PURE, in French *pur*, Latin *purus*.

Clean expresses a freedom from dirt or soil; *cleanly* the disposition or habit of being *clean*.

A person who keeps himself *clean* is *cleanly*; a *cleanly* servant takes care to keep other things *clean*.

Clean is employed in the proper sense only; *pure* mostly in the moral sense: the hands should be *clean*; the heart should be *pure*: it is the first requisite of good writing that it should be *clean*; it is of the first importance for the morals of youth to be kept *pure*.

Age itself is not unamiable while it is preserved *clean* and unsoiled. **SPECTATOR.**

In the east, where the warmth of the climate makes *cleanness* more immediately necessary than in colder countries, it is made one part of their religion. The Jewish law, and the Mahometan, which in some things copies after it, is filled with bathing, purifications, and other rites of the like nature. Though there is the above named convenient reason to be assigned for these ceremonies, the chief intention was to typify inward *purity* of heart. **SPECTATOR.**

CLEANLY, *v. Clean.*

CLEAR, *v. Apparent.*

CLEAR, LUCID, BRIGHT, VIVID.

CLEAR, *v. To absolve.*

LUCID, in Latin *lucidus*, from *luceo* to shine, and *lux* light, signifies having light.

BRIGHT, *v. Brightness.*

VIVID, Latin *vividus* from *vivo* to live, signifies being in a state of life.

These epithets mark a gradation in their sense; the idea of light is common to them, but *clear* expresses less than *lucid*, *lucid* than *bright*, and *bright* less than *vivid*: a mere freedom from stain or dullness constitutes the *clearness*; the return of light, and consequent removal of darkness, constitutes *lucidity*; *brightness* supposes a certain strength of light; *vividness* a freshness combined with the strength, and even a degree of brilliancy: a sky is *clear* that is divested of clouds; the atmosphere is *lucid* in the day, but not in the night; the sun shines *bright* when it is unobstructed by any thing in the atmosphere; lightning sometimes presents a *vivid* redness, and sometimes a *vivid* pale: the light of the stars may be *clear*, and sometimes *bright*, but never *vivid*; the light of the sun is rather *bright*, than *clear* or *vivid*; the light of the moon is either *clear*, *bright*, or *vivid*.

These epithets may with equal propriety be applied to colour, as well as to light: a *clear* colour is unmingled with any other; a *bright* colour has something striking and strong in it; a *vivid* colour something lively and fresh in it.

Some choose the *clearest* light,
And boldly challenge the most piercing eye.
ROSCOMMON.

Nor is the stream
Of purest crystal, nor the *lucid* air,
Though one transparent vacancy it seems,
Void of their unseen people. THOMSON.

This place, the *brightest* mansion of the sky,
I'll call the palace of the Deity. DRYDEN.

From the moist meadow to the withered hill,
Led by the breeze, the *vivid* verdure runs,
And swells, and deepens to the cherish'd eye.
THOMSON.

In their moral application they preserve a similar distinction: a conscience is said to be *clear* when it is free from every stain or spot; a deranged understanding may have *lucid* intervals; a *bright* intellect throws light on every thing around it; a *vivid* imagination glows with every image that nature presents.

I look upon a sound imagination as the greatest blessing of life, next to a *clear* judgment, and a good conscience. ADDISON.

I believe were Rousseau alive, and in one of

* Vide Trumler: "Clearly, distinctly."

his *lucid* intervals, he would be shocked at the practical frenzy of his scholars. BURKE.

But in a body which doth freely yield
His parts to reason's rule obedient,
There Alma, like a virgin queen most bright,
Doth flourish in all beauty excellent. SPENSER.

There let the classic page thy fancy lead
Through rural scenes, such as the Mantuan
swain

Paints in the matchless harmony of song,
Or catch thyself the landscape, gilded swift
Athwart imagination's *vivid* eye. THOMSON.

CLEAR, *v.* Fair.

TO CLEAR, *v.* To absolve.

CLEARLY, DISTINCTLY.

THAT is seen CLEARLY of which one has a general view; that is seen DISTINCTLY which is seen so as to distinguish the several parts.

We see the moon *clearly* whenever it shines; but we cannot see the spots in the moon *distinctly* without the help of glasses.

What we see *distinctly* must be seen *clearly*, but a thing may be seen *clearly* without being seen *distinctly*.

A want of light, or the intervention of other objects, prevents us from seeing *clearly*; distance, or a defect in the sight, prevents us from seeing *distinctly*.

* Old men often see *clearly* but not *distinctly*; they perceive large or luminous objects at a distance, but they cannot distinguish such small objects as the characters of a book without the help of convex glasses; short-sighted persons, on the contrary, see small objects *distinctly*, but they have no *clear* vision of large objects, unless they are diminished by concave glasses.

The custom of arguing on any side, even against our persuasion, dims the understanding, and makes it by degrees lose the faculty of discerning *clearly* between truth and falsehood.

LOCKE.

Whether we are able to comprehend all the operations of nature, and the manners of them, it matters not to inquire; but this is certain, that we can comprehend no more of them than we can *distinctly* conceive. LOCKE.

CLEARNESS, PERSPICUITY.

CLEARNESS, from *clear* (*v.* *Clear*, *lucid*), is here used figuratively, to

mark the degree of light by which one sees things distinctly.

PERSPICUITY, in French *perspicuité*, Latin *perspicuitas* from *perspicuus* and *perspicio* to look through, signifies the quality of being able to be seen through.

These epithets denote qualities equally requisite to render a discourse intelligible, but each has its peculiar character. * *Clearness* respects our ideas, and springs from the distinction of the things themselves that are discussed: *perspicuity* respects the mode of expressing the ideas, and springs from the good qualities of style. It requires a *clear* head to be able to see a subject in all its bearings and relations; to distinguish all the niceties and shades of difference between things that bear a strong resemblance, and to separate it from all irrelevant objects that intermingle themselves with it. But whatever may be our *clearness* of conception, it is requisite if we will communicate our conceptions to others, that we should observe a purity in our mode of diction, that we should be particular in the choice of our terms, careful in the disposition of them, and accurate in the construction of our sentences; that is *perspicuity*, which as it is the first, so, according to Quintilian, it is the most important part of composition.

Clearness of intellect is a natural gift: *perspicuity* is an acquired art: although intimately connected with each other, yet it is possible to have *clearness* without *perspicuity*, and *perspicuity* without *clearness*. People of quick capacities will have *clear* ideas on the subjects that offer themselves to their notice, but for want of education they may often use improper or ambiguous phrases; or by errors of construction render their phraseology the reverse of *perspicuous*: on the other hand, it is in the power of some to express themselves on subjects far above their comprehension from a certain facility which they acquire of catching up suitable modes of expression.

The study of the classics and mathematics are most fitted for the improvement of *clearness*; the study of

grammar, and the observance of good models will serve most effectually for the acquirement of *perspicuity*.

It is one thing to think right, and another thing to know the way to lay our thoughts before others with advantage and *clearness*. LOCKE.

No modern orator can dare to enter the lists with Demosthenes and Tully. We have discourses, indeed, that may be admitted for their *perspicuity*, purity, and elegance; but can produce none that abound in a sublime which whisks away the auditor like a mighty torrent.

WHARTON.

TO CLEAVE, *v.* To stick.

CLEMENCY, LENITY, MERCY.

CLEMENCY is in Latin *clementia*, signifying mildness.

LENITY, in Latin *lenitas* from *lenis* soft, or *levis* smooth, and the Greek *λενς* mild.

MERCY is in Latin *misericordia*, compounded of *miseria* and *cordis* the pain of the heart, signifying the pain produced by observing the pain of others.

Clemency and *lenity* are employed only towards offenders; *mercy* towards all who are in trouble, whether from their own fault, or any other cause.

Clemency lies in the disposition; *lenity* and *mercy* in the act; the former as respects superiors in general, the latter in regard to those who are invested with civil power: a monarch displays his *clemency* by showing *mercy*; a master shows *lenity* by not inflicting punishment where it is deserving.

Clemency is arbitrary on the part of the dispenser, flowing from his will independent of the object on whom it is bestowed; *lenity* and *mercy* are discretionary, they always have regard to the object and the nature of the offence, or misfortunes; *lenity* therefore often serves the purposes of discipline, and *mercy* those of justice by forgiveness, instead of punishment; but *clemency* defeats its end by forbearing to punish where it is needful.

A mild master who shows *clemency* to a faithless servant by not bringing him to justice, often throws a worthless wretch upon the public to commit more atrocious depredations. A well-timed *lenity* sometimes recalls an

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Clairté, perspicuité."

offender to himself, and brings him back to good order. Upon this principle, the English constitution has wisely left in the hands of the monarch the discretionary power of showing mercy in all cases that do not demand the utmost rigour of the law.

We wretched Trojans toss'd on ev'ry shore,
From sea to sea, thy clemency implore;
Forbid the fires our shipping to deface,
Receive th' unhappy fugitives to grace. DRYDEN.

The King (Charles II.) with *lenity* of which the world has had perhaps no other example, declined to be the judge or avenger of his own or his father's wrongs. JOHNSON.

The gods (if gods to goodness are inclin'd,
If acts of mercy touch their heav'nly mind),
And more than all the gods, your gen'rous heart,
Conscious of worth, requite its own desert. DRYDEN.

CLERGYMAN, PARSON, PRIEST, MINISTER.

CLERGYMAN, altered from *clerk*, *clericus*, signified any one holding a regular office, and by distinction one who held the holy office.

PARSON is either changed from *person*, that is, by distinction the person who spiritually presides over a parish, or contracted from *parochianus*.

PRIEST, in German, &c. *priester*, comes from the Greek *πρεσβυτερος*, signifying an elder who holds the sacerdotal office.

MINISTER, in Latin *minister* a servant, from *minus* less or inferior, signifies literally one who performs a subordinate office, and has been extended in its meaning, to signify generally one who officiates or performs an office.

The word *clergyman* applies to such as are regularly bred according to the forms of the national religion, and applies to none else. In this sense we speak of the English, the French, and Scotch *clergy* without distinction. A *parson* is a species of *clergyman*, who ranks the highest in the three orders of inferior *clergy*; that is, *parson*, vicar, and curate; the *parson* being a technical term for the rector, or he who holds the living: in its technical sense it has now acquired a definite use; but in general conversation it is become almost a nickname. The word *clergyman* is always substituted for *parson* in polite society. When *priest* respects the Christian religion

it is a species of *clergyman*, that is, one who is ordained to officiate at the altar in distinction from the deacon, who is only an assistant to the *priest*. But the term *priest* has likewise an extended meaning in reference to such as hold the sacerdotal character in any form of religion, as the *priests* of the Jews, or those of the Greeks, Romans, Indians, and the like. A *minister* is one who actually or habitually officiates. *Clergymen* are therefore not always strictly *ministers*; nor are all *ministers* *clergymen*. If a *clergyman* delegates his functions altogether he is not a *minister*; nor is he who presides over a dissenting congregation a *clergyman*. In the former case, however, it would be invidious to deprive the *clergyman* of the name of *minister* of the gospel, but in the latter case it is a misuse of the term *clergyman* to apply it to any *minister* who does not officiate according to the form of an established religion.

By a *clergyman* I mean one in holy orders! STANLEY.

To the time of Edward III. it is probable that the French and English languages subsisted together throughout the kingdom; the higher orders, both of the *clergy* and laity, speaking almost universally French; the lower retaining the use of their native tongue. TYNDAL.

Call a man a *priest*, or *parson*, and you set him in some men's esteem ten degrees below his own servant. BURN.

With leave and honor enter our abodes,
Ye sacred *ministers* of men and gods. POPE.

CLEVER, SKILFUL, EXPERT, DEXTEROUS, ADROIT.

CLEVER, in French *legère*, Latin *levis* light.

SKILFUL signifies full of *skill*; and *skill* probably comes from the Latin *scio* to know.

EXPERT, in French *experte*, Latin *expertus* participle of *experire* to search or try, signifies searched and tried.

DEXTEROUS, in Latin *dexter*, in Greek *δεξιτερς*, comparative of *δεξις* clever, and *δεξις* the right hand, because it is the most fitted for action, signifies the quality of doing rightly, as with the right hand.

ADROIT, in French *adroite*, Latin *adrectus* or *rectus* right or straight.

Clever and *skilful* are qualities of the mind; *expert*, *dexterous*, and

adroit, refer to modes of physical action. *Cleverness* regards in general the readiness to comprehend; *skill* the maturity of the judgement; *expertness* a facility in the use of things; *dexterity* a mechanical facility in the performance of any work; *adroitness* the suitable movements of the body. A person is *clever* at drawing who shows a taste for it, and executes it well without much instruction; he is *skilful* in drawing if he understands it both in theory and practice; he is *expert* in the use of the bow if he can use it with expedition and effect; he is *dexterous* at any game when he goes through the manœuvres with celerity and an unerring hand; he is *adroit* if by a quick, sudden, and well-directed movement of his body, he effects the object he has in view.

Cleverness is mental power employed in the ordinary concerns of life: a person is *clever* in business. *Skill* is both a mental and corporeal power, exerted in mechanical operations and practical sciences: a physician, a lawyer, and an artist, is *skilful*: one may have a *skill* in divination, or a *skill* in painting. *Expertness* and *dexterity* require more corporeal than mental power exerted in minor arts and amusements: one is *expert* at throwing the quoit; *dexterous* in the management of horses. *Adroitness* is altogether a corporeal talent, employed only as occasion may require: one is *adroit* at eluding the blows aimed by an adversary.

Cleverness is rather a natural gift; *skill* is *cleverness* improved by practice and extended knowledge; *expertness* is the effect of long practice; *dexterity* arises from habit combined with *agility*; *adroitness* is a species of *dexterity* arising from a natural agility.

My friend bade me welcome, but struck me quite dumb,

With tidings that Johnson and Burke would not come;

And I knew it," he cried; "both eternally full,

The one at the House and the other with Thrace.

But no matter; I'll warrant we'll make up the party.

With two full as clever and ten times as hearty."

GOLDENRUL.

There is nothing more graceful than to see the play stand still for a few moments, and the audience kept in an agreeable suspense, during the silence of a *skilful* actor.

ADISON.

O'er bar and shelf the watery path they sound,
With dexterous arm, sagacious of the ground;
Fearless they combat every hostile wind,
Wheeling in many tracks with counter wind,
Expert to moor, where terrors lie the road.

FALCONER.

He applied himself next to the coquette's hand, which he likewise laid open with great *dexterity*.

ANONON.

TO CLIMB, *v.* To arise.

TO CLING, *v.* To stick.

CLOAK, MASK, BLIND, VEIL.

THESE are figurative terms, expressive of different modes of intentionally keeping something from the view of others. They are borrowed from those familiar objects which serve similar purposes in common life. CLOAK and MASK express figuratively and properly more than BLIND or VEIL. The two former keep the whole object out of sight; the two latter only partially intercept the view. In this figurative sense they are all employed for a bad purpose.

The *cloak*, the *mask*, and the *blind*, serve to deceive others; the *veil* serves to deceive one's self.

The whole or any part of a character may be concealed by a *blind*; a part, though not the whole, may be concealed by a *mask*. A *blind* is not only employed to conceal the character but the conduct or proceedings. We carry a *cloak* and a *mask* about with us; but a *blind* is something external.

The *cloak*, as the external garment, is the most convenient of all coverings for entirely keeping concealed what we do not wish to be seen; a good outward deportment serves as a *cloak* to conceal a bad character. A *mask* only hides the face; a *mask* therefore serves to conceal only as much as words and looks can effect. A *blind* is intended to shut out the light and prevent observation; whatever, therefore, conceals the real truth, and prevents suspicion by a false exterior, is a *blind*. A *veil* prevents a person from seeing as well as being seen; whatever, therefore, obscures the mental sight acts as a *veil* to the mind's eye.

Religion is unfortunately the object which may serve to *cloak* the worst of purposes and the worst of characters:

claustrum, signifies an habitation for monks, from the Greek *κλῆτρον*; alone.

The proper idea of *cloister* is that of seclusion; the proper idea of *convent* is that of community; the proper idea of a *monastery* is that of solitude. One is shut up in a *cloister*, put into a *convent*, and retires to a *monastery*.

Whoever wishes to take an absolute leave of the world, shuts himself up in a *cloister*; whoever wishes to attach himself to a community that has renounced all commerce with the world, goes into a *convent*; whoever wishes to shun all human intercourse retires to a *monastery*.

In the *cloister* our liberty is sacrificed: in the *convent* our worldly habits are renounced, and those of a regular religious community being adopted, we submit to the yoke of established orders: in a *monastery* we impose a sort of voluntary exile upon ourselves; we live with the view of living only to God.

In the ancient and true *monasteries*, the members divided their time between contemplation and labour; but as population increased, and towns multiplied, *monasteries* were, properly speaking, succeeded by *convents*.

In ordinary discourse, *cloister* is employed in an absolute and indefinite manner: we speak of the *cloister* to designate a monastic state; as entering a *cloister*; burying one's self in a *cloister*; penances and mortifications are practised in a *cloister*.

It is not the same thing when we speak of the *cloister* of the Benedictines and of their *monastery*; or the *cloister* of the Capuchins and their *convent*.

Some solitary cloister will I choose,
And there with holy virgins live immur'd.

DAYDEN.

Nor were the new abbots less industrious to stock their convents with foreigners. TYRWHITT.

Besides independent foundations, which were opened for the reception of foreign monks in preference to the natives, a considerable number of religious houses were built and endowed as cells in different *monasteries* abroad.

LIST OF ENGLISH MONASTERIES.

CLOSE, COMPACT.

CLOSE, *v.* Close, near.

COMPACT, in Latin *compactus*,

participle of *compingo* to fix or join in, signifies jointed close together.

Proximity is expressed by both these terms; the former in a general and the latter in a restricted sense. Two bodies may be *close* to each other, but a body is *compact* with regard to itself.

Contact is not essential to constitute *closeness*; but a perfect adhesion of all the parts of a body is essential to produce *compactness*. Lines are *close* to each other that are separated but by a small space; things are rolled together in a *compact* form that are brought within the smallest possible space.

To right and left the martial wings display
Their shining arms, and stand in *close* array;
Though weak their spears, though dwarfish be
their height,

Compact they move, the bulwark of the fight.

SIR Wm. JOHNS.

CLOSE, NEAR, NIGH.

CLOSE, *v.* To close.

NEAR, and NIGH, is in Saxon *near*, *neah*, German, &c. *nah*.

Close is more definite than *near*: houses stand *close* to each other which are almost joined; men stand *close* when they touch each other: objects are *near* which are within sight; persons are *near* each other when they can converse together. *Near* and *nigh*, which are but variations of each other, in etymology, admit of little or no difference in their use; the former however is the most general. People live *near* each other who are in the same street; they live *close* to each other when their houses are adjoining.

Close is annexed as an adjective; *near* is employed only as an adverb or preposition. We speak of *close* ranks or *close* lines; but not *near* ranks or *near* lines.

Th' unwearied watch their listening leaders keep,
And couching *close*, repel invading sleep. PERR.
O friend! Ulysses' shouts invade my ear;
Distress'd he seems, and no assistance *near*.

PERR.

From the red field their scatter'd bodies bear,
And *nigh* the fleet a funeral structure rear.

PERR.

TO CLOSE, SHUT.

CLOSE, is in French *clos*, Latin *clausus*, participle of *claudio* to shut.

SHUT, is in Saxon *scutten*, Dutch *schutten*, Hebrew *salem*.

ASSISTANT signifies properly one that assists or takes a part.

A *coadjutor* is more noble than an assistant: the latter is mostly in a subordinate station, but the former is an equal; the latter performs menial offices in the minor concerns of life, and a subordinate part at all times; the former labours conjointly in some concern of common interest and great importance. An *assistant* is engaged for a compensation; a *coadjutor* is a voluntary fellow-labourer. In every public concern where the purposes of charity or religion are to be promoted, *coadjutors* often effect more than the original promoters: in the medical and scholastic professions *assistants* are indispensable to relieve the pressure of business. *Coadjutors* ought to be zealous and unanimous; *assistants* ought to be assiduous and faithful.

Adrian from Vienna import that the Archbishop of Salzburg is dead, who is succeeded by Count Harrach, formerly Bishop of Vienna, named for those three last years *coadjutor* to the said Archbishop. **STRICK.**

As for you, gentlemen and ladies, my associates and grand juries, I have made choice of you on my right hand, because I know you to be very jealous of your honour; and you on my left, because I know you are very much concerned for the reputation of others. **ADDISON.**

TO COALESCE, v. To add.

COARSE, ROUGH, RUDE.

COARSE, probably from the Gothic *zauris* heavy, answering to our *ord* gross, and the Latin *gravis*.

ROUGH, in Saxon *kruh*, German, *rau*, *roh*, &c.

RUDE, in Latin *rudis*, changed from *rundis*, comes from *raβδus*, a twig, signifying unpeeled.

These epithets are equally applied to what is not polished by art. In the proper sense *coarse* refers to the composition and materials of bodies, as *coarse* bread, *coarse* meat, *coarse* cloth; *rough* respects the surface of bodies, as *rough* wood and *rough* skin; *rude* respects the make or fashion of things, as a *rude* bark, a *rude* utensil.

Coarse is opposed to fine, *rough* to smooth, *rude* to polished.

In the figurative application they are distinguished in a similar manner: *coarse* language is used by persons of naturally *coarse* feeling; *rough* lan-

guage by those whose tempers are either naturally or occasionally *rough*; *rude* language by those who are ignorant of any better.

The fineness and delicacy of perception which the man of taste acquires, may be more liable to irritation than the coarser feelings of minds less cultivated. **CRASS.**

This is some fellow,
Who, having been prais'd for bluntness, doth
affect
A saucy roughness. **SHAKESPEARE.**

Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill
is display'd? the shallowest understanding, the
rudest hand, is more than equal to that task. **BURKE.**

COARSE, v. Gross.

**TO COAX, WHEEDLE, CAJOLE,
FAWN.**

COAX probably comes from *coke* a simpleton, signifying to treat as a simpleton.

WHEEDLE is a frequentative of *wheel*, signifying to come round a person with smooth art.

CAJOLE is in French *cajoler*.

TO FAWN, from the noun *fawn*, signifies to act or move like a *fawn*.

The idea of using mean arts to turn people to one's selfish purposes is common to all these terms: *coar* has something childish in it; *wheedle* and *cajole* that which is knavish; *fawn* that which is servile.

The act of *coaxing* consists of urgent entreaty and whining supplication; the act of *wheedling* consists of smooth and winning entreaty; *cajoling* consists mostly of trickery and stratagem, disguised under a soft address and insinuating manners; the act of *fawning* consists of supplicant grimace and antics, such as characterise the little animal from which it derives its name: children *coax* their parents in order to obtain their wishes; the greedy and covetous *wheedle* those of an easy temper; knaves *cajole* the simple and unsuspecting; parasites *fawn* upon those who have the power to contribute to their gratifications: *coaxing* is mostly resorted to by inferiors towards those on whom they are dependant; *wheedling* and *cajoling* are low practices confined to the baser sort of men with each other; *fawning*, though not less mean and disgraceful than the

language are not very scrupulous about the correctness of their assertions.

Upon men intent only upon truth, the arm of an orator has little power; a credible testimony, or a cogent argument, will overcome all the art of modulation and all the violence of contortion.
JOHNSON.

The ingenious author just mentioned, assured me that the Turkish satires of Ruhl Bag-dadi were very forcible.
SIR WM. JONES.

Such is the censure of Dennis. There is, as Dryden expresses it, perhaps "too much horreplay in his rallery;" but if his jests are coarse his arguments are strong.
JOHNSON.

TO COINCIDE, CONCUR.

COINCIDE, *v.* To agree, coincide.

CONCUR, *v.* To agree, coincide.

These words are here considered only in their application to things; in which case *coincide* implies simply meeting at a point; *concur* running towards a point; the former seems to exclude the idea of design, the latter that of chance: two sides of different triangles *coincide* when they are applied to each other so as to fall on the same points; two powers *concur* when they both act so as to produce the same result.

A coincidence of circumstances is sometimes so striking and singular that it can hardly be attributed to pure accident; a concurrence of circumstances, which seemed all to be formed to combine, is sometimes notwithstanding purely casual.

A coincidence of sentiment may easily happen without any communication, since there are many occasions in which all reasonable men will nearly think alike.
JOHNSON.

Embrace of station, greatness of effect, and all the favours of fortune, must concur to place an excellence in public view.
JOHNSON.

TO COINCIDE, *v.* To agree.

COLD, *v.* Chill.

COLD, *v.* Cool.

COLLEAGUE, PARTNER.

COLLEAGUE, in French *collègue*, Latin *collega*, compounded of *col* or *com* and *legatus* sent, signifies sent or dispatched upon the same business.

PARTNER from the word *part*, signifies one having a *part* or share.

Colleague is more noble than partner: men in the highest offices are colleagues; tradesmen, mechanics, and subordinate persons, are partners:

every Roman Council had a *colleague*; every workman has commonly a *partner*.

Colleague is used only with regard to community of office; a *partner* is most generally used with regard to community of interest: whenever two persons are employed to act together on the same business they stand in the relation of *colleagues* to each other; whenever two persons unite their endeavours either in trade or in games they are denominated *partners*: ministers, judges, commissioners, and plenipotentiaries, are *colleagues*; bankers, merchants, chess-players, card-players, and the like, have *partners*.

But from this day's decision, from the choice
Of his first *colleagues*, shall succeeding times
Of Edward judge, and on his fame pronounce.
WEST.

And lo! sad partner of the general care,
Weary and faint I drive my goats afar.
WHARTON.

TO COLLECT, *v.* To assemble.

TO COLLECT, *v.* To gather.

COLLECTED, *v.* Calm.

COLLECTION, *v.* Assembly.

COLLOQUY, *v.* Conversation.

TO COLOR, DYE, TINGE, STAIN.

COLOR, in Latin *color*, probably from *colo* to adorn.

DYE, in Saxon *deagen*, is a variation of *tinge*.

TINGE is in Latin *tingo*, from the Greek *τιγγω* to sprinkle.

STAIN, like the French *desteindre*, is but a variation of *tinge*.

To *color* is to put *color* on; to *dye* is to dip in any *color*; to *tinge* is to touch lightly with a *color*; to *stain* is to put on a bad *color* or in a bad manner: we *color* a drawing, we *dye* clothes of any *color*, we *tinge* a painting with blue by way of intermixture, we *stain* a painting when we put blue instead of red.

They are taken in a moral acceptation with a similar distinction: we *color* a description by the introduction of strong figures, strong facts, and strong expressions; a person is represented as *dyeing* his hands in blood, who is so engaged in the shedding of blood as that he may change the *color* of his skin; a person's mind is *tinged*

The guardian directs one of his pupils to think with the wise, but speak with the vulgar. This is a precept *specious* enough, but not always practicable. JOHNSON.

What is truly astonishing, the partisans of those two opposite systems were at once prevalent and at once employed, the one *ostensibly*, the other secretly, during the latter part of the reign of Louis XV. BURKE.

In this superficial way indeed the mind is capable of more variety of *plausible* talk, but is not enlarged as it should be in its knowledge. LOCKE.

It is some years since I thought the matter *feasible*, that if I could by an exact time-keeper find in any part of the world what a clock it is at Dover and at the same time where the ship is, the problem is solved. ARBUTHNOT.

COLUMN, *v.* Pillar.

COMBAT, *v.* Battle.

COMBAT, *v.* Conflict.

TO COMBAT, OPPOSE.

COMBAT, from the French *combattre* to fight together, is used figuratively in the same sense with regard to matters of opinion.

OPPOSE, in French *opposer*, Latin *opponi* perfect of *oppono*, compounded of *ob* and *pono* to place one's self in the way, signifies to set one's self against another.

Combat is properly a species of *opposing*; one always *opposes* in *combatting*, though not *vice versa*. To *combat* is used in regard to speculative matters; *oppose* in regard to private and personal concerns. A person's positions are *combatted*, his interests or his measures are *opposed*. The Christian *combats* the erroneous doctrines of the infidel with no other weapon than that of argument; the sophist *opposes* Christianity with ridicule and misrepresentation.

The most laudable use to which knowledge can be converted is to *combat* error wherever it presents itself; but there are too many, particularly in the present day, who employ the little pittance of knowledge which they have collected, to no better purpose than to *oppose* every thing that is good, and excite the same spirit of *opposition* in others.

When fierce temptation, seconded within
By insatiate appetite, and armed with darts
Tempered in hell, invades the throbbing breast,
To *combat* may be glorious, and success
Perhaps may crown us, but to fly is safe.

COWPER.

Though various foes against the truth combine,

Pride above all *opposes* her design. COWPER.

COMBATANT, CHAMPION.

COMBATANT, from *to combat*, marks any one that engages in a *combat*.

CHAMPION, French *champion*, Saxon *cempe*, German *kaempe*, signifies originally a soldier or fighter, from the Latin *campus* a field of battle.

A *combatant* fights for himself and for victory; a *champion* fights either for another, or in another's cause. The word *combatant* has always relation to some actual engagement; *champion* may be employed for one ready to be engaged, or in the habits of being engaged. The *combatants* in the Olympic games used to contend for a prize; the Roman gladiators were *combatants* who fought for their lives: when knight errantry was in fashion there were *champions* of all descriptions, *champions* in behalf of distressed females, *champions* in behalf of the injured and oppressed, or *champions* in behalf of aggrieved princes.

The mere act of fighting constitutes a *combatant*; the act of standing up in another's defence at a personal risk, constitutes the *champion*. Animals have their *combats*, and consequently are *combatants*; but they are seldom *champions*. In the present day there are fewer *combatants* than *champions* among men. We have *champions* for liberty, who are the least honorable and the most questionable members of this community; they mostly contend for a shadow, and court persecution, in order to serve their own purposes of ambition. *Champions* in the cause of Christianity are not less ennobled by the object for which they contend, than by the disinterestedness of their motives in contending; they must expect in an infidel age, like the present, to be exposed to the derision and contempt of their self-sufficient opponents.

Conscious that I do not possess the strength, I shall not assume the importance of a *champion*, and as I am not of dignity enough to be angry, I shall keep my temper and my distance too, skirmishing like those insignificant gentry, who play the part of teasers in the Spanish bull-fights whilst bolder *combatants* engage him at the point of his horns. CUMBERLAND.

about some evil change in public oftener than in private concerns; it is commonly directed against the governor, in order to overturn the government: in a republic, *conspiracies* are justified and hailed as glorious events when sanctioned by success: the *conspiracy* of Brutus against Cæsar is always represented by the favorers of a republic as a magnanimous exploit: where every man can rule, there will always be usurpers and tyrants, and where every man has an equal right to set himself up against his ruler, there will never be wanting *conspiracies* to crush the usurpers; hence usurpations and *conspiracies* succeed each other as properly and naturally in republics as cause and effect; the right of the strongest, the most daring, or the most unprincipled, is the only right which can be acknowledged upon the principles of republican equality: on the contrary, in a monarchy where the person and his authority are alike sacred, every *conspirator* to his country, and every *conspiracy*, does no less violence to the laws of God, than to those of man.

The protector dreading *combinations* between the parliament and the malcontents in the army, resolved to allow no leisure for forming *conspiracies* against him. HUME.

I see you court the crowd,
When with the shouts of the rebellious rabble,
I see you borne on shoulders to *cabals*. DRYDEN.
Oh! think what anxious moments pass between
The birth of *plots*, and their last fatal periods. ADDISON.

Conspiracies no sooner should be formed than executed. ADDISON.

COMBINE, *v.* Connect.

TO COME, ARRIVE.

COME is general; ARRIVE is particular.

Persons or things *come*; persons only, or what is personified, *arrive*.

To *come* specifies neither time nor manner; *arrival* is employed with regard to some particular period or circumstances. The *coming* of our Saviour was predicted by the prophets; the *arrival* of a messenger is expected at a certain hour. We know that evils must *come*, but we do wisely not to meet them by anticipation; the *arrival* of a vessel in the haven, after a long and dangerous

voyage, is a circumstance of general interest in the neighbourhood where it happens.

Hail, rev'rend priest! to Phœbus' awful dome.
A suppliant I from great Atrides come. POPE.
Old men love novelties; the last arriv'd
Still pleases best, the youngest steals their smiles. YOUNG.

COMEDIAN, *v.* Actor.

COMELY, *v.* Becoming.

COMELY, *v.* Graceful.

COMFORT, PLEASURE.

COMFORT, *v.* To cheer, encourage.

PLEASURE, from to *please*, signifies what *pleases*.

Comfort, that genuine English word, describes what England only affords: we may find *pleasure* in every country; but *comfort* is to be found in our own country only: the grand feature in *comfort* is substantiality; in that of *pleasure* is warmth. *Pleasure* is quickly succeeded by pain; it is the lot of humanity that to every *pleasure* there should be an alloy: *comfort* is that portion of *pleasure* which seems to lie exempt from this disadvantage; it is the most durable sort of *pleasure*.

Comfort must be sought for at home; *pleasure* is pursued abroad: *comfort* depends upon a thousand nameless trifles which daily arise; it is the relief of a pain, the heightening of a gratification, the supply of a want, or the removal of an inconvenience: *pleasure* is the companion of luxury and abundance; it dwells in the palaces of the rich and the abodes of the voluptuary: but *comfort* is within the reach of the poorest, and the portion of those who know how to husband their means, and to adopt their enjoyments to their habits and circumstances in life. *Comfort* is less than *pleasure* in the detail; it is more than *pleasure* in the aggregate.

Thy growing virtues justified my cares,
And promised *comfort* to my silver hairs. POPE.

I will believe there are happy tempers in being, to whom all the good that arrives to any of their fellow creatures gives a *pleasure*.

STEELE.

TO COMFORT, *v.* To cheer.

TO COMFORT, *v.* To console.

COMICAL, *v.* Laughable.

Parliament be (Lord Somers) makes the Lords and Commons fall to a pious legislative ejaculation. **BURKE.**

Fear not, that I shall watch, with servile shame,
Th' imperious looks of some proud Grecian
dame. **DRYDEN.**

Authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which the member (of Parliament) is bound blindly and implicitly to vote and argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience; these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land. **BURKE.**

TO COMMEMORATE, v. To celebrate.

TO COMMENCE, v. To begin.

TO COMMEND, v. To praise.

COMMENDABLE, v. Laudable.

COMMENSURATE, v. Proportionate.

COMMENTARIES, v. Remarks.

COMMENTS, v. Remarks.

COMMERCE, v. Trade.

COMMERCE, v. Intercourse.

COMMERCIAL, v. Mercantile.

COMMISERATION, v. Sympathy.

TO COMMISSION, AUTHORIZE, EMPOWER.

COMMISSION, from *commit*, signifies the act of *committing*, or putting into the hands of another.

To **AUTHORIZE** signifies to give *authority*; to **EMPOWER**, to put in possession of the *power*.

The idea of transferring some business to another is common to these terms; the circumstances under which this is performed constitute the difference. We *commission* in ordinary cases; we *authorize* and *empower* in extraordinary cases. We *commission* in matters where our own will and convenience are concerned; we *authorize* in matters where our personal *authority* is requisite; and we *empower* in matters where the *authority* of the law is required. A *commission* is given by the bare communication of one's wishes; we *authorize* by a positive and formal declaration to that intent; we *empower* by the transfer of some legal document. A person is *commissioned* to make a purchase; he is au-

thorized to communicate what has been confined to him; he is *empowered* to receive money.

Commissioning passes mostly between equals; the performance of *commissions* is an act of civility; *authorizing* and *empowering* are as often directed to inferiors, they are frequently acts of justice and necessity. Friends give each other *commissions*; servants and subordinate persons are sometimes *authorized* to act in the name of their employers; magistrates *empower* the officers of justice to apprehend individuals or enter houses. We are *commissioned* by persons only; we are *authorized* sometimes by circumstances; we are *empowered* by law.

*Commission'd in alternate watch they stand,
The sun's bright portals and the skies command.* **PORR.**

A more decisive proof cannot be given of the full conviction of the British nation that the principles of the Revolution did not *authorize* them to elect kings at pleasure, than their continuing to adopt a plan of hereditary Protestant succession in the old line. **BURKE.**

*Empower'd the wrath of Gods and men to tame,
E'en Jove rever'd the venerable dame.* **PORR.**

TO COMMIT, v. To consign.

TO COMMIT, v. To perpetrate.

COMMODIOUS, CONVENIENT.

COMMODIOUS, from the Latin *commodus*, or *con* and *modus*, according to the measure and degree required.

CONVENIENT, from Latin *conveniens*, participle of *con* and *venio* to come together as it ought.

Both these terms convey the idea of what is calculated for the pleasure of a person. *Commodious* regards the physical condition, and *convenience* the mental feelings. That is *commodious* which suits one's bodily ease; that is *convenient* which suits one's purpose. A house, a chair, is *commodious*; a time, an opportunity, a season, or the arrival of any person, is *convenient*. A noise *incommodes*; the staying or going of a person may *inconvenience*. A person wishes to sit *commodiously*, and to be *conveniently* situated for witnessing any spectacle.

When a position teems thus with *commodious* consequences, who can without regret confess it to be false? **JOHNS**

is an *ordinary* practice for
to take light of their word.

It is unlimited in its appli-
cation; it includes both *vulgar* and
refined; the latter are said in refer-
ence to persons only, *common* with re-
ference to persons or things: an opinion
common or *vulgar*; an em-
otion is either *common* or *ordi-*
ary. It was long a *vulgarly* received
notion that the sun turned round the
earth; it is the *ordinary* pursuit of
philosophers to observe the motions of
celestial bodies: disputes on reli-
gion have rendered many facts *vulgar*
which were formerly known
only to the learned; on that account
they become an *ordinary* or a *com-*
mon topic for men to dispute about
and even to frame a new set
of laws for themselves.

In a figurative sense, in which
it conveys the idea of low value,
it is synonymous with *mean*:
it is to be seen, heard, and enjoyed
by every body is *common*, and natu-
rally of little value, since the worth
of a thing frequently depends upon
its rarity and the difficulty of ob-
taining it. What is peculiar to
a few people is *vulgar*, and conse-
quently more than *common*; it is sup-
posed to belong to those who are igno-
rantly depraved in taste as well as
in judgment: what is done and seen
every day may be done and seen
by every body: it requires no abilities or
extraordinary requirements; it has nothing
in it, it excites no interest:
mean is even below that which
is *vulgar*; there is something de-
fective in it.

It is opposed to rare and re-
fined; *vulgar* to polite and cultivated;
it is common to the distinguished; *mean*
to the vulgar: a *common* mind busies
itself with *common* objects; *vulgar*
is easily contracted from a
course with *vulgar* people;
every person is seldom asso-
ciated with elevation of character;
a certain appearance is a certain
degraded condition, if not
a corrupted mind.

They change their climate, but they can-
not change their nature. A man that goes out a fool
will sail himself into *common* sense.

ADDISON.

His thought of directing Satan to the

sun, which in the *vulgar* opinion of mankind, is
the most conspicuous part of the creation, and
the placing in it an angel, is a circumstance
very finely contrived.

ADDISON

A very *ordinary* telescope shows us that a
louse is itself a very lousy creature.

ADDISON

Under his forming hands a creature grew,
Manlike, but diff'rent sex, so lovely fair,
That what seem'd fair in all the world seem'd
now

Mean, or in her sum'm'd up.

MILTON.

COMMONLY, GENERALLY, FRE- QUENTLY, USUALLY.

COMMONLY, in the form of *com-*
mon (*v. Common*).

GENERALLY, from *general*, and
the Latin *genus* the kind, respects the
whole body in distinction from the in-
dividual.

FREQUENTLY, from *frequent*,
in French *frequent*, Latin *frequens*,
from *frago*, in Greek *φραγω* and *φραγνυμι*
to go about, signifies properly a
crowding.

USUALLY, from *usual* and *use*,
signifies according to *use* or custom.

What is *commonly* done is an action
common to all; what is *generally* done
is the action of the greatest part;
what is *frequently* done is either the
action of many, or an action many
times repeated by the same person;
what is *usually* done is done regularly
by one or many.

Commonly is opposed to rarely;
generally and *frequently* to occasion-
ally or seldom; *usually* to casually:
men *commonly* judge of others by
themselves; those who judge by the
mere exterior are *generally* deceived;
but notwithstanding every precaution,
one is *frequently* exposed to gross
frauds; a man of business *usually* re-
pairs to his counting-house every day
at a certain hour.

It is *commonly* observed among soldiers and
seamen, though there is much kindness, there is
little grief.

JOHNSON.

It is *generally* not so much the desire of men,
sunk into depravity, to deceive the world as them-
selves.

JOHNSON.

It is too *frequently* the pride of students to
despise those amusements and recreations which
give to the rest of mankind strength of limbs and
cheerfulness of heart.

JOHNSON.

The inefficacy of advice is *usually* the fault of
the counsellor.

JOHNSON.

COMMONWEALTH, *v. State*.

communicative for the instruction or amusement of others, and is *free* in imparting to others whatever he can of his enjoyments.

The most miserable of all beings is the most envious; as on the other hand the most *communicative* is the happiest. GROVE.

Aristophanes was in private life of a *free*, open, and companionable temper. CUMBERLAND.

COMMUNION, CONVERSE.

COMMUNION from *commune* and *common*, signifies the act of making common (*v. Common*).

CONVERSE, from the Latin *converto* to *convert* or translate, signifies a transferring.

Both these terms imply a communication between minds; but the former may take place without corporeal agency, the latter never does; spirits hold *communion* with each other; people hold *converse*.

For the same reason a man may hold *communion* with himself; he holds *converse* always with another.

Where a long course of piety and close communion with God has purged the heart and rectified the will, knowledge will break in upon such a soul. SOUTH.

In varied converse softening every theme,
You frequent pausing turn; and from her eyes,
Where meekness'd sense, and amiable grace,
And lively sweetness dwell, enraptured drink
That nameless spirit of ethereal joy. THOMSON.

COMMUNION, *v. Lord's supper*.

COMMUNITY, SOCIETY.

BOTH these terms are employed for a body of rational beings.

COMMUNITY, from *communitas* and *communis* common (*v. Common*), signifies abstractedly the state of being common, and in an extended sense those who are in a state of common possession.

SOCIETY, in Latin *societas*, from *socius* a companion, signifies the state of being companions, or those who are in that state.

Community in any thing constitutes a *community*; a common interest, a common language, a common government, is the basis of that *community* which is formed by any number of individuals; *communities* are therefore divisible into large or small; the former may be states, the latter families: the coming together of many constitutes a *society*; *societies* are

either private or public, according to the purpose for which they meet together; friends form *societies* for the purpose of pleasure; indifferent persons form *societies* for the purposes of business.

Community has always a restrictive and relative sense; *society* has a general and unlimited import: the most dangerous members of the *community* are those who attempt to poison the minds of youth with contempt for religion and disaffection to the state; the morals of *society* are thus corrupted as it were at the fountain head.

Community refers to spiritual as well as corporeal agents; *society* mostly to human beings only: the angels, the saints, and the spirits of just men made perfect, constitute a *community*; with them there is more communion than association.

Was there ever any *community* so corrupt as not to include within it individuals of real worth? BLAIR.

The great *community* of mankind is necessarily broken into smaller independent *societies*. JOHNSON.

COMMUTE, *v. Exchange*.

COMPACT, *v. Agreement*.

COMPACT, *v. Close*.

COMPANION, *v. Accompaniment*.

COMPANION, *v. Associate*.

COMPANY, *v. Assembly*.

COMPANY, *v. Association*,

COMPANY, *v. Band*.

COMPANY, *v. Society*.

COMPANY, *v. Troop*.

COMPARISON, CONTRAST.

COMPARISON, from *compare*, and the Latin *comparo* or *com* and *par* equal, signifies the putting together of equals.

CONTRAST, in French *contraster*, Latin *contrast* or *contra* and *sto* to stand against, signifies the placing one thing opposite to another.

Likeness in the quality and difference in the degree are requisite for a *comparison*; likeness in the degree opposition in the quality are requisite for a *contrast*: things of the colour are *compared*; those of a

posite colour are *contrasted*: a *comparison* is made between two shades of red; a *contrast* between black and white.

Comparison is of a practical utility, it serves to ascertain the true relation of objects; *contrast* is of utility among poets, it serves to heighten the effect of opposite qualities: things are large or small by *comparison*; they are magnified or diminished by *contrast*: the value of a coin is best learned by *comparing* it with another of the same metal; the generosity of one person is most strongly felt when *contrasted* with the meanness of another.

They who are apt to remind us of their ancestors only put us upon making *comparisons* to their own disadvantage. SPECTATOR.

In lovely *contrast* to this glorious view,
Calmly magnificent, then will we turn
To where the silver Thames first rural grows. THOMSON.

COMPARISON, *v. Simile.*

COMPASSION, *v. Pity.*

COMPASSION, *v. Sympathy.*

COMPATIBLE, CONSISTENT.

COMPATIBLE, compounded of *com* and the Latin *patibilis*, from *patior* to suffer, signifies the capacity of suffering together.

CONSISTENT, in Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, compounded of *con* and *sisto*, signifies the fitness to be placed together.

Compatibility has a principal reference to plans and measures; *consistency* to character, conduct, and station. Every thing is *compatible* with a plan which does not interrupt its prosecution; every thing is *consistent* with a person's station by which it is neither degraded nor elevated. It is not *compatible* with the good discipline of a school to allow of foreign interference; it is not *consistent* with the elevated and dignified character of a clergyman to engage in the ordinary pursuits of other men.

Whatever is *incompatible* with the highest dignity of our nature should indeed be excluded from our conversation. HAWKSWORTH.

Truth is always *consistent* with itself, and needs nothing to help it out. TILLOTSON.

TO COMPEL, FORCE, OBLIGE, NECESSITATE.

COMPEL, Latin *compello* or *pello*

to drive, signifies to drive for a specific purpose or to a point.

FORCE, in French *force*, comes from the Latin *fortis* strong; *force* being nothing but the exertion of strength.

OBLIGE, in French *obliger*, Latin *obligo*, compounded of *ob* and *ligo*, signifies to bind down. These three terms mark an external action on the will, but *compel* expresses more than *oblige*, and less than *force*. NECESSITATE is to make necessary.

Compulsion and *force* act much more directly and positively than *oblige* or *necessitate*; and the latter indicates more of physical strength than the former. We are *compelled* by outward or inward motives; we are *obliged* more by motives than any thing else; we are *forced* sometimes by circumstances, though oftener by plain strength; we are *necessitated* solely by circumstances. An adversary is *compelled* to yield who resigns from despair of victory; he is *forced* to yield if he stand in fear of his life; he is *obliged* to yield if he cannot withstand the entreaties of his friends; he is *necessitated* to yield if he want the strength to continue.

An obstinate person must be *compelled* to give up his point; a turbulent and disorderly man must be *forced* to go where the officers of justice choose to lead him; an unreasonable person must be *obliged* to satisfy a just demand; we are all occasionally *necessitated* to do that which is not agreeable to us.

Pecuniary want *compels* men to do many things inconsistent with their station. Honour and religion *oblige* men scrupulously to observe their word one to another. Hunger *forces* men to eat that which is most loathsome to the appetite. The fear of a loss *necessitates* a man to give up a favourite project.

He would the ghosts of slaughter'd soldiers call,
These his dread wands did to short life *compel*,
And *forc'd* the fate of battles to foretel.

DRYDEN.

He that once owes more than he can pay is often *obliged* to bribe his creditors to patience; by increasing his debt. JOHNSON.

I have sometimes fancied that women have not a retentive power, or the faculty of suppressing their thoughts, but that they are *necessitated* to speak every thing they think. ANDERSON.

COMPENDIUM, v. Abridgement.

COMPENSATION, SATISFACTION, AMENDS, REMUNERATION, RECOMPENCE, REQUITAL, REWARD.

THE first three of these terms are employed to express a return for some evil; *remuneration*, *recompence*, and *requital*, a return for some good; *reward*, a return for either good or evil.

COMPENSATION, Latin *compensatio*, compounded of *com* and *pen-satio*, *pensus* and *pendo* to pay, signifies the paying what has become due.

SATISFACTION, from *satisfy*, signifies the thing that satisfies, or makes up in return.

AMENDS, from the word to *amend*, signifies the thing that makes good what has been bad.

REMUNERATION, from *remunerate*, Latin *remuneratus* or *remunero*, compounded of *re* and *munus* an office, or service, signifies what is given in return for a service.

RECOMPENCE, compounded of *re* and *compence*, signifies the thing paid back as an equivalent.

REQUITAL, compounded of *re* and *quital*, or *quittal* from *quit*, signifies the making one's self clear by a return.

REWARD is probably connected with regard, implying to take cognizance of the deserts of any one.

A *compensation* is something real; it is made for some positive injury sustained; justice requires that it should be equal in value, if not like in kind, to that which is lost or injured: a *satisfaction* may be imaginary, both as to the injury and the return; it is given for personal injuries, and depends on the disposition of the person to be *satisfied*: *amends* is real, but not always made for injuries done to others, as for offences committed by ourselves. Sufferers ought to have a *compensation* for the injuries they have sustained through our means, but there are injuries, particularly those which wound the feelings, for which there can be no *compensation*: tenacious and quarrelsome people demand *satisfaction*; their offended pride is not *satisfied* without the humiliation

of their adversary: an *amends* is honourable which serves to repair a fault; the best *amends* which an offending person can make is to acknowledge his error, and avoid a repetition: christianity enjoins upon its followers to do good, even to its enemies; but there is a thing called honour, which impels some men after they have insulted their friends to give them the *satisfaction* of shedding their blood; this is termed an honourable *amends*; but will the survivors find any *compensation* in such an *amends* for the loss of a husband, a father, or a brother? Not to offer any *compensation* to the utmost of our power, for any injury done to another, evinces a gross meanness of character, and selfishness of disposition: *satisfaction* can seldom be demanded with any propriety for any personal affront; although the true Christian will refuse no *satisfaction* which is not inconsistent with the laws of God and man.

Compensation often denotes a return for services done, in which sense it approaches still nearer to *remuneration*, *recompence*, and *requital*; but the first two are obligatory; the latter are gratuitous. *Compensation* is an act of justice; the service performed involves a debt; the omission of paying it becomes an injury to the performer: the labourer is worthy of his hire; the time and strength of a poor man ought not to be employed without his receiving a *compensation*: *Remuneration* is a higher species of *compensation*; it is a matter of equity dependant upon a principle of honor in those who make it; it differs from the ordinary *compensation*, both in the nature of the service, and of the return. *Compensation* is made for bodily labor and menial offices; *remuneration* for mental exertions, for literary, civil, or political offices; *compensation* is made to inferiors, or subordinate persons; *remuneration* to equals, and even superiors in education and birth, though not in wealth: a *compensation* is prescribed by a certain ratio; *remuneration* depends on collateral circumstances. A *recompence* is voluntary, both as to the service and the return; it is an act of generosity; it is not founded on

the value of the service so much as on the intention of the server; it is not received as a matter of right, as of courtesy: there are a thousand acts of civility performed by others which are entitled to some *recompence*, though not to any specific *compensation*. *Requital* is a return for a kindness; the making it is an act of gratitude; the omission of it wounds the feelings: it sometimes happens that the only *requital* which our kind action obtains, is the animosity of the person served.

It belongs to the wealthy to make *compensation* for the trouble they give: it is scarcely possible to estimate too high what is done for ourselves, nor too low what we do for others. It is a hardship not to obtain the *remuneration* which we expect, but it is folly to expect that which we do not deserve. He who will not serve another, until he is sure of a *recompence*, is not worthy of a *recompence*. Those who befriend the wicked must expect to be ill *requited*.

Reward conveys no idea of obligation; whoever *rewards* acts altogether optionally; the conduct of the agent produces the *reward*. In this sense, it is comparable with *compensation*, *amends*, and *recompence*; but not with *satisfaction*, *remuneration*, or *requital*: things, as well as persons, may *compensate*, make *amends*, *recompence*, and *reward*; but persons only can give *satisfaction*, *remuneration*, and *requital*.

Reward respects the merit of the action; but *compensate* and the other words simply refer to the connexion between the actions and their results: what accrues to a man as the just consequence of his conduct, be it good or bad, is the *reward*. *Compensation* and *amends* serve to supply the loss or absence of any thing; *recompence* and *reward* follow from particular exertions. It is but a poor *compensation* for the loss of peace and health to have one's coffers filled with gold: a social intercourse by letter will make *amends* for the absence of those who are dear. It is a mark of folly to do any thing, however trifling, without the prospect of a *recompence*, and yet we see this daily realized in persons who give themselves much

trouble to no purpose. The *reward* of industry is ease and content: when a deceiver is caught in his own snare, he meets with the *reward* which should always attend deceit.

What can *compensate* for the loss of honor? What can make *amends* to a frivolous mind for the want of company? What *recompences* so sweet as the consciousness of having served a friend? What *reward* equals the *reward* of a good conscience?

Now goes the nightly thief prowling abroad
For plunder, much solicitous how best
He may *compensate* for a day of sloth,
By works of darkness and nocturnal wrong.

COWPER.

Savage had the *satisfaction* of finding that though he could not reform his mother, he could punish her.

JOHNSON.

Nature has obscurely fitted the mole with eyes. But for *amends*, what she is capable of for her defence, and warning of danger, she has very eminently conferred upon her, for she is very quick of hearing.

ADDISON.

Remuneratory honors are proportioned at once to the usefulness and difficulty of performances.

JOHNSON.

Patriots have toiled, and in their country's cause
Bled nobly, and their deeds, as they deserve,
Receive proud *recompence*.

COWPER.

As the world is unjust in its judgments, so it is ungrateful in its *requitals*.

BLAIR.

There are no honorary *rewards* among us which are more esteemed by the person who receives them, and are cheaper to the prince, than the giving of medals.

ADDISON.

COMPETENT, FITTED, QUALIFIED.

COMPETENT, in Latin *competens*, participle of *competo* to agree or suit, signifies suitable.

FITTED from *fit* (v. *Becoming*).

QUALIFIED, participle of *qualify*, from the Latin *qualis* and *facio*, signifies made as ought to be.

Competency mostly respects the mental endowments and attainments; *fitness* the disposition and character; *qualification* the artificial acquirements. A person is *competent* to undertake an office; *fitted* or *qualified* to fill a situation.

Familiarity with any subject aided by strong mental endowments gives *competency*: suitable habits and temper constitute the *fitness*: acquaintance with the business to be done, and expertness in the mode of performing it, constitutes the *qualification*: none should pretend to

Give their opinions on serious subjects who are not *competent* judges; none but lawyers are *competent* to decide in cases of law; none but medical men are *competent* to prescribe medicines; none but divines of sound learning, as well as piety, to determine on doctrinal questions: men of sedentary and studious habits, with a serious temper, are most *fitted* to be clergymen: and those who have the most learning and acquaintance with the Holy Scriptures are the best *qualified* for the important and sacred office of instructing the people.

Many are *qualified* for managing the concerns of others, who would not be *competent* to manage a concern for themselves. Many who are *fitted* from their turn of mind for any particular charge, may be unfortunately *incompetent* for want of the requisite *qualifications*.

Man is not *competent* to decide upon the good or evil of many events which befall him in this life. CUMBERLAND.

What is more obvious and ordinary than a mole? and yet what more palpable argument of Providence than it? The members of her body are so exactly *fitted* to her nature and manner of life. ADDISON.

Such benefits only can be bestowed as others are capable to receive, and such pleasures imparted as others are *qualified* to enjoy. JOHNSON.

COMPETITION, EMULATION, RIVALRY.

COMPETITION, from the Latin *competo*, compounded of *com* and *peto*, signifies to sue or seek together, to seek for the same object.

EMULATION, in Latin *emulatio*, from *emulor*, and the Greek *αμιλλα* a contest, signifies the spirit of contending.

RIVALRY, from the Latin *rivus* the bank of a stream, signifies the undivided or common enjoyment of any stream which is the natural source of discord.

Competition expresses the relation of a competitor, or the act of seeking the same object; *emulation* expresses a disposition of the mind towards particular objects; *rivalry* expresses both the relation and the disposition of a rival. *Emulation* is to *competition* as the motive to the action; *emu-*

lation produces *competitors*, but it may exist without it: they have the same marks to distinguish them from *rivalry*.

Competition and *emulation* have honour for their basis; *rivalry* is but a desire for selfish gratification. A *competitor* strives to surpass by honest means; he cannot succeed so well by any other: a *rival* is not bound by any principle; he seeks to supplant by whatever means seem to promise success. An unfair *competitor* and a generous *rival* are equally unusual and inconsistent.

Competition animates to exertion; *rivalry* provokes hatred: * *competition* seeks to merit success; *rivalry* is contented with obtaining it.

Competitors may sometimes become *rivals* in spirit, although *rivals* will never become *competitors*. It is further to be remarked, that *competition* supposes some actual effort for the attainment of a specific object set in view: *rivalry* may consist of a continued wishing for and aiming at the same general end without necessarily comprehending the idea of close action. *Competitors* are in the same line with each other; *rivals* may work toward the same point at a great distance from each other. Literary prizes are the objects of *competition* among scholars; the affections of a female are the object of *rivals*. William the Conqueror and Harold were *competitors* for the crown of England; Æneas and Turnus were *rivals* for the hand of Lavinia. In the games which were celebrated by Æneas in honour of his father Anchises, the naval *competitors* were the most eager in the contest. Juno, Minerva, and Venus, were *rival* goddesses in their pretensions to beauty.

It cannot be doubted but there is as great a desire of glory in a ring of wrestlers or cudgel-players as in any other more refined *competition* for superiority. HOOKER.

Of the ancients enough remains to excite our *emulation* and direct our endeavours. JOHNSON.

To be no man's *rival* in love, or *competitor* in business, is a character which, if it does not recommend you as it ought to benevolence among those whom you live with, yet has it certainly this effect, that you do not stand so much in need of their approbation as if you aimed at more. STEELE.

* Vide Abbé Roubaud, "Emulation, rivalité."

complaining; religion only can arm the soul against all the ills of life: the rebellious Israelites were frequently guilty of *murmurings*, not only against Moses, but even against their Almighty Deliverer, notwithstanding the repeated manifestations of his goodness and power: a want of confidence in God is the only cause of *repinings*; he who sees the hand of God in all things cannot *repine*.

I'll not *complain*;
Children and cowards rail at their misfortunes.

TRAF.

Yet O my soul! thy rising *murmurs* stay,
Nor dare th' ALLWISE DISPOSER to arraign;
Or against his supreme decree,
With impious grief *complain*. LYTTLETON.

Would all the deities of Greece combine,
In vain the gloomy thund'rer might *repine*;
None should be left, with scarce a god to friend,
And see his Trojans to the shades descend.

POPE.

COMPLAINT, ACCUSATION.

COMPLAINT, *v.* To complain.

ACCUSATION, *v.* To accuse.

Both these terms are employed in regard to the conduct of others, but the *complaint* is mostly made in matters that personally affect the complainant; the *accusation* is made of matters in general, but especially those of a moral nature. A *complaint* is made for the sake of obtaining redress; an *accusation* is made for the sake of ascertaining the fact or bringing to punishment. A *complaint* may be frivolous; an *accusation* false. People in subordinate stations should be careful to give no cause for *complaint*; the most guarded conduct will not protect any person from the unjust *accusations* of the malevolent.

On this occasion (of an interview with Addison). Pope made his *complaint* with frankness and spirit, as a man undeservedly neglected and opposed.

JOHNSON.

With guilt enter distrust and discord, mutual *accusation* and stubborn self-defence.

JOHNSON.

COMPLAISANCE, DEFERENCE, CONDESCENSION.

COMPLAISANCE, or the desire of pleasing, is the pleasing one's self in doing that which pleases others.

DEFERENCE, in French *déférence*, from the Latin *deferre* to bear down, marks the inclination to defer, or acquiesce in the sentiments of another in preference to one's own.

CONDESCENSION marks the act of *condescending* from one's own height to yield to the satisfaction of others, rather than rigorously to exact one's rights.

The necessities, the conveniences, the accommodations and allurements of society, of familiarity, and of intimacy, lead to *complaisance*; it makes sacrifices to the wishes, tastes, comforts, enjoyments, and personal feelings of others. Age, rank, dignity, and personal merit, call for *deference*; it enjoins compliance on our opinions, judgements, pretensions, and designs. The infirmities, the wants, the defects and foibles of others, call for *condescension*; it relaxes the rigour of authority, and removes the distinction of rank or station.

Complaisance is the act of an equal; *deference* that of an inferior; *condescension* that of a superior. *Complaisance* is due from one well-bred person to another; *deference* is due to all superiors in age, knowledge, or station, whom one approaches; *condescension* is due from all superiors to such as are dependant on them for comfort and enjoyment.

All these qualities spring from a refinement of humanity; but *complaisance* has most of genuine kindness in its nature; *deference* most of respectful submission; *condescension* most of easy indulgence. *Complaisance* has unalloyed pleasure for its companion; it is pleased with doing; it is pleased with seeing that it has pleased; it is pleasure to the giver and pleasure to the receiver: *deference* is not unmixed with pain; it fears to offend, or to fail in the part it has to perform; it is mingled with a consciousness of inferiority, and a fear of appearing lower than it deserves to be thought: *condescension* is not without its alloy; it is accompanied with the painful sentiment of witnessing inferiority, and the no less painful apprehension of not maintaining its own dignity.

Complaisance is busied in anticipating and meeting the wishes of others; it seeks to amalgamate one's own will with that of another: *deference* is busied in yielding submission, doing homage, and marking one's sense of another's superiority: *condescension* employs itself in not op-

and unsteady people set about many things without *finishing* any. Litigious people *terminate* one dispute only to commence another.

It is perhaps kindly provided by nature, that as the feathers and strength of a bird grow together, and her wings are not *completed* till she is able to fly, so some proportion should be preserved in the human kind between judgment and courage. JOHNSON.

The artificer, for the manufacture which he *finishes* in a day, receives a certain sum; but the wit frequently gains no advantage from a performance at which he has toiled many months. HAWKSWORTH.

The thought 'that our existence *terminates* with this life,' doth naturally check the soul in any generous pursuit. BERKELEY.

COMPLEAT, *v. Whole.*

COMPLETION, *v. Consummation.*

COMPLEX, *v. Compound.*

COMPLEXITY, COMPLICATION, INTRICACY.

COMPLEXITY and COMPLICATION, in French *complication*, Latin *complicatio* and *complico*, compounded of *com* and *plico*, signifies a folding one within another.

INTRICACY, Latin *intricatio* and *intrico*, compounded of *in* and *trico* or *trices*, the small hairs which are used to ensnare birds, signifies a state of entanglement by means of many involutions.

Complexity expresses the abstract quality or state; *complication* the act: they both convey less than *intricacy*; *intricate* is that which is very *complicated*.

Complexity arises from a multitude of objects, and the nature of these objects; *complication* from an involvement of objects; and *intricacy* from a winding and confused involution. What is *complex* must be decomposed; what is *complicated* must be developed; what is *intricate* must be unravelled. A proposition is *complex*; affairs are *complicated*; the law is *intricate*.

Complexity puzzles; *complication* confounds; *intricacy* bewilders. A clear head is requisite for understanding the *complex*; keenness and penetration are required to lay open that which is *complicated*; a comprehensive mind coupled with coolness and

perseverance of research, are essential to disentangle the *intricate*. A *complex* system may have every perfection but the one that is requisite, namely, a fitness to be reduced to practice: *complicated* schemes of villainy commonly frustrate themselves; they require unity of design among too many individuals of different stations, interests, and vices, to allow of frequent success with such heterogeneous combinations: the *intricacy* of the law is but the natural attendant on human affairs; every question admits of different illustrations as to their causes, consequences, analogies, and bearings; it is likewise dependant on so many cases infinitely ramified as to impede the exercise of the judgment in the act of deciding.

The *complexity* of the subject often deters young persons from application to their business. There is nothing embarrasses a physician more than a *complication* of disorders, where the remedy for one impedes the cure for the other. Some affairs are involved in such a degree of *intricacy*, as to exhaust the patience and perseverance of the most laborious.

Through the disclosing deep
Light my blind way; the mineral strata there
Thrust blooming, thence the vegetable world.
O'er that the rising system more *complex*
Of animals, and higher still the mind.

THOMSON.

Every living creature, considered in itself, has many very *complicated* parts that are exact copies of some other parts which it possesses, and which are *complicated* in the same manner.

ADDISON.

When the mind, by insensible degrees, has brought itself to attention and close thinking, it will be able to cope with difficulties. Every abstract problem, every *intricate* question, will not baffle or break it. LOCKE.

COMPLICATION, *v. Complexity.*

TO COMPLIMENT, *v. To adulate.*

TO COMPLY, CONFORM, YIELD, SUBMIT.

COMPLY, *v. To accede.*

CONFORM, compounded of *con* and *form*, signifies to put into the same *form*.

YIELD, *v. To accede.*

SUBMIT, in Latin *submitto*, com

disposition will be imposed upon by the selfish and unreasonable; a *yielding* disposition is most unfit for commanding; a *submissive* disposition exposes a person to the exactions of tyranny.

Be silent and complying; you'll soon find
Sir John without a medicine will be kind.

HARRISON.

A peaceable temper supposes *yielding* and
condescending manners. BLAIR.

When force and violence and hard necessity
have brought the yoke of servitude upon a people's neck, religion will supply them with a patient and a *submissive* spirit. FLEETWOOD.

TO COMPLY, *v. To accede.*

TO COMPOSE, SETTLE.

COMPOSE, in Latin *composui* perfect of *compono* to put together, signifies to put in due order.

SETTLE is a frequentative of *set*.

We *compose* that which has been disjointed and separated, by bringing it together again; we *settle* that which has been disturbed and put in motion, by making it rest: we *compose* the thoughts which have been deranged and thrown into confusion; we *settle* the mind which has been fluctuating and distracted by contending desires: the mind must be *composed* before we can think justly; it must be *settled* before we can act consistently.

We *compose* the differences of others: we *settle* our own differences with others: it is difficult to *compose* the quarrels of angry opponents, or to *settle* the disputes of obstinate partisans.

Thy presence did each doubtful heart *compose*,
And factions wonder'd that they once arose.

TICKELL.

Perhaps my reason may but ill defend
My *settled* faith, my mind with age impair'd.

SHENSTONE.

TO COMPOSE, *v. To Compound.*

TO COMPOSE, *v. To form.*

COMPOSED, SEDATE.

COMPOSED expresses the state of being *composed* (*v. To compose*).

SEDATE, in Latin *sedatus* participle of *sedo* to settle, signifies the quality of being settled.

Composed respects the air and looks externally, and the spirits internally; *sedate* relates to the deportment or

carriage externally, and the fixedness of the purpose internally: *composed* is opposed to ruffled or hurried, *sedate* to buoyant or volatile.

Composure is a particular state of the mind; *sedateness* is an habitual frame of mind; a part of the character: a *composed* mien is very becoming in the season of devotion; a *sedate* carriage is becoming in youth who are engaged in serious concerns.

Upon her nearer approach to Hercules she stepped before the other lady, who came forward with a regular *composed* carriage. ANDERSON.

Let me associate with the serious night,
And contemplation, her *sedate* compeer.

THOMSON.

COMPOSED, *v. Calm.*

COMPOUND, COMPLEX.

COMPOUND comes from *compono* the present, as *compose* (*v. To compose*) comes from *composui* the preterite of the same verb.

COMPLEX, *v. Complexity.*

The *compound* consists of similar and whole bodies put together; the *complex* consists of various parts linked together: adhesion is sufficient to constitute a *compound*; involution is requisite for the *complex*; we distinguish the wholes that form the *compound*; we separate the parts that form the *complex*: what is *compound* may consist only of two; what is *complex* consists always of several.

Compound and *complex* are both commonly opposed to the simple; but the former may be opposed to the single, and the latter to the simple: words are *compound*, sentences are *complex*.

Inasmuch as man is a *compound* and a mixture of flesh as well as spirit, the soul during its abode in the body does all things by the mediation of these passions, and inferior affections.

SOUTH.

With such perfection fram'd,
Is this *complex* stupendous scheme of things.

THOMSON.

TO COMPOUND, COMPOSE.

COMPOUND and COMPOSE, *v. To compose.*

Compound is used in the physical sense only; *compose* in the proper or the moral sense: words are *composed* by making two or more into sentences are *composed* by putting words together so as to make 1

fall short of his estimate who does not *include* the minor contingencies which usually attach to every undertaking.

What, Egypt, do thy pyramids comprise,
What greatness in the high raised folly lies?

SKWELL.

That particular scheme which comprehends the social virtues may give employment to the most industrious temper, and find a man in business more than the most active station of life.

ANDERSON.

The virtues of the several soils I sing,
Mæcenæ; now the needful succour bring;
Not that my song in such a scanty space
So large a subject fully can embrace. DAYDEN.

All a woman has to do in this world is contained within the duties of a daughter, a sister, a wife, and a mother.

STEELE.

The universal axiom in which all complaisance is included is, that no man should give any preference to himself.

JOHNSON.

COMPULSION, *v. Constraint.*

COMPUNCTION, *v. Repentance.*

TO COMPUTE, *v. To calculate.*

TO COMPUTE, *v. To estimate.*

TO CONCEAL, DISSEMBLE, DISGUISE.

CONCEAL, compounded of *con* and *ceal*, in French *celer*, Latin *celo*, Hebrew *cala* to have privately.

DISSEMBLE, in French *dissimuler*, compounded of *dis* and *simulo* or *similes*, signifies to make a thing appear unlike what it is.

DISGUISE, in French *disguiser*, compounded of the privative *dis* or *de* and *guise*, in German *weise*, a manner or fashion, signifies to take a form opposite to the reality.

To *conceal* is simply to abstain from making known what we wish to keep secret; to *dissemble* and *disguise* signify to *conceal*, by assuming some false appearance: we *conceal* facts; we *dissemble* feelings; we *disguise* sentiments.

* Caution only is requisite in *concealing*; it may be effected by simple silence: art and address must be employed in *dissembling*; it mingles falsehood with all its proceedings: labor and cunning are requisite in *disguising*; it has nothing but falsehood in all its movements.

The *concealer* watches over him-

self that he may not be betrayed into any indiscreet communication; the *dissembler* has an eye to others so as to prevent them from discovering the state of his heart; *disguise* assumes altogether a different face from the reality, and rests secure under this shelter: it is sufficient to *conceal* from those who either cannot or will not see; it is necessary to *dissemble* with those who can see without being shown; but it is necessary to *disguise* from those who are anxious to discover and use every means to penetrate the veil that intercepts their sight.

Concealment is a matter of prudence often adviseable, mostly innocent; when we have not resolution to shake off our vices, it is wisdom at least to *conceal* them from the knowledge of others.

According to Girard, it was a maxim with Louis XI. that in order to know how to govern, it was necessary to know how to *dissemble*; this, he adds, is true in all cases even in domestic government; but if the word conveys as much the idea of falsehood in French as in English, then is this a French and not an English maxim; there are, however, many cases in which it is prudent to *dissemble* our resentments, if by allowing them time to die away we keep them from the knowledge of others. *Disguise* is altogether opposed to candor: an ingenious mind revolts at it; an honest man will never find it necessary, unless the Abbé Girard be right, in saying that "when the necessity of circumstances and the nature of affairs call for *disguise* it is politic." Yet what train of circumstances can we conceive to exist which will justify policy founded upon the violation of truth? Intriguers, conspirators, and all who have dishonest purposes to answer, must practise *disguise* as the only means of success, but true policy is as remote from *disguise* as cunning is from wisdom.

Ridicule is never more strong than when it is concealed in gravity.

SPECTATOR.

Let school-taught pride *dissemble* all it can,
These little things are great to little men.

GOLDENRITH.

Good breeding has made the tongue falsify the heart, and act a part of continual restraint, while

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Cacher, dissimuler, déguiser."

or only apparent. *Conceit* applies only to internal objects; it is mental in the operation and the result; it is a species of invention: *fancy* is applied to external objects, or whatever acts on the senses: nervous people are subject to strange *conceits*; timid people *fancy* they hear sounds, or see objects in the dark which awaken terror.

Those who are apt to *conceit* oftener *conceit* that which is painful than otherwise; *conceiting* either that they are always in danger of dying, or that all the world is their enemy. There are however insane people who *conceit* themselves to be kings and queens; and some indeed who are not called insane, who *conceit* themselves very learned whilst they know nothing, or very wise and clever while they are exposing themselves to perpetual ridicule for their folly, or very handsome while the world calls them plain, or very peaceable while they are always quarrelling with their neighbours, or very humble whilst they are tenaciously stickling for their own: it would be well if such *conceits* afforded a harmless pleasure to their authors, but unfortunately they only render them more offensive and disgusting than they would otherwise be.

Those who are apt to *fancy* never *fancy* any thing to please themselves; they *fancy* that things are too long or too short, too thick or too thin, too cold or too hot, with a thousand other *fancies* equally trivial in their nature; thereby proving that the slightest aberration of the mind is a serious evil, and productive of evil.

Desponding fear, of feeble *fancies* full,
Weak and unmanly, loosens every power.

THOMSON.

Some have been wounded with *conceit*,
And died of mere opinion strait.

BUTLER.

When taken in reference to intellectual objects, *conceit* is always in a bad sense; but *fancy* may be employed in a good sense.

Nothing can be more plainly impossible than for a man "to be profitable to God," and consequently nothing can be more absurd than for a man to cherish so irrational a *conceit*. ADDISON.

My friend, Sir Roger de Coverley, told me t'other day, that he had been reading my paper upon Westminster Abbey, in which, says he, there are a great many ingenious *fancies*. ADDISON.

CONCEIT, *v.* *Pride*.

CONCEITED, *v.* *Opinionated*.

TO CONCEIVE, APPREHEND,
SUPPOSE, IMAGINE.

CONCEIVE, *v.* *Conceit*.

APPREHEND, *v.* *To apprehend*.

SUPPOSE, in French *supposer*, Latin *supposui*, perfect of *suppono*, or *sub* and *pono* to put one thing in the place of another, signifies to have one thing in one's mind in lieu of another.

IMAGINE, in French *imaginer*, Latin *imagino*, from *imago* an image, signifies to reflect as an image or phantom in the mind.

Conceive, in the strict sense of the word, is the generic, the others the specific terms: since in *apprehending*, *imagining*, and *supposing*, we always *conceive* or form an idea, but not *vice versa*; the difference consists in the mode and object of the action; we *conceive* of things as proper or improper, and just or unjust, right or wrong, good or bad, this is an act of the judgement; we *apprehend* the meaning of another, this is by the power of simple perception, or of combination and reflection; we *suppose* and *imagine* that which has happened or may happen, these are both acts of the *imagination*; but the former rests commonly on some ground of reality; the latter may be the mere offspring of the brain.

What is *conceived* is conclusive; what is *apprehended* is rather dubious; both refer to matters of deduction, in distinction from *suppose* and *imagine*, which relate to matters of fact.

To *conceive* is an ordinary operation of the mind; it must precede every other; we cannot either think or act without *conceiving*: *apprehend* is employed in cases where certainty cannot be had, where no determinate conclusion can be formed; we shall never *apprehend* where we can see distinctly before us: *suppose* is used in opposition to positive knowledge; no person *supposes* that of which he is not informed; *imagine* is employed that which in all probability exist; we shall not *imagine* evident and undeniable.

Our finite knowledge cannot comprehend
The principles of an unbounded way. **SUMLEY.**

CONCEPTION, NOTION.

CONCEPTION, from *conceive* (*v.* *To conceive*), signifies the thing *conceived*.

NOTION, in French *notion*, Latin *notio*, from *notus* participle of *nosco* to know, signifies the thing known.

Conception is the mind's own work, what it pictures to itself from the exercise of its own powers; *notion* is the representation of objects as they are drawn from observation. *Conceptions* are the fruit of the imagination; *notions* are the result of reflection and experience. *Conceptions* are formed; *notions* are entertained. *Conceptions* are either grand or mean, gross or sublime, either clear or indistinct, crude or distinct; *notions* are either true or false, just or absurd. Intellectual culture serves to elevate the *conception*; the extension of knowledge serves to correct and refine the *notions*.

Some heathen philosophers had an indistinct *conception* of the Deity, whose attributes and character are unfolded to us in his revelation: the ignorant have often false *notions* of their duty and obligations to their superiors. The unenlightened express their gross and crude *conceptions* of a Superior Being by some material and visible object: the vulgar *notion* of ghosts and spirits is not entirely banished from the most cultivated parts of England.

Words signify not immediately and primely things themselves, but the *conceptions* of the mind concerning things. **SOURU.**

The story of *Telemachus* is formed altogether in the spirit of Homer, and will give an unlearned reader a *notion* of that great poet's manner of writing. **ADDISON.**

It is natural for the imaginations of men who lead their lives in too solitary a manner to prey upon themselves, and form from their own *conceptions* beings and things which have no place in nature. **STEELE.**

Considering that the happiness of the other world is to be the happiness of the whole man, who can question, but there is an infinite variety in those pleasures we are speaking of. Revelation, likewise, very much confirms this *notion* under the different views it gives us of our future happiness. **ADDISON.**

CONCEPTION, *v.* *Perception*.

CONCERN, *v.* *Affair*.

CONCERN, *v.* *Affect*.

CONCERN, *v.* *Care*.

CONCERN, *v.* *Interest*.

TO CONCERT, CONTRIVE,
MANAGE.

CONCERT is either a variation of *consort* a companion, or from the Latin *concerto* to debate together.

CONTRIVE, from *contrivi* perfect of *contero* to bruise together, signifies to pound or put together in the mind so as to form a composition.

MANAGE, in French *menager*, compounded of the Latin *manus* and *ago*, signifies to lead by the hand.

There is a secret understanding in *concerting*; invention in *contriving*; execution in *managing*. There is mostly *contrivance* and *management* in *concerting*; but there is not always *concerting* in *contrivance* or *management*. Measures are *concerted*; schemes are *contrived*; affairs are *managed*.

Two parties at least are requisite in *concerting*, one is sufficient for *contriving* and *managing*. *Concerting* is always employed in all secret transactions; *contrivance* and *management* are used indifferently.

Robbers who have determined on any scheme of plunder *concert* together the means of carrying their project into execution; they *contrive* various devices to elude the vigilance of the police; they *manage* every thing in the dark.

Those who are debarred the opportunity of seeing each other unrestrainedly, *concert* measures for meeting privately. The ingenuity of a person is frequently displayed in the *contrivances* by which he strives to help himself out of his troubles. Whenever there are many parties interested in a concern, it is never so well *managed* as when it is in the hands of one individual suitably qualified.

Modern statesmen are *concerting* schemes and engaged in the depth of politics, at the time when their forefathers were laid down quietly to rest, and had nothing in their heads but dreams. **STEELE.**

When *Cæsar* was one of the masters of the mint, he placed the figure of an elephant upon the reverse of the public money: the word *Cæsar* signifying an elephant in the Punic language.

It is necessary to be *conclusive* when we deliberate, and *decisive* when we command. What is *conclusive* puts an end to all discussion, and determines the judgement; what is *decisive* puts an end to all wavering, and determines the will. Negotiators have sometimes an interest in not speaking *conclusively*; commanders can never retain their authority without speaking *decisively*: *conclusive* when compared to *convincing* is general; the latter is particular: an argument is *convincing*, a chain of reasoning *conclusive*. There may be much that is *convincing*, where there is nothing *conclusive*: a proof may be *convincing* of a particular circumstance; but *conclusive* evidence will bear upon the main question.

I will not disguise that Dr. Bentley, whose criticism is so *conclusive* for the forgery of those tragedies quoted by Plutarch, is of opinion "Thespis himself published nothing in writing."

CUMBERLAND.

Is it not somewhat singular that Young preserved, without any palliation, this preface (to his Satire on Women) so bluntly *decisive* in favour of laughing at the world, in the same collection of his works which contains the mournful, angry, gloomy, *Night Thoughts*? CROFT.

That religion is essential to the welfare of man, can be proved by the most *convincing* arguments. BLAIR.

CONCLUSIVE, *v. Final.*

CONCOMITANT, *v. Accompaniment.*

CONCORD, HARMONY.

CONCORD, in French *concorde*, Latin *concordia*, from *con* and *cors*, having the same heart and mind.

HARMONY, in French *harmonie*, Latin *harmonia*, Greek *ἁρμονία* from *ἁρμό* to fit or suit, signifies the state of fitting or suiting.

The idea of union is common to both these terms, but under different circumstances. *Concord* is generally employed for the union of wills and affections; *harmony* respects the aptitude of minds to coalesce. There may be *concord* without *harmony*, and *harmony* without *concord*. Persons may live in *concord* who are at a distance from each other; but *harmony* is mostly employed for those who are in close connexion, and obliged to co-operate. *Concord* should never be

broken by relations under any circumstances; *harmony* is indispensable in all members of a family that dwell together. Interest will sometimes stand in the way of brotherly *concord*; a love of rule, and a dogmatical temper, will sometimes disturb the *harmony* of a family. *Concord* is as essential to domestic happiness, as *harmony* is to the peace of society, and the uninterrupted prosecution of business. What *concord* can there be between kindred who despise each other? what *harmony* between the rash and the discreet?

The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, villanies, and spoli.

SHAKESPEARE.

If we consider the world in its subserviency to man, one would think it was made for our use; but if we consider it in its natural beauty and *harmony*, one would be apt to conclude it was made for our pleasure.

ADDISON.

TO CONCUR, *v. To agree.*

TO CONCUR, *v. To coincide.*

CONCURRENCE, *v. Assent.*

CONCUSSION, *v. Shock.*

TO CONDEMN, *v. To blame.*

TO CONDEMN, *v. To reprobate.*

TO CONDEMN, *v. To sentence.*

CONDESCENSION, *v. Complaisance.*

CONDITION, *v. Article.*

CONDITION, STATION.

CONDITION, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo* to build or form, signifies properly the thing formed; and in an extended sense, the manner and circumstances under which a thing is formed.

STATION, in French *station*, Latin *statio*, from *sto* to stand, signifies the standing place or point.

Condition has most relation to the circumstances, education, birth, and the like; *station* refers rather to the rank, occupation, or mode of life which one pursues. Riches *sur-* acquired are calculated to make man forget his original *condition* and to render him negligent of his *station*.

A master of the ceremonies *conducts* all strangers whom he wishes to introduce into the company. A teacher *guides* his scholars in the acquirement of knowledge. A love of pleasure sometimes *leads* young people into the most destructive vices.

A wise man is willing to be *conducted*, in cases where he cannot with propriety *conduct* himself. An attentive perusal of the Scriptures is sufficient to *guide* us in the way of salvation. There is a weakness in suffering one's self to be *led* by the will of others: prudent people are willing to take good counsel, but they will always form their own resolutions.

We waited some time in expectation of the next worthy, who came in with a great retinue of historians, whose names I could not learn, most of them being natives of Carthage. The person thus *conducted*, who was Hannibal, seemed much disturbed. ADDISON.

The brutes are *guided* by instinct and know no sorrow; the angels have knowledge and they are happy. STEELE.

A general's office engages him to *lead* as well as to command his army. SOUTH.

TO CONDUCT, MANAGE, DIRECT.

CONDUCT, *v.* To conduct, guide.

MANAGE, *v.* Care, charge.

DIRECT, in Latin *directus*, participle of *dirigo*, compounded of *di* and *rego* to regulate distinctly, signifies to put every thing in its right place.

Conducting requires most wisdom and knowledge; *managing* most action; *direction* most authority. A lawyer *conducts* the cause entrusted to him; a steward *manages* the mercantile concerns for his employer; a superintendent *directs* the movements of all the subordinate agents.

Conducting is always applied to affairs of the first importance: *management* is a term of familiar use to characterize a familiar employment: *direction* makes up in authority what it wants in importance; it falls but little short of the word *conduct*. A *conductor* conceives and plans; a *manager* acts or executes; a *director* commands. It is necessary to *conduct* with wisdom; to *manage* with diligence and attention; to *direct* with promptitude, precision, and clearness. A minister of state requires peculiar talents to *conduct* with success the various and complicated concerns

which are connected with his office: he must exercise much skill in *managing* the various characters and clashing interests with which he becomes connected: and possess much influence to *direct* the multiplied operations by which the grand machine of government is kept in motion.

When a general undertakes to *conduct* a campaign he will entrust the *management* of minor concerns to persons on whom he can rely; but he will *direct* in person whatever is likely to have any serious influence on his success.

The general purposes of men in the *conduct* of their lives, I mean with relation to this life only, end in gaining either the affection or esteem of those with whom they converse. STEELE.

Good delivery is a graceful *management* of the voice, countenance, and gesture. STEELE.

I have sometimes amused myself with considering the several methods of *managing* a debate, which have obtained in the world. ADDISON.

To *direct* a wanderer in the right way is to light another man's candle by one's own, which loses none of its light by what the other gains. GROVE.

CONFEDERACY, *v.* Alliance.

CONFEDERATE, ACCOMPLICE.

CONFEDERATE, *v.* Ally.

ACCOMPLICE, *v.* Abettor.

Both these terms imply a partner in some proceeding, but they differ as to the nature of the proceeding: in the former case it may be lawful or unlawful; in the latter unlawful only. In this latter sense a *confederate* is a partner in a plot or secret association; an *accomplice* is a partner in some active violation of the laws. Guy Fawkes retained his resolution, till the last extremity, not to reveal the names of his *confederates*: it is the common refuge of all robbers and desperate characters to betray their *accomplices* in order to screen themselves from punishment.

Now march the bold *confederates* through the plain,

Well hors'd, well clad, a rich and shining train.

DRYDEN.

It is not improbable that the Lady Mason (the grandmother of Savage) might persuade or compel his mother to dissent, or perhaps she could not easily find *accomplices* wicked enough to concur in so cruel an action, as that of leading him to the American plantations. J.

CONFEDERATE, *v.* Ally.

he has asserted, as he is convinced that he has made no mistake.

Confidence is opposed to diffidence; *dogmatism* to scepticism: *positivity* to hesitation. A *confident* man mostly fails for want of using the necessary means to ensure success; a *dogmatical* man is mostly in error, because he substitutes his own partial opinions for such as are established; a *positive* man is mostly deceived, because he trusts more to his own senses and memory than he ought. Self-knowledge is the most effectual cure for *self-confidence*; an acquaintance with men and things tends to lessen *dogmatism*; the experience of having been deceived one's self, and the observation that others are perpetually liable to be deceived, ought to check the folly of being *positive* as to any event or circumstance that is past.

People forget how little it is that they know and how much less it is that they can do, when they grow *confident* upon any present state of things. SOUTH.

If you are neither *dogmatical*, nor show either by your words or your actions that you are full of yourself, all will the more heartily rejoice at your victory. HUBBELL.

Positive as you now are in your opinions, and *confident* in your assertions, be assured that the time approaches when both men and things will appear to you in a different light. BLAIR.

TO CONFINE, *v.* To bound.

CONFINED, *v.* Contracted.

CONFINEMENT, IMPRISONMENT, CAPTIVITY.

CONFINEMENT, *v.* To bound, limit.

IMPRISONMENT, compounded of *im* and *prison*, French *prison*, from *pris* participle of *prendre*, Latin *pre-hendo* to take, signifies the act or state of being taken or laid hold of.

CAPTIVITY, in French *captivité*, Latin *captivitas* and *capiō*, signifies likewise the state of being, or being kept in possession by another.

Confinement is the generic, the other two specific terms. *Confinement* and *imprisonment* both imply the abridgment of one's personal freedom, but the former specifies no cause which the latter does. We may be *confined* in a room for ill health, or *confined* in any place by way of punishment; but

we are never *imprisoned* but in some specific place appointed for the *confinement* of offenders, and always on some supposed offence. We are *captives* by the rights of war, when we fall into the hands of the enemy.

Confinement does not specify the degree or manner as the other terms do; it may even extend to the restricting the body of its free movements; while *imprisonment* simply *confines* the person within a certain extent of ground, or the walls of a *prison*; and *captivity* leaves a person at liberty to range within a whole country or district.

Confinement is so general a term, as to be applied to animals and even inanimate objects; *imprisonment* and *captivity* are applied in the proper sense to persons only, but they admit of a figurative application. The poor stray brutes, who are found trespassing on unlawful ground, are doomed to a wretched *confinement*, rendered still more hard and intolerable by the want of food: the *confinement* of plants within too narrow a space will stop their growth for want of air. There is many a poor *captive* in a cage who, like Sterne's starling, would say, if it could, "I want to get out."

But now my sorrows, long with pain suppress,
Burst their *confinement* with impetuous sway.

YOUNG.

Confinement of any kind is dreadful: let your imagination acquaint you with what I have not words to express, and conceive, if possible, the horrors of *imprisonment*, attended with reproach and ignominy. JOHNSON.

For life, being weary of these worldly bars,
Never lacks power to dismiss itself;
In that each bondman, in his own hand, bears
The power to cancel his *captivity*:
But I do think it cowardly and vile.

SHAKESPEARE.

CONFINES, *v.* Border.

TO CONFIRM, CORROBORATE.

CONFIRM, in French *confirmer*, Latin *confirmo*, which is compounded of *con* and *firmo* or *firmus*, signifying to make additionally *firm*.

CORROBORATE, in Latin *corroboratus* participle of *corroboro*, compounded of *cor* or *con* and *roboro* to strengthen, signifies to add to the strength.

The idea of strengthening is com-

been wars and party-broils among men, which have occasioned *conflicts* the most horrible and destructive that can be conceived: that *combats* have been mere trials of skill is evinced by the *combats* in the ancient games of the Greeks and Romans, as also in the justs and tournaments of later date. *Contests* are as various as the pursuits and wishes of men: whatever is an object of desire for two parties becomes the ground of a *contest*; ambition, interest, and party-zeal are always busy in furnishing men with objects for a *contest*.

In a figurative sense these terms are applied to the movements of the mind, the elements or whatever seems to oppose itself to another thing, in which sense they preserve the same analogy: violent passions have their *conflicts*; ordinary desires their *combats*; motives their *contests*: it is the poet's part to describe the *conflicts* between pride and passion, rage and despair, in the breast of the disappointed lover; reason will seldom come off victorious in its *combat* with ambition, avarice, a love of pleasure, or any predominant desire, unless aided by religion: where there is a *contest* between the desire of following one's will and a sense of propriety, the voice of a prudent friend may be heard and heeded.

Happy is the man who, in the conflict of desire between God and the world, can oppose not only argument to argument, but pleasure to pleasure. BLAIR.

Elsewhere he saw, where Troilus died
Achilles, and unequal combat tried. DRYDEN.

Soon afterwards the death of the king furnished a general subject for poetical contest. JOHNSON.

TO CONFORM, *v.* To comply.

CONFORMABLE, AGREEABLE, SUITABLE.

CONFORMABLE signifies able to conform (*v.* To comply), that is, having a sameness of form.

AGREEABLE signifies the quality of being able to agree (*v.* To agree).

SUITABLE signifies able to suit (*v.* To agree).

Conformable is employed for matters of obligation; *agreeable* for matters of choice; *suitable* for matters of

propriety and discretion: what is *conformable* accords with some prescribed form or given rule of others; what is *agreeable* accords with the feelings, tempers, or judgements of ourselves or others: what is *suitable* accords with the outward circumstances: it is the business of those who act for others to act *conformably* to their directions; it is the part of a friend to act *agreeably* to the wishes of a friend; it is the part of every man to act *suitably* to his station.

The decisions of a judge must be strictly *conformable* to the letter of the law; he is seldom at liberty to consult his views of equity: the decision of a partisan is always *agreeable* to the temper of his party: the style of a writer should be *suitable* to his subject.

Conformable is most commonly employed for matters of temporary moment; *agreeable* and *suitable* are mostly said of things which are of constant value: we make things *conformable* by an act of discretion; they are *agreeable* or *suitable* by their own nature: a treaty of peace is made *conformable* to the preliminaries; a legislator must take care to frame laws *agreeably* to the Divine law; it is of no small importance for every man to act *suitably* to the character he has assumed.

A man is glad to gain numbers on his side, as they serve to strengthen him in his opinions. It makes him believe that his principles carry conviction with them, and are the more likely to be true, when he finds they are *conformable* to the reason of others as well as to his own. ADDISON.

As you have formerly offered some arguments for the soul's immortality, *agreeable* both to reason and the Christian doctrine, I believe your readers will not be displeased to see how the same great truth shines in the pomp of Roman eloquence. HUME.

I think banging a cushion gives a man too warlike or perhaps too theatrical a figure, to be *suitable* to a Christian congregation. SWIFT.

CONFORMATION, *v.* Form.

TO CONFOUND, *v.* To abash.

TO CONFOUND, *v.* To baffle.

TO CONFOUND, TO CONFUSE.

CONFOUND and CONFUSE are both derived from different parts of the same verb, namely, *confundere* and

The pernicious doctrines of sceptics, though often *confuted*, are as often advanced with the same degree of assurance by the free-thinking, and I might say the unthinking few who imbibe their spirit; it is the employment of libellists to deal out their malicious aspersions against the objects of their malignity in a manner so loose and indirect, as to preclude the possibility of *refutation*: it would be a fruitless and unthankful task to attempt to *disprove* all the statements which are circulated in a common newspaper.

It is the duty of ministers of the Gospel to *oppose* all doctrines that militate against the established faith of Christians.

The learned do, by turns, the learn'd *confute*,
Yet all depart unalter'd by dispute. OAKLEY.

Philip of Macedon *refuted* by the force of
gold all the wisdom of Athens. ARISTOTEL.

Man's feeble race what ills await!
Labor and poverty, the racks of pain,
Disease, and sorrow's weeping train,
And death, and refuge from the storm of fate,
The fond complaint, my song! *disprove*,
And justify the laws of Jove. COLMAN.

Ramus was one of the first *opponents* of the
old philosophy, who disturbed with innovations
the quiet of the schools. JOHNSON.

TO CONGRATULATE, *v.* *To*
felicitate.

CONGREGATION, *v.* *Assembly*.

CONGRESS, *v.* *Assembly*.

CONJECTURE, SUPPOSITION,
SURMISE.

CONJECTURE, in French *conjecture*, Latin *conjectura*, from *conjicio* or *con* and *jacio*, signifies the thing put together or framed in the mind without design or foundation.

SUPPOSITION, in French *supposition*, from *suppono*, compounded of *sub* and *pono*, signifies to put one's thoughts in the place of reality.

SURMISE, compounded of *sur* or *sub* and *misc*, Latin *missus* participle of *mitto* to send or put forth, has the same original meaning as the former.

All these terms convey an idea of something in the mind independent of the reality; but *conjecture* is founded less on rational inference than *supposition*; and *surmise* less than either: any circumstance, however trivial,

may give rise to a *conjecture*; some reasons are requisite to produce a *supposition*; a particular state of feeling or train of thinking may of itself create a *surmise*.

Although the same epithets are generally applicable to all these terms, yet we may with propriety say that a *conjecture* is idle; a *supposition* false; a *surmise* fanciful.

Conjectures are employed on events, their causes, consequences, and contingencies; *supposition* on speculative points; *surmise* on personal concerns. The secret measures of government give rise to various *conjectures*: all the *suppositions* which are formed respecting comets seem at present to fall short of the truth: the behaviour of a person will often occasion a *surmise* respecting his intentions and proceedings, let them be ever so disguised. Antiquarians and etymologists deal much in *conjectures*; they have ample scope afforded them for asserting what can be neither proved nor denied: religionists are pleased to build many *suppositions* of a doctrinal nature on the Scriptures, or, more properly, on their own partial and forced interpretations of the Scriptures: it is the part of prudence, as well as justice, not to express any *surmises* which we may entertain, either as to the character or conduct of others, which may not redound to their credit.

Persons of studious and contemplative nature often entertain themselves with the history of past ages, or raise schemes and *conjectures* upon futurity. ADDISON.

Even in that part which we have of the journey to Canterbury, it will be necessary, in the following Review of Chaucer, to take notice of certain defects and inconsistencies, which can only be accounted for upon the *supposition*, that the work was never finished by the author. TYNEMAN.

Any the least *surmise* of neglect has raised an aversion in one man to another. SOUTH.

TO CONJECTURE, *v.* *To guess*.

CONJUNCTURE, CRISIS.

CONJUNCTURE, in Latin *conjunctura* and *conjungo* to join together, signifies the joining together of circumstances.

CRISIS, in Latin *crisis*, Greek κρίσις a judgment, signifies in an ex-

tended sense whatever decides or turns the scale.

Both these terms are employed to express a period of time marked by the state of affairs. A *conjuncture* is a joining or combination of corresponding circumstances tending towards the same end; a *crisis* is the high-wrought state of any affair which immediately precedes a change: a *conjuncture* may be favourable, a *crisis* alarming.

An able statesman seizes the *conjuncture* which promises to suit his purpose, for the introduction of a favourite measure: the abilities, firmness, and perseverance of Alfred the Great, at one important *crisis* of his reign, saved England from destruction.

Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object, and a fit *conjuncture* of circumstances for the due exercise of it. ADDISON.

Thought be, this is the lucky hour,
Wines work, when vines are in the flower;
This *crisis* then I will set my rest on,
And put her boldly to the question. BUTLER.

TO CONNECT, COMBINE, UNITE.

CONNECT, Latin *connecto*, compounded of *con* and *necto*, signifies knit together.

COMBINE, *v.* Association, combination.

UNITE, *v.* To add, join.

The idea of being put together is common to these terms, but with different degrees of proximity. *Connected* is more remote than *combined*, and this than *united*. What is *connected* and *combined* remains distinct, but what is *united* loses all individuality. Things the most dissimilar may be *connected* or *combined*; things of the same kind only can be *united*.

Things or persons are *connected* more or less remotely by some common property or circumstance that serves as a tie; they are *combined* by a species of juncture; they are *united* by a coalition: houses are *connected* by means of a common passage; the armies of two nations are *combined*; two armies of the same nation are *united*.

Trade, marriage, or general intercourse, create a *connexion* between individuals; co-operation or similarity of tendency are grounds for com-

bination; entire accordance leads to a union. It is dangerous to be *connected* with the wicked in any way; our reputation, if not our morals, may be the sufferers thereby. The most obnoxious members of society are those in whom wealth, talents, influence, and a lawless ambition, are combined. *United* is an epithet that should apply equally to nations and families; the same obedience to laws should regulate every man who lives under the same government; the same heat should animate every breast; the same spirit should dictate every action of every member in the community, who has a common interest in the preservation of the whole.

A right opinion is that which connects distant truths by the shortest train of intermediate propositions. JENSON.

Fancy can combine the ideas which memory has treasured. HAWKSWORTH.

A friend is he with whom our interest is united. HAWKSWORTH.

CONNECTED, RELATED.

CONNECTED, *v.* To connect.

RELATED, from *relate*, in Latin *relatus* participle of *refero* to bring back, signifies brought back to the same point.

These terms are employed in the moral sense, to express an affinity between subjects or matters of thought.

Connexion marks affinity in an indefinite manner; *relation* in a specific manner. A *connexion* may be either close or remote; a *relation* direct or indirect. What is *connected* has some common principle on which it depends; what is *related* has some likeness with the object to which it is *related*, it is a part of some whole.

It is odd to consider the *connexion* between despotism and barbarity, and how the making one person more than man, makes the rest less. ADAMS.

All mankind are so *related*, that care is to be taken, in things to which all are liable, you do not mention what concerns one in terms which shall disgust another. STEELE.

CONNEXION, *v.* Intercourse.

TO CONQUER, VANQUISH,
SUBDUE, OVERCOME,
SURMOUNT.

CONQUER, in French *conquerir*,

conquiro, compounded of *con* and *quiro*, signifies to seek or try to reach an object.

CONQUISH is in French *vaincre*, in Spanish *gencar*, Greek (*per metathesis*) *nikao*, Hebrew *natzach*.

CONDUCE, Latin *subdo*, signifies to put under.

OVERCOME, compounded of *over* and *come*, signifies to come over or get mastery over one.

SURMOUNT, in French *surmonter*, compounded of *sur* over and *mount*, signifies to rise above one.

Persons or things are *conquered*; persons only are *vain*. An enemy or a country is *vanquished*; a foe is *vanquished*; people are *subdued*.

To *conquer* an enemy by whatever means we gain the mastery over him; to *vanquish* him, when by force we make him yield; we *subdue* him by any means we check in him the resistance. A Christian tries to *subdue* his enemies by kindness and mercy; a warrior tries to *conquer* them in the field; a prudent man tries to *subdue* his rebellious passions by a due mixture of clemency and severity.

A man may be *vanquished* in a single battle; one is *subdued* only by the patient and persevering measures. Alexander the First *conquered* England, *vanquishing* his rival Harold; after that he completely *subdued* the island.

Alexander having *vanquished* all enemies that opposed him, and *subdued* all the nations with whom he came, fancied that he had *conquered* the whole world, and is said to have wept at the idea that there were no more worlds to *conquer*. He was at last *vanquished* by the host of foes; namely, drunkenness and disease.

Conquish is used only in the proper sense. *Conquer* and *subdue* are likewise employed figuratively, in which they are analogous to *overcome* and *surmount*. That is *conquered* and *subdued* which is in the mind; that is *overcome* and *surmounted* which is internal or external. We *conquer* and *overcome* what makes no resistance; we *subdue* and *sur-*

mount what is violent and strong in its opposition; dislikes, attachments, and feelings in general, either for or against, are *conquered*; unruly and tumultuous passions are to be *subdued*; a man *conquers* himself; he *subdues* his spirit.

One *conquers* by ordinary means and efforts; one *subdues* by extraordinary means. Antipathies when cherished in early life, are not easily *conquered* in riper years: nothing but a prevailing sense of religion, and a perpetual fear of God, can ever *subdue* the rebellious wills and propensities.

It requires determination and force to *conquer* and *overcome*; patience and perseverance to *subdue* and *surmount*. Prejudices and prepossessions are *overcome*; obstacles and difficulties are *surmounted*: it too frequently happens that those who are eager to *overcome* their prejudices, in order to dispose themselves for the reception of new opinions, fall into greater errors than those they have abandoned: nothing truly great has ever been effected where great difficulties have not been encountered. It is the characteristic of genius to *surmount* every difficulty: Alexander conceived that he could *overcome* nature herself, and Hannibal succeeded in this very point: there were scarcely any obstacles which she opposed to him that he did not *surmount* by prowess and perseverance.

Whoever aims at Christian perfection must strive with God's assistance to *conquer* avarice, pride, and every inordinate propensity; to *subdue* wrath, anger, lust, and every carnal appetite; to *overcome* temptations, and to *surmount* trials and impediments which obstruct his course.

Real glory

Springs from the silent conquest of ourselves.

THOMSON.

There are two parts in our nature. The inferior part is generally much stronger, and has always the start of reason; which, if it were not aided by religion, would almost universally be corrupted.

BENJAMIN.

Socrates and Marcus Aurelius are instances of men, who by the strength of philosophy having subdued their passions, are celebrated for great husbands.

The patient mind by yielding over-

more than the bare exercise of authority, and involve no other consequence than the temporary pleasure of the parties concerned. Public measures are *permitted* and *allowed*, but never *consented* to. The law *permits* or *allows*; or the person who is authorized *permits* or *allows*. *Permit* in this case retains its positive sense; *allow* its negative sense, as before. Government *permits* individuals to fit out privateers in time of war: when magistrates are not vigilant, many things will be done which are not *allowed*. A judge is not *permitted* to pass any sentence, but what is strictly conformable to law: every man who is accused is *allowed* to plead his own cause, or entrust it to another, as he thinks fit.

O no! our reason was not vainly lent!
Nor is a slave, but by his own consent. DAYDEN.

Shame, and his conscience
Will not permit him to deny it. RANDOLPH.

I think the strictest moralists *allow* forms of address to be used, without much regard to their literal acceptance. JOHNSON.

TO CONSENT, *v.* *To accede.*

TO CONSENT, *v.* *To assent.*

CONSEQUENCE, RESULT.

CONSEQUENCE, in French *consequence*, Latin *consequentia*, from *consequor* to follow, signifies the thing that follows in connection.

RESULT, in French *resulte*, Latin *resulto*, or *resultus* and *resilio* to rebound, signifies that which springs or bounds back from another thing.

Consequences flow of themselves from the nature of things; *results* are drawn. *Consequences* proceed from actions in general; *results* proceed from particular efforts and attempts. *Consequences* are good or bad; *results* are successful or unsuccessful.

We endeavour to avert *consequences* which threaten to be bad; we endeavour to produce *results* that are according to our wishes. Not to foresee the *consequences* which are foreseen by others, evinces a more than ordinary share of indiscretion and infatuation. To calculate on a favourable *result* from an ill-judged and ill-executed enterprise, only proves a consistent blindness in the projector.

Judicious often draws after it a fatal train of consequences. ADDISON.

The state of the world is continually changing, and none can tell the result of the next vicissitude. JOHNSON.

CONSEQUENCE, *v.* *Effect.*

CONSEQUENCE, *v.* *Event.*

CONSEQUENCE, *v.* *Importance.*

CONSEQUENTLY, *v.* *Naturally.*

CONSEQUENTLY, *v.* *Therefore.*

TO CONSIDER, TO REFLECT.

CONSIDER, in French *considerer*, Latin *considero*, a factative, from *consido* to sit down, signifies to make to settle.

REFLECT, in Latin *reflecto*, compounded of *re* and *flecto*, signifies to turn back or upon itself.

The operation of thought is expressed by these two words, but it varies in the circumstances of the action.

Consideration is employed for practical purposes; *reflection* for matters of speculation or moral improvement. Common objects call for *consideration*; the workings of the mind itself, or objects purely spiritual, occupy *reflection*. It is necessary to *consider* what is proper to be done, before we take any step; it is consistent with our natures, as rational beings, to *reflect* on what we are, what we ought to be, and what we shall be.

Without *consideration* we shall naturally commit the most flagrant errors; without *reflection* we shall never understand our duty to our Maker, our neighbour, and ourselves.

He who *considers* of a thing with prejudice has judged the cause before he hears it. SOUTH.

Whoever *reflects* frequently on the uncertainty of his own duration, will find out that the state of others is not more permanent than his own.

JOHNSON.

TO CONSIDER, REGARD.

CONSIDER, *v.* *To consider, reflect.*

REGARD, *v.* *Care, concern.*

There is most caution in *considering*; most attention in *regarding*.

The circumstances, situation, advantages, disadvantages, and the like, are objects of *consideration*; personal character, abilities, and qualities, are objects of *regard*. A want of *consideration* leads a person to form a very unfair judgment of others; a want of *regard* makes them regardless of

CONSONANT.

only to set rocks and hardships at defiance, and
commit his life to the wind.
Supposing both equal in character,
Gitty, I conclude, is the better person.

Supposing both equal in their natural integrity, I ought in common prudence to fear foul play from an indignant person rather than from one whose circumstances seem to have placed him above the base temptation of money. This reason makes the commonwealth regard her richest subjects as the fittest to be entrusted with her highest employments.

JOHNSON.

ADDISON.

CONSISTENCY.

CONSISTENT, v. Compatible.

CONSISTENT, v. Compatible.
CONSONANT, v. Consonant.
CONSOLE, v.

TO CONSOLE, SOLACE, COMFORT.

CONSOLE and **SOLACE** are derived from the same source, in French *consoler*, Latin *consolor* and *solatium*, possibly from *solum* the ground, which nourishes all things. *See the same*
COMFORT, *v. Comfort*.
Console and

COMFORT, v. Comfort.
Console and

COMFORT, v. Comfort.
Console and *solace* denote the relieving of pain; *comfort* marks the communication of positive pleasure. We *console* others with words; we *console* or *solace* ourselves with reflections; we *comfort* by words or deeds. *Console* is used on more important occasions than *solace*. We *console* our friends when they meet with afflictions; we *solace* ourselves when we meet with disasters; we *comfort* those who stand in need of *Comfort*.
 The great

The greatest consolation which we can enjoy on the death of our friends is derived from the hope that they have exchanged a state of imperfection and sorrow for one that is full of pure and unmixed felicity. It is no small solace to us in the midst of all our troubles, to consider that they are not so bad as that they might not have been worse. The comforts which a person enjoys may be considerably enhanced by the comparison with what he has formerly suffered.

No afflictions men generally draw their consolation out of books of morality, which indeed serve of great use to fortify and strengthen the mind against the impressions of sorrow.

ADDISON.

He that undergoes the fatigue of labour must
 for his weariness with the contemplation of
 his reward.

If our afflictions are light
 for aught the

ADDISON.
 JOHNSON.

Johnson.

If our afflictions are light, we shall be comforted by the comparison we make between ourselves and our fellow sufferers.

ADDISON.

CONSONANT, ACCORDANT,
CONSISTENT

CONSISTENT.

CONSISTENT.
CONSONANT, from the Latin

CONSONANT.

consonans, participle of *con* and *sonare*, to sound together, signifies to sound or be in unison or harmony.

ACCORDANT, from *accord* (v. To agree), signifies the quality of agreeing.

CONSISTENT, from the Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, *con* and *sisto* to place together, signifies the quality of being able to stand in unison together. | *Consonant*

Consonant is employed in matters of representation; *accordant* in matters of opinion or sentiment; *consistent* in matters of conduct. A particular passage is *consonant* with the whole tenor of the Scriptures; a particular account is *accordant* with all one hears and sees on a subject; a person's conduct is not *consistent* with his station.

The *consonance* of the whole Scriptures in the Old and New Testaments, with regard to the character, dignity, and mission of our Blessed Saviour, has justly given birth to that form, which constitutes the established religion of England. The *accordance* of the prophecies respecting our Saviour with the event of his birth, life, and sufferings, are incontestable evidences of his being the true Messiah. The *consistency* of a man's practice with his profession is the only criterion of his sincerity.

Consonant is opposed to *dissonant*; *accordant* to *discordant*; *consistent* to *inconsistent*. *Consonance* is not so positive a thing as either *accordance* or *consistency*, which respect real events, circumstances, and actions. *Consonance* mostly serves to prove the truth for any thing, but *dissonance* does not prove its falsehood until it amounts to direct *discordance* or *inconsistency*. There is a *dissonance* in the accounts given by the four Evangelists of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of all collusion and imposture, since there is neither *discordance* nor *inconsistency* in what they have related or omitted.

Our faith in the discoveries of the Gospel will receive confirmation from discerning their consonance with the natural sentiments of the human heart.

The difference of good and evil is not founded on

BLAIR.

BLAIR.

The difference of good and evil in actions is not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things, and the nature of

CONSTITUTE.

ters; an assembly *deputes* some of its members.

To *constitute* implies the act of making as well as choosing; the office as well as the person is new: in *appointing*, the person but not the office is new. A person may be *constituted* arbiter or judge as circumstances may require; a successor is *appointed* but not *constituted*.

Whoever is *constituted* is invested with supreme authority derived from the highest sources of human power, common consent; whoever is *appointed* derives his authority from the authority of others, and has consequently but limited power: no individual can *appoint* another with authority equal to his own: whoever is *deputed* has private and not public authority; his office is partial, often confined to the particular transaction of an individual, or a body of individuals. According to the Romish religion, the Pope is *constituted* supreme head of the Christian church throughout the whole world; governors are *appointed* to distant provinces; persons are *deputed* to present petitions or make representations to government.

It has been the fashion of the present day to speak contemptuously of all *constituted* authorities: the *appointments* made by government are a fruitful source of discontent for those who follow the trade of opposition: a busy multitude, when agitated by political discussions, are ever ready to form societies and send *deputations*, in order to communicate their wishes to their rulers.

Where there is no *constituted* judge, as be-
ware independent states there is not, the violence
itself is the natural judge. BARRER.

The accusations against Columbus gained such
credit in a jealous court, that a commissioner
was *appointed* to repair to Hispaniola, and to
inspect into his conduct. ROBERTSON.

If the Commons disagree to the amendments,
a conference usually follows between members
deputed from each house. BLACKSTONE.

TO CONSTITUTE, *v.* To form.

CONSTITUTION, *v.* Frame.

CONSTITUTION, *v.* Govern-
ment.

CONSTRAINT, COMPULSION.

CONSTRAINT, from *constrain*,

CONSTRAINT.

Latin *constringo*, compounded of *con* and *stringo*, signifies the act of straining or tying together.

COMPULSION signifies the act of compelling (*v.* To compel).

There is much of binding in *constraint*; of violence in *compulsion*: *constraint* prevents from acting agreeably to the will; *compulsion* forces to act contrary to the will: a soldier in the ranks moves with much *constraint*, and is often subject to much *compulsion* to make him move as is desired. *Constraint* may arise from outward circumstances; *compulsion* is always produced by some active agent: the forms of civil society lay a proper *constraint* upon the behaviour of men so as to render them agreeable to each other; the arm of the civil power must ever be ready to *compel* those who will not submit without *compulsion*: in the moments of relaxation, the actions of children should be as free from *constraint* as possible, which is one means of lessening the necessity for *compulsion* when they are called to the performance of their duty.

Commands are no *constraints*. If I obey them
I do it freely. MURRAY.

Seavage declared that it was not his design to
fly from justice; that he intended to have ap-
peared (to appear) at the bar without *compul-
sion*. JENKINSON.

CONSTRAINT, RESTRAINT.

CONSTRAINT, *v.* *Constraint*,
compulsion.

RESTRAINT, *v.* To *coerce*, *re-
strain*.

Constraint respects the movements of the body only; *restraint* those of the mind, and the outward actions: when they both refer to the outward actions, we say a person's behaviour is *constrained*; his feelings are *restrained*: he is *constrained* to act or not to act, or to act in a certain manner; he is *restrained* from acting at all, if not from feeling: the conduct is *constrained* by certain prescribed rules, by discipline and order; it is *restrained* by particular motives: whoever learns a mechanical exercise is *constrained* to move his body in a certain direction; the fear of detection often *restrains* persons from the com-

summatio, compounded of *con* and *summa* the sum, signifies the summing or winding up of the whole; the putting a final period to any concern.

COMPLETION signifies either the act of completing, or the state of being completed (*v. To complete*).

The arrival at a conclusion is comprehended in both these terms, but they differ principally in application; wishes are *consummated*; plans are *completed*: we often flatter ourselves that the *completion* of all our plans will be the *consummation* of all our wishes, and thus expose ourselves to grievous disappointments: the *consummation* of the nuptial ceremony is not always the *consummation* of hopes and joys; it is frequently the beginning of misery and disappointment: we often sacrifice much to the *completion* of a purpose which we afterwards find not worth the labour of attaining.

As epithets, *consummate* is employed only in a bad sense, and *complete* either in a good or bad sense: those who are regarded as *complete* fools are not unfrequently *consummate* knaves: the theatre is not the only place for witnessing a farce; human life affords many of various descriptions; among the number of which we may reckon those as *complete* in their kind, which are acted at elections, where *consummate* folly and *consummate* hypocrisy are practised by turns.

It is not to be doubted but it was a constant practice of all that is praise-worthy, which made her capable of beholding death, not as the dissolution but the *consummation* of life. **STEELE.**

As our concern is solely with that period when the incorporation of the two languages was completed, it is of no great importance to determine the precise time at which any word or phrase becomes naturalised. **TRAWART.**

CONSUMPTION, *v. Decay.*

CONTACT, TOUCH.

CONTACT, Latin *contactus* participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango* to touch together, is distinguished from the simple word **TOUCH**, not so much in sense as in grammatical construction; the former expressing a state, and referring to two bodies actually in that state; the latter on the other hand implying the abstract act of *touching*: we speak of things coming or being in *contact*, but

not of the *contact* instead of the *touch* of a thing: the poison which comes from the poison-tree is so powerful in its nature, that it is not necessary to come in *contact* with it in order to feel its baneful influence; some insects are armed with stings so inconceivably sharp, that the smallest *touch* possible is sufficient to produce a puncture into the flesh.

We are attracted towards each other by general sympathy, but kept back from *contact* in private interest. **JOHNSON.**

O death! where is now thy sting! O grave! where is thy victory? Where are the terrors with which thou hast so long affrighted the nations? At the *touch* of the Divine rod, thy visionary horrors are fled. **BLAIR.**

CONTAGION, INFECTION.

BOTH these terms imply the power of communicating something bad, but **CONTAGION**, from the Latin verb *contingo* to come in contact, proceeds from a simple touch; and **INFECTION**, from the Latin verb *inficio* or *in* and *facio* to put in, proceeds by receiving something inwardly, or having it infused.

Some things act more properly by *contagion*, others by *infection*: the more powerful diseases, as the plague or yellow fever, are communicated by *contagion*; they are therefore denominated *contagious*; the less virulent disorders, as fevers, consumptions, and the like, are termed *infectious*, as they are communicated by the less rapid process of *infection*: the air is *contagious* or *infectious* according to the same rule of distinction: when heavily overcharged with noxious vapours and deadly disease, it is justly entitled *contagious*, but in ordinary cases *infectious*. In the figurative sense, vice is for the same obvious reason termed *contagious*; and bad principles are denominated *infectious*: some young people, who are fortunate enough to shun the *contagion* of bad society, are, perhaps, caught by the *infection* of bad principles, acting as a slow poison on the moral constitution.

If I send my son abroad, it is scarcely possible to keep him from the reigning *contagion* of rudeness. **LOCKE.**

But we who only do infuse,
The rage in them like *bouté-feu*,
'Tis our example that infects
In them the *infection* of our ills. **BUTLER.**

ts if not their inclinations. re thrown in the way of seeing is of females *defiled* with the it indecencies, and hearing or things which cannot be heard a without *polluting* the soul: it : be surprising if after this their les are found to be *corrupted* they have reached the age of ity.

drop of water after its progress through channels of the street is not more *contaminated* with filth and dirt, than a simple story has passed through the mouths of a few tale-bearers. HAWKESWORTH.

from the mountain tops with hideous cry lifting wings the hungry harpies fly, snatch the meat, *defiling* all they find, nothing leave a loathsome stench behind. DRYDEN.

the statue with their bloody hands defiled, and profan'd her holy bands. DRYDEN.

men agree that licentious poems do, of all, most *corrupt* the heart. STEELE.

swarming ewes shall no strange meadows try, nor a rot from *tainted* company. DRYDEN.

CONTEMN, DESPISE, SCORN, DISDAIN.

CONTEMN, in Latin *contemno*, compounded of *con* and *temno*, is pronounced from *tamino*, and the *tem* *tam* to pollute or render less, which is the cause of *con-*

DESPISE, in Latin *despicio*, compounded of *de* and *specio*, signifies to look down upon, which is a strong expression of *contempt*.

SCORN, varied from our word *scorn*, signifies stripped of all honours exposed to derision, which situates the cause of *scorn*.

DISDAIN, compounded of *dis* and *dain* or *deign* to think, signifies to hold altogether worthy.

The above elucidations sufficiently express the feeling towards others which give birth to all these actions. But the feeling of *contempt* is not quite so strong as that of *despising*, nor that of *despising* so strong as those of *scorning* and *disdaining*; the latter of which expresses the strongest sentiment of all. Persons are *contemned* for their moral qualities; they are *despised* on account of their outward

circumstances, their characters, or their endowments. Superiors may be *contemned*; inferiors only, real or supposed, are *despised*.

Contempt, as applied to persons, is not incompatible with a Christian temper when justly provoked by their character; but *despising* is distinctly forbidden and seldom warranted. Yet it is not so much our business to *contemn* others as to *contemn* that which is *contemptible*; but we are not equally at liberty to *despise* the person, or any thing belonging to the person, of another. Whatever springs from the free will of another may be a subject of *contempt*; but the casualties of fortune or the gifts of Providence, which are alike independent of personal merit should never expose a person to be *despised*. We may, however, *contemn* a person for his impotent malice, or *despise* him for his meanness.

Persons are not *scorned* or *disdained*, but they may be treated with *scorn* or *disdain*; they are both improper expressions of *contempt* or *despise*; *scorn* marks the sentiment of a little vain mind; *disdain* of a haughty and perverted mind. A beautiful woman looks with *scorn* on her whom she *despises* for the want of this natural gift. The wealthy man treats with *disdain* him whom he *despises* for his poverty. There is nothing excites the *contempt* of mankind so powerfully as a mixture of pride and meanness; a moment's reflection will teach us the folly and wickedness of *despising* another for that to which by the will of Providence we may the next moment be exposed ourselves; there are silly persons who will *scorn* to be seen in the company of such as have not an equal share of finery; and there are weak upstarts of fortune, who *disdain* to look at those who cannot measure purses with themselves.

Contempt and *derision* are hard words: but in what manner can one give advice to a youth in the pursuit and possession of sensual pleasures, or afford pity to an old man in the impotence and desire of enjoying them. STEELE.

It is seldom that the great or the wise suspect that they are cheated and *despised*. JOHNSON.

Infamous wretch!
So much below my *scorn*, I dare not kill thee. DRYDEN

is not any property or circumstance of that I *contemplate* with more joy than reality. BRERKELEY.

is nothing so forced and constrained as frequently meet with in tragedies; to man under the weight of great sorrow, meditation upon what he is going to cast about for a simile to what he himself the thing which he is going to act.

STEELE.

is went on this and that,
as as I know not what.

FRANCIS.

CONTEMPTIBLE, CONTEMPTUOUS.

THESE terms are very frequently, very erroneously, confounded in discourse.

CONTEMPTIBLE is applied to things deserving *contempt*; CONTEMPTUOUS to that which is *exempt* of *contempt*. Persons, or what by persons, may be either *con-temptible* or *contemptuous*; but a thing *contemptible*.

A person's conduct is *contemptible*; a person's look is *contemptuous*.

A look, or a negligent indifference, proceeds or mixed with scorn, that shows another to be by you too *contemptible* to be regarded.

ADDISON.

A person's principles in many particulars that there has been always such a harmony in that she seldom smiles upon those who would lead me to pass with a *contemptuous* smile.

HAWKSWORTH.

CONTEMPTIBLE, DESPICABLE, PITIFUL.

CONTEMPTIBLE is not so strong as DESPICABLE or PITIFUL.

A person may be *contemptible* for his poverty or weakness; but he is *despicable* for his servility and baseness of character; he is *pitiful* for his want of firmness and becoming spirit. A person is *contemptible* when it is told for purposes of private interest; it is *pitiful* when accompanied with indications of unmanly fear. It is *con-temptible* to take credit to one's self for good action one has not performed; it is *despicable* to charge another with the faults which we ourselves have committed; it is *pitiful* to reproach others, and then attempt to find shelter from their resentment in any shelter which offers. It is *contemptible* for a man in a superior position to borrow of his inferiors: it

is *despicable* in him to forfeit his word; it is *pitiful* in him to attempt to conceal by artifice.

Were every man persuaded from how mean and low a principle this passion (for flattery) is derived, there can be no doubt but the person who should attempt to gratify it would then be as *contemptible* as he is now successful. STEELE.

To put on an artificial part to obtain no other but an unjust praise from the undiscerning is of all endeavours the most *despicable*. STEELE.

There is something *pitifully* mean in the inverted ambition of that man who can hope for annihilation, and please himself to think that his whole fabric shall crumble into dust. STEELE.

CONTEMPTUOUS, v. *Contemptible*.

CONTEMPTUOUS, SCORNFUL, DISDAINFUL.

THESE epithets rise in sense by a regular gradation.

CONTEMPTUOUS is general, and applied to whatever can express *contempt*: SCORNFUL and DISDAINFUL are particular; they apply only to outward marks: one is *contemptuous* who is *scornful* or *disdainful*, but not *vice versa*.

Words, actions, and looks are *contemptuous*; looks, sneers, and gestures are *scornful* and *disdainful*.

Contemptuous expressions are always unjustifiable; whatever may be the *contempt* which a person's conduct deserves, it is unbecoming in another to give him any indications of the sentiment he feels. *Scornful* and *disdainful* smiles are resorted to by the weakest or the worst of mankind.

Prior never sacrifices accuracy to haste, nor indulges himself in *contemptuous* negligence or impatient idleness. JOHNSON.

As soon as Maria began to look round, and saw the vagabond Mirtillo who had so long absented himself from her circle, she looked upon him with that glance which in the language of ogles is called the *scornful*. STEELE.

In vain he thus attempts her mind to move,
With tears and prayers and late repenting love;
Disdainfully she looked, then turning round,
She fix'd her eyes unmov'd upon the ground.

DRYDEN.

TO CONTEND, STRIVE, VIE.

CONTEND, in Latin *contendo*, compounded of *con* or *contra* and *tendo* to bend one's steps, signifies to exert one's self against any thing.

STRIVE is in Dutch *streven*, low German *strevan*, high German *streben*,

alone riots, reason then contends,
the conquest every bliss depends.

SHENSTONE.

The poor worm
swe her contest vain. Life's little day
runs, and she is gone. While I appear
with the bloom of youth through heav'n's
eternal year. MASON ON TRUTH.

me not to languish out my days,
the best exchange of life for praise.
this lance, can well dispute the prize.

DRYDEN.

has been a long dispute for precedence
the tragic and heroic poets. ADDISON.

CONTENTION, STRIFE,

Both derived from the preceding
(*v. To contend, strive*), have a
different meaning in which they are
used. The common idea to them
is of opposing one's self to an-
other with an angry humor.

CONTENTION is mostly occa-
sioned by the desire of seeking one's
own STRIFE springs from a quar-
relsome temper. Greedy and envious
men deal in contention, the former
because they are fearful lest they
will not get enough; the latter be-
cause they are fearful lest others
will get too much. Where bad tem-
pers are under no control come in
at collision, perpetual strife will
be the consequence.

me four more of lesser fame
in noble rank, attendant came;
they came with smiling grace,
and pudence, with brazen face,
few bold, with iron lungs,
and older, with her hundred tongues. MOORE.
The solid and substantial greatness of soul looks
with a generous neglect on the censures
and pleasures of the multitude, and places a
premium on the little noise and strife of tongues.

ADDISON.

CONTENTION, *v. Dissension.*

CONTENTMENT, SATISFACTION.

CONTENTMENT, in French *con-*
tent, from *content*, in Latin *con-*
participium of *contineo* to con-
tain or hold, signifies the keeping
of oneself to a thing.

SATISFACTION, in Latin *satis-*
factio, compounded of *satis* and *facio*,
signifies the making or having enough.
Contentment lies in ourselves: satis-
faction is derived from external ob-

jects. One is *contented* when one wishes
for no more: one is *satisfied* when one
has obtained what one wishes.

The *contented* man has always
enough; the *satisfied* man receives
enough.

The *contented* man will not be *dis-*
satisfied; but he who looks for *satis-*
faction will never be *contented*. *Con-*
tentment is the absence of pain; *satis-*
faction is positive pleasure. *Con-*
tentment is accompanied with the
enjoyment of what one has; *satis-*
faction is often quickly followed with
the alloy of wanting more. A *con-*
tented man can never be miserable; a
satisfied man can scarcely be long
happy. *Contentment* is a permanent
and habitual state of mind; it is the
restriction of all our thoughts, views,
and desires, within the compass of
present possession and enjoyment:
satisfaction is a partial and turbulent
state of the feelings, which awakens
rather than deadens desire. *Con-*
tentment is suited to our present con-
dition; it accommodates itself to the
vicissitudes of human life: *satisfac-*
tion belongs to no created being; one
satisfied desire engenders another that
demands *satisfaction*. *Contentment*
is within the reach of the poor man,
to whom it is a continual feast; but
satisfaction has never been procured
by wealth, however enormous, or am-
bition, however boundless and suc-
cessful. We should therefore look
for the *contented* man, where there are
the fewest means of being *satisfied*.
Our duty bids us be *contented*; our
desires ask to be *satisfied*; but our
duty is associated with our happiness;
our desires are the sources of our
misery.

True happiness is to no place confin'd,
But still is found in a *contented* mind.

ANONYMOUS.

Women who have been married some time,
not having it in their heads to draw after them
a numerous train of followers, find their *satis-*
faction in the possession of one man's heart.

SPECTATOR.

No man should be *contented* with himself
that he barely does well, but he should perform
every thing in the best manner he is able.

STEELE.

It is necessary to an easy and happy life to
possess our minds in such a manner as to be
well *satisfied* with our own reflections. STEELE.

CONTEST, *v. Conflict.*

TO CONTEST, *v. To contend.*

CONTIGUOUS, *v. Adjacent.*

continuance, or of long *duration* : *continuance* is used only with regard to the conduct of men ; *duration* with regard to the existence of thing. Whatever is occasional, and soon to be ended, is not a *continuance* ; whatever is permanent and soon destroyed, is not of *duration* ; there are many examples ; institutions in England which seem to be of no less *continuance* of utility. *Duration* is with us a relative term ; things are of long or short *duration* : by comparison, the duration of the world and all subliminal objects is nothing in regard to eternity.

Time seems to have equally divided the lot of mankind into different sexes, that woman may have her husband, and that man may equally contribute to the *continuance* of species. STEELE.

Pythagorean transmigration, the resurrection of the Mahometan, and the shades of Plato, do all agree in the main point, the *duration* of our existence. BERKELEY.

Locke observes, " that we get the idea of *duration*, by reflecting on that train of ideas which succeed one another in our minds."

ADAMSON.

CONTINUATION, CONTINUITY.

CONTINUATION, as may be seen (*v. Continuance*), is the act of continuing ; *continuity* is the quality of continuing : the former is employed in the figurative sense for the connection of events and actions ; the latter in the physical sense for the connection of the component parts of bodies. The *continuation* of a story up to the existing period of the writer is the work of every age, of every year : there are bodies of little *continuity* that they will break to pieces on the slightest touch.

Man ascending into the northern signs feels first a temperate heat, which by his approach unto the solstice he intendeth ; and by his retreat the same even upon declination.

BROWN'S VULGAR ERRORS.

Man always perceives the passages by which he is insinuated ; feels the impulse of another where it yields thereto : perceives the separation of its *continuity*, and for a time resists it. Hence, perception is diffused through all nature. BACON.

The sprightly breast demands constant rapture ; life, a tedious load, and its *continuity* of joy. SWEETSTONE.

CONTINUATION, *v. Continuance*.

TO CONTINUE, REMAIN, STAY.

CONTINUE, *v. Continual, perpetual*.

REMAIN, in Latin *remaneo*, is compounded of *re* and *maneo*, Greek *μεινω*, Hebrew *omad* to tarry.

STAY is but a variation of the word stand.

The idea of confining one's self to something is common to all these terms ; but *continue* applies often to the sameness of action, and *remain* to the sameness of place or situation ; the former has most of the active sense in it, and expresses a state of action ; the latter is altogether neuter, and expresses a state of rest. We speak of *continuing* a certain course, of *continuing* to do, or *continuing* to be any thing ; but of *remaining* in a position, in a house, in a town, in a condition, and the like.

There is more of will in *continuing* ; more of necessity and circumstances in *remaining*. A person *continues* in office as long as he can perform it with satisfaction to himself, and his employers : a sentinel *remains* at his post or station. *Continue* is opposed to cease ; *remain* is opposed to go. Things *continue* in motion ; they *remain* stationary. The females among the brutes will sometimes *continue* to feed their young, long after they are able to provide for themselves : many persons are restored to life after having *remained* several hours in a state of suspended animation.

Remain and *stay* are both perfectly neuter in their sense, but *remain* is employed for either persons or things ; *stay* for persons only. It is necessary for some species of wood to *remain* long in the water in order to be seasoned : some persons are of so restless a temper, that they cannot *stay* long in a place without giving symptoms of uneasiness.

When *remain* is employed for persons, it is often involuntary, if not compulsory ; *stay* is altogether voluntary. Soldiers must *remain* where they are stationed. Friends *stay* at each other's houses as visitors. Former times afford many instances of servants *continuing* faithful to their employers, even in the season of

gison with *pursue* or *prosecute*, it is always followed by some object: we *continue* to do, *persevere*, or *persist* in doing something: but we *continue*, *pursue*, or *prosecute* some object which we wish to bring to perfection by additional labour.

Continue is equally indefinite, as in the former case; *pursue* and *prosecute* both comprehend collateral ideas respecting the disposition of the agent, and the nature of the object: to *continue* is to go on with a thing as it has been begun; to *pursue* and *prosecute* is to *continue* by some prescribed rule, or in some particular manner: a work is *continued*; a plan, measure, or line of conduct is *pursued*; an undertaking or a design is *prosecuted*: we may *continue* the work of another in order to supply a deficiency; we may *pursue* a plan that emanates either from ourselves or another; we *prosecute* our own work only in order to obtain some peculiar object: *continue*, therefore, expresses less than *pursue*, and this less than *prosecute*: the history of England has been *continued* down to the present period by different writers; Smollett has *pursued* the same plan as Hume, in the *continuation* of his history; Captain Cook *prosecuted* his work of discovery in three several voyages.

We *continue* the conversation which has been interrupted; we *pursue* the subject which has engaged our attention; we *pursue* a journey after a certain length of stay; we *prosecute* any particular journey which is important either on account of its difficulties or its object.

To *continue* is in itself altogether an indifferent action; to *pursue* is always a commendable action; to *prosecute* rises still higher in value: it is a mark of great instability not to *continue* any thing that we begin; it betrays a great want of prudence and discernment not to *pursue* some plan on every occasion which requires method; it is the characteristic of a *persevering* mind to *prosecute* whatever it has deemed worthy to enter upon.

After having petitioned for power to resist temptation, there is so great an incongruity in not *continuing* the struggle, that we blush at

the thought, and *persevere*, lest we lose all reverence for ourselves. HAWKSWORTH.

Look round the habitable world, how few
Know their own good, or knowing it, *pursue*.
DAYDEN.

Will ye not now the pair of sages praise,
Who the same end *pursu'd* by several ways?
DAYDEN.

There will be some study which every man
more zealously *prosecutes*, some darling subject
on which he is principally pleased to converse.
JOHNSON.

CONTINUED, *v. Continual*.

CONTINUITY, *v. Continuation*.

TO CONTRACT, *v. To abridge*.

CONTRACT, *v. Agreement*.

CONTRACTED, CONFINED,
NARROW.

CONTRACTED, from the verb *contract*, in Latin *contractus* participle of *contraho* to draw or come close together, signifies either the state or quality of being shrunk up, lessened in size, or brought within a smaller compass.

CONFINED marks the state of being *confined* (*v. To bound*).

NARROW is a variation of near, signifying the quality of being near, close, or not extended.

Contraction arises from the inherent state of the object; *confined* is produced by some external agent: a limb is *contracted* from disease; it is *confined* by a chain: we speak morally of the *contracted* span of a man's life, and the *confined* view which he takes of a subject.

Contracted and *confined* respect the operations of things; *narrow* their qualities or accidents: whatever is *contracted* or *confined* is more or less *narrow*; but many things are *narrow* which have never been *contracted* or *confined*; what is *narrow* is therefore more positively so than either *contracted* or *confined*: a *contracted* mind has but few objects on which it dwells to the exclusion of others; a *confined* education is *confined* to few points of knowledge or information; a *narrow* soul is hemmed in by a single selfish passion.

Notwithstanding a *narrow*, *contracted* temper be that which obtains most in the world, must not therefore conclude this to be the general characteristic of mankind. GIL.

ingenuity is the faculty which is exerted in inventing.

Contriving requires even less exercise of the thoughts than *devising*: we *contrive* on familiar and common occasions; we *devise* in seasons of difficulty and trial. A *contrivance* is simple and obvious to a plain understanding: a *device* is complex and far-fetched; it requires a ready conception and a degree of art.

Contrivances serve to supply a deficiency, or increase a convenience; *devices* are employed to extricate from danger, to remove an evil, or forward a scheme: the history of Robinson Crusoe derives considerable interest from the relation of the various *contrivances*, by which he provided himself with the first articles of necessity and comfort; the history of robbers and adventurers is full of the various *devices* by which they endeavour to carry on their projects of plunder, or elude the vigilance of their pursuers; the history of civilized society contains an account of the various *inventions* which have contributed to the enjoyment or improvement of mankind.

My sentence is for open war; of wiles
More unexpert I boast not; then let those
Contrive who need, or when they need, not now.
MILTON.

The briskest nectar
Shall be his drink, and all th' ambrosial cates
Art can *devise* for wanton appetite
Furnish his banquet.
NASS.

Architecture, painting, and statuary, were *invented* with the design to lift up human nature.
ADDISON.

TO CONTRIVE, *v.* To concert.

TO CONTROL, *v.* To check.

TO CONTROVERT, DISPUTE.

CONTROVERT, compounded of the Latin *contra* and *verto*, signifies to turn against another in discourse, or direct one's self against another.

DISPUTE, *v.* To argue, debate.

To *controvert* has regard to speculative points; to *dispute* respects matters of fact: there is more of opposition in *controversy*; more of doubt in *disputing*: a sophist *controverts*; a sceptic *disputes*: the plainest and sublimest truths of the Gospel have been all *controverted* in their turn by the *self-sufficient inquirer*; the authenti-

city of the Bible itself has been *disputed* by some few individuals; the existence of a God by still fewer.

Controversy is worse than an unprofitable task; instead of eliciting truth, it does but expose the failings of the parties engaged: *disputing* is not so personal, and consequently not so objectional: we never *controvert* any point without seriously and decidedly intending to oppose the notions of another; we may sometimes *dispute* a point for the sake of friendly argument, or the desire of information: theologians and politicians are the greatest *controversialists*; it is the business of men in general to *dispute* whatever ought not to be taken for granted.

The demolishing of Dunkirk was so eagerly insisted on, and so warmly *controverted*, as had like to have produced a challenge.
BODLEY.

Avoid *disputes* as much as possible. BODLEY.

CONTUMACIOUS, *v.* Obstinate.

CONTUMACY, REBELLION.

CONTUMACY, from the Latin *contumax*, compounded of *contra* and *tumeo* to swell, signifies the swelling one's self up by way of resistance.

REBELLION, in Latin *rebellio*, from *rebello* or *re* and *bello* to war in return, signifies carrying on war against those to whom we owe, and have before paid, a lawful subjection.

Resistance to lawful authority is the common idea included in both the signification of these terms, but *contumacy* does not express so much as *rebellion*: the *contumacious* resist only occasionally; the *rebel* resists systematically: the *contumacious* stand only on certain points, and oppose the individual; the *rebel* sets himself up against the authority itself: the *contumacious* thwart and contradict, they never resort to open violence; the *rebel* acts only by main force: *contumacy* shelters itself under the plea of equity and justice; *rebellion* sets all law and order at defiance.

The censor told the criminal that he spoke in contempt of the court, and that he should be proceeded against for *contumacy*.
ADDISON.

The mother of Waller was the daughter of John Hampden of Hampden, in the same county, and sister to Hampden the zealot of rebellion.
JOHNSON.

TO CONVERNE, *v.* *To assemble.*

CONVENIENT, SUITABLE.

CONVENIENT, *v.* *Commodious.*

SUITABLE, *v.* *Conformable.*

Convenient regards the circumstances of the individual; *suitable* respects the established opinions of mankind, and is closely connected with moral propriety: nothing is *convenient* which does not favour one's purpose: nothing is *suitable* which does not suit the person, place, and thing: whoever has any thing to ask of another must take a *convenient* opportunity in order to ensure success; his address on such an occasion would be very *unsuitable*, if he affected to claim as a right what he ought to solicit as a favour.

If any man think it *convenient* to seem good, let him be so indeed, and then his goodness will appear to every body's satisfaction. TILLOTSON.

Pleasure in general is the consequent apprehension of a *suitable* object, *suitably* applied to a rightly disposed faculty. SOUTH.

CONVENIENT, *v.* *Commodious.*

CONVENT, *v.* *Cloister.*

CONVENTION, *v.* *Assembly.*

CONVERSANT, FAMILIAR.

CONVERSANT, from *converse*, signifies turning over and over, consequently becoming acquainted.

FAMILIAR, from the Latin *familiaris* to be of the same family, signifies the closest connexion.

An acquaintance with things is implied in both these terms, but the latter expresses something more particular than the former.

A person is *conversant* in matters that come frequently before his notice; he is *familiar* with such as form the daily routine of his business: one who is not a professed lawyer may be *conversant* with the questions of law which occur on ordinary occasions; but one who is skilled in his profession will be *familiar* with all cases, which may possibly be employed in support of a cause: it is advisable to be *conversant* with the ways of the world; but to be *familiar* with the greater part of them would not redound to one's credit or advantage.

The waking mind is *conversant* with the

world of nature: when he sleeps he retires to a private world that is particular to himself.

ARNDT.

Groves, fields, and meadows, are at any season of the year pleasant to look upon, but more so much as in the opening of the spring, when they are all new and fresh with the first glance of them, and not yet too *familiar* to the eye.

ARNDT.

CONVERSATION, DIALOGUE, CONFERENCE, COLLOQUY.

CONVERSATION denotes the act of holding *converse* (*v.* *Communion*).

DIALOGUE, in French *dialogue*, Latin *dialogus*, Greek *διαλογος* compound of *δια* and *λογος*, signifies a speech between two.

CONFERENCE, from the Latin *con* and *fero* to put together, signifies consulting together on subjects.

COLLOQUY, in Latin *colloquium* from *col* or *con* and *loquor* to speak, signifies the act of talking together.

A *conversation* is always something actually held between two persons; a *dialogue* is mostly fictitious, and written as if spoken: any number of persons may take part in a *conversation*; but a *dialogue* always refers to the two persons who are expressly engaged: a *conversation* may be desultory, in which each takes his part at pleasure; a *dialogue* is formal, in which there will always be reply and rejoinder: a *conversation* may be carried on by any signs besides words, which are addressed personally to the individual present; a *dialogue* must always consist of express words: a prince holds frequent *conversations* with his ministers on affairs of state; Cicero wrote *dialogues* on the nature of the gods, and many later writers have adopted the *dialogue* form as a vehicle for conveying their sentiments: a *conference* is a species of *conversation*; a *colloquy* is a species of *dialogue*: a *conversation* is indefinite as to the subject, or the parties engaged in it; a *conference* is confined to particular subjects and descriptions of persons: a *conversation* is mostly occasional; a *conference* is always specifically appointed: a *conversation* is mostly on indifferent matters; a *conference* is mostly on national or public concerns: we have a *conversation* as friends; we have a *conference* as ministers of state.

The *dialogue* naturally limits the number to two; the *colloquy* is indefinite as to number: there may be *dialogues* therefore which are not *colloquies*; but every *colloquy* may be denominated a *dialogue*.

I find so much Arabic and Persian to read, that all my leisure in a morning is hardly sufficient for a thousandth part of the reading that would be agreeable and useful, as I wish to be a match in conversation with the learned natives whom I happen to meet.

SIR Wm. JOHNS.

Aurengarbo is written in rhyme, and has the appearance of being the most elaborate of all Dryden's plays. The personages are imperial, but the *dialogue* is often domestic, and therefore susceptible of sentiments accommodated to familiar incidents.

JOHNSON.

The conference between Gabriel and Satan abounds with sentiments proper for the occasion, and suitable to the persons of the two speakers.

ADDISON.

The close of this divine *colloquy* (between the Father and the Son) with the hymn of Angels that follow, are wonderfully beautiful and poetical.

ADDISON.

CONVERSE, *v.* Communion.

CONVERSIBLE, *v.* Facetious.

CONVERT, PROSELYTE.

CONVERT, from the Latin *converto*, signifies changed to something in conformity with the views of another.

PROSELYTE, from the Greek *προσelyτης* and *προσelyχουμαι*, signifies come over to the side of another.

Convert is more extensive in its sense and application than *proselyte*: *convert* in its full sense includes every change of opinion, without respect to the subject; *proselyte* in its strict sense refers only to changes from one religious belief to another: there are many *converts* to particular doctrines of Christianity, and *proselytes* from the Pagan, Jewish, or Mahomedan, to the Christian faith: there are political as well as religious *converts*, who could not with the same strict propriety be termed *proselytes*.

Conversion is a more voluntary act than *proselytism*; it emanates entirely from the mind of the agent, independent of foreign influence; it extends not merely to the abstract or speculative opinions of the individual, but to the whole current of his feelings and spring of his actions: it is

the *conversion* of the heart and soul. *Proselytism* is an outward act, which need not extend beyond the conformity of one's words and actions to a certain rule: *convert* is therefore always taken in a good sense; it bears on the face of it the stamp of sincerity: *proselyte* is a term of more ambiguous meaning; the *proselyte* is often the creature and tool of a party; there may be many *proselytes* where there are no *converts*.

The *conversion* of a sinner is the work of God's grace, either by his special interposition, or by the ordinary influence of his Holy Word on the heart; it is an act of great presumption, therefore, in those men who rest so strongly on their own particular modes and forms in bringing about this great work: they may without any breach of charity be suspected of rather wishing to make *proselytes* to their own party.

A believer may be excused by the most hardened atheist for endeavouring to make him a *convert*, because he does it with an eye to both their interests.

ADDISON.

False teachers commonly make use of base, and low, and temporal considerations, of little tricks and devices to make disciples and gain *proselytes*.

TILLOTSON.

TO CONVEY, *v.* To bear.

TO CONVICT, DETECT.

CONVICT, from the Latin *convictus*, participle of *convinco* to make manifest, signifies to make guilt clear.

DETECT, from the Latin *detectus*, participle of *detego*, compound of the privative *de* and *tego* to cover, signifies to uncover or lay open guilt.

A person is *convicted* by means of evidence; he is *detected* by means of ocular demonstration. One is *convicted* of having been the perpetrator of some evil deed; one is *detected* in the very act of committing the deed. One is *convicted* of crimes in a court of judicature; one is *detected* in various misdemeanours by different casualties: punishment necessarily follows the *conviction*; but in the case of *detection*, it rests in the breast of the individual against whom the offence is committed.

Advice is offensive, not because it lays us open to unexpected regret, or *convicts* us of any fault which had escaped our notice, but because

It shows us that we are known to others as well as ourselves. JOHNSON.

Every member of society feels and acknowledges the necessity of detecting crimes. JOHNSON.

CONVICT, *v. Criminal.*

CONVICTION, PERSUASION.

CONVICTION, from *convince* (*v. Conclusive*), denotes either the act of convincing or the state of being convinced.

PERSUASION, from *persuade*, expresses likewise either the act of persuading or the state of being persuaded. *Persuade*, in Latin *persuadeo*, from the Greek *πεισσειν*, sweet, signifies to make thoroughly agreeable to the taste.

What *convinces* binds; what *persuades* attracts. We *convince* by arguments; it is the understanding which determines: we are *persuaded* by entreaties and personal influence; it is the imagination or will which decides. Our *conviction* respects solely matters of belief or faith; our *persuasion* respects matters of belief or practice: we are *convinced* that a thing is true or false; we are *persuaded* that it is either right or wrong, advantageous or the contrary. A person will have half effected a thing who is *convinced* that it is in his power to effect it; he will be easily *persuaded* to do that which favours his own interests.

Conviction respects our most important duties; *persuasion* is applied to matters of indifference. The first step to true repentance is a thorough *conviction* of the enormity of sin. The cure of people's maladies is sometimes promoted to a surprising degree by their *persuasion* of the efficacy of the remedy.

As *conviction* is the effect of substantial evidence, it is solid and permanent in its nature; it cannot be so easily changed and deceived: *persuasion*, depending on our feelings, is influenced by external objects, and exposed to various changes; it may vary both in the degree and in the object. *Conviction* answers in our minds to positive certainty; *persuasion* answers to probability.

The practical truths of Christianity demand our deepest *conviction*; of its

speculative truths we ought to have: rational *persuasion*.

The *conviction* of the truth or falsehood of that which we have been accustomed to condemn or admire cannot be effected without powerful means; but we may be *persuaded* of the propriety of a thing to-day, which to-morrow we shall regard with indifference. We ought to be *convinced* of the propriety of avoiding every thing which can interfere with the good order of society; we may be *persuaded* of the truth of a person's narrative or not, according to the representation made to us; we may be *persuaded* to pursue any study or lay it aside.

When men have settled in themselves a conviction that there is nothing honourable which is not accompanied with innocence; nothing mean but what has guilt in it; riches, pleasure, and honour, will easily lose their charm, if they stand between us and our integrity.

BRAD.

Let the mind be possessed with the persuasion of immortal happiness annexed to the act, and there will be no want of candidates to struggle for the glorious prerogative. CROMWELL.

CONVINCING, *v. Conclusive.*

CONVIVIAL, SOCIAL.

CONVIVIAL, in Latin *convivialis* from *convivo* to live together, signifies being entertained together.

SOCIAL, from *socius* a companion, signifies pertaining to company.

The prominent idea in *convivial* is that of sensual indulgence; the prominent idea in *social* is that of enjoyment from an intercourse with society. *Convivial* is a species of the *social*; it is the *social* in matters of festivity. What is *convivial* is *social*, but what is *social* is something more; the former is excelled by the latter as much as the body is excelled by the mind. We speak of *convivial* meetings, *convivial* enjoyments or the *convivial* board; but *social* intercourse, *social* pleasure, *social* amusements, and the like.

It is related by Carte, of the Duke of Ormond, that he used often to pass a night with Dryden, and those with whom Dryden conversed; who they were, Carte has not told, but certainly the *convivial* table at which Ormond sat was not surrounded with a plebeian society.

JOHNSON.

Plato and Socrates shared many *social* hours with Aristophanes. CROMWELL.

VOCATION, *v. Assembly.*

CONVOKE, *v. To assemble.*

COOL, COLD, FRIGID.

In the natural sense, COOL is simply absence of warmth; COLD and FRIGID are positively contrary to warmth; the former in regard to the general, the latter to moral sense; in the physical sense the former is strictly preserved. *Cool* is used as it respects the passions and actions; *cold* only with regard to inclinations; *frigid* only in regard to inclinations.

In regard to the passions, *coolness* is a freedom from agitation, is a desirable quality. *Coolness* at a time of danger, and *coolness* of argument, are alike commendable.

Cool and *cold* respect the affection; the *cool* is opposed to the *hot*, the *cold* to the warm-hearted; the *frigid* to the animated; the *cool* is but a degree of the latter. *Coolness* is said to be *cool*; an object to be *cold*; a sentiment to be *frigid*.

Coolness is an enemy to social affections; *coldness* is an enemy to moral virtue; *frigidity* destroys the force of character. *Coolness* is varied by circumstances; it supersedes the previous existence of *heat*; *coldness* lies often in the temper, or is engendered by passion; it is always something vicious; *coolness* is occasional, and is always moderate. Trifling differences produce sometimes between the best: trade sometimes engenders a calculating temper in some of those who are remarkable for it; they will often express themselves with *frigid* indifference on the important subjects.

Johnson says that a man's disease is of so malignant that it converts all it takes into its own element. A *cool* behaviour is interpreted as a sign of aversion: a fond one takes his own.

ADDISON.

Johnson says that a man can get over the influence and possession of his own mind, so take delight either in paying or receiving and repeated civilities.

STEELE.

Johnson of the moderns abounds in topics so far from noble and exalted, as might be expected from the flames of genuine oratory in the most fertile and barren genius.

WHARTON.

* Vide Girard: "Copie, modèle."

COOL, *v. Dispassionate.*

COPIOUS, *v. Plentiful.*

COPIOUSLY, *v. Largely.*

TO COPY, TRANSCRIBE.

COPY is probably changed from the Latin *capio* to take, because we take that from an object which we copy.

TRANSCRIBE, in Latin *transcribo*, that is *trans* over, and *scribo*, signifies literally to write over from something else, to make to pass over in writing from one to the other.

To *copy* respects the matter; to *transcribe* respects simply the act of writing. What is *copied* must be taken immediately from the original, with which it must exactly correspond; what is *transcribed* may be taken from the *copy*, but not necessarily in an entire state. Things are *copied* for the sake of getting the contents; they are often *transcribed* for the sake of clearness and fair writing. A *copier* should be very exact; a *transcriber* should be a good writer. Lawyers *copy* deeds, and have them afterwards frequently *transcribed* as occasion requires.

Aristotle tells us that the world is a *copy* or *transcript* of those ideas which are in the mind of the First Being, and that those ideas which are in the mind of man are a *transcript* of the world. To this we may add that words are the *transcript* of those ideas which are in the mind of man, and that writing or printing are the *transcript* of words.

ADDISON.

COPY, MODEL, PATTERN, SPECIMEN.

COPY, from the verb to *copy* (*v. To copy*), marks either the thing from which we *copy* or the thing *copied*.

MODEL, in French *modèle*, Latin *modulus* a little mode or measure, signifies the thing that serves as a measure, or that is made after a measure.

PATTERN, which is a variation of *patron*, from the French *patron*, Latin *patronus*, signifies the thing that directs.

SPECIMEN, in Latin *specimen*, from *specio* to behold, signifies the thing looked at or determined by.

*A *copy* and a *model* may be both employed either as an original work or as a work formed after an original.

come so from COQUETS, but one may be a coquet without being a jilt. *Coquetry* is contented with employing little arts to excite notice; *jilting* extends to the violation of truth and honor, in order to awaken a passion which it afterwards disappoints. Vanity is the main spring by which coquets and jilts are impelled to action; but the former indulges her propensity mostly at her own expense only; but the latter does no less injury to the peace of others than she does to her own reputation. The coquet makes a traffic of her own charms by seeking a multitude of admirers; the jilt sports with the sacred passion of love, and barter it for the gratification of any selfish propensity. *Coquetry* is a fault which should be guarded against by every female as a snare to her own happiness; *jilting* is a vice which cannot be practised where there is not some depravity of heart.

The coquette is indeed one degree towards the jilt; but the heart of the former is bent upon admiring herself, and giving false hopes to her lovers; but the latter is not contented to be extremely amiable, but she must add to that advantage a certain delight in being a torment to others.

STEELE.

CORDIAL, *v.* Hearty.

CORNER, ANGLE.

CORNER answers to the French coin, and Greek γωνία, which signifies either a corner or a hidden place.

ANGLE, in Latin *angulus*, comes in all probability from γυμνόν the elbow.

The vulgar use of *corner* in the ordinary concerns of life, and the technical use of *angle* in the science of mathematics, is not the only distinction between these terms.

Corner properly implies the outer extreme point of any solid body; *angle*, on the contrary, the inner extremity produced by the meeting of two right lines. When speaking therefore of solid bodies, *corner* and *angle* may be both employed; but in regard to simple right lines, the word *angle* only is applicable: in the former case a *corner* is produced by the meeting of the different parts of a body whether inwardly or outwardly; but an *angle* is produced by the meeting of two bodies; one house has many *corners*; two houses, or two walls

at least, are requisite to make an angle.

We likewise speak of making an angle by the direction that is taken in going either by land or sea, because such a course is equivalent to a right line; in that case the word *corner* could not be substituted: on the other hand the word *corner* is often used for a place of secrecy or obscurity, agreeably to the derivation of the term.

Some men, like pictures, are siter for a corner than for a full light.

FORGE.

Jewellers gird their diamonds with many sides and angles, that their lustre may appear many ways.

DERHAM.

CORPORAL, CORPOREAL, BODILY.

CORPORAL, CORPOREAL, and BODILY, as their origin bespeaks, have all relation to the same object, the *body*; but the two former are employed to signify relating or appertaining to the *body*; the latter to denote containing or forming part of the *body*. Hence we say, *corporal* punishment, *bodily* vigor or strength, *corporeal* substances; the Godhead *bodily*, the *corporeal* frame, *bodily* exertion.

Corporal is only employed for the animal frame in its proper sense; *corporeal* is used for animal substance in an extended sense; hence we speak of *corporal* sufferance and *corporeal* agents. *Corporeal* is distinguished from spiritual; *bodily* from mental. It is impossible to represent spiritual beings any other way than under a *corporeal* form; *bodily* pains, however severe, are frequently overpowered by mental pleasures.

Bettesworth was so little satisfied with this account, that he publicly professed his resolution of a violent and *corporeal* revenge, but the inhabitants of St. Patrick's district embodied themselves in the Dean's (Swift's) defence.

JOHNSON.

When the soul is freed from all *corporeal* alliance then it truly exists.

HUGO.

The soul is beset with a numerous train of temptations to evil, which arise from *bodily* appetites.

BLAIR.

CORPOREAL, *v.* Corporal.

CORPOREAL, MATERIAL.

CORPOREAL is properly a species of *material*; whatever is *corporeal* is

A man has frequent opportunities of mitigating the fierceness of a party; of softening the curious, quieting the angry, and rectifying the prejudiced.

ADDISON.

Edward and Henry, now the boast of fame,
And virtuous Alfred, a more sacred name,
After a life of pious toils endur'd,
The Gauls subdu'd or property secur'd,
Ambition humbled, mighty cities storm'd,
Or laws establish'd and the world reform'd.

Pope.

CORRECT, ACCURATE.

CORRECT is equivalent to *corrected* (v. *To amend*), or set to rights. **ACCURATE** (v. *Accurate*) implies properly done with care, or by the application of care. *Correct* is negative in its sense; *accurate* is positive: it is sufficient to be free from fault to be *correct*; it must contain every minute particular to be *accurate*. Information is *correct* which contains nothing but facts; it is *accurate* when it contains a vast number of details.

What is *incorrect* is allied to falsehood; what is *inaccurate* is general and indefinite. According to the dialect of modern times, in which gross vices are varnished over with smooth names, a liar is said to speak *incorrectly*; this is however not only an *inaccurate* but an *incorrect* mode of speech, for a lie is a direct violation of truth, and the *incorrect* is only a deviation from it to greater or less extent.

Salust, the most elegant and *correct* of all the Latin Historians, observes, that in his time when the most formidable states of the world were subdued by the Romans, the republic sunk into those two opposite vices of a quite different nature, luxury and avarice.

ADDISON.

Those ancients who were the most *accurate* in their remarks on the genius and temper of mankind, have with great exactness allotted inclinations and objects of desire to every stage of life.

STEELE.

CORRECTION, DISCIPLINE, PUNISHMENT.

As **CORRECTION** and **DISCIPLINE** have commonly required **PUNISHMENT** to render them efficacious, custom has affixed to them a strong resemblance in their application, although they are distinguished from each other by obvious marks of difference. The prominent idea in *correction* (v. *To correct*), is that of making right what has been wrong. In *discipline*, from the Latin *disciplina* and

disco to learn, the leading idea is that of instructing or regulating. In *punishment*, from the Latin *punio*, and the Greek πῦναι pain, the leading idea is that of inflicting pain.

Children are the peculiar subjects of *correction*; *discipline* and *punishment* are confined to no age. A wise parent corrects his child; a master maintains *discipline* in his school; a general preserves *discipline* in his army. Whoever commits a fault is liable to be *punished* by those who have authority over him; if he commits a crime he subjects himself to be *punished* by law.

Correction and *discipline* are mostly exercised by means of chastisement, for which they are often employed as a substitute; *punishment* is inflicted in any way that gives pain. *Correction* and *discipline* are both of them personal acts of authority exercised by superiors over inferiors, but the former is mostly employed by one individual over another; the latter has regard to a number who are the subjects of it directly or indirectly: *punishment* has no relation whatever to the agent by which the action is performed; it may proceed alike from persons or things. A parent who spares the due *correction* of his child, or a master who does not use a proper *discipline* in his school, will alike be *punished* by the insubordination and irregularities of those over whom they have a control.

There was once that virtue in this commonwealth, that a bad citizen was thought to deserve a severer *correction* than the bitterest enemy.

STEELE AFTER CROMWELL.

The imaginations of young men are of a roving nature, and their passions under no *discipline* or restraint.

ADDISON.

When by just vengeance impious mortals perish,
The Gods behold their *punishment* with pleasure.

ADDISON.

CORRECTNESS, v. Justness.

CORRESPONDENT, ANSWERABLE, SUITABLE.

CORRESPONDENT, in French *correspondant*, from the Latin *com* and *respondeo* to answer in unison or in uniformity.

ANSWERABLE and **SUITABLE**, from *answer* and *suit*, mark the quality or capacity of *answering* or *suiting*.

niture, of luxury, or indulgence, are *costly*, either from their variety or their intrinsic value; every thing is *expensive* which is attended with much *expence*, whether of little or great value, Jewels are *costly*; travelling is *expensive*. The *costly* treasures of the East are imported into Europe for the gratification of those who cannot be contented with the produce of their native soil: those who indulge themselves in such *expensive* pleasures often lay up in store for themselves much sorrow and repentance in the time to come.

In the moral acceptation, the attainment of an object is said to *cost* much pains; a thing is persisted in at the *expence* of health, of honor, or of life.

The real patriot bears his private wrongs,
Rather than right them at the public cost.

BELLER.

If ease and politeness be only attainable at the *expence* of slavery to the men, and chastity to the women, I flatter myself there are few of my readers who would not think the purchase made at too high a *price*.

ANACRONY.

Would a man build for eternity, that is, in other words, would he *save*; let him consider with himself what *charges* he is willing to be at that he may be so.

SCOTT.

COSTLY, v. Valuable.

COTEMPORARY, v. Coeval.

COVENANT, v. Agreement.

TO COVER, HIDE.

COVER, in French *couvrir*, is contracted from *contra* and *ouvrir*, signifying to do the contrary of open, to put out of view.

HIDE, v. To conceal.

To *cover* is to *hide* as the means to the end: we commonly *hide* by *covering*; but we may easily *cover* without *hiding*, as also *hide* without *covering*. The ruling idea in the word *cover* is that of throwing or putting something over a body: in the word *hide* is that of keeping carefully to one's self, from the observation of others.

To *cover* is an indifferent action, springing from a variety of motives, of convenience, or comfort; to *hide* is an action that springs from one specific intent, from care and concern for the thing, and the fear of foreign intrusion. In most civilized countries it is common to *cover* the head; in the Eastern

countries females commonly wear veils to *hide* the face. There are many things which decency as well as health require to be *covered*; and others which from their very nature must always be *hidden*. Houses must be *covered* with roofs, and bodies with clothing; the earth contains many treasures, which in all probability will always be *hidden*.

Spacious names are lent to *cover* vice.

SPECTATOR.

Hide me from the face

Of God, whom to behold, was then my height
Of happiness.

MILTON.

COVER, SHELTER, SCREEN.

COVER properly denotes what serves as a *cover*, and in the literal sense of the verb from which it is derived (*v. To cover*).

SHELTER, like the word shield, comes from the German *schild*, old German *schelen* to cover.

SCREEN, from the Latin *secerno*, signifies to keep off or apart.

Cover is literally applied to many particular things which are employed in *covering*; but in the general sense which makes it analogous to the other terms, it includes the idea of concealing: *shelter* comprehends that of protecting from some immediate or impending evil: *screen* includes that of warding off some trouble. A *cover* always supposes something which can extend over the whole surface of a body; a *shelter* or a *screen* may merely interpose to a sufficient extent to serve the intended purpose. Military operations are sometimes carried on under *cover* of the night; a bay is a convenient *shelter* for vessels against the violence of the winds; a chair may be used as a *screen* to prevent the violent action of the heat, or the external air.

In the moral sense, a fair reputation is sometimes made the *cover* for the commission of gross irregularities in secret. When a person feels himself unable to withstand the attacks of his enemies, he seeks a *shelter* under the sanctity and authority of a great name. Bad men sometimes use wealth and power as a *screen* from the punishment which is due to their offences.

as patience more than human, when he believes himself countenanced by the Almighty. BLAIR.

Men of the greatest sense are always diffident of their private judgement, until it receives a sanction from the public. ADDISON.

The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own happiness or safety compels us to seek from one another assistance and support. JOHNSON.

COUNTENANCE, *v. Face.*

TO COUNTERFEIT, *v. To imitate.*

COUNTERFEIT, *v. Spurious.*

COUNTRY, *v. Land.*

COUNTRYMAN, PEASANT, SWAIN,
HIND, RUSTIC, CLOWN.

COUNTRYMAN, that is a man of the *country*, or one belonging to the *country*, is the general term applicable to all inhabiting the *country*, in distinction from a townsman.

PEASANT, in French *parson* from *pays*, is employed in the same sense for any *countryman* among the inhabitants of the Continent, and is in consequence used in poetry or the grave style.

SWAIN in the Saxon signified a labourer, but it has acquired, from its use in poetry, the higher signification of a shepherd.

HIND may in all probability signify one who is in the back ground, an inferior.

RUSTIC, from *rus* the country, signifies one born and bred in the country.

CLOWN, contracted from *colonus* a husbandman, signifies of course a menial in the *country*.

All these terms are employed as epithets to persons, and principally to such as live in the *country*: the terms *countryman* and *peasant* are taken in an indifferent sense, and may comprehend persons of different descriptions; they designate nothing more than habitual residence in the *country*: the other terms are employed for the lower orders of *countrymen*, but with collateral ideas favourable or unfavourable annexed to them: *swain*, *hind*, both convey the idea of innocence in a humble station, and are therefore always employed in poetry in a good sense: the *rustic* and *clown* both convey the idea of that uncouth

rudeness and ignorance which is in reality found among the lowest orders of *countrymen*.

Though considering my former condition, I may now be called a *countryman*; yet you cannot call me a *rustic* (as you would imply in your letter) as long as I live in so civil and noble a family. HOWEL.

If by the poor measures and proportions of a man we may take an estimate of this great action (our Saviour's coming in the flesh), we shall quickly find how irksome it is to flesh and blood "to have been happy," to descend some steps lower, to exchange the estate of a prince for that of a *peasant*. SOUTH.

As thus the snows arise, and foul and fierce
All winter drives along the darken'd air,
In his own loose revolving fields the *swain*
Disaster'd stands. THOMSON.

The lab'ring *hind* his oxen shall dijoin. DRYDEN.

In arguing too the parson own'd his skill,
For ev'n tho' vanquish'd he could argue still;
While words of learned length and thundering
sound
Amaz'd the gazing *rustics* rang'd around. GOLDSMITH.

Th' astonish'd mother finds a vacant nest,
By the hard hand of unrelenting *clowns*
Robb'd. THOMSON.

COUPLE, BRACE, PAIR.

COUPLE, in French *couple*, comes from the Latin *copulo* to join or tie together, *copula*, in Hebrew *cabel* a rope or a shackle, signifying things tied together; and as two things are with most convenience bound together, it has by custom been confined to this number.

BRACE, from the French *bras* arm, signifies things locked together after the manner of the folded arms, which on that account are confined to the number of two.

PAIR, in French *paire*, Latin *par* equal, signifies things that are equal, which can with propriety be said only of two things with regard to each other.

From the above illustration of these terms, it is clear that the number of two, which is included in all of them, is, with regard to the first, entirely arbitrary; that with regard to the second, it arises from the nature of the junction; and with regard to the third, it arises altogether from the nature of the objects: *couples* and *br-* are made by *coupling* and *br* *pairs* are either so of themself

others is marked by their confidence in our judgement; by their disposition to submit to our decisions; by their reliance in our veracity, or assent to our opinions: the *favor* we have with others is marked by their readiness to comply with our wishes; their subserviency to our views; attachment to our society: men of talent are ambitious to gain *credit* with their sovereigns, by the superiority of their counsel: weak men or men of ordinary powers are contented with being the *favorites* of princes, and enjoying their patronage and protection. *Credit* redounds to the honor of the individual, and stimulates him to noble exertions; it is beneficial in its results to all mankind, individually or collectively: *favor* redounds to the personal advantage, the selfish gratification of the individual; it is apt to inflame pride, and provoke jealousy. The honest exertion of our abilities is all that is necessary to gain *credit*; there will always be found those who are just enough to give *credit* where *credit* is due: *favor*, whether in the gaining or maintaining, requires much finesse and trick; much management of the humours of others; much control of one's own humours; what is thus gained with difficulty is often lost in a moment, and for a trifle. *Credit*, though sometimes obtained by falsehood, is never got without exertion; but *favor*, whether justly or unjustly bestowed, often comes by little or no effort on the part of the receiver: a minister gains *credit* with his parishioners by the consistency of his conduct, the gravity of his demeanour, and the strictness of his life; the *favor* of the populace is gained by arts, which men of upright minds would disdain to employ.

Credit and *favor* are the gifts of others; *influence* is a possession which we derive from circumstances: there will always be *influence* where there is *credit* or *favor*, but it may exist independently of either: we have *credit* and *favor* for ourselves; we exert *influence* over others: *credit* and *favor* serve one's own purposes; *influence* is employed in directing others: weak people easily give their *credit*, or bestow their *favor*, by which an *influence* is gained over them

to bend them to the will of others; the *influence* itself may be good or bad, according to the views of the person by whom it is exerted.

Truth itself shall lose its credit, if delivered by a person that has none. SOCRUS.

Halifax thinking this a lucky opportunity of securing immortality, made some advances of *favor*, and some overtures of advantage to Pope, which he seems to have received with sullen coldness. JOHNSON.

What motive could induce Murray to murder a prince without capacity, without followers, without *influence* over the nobles, whom the queen, by her neglect, had reduced to the lowest state of contempt. ROBERTSON.

CREDIT, *v.* Belief.

CREDIT, *v.* Name.

CRED, *v.* Faith.

CREW, *v.* Band.

CRIME, VICE, SIN.

CRIME, in Latin *crimen*, Greek *κριμα*, signifies a judgement, sentence, or punishment; the cause of the sentence or punishment, in which latter sense it is here taken.

VICE, in Latin *vitium*, from *vito* to avoid, signifies that which ought to be avoided.

SIN, in Saxon *synne*, Swedish *synd*, German *synde*, old German *sunta*, *sunto*, &c. Latin *sondes*, Greek *σιν*, from *σινω* to hurt, signifies the thing that hurts; *sin* being of all things the most hurtful.

A *crime* is a social offence; a *vice* is a personal offence: every action which does injury to others, either individually or collectively, is a *crime*; that which does injury to ourselves is a *vice*.

The *crime* consists in a violation of human laws; the *vice* in a violation of the moral law; the *sin* in a violation of the Divine law: the *sin*, therefore, comprehends both the *crime* and the *vice*; but there are many *sins* which are not *crimes* and *vices*: *crimes* are tried before a human court, and punished agreeably to the sentence of the judge; *vices* and *sins* are brought before the tribunal of the conscience; the former are punished in this world, the latter will be punished in the world to come, by the sentence of the Almighty: treason is one of the most atrocious *crimes*; drunkenness one of the most dreadful *vices*; reli-

most positively concealed. The higher the rank of a person, the greater his criminality if he does not observe an upright and irreproachable conduct: where a number of individuals are concerned in any unlawful proceeding, the difficulty of attaching the guilt to the real offender is greatly increased.

Criminality attaches to the aider, abettor, or encourager; but *guilt*, in the strict sense only, to the perpetrator of what is bad. A person may therefore sometimes be *criminal* without being *guilty*. He who conceals the offences of another may, under certain circumstances, be more *criminal* than the *guilty* person himself. On the other hand, we may be *guilty* without being *criminal*: the latter designates something positively bad, but the former is qualified by the object of the *guilt*. Those only are denominated *criminal* who offend seriously, either against public law or private morals; but a person may be said to be *guilty*, either of the greatest or the smaller offences. He who contradicts another abruptly in conversation is *guilty* of a breach of politeness, but he is not *criminal*.

Criminal is moreover applied as an epithet to the things done; *guilty* is mostly applied to the person doing. We commonly speak of actions, proceedings, intentions, and views, as *criminal*; but of the person, the mind, or the conscience, as *guilty*. It is very *criminal* to sow dissension among men; although there are too many who from a busy temper are *guilty* of this offence.

True modesty avoids every thing that is criminal; false modesty every thing that is unfashionable.

ADDISON.

Guilt bears appall'd with the deeply troubled thought;

And yet not always on the guilty head

Descends the fated flash.

THOMSON.

CRIMINAL, CULPRIT, MALEFACTOR, FELON, CONVICT.

ALL these terms are employed for a public offender; but the first conveys no more than this general idea; whilst the others comprehend some accessory idea in their signification.

CRIMINAL (*v. Criminal, guilty*) is a general term, and the rest are properly species of criminals.

CULPRIT, from the Latin *culpa*, and *prehensus* taken in a fault, signifies the criminal who is directly charged with his offence.

MALEFACTOR, compounded of the Latin terms *male* and *factor* an evil doer, that is, one who does evil, in distinction from him who does good.

FELON, from *felony*, in Latin *felonia* a capital crime, comes from the Greek *φελονία*; an imposture, because fraud and villany are the prominent features of every capital offence.

CONVICT, in Latin *convictus*, participle of *convincio* to convince or prove, signifies one proved or found guilty.

When we wish to speak in general of those who by offences against their laws or regulations of society have exposed themselves to punishment, we denominate them *criminals*: when we consider them as already brought before a tribunal, we call them *culprits*: when we consider them in regard to the moral turpitude of their character, as the promoters of evil rather than of good, we entitle them *malefactors*: when we consider them as offending by the grosser violations of the law, they are termed *felons*: when we consider them as already under the sentence of the law, we denominate them *convicts*. The punishments inflicted on *criminals* vary according to the nature of their crimes, and the spirit of the laws by which they are judged: a guilty conscience will give a man the air of a *culprit* in the presence of those who have not authority to be either his accusers or judges: it gratified the malice of the Jews to cause our blessed Saviour to be crucified between two *malefactors*: it is an important regulation in the internal economy of a prison, to have *felons* kept distinct from each other, particularly if their crimes are of an atrocious nature: it has not unfrequently happened, that when the sentence of the law has placed *convicts* in the lowest state of degradation, their characters have undergone so entire a reformation, as to enable them to attain a higher pitch of elevation than they had ever enjoyed before.

If I attack the vicious, I shall only cut them in a body, and will not be provoked to

brutal or *savage* according to the circumstances of aggravation which accompany the act of torturing.

Cruel is applied either to the disposition or the conduct; *inhuman* and *barbarous* mostly to the outward conduct; *brutal* and *savage* mostly to the disposition. *Cruelties* and even *barbarities*, too horrid to relate, are daily practised by men upon dogs and horses, the usefulest and most unoffending of *brutes*; either for the indulgence of a naturally *brutal* temper, or from the impulse of a *savage* fury: we need not wonder to find the same men *inhuman* towards their children or their servants. Domitian is celebrated for the *cruelty* of his disposition: the Romans indulged themselves in the *inhuman* practice of making their slaves and convicts fight with wild beasts; but the *barbarities* which have been practised on slaves in the colonies of European states, exceed every thing in atrocity that is related of ancient times; proving that, in spite of all the refinement which the religion of our blessed Saviour has introduced into the world, the possession of uncontrolled power will inevitably *brutalize* the mind and give a *savage* ferocity to the character.

Now be thy rage, thy fatal rage resign'd,
A cruel heart ill suits a manly mind. POPE.

Relentless love the *cruel* mother led
The blood of her unhappy babes to shed,
Have lost the sword, the mother struck the blow,
Inhuman she, but more *inhuman* thou. DRYDEN.

I have found out a gift for my fair,
I have found where the wood-pigeons breed,
But let me that plunder forbear,
She will say 'twas a *barbarous* deed. SHENSTONE.

The play was acted at the other theatre, and
the *brutal* petulance of Cibber was contested,
though perhaps not shamed by general applause. JOHNSON.

Brothers by brothers' impious hands are slain;
Mistaken seal how *savage* is thy reign! JENYNS.

CRUEL, *v.* Hardhearted.

TO CRUSH, *v.* To break.

TO CRUSH, *v.* To overwhelm.

CRUTCH, *v.* Staff.

TO CRY, WEEP.

CRY comes from the Greek *κραζειν*,
and the Hebrew *kara* to cry or call.

WEEP, in low German *wapen*, is

a variation of wine, in German *weinen*, which is an onomatopœia. An outward indication of pain is expressed by both these terms, but the former comprehends an audible expression accompanied or not with tears; the latter simply indicates the shedding of tears.

Crying arises from an impatience in suffering corporeal pains; children and weak people commonly *cry*: *weeping* is occasioned by mental grief; the wisest and best of men will not disdain sometimes to *weep*.

Crying is as selfish as it is weak; it serves to relieve the pain of the individual to the annoyance of the hearer; *weeping*, when called forth by other's sorrows, is an infirmity which no man would wish to be without; as an expression of generous sympathy it affords essential relief to the sufferer.

The babe clung crying to his nurse's breast,
Scared at the dazling helm and nodding crest. POPE.

Thy Hector, wrapt in everlasting sleep,
Shall neither hear thee sigh, nor see thee weep. POPE.

TO CRY, SCREAM, SHRIEK.

CRY, *v.* To cry, weep.

SCREAM and SHRIEK are variations of *cry*.

To *cry* indicates the utterance of an articulate or an inarticulate sound; *scream* is a species of *crying* in the first sense of the word; *shriek* is a species of *crying* in its latter sense.

Crying is an ordinary mode of loud utterance resorted to on common occasions; one *cries* in order to be heard: *screaming* is an intemperate mode of *crying*, resorted to from an impatient desire to be heard, or from a vehemence of feeling. People *scream* to deaf people from the mistaken idea of making themselves heard: whereas a distinct articulation will always be more efficacious. It is frequently necessary to *cry* when we cannot render ourselves audible by any other means; but it is never necessary or proper to *scream*. *Shriek* may be compared with *cry* and *scream*, as expressions of pain; in this case to *shriek* is more than to *cry*, and less than to *scream*. They both signify to *cry* with a violent effort. We may *cry* from the slightest pain or in-

one's own skill or the perfection of the thing itself; but the mind requires *culture* previous to this particular exertion of the powers.

Civilization is the first stage of *cultivation*; *refinement* is the last stage: we *civilize* savages by divesting them of their rudeness, and giving them a knowledge of such arts as are requisite for *civil* society; we *cultivate* people in general by calling forth their powers into action and independent exertion; we *refine* them by the introduction of the liberal arts.

The introduction of Christianity has been the best means of *civilizing* the rudest nations. The *cultivation* of the mind in serious pursuits tends to *refine* the sentiments without debilitating the character; but the *cultivation* of the liberal arts may be pursued to a vicious extent, so as to introduce an excessive *refinement* of feeling that is incompatible with real manliness.

Cultivation is applied either to persons or things; *civilization* is applied to men collectively, *refinement* to men individually: we may *cultivate* the mind or any of its operations; or we may *cultivate* the ground or any thing that grows in the ground; we *civilize* nations; we *refine* the mind or the manners.

Notwithstanding this faculty (of taste) must be in some measure born with us, there are several methods of *cultivating* and improving it.

ADDISON.

But tho' Heav'n's

Every breath has sown these early seeds
Of love and admiration, yet in vain
Without fair culture's kind parental aid.

AKENSIDE.

To *civilize* the rude unpolish'd world
And lay it under the restraint of laws,
To make man mild and sociable to man,
To *cultivate* the wild licentious savage
With wisdom, discipline, and lib'ral arts,
To embellishments of life! Virtues like these
Make human nature shine.

ADDISON.

Poetry makes a principal amusement among
unpolished nations, but in a country verging to
the extremes of refinement, painting and music
come in for a share.

GOLDSMITH.

CULTIVATION, TILLAGE, HUSBANDRY.

CULTIVATION has a much more comprehensive meaning than either *tillage* or *husbandry*. *TILLAGE* is a mode of *cultivation* that extends no

farther than the preparation of the ground for the reception of the seed; *cultivation* includes the whole process by which the produce of the earth is brought to maturity. We may *till* without *cultivating*; but we cannot *cultivate*, as far as respects the soil, without *tillage*. *HUSBANDRY* is more extensive in its meaning than *tillage*; but not so extensive as *cultivation*.

Tillage respects the act only of *tilling* the ground; *husbandry* is employed for the office of *cultivating* for domestic purposes. A *cultivator* is a general term, defined only by the object that is *cultivated*, as the *cultivator* of the grape, or the olive; a *tiller* is a laborer in the soil that performs the office for another; a *husbandman* is a humble species of *cultivator*, who himself performs the whole office of *cultivating* the ground for domestic purposes.

O softly swelling hills
On which the power of *cultivation* lies,
And joys to see the wond'ers of his toil.

THOMSON.

The South-east parts of Britain had already before the age of Caesar made the first and most requisite step towards a civil settlement: and the Britons by *tillage* and *agriculture* had there increased to a great multitude.

HUME.

We find an image of the two states, the contemplative and the active, figured out in the persons of Abel and Cain, by the two primitive trades, that of the shepherd and that of the husbandman.

BACON.

CULTURE, v. Cultivation.

CUNNING, v. Art.

CUNNING, CRAFTY, SUBTLE, SLY, WILY.

CUNNING, v. Art.

CRAFTY signifies having *craft*, that is, according to the original meaning of the word, having a knowledge of some trade or art; hence, figuratively applied to the character.

SUBTLE, in French *subtil*, and Latin *subtilis* thin, from *sub* and *tele* a thread drawn to be fine; hence in the figurative sense in which it is here taken, fine or acute in thought.

SLY is in all probability connected with slow, and sleek, or smooth; deliberation and smoothness entering very much into the sense of *sly*.

WILY signifies disposed to *wiles* or stratagems.

If the frail body feels disorder'd pangs
Then drugs medicinal can give us ease;
The soul, no Æsculapian medicine can cure.

GENTLEMAN.

Scarcely an ill to human life belongs,
But what our follies cause, or mutual wrongs;
Or if some stripes from Providence we feel,
He strikes with pity, and but wounds to heal.

JENYNS.

Every man has frequent grievances which only
the sollicitude of friendship will discover and
remedy.

JOHNSON.

CURE, REMEDY.

CURE (*v. To cure*) denotes either the act of *curing*, or the thing that *cures*. REMEDY is mostly employed for the thing that *remedies*. In the former sense the *remedy* is to the *cure* as the means to the end; a *cure* is performed by the application of a *remedy*. That is *incurable* for which no *remedy* can be found; but a *cure* is sometimes performed without the application of any specific *remedy*. The *cure* is compleat when the evil is entirely removed; the *remedy* is sure which by proper application never fails of effecting the *cure*. The *cure* of disorders depends upon the skill of the physician and the state of the patient; the efficacy of *remedies* depends upon their suitable choice and application; but a *cure* may be defeated or a *remedy* made of no avail by a variety of circumstances independent of either.

A *cure* is sometimes employed for the thing that *cures*, but only in the sense of what infallibly *cures*. Quacks always hold forth their nostrums as infallible *cures* not for one but for every sort of disorder; *experience* has however fatally proved that the *remedy* in most cases is worse than the disease.

Why should he choose these miseries to endure
If death could grant an everlasting cure?

'Tis plain there's something whispers in his ear
(The tale he'd hide it), he has much to fear.

JENYNS.

The great defect of Thomson's seasons is want
of method; but for this I know not that there was
any remedy.

JOHNSON.

CURIOUS, INQUISITIVE, PRYING.

CURIOUS, in French *curieux*, Latin *curiosus* from *cura* care, signifying full of care.

INQUISITIVE, in Latin *inquisitus*, from *inquire* to inquire or search into,

signifying a disposition to investigate thoroughly.

PRYING from *pry*, changed from the French *preuver* to try, signifying the disposition to try or sift to the bottom.

The disposition to interest one's self in matters not of immediate concern is the idea common to all these terms. *Curiosity* is directed to all objects that can gratify the inclination, taste, or understanding; *inquisitiveness* to such things only as satisfy the understanding.

The *curious* person interests himself in all the works of nature and art; he is *curious* to try effects and examine causes: the *inquisitive* person endeavours to add to his store of knowledge. *Curiosity* employs every means which falls in its way in order to procure gratification; the *curious* man uses his own powers or those of others to serve his purpose: *inquisitiveness* is indulged only by means of verbal inquiry; the *inquisitive* person collects all from others. A traveller is *curious* who examines every thing for himself; he is *inquisitive* when he minutely questions others. *Inquisitiveness* is therefore to *curiosity* as a part to the whole; whoever is *curious* will naturally be *inquisitive*, and he who is *inquisitive* is so from a species of *curiosity*.

Curious and *inquisitive* may be both used in a bad sense; *prying* is never used otherwise than in a bad sense. *Inquisitive*, as in the former case, is a mode of *curiosity*, and *prying* is a species of eager *curiosity*. A *curious* person takes unallowed means of learning that which he ought not to wish to know; an *inquisitive* person puts many impertinent and troublesome questions; a *prying* temper is unceasing in its endeavours to get acquainted with the secrets of others. *Curiosity* is a fault common to females; *inquisitiveness* is most general among children; a *prying* temper belongs only to people of low character.

A well-disciplined mind checks the first risings of idle *curiosity*: children should be taught early to suppress an *inquisitive* temper, which may so easily become burdensome to others: those who are of a *prying* temper are insensible to every thing but the desire of

every nation has *customs* peculiar to itself; and every individual has *habits* peculiar to his age, station, and circumstances.

It is the *custom* of the Mahometans, if they see any printed or written paper upon the ground, to take it up and lay it aside carefully, as not knowing but it may contain some piece of the Alcoran. ADDISON.

If a loose and careless life has brought a man into *habits* of dissipation, and led him to neglect those religious duties which he owed to his Maker, let him return to the regular worship of God. BLAIR.

I dare not shock my readers with the description of the *customs* and manners of these barbarians (the Hottentots). HUME.

Customary and *habitual*, the epithets derived from these words, admit of a similar distinction: the *customary* action is that which is repeated after the manner of a *custom*; the *habitual* action is that which is done by the force of *habit*.

This *customary* superiority grew too delicate for truth, and Swift, with all his penetration, allowed himself to be delighted with low flattery. JOHNSON.

We have all reason to believe that, amidst numberless infirmities which attend humanity, what the great Judge will chiefly regard is the *habitual* prevailing turn of our heart and life. BLAIR.

CUSTOM, FASHION, MANNER, PRACTICE.

CUSTOMS, FASHIONS, and MANNERS, are all employed for communities of men: *custom* (v. *Custom, habit*) respects established and general modes of action: *fashion*, a French *façon*, from *facio* to do or make, regards partial and transitory modes of making or doing things: *manner*, in the limited sense in which it is here taken, signifies the *manner* or mode of men's living or behaving in their social intercourse.

Custom is authoritative; it stands in the place of law, and regulates the conduct of men in the most important concerns of life: *fashion* is arbitrary and capricious, if decides in matters of trifling import: *manners* are rational; they are the expressions of moral feelings. *Customs* are most prevalent in a barbarous state of society; *fashions* rule most where luxury has made the greatest progress; *manners* are most distinguishable in a civilized state of society.

Customs are in their nature as unchangeable as *fashions* are variable; *manners* depend on cultivation and collateral circumstances: *customs* die away or are abolished; *fashions* pass away, and new ones take their place; *manners* are altered either for the better or the worse: endeavours have been successfully employed in several parts of India to abolish the *custom* of infanticide, and that of women sacrificing themselves on the funeral piles of their husbands; the votaries of *fashion* are not contented with giving the law for the cut of the coat or the shape of the bonnet, but they wish to intrude upon the sphere of the scholar or the artist, by prescribing in matters of literature and taste; the influence of public opinion on the *manners* of a people has never been so strikingly illustrated as in the instance of the French nation during and since the Revolution.

PRACTICE, in Latin *practica*, Greek *πρακτική*, from *πραττω* to do, signifies actual doing or the thing done, that is by distinction the regularly doing, or the thing regularly done, in which sense it is most analogous to *custom*; but the former simply conveys the idea of actual performance; the latter includes also the accessory idea of repetition at stated periods: a *practice* must be defined as frequent or unfrequent, regular or irregular; but a *custom* does not require to be qualified by any such epithets: it may be the *practice* of a person to do acts of charity, as the occasion requires; but when he uniformly does a particular act of charity at any given period of the year, it is properly denominated his *custom*.

Both *practice* and *custom* are general or particular, but the former is absolute, the latter relative: the *practice* may be adopted by a number of persons without reference to each other; but a *custom* is always followed either by imitation or prescription: the *practice* of gaming has always been followed by the vicious part of society; but it is to be hoped for the honor of man that it will never become a *custom*.

The *custom* of representing the grief we have for the loss of the dead by our habits, certainly had its rise from the real sorrow of such as were

too much distressed to take the care they ought of their dress. **STEELE.**

Of beasts, it is confess'd, the ape
Comes nearest us in human shape;
Like man, he imitates each *fashion*,
And malice is his ruling passion. **SWIFT.**

Their arms, their arts, their *manners*, I disclose,
And how they war, and whence the people rose.
DRYDEN.

Savage was so touched with the discovery of his real mother, that it was his frequent practice to walk in the dark evenings for several hours before her door, with hopes of seeing her as she might cross her apartments with a candle in her hand. **JOHNSON.**

CUSTOM, *v.* Usage.

CUSTOM, *v.* Tax.

D.

DAILY, DIURNAL.

DAILY, from *day* and *like*, signifies after the manner or in the time of the *day*.

DIURNAL, from *dies* day, signifies belonging to the *day*.

Daily is the colloquial term which is applicable to whatever passes in the *daytime*; *diurnal* is the scientific term, which applies to what passes within or belongs to the astronomical *day*: the physician makes *daily* visits to his patients; the earth has a *diurnal* motion on its own axis.

All creatures else forget their *daily* care,
And sleep, the common gift of nature, share.
DRYDEN.

Half yet remains unsung, but narrow bound
Within the visible *diurnal* sphere. **MILTON.**

DAINTY, DELICACY.

THESE terms, which are in vogue among epicures, have some shades of difference in their signification not altogether undeserving of notice.

DAINTY from *dain*, *deign*, and the Latin *dignus* worthy, signifies the thing that is of worth or value; it is of course applied only to such things as have a superior value in the estimation of epicures; and consequently conveys a more positive meaning than DELICACY: in as much as a *dainty* may be that which is extremely *delicate*, a *delicacy* is sometimes a species of *dainty*; but there are many *delicacies* which are altogether suited to the most *delicate* appetite, that are

neither costly nor rare, two qualities which are almost inseparable from *dainty*: those who indulge themselves freely in *dainties* and *delicacies* sensibly know what it is to eat with appetite; but those who are temperate in their use of the enjoyments of life will be enabled to derive pleasure from ordinary objects.

My landlord's cellar stock'd with beer and ale,
Instantly brings the choicest liquors out,
Whether we ask'd for home-brew'd or for stout,
For mead or cider; or with delicate feed,
Ring for a flask or two of white or red. **SWIFT.**
She turns, on hospitable thoughts intent,
What choice to chase for *delicacy* bent. **BYRON.**

DAMAGE, *v.* Injury.

DAMAGE, *v.* Loss.

DAMP, *v.* Moisture.

DANGER, PERIL, HAZARD.

DANGER, in French *danger*, comes from the Latin *damnum* a loss or damage, signifying the chance of a loss.

PERIL, in French *peril*, comes from *pereo*, which signifies either to go over, or to perish; and *periculum*, which signifies literally that which is undergone; designating a critical situation, a rude trial, which may terminate in one's ruin.

HAZARD, *v.* Chance, *hasard*.

The idea of chance or uncertainty is common to all these terms; but the two former may sometimes be foreseen and calculated upon; but the latter is purely contingent.

The *danger* and *peril* are applied to a positive evil; the *hasard* may simply respect the loss of a good; risks are voluntarily run from the hope of good: there may be many *dangers* included in a *hasard*; and there cannot be a *hasard* without some *danger*.

A general *hasard* a battle, in order to disengage himself from a difficulty; he may by this step involve himself in imminent *danger* of losing his honor or his life; but it is likewise possible that by his superior skill he may set both out of all *danger*: we are hourly exposed to *dangers* which no human foresight can guard against, and are frequently induced to engage in enterprises at the *hasard* of our lives, and of all that we hold dear.

Dangers are far and near, ordinary and extraordinary ; they meet us if we do not go in search of them : *perils* are always distant and extraordinary ; we must go out of our course to expose ourselves to them : in the quiet walk of life, as in the most busy and tumultuous, it is the lot of man to be surrounded by *danger* ; he has nothing which he is not in *danger* of losing ; and knows of nothing which he is not in *danger* of suffering : the mariner and the traveller who go in search of unknown countries put themselves in the way of undergoing *perils* both by sea and land.

Proud of the favors mighty Jove has shown,
On certain *dangers* we too rashly run. POPE.
From that dire deluge through the watery waste,
Such length of years, such various *perils* past
At last escaped, to Latium we repair. DRYDEN.
One was their care, and their delight was one ;
One common hazard in the war they shared.
DRYDEN.

The same distinction exists between the epithets that are derived from these terms.

It is *dangerous* for a youth to act without the advice of his friends ; it is *perilous* for a traveller to explore the wilds of Africa ; it is *hazardous* for a merchant to speculate in time of war : experiments in matters of policy or government are always *dangerous* ; a journey through deserts that are infested with beasts of prey is *perilous* ; a military expedition conducted with inadequate means is *hazardous*.

Hear this, and tremble ! all who would be great,
Yet know not what attends that *dangerous*
wretched state. JAYNS.

The grisly bear is singled from his herd,
A match for Hercules ; round him they fly
In circles wide, and each in passing sends
His feather'd death into his brawny sides ;
But *perilous* th' attempt. SOMERVILLE.

The previous steps being taken, and the time fixed for this *hazardous* attempt, Admiral Holmes moved with his squadron farther up the river about three leagues above the place appointed for the disembarkation, that he might deceive the enemy. SKOLLET.

TO DARE, *v.* To brave.

DARING, BOLD.

DARING signifies having the spirit to *dare*.

BOLD, *v.* Audacity.

These terms may be both taken in a bad sense ; but *daring* much oftener

than *bold* ; in either case *daring* expresses much more than *bold* : he who is *daring* provokes resistance, and courts *danger* ; but the *bold* man is contented to overcome the resistance that is offered to him : a man may be *bold* in the use of words only ; he must be *daring* in actions : he is *bold* in the defence of truth ; he is *daring* in military enterprise.

Too *daring* prince ! ah ! whither dost thou run ?
Ah ! too forgetful of thy wife and son. POPE.

Thirty-six barrels of gunpowder were lodged in the cellar, the whole covered up with fagots and billets ; the doors *boldly* flung open, and every body admitted as if it contained nothing dangerous. HUME.

DARK, OBSCURE, DIM, MYSTERIOUS.

DARK, in Saxon *deorc*, is doubtless connected with the German *dunkel* dark and *dunst* a vapor, which is a cause of *darkness*.

OBSCURE, in Latin *obscurus*, compounded of *ob* and *scurus*, Greek *σκιω* : and *σ* is a shadow, signifies literally interrupted by a shadow.

DIM is but a variation of *dark*, *dunkel*, &c.

Darkness expresses more than *obscurity* : the former denotes the total privation of light ; the latter only the diminution of light.

Dark is opposed to light ; *obscure* to bright : what is *dark* is altogether hidden ; what is *obscure* is not to be seen distinctly, or without an effort.

Darkness may be used either in the natural or moral sense ; *obscurity* only in the moral sense ; in this case the former conveys a more unfavourable idea than the latter : *darkness* serves to cover that which ought not to be hidden ; *obscurity* intercepts our view of that which we would wish to see : the former is the consequence of design ; the latter of neglect or accident : the letter sent by the conspirator in the gunpowder plot to his friend was *dark* ; all passages in ancient writers which allude to circumstances no longer known, must necessarily be *obscure* : a corner may be said to be *dark* or *obscure*, but the former is used literally and the latter figuratively : the owl is obliged, from the weakness of its visual organs, to seek the *darkest* corners in the day-time ; men of

much or little : *deal* is a term confined to familiar use, and sometimes substituted for *quantity*, and sometimes for *portion*. It is common to speak of a *deal* or a *quantity* of paper, a great *deal* or a great *quantity* of money ; likewise of a great *deal* or a great *portion* of pleasure, a great *deal* or a great *portion* of wealth : and in some cases *deal* is more usual than either *quantity* or *portion*, as a *deal* of heat, a *deal* of rain, a *deal* of frost, a *deal* of noise, and the like ; but it is altogether inadmissible in the higher style of writing.

Portion is employed only for that which is detached from the whole ; *quantity* may sometimes be employed for a number of wholes. We may speak of a large or a small *quantity* of books ; a large or a small *quantity* of plants or herbs ; but a large or small *portion* of food, a large or small *portion* of color. *Quantity* is used only in the natural sense : *portion* also in the moral application. Material substances, as wood, stone, metals, and liquids, are necessarily considered with regard to *quantity* ; the qualities of the mind and the circumstances of human life are divided into *portions*. A builder estimates the *quantity* of materials which he will want for the completion of a house ; the workman estimates the *portion* of labour which the work will require.

This, my inquisitive temper, or rather impatient humour, of prying into all sorts of writing, with my natural aversion to loquacity, gives me a good deal of employment when I enter any house in the country. ADDISON.

There is never room in the world for more than a certain *quantity* or measure of renown. JOHNSON.

The jars of generous wine, Accents' gift,
He set abroad, and for the feast prepar'd,
In equal portion with the ven'son shar'd. DRYDEN.

TO DEAL, *v.* To part.

DEALING, *v.* Trade.

DEARTH, *v.* Scarcity.

DEATH, DEPARTURE, DECEASE,
DEMISE.

DEATH signifies the act of *dying*.

DEPARTURE signifies the act of *departing*.

DECEASE, from the Latin *decedo* to fall off, signifies the act of falling away.

DEMISE, from *demitto* to lay down, signifies literally resigning possession.

Death is a general or a particular term ; it marks in the abstract sense the extinction of life, and is applicable to men or animals ; to one or many. *Departure*, *decease*, and *demise*, are particular expressions suited only to the condition of human beings. * *Departure* is a Christian term, which carries with it an idea of a passage from one life to another ; *decease* is a technical term in law, which is introduced into common life to designate one's falling off from the number of the living ; *demise* is substituted for *decease* sometimes in speaking of princes.

Death of itself has always something terrific in it ; but the Gospel has divested it of its terrors : the hour of *departure*, therefore, for a Christian, is often the happiest period of his mortal existence. *Decease* presents only the idea of leaving life to the survivors. Of *death* it has been said, that nothing is more certain than that it will come, and nothing more uncertain than when it will come. Knowing that we have here no resting place of abode, it is the part of wisdom to look forward to our *departure* : property is in perpetual occupancy ; at the *decease* of one possessor, it passes into the hands of another.

The *death* of an individual is sometimes attended with circumstances peculiarly distressing to those who are nearly related. The tears which are shed at the *departure* of those we love are not always indications of our weakness, but rather testimonies of their worth.

How quickly would the honours of illustrious men perish after *death*, if their souls performed nothing to preserve their fame.

HUGHES, AFTER XENOPHON.

The loss of our friends impresses upon us hourly the necessity of our own *departure*.

JOHNSON.

Though men see every day people go to their long home, they are not so apt to be alarmed at that, as at the *decease* of those who have lived longer in their sight. STEELE.

So tender is the law of supposing even a pos-

* Vide Dr. Trumler : " Departure, death, decease."

ability of the King's death, that his natural disposition is generally called his *devotion*.

BLACKSTONE.

As an epithet, *dead* is used collectively; *departed* is used with a noun only; *deceased* generally without a noun, to denote one or more according to the connection.

There is a respect due to the *dead*, which cannot be violated without offence to the living. It is a pleasant reflection to conceive of *departed* spirits, as taking an interest in the concerns of those whom they have left. All the marks on the body of the deceased indicated that he had met with his death by some violence.

The living and the dead, at his command,
Were coupled face to face, and hand to hand.

DARWIN.

The sophistic tyrants of Paris are loud in their declamations against the *departed* regal tyrants, who in former ages have vexed the world.

BONNEN.

It was enacted in the reign of Edward I. that the ordinary shall be bound to pay the debts of the intestate, in the same manner that executors were bound in case the deceased left a will.

BLACKSTONE.

TO DEBAR, *v.* To deprive.

TO DEBASE, *v.* To abase.

TO DEBATE, *To argue.*

TO DEBATE, *v.* To consult.

TO DEBATE, DELIBERATE.

DEBATE, *v.* To argue, dispute.

DELIBERATE, *v.* To consult, deliberate.

These terms equally mark the acts of pausing or withholding the decision, whether applicable to one or many. To *debate* supposes always a contrariety of opinion; to *deliberate* supposes simply the weighing or estimating the value of the opinion that is offered. Where many persons have the liberty of offering their opinions, it is natural to expect that there will be *debating*; when any subject offers that is complicated and questionable, it calls for mature *deliberation*. It is lamentable when passion gets such an ascendancy in the mind of any one, as to make him *debate* which course of conduct he shall pursue; the want of *deliberation*, whether in private or public transactions, is a more fruitful source of mischief than almost any other.

of the ordinary functions of nature; it is a deficiency in the muscular power of the body: *infirmity* is a partial want of power, which interferes with, but does not necessarily destroy, the activity: *imbecility* lies in the whole frame, and renders it almost entirely powerless.

Young people are frequently troubled with *debilities* in their ankles or legs, of which they are never cured. Old age is most exposed to *infirmities*; but there is no age at which human beings are exempt from *infirmity* of some kind or another. The *imbecility* natural to youth, both in body and mind, would make them willing to rest on the strength of their elders, if they were not too often misled by a mischievous confidence in their own strength.

As increasing years debilitate the body, so they weaken the force and diminish the warmth of the affections.

BOSS.

' This is weakness, not wisdom I own, and on that account fitter to be trusted to the bosom of a friend, where I may safely lodge all my infirmities. ATTERRBURY.

It is seldom that we are otherwise than by affliction awakened to a sense of our imbecility. JOHNSON.

DEBT, DUE.

DEBT and DUE are both derived from the same verb. *Debt* comes from *debitus* participle of the Latin verb *debeo* : and *due*, in French *du* participle of *devoir*, comes likewise from *debeo* to owe.

Debt is used always as a substantive; *due*, either as a substantive or an adjective. A person contracts *debts*, and receives his *due*. The *debt* is both obligatory and compulsory; it is a return for something equivalent in value, and cannot be dispensed with: what is *due* is obligatory, but not always compulsory. A *debtor* may be compelled to discharge his *debts*; but it is not always in the power of a man even to claim that which is his *due*. *Debt* is generally used in a mercantile sense; *due* either in a mercantile or moral sense. A *debt* is determined by law; what is *due* is fixed often by principles of equity and honor. He who receives the stipulated price of his goods receives his *debt*; he who receives praise and honor, as a reward of good actions, receives his *due*.

Though Christ was as pure and undefiled, without the least spot of sin, as purity and innocence itself; yet he was pleased to make himself the greatest sinner in the world by imputation, and render himself a surety responsible for our *debts*. SOUTH.

The ghosts rejected are th' unhappy crew,
Depriv'd of sepulchres and fun'ral *due*. DRYDEN.

DECAY, DECLINE, CONSUMPTION.

DECAY, French *dechoir*, from the Latin *decado*, signifies literally to fall off or away.

DECLINE, from the Latin *declino*, or *de* and *clino*, signifies to turn away or lean aside.

The direction expressed by both these actions is very similar; it is a sideward movement, but *decay* expresses more than *decline*. What is *decayed* is fallen or gone; what *declines* leans towards a fall, or is going;

when applied, therefore, to the same objects, a *decline* is properly the commencement of a *decay*. The health may experience a *decline* at any period of life from a variety of causes, but it naturally experiences a *decay* in old age.

CONSUMPTION (*v. To consume*) implies a rapid decay.

* By *decay* things lose their perfection, their greatness, and their consistency; by *decline* they lose their strength, their vigor, and their lustre; by *consumption* they lose their existence. *Decay* brings to ruin; *decline* leads to an end or expiration. There are some things to which *decay* is peculiar, and some things to which *decline* is peculiar, and other things to which both *decay* and *decline* belong. The corruption to which material substances are particularly exposed is termed *decay*; the close of life, when health and strength begin to fall away, is termed the *decline*; the *decay* of states in the moral world takes place by the same process as the *decay* of fabrics in the natural world; the *decline* of empires, from their state of elevation and splendor, is a natural figure drawn from the *decline* of the setting sun. *Consumption* is seldom applied to any thing but animal bodies.

The seas shall waste, the skies in smoke *decay*,
Rocks fall to dust, and mountains melt away;
But fix'd his word, his saving power remains,
Thy realm for ever lasts, thy own Messiah reigns. FORR.

After the death of Julius and Augustus Cæsar the Roman empire *declined* every day. SOUTH.

By degrees the empire shrivelled and pined away; and from such a surfeit of immoderate prosperity passed at length into a final *consumption*. SOUTH.

TO DECAY, *v. To perish*.

DECEASE, *v. Death*.

DECEIT, *v. Art*.

DECEIT, DECEPTION.

DECEIT (*v. To deceive*) marks the propensity to *deceive*, or the practice of *deceiving*; DECEPTION the art of *deceiving* (*v. To deceive*).

A *deceiver* is full of *deceit*; but *deception* may be occasionally practised by one who has not this habit of *deceiving*. *Deceit* is a character

* Vide Truſler: "Decay, decline, decrease."

The story of the three books of the sibyls sold to Parquin was all a *fraud* devised for the convenience of state.

PRIDEAUX.

Was it for force or guile
Or some religious end, you rais'd this pile?

DAYDEN.

TO DECEIVE, DELUDE, IMPOSE
UPON.

DECEIVE, in French *decevoir*, Latin *decipio*, compounded of *de* privative, and *capio* to take, signifies to take wrong.

DELUDE, in Latin *deludo*, compounded of *de* and *ludo*, signifies to play upon or to mislead by a trick.

IMPOSE, in Latin *imposui*, perfect of *impono*, signifies literally to lay or put upon.

Falsehood is the leading feature in all these terms; they vary however in the circumstances of the action. To *deceive* is the most general of the three; it signifies simply to produce a false conviction: the other terms are properly species of *deceiving*, including accessory ideas. *Deception* may be practised in various degrees; *deluding* is always something positive, and considerable in degree. Every false impression produced by external objects, whether in trifles or important matters, is a *deception*; but *delusion* is confined to errors in matters of opinion. We may be *deceived* in the color or the distance of an object; we are *deluded* in what regards our principles or moral conduct.

A *deception* does not always suppose a fault on the part of the person *deceived*, but a *delusion* does. A person is sometimes *deceived* in cases where *deception* is unavoidable: he is *deluded* through a voluntary blindness of the understanding: artful people are sometimes capable of *deceiving* so as not even to excite suspicion; their plausible tales justify the credit that is given to them: when the ignorant enter into nice questions of politics or religion, it is their ordinary fate to be *deluded*.

Deception is practised by an individual on himself or others; a *delusion* is commonly practised on one's self; an *imposition* is always practised on another. Men *deceive* others from a variety of motives; they always *impose upon* them for purposes of gain,

or the gratification of ambition. Men *deceive* themselves with false pretexts and false confidence; they *delude* themselves with vain hopes and wishes.

Professors in religion often *deceive* themselves as much as they do others: the grossest and most dangerous *delusion* into which they are liable to fall is that of substituting faith for practice, and an extravagant regard to the outward observances of religion in lieu of the mild and humble temper of Jesus: no *imposition* was ever so successfully practised upon mankind as that of Mahomet.

I would have all my readers take care how they mistake themselves for uncommon geniuses and men above rule, since it is very easy for them to be *deceived* in this particular.

BUNELL.

Deluded by a seeming excellence. ROSCOMMON.

As there seem to be in this manuscript some anachronisms and deviations from the ancient orthography, I am not satisfied myself that it is authentic, and not rather the production of one of those Grecian sophisters who have *imposed upon* the world several spurious works of this nature.

ADDISON.

DECEIVER, IMPOSTOR.

DECEIVER and IMPOSTOR, the derivatives from *deceive* and *impose*, have a farther distinction worthy of notice.

Deceiver is a generic term; *impostor* specific: every *impostor* is a species of *deceiver*: the words have however a distinct use. The *deceiver* practises *deception* on individuals; the *impostor* only on the public at large. The false friend and the faithless lover are *deceivers*; the assumed nobleman who practices frauds under his disguise, and the pretended prince who lays claim to a crown to which he was never born, are *impostors*.

Deceivers are the most dangerous members of society; they trifle with the best affections of our nature, and violate the most sacred obligations. *Impostors* are seldom so culpable as those who give them credit. It would require no small share of credulity to be *deceived* by any of the impositions which have been hitherto practised upon the inconsiderate part of mankind.

That tradition of the Jews that Christ was stolen out of the grave is ancient; it was the invention of the Jews, and denies the integrity of

the witnesses of his resurrection, making them deceivers. TILLOTSON.

Our Saviour wrought his miracles frequently, and for a long time together: a time sufficient to have detected any impostor in. TILDENSON.

DECENCY, DECORUM.

THOUGH DECENCY and DECORUM are both derived from the same word (*v. Becoming*), they have acquired a distinction in their sense and application. *Decency* respects the conduct; *decorum* the behaviour: a person conducts himself with *decency*; he behaves with *decorum*.

Indecency is a vice; it is the violation of public or private morals: *indecorum* is a fault; it offends the feelings of those who witness it. Nothing but a depraved mind can lead to *indecent* practices; indiscretion and thoughtlessness may sometimes give rise to that which is *indecorous*. *Decency* enjoins upon all relatives, according to the proximity of their relationship, to show certain marks of respect to the memory of the dead: regard for the feelings of others enjoins a certain outward *decorum* upon every one who attends a funeral.

Even religion itself, unless *decency* be the handmaid which waits upon her, is apt to make people appear guilty of sourness and ill-humour. SPECTATOR.

I will admit that a fine woman of a certain rank cannot have too many real vices; but at the same time I do insist upon it, that it is essentially her interest not to have the appearance of any one. This *decorum*, I confess, will conceal her conquests; but on the other hand, if she will be pleased to reflect that those conquests are known sooner or later, she will not upon an average find herself a loser. CHESTERFIELD.

DECENT, *v. Becoming*.

DECEPTION, *v. Deceit*.

TO DECIDE, DETERMINE, CONCLUDE UPON.

DECIDE, from the Latin *decido*, compounded of *de* and *cado*, signifies to cut off or cut short a business.

DETERMINE, from the Latin *determino*, compounded of *de* and *terminus* a term or boundary, signifies to fix the boundary.

CONCLUDE, *v. To close, finish*.

The idea of bringing a thing to an end is common to the signification of *ese* words; but *decide* expresses

more than *determine*, and *determine* more than *conclude*.

Decide and *determine* are both employed in matters relating to ourselves or others; *conclude* is employed in matters that respect the parties only who *conclude*. As it respects others, to *decide* is an act of greater authority than to *determine*: a parent *decides* for his child; a subordinate person may *determine* sometimes for those who are under him in the absence of his superiors. In all cases, to *decide* is an act of greater importance than to *determine*. The nature and character of a thing is *decided* upon: its limits or extent are *determined* on. A judge *decides* on the law and equity of the case; the jury *determine* as to the guilt or innocence of the person. An individual *decides* in his own mind on any measure, and the propriety of adopting it; he *determines* in his own mind, as to how, when, and where it shall be commenced.

One *decides* in all matters of question or dispute; one *determines* in all matters of fact. We *decide* in order to have an opinion; we *determine* in order to act. In complicated cases, where arguments of apparently equal weight are offered by men of equal authority, it is difficult to *decide*; when equally feasible plans are offered for our choice, we are often led to *determine* upon one of them from trifling motives.

To *determine* and *conclude* are equally practical: but *determine* seems to be more peculiarly the act of an individual; *conclude* may be the act of one or of many. We *determine* by an immediate act of the will; we *conclude* on a thing by inference and deduction. Caprice may often influence in *determining*; but nothing is *concluded* on without deliberation and judgement. Many things may be *determined* on which are either never put into execution, or remain long unexecuted; but that which is *concluded* on is mostly followed by immediate action. To *conclude* on is properly to come to a final determination.

With mutual blood th' Ausonian soil is dyed,
While on its borders each their claims decide.

DRYDEN.

DECISION.

No mystic dream could make their fates appear;
Though now determin'd by Tyddies' spear.
But no frail man, however great or high,
Can be concluded blest before he die. Addison.

DECIDED, DETERMINED, RESOLUTE.

A MAN who is **DECIDED** (*v. To decide*) remains in no doubt: he who is **DETERMINED** is uninfluenced by the doubts or questions of others: he who is **RESOLUTE** (*v. To determine, resolve*) is uninfluenced by the consequences of his actions. A *decided* character is at all times essential for a prince or a minister, but particularly so in an unsettled period like the present; a *determined* character is essential for a commander, or any one who has to exercise authority; a *resolute* character is essential for one who is engaged in dangerous enterprises. Pericles was a man of a *decided* temper which was well fitted to direct the affairs of government in a season of turbulence and inquietude: Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed himself to be a man of a *determined* character, when he put to death his victorious son for a breach of military discipline: Brutus, the murderer of Cæsar was a man of a *resolute* temper.

Almost all the high bred republicans of my time have, after a short space, become the most *decided* thorough paced courtiers.
A race determined, that to death contend;
So fierce these Greeks their last retreats defend. Burke.

Most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse may act upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some of them border so near upon certainty that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act according to that assent as resolutely, as if they were infallibly demonstrated. Locke.

DECIDED, DECISIVE.

DECIDED marks that which is actually decided: **DECISIVE** that which appertains to decision.

Decided is employed for persons or things; *decisive* only for things. A person's aversion or attachment is *decided*; a sentence, a judgement, or a victory, is *decisive*. A man of a *decided* character always adopts *decisive* measures. It is right to be *decidedly* averse to every thing which is

immoral: we should be cautious to pronounce *decisively* on any where we are not perfectly clear, well grounded in our opinion. every popular commotion it is the duty of a good subject to take a *decided* part in favor of law and order: such is the nature of law, that were not *decisive* it would be of value.

A politic caution, a guarded circumspection were among the ruling principles of our fathers in their most *decided* conduct. Burke.

The sentence of superior judges is final, decisive, and irrevocable.

It is notorious that the measures of the national assembly are *decided* before they are debated. Burke.

DECISION, JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE.

DECISION signifies literally the act of *deciding*, or the thing *decided* upon (*v. To decide*).

JUDGEMENT signifies the act of *judging* or *determining* in general (*v. To decide*).

SENTENCE, in Latin *sententia*, signifies the opinion held or maintained.

These terms, though very different in their original meaning, are now employed so that the two latter are species of the former; a final conclusion of any business is comprehended in them all: but the *decision* conveys none of the collateral ideas which is expressed by *judgement* and *sentence*: a *decision* has no respect to the agent; it may be said of one or many; it may be the *decision* of the court, of the nation, of the public, of a particular body of men, or of a private individual: but a *judgement* is given in a public court, or among private individuals: a *sentence* is passed in a court of law, or at the bar of the public.

A *decision* specifies none of the circumstances of the action; it may be a legal or an arbitrary *decision*; it may be a *decision* according to one's caprice, or after mature deliberation: a *judgement* is always passed either in a court of law, and consequently by virtue of authority; or it is passed by an individual by the authority of his own *judgement*: a *sentence* is always passed by the authority of law, or the will of the public.

published; the measures of government are *proclaimed*: it is folly for a man to *declare* any thing to be true, which he is not certain to be so, and wickedness in him to *declare* that to be true which he knows to be false; whoever *publishes* all he hears will be in great danger of *publishing* many falsehoods; whatever is *proclaimed* is supposed to be of sufficient importance to deserve the notice of all who may hear or read.

In cases of war or peace, princes are expected to *declare* themselves on one side or the other; in the political world intelligence is quickly *published* through the medium of the public papers; in private life domestic occurrences are *published* with equal celerity through the medium of tale-bearers; a *proclamation* is the ordinary mode by which a prince makes known his wishes, and issues his commands to his subjects: it is an act of indiscretion very common to young and ardent inquirers to *declare* their opinions before they are properly matured; the *publication* of domestic circumstances is oftentimes the source of much disquiet and ill-will in families; ministers of the gospel are styled messengers, who should *proclaim* its glad tidings to all people, and in all tongues.

The Greeks in shouts their joint assent *declare*,
The priest to reverence and release the fair.

Pope.

I am surprised that none of the fortune-tellers, or, as the French call them, the *Disseurs de bonne aventure*, who *publish* their bills in every quarter of the town, have not turned our lotteries to their advantage.

ADDISON.

Nine sacred heralds now, *proclaiming* loud
The monarch's will, suspend the listening crowd.

Pope.

TO DECLARE, *v.* To discover.

TO DECLARE, *v.* To express.

TO DECLARE, *v.* To profess.

DECLINE, *v.* Decay.

TO DECLINE, *v.* To refuse.

TO DECORATE, *v.* To adorn.

DECORUM, *v.* Decency.

TO DECOY, *v.* To allure.

TO DECREASE, *v.* To abate.

DECREE, EDICT, PROCLAMATION.

DECREE, in French *decret*, Latin *decretus*, from *decerno* to give judgement or pass sentence, signifies the sentence or resolution that is passed.

EDICT, in Latin *edictus*, from *edico* to say out, signifies the thing spoken out or sent forth.

PROCLAMATION, *v.* To declare.

A *decree* is a more solemn and deliberative act than an *edict*; on the other hand an *edict* is more authoritative: a *decree* is the decision of one or many; an *edict* speaks the will of an individual: councils and senates, as well as princes, make *decrees*; despotic rulers issue *edicts*.

Decrees are passed for the regulation of public and private matters; they are made known as occasion requires, but are not always public: *edicts* and *proclamations* contain the commands of the sovereign authority, and are directly addressed by the prince to his people. An *edict* is peculiar to a despotic government; a *proclamation* is common to a monarchical and aristocratic form of government: the ukase in Russia is a species of *edict*, by which the emperor makes known his will to his people; the king of England communicates to his subjects the determinations of himself and his council by means of a *proclamation*.

Are we condemn'd, by fate's unjust decree,
No more our houses and our homes to see?

DRYDEN.

This statute or act of parliament is placed among the records of the kingdom, there needing no formal promulgation to give it the force of a law, as was necessary by the civil law with regard to the emperor's *edicts*.

BLACKSTONE.

From the same original of the king's being the fountain of justice, we may also deduce the prerogative of issuing *proclamations*, which is vested in the king alone.

BLACKSTONE.

TO DECRY, *v.* To disparage.

TO DEDICATE, DEVOTE, CONSECRATE, HALLOW.

DEDICATE, in Latin *dedicatus*, participle from *de* and *dico*, signifies to set apart by a promise.

DEVOTE, in Latin *devotus*, participle from *devoveo*, signifies to vow for an express purpose.

CONSECRATE, in Latin *consecratus*, from *consecro* or *con* and *secro*, signifies to make sacred by a special act.

HALLOW from *holy*, or the German *heilig*, signifies to make holy.

There is something more positive in the act of dedicating than in that of devoting; but less so than in that of consecrating.

To *dedicate* and *devote* may be employed in both temporal and spiritual matters; to *consecrate* and *hallow* only in the spiritual sense: we may *dedicate* or *devote* any thing that is at our disposal to the service of some object; but the former is employed mostly in regard to superiors, and the latter to persons without distinction of rank: we *dedicate* a house to the service of God; or we *devote* our time to the benefit of our friends, or the relief of the poor: we may *dedicate* or *devote* ourselves to an object; but the former always implies a solemn setting apart springing from a sense of duty; the latter an entire application of one's self from zeal and affection; in this manner he who *dedicates* himself to God abstracts himself from every object which is not immediately connected with the service of God; he who *devotes* himself to the ministry pursues it as the first object of his attention and regard: such a *dedication* of oneself is hardly consistent with our other duties as members of society; but a *devotion* of one's powers, one's time, and one's knowledge to the spread of religion among men is one of the most honourable and sacred kinds of *devotion*.

To *consecrate* is a species of formal *dedication* by virtue of a religious observance; it is applicable mostly to places and things connected with religious works: *hallow* is a species of informal *consecration* applied to the same objects: the church is *consecrated*; particular days are *hallowed*.

Warn'd by the seer, to her offended name

We rais'd and dedicated this wondrous frame.

DAYTON.

Gilbert West settled himself in a very pleasant house at Wickham in Kent, where he devoted himself to piety.

JOURNAL.

The greatest conqueror in this holy nation did not only compose the words of his divine edes, but generally set them to music himself; after

played.

ACHIEVEMENT, from *achiever*, signifies the thing *achieved*.

FEAT, in French *fait*, from *facio*, signifies the thing *done*.

The first three words rise progressively on each other: *deeds*, compared with the others, is employed for that which is ordinary or extraordinary; *exploit* and *achievement* are used only for the extraordinary; the latter is a higher sense than the former.

Deeds must always be characterized as good or bad, magnanimous or atrocious, and the like: *exploit* and *achievement* do not necessarily require such epithets; they are always taken in the proper sense for something great. *Exploit*, when compared with

achievement, is a term used in plain prose; it designates not so much what is great as what is real: *achievement* is most adapted to poetry and romance; it soars above what the eye sees, and the ear hears, and affords scope for the imagination. Martial *deeds* are as interesting to the reader as to the performer: the pages of modern history will be crowded with the *exploits* of Englishmen both by sea and land, as those of ancient and fabulous history are with the *achievements* of their heroes and demi-gods. An *exploit* marks only personal bravery in action; an *achievement* denotes elevation of character in every respect, grandeur of design, promptitude in execution, and valor in action.

An *exploit* may be executed by the design and at the will of another; a common soldier or an army may perform *exploits*. An *achievement* is designed and executed by the *achiever*; Hercules is distinguished for his *achievements*: and in the same manner we speak of the *achievements* of knights-errants or of great commanders.

Feat approaches nearest to *exploit*, in signification; the former marks skill, and the latter resolution. The *tricks* of chivalry displayed in jousts and tournaments were in former times as much esteemed as warlike *exploits*. *Exploit* and *feat* are often used in derision, to mark the absence of those qualities in the actions of individuals. The soldier who affects to be foremost in situations where there is no danger cannot be more properly derided than by terming his action an *exploit*: he who prides himself on the display of skill in the performance of a paltry trick may be laughed at for having performed a *feat*.

Great Pello! thou for whom thy Rome prepares
Her ready triumph of thy finish'd wars;
There is fate an hour reserv'd for me
To sing thy deeds in numbers worthy thee?

DRYDEN.

High matter thou injoin'st me, O prime of men!
Less task and hard: for how shall I relate
To human sense th' invisible exploits
Of warring spirits?

MILTON.

Great spoils and trophies, gain'd by thee they
bear,
Thou let thy own achievements be thy share.

DRYDEN.

Much I have heard
Of thy prodigious might, and feats perform'd.

MILTON

DEED, *v.* Action.

TO DEFACE, DISFIGURE,
DEFORM.

DEFACE, DISFIGURE, and DEFORM, signify literally to spoil the *face*, *figure*, and *form*.

Deface expresses more than either *deform* and *disfigure*. To *deface* is an act of destruction; it is the actual destruction of that which has before existed: to *disfigure* is either an act of destruction or an erroneous execution, which takes away the figure: to *deform* is altogether an imperfect execution, which renders the *form* what it should not be. A thing is *defaced* by design; it is *disfigured* either by design or accident; it is *deformed* either by an error or by the nature of the thing.

Persons only *deface*; persons or things *disfigure*; things are most commonly *deformed* of themselves. That may be *defaced*, the face or external surface of which may be injured or destroyed; that may be *disfigured* or *deformed*, the figure or form of which is imperfect or may be rendered imperfect. A fine painting or piece of writing is *defaced* which is torn or besmeared with dirt: a fine building is *disfigured* by any want of symmetry in its parts: a building is *deformed* that is made contrary to all form. A statue may be *defaced*, *disfigured*, and *deformed*: it is *defaced* when any violence is done to the face or any outward part of the body; it is *disfigured* by the loss of a limb; it is *deformed* if made contrary to the perfect form of a human being.

Inanimate objects are mostly *defaced* or *disfigured*, but seldom *deformed*; animate objects are either *disfigured* or *deformed*, but not *defaced*. A person may *disfigure* himself by his dress; he is *deformed* by the hand of nature.

Yet she had heard an ancient rumour fly
(Long cited by the people of the sky),
That times to come should see the Trojan race
Her Carthage ruin, and her tow'rs *deface*.

DRYDEN.

It is but too obvious that errors are committed in this part of religion (devotion). - These fre-

arms: the Roman people were guilty of a *defection* when they left the senate and retired to mount Aventine: the Germans frequently attempted to recover their liberty by *revolting* against the Romans.

At the time of the general *defection* from Nero, Virginius Rufus was at the head of a very powerful army in Germany, which had pressed him to accept the title of emperor, but he constantly refused it. MELNOR.

Exeter, instigated by Githa, mother to king Harold, refused to admit a Norman garrison, and, betaking themselves to arms, were strengthened by the accession of the neighbouring inhabitants of Devonshire and Cornwall. The king hastened with his forces to chastise this revolt. HUME.

DEFECTIVE, DEFICIENT.

DEFECTIVE expresses the quality or property of having a *defect* (*v. Blemish*): DEFICIENT is employed with regard to the thing itself that is wanting. A book may be *defective*, in consequence of some leaves being *deficient*. A *deficiency* is therefore often what constitutes a *defect*. Many things however may be *defective* without having any *deficiency*, and *vice versa*. Whatever is mis-shapen, and fails either in beauty or utility, is *defective*; that which is wanted to make a thing compleat is *deficient*. It is a *defect* in the eye when it is so constructed that things are not seen at their proper distances; there is a *deficiency* in a tradesman's accounts, when one side is made to fall short of the other.

Things only are said to be *defective*; but persons may be termed *deficient* either in attention, in good breeding, in civility, or whatever else the occasion may require. That which is *defective* is most likely to be permanent; but a *deficiency* may be only occasional and easily rectified.

Providence, for the most part, sets us upon a level: if it renders us perfect in one accomplishment, it generally leaves us *defective* in another. ADDISON.

If there be a *deficiency* in the speaker, there will not be sufficient attention and regard paid to the thing spoken. SWIFT.

DEFENCE, *v. Apology.*

TO DEFEND, PROTECT,
VINDICATE.

DEFEND, *v. Apology.*

PROTECT, in Latin *protectum* participle of *protego*, compounded of *pro* and *tego*, signifies to put any thing before a person as a covering.

VINDICATE, *v. To assert.*

Defend is a general term; it defines nothing with regard to the degree and manner of the action: *protect* is a particular and positive term, expressing an action of some considerable importance. Persons may *defend* others without distinction of rank or station: none but superiors *protect* their inferiors. *Defence* is an occasional action; *protection* is a permanent action. A person may be *defended* in any particular case of actual danger or difficulty; he is *protected* from what may happen as well as what does happen. *Defence* respects the evil that threatens; *protection* involves the supply of necessities and the affording comforts.

A master may justify an assault in *defence* of his servant, and a servant in *defence* of his master. BLACKSTONE.

They who *protected* the weakness of our infancy are entitled to our *protection* in their old age. BLACKSTONE.

Defence requires some active exertion either of body or mind; *protection* may consist only of the extension of power in behalf of any particular. A *defence* is successful or unsuccessful; a *protection* weak or strong. A soldier *defends* his country; a counsellor *defends* his client: a prince *protects* his subjects. Henry the Eighth styled himself *defender* of the faith (that is of the Romish faith) at the time that he was subverting the whole religious system of the Catholics: Oliver Cromwell styled himself *protector* at the time that he was overturning the government.

Savage (on his trial for the murder of Sinclair) did not deny the fact, but endeavoured to justify it by the necessity of *self-defence*, and the hazard of his own life if he had lost the opportunity of giving the thrust. JOHNSON.

First give thy faith and plight, a prince's word,
Of sure *protection* by thy power and sword;
For I must speak what wisdom would conceal,
And truth invidious to the great reveal. POPE.

In a figurative and extended sense, things may either *defend* or *protect* with a similar distinction: a coat *defends* us from the inclemencies of the weather; houses are a *protection* not only against the changes of the sea-

A king, circumstanced as the present (king of France), has no generous interest that can excite him to action. At best his conduct will be passive and defensive. . . . BURKE.

DEFENSIVE, *v. Defensible.*

TO DEFER, *v. To delay.*

DEFERENCE, *v. Complaisance.*

DEFICIENT, *v. Defective.*

DEFINITE, POSITIVE.

DEFINITE, in Latin *definitum* participle of *definio*, compounded of *de* and *finis*, signifies drawing the line or limit.

POSITIVE, in Latin *positivus* from *pono* to place, signifies placing or fixing.

The understanding and reasoning powers are connected with what is *definite*; the will with what is *positive*. A *definite* answer leaves nothing to be explained; a *positive* answer leaves no room for hesitation or question. It is necessary to be *definite* in giving instructions, and to be *positive* in giving commands. A person who is *definite* in his proceedings with another, puts a stop to all unreasonable expectations; it is necessary for those who have to exercise authority to be *positive*, in order to enforce obedience from the self-willed and contumacious.

We are not able to judge of the degree of conviction which operated at any particular time upon our own thoughts, but as it is recorded by some certain and *definite* effect. JOHNSON.

The Earl Rivers being now in his own opinion on his death bed, thought it his duty to provide for Savage among his other natural children, and therefore demanded a *positive* account of him. JOHNSON.

DEFINITION, EXPLANATION.

A DEFINITION is properly a species of EXPLANATION. The former is used scientifically, the latter on ordinary occasions; the former is confined to words, the latter is employed for words or things.

A *definition* is correct or precise; an *explanation* is general or ample.

The *definition* of a word defines or limits the extent of its signification; it is the rule for the scholar in the use of any word: the *explanation* of a word may include both definition and illustration: the former admits of no more words than will include the lead-

ing features in the meaning of any term; the latter admits of an unlimited scope for diffuseness on the part of the explainer.

As to politeness, many have attempted *definitions* of it. I believe it is best to be known by description, *definition* not being able to comprise it. LORD CHATHAM.

If you are forced to desire further information or *explanation* upon a point, do it with proper apologies for the trouble you give. LORD CHATHAM.

TO DEFORM, *v. To deface.*

TO DEFRAUD, *v. To cheat.*

TO DEFY, *v. To brave.*

TO DEGRADE, DISGRACE.

DEGRADE, from the Latin *gradus* a step or degree, signifies to bring down, or a step lower.

DISGRACE, from the Latin *gratia* favor, signifies to bring out of favor or esteem: an officer in the army is *degraded*; a minister of state or a courtier is *disgraced*.

In the general or moral application, *degrade* respects the external station or rank; *disgrace* refers to the moral estimation or character: one is often *disgraced* by a *degradation*, and likewise when there is no express *degradation*: whatever is low and mean is *degrading*; whatever is immoral is *disgraceful*: it is *degrading* for a nobleman to associate with prize-fighters and jockeys; it is *disgraceful* for him to countenance the violation of the laws which he is bound to protect: it is *degrading* for a clergyman to take part in the ordinary pleasures and diversions of mankind in general; it is *disgraceful* for him to indulge in any levities: Domitian *degraded* himself by the meanness of the employment which he chose; he *disgraced* himself by the cruelty which he mixed with his meanness: King John of England *degraded* himself as much by his mean compliance when in the power of the barons, as he had *disgraced* himself before by his detestable tyranny and oppression.

The higher the rank of the individual, the greater his *degradation*: the higher his character, or the more sacred his office, the greater his *disgrace*, if he act inconsistently with its dignity: but these terms are not con-

prone to *delay*; when a plan is not maturely digested, it is prudent to *defer* its execution until every thing is in an entire state of preparation. *Procrastination* is a culpable *delay* arising solely from the fault of the *procrastinator*: it is the part of a dilatory man to *procrastinate* that which it is both his interest and duty to perform.

To *defer* is used without regard to any particular time or object; to *postpone* has always relation to something else: it is properly to *defer* until the completion of some period or event: a person may *defer* his visit from month to month; he *postpones* his visit until the commencement of a new year: a tardy debtor *delays* the settlement of his accounts; a merchant *defers* the shipment of any goods in consequence of the receipt of fresh intelligence; he *postpones* the shipment until after the arrival of the expected fleet.

We *delay* the execution of a thing; we *prolong* or *protract* the continuation of a thing; we *retard* the termination of a thing: we may *delay* answering a letter, *prolong* a contest, *protract* a lawsuit, and *retard* a publication.

From thee both old and young with profit learn,
The bounds of good and evil to discern:
Unhappy he who does this work adjourn,
And to to-morrow would the search *delay*;
His lazy morrow will be like to-day. DAYDEN.

Never *defer* that till to-morrow which you can
do to-day. BURGILL.

When I *postponed* to another summer my journey
to England, could I apprehend that I never
should see her again? GIBSON.

Procrastination is the thief of time. YOUNG.

Perhaps great Hector then had found his fate,
But Jove and destiny *prolong'd* his date. POPE.

To this Euryalus: "You plead in vain,
And but *protract* the cause you cannot gain." VIRGIL.

I see the layers then
Of mingled moulds of more retentive earths,
That while the stealing moisture they transmit,
Retard its motion and forbid its waste. THOMSON.

DELEGATE, DEPUTY.

DELEGATE, in Latin *delegatus*, from *delego*, signifies one commissioned.

DEPUTY, in Latin *deputatus*, from *deputo*, signifies one to whom a business is assigned.

A *delegate* has a more active office than a *deputy*; he is appointed to execute some positive commission: a *deputy* may often serve only to supply the place or answer in the name of one who is absent: *delegates* are mostly appointed in public transactions; *deputies* are chosen either in public or private matters: *delegates* are chosen by particular bodies for purposes of negotiation either in regard to civil or political affairs; *deputies* are chosen either by individuals or small communities to officiate on certain occasions of a purely civil nature: the Hans-towns in Germany used formerly to send *delegates* to the Diet at Ratisbon; when Calais was going to surrender to Edward III. King of England, *deputies* were sent from the townsmen to implore his mercy.

Let chosen *delegates* this hour be sent,
Myself will name them, to Pelides' tent. POPE.

Every member (of parliament), though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned serves for the whole realm; and therefore he is not bound, like a *deputy* in the united provinces, to consult with his constituents on any particular point. BLACKSTONE.

But this
And all the much-transported name can sing,
Are to thy beauty, dignity, and use,
Unequal far, great *delegated* source
Of light and life, and grace, and joy below. THOMSON.

The assembling of persons *deputed* from people at great distances is a trouble to them that are sent and a charge to them that send. TEMPLE.

TO DELIBERATE, *v.* To *debate*.

TO DELIBERATE, *v.* To *consult*.

DELIBERATE, *v.* *Thoughtful*.

DELICACY, *v.* *Dainty*.

DELICATE, *v.* *Fine*.

DELIGHT, *v.* *Pleasure*.

DELIGHTFUL, CHARMING.

DELIGHTFUL is applied either to material or spiritual objects; CHARMING mostly to objects of sense.

When they both denote the pleasure of the sense, *delightful* is not so strong an expression as *charming*: a prospect may be *delightful* or *charm-*

is to a certain extent justifiable: the careful **DELIVERY** of property into the hands of the owner will be the first object of concern with a faithful agent.

What'er befall your life shall be my care,
One death, or one deliverance, we will share.

DRYDEN.

With our Saxon ancestors the *delivery* of a turf was a necessary solemnity to establish the conveyance of lands.

BLACKSTONE.

DELIVERY, v. Deliverance.

TO DELUDE, v. To deceive.

DELUGE, v. Overflow.

DELUSION, v. Fallacy.

TO DEMAND, v. To ask for.

TO DEMAND, REQUIRE.

DEMAND, v. To ask.

REQUIRE, in Latin *requiro*, compounded of *re* and *quero*, signifies to seek for or to seek to get back.

We *demand* that which is owing and ought to be given; we *require* that which we wish and expect to have done. A *demand* is more positive than a *requisition*; the former admits of no question; the latter is liable to be both questioned and refused: the creditor makes a *demand* on the debtor; the master *requires* a certain portion of duty from his servant: it is unjust to *demand* of a person what he has no right to give; it is unreasonable to *require* of him what it is not in his power to do.

A thing is commonly *demand*ed in express words; it is *required* by implication: a person *demand*s admission when it is not voluntarily granted; he *requires* respectful deportment from those who are subordinate to him.

In the figurative application the same sense is preserved: things of urgency and moment *demand* immediate attention; difficult matters *require* a steady attention.

Hear, all ye Trojans! all ye Grecian bands,
What Paris, author of the war, *demand*s.

Pope.

Now, by my sov'reign and his fate I swear,
Renown'd for faith in peace, and force in war,
Oft our alliance other lands desir'd,
And what we seek of you of us requir'd.

DRYDEN.

Surely the retrospect of life and the extirp of lusts and appetites deeply rooted and w spread may be allowed to *demand* some resce from business and and folly.

JOHNS

Oh then how blind to all that truth *requires*,
Who think it freedom when a part aspires.

GOLDEN

DEMEANOUR, v. Behaviour.

DEMISE, v. Death.

TO DEMOLISH, RAZE, DISMANTLE, DESTROY.

THE throwing down what has been built up is the common idea included in all these terms.

DEMOLISH, from the Latin *demolior*, and *moles* a mass, signifies to decompound what has been in a mass.

RAZE like *erase* (*v. To blot out*) signifies the making smooth or even with the ground.

DISMANTLE, in French *deman-teler*, signifies to deprive of the mantle or guard.

DESTROY, from the Latin *destruo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *struo* to build, signifies properly to pull down.

A fabric is *demolished* by scattering all its component parts; it is mostly an unlicensed act of caprice; it is **razed* by way of punishment, that it may be left as a monument of public vengeance; a fortress is *dismantled* from motives of prudence, in order to render it defenceless; places are *de-destroyed* by various means and from various motives, that they may not exist any longer.

Individuals may *demolish*; justice causes a *razure*; a general orders towers to be *dismantled* and fortifications to be *destroyed*.

From the *demolish'd* tow'rs the Trojans throw
Huge heaps of stones, that falling crush the foe.

DRYDEN.

Great Diomedes has compass'd round with walls
The city which Argypa he calls,
From his own Argos nam'd; we touch'd with joy

The royal hand that ras'd unhappy Troy.

DRYDEN.

O'er the drear spot see desolation spread,
And the *dismantled* walls in ruins lie.

MOORE.

We, for myself I speak, and all the name
Of Grecians, who to Troy's *destruction* came,
Not one but suffered and too dearly bought
The prize of honor which in arms he sought.

DRYDEN.

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Demolir, raser, demanteler, detruire."

If every man were wise and virtuous, capable to discern the best use of time and resolute to practise it, it might be granted, I think without hesitation, that total liberty would be a blessing.
JOHNSON.

Lloyd was always raising objections and removing them.
JOHNSON.

TO DENOMINATE, *v. To name.*

DENOMINATION, *v. Name.*

TO DENOTE, SIGNIFY.

DENOTE, in Latin *denoto* or *noto*, from *notum* participle of *nosco*, signifies to cause to know.

SIGNIFY, from the Latin *signum* a sign, and *fit* to become, signifies to become or be made a sign, or guide for the understanding.

Denote is employed with regard to things and their characters; *signify* with regard to the thoughts or movements. A letter or character may be made to *denote* any number, as words are made to *signify* the intentions and wishes of the person. Among the ancient Egyptians hieroglyphics were very much employed to *denote* certain moral qualities; in many cases looks or actions will *signify* more than words. Devices and emblems of different descriptions drawn either from fabulous history or the natural world are likewise now employed to *denote* particular circumstances or qualities: the cornucopia *denotes* plenty; the beehive *denotes* industry; the dove *denotes* meekness; and the lamb *denotes* gentleness: he who will not take the trouble to *signify* his wishes otherwise than by words or signs must expect to be frequently misunderstood.

Another may do the same thing, and yet the action want that air and beauty which distinguish it from others, like that insupportable sunshine which is said to have diffused over his landscapes, which *denotes* them his.
SPECTATOR.

Simple abstract words are used to *signify* immense and simple ideas, without much adverting to others which may chance to attend it. BURKE.

DENSE, *v. Thick.*

TO DENY, *v. To contradict.*

TO DENY, REFUSE.

DENY, in Latin *denego* or *nego*, that is *ne* or *non* and *ago*, signifies to say no to a thing.

REFUSE, in Latin *refusus*, from *re* and *fundo* to pour or cast, signifies to throw back that which is presented.

To *deny* respects matters of fact or knowledge; to *refuse* matters of wish or request. We *deny* what immediately belongs to ourselves; we *refuse* what belongs to another. We *deny* as to the past; we *refuse* as to the future: we *deny* our participation in that which has been; we *refuse* our participation in that which may be: to *deny* must always be expressly verbal; a *refusal* may sometimes be signified by actions or looks as well as words. A *denial* affects our veracity; a *refusal* affects our good nature.

To *deny* is likewise sometimes used in regard to one's own gratifications as well as to one's knowledge, in which case it is still more analogous to *refuse*, which regards the gratifications of another. In this case we say we *deny* a person a thing, but we *refuse* his request or *refuse* to do a thing. Some Christians think it very meritorious to *deny* themselves their usual quantity of food at certain times; they are however but sorry professors of Christianity if they *refuse* at the same time to give of their substance to the poor. Instances are not rare of misers who have *denied* themselves the common necessities of life, and yet have never *refused* to relieve those who were in distress, or assist those who were in trouble.

Deny is sometimes the act of unconscious agents; *refuse* is always a personal and intentional act. We are sometimes *denied* by circumstances the consolation of seeing our friends before they die; when prisoners want to see their friends for sinister purposes they must be *refused*.

Jove to his Thetis nothing could *deny*,
Nor was the signal vain that shook the sky.
POPE.

O sire of Gods and men! Thy suppliant hear;
Refuse or grant; for what has Jove to fear?
POPE.

Inquire you how these pow'rs we shall attain?
'Tis not for us to know; our starch is vain;
Can any one remember or relate
How he existed in the embryo state?
That light's *deny'd* to him which others see,
He knows perhaps you'll say—and so do we.
JOHNSON.

TO DENY, DISOWN.

DENY (*v. To deny*) approaches nearest to the sense of *disown* when applied to persons; DISOWN, that

is, not to own, on the other hand bears a strong analogy to *deny* when applied to things.

In the first case *deny* is said with regard to one's knowledge of or connection with a person; *disowning* on the other hand is a term of larger import, including the renunciation of all relationship or social tie: the former is said of those who are not related; the latter of such only as are related. Peter *denied* our Saviour; a parent can scarcely be justified in *disowning* his child let his vices be ever so enormous; a child can never *disown* its parent in any case without violating the most sacred duty.

In the second case *deny* is said in regard to things that concern others as well as ourselves; *disown* only in regard to what is done by one's self or that in which one is personally concerned. A person *denies* that there is any truth in the assertion of another; he *disowns* all participation in any affair. We may *deny* having seen a thing; we may *disown* that we did it ourselves. Our veracity is often the only thing implicated in a *denial*; our guilt, innocence, or honour are implicated in what we *disown*. A witness *denies* what is stated as a fact; the accused party *disowns* what is laid to his charge.

A *denial* is employed only for outward actions or events; that which can be related may be *denied*: *disowning* extends to whatever we can own or possess; we may *disown* our feelings, our name, our connexions, and the like.

Christians *deny* the charges which are brought against the gospel by its enemies. The apostles would never *disown* the character which they held as messengers of Christ.

If, like Zeno, any shall walk about and yet *deny* there is any motion in nature, surely that man was constituted for Anticyra, and were a fit companion for those who, having a conceit they are dead, cannot be convicted unto the society of the living.

BROWN.

Sometimes lest man should quite his pow'r
disown,

He makes that pow'r to trembling nations known.

JENYNS.

TO DENY, *v.* To disavow.

DEPARTURE, *v.* Death.

DEPARTURE, *v.* Exit.

DEPENDANCE, RELIANCE.

DEPENDANCE, from *depend* or *de* and *pend*, in Latin *pendo* to hang from, signifies literally to rest one's weight by hanging from that which is held.

RELY, compounded of *re* and *ly* or *lie*, signifies likewise to rest one's weight by lying or hanging back from the object held.

Dependance is the general term; *reliance* is a species of *dependance*: we *depend* either on persons or things; we *rely* on persons only: *dependance* serves for that which is immediate or remote; *reliance* serves for the future only. We *depend* upon a person for that which we are obliged to receive or led to expect from him: we *rely* upon a person for that which he has given us reason to expect from him.

Dependance is an outward condition or the state of external circumstances; *reliance* is a state of the feelings with regard to others. We *depend* upon God for all that we have or shall have; we *rely* upon the word of man for that which he has promised to perform. We may *depend* upon a person's coming from a variety of causes; but we *rely* upon it only in reference to his avowed intention.

A man who uses his best endeavours to live according to the dictates of virtue and right reason has two perpetual sources of cheerfulness, in the consideration of his own nature, and of that Being on whom he has a *dependance*. ANTHONY.
The tender twig shoots upward to the skies,
And on the faith of the new sun relies.

DAYNES.

TO DEPICT, *v.* To paint.

TO DEPLORE, LAMENT.

DEPLORE, in Latin *deploro*, that is *de* and *ploro*, or *plango*, to give signs of distress with the face or mouth.

LAMENT, *v.* To bewail.

Deplore is a much stronger expression than *lament*; the former calls forth tears from the bitterness of the heart; the latter excites a cry from the warmth of feeling. * *Deplorable* indicates despair; to *lament* marks only pain or distress. Among the poor we

* Vide Truher: * Lamentable, deplorable."

have *deplorable* instances of poverty, ignorance, vice, and wretchedness combined: among the higher classes we have often *lamentable* instances of extravagance and consequent ruin. A field of battle or a city overthrown by an earthquake is a spectacle truly *deplorable*: it is *lamentable* to see beggars putting on all the disguises of wretchedness in order to obtain what they might earn by honest industry. The condition of a dying man suffering under the agonies of an awakened conscience is *deplorable*; the situation of the relative or friend who witnesses the agony, without being able to afford consolation to the sufferer, is truly *lamentable*.

The wounds they wash'd, their pious tears they shed,
And laid along their oars *deplor'd* the dead.

Pope.

But let not chief the nightingale lament
Her ruin'd care, too delicately fram'd
To brook the harsh confinement of the cage.

Thomson.

DEPONENT, EVIDENCE, WITNESS.

DEPONENT, from the Latin *depono*, is the one laying down or open what he has heard or seen.

EVIDENCE, from *evident*, is the one producing *evidence* or making *evident*.

WITNESS, from the Saxon *witan*, Teutonic *weisen*, Greek *εἶδω*, and Hebrew *ido* to know, is the one knowing or making known.

The *deponent* always declares upon oath; he serves to give information: the *evidence* is likewise generally bound by an oath; he serves to acquit or condemn: the *witness* is employed upon oath or otherwise; he serves to confirm or invalidate.

A *deponent* declares either in writing or by word of mouth; the *deposition* is preparatory to the trial: an *evidence* may give *evidence* either by words or actions; whatever serves to clear up, whether a person or an animal, the thing is used as an *evidence*; the *evidence* always comes forward on the trial: a *witness* is always a person in the proper sense, but may be applied figuratively to inanimate objects; he declares by word of mouth what he personally knows. Every *witness* is an *evidence* at the moment of trial,

but every *evidence* is not a *witness*. When a dog is employed as an *evidence* he cannot be called a *witness*.

Evidence on the other hand is confined mostly to judicial matters; and *witness* extends to all the ordinary concerns of life. One person appears as an *evidence* against another on a criminal charge: a *witness* appears for or against; he corroborates the word of another, and is a security in all dealings or matters of question between man and man.

The pleader having spoke his best,
And *witness* ready to attest;
Who fairly could on oath depose,
When questions on the fact arose,
That ev'ry article was true.
Nor further these *deponents* knew.

SWIFT.

Of the *evidence* which appeared against him (Savage) the character of the man was not unexceptionable; that of the woman notoriously infamous.

JOHNSON.

In case a woman be forcibly taken away and married, she may be a *witness* against her husband in order to convict him of felony.

BLACKSTONE.

In every man's heart and conscience, religion has many *witnesses* to its importance and reality.

BLAIR.

DEPARTMENT, *v.* Behaviour.

DEPOSIT, PLEDGE, SECURITY.

DEPOSIT is a general term from the Latin *depositus* participle of *depono*, signifying to lay down, or put into the hands of another.

PLEDGE, comes probably from *plico*, signifying what engages by a tie or envelope.

SECURITY signifies that which makes *secure*.

The *deposit* has most regard to the confidence we place in another; the *pledge* has most regard to the security we give for ourselves; *security* is a species of *pledge*. A *deposit* is always voluntarily placed in the hands of an indifferent person; a *pledge* and *security* are required from the parties who are interested. A person may make a *deposit* for purposes of charity or convenience; he gives a *pledge* or *security* for a temporary accommodation, or the relief of a necessity. Money is *deposited* in the hands of a friend in order to execute a commission: a *pledge* is given as an equivalent for that which has been

innocence, there will probably be universal happiness; for why should afflictions be permitted to falsest beings who are not in danger of corruption from blessings? JOHNSON.

The force of irregular propensities and distempered imaginations produces a *depravity* of manners; the force of example and the dissemination of bad principles produce a *corruption*. A judgement not sound or right is *depraved*; a judgement debased by that which is vicious is *corrupted*. What is *depraved* requires to be reformed: what is *corrupted* requires to be purified. *Depravity* has most regard to apparent and excessive disorders; *corruption* to internal and dissolute vices. "Manners," says Cicero, "are *corrupted* and *depraved* by the love of riches." "Port Royal says that God has given up infidels to the wandering of a *corrupted* and *depraved* mind." These words are by no means a pleonasm or repetition, because they represent two distinct images; one indicates the state of a thing very much changed in its substance; the other the state of a thing very much opposed to regularity. "Good God! (says Masillon the preacher), what a dreadful account will the rich and powerful have one day to give; since, besides their own sins, they will have to account before Thee for public disorder, *depravity* of morals, and the *corruption* of the age." Public disorders bring on naturally *depravity* of morals; and sins or vicious practices naturally give birth to *corruption*. *Depravity* is more or less open; it revolts the sober upright understanding; *corruption* is more or less disguised in its operations, but fatal in its effects: the former sweeps away every thing before it like a torrent; the latter infuses itself into the moral frame like a slow poison.

That is a *depraved* state of morals in which the gross vices are openly practised in defiance of all decorum: that is a *corrupt* state of society in which vice has secretly insinuated itself into all the principles and habits of men, and concealed its deformity under the fair semblance of virtue and honor. The manners of savages are most likely to be *depraved*; those of civilized nations to be *corrupt*, when luxury and refinement are risen to an

excessive pitch. Cannibal nations present us with the picture of human *depravity*; the Roman nation during the time of the emperors, affords us an example of almost universal *corruption*.

From the above observations, it is clear that *depravity* is best applied to those objects to which common usage has annexed the epithets of right, regular, fine, &c. and *corruption* to those which may be characterized by the epithets of sound, pure, innocent, or good. Hence we prefer to say *depravity* of mind and *corruption* of heart; *depravity* of principle and *corruption* of sentiment or feeling: a *depraved* character; a *corrupt* example; a *corrupt* influence.

The greatest difficulty that occurs in analyzing his (Swift's) character, is to discover by what *depravity* of intellect he took delight in revolving ideas from which almost every other mind shrinks with disgust. JOHNSON.

Peace is the happy natural state of man; War his *corruption*, his disgrace. THOMSON.

No *depravity* of the mind has been more frequently or justly censured than ingratitude.

JOHNSON.

I have remarked in a former paper, that credulity is the common falling of inexperienced virtue, and that he who is spontaneously suspicious may be justly charged with radical *corruption*. JOHNSON.

In reference to the arts or belles lettres we say either *depravity* or *corruption* of taste, because taste has its rules, is liable to be disordered, is or is not conformable to natural order, is regular or irregular; and on the other hand it may be so intermingled with sentiments and feelings foreign to its own native purity as to give it justly the title of *corrupt*.

The last thing worthy of notice respecting the two words *depravity* and *corruption*, is that the former is used for man in his moral capacity; but the latter for man in a political capacity: hence we speak of human *depravity*, but the *corruption* of government.

The *depravity* of mankind is so easily discoverable, that nothing but the desert or the cell can exclude it from notice. JOHNSON.

Every government, say the politicians, is perpetually degenerating towards *corruption*.

JOHNSON.

TO DEPRECIATE, *v.* To disparage.

kingdom cannot ever be *abridged* at the mere discretion of the magistrate. BLACKSTONE.

DEPTH, PROFUNDITY.

DEPTH, from *deep*, *dip* or *dive*, the Greek *δύτης*, and the Hebrew *ta-bang* to dive, signifies the point under water which is dived for.

PROFUNDITY, from *profound*, in Latin *profundus*, compounded of *pro* or *procul* far, and *fundus* the bottom, signifies the bottom which is far down from the surface.

These terms do not differ merely in their derivation; but *depth* is indefinite in its signification; and *profundity* is a positive and considerable degree of *depth*. Moreover the word *depth* is applied to objects in general; *profundity* is confined in its application to moral objects: thus we speak of the *depth* of the sea, or the *depth* of a person's learning; but his *profundity* of thought.

By these two passions of hope and fear, we reach forward into futurity, and bring up to our present thoughts objects that lie in the remotest depths of time. ADDISON.

The penman of Swift will want very little previous knowledge: it will be sufficient that he is acquainted with common words and common things; he is neither required to mount elevations nor to explore profundities. JOHNSON.

TO DEPUTE, *v.* *To constitute.*

DEPUTY, *v.* *Ambassador.*

DEPUTY, *v.* *Delegate.*

TO DERANGE, *v.* *To disorder.*

DERANGEMENT, INSANITY, LUNACY, MADNESS, MANIA.

DERANGEMENT, from the verb to *derange*, implies the first stage of intellect. **INSANITY**, or unsoundness, implies positive disease, which is more or less permanent. **LUNACY** is a violent sort of insanity, which was supposed to be influenced by the moon. **MADNESS** and **MANIA**, from the Greek *μανία* to rage, implies insanity or lunacy in its most furious and confirmed stage. *Deranged* persons may sometimes be perfectly sensible in every thing but particular subjects. *Insane* persons are sometimes entirely restored. *Lunatics* have their lucid intervals, and *maniacs* their intervals of repose.

Derangement may sometimes be applied to the temporary confusion of a disturbed mind, which is not in full possession of all its faculties: *madness* may sometimes be the result of violently inflamed passions: and *mania* may be applied to any vehement attachment which takes possession of the mind.

Perhaps it might be no absurd or unreasonable regulation in the legislature to divest all lunatics of the privilege of insanity, and in cases of enormity to subject them to the common penalties of the law. SMOLLET.

A lunatic is indeed sometimes merry, but the merry lunatic is never kind. HAWKSWORTH.

The consequences of murder committed by a maniac may be as pernicious to society as those of the most criminal and deliberate assassination. SMOLLET.

The locomotive mania of an Englishman circulates his person, and of course his cash, into every quarter of the kingdom. CUMBERLAND.

TO DERIDE, MOCK, RIDICULE, RALLY, BANTER.

DERIDE, compounded of *de* and the Latin *rideo*; and **RIDICULE**, from *rideo*, both signify to laugh at.

MOCK, in French *moquer*, Dutch *mocken*, Greek *μαχαν*, signifies likewise to laugh at.

RALLY, in French *railler*.

BANTER, possibly from the French *badiner* to jest.

Strong expressions of contempt are designated by all these terms.

Derision and *mockery* evince themselves by the outward actions in general; *ridicule* consists more in words than actions; *rallying* and *bantering* almost entirely in words. *Deride* is not so strong a term as *mock*, but much stronger than *ridicule*. There is always a mixture of hostility in *derision* and *mockery*; but *ridicule* is frequently unaccompanied with any personal feeling of displeasure. *Derision* is often deep, not loud; it discovers itself in suppressed laughs, contemptuous sneers or gesticulations, and cutting expressions: *mockery* is mostly noisy and outrageous; it breaks forth in insulting buffoonery, and is sometimes accompanied with personal violence: the former consists of real but contemptuous laughter; the latter often of affected laughter and grimace. *Derision* and

stances or observations. The Trojans *derived* the name of their city from Tros, a king of Phrygia; they *traced* the line of their kings down to Dardanus; Copernicus *deduced* the principle of the earth's turning round from several simple observations, particularly from the apparent and contrary motion of bodies that are really at rest. The English tongue is of such mixed origin that there is scarcely any known language from which some one of its words is not *derivable*; it is an interesting employment to *trace* the progress of science and civilization in countries which have been involved in ignorance and barbarism; from the writings of Locke and other philosophers of an equally loose stamp, have been *deduced* principles both in morals and politics that are destructive to the happiness of men in civil society.

The kings among the heathens ever *derived* themselves or their ancestors from some good.

TEMPLE.

Let Newton, pure intelligence! whom God
To mortals lent to trace his boundless works,
From laws ably simple speak thy fame.

THOMSON.

From the discovery of some natural authority
may perhaps be *deduced* a truer original of all
governments among men than from any con-
tracts.

TEMPLE.

TO DEROGATE, *v.* To *dis-*
parage.

TO DESCRIBE, *v.* To *relate*.

DESCRIPTION, *v.* *Account*.

DESCRIPTION, *v.* *Cast*.

TO DESCHY, *v.* To *find*.

TO DESCRY, *v.* To *see*.

TO DESERT, *v.* To *abandon*.

TO DESERT, *v.* To *abdicate*.

DESERT, MERIT, WORTH.

DESERT from *deserve*, in Latin *deservio*, signifies to do service or be *serviceable*.

MERIT, in Latin *meritus* participle of *mereor*, comes from the Greek *meris* to get, because he who *merits* has a right to get.

WORTH, in German *werth*, is connected with *würde* dignity, and *bürde* a burden, because one bears *worth* as a thing attached to the person.

Desert is taken for that which is good or bad; *merit* for that which is good only. We *deserve* praise or blame: we *merit* a reward. The *desert* consists in the action, work, or service performed; the *merit* has regard to the character of the agent or the nature of the action. The person does not *deserve* the recompence until he has performed the service; he does not *merit* approbation if he have not done his part well.

Deserve is a term of ordinary import: *merit* applies to objects of greater moment: the former includes matters of personal and physical gratification; the latter those altogether of an intellectual nature. Children are always acting so as to *deserve* either reproof or commendation, reward or punishment; candidates for public applause or honors conceive they have frequent occasion to complain that they are not treated according to their *merits*. Criminals cannot always be punished according to their *deserts*; a noble mind is not contented with barely obtaining, it seeks to *merit* what it obtains.

The idea of value, which is prominent in the signification of the term *merit*, renders it closely allied to that of *worth*. The man of *merit* looks to the advantages which shall accrue to himself; the man of *worth* is contented with the consciousness of what he possesses in himself: *merit* respects the attainments or qualifications of a man; *worth* respects his moral qualities only. It is possible therefore for a man to have great *merit* and little or no *worth*. He who has great powers and uses them for the advantage of himself or others is a man of *merit*; he only who does good from a good motive is a man of *worth*. We look for *merit* among men in the discharge of their several offices or duties; we look for *worth* in their social capacities.

The beauteous champion views with marks of
fear,

Smilt with a conscious sense, retires behind,
And shuns the fate he well *deserv'd* to find.

Pope.

Praise from a friend or censure from a foe
Are lost on hearers that our *merits* know.

To birth or office, no respect be paid,
Let *worth* determine here.

Pope

down rules which are not *intended* to be kept; an honest man always *means* to satisfy his creditors.

Design and *purpose* are taken sometimes in the abstract sense; *intend* and *mean* always in connexion with the agent who *intends* or *means*: we see a *design* in the whole creation which leads us to reflect on the wisdom and goodness of the Creator; whenever we see any thing done we are led to inquire the *purpose* for which it is done; or are desirous of knowing the *intention* of the person for so doing: things are said to be done with a *design*, in opposition to that which happens by chance; they are said to be done for a *purpose*, in reference to the immediate *purpose* which is expected to result from them. *Design*, when not expressly qualified by a contrary epithet, is used in a bad sense in connexion with a particular agent; *purpose*, *intention*, and *meaning*, in an indifferent sense: a *designing* person is full of latent and interested *designs*; there is nothing so good that it may not be made to serve the *purposes* of those who are bad; the *intentions* of a man must always be taken into the account when we are forming an estimate of his actions; ignorant people frequently *mean* much better than they do.

Nothing can evince greater depravity of mind than *designedly* to rob another of his good name; when a person wishes to get any information he *purposely* directs his discourse to the subject upon which he desires to be informed; if we *unintentionally* incur the displeasure of another, it is to be reckoned our misfortune rather than our fault; it is not enough for our endeavours to be well *meant*, if they be not also well directed.

Jove honours me and favors my *designs*,
His pleasure guides me, and his will confines.

POPE.

Proud as he is, that iron heart retains
His stubborn *purpose*, and his friends disdain.

POPE.

And must I then, O sire of floods!
Bear this fierce answer to the king of gods!
Correct it yet, and change thy rash *intent*;
A noble mind disdain not to repent.

POPE.

Then first Polydamus the silence broke,
Long weigh'd the signal, and to Hector spoke:
How oft, my brother! thy reproach I bear,
For words well *meant* and sentiments sincere.

POPE.

DESIGN, PLAN, SCHEME, PROJECT.

DESIGN, *v.* To design.

PLAN, in French *plan*, comes from *plane* or *plain*, in Latin *planus*, smooth or even, signifying in general any *plane* place, or in particular the even surface on which a building is raised: and by an extended application the sketch of the *plane* surface of any building or object.

SCHEME, in Latin *schema*, Greek *σχημα* the form or figure, signifies the thing drawn out in the mind.

PROJECT, in Latin *projectus*, from *projicio*, compounded of *pro* and *jacio*, signifies to cast or put forth, that is, the thing proposed.

Arrangement is the idea common to these terms: the *design* includes the thing that is to be brought about; the *plan* includes the means by which it is to be brought about: a *design* was formed in the time of James I. for overturning the government of the country; the *plan* by which this was to have been realized, consisted in placing gunpowder under the parliament-house and blowing up the assembly.

A *design* is to be estimated according to its intrinsic worth; a *plan* is to be estimated according to its relative value, or fitness for the *design*: a *design* is noble or wicked, a *plan* is practicable: every founder of a charitable institution may be supposed to have a good *design*; but he may adopt an erroneous *plan* for obtaining the end proposed.

Scheme and *project* respect both the end and the means, which makes them analogous to *design* and *plan*: the *design* stimulates to action; the *plan* determines the mode of action; the *scheme* and *project* consist most in speculation: the *design* and *plan* are equally practical, and suited to the ordinary and immediate circumstances of life: the *scheme* and *project* are contrived or conceived for extraordinary or rare occasions: no man takes any step without a *design*; a general forms the *plan* of his campaign; adventurous men are always forming *schemes* for gaining money; ambitious monarchs are full of *projects* for increasing their dominions.

but we *leave off* at our option: it is prudent to *desist* from using our endeavours when we find them ineffectual; it is natural for a person to *leave off* when he sees no farther occasion to continue his labor: he who annoys another must be made to *desist*; he who does not wish to offend will *leave off* when requested.

So ev'n and more accomplished the sixth,
Yet not till the Creator form'd his work;
Desisting, though unwearied, up return'd.

MILTON.

Vanity, the most innocent species of pride, was most frequently predominant: he (Savage) could not easily *leave off* when he had once began to mention himself or his works.

JOHNSON.

DESOLATE, *v.* Solitary.

DESOLATION, *v.* Ravage.

DESPAIR, DESPERATION,
DESPONDENCY.

DESPAIR, DESPERATION, from the French *desespoir*, compounded of the privative *de* and the Latin *spes* hope, signifies the absence or the annihilation of all hope.

DESPONDENCY, from *despond*, in Latin *despondeo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *spondeo* to promise, signifies literally to deprive in a solemn manner, or cut off from every gleam of hope.

Despair is a state of mind produced by the view of external circumstances; *desperation* and *despondency* may be the fruit of the imagination; the former therefore always rests on some ground, the latter are sometimes ideal: *despair* lies mostly in reflection; *desperation* and *despondency* in the feelings; the former marks a state of vehement and impatient feeling, the latter that of fallen and mournful feeling. *Despair* is often the forerunner of *desperation* and *despondency*, but it is not necessarily accompanied with effects so powerful: the strongest mind may have occasion to *despair* when circumstances warrant the sentiment; men of an impetuous character are apt to run into a state of *desperation*; a weak mind full of morbid sensibility is most liable to fall into *despondency*.

Despair interrupts or checks exertion; *desperation* impels to greater

exertions; *despondency* unfits for exertion: when a physician *despairs* of making a cure, he lays aside the application of remedies; when a soldier sees nothing but death or disgrace before him, he is driven to *desperation*, and redoubles his efforts; when a tradesman sees before him nothing but failure for the present, and want for the future, he may sink into *despondency*: *despair* is justifiable as far as it is a rational calculation into futurity from present appearances: *desperation* may arise from extraordinary circumstances or the action of strong passions; in the former case it is unavoidable, and may serve to rescue from great distress; in the latter case it is mostly attended with fatal consequences: *despondency* is a disease of the mind, which nothing but a firm trust in the goodness of Providence can obviate.

Despair and grief distract my lab'ring mind;
Gods! what a crime my impious heart design'd.

Pope.

It may be generally remarked of those who squander what they know their fortune is not sufficient to allow, that in their most jovial moments there always breaks out some proof of discontent and impatience; they either scatter with a wild *desperation*, or pay their money with a peevish anxiety.

JOHNSON.

Thomson submitting his productions to some who thought themselves qualified to criticize, he heard of nothing but faults; but finding other judges more favorable, he did not suffer himself to sink into *despondence*.

JOHNSON.

DESPERATE, HOPELESS.

DESPERATE (*v.* *Despair*) is applicable to persons or things; HOPELESS to things only: a person makes a *desperate* effort; he undertakes a *hopeless* task.

Desperate, when applied to things, expresses more than *hopeless*; the latter marks the absence of hope as to the attainment of good, the former marks the absence of hope as to the removal of an evil: a person who is in a *desperate* condition is overwhelmed with actual trouble for the present, and the prospect of its continuance for the future; he whose case is *hopeless* is without the prospect of effecting the end he has in view: gamblers are frequently brought into *desperate* situations when bereft of every thing that might possibly serve to lighten the

Oh! grant me, gods! ere Hector meets his
doom,

All I can ask of Heav'n, an early tomb. **Pope.**

DESTINY, DESTINATION.

BOTH DESTINY and DESTINATION are used for the thing *destined*; but the former is said in relation to a man's important concerns, the latter only of particular circumstances; in which sense it may likewise be employed for the act of *destining*.

The *destiny* is the point or line marked out in the walk of life; the *destination* is the place fixed upon in particular: as every man has his peculiar *destiny*, so every traveller has his particular *destination*. *Destiny* is altogether set above human control; no man can determine, though he may influence, the *destiny* of another: *destination* is, however, the specific act of an individual, either for himself or another: we leave the *destiny* of a man to develop itself; but we may inquire about his own *destination*, or that of his children: it is a consoling reflection that the *destinies* of short-sighted mortals, like ourselves, are in the hands of One, who both can and will overrule them to our advantage if we place full reliance in Him; in the *destination* of children for their several professions or callings, it is of importance to consult the particular turn of mind, as well as inclination.

Milton had once designed to celebrate king Arthur, as he hints in his verses to Manus; but "Arthur was reserved," says Fenton, "to another *destiny*." **Johnson.**

Moore's original *destination* appears to have been for trade. **Johnson.**

DESTITUTE, v. Bare.

DESTITUTE, v. Forsaken.

TO DESTROY, v. To consume.

TO DESTROY, v. To demolish.

DESTRUCTION, RUIN.

DESTRUCTION, from *destroy* and the Latin *destruo*, signifies literally to unbuild that which is raised up.

RUIN, from the Latin *ruo* to fall, signifies to fall into pieces.

Destruction is an act of immediate violence; *ruin* is a gradual process: a thing is *destroyed* by some *external action upon it*; a thing falls

to *ruin* of itself: we witness *destruction* wherever war or the adverse elements rage; we witness *ruin* whenever the works of man are exposed to the effects of time: nevertheless if *destruction* be more forcible and rapid, *ruin* is on the other hand more sure and complete: what is *destroyed* may be rebuilt or replaced; but what is *ruined* is lost for ever, it is past recovery: when houses or towns are *destroyed*, fresh ones rise up in their place; but when commerce is *ruined*, it seldom returns to its old course.

Destruction admits of various degrees; *ruin* is something positive and general. The property of a man may be *destroyed* to a greater or less extent, without necessarily involving his *ruin*. The *ruin* of a whole family is oftentimes the consequence of *destruction* by fire. The health is *destroyed* by violent exercises, or some other active cause; it is *ruined* by a course of imprudent conduct. The happiness of a family is *destroyed* by broils and discord; the morals of a young man are *ruined* by a continued intercourse with vicious companions.

Destruction may be used either in the proper or the improper sense; *ruin* has mostly a moral application. The *destruction* of both body and soul is the consequence of sin; the *ruin* of a man, whether in his temporal or spiritual concerns, is inevitable, if he follow the dictates of misguided passion.

Destruction hangs o'er yon devoted wall,
And nodding Ilion waits th' impending fall.

Pope.

The day shall come, that great avenging day,
Which Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay;
When Priam's pow'rs, and Priam's self, shall fall,
And one prodigious *ruin* swallow all. **Pope.**

DESTRUCTIVE, RUINOUS, PERNICIOUS.

DESTRUCTIVE signifies producing *destruction* (v. *Destruction*).

RUINOUS signifies either having or causing *ruin* (v. *Destruction*).

PERNICIOUS, from the Latin *perniciēs* or *per* and *neco* to kill violently, signifies causing violent and total dissolution.

Destructive and *ruinous*, as the epithets of the preceding terms, have a similar distinction in their sense and

The proud man discourages those from approaching him who are of a mean condition, and who must want his assistance. ADDISON.

Be not disheartened then, nor cloud those looks,
That went to be more cheerful and serene,
Than when fair morning first smiles on the world. MILTON.

TO DETERMINE, *v.* To decide.

TO DETERMINE, RESOLVE.

DETERMINE, *v.* To decide.

RESOLVE, *v.* Courage.

To *determine* is more especially an act of the judgement; * to *resolve* is an act of the will: the former requires examination and choice; we *determine* how or what we shall do: the latter requires a firm spirit; we *resolve* that we will do what we have *determined* upon. Our *determinations* should be prudent, that they may not cause repentance; our *resolutions* should be fixed, in order to prevent variation. There can be no co-operation with a man who is *undetermined*; it will be dangerous to co-operate with a man who is *irresolute*.

In the ordinary concerns of life we have frequent occasion to *determine* without *resolving*; in the discharge of our moral duties, or the performance of any office, we have occasion to *resolve* without *determining*. A master *determines* to dismiss his servant; the servant *resolves* on becoming more diligent. Personal convenience or necessity gives rise to the *determination*; a sense of duty, honor, fidelity, and the like, gives birth to the *resolution*. A traveller *determines* to take a certain rout; a learner *resolves* to conquer every difficulty in the acquirement of learning. Humour or change of circumstances occasions a person to alter his *determination*; timidity, fear, or defect in principle, occasions the *resolution* to waver. Children are not capable of *determining*; and their best *resolutions* fall before the gratification of the moment. Those who *determine* hastily are frequently under the necessity of altering their *determinations*: there are no *resolutions* so weak as those that are made on a sick bed; the return of health is quickly succeeded by a recurrence to the former course of life.

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Decision, resolution."

In science, *determine* is to fix the mind, or to cause it to rest in a certain opinion; to *resolve* is to lay open what is obscure, to clear the mind from doubt and hesitation. We *determine* points of question; we *resolve* difficulties. It is more difficult to *determine* in matters of rank or precedence than in cases where the solid and real interests of men are concerned: it is the business of the teacher to *resolve* the difficulties which are proposed by the scholar. Every point is not proved which is *determined*; nor is every difficulty *resolved* which is answered.

When the mind hovers among such a variety of allurements, one had better settle on a way of life that is not the very best we might have chosen, than grow old without *determining* our choice.

ADDISON.

The *resolution* of dying to end our miseries does not show such a degree of magnanimity, as a *resolution* to bear them, and submit to the dispensations of Providence. ADDISON.

We pray against nothing but sin, and against evil in general (in the Lord's prayer), leaving it with Omniscience to *determine* what is really such. ADDISON.

I think there is no great difficulty in *resolving* your doubts. The reasons for which you are inclined to visit London are, I think, not of sufficient strength to answer the objections. JOHNSON.

TO DETERMINE, *v.* To fix.

DETERMINED, *v.* Decided.

TO DETEST, *v.* To abhor.

TO DETEST, *v.* To hate.

DETESTABLE, *v.* Abominable.

TO DETRACT, *v.* To asperse.

TO DETRACT, *v.* To disparage.

DETRIMENT, *v.* Disadvantage.

DEVASTATION, *v.* Ravage.

TO DEVELOPE, *v.* To unfold.

TO DEVIATE, WANDER,
SWERVE, STRAY.

DEVIATE, from *devious*, and the Latin *de via*, signifies literally to turn out of the way.

WANDER, in German *wandern*, or *wandeln*, probably connected with *wenden* to turn, and the Greek *βασις* to go, signifies in general the act of going.

Since the *devil** is represented as the father of all wickedness, associations have been connected with the name that render its pronunciation in familiar discourse offensive to the chastened ear; while *demon* is a term of indifferent application, that is commonly substituted in its stead to designate either a good or an evil spirit.

Malice and fraud are the peculiar characteristics of the *devil*; rage is properly that of a *demon*. The *devil* is said in proverbial discourse to be in such things as go contrary to the wish; the *demon* of jealousy is said to possess the mind that is altogether carried away with that passion. Men who wish to have credit for more goodness than they possess, and to throw the load of guilt off themselves, attribute to the *devil* a perpetual endeavour to draw them into the commission of crimes; wherever the *demon* of discord has got admittance there is a farewell to all the comforts of social life.

The enemies we are to contend with are not men but *devils*. TILLOTSON.

My good *demon* who sat at my right hand during the course of this whole vision, observing in me a burning desire to join that glorious company, told me he highly approved of that generous ardor with which I seemed transported.

ADDISON.

TO DEVISE, *v.* To contrive.

TO DEVISE, BEQUEATH.

DEVISE, compounded of *de* and *visc* or *visus* participle of *video* to see or show, signifies to point out specifically.

BEQUEATH, compounded of *be* and *queath*, in Saxon *cucsan*, from the Latin *quæso* to say, signifies to give over to a person by saying or by word of mouth.

To *devise* is a formal, to *bequeath* is an informal assignment of our property to another on our death. We *devise* therefore only by a legal testament; we may *bequeath* simply by word of mouth, or by any expression of our will: we can *devise* only that which is property in the eye of the law; we may *bequeath* in the moral sense any thing which we cause to pass over to another: a man *devises*

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Diable, démon."

his lands; he *bequeaths* his name or his glory to his children.

The right of inheritance or descent to his children and relations seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right of *devising* by testament.

BLACKSTONE.

With this, the Modes to lab'ring age bequeath
New lungs.

DRYDEN.

DEVOID, *v.* Empty.

TO DEVOTE, *v.* To addict.

TO DEVOTE, *v.* To dedicate.

DEVOUT, *v.* Holy.

DEXTERITY, ADDRESS, ABILITY.

DEXTERITY, in Latin *dexteritas*, comes from *dexter* the right hand, because that is the member most fitted for *dexterous* execution.

ADDRESS signifies properly the mode of *address* or of managing one's self (*v.* *Address*).

ABILITY (*v.* *Ability*) signifies the power of having or holding one's self.

Dexterity, says the Abbé Girard,† respects the manner of executing things; it is the mechanical facility of performing an office: *address* refers to the use of means in executing: *ability* to the discernment of the things themselves.

Dexterity and *address* are but in fact modes of *ability*: the former may be acquired; the latter is the gift of nature: we may have *ability* to any degree (*v.* *Ability*), but *dexterity* and *address* are positive degrees of *ability*. To form a good government there must be *ability* in the prince or his ministers; *address* in those to whom the detail of operations is entrusted; and *dexterity* in those to whom the execution of orders is entrusted. With little *ability* and long habit in transacting business, we may acquire a *dexterity* in dispatching it, and *address* in giving it whatever turn will best suit our purpose.

Dexterity lends an air of ease to every action; *address* supplies art and ingenuity in contrivance; *ability* enables us to act with intelligence and confidence. To manage the whip with *dexterity*, to carry on an intrigue with *address*, to display some *ability* on the turf, will raise a man high in the rank of the present fashionables.

† Vide "Dextérité, adresse, habilité."

STYLE comes from the Latin *stylus* the bodkin with which they both wrote and corrected what they had written on their waxen tablets; whence the word has been used for the manner of writ-

literary works. *Diction* requires only to be pure and clear; *style* may likewise be neat, elegant, florid, poetic, sober, and the like.

Diction is said mostly in regard to what is written; *phrase* and *phraseology* are said as often of what is spoken as what is written. He has adapted a strange *phrase* or *phraseology*; the former respects single words; the latter comprehends a succession of *phrases*.

Fair's diction is more his own than that of any among the successors of Dryden. JOHNSON.

I think we may say with justice that when mortals converse with their Creator, they cannot do it in so proper a style as in that of the Holy Scriptures. ANON.

Wade am I in speech,
And like him with the soft phrases of speech. SHAKESPEARE.

I was no longer able to accommodate myself to the accidental current of my conversation; my notions grew particular and paradoxical, and my phraseology formal and unfashionable. JOHNSON.

DICTIONARY, ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

DICTIONARY, from the Latin *dictum* a saying or word, is a register of words.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA, from the Greek *ἐνκυκλοπαιδία* or *ἐν κύκλῳ* and *παιδία* learning, signifies a register of things.

The definition of words, with their various changes, modifications, uses, acceptations and applications, are the proper subjects of a *dictionary*; the nature and property of things with their construction, uses, powers, &c. &c. are the proper subjects of an *encyclopædia*. A general acquaintance with all arts and sciences as far as respects the use of technical terms, and a perfect acquaintance with the classical writers in the language, are essential for the composition of a *dictionary*; an entire acquaintance with all the minutiae of every art and science is requisite for the composition of an *encyclopædia*. A single individual may qualify himself for the task of writing a *dictionary*; but the universality and diversity of knowledge contained in an *encyclopædia* render it necessarily the work of many.

A *dictionary* has been extended in its application to any work alphabetically arranged, as biographical, medical, botanical *dictionaries*, and the like, but still preserving this distinction, that the *dictionary* always contains only a general or partial illustration of the subject proposed, whilst the *encyclopædia* embraces the whole circuit of science.

If a man that lived an age or two ago should return into the world again, he would really want a *dictionary* to help him to understand his own language. TULLOCH.

Every science borrows from all the rest, and we cannot attain any single one without the *encyclopædia*. GRANTHAM.

DICTIONARY, LEXICON, VOCABULARY, GLOSSARY, NOMENCLATURE.

DICTIONARY, *v.* *Dictionary*, is a general term, LEXICON from *λεγω* to say. VOCABULARY from *vox*, a word, GLOSSARY from *gloss* to explain, and NOMENCLATURE from *nomen*, are all species of the *dictionary*.

Lexicon is a species of *dictionary*

appropriately applied to the dead languages. A Greek or Hebrew *lexicon* is distinguished from a *dictionary* of the French or English. A *vocabulary* is a partial kind of *dictionary* which may comprehend a simple list of words, with or without explanation, arranged in order or otherwise. A *glossary* is an explanatory *vocabulary*, which commonly serves to explain the obsolete terms employed in any old author. A *nomenclature* is literally a list of names, and in particular reference to proper names.

TO DIE, EXPIRE.

DIE, in low German *doen*, Danish *døe*, from the Greek *θνήσκειν* to kill, designates in general the extinction of being.

EXPIRE, from the Latin *e* or *ex* and *spiro* to breathe out, designates the last action of life in certain objects.

She died every day she lived.

Rowe.

Pope died in the evening of the thirtieth day of May, 1744, so placidly, that the attendants did not discern the exact time of his expiration.

Johnson.

* There are beings, such as trees and plants, which are said to live, although they have not breath; these *die*, but do not *expire*: there are other beings which absorb and emit air, but do not live; such as the flame of a lamp, which does not *die*, but it *expires*. By a natural metaphor, the time of being is put for the life of objects; and hence we speak of the date *expiring*, the term *expiring*, and the like; and as life is applied figuratively to moral objects, so may death to objects not having physical life.

A parliament may expire by length of time.

Blackstone.

A dissolution is the civil death of parliament.

Blackstone.

When Alexander the Great died, the Grecian monarchy expired with him.

South.

TO DIE, v. To perish.

DIET, v. Food.

DIET, v. Assembly.

TO DIFFER, VARY, DISAGREE, DISSENT.

DIFFER, in Latin *differo* or *dis* and *fero*, signifies to make into two.

* Translator: "Die, expire."

VARY, v. To change, alter.

DISAGREE is literally not to agree.

DISSENT, in Latin *dissentio* or *dis* and *sentio*, signifies to think or feel apart or differently.

Differ, vary, and disagree, are applicable either to persons or things; *dissent* to persons only. First as to persons: to *differ* is the most general and indefinite term, the rest are but modes of *difference*: we may *differ* from any cause, or in any degree; we *vary* only in small matters; thus persons may *differ* or *vary* in their statements. There must be two at least to *differ*; and there may be an indefinite number: one may *vary*, or an indefinite number may *vary*; two or a specific number *disagree*: thus two or more may *differ* in an account which they give; one person may *vary* at different times in the account which he gives; and two particular individuals *disagree*: we may *differ* in matters of fact or speculation; we *vary* only in matters of fact; we *disagree* mostly in matters of speculation. Historians may *differ* in the representation of an affair, and authors may *differ* in their views of a particular subject; narrators *vary* in certain circumstances; two particular philosophers *disagree* in accounting for a phenomenon.

To *disagree* is the act of one man with another: to *dissent* is the act of one or more in relation to a community; thus two writers on the same subject may *disagree* in their conclusions, because they set out from *different* premises; men *dissent* from the established religion of their country according to their education and character.

When applied to the ordinary transactions of life, *differences* may exist merely in opinion, or with a mixture of more or less acrimonious and discordant feeling; *variances* arise from a collision of interests; *disagreements* from asperity of humor; *dissensions* from a clashing of opinions; *differences* may exist between nations, and may be settled by cool discussions; when *variances* arise between neighbours, their passions often interfere to prevent accommodations;

When members of a family consult interest or humor rather than affections, there will be necessarily *disagreements*; and when many members of a community have an equal liberty to express their opinions, there will necessarily be *dissensions*.

The ministers of the different potentates conferred and conferred; but the peace advanced so slowly, that speedier methods were found necessary, and Bolingbroke was sent to Paris to adjust differences with less formality. JOHNSON.

How many bleed
By shameful variance betwixt man and man.
THOMSON.

On his arrival at Geneva, Goldsmith was recommended as a travelling tutor to a young gentleman who had been unexpectedly left a sum of money by a near relation. This connexion lasted but a short time: they *disagreed* in the south of France and parted. JOHNSON.

When Carthage shall contend the world with
Rome,

Then is your time for faction and debate,
For partial favor and permitted hate:
Let now your immature *dissension* cease.
DRYDEN.

In regard to things, *differ* is said of two things with respect to each other; *vary* of one thing in respect to itself: thus two tempers *differ* from each other, and a person's temper *varies* from time to time. Things *differ* in their essences, they *vary* in their accidents; thus the genera and species of things *differ* from each other, and the individuals of each species *vary*: *differ* is said of every thing promiscuously, but *disagree* is only said of such things as might agree; thus two trees *differ* from each by the course of things, but two numbers *disagree* which are intended to agree.

We do not know in what either reason or instinct consist, and therefore cannot tell with exactness in what they *differ*. JOHNSON.

That mind and body often sympathize
Is plain; such is this union nature ties:
But then as often too they *disagree*,
Which proves the soul's superior progeny.

JENYNS.

Trade and commerce might doubtless be still carried a thousand ways, out of which would arise such branches as have not been touched.

JOHNSON.

DIFFERENCE, VARIETY, DIVERSITY, MEDLEY.

DIFFERENCE signifies the cause or the act of differing.

VARIETY, from *various* or *vary*,

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Difference, diversité, variété, bigarrure."

in Latin *varius*, probably comes from *varus* a speck or speckle, because this is the best emblem of *variety*.

DIVERSITY, in Latin *diversitas*, comes from *diverto*, compounded of *di* and *verto*, and signifies to turn asunder.

MEDLEY comes from the word *meddle*, which is but a change from *mingle*, *mix*, &c.

Difference and *variety* seem to lie in the things themselves; *diversity* and *medley* are created either by accident or design: the *difference* may lie in two objects only; a *variety* cannot exist without an assemblage: the *difference* is discovered by means of a comparison which the mind forms of objects to prevent confusion; the *variety* strikes on the mind, and pleases the imagination with many agreeable images; it is opposed to dull uniformity: the acute observer traces *differences*, however minute, in the objects of his research, and by this means is enabled to class them under their general or particular heads; nature affords such an infinite *variety* in every thing which exists, that if we do not perceive it the fault is in ourselves; the *diversity* arises from an assemblage of objects naturally contrasted; the *medley* is produced by an assemblage of objects so ill suited as to produce a ludicrous effect.

Diversity exists in the tastes or opinions of men; the *medley* is produced by the concurrence of such tastes or opinions as can in no wise coalesce: where the minds of men are disengaged from the shackles of superstition and despotism, there will be a great *diversity* of opinions; where a number of men come together with *different* habits, we may expect to find a *medley* of characters; good taste may render a *diversity* of color agreeable to the eye; caprice or bad taste will be apt to form a ridiculous *medley* of colors and ornaments. A *diversity* of sounds heard at a suitable distance in the stillness of the evening, will have an agreeable effect on the ear; a *medley* of noises, whether heard near or at a distance, must always be harsh and offensive.

I have often thought if the minds of men were

DISTINCT, in Latin *distinctus* participle of *distinguo* (*v. To abstract, separate*).

SEPARATE, *v. To abstract*.

Difference is opposed to similitude; there is no *difference* between objects absolutely alike: *distinctness* is opposed to identity; there can be no *distinction* where there is only one and the same being: *separation* is opposed to unity; there can be no *separation* between objects that coalesce or adhere: things may be *different* and not *distinct*, or *distinct* and not *different*: *different* is said altogether of the internal properties of things; *distinct* is said of things as objects of vision, or as they appear either to the eye or the mind: when two or more things are seen only as one, they may be *different*, but they are not *distinct*; but whatever is seen as two or more things, each complete in itself, is *distinct*, although it may not be *different*: two roads are said to be *different* which run in *different* directions, but they may not be *distinct* when seen on a map: on the other hand, two roads are said to be *distinct* when they are observed as two roads to run in the same direction, but they need not in any particular to be *different*: two stars of *different* magnitudes may, in certain directions, appear as one, in which case they are *different*, but not *distinct*; two books on the same subject, and by the same author, but not written in continuation of each other, are *distinct* books, but not *different*.

What is *separate* must in its nature be generally *distinct*; but every thing is not *separate* which is *distinct*: when houses are *separate* they are obviously *distinct*; but they may frequently be *distinct* when they are not positively *separated*: the *distinct* is marked out by some external sign, which determines its beginning and its end; the *separate* is that which is set apart, and to be seen by itself: *distinct* is a term used only in determining the singularity or plurality of objects; the *separate* only in regard to their proximity or to distance from each other: we speak of having a *distinct* household, but of living in *separate* apartments; of dividing one's subject into *distinct* heads, or of mak-

ing things into *separate* parcels: the body and soul are *different*, in as much as they have *different* properties; they are *distinct* in as much as they have marks by which they may be *distinguished*, and at death they will be *separate*.

No hostile arms approach your happy ground;
Far *diff'rent* is my fate. DAYDEN.

His *sep'rate* troops let every leader call,
Each strengthen each, and all encourage all;
What chief or soldier of the num'rous band,
Or bravely fights or ill obeys command,
When thus *distinct* they war, soon shall be known. POPE.

DIFFERENT, SEVERAL, DIVERS, SUNDRY, VARIOUS.

ALL these terms are employed to mark a number (*v. To differ, vary*); but DIFFERENT is the most indefinite of all these terms, as its office is rather to define the quality than the number, and is equally applicable to few and many; it is opposed to singularity, but the other terms are employed positively to express many. SEVERAL, from *sever*, signifies split or made into many; they may be either *different* or alike: there may be *several* different things, or *several* things alike; but there cannot be *several* divers things, for the word *divers* signifies properly many *different*. SUNDRY, from *asunder* or apart, signifies many scattered or at a distance, whether as it regards time or space. VARIOUS expresses not only a greater number, but a greater *diversity* than all the rest.

The same thing often affects *different* persons *differently*: an individual may be affected *several* times in the same way; or particular persons may be affected at *sundry* times and in *divers* manners; the ways in which men are affected are so *various* as not to admit of enumeration: it is not so much to understand *different* languages as to understand *several different* languages; *divers* modes have been suggested and tried for the good education of youth, but most of too theoretical a nature to admit of being reduced successfully to practice; an incorrect writer omits *sundry* articles that belong to a statement; we need not wonder at the misery which is introduced into families by extravagance and luxury, when we notice the inf-

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nitely various allurements for spending money which are held out to the young and the thoughtless.

It is astonishing to consider the *different* degrees of care that descend from the parent to the young, so far as is absolutely necessary for the leaving a posterity. ANON.

The bishop has several courts under him, and may visit at pleasure every part of his diocese. BLACKSTONE.

In the frame and constitution of the economical polity, there are *divers* ranks and degrees. BLACKSTONE.

Fat olives of sundry sorts appear,
Of sundry shapes their waxy heads bear. DAYTON.

As land is improved by sowing it with various seeds, so is the mind by ennobling it with different studies. MILMOR'S LESSONS OF PAPER.

DIFFERENT, UNLIKE.

DIFFERENT is positive, UNLIKE is negative: we look at what is *different*, and draw a comparison; but that which is *unlike* needs no comparison: a thing is said to be *different* from every other thing, or *unlike* to any thing seen before; which latter mode of expression obviously conveys less to the mind than the former.

How *different* is the view of past life in the man who is grown old in knowledge and wisdom from that of him who is grown old in ignorance and folly. ANON.

How far *unlike* those chiefs of race divine,
How vast the difference of their deeds and mine. PAR.

DIFFICULT, *v.* *Arduous*.

DIFFICULT, *v.* *Hard*.

DIFFICULTIES, EMBARRASSEMENTS, TROUBLES.

THESE terms are all applicable to a person's concerns in life; but DIFFICULTIES relate to the *difficulty* (*v.* *Difficulty*) of conducting a business; EMBARRASSEMENTS relate to the confusion attending a state of debt; and TROUBLE to the pain which is the natural consequence of not fulfilling engagements or answering demands. Of the three, *difficulties* expresses the least, and *troubles* the most. A young man on his entrance into the world will unavoidably experience *difficulties*, if not provided with ample means in the outset. But let his means be ever so ample, if he have

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Difficulté, obstacle, embarras."

~~usual~~ career; ignorance in the language is the greatest impediment which a foreigner experiences in the pursuit of any object out of his own country.

Truth has less of trouble and difficulty of entanglement and perplexity of danger and hazard in it. TILLOTSON.

One obstacle must have stood not a little in the way of that preferment after which Young seems to have panted. Though he took orders, he never entirely shook off politics. CROFT.

The necessity of complying with times, and of sparing persons, is the great impediment of biography. JOHNSON.

DIFFIDENT, *v. Distrustful.*

DIFFIDENT, *v. Modest.*

DIFFUSE, PROLIX.

BOTH mark defects of style opposed to brevity.

DIFFUSE, in Latin *diffusus* participle of *diffundo* to pour out or spread wide, marks the quality of being extended in space.

PROLIX, in French *prolix*, changed from *prolarus*, signifies to let loose in a wide space.

The *diffuse* is properly opposed to the precise; the *prolix* to the concise or laconic. A *diffuse* writer is fond of amplification, he abounds in epithets, tropes, figures, and illustrations; the *prolix* writer is fond of circumlocution, minute details, and trifling particulars. *Diffuseness* is a fault only in degree, and according to circumstances; *prolixity* is a positive fault at all times. The former leads to the use of words unnecessarily; the latter to the use of phrases, as well as words, that are altogether useless: the *diffuse* style has too much of repetition; the *prolix* style abounds in tautology. *Diffuseness* often arises from an exuberance of imagination; *prolixity* from the want of imagination; on the other hand the former may be coupled with great superficiality, and the latter with great solidity.

Gibbon and other modern writers have fallen into the error of *diffuseness*. Lord Clarendon and many English writers preceding him are chargeable with *prolixity*.

Few authors are more clear and perspicuous on the whole than Archbishop Tillotson and Sir William Temple, yet neither of them are re-

markable for precision; they are loose and *diffuse*. BLAIR.

I look upon a tedious talker, or what is generally known by the name of a story teller, to be much more insufferable than a *prolix* writer. STARR

TO DIFFUSE, *v. To spread.*

DIGEST, *v. Abridgement.*

TO DIGEST, *v. To dispose.*

DIGNIFIED, *v. Majestic.*

DIGNITY, *v. Honor.*

TO DIGRESS, DEVIATE.

BOTH in the original and the accepted sense, these words express going out of the ordinary course; but DIGRESS is used only in particular, and DEVIATE in general cases. We *digress* only in a narrative whether written or spoken; we *deviate* in actions as well as in words, in our conduct as well as in writings.

Digress is mostly taken in a good or indifferent sense; *deviate* in an indifferent or bad sense. Although frequent *digressions* are faulty, yet occasionally it is necessary to *digress* for the purposes of explanation; every *deviation* is bad, which is not sanctioned by the necessity of circumstances.

The *digressions* in the Tale of a Tub, relating to Wotton and Bentley, must be confessed to discover want of knowledge or want of integrity. JOHNSON.

A resolution was taken (by the authors of the Spectator) of courting general approbation by general topics; to this practice they adhered with few *deviations*. JOHNSON.

TO DILATE, EXPAND.

DILATE, in Latin *dilato* from *di* apart and *latus* wide, that is, to make very wide.

EXPAND, in Latin *expando* compounded of *ex* and *pando* to spread, from the Greek *φαίω* to appear or show, signifying to set forth or lay open to view by spreading out.

The idea of drawing any thing out so as to occupy a greater space is common to these terms in opposition to contracting. *Dilate* is an intransitive verb; *expand* is transitive or intransitive; the former marks the action of any body within itself; the latter an external action on any body. A bladder *dilates* on the admission

DIRECTION, ADDRESS, SUPERScription.

DIRECTION (*v. To direct*), marks that which directs.

ADDRESS (*v. To address*) is that which addresses.

SUPERScription from *super* and *scribo*, signifies that which is written over.

Although these terms may be used promiscuously for each other, yet they have a peculiarity of signification by which their proper use is defined: the *direction* may serve to direct to places as well as to persons: the *address* is never used but in direct application to the person: the *superscription* has more respect to the thing than the person. The *direction* may be written or verbal; the *address* in this sense is always written; the *superscription* must not only be written but either on or over some other thing: a *direction* is given to such as go in search of persons and places, it ought to be clear and particular: an *address* is put either on a card, and a letter, or in a book; it ought to be suitable to the station and situation of the person *addressed*: a *superscription* is placed at the head of other writings or over tombs and pillars; it ought to be appropriate.

There could not be a greater chance than that which brought to light the powder treason, when Providence (as it were, snatch'd a king and kingdom out of the very jaws of death only by the mistake of a word in the *direction* of a letter.

SOUTH.

We think you may be able to point out to him the evil of succeeding; if it be solicitation, you will tell him where to *address* it.

LORD CHESTERFIELD.

Deceit and hypocrisy carry in them more of the express image and *superscription* of the devil than any bodily sins whatsoever. SOUTH.

DIRECTION, ORDER.

DIRECTION, *v. To direct*.

ORDER, *v. To command*.

Direction contains most of instruction in it: *order* most of authority. *Directions* should be followed; *orders* obeyed. It is necessary to *direct* those who are unable to act for themselves: it is necessary to *order* those whose business it is to execute the *orders*. To servants and children the *directions* must be clear, simple, and precise; to tradespeople the *orders* may be particular or general.

Directions extend to the moral conduct of others, as well as the ordinary concerns of life; *orders* are confined to the personal convenience of the individual. A parent *directs* a child as to his behaviour in company, or as to his conduct when he enters life; a teacher *directs* his pupil in the choice of books, or in the distribution of his studies: the master gives *orders* to his attendants to be in waiting for him at a certain hour; or he gives *orders* to his tradesmen to provide what is necessary.

Then meet me forthwith at the notary's,
Give him *direction* for this merry bond.

SHAKESPEARE.

To execute laws is a royal office: to execute *orders* is not to be a king.

BURKE.

DIRECTLY, IMMEDIATELY, INSTANTLY, INSTANTANEOUSLY.

DIRECTLY signifies in a *direct* or straight manner.

IMMEDIATELY signifies without any medium or intervention.

INSTANTLY and **INSTANTANEOUSLY**, from *instant*, signifies in an instant.

Directly is most applicable to the actions of men; *immediately* and *instantly* to either actions or events. *Directly* refers to the interruptions which may intentionally delay the commencement of any work: *immediately* in general refers to the space of time that intervenes. A diligent person goes *directly* to his work; he suffers nothing to draw him aside: good news is *immediately* spread abroad upon its arrival; nothing intervenes to retard it. *Immediately* and *instantly*, or *instantaneously*, both mark a quick succession of events, but the latter in a much stronger degree than the former. *Immediately* is negative; it expresses simply that nothing intervenes: *instantly* is positive, signifying the very existing moment in which the thing happens. A person who is of a willing disposition goes or runs *immediately* to the assistance of another; but the ardor of affection impels him to fly *instantly* to his relief, as he sees the danger. A surgeon does not proceed *directly* to dress a wound: he first examines it in order to ascertain its nature: men of lively minds *immediate*

unfavorable meaning which is attached to the latter. A man may have reasons to think himself justified in *disaffection*; but he will never attempt to offer any thing in justification of *disloyalty*. A usurped government will have many *disaffected* subjects with whom it must deal leniently; the best king may have *disloyal* subjects, upon whom he must exercise the rigor of the law. Many were *disaffected* to the usurpation of Oliver Cromwell, because they would not be *disloyal* to their king.

Yet, I protest, it is no salt desire
Of seeing countries shifting for a religion;
Nor any *disaffection* to the state
Where I was bred, and unto which I owe
My dearest plots, hath brought me out.

BEN JOHNSON.

Milton being cleared from the effects of his *disloyalty*, had nothing required from him but the common duty of living in quiet. JOHNSON.

TO DISAGREE, *v. To differ.*

TO DISAPPEAR, VANISH.

To DISAPPEAR signifies not to appear (*v. Air*).

VANISH, in French *evanir*, Latin *evaneo* or *evanesco*, compounded of *e* and *vaneo*, in Greek $\phiανναι$ to appear, signifies to go out of sight.

To *disappear* comprehends no particular mode of action; to *vanish* includes in it the idea of a rapid motion. A thing *disappears* either gradually or suddenly; it *vanishes* on a sudden. A thing *disappears* in the ordinary course of things; it *vanishes* by an unusual effort, a supernatural or a magic power. Any object that recedes or moves away will soon *disappear*; in fairy tales things are made to *vanish* the instant they are beheld. To *disappear* is often a temporary action; to *vanish*, generally conveys the idea of being permanently lost to the sight. The stars appear and *disappear* in the firmament; lightning *vanishes* with a rapidity that is unequalled.

Red meteors ran across th' ethereal space,
Stars *disappear'd* and comets took their place.

DRYDEN.

Whilst I was lamenting this sudden desolation that had been made before me, the whole scene vanished.

ANDERSON.

TO DISAPPOINT, *v. To defeat.*

DISAPPROBATION, *v. Displeasure.*

TO DISAPPROVE, DISLIKE.

To DISAPPROVE is not to approve, or to think not good.

To DISLIKE is not to like, or to find unlike or unsuitable to one's wishes.

Disapprove is an act of the judgement; *dislike* is an act of the will. To *approve* or *disapprove* is peculiarly the part of a superior, or one who determines the conduct of others; to *dislike* is altogether a personal act, in which the feelings of the individual are consulted. It is a misuse of the judgement to *disapprove* where we need only *dislike*; it is a perversion of the judgement to *disapprove*, because we *dislike*.

The poem (*Samson Agonistes*) has a beginning and an end, which Aristotle himself could not have *disapproved*, but it must be allowed to want a middle. JOHNSON.

The man of peace will bear with many whose opinions or practices he *dislikes*, without an open and violent rupture. BLAIR.

DISASTER, *v. Calamity.*

TO DISAVOW, DENY.

To DISAVOW is to *avow* that a thing is not; to DENY (*v. To deny*) is to assert that a thing is not.

The *disavowal* is a general declaration; the *denial* is a particular assertion; the former is made voluntarily and unasked for, the latter is always in direct answer to a charge: we *disavow* in matters of general interest where truth only is concerned; we *deny* in matters of personal interest where the character or feelings are implicated.

What is *disavowed* is generally in support of truth; what is *denied* may often be in direct violation of truth: an honest mind will always *disavow* whatever has been erroneously attributed to it; a timid person sometimes *denies* what he knows to be true from a fear of the consequences: many persons have *disavowed* being the author of the letters which are known under the name of Junius; the real authors who have *denied* their concern in it (as doubtless they have) availed themselves of the subterfuge, that since it was the affair several, no one individually could himself the author.

prevents us from committing mistakes or involving one's self in embarrassments.

When the question is to estimate the real qualities of either persons or things, we exercise *discernment*; when it is required to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exercise *penetration*; when the question is to determine the proportions and degrees of qualities in persons or things, we must use *discrimination*; when called upon to take any step, or act any part, we must employ the *judgement*. *Discernment* is more or less indispensable for every man in private or public station; he who has the most promiscuous dealings with men, has the greatest need of it: *penetration* is of peculiar importance for princes and statesmen: *discrimination* is of great utility for commanders, and all who have the power of distributing rewards and punishments: *judgement* is an absolute requisite for all to whom the execution or management of concerns is entrusted.

Cool age advances venerably wise,
Turns on all hands its deep discerning eyes.

Pope.

He is as slow to decide, as he is quick to apprehend, calmly and deliberately weighing every opposite reason that is offered, and tracing it with a most judicious penetration.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Perhaps there is no character through all Shakespeare drawn with more spirit and just discrimination than Shylock's.

HENLEY.

I love him, I confess, extremely; but my affection does by no means prejudice my judgement.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

TO DISCHARGE, *v.* To dismiss.

DISCIPLE, *v.* Scholar.

DISCIPLINE, *v.* Correction.

TO DISCLAIM, DISOWN.

DISCLAIM and DISOWN are both personal acts respecting the individual who is the agent: to *disclaim* is to throw off a *claim*, as to *disown* (*v.* To acknowledge) is not to admit as one's own; as *claim*, from the Latin *clamo*, signifies to declare with a loud tone what we want as our own; so to *disclaim* is with an equally loud or positive tone, to give up a *claim*: this

is a more positive act than to *disown*, which may be performed by insinuation, or by the mere abstaining to own.

He who feels himself disgraced by the actions that are done by his nation, or his family, will be ready to *disclaim* the very name which he bears in common with the offending party; an absurd pride sometimes impels men to *disown* their relationship to those who are beneath them in external rank and condition: an honest mind will *disclaim* all right to praise which it feels not to belong to itself; the fear of ridicule sometimes makes a man *disown* that which would redound to his honor.

The thing call'd life, with ease I can *disclaim*,
And think it over-sold to purchase fame.

DRYDEN.

Here Priam's son, Deiphobus, he found:
He scarcely knew him, striving to *disown*
His blotted form, and blushing to be known.

DRYDEN.

TO DISCLOSE, *v.* To publish.

TO DISCOMPOSE, *v.* To disorder.

TO DISCONCERT, *v.* To baffle.

TO DISCONCERT, *v.* To disorder.

TO DISCONTINUE, *v.* To cease.

DISCORD, STRIFE.

DISCORD derives its signification from the harshness produced in music by the clashing of two strings which do not suit with each other; whence in the moral sense, the chords of the mind which come into an unsuitable collision produce a *discord*.

STRIFE comes from the word *strive*, to denote the action of *striving*, that is, in an angry manner (*v.* To contend): where there is *strife*, there must be *discord*; but there may be *discord* without *strife*: *discord* consists most in the feeling; *strife* consists most in the outward action. *Discord* evinces itself in various ways; by looks, words, or actions: *strife* displays itself in words or acts of violence. *Discord* is fatal to the happiness of families; *strife* is the greatest enemy to peace between neighbours: *discord* arose between the Goddesses on the apple being thrown into the assembly; Homer co

his name and himself to be the general subject of *reproach*: as the profession of a Christian with a consistent practice is the greatest ornament which a man can put on; so is the profession with an inconsistent practice the greatest deformity that can be witnessed; it is calculated to bring a *scandal* on the religion itself in the eyes of those who do not know and feel its intrinsic excellences.

Discredit depends much on the character, circumstances, and situation of those who *discredit* and those who are *discredited*. Those who are in responsible situations, and have had confidence reposed in them, must have a peculiar guard over their conduct not to bring *discredit* on themselves: *disgrace* depends on the temper of men's minds as well as collateral circumstances; where a nice sense of moral propriety is prevalent in any community, *disgrace* inevitably attaches to a deviation from good morals. *Reproach* and *scandal* refer more immediately to the nature of the actions than the character of the persons; the former being employed in general matters; the latter mostly in a religious application: it is greatly to the *discredit* of all heads of public institutions, when they allow of abuses that interfere with the good order of the establishment, or divert it from its original purpose: in Sparta the slightest intemperance reflected great *disgrace* on the offender: in the present age, when the views of men on Christianity and its duties are so much more enlightened than they ever were, it is a *reproach* to every nation that continues to traffic in the blood of its fellow creatures: the blasphemous indecencies of which religious enthusiasts are guilty in the excess of their zeal is a *scandal* to all sober-minded Christians.

When a man is made up wholly of the dove without the least grain of the serpent in his composition, he becomes ridiculous in many circumstances of his life, and very often *discredits* his best actions.

ADDISON.

And where the vales with violets once were crown'd,
Now knotty briars and thorns *disgrace* the ground.

DRYDEN.

The cruelty of Mary's persecution equalled the deeds of those tyrants who have been the *reproach* to human nature.

ROBERTSON.

Oh! hadst thou dy'd when first thou saw'st the light,
Or dy'd at least before thy nuptial rite;
A better fate than vainly thus to boast,
And fly the scandal of the Trojan host. POPE.

DISCRETION, *v.* *Judgement*.

TO DISCRIMINATE, *v.* *To distinguish*.

DISCRIMINATION, *v.* *Discernment*.

TO DISCUSS, EXAMINE.

DISCUSS, in Latin *discussus* participle of *discutio*, signifies to shake asunder or to separate thoroughly so as to see the whole composition.

EXAMINE, in Latin *examine* comes from *examen* the middle beam or thread by which the poise of the balance is held, because the judgement holds the balance in examining.

The intellectual operation expressed by these terms is applied to objects that cannot be immediately discerned or understood, but they vary both in mode and degree. *Discussion* is altogether carried on by verbal and personal communication; *examination* proceeds by reading, reflection, and observation; we often examine therefore by *discussion*, which is properly one mode of *examination*: a *discussion* is always carried on by two or more persons; an *examination* may be carried on by one only: politics are a frequent though not always a pleasant subject of *discussion* in social meetings: complicated questions cannot be too thoroughly *examined*; *discussion* serves for amusement rather than for any solid purpose; the cause of truth seldom derives any immediate benefit from it, although the minds of men may become invigorated by a collision of sentiment: *examination* is of great practical utility in the direction of our conduct: all decisions must be partial, unjust, or imprudent, which are made without previous *examination*.

A country fellow distinguishes himself as much in the church-yard as a citizen does upon the change; the whole parish politics being generally *discussed* in that place either after sermon or before the bell rings.

ADDISON.

Men follow their inclinations without asking whether there be any principles which ought to form for regulating their conduct.

to get it by fraud or artifice, or by imposing on the confidence of another. We may prevent *dishonest* practices by ordinary means of security; but we must not trust ourselves in the company of *knaveish* people if we do not wish to be over-reached.

Gaming is too unreasonable and *dishonest* for a gentleman to addict himself to it.

Lord LYTTLETON.

Not to laugh when nature prompts is but a *hypocritical* way of making a mask of one's face.

POPE.

DISHONOR, DISGRACE, SHAME.

DISHONOR signifies what does away honor.

DISGRACE, *v.* To degrade.

SHAME signifies what produces shame.

Disgrace is more than *dishonor*, and less than *shame*. The *disgrace* is applicable to those who are not sensible of the *dishonor*, and the *shame* for those who are not sensible of the *disgrace*. The tender mind is alive to *dishonor*: those who yield to their passions, or are hardened in their vicious courses, are alike insensible to *disgrace* or *shame*. *Dishonor* is seldom the consequence of any offence, or offered with any intention of punishing; it lies mostly in the consciousness of the individual. *Disgrace* and *shame* are the direct consequences of misconduct: but *disgrace* attaches to the punishment which lowers a person in his own eyes; *shame* to that which lowers him in the eyes of others: the former is not so degrading nor so exposed to notice as the latter: a citizen feels it a *dishonor* not to be chosen to those offices of trust and honor for which he considers himself eligible: it is a *disgrace* to a school-boy to be placed the lowest in his class, which is heightened into *shame* if it brings him into punishment.

The fear of *dishonor* acts as a laudable stimulus to the discharge of one's duty; the fear of *disgrace* or *shame* serves to prevent the commission of vices or crimes. A soldier feels it a *dishonor* not to be placed at the post of danger, but he is not always sufficiently alive to the *disgrace* of being punished, nor is he deterred from his irregularities by the open *shame* to

which he is sometimes put in the presence of his fellow-soldiers.

As epithets they likewise rise in sense, and are distinguished by other characteristics: a *dishonorable* action is that which violates the principles of honor; a *disgraceful* action is that which reflects *disgrace*; a *shameful* action is that of which one ought to be fully *ashamed*: it is very *dishonorable* for a man not to keep his word; very *disgraceful* for a gentleman to associate with those who are his inferiors in station and education; very *shameful* for him to use his rank and influence over the lower orders only to mislead them from their duty: a person is likewise said to be *dishonorable* who is disposed to bring *dishonor* upon himself; but things only are *disgraceful* or *shameful*: a *dishonorable* man renders himself an outcast among his equals; he must then descend to his inferiors, among whom he may become familiar with the *disgraceful* and the *shameful*: men of cultivation are alive to what is *dishonorable*; men of all stations are alive to that which is for them *disgraceful*, or to that which is in itself *shameful*: the sense of what is *dishonorable* is to the superior what the sense of the *disgraceful* is to the inferior; but the sense of what is *shameful* is independent of rank or station, and forms a part of that moral sense which is inherent in the breast of every rational creature. Whoever therefore cherishes in himself a lively sense of what is *dishonorable* or *disgraceful* is tolerably secure of never committing any thing that is *shameful*.

'Tis no *dishonour* for the brave to die.

DRYDEN.

I was secretly concerned to see human nature in so much wretchedness and *disgrace*, but could not forbear smiling to hear Sir Roger advise the old woman to avoid all communications with the devil.

ADDISON.

Where the proud theatres disclose the scene
Which interwoven Britons seem to raise,
And show the triumph which their *shame* displays.

DRYDEN.

DISINCLINATION, *v.* Dislike.

TO DISJOIN, *v.* To separate.

TO DISJOINT, DISMEMBER.

DISJOINT signifies to separate at the joint.

its duration: the *disgust* is either transitory or otherwise; momentarily or gradually produced, but stronger than either of the two others.

Caprice has a great share in our likes and dislikes: *distaste* depends upon the changes to which the constitution physically and mentally is exposed: *disgust* owes its origin to the nature of things and their natural operation on the minds of men. A child likes and dislikes his playthings without any apparent cause for the change of sentiment: after a long illness a person will frequently take a *distaste* to the food or the amusements which before afforded him much pleasure: what is indecent or filthy is a natural object of *disgust* to every person whose mind is not depraved. It is good to suppress unfounded dislikes; it is difficult to overcome a strong *distaste*; it is advisable to divert our attention from objects calculated to create *disgust*.

Dryden's *distaste* of the priesthood is imputed by Langbaine, and I think by Brown, to a repulse which he suffered when he solicited ordination.

JOHNSON.

Because true history, through frequent satiric and similitude of things, works a *distaste* and misprision in the mind of men, poetry cheereth and refresheth the soul, chanting things rare and various.

BACON.

Vice, for vice is necessary to be shown, should always *disgust*.

JOHNSON.

DISLIKE, DISINCLINATION.

DISLIKE, *v. Dislike*.

DISINCLINATION is the reverse of inclination (*v. Attachment*).

Dislike applies to what one has or does; *disinclination* only to what one does: we *dislike* the thing we have, or *dislike* to do the thing; but we are *disinclined* to do the thing.

They express a similar feeling that differs in degree. The *disinclination* is but a small degree of *dislike*; the *dislike* marks something contrary; the *disinclination* does not amount to more than the absence of an inclination. None but a disobliging temper has a *dislike* to comply with reasonable requests; but the most obliging disposition may have an occasional *disinclination* to comply with a particular request.

Murmurs rise with mix'd applause,
Just as they favor or *dislike* the cause.

DRYDEN.

To be grave to a man's mirth, or inattentive

to his discourse, argues a *disinclination* to be entertained by him.

STEELE.

DISLOYALTY, *v. Disaffection*.

DISMAL, *v. Dull*.

TO DISMANTLE, *v. To demolish*.

TO DISMAY, DAUNT, APPAL.

DISMAY, in French *desmayer*, is probably changed from *desmouvoir*, signifying to move or pull down the spirit.

DAUNT, changed from the Latin *domitus*, conquered, signifies to bring down the spirit.

APPAL, compounded of the intensive *ap* or *ad*, and *palleo* to grow pale, signifies to make pale with fear.

The effect of fear on the spirit is strongly expressed by all these terms; but *dismay* expresses less than *daunt*, and this than *appal*. We are *dismayed* by alarming circumstances; we are *daunted* by terrifying; we are *appalled* by horrid circumstances. A severe defeat will *dismay* so as to lessen the force of resistance: the fiery glare from the eyes of a ferocious beast will *daunt* him who was venturing to approach: the sight of an apparition will *appal* the stoutest heart.

So flies a herd of bees, that bear, *dismay'd*,
The lions roaring through the midnight shade.

Pope.

Jove got such heroes as my sire, whose soul
No fear could *daunt*, nor earth, nor hell controul.

Pope.

Now the last ruin the whole host *appals*;
Now Greece had trembled in her wooden walls,
But wise Ulysses call'd Tydides forth.

Pope.

TO DISMEMBER, *v. To disjoint*.

TO DISMISS, DISCHARGE,
DISCARD.

DISMISS, in Latin *dimissus*, participle of *dimitto*, compounded of *di* and *mitto*, signifies to send asunder or away.

DISCHARGE signifies to release from a charge.

DISCARD, in Spanish *descartar*, compounded of *des* and *cartar*, signifies to lay cards out or aside, to cast them off.

The idea of removing to a distance is included in all these terms; but with various collateral circumstances. *Dismiss* is the general term; *discharge* and *discard* are modes of dismissing; *dismiss* is applicable to persons of all

of course it is apt to derange the regular course of our ideas. BLAIR.

There are men whose powers operate only at leisure and in retirement ; and whose intellectual vigour deserts them in conversation ; whom mer- riment confuses, and objection *disconcerts*. JOHNSON.

But with the changeful temper of the skies,
As rains condense, and sunshine rarefies,
So turn the species in their alter'd minds,
Compos'd by calms, and *discompos'd* by winds. DAYDEN.

DISORDER, DISEASE, DISTEMP- PER, MALADY.

DISORDER signifies the state of being out of order.

DISEASE signifies the state of being ill at ease.

DISTEMPER signifies the state of being out of temper, or out of a due temperament.

MALADY, from the Latin *malus* evil, signifies an ill.

All these terms agree in their application to the state of the animal body. *Disorder* is, as before (*v. To disorder*), the general term, and the others specific. In this general sense *disorder* is altogether indefinite ; but in its restricted sense it expresses less than all the rest : it is the mere commencement of a *disease* : *disease* is also more general than the other terms, for it comprehends every serious and permanent *disorder* in the animal economy, and is therefore of universal application. The *disorder* is slight, partial, and transitory : the *disease* is deep rooted and permanent. The *disorder* may lie in the extremities : the *disease* lies in the humors and the vital parts. Occasional head-achs, colds, or what is merely cutaneous, are termed *disorders* ; fevers, dropsies, and the like, are *diseases*. *Distemper* is used for such particularly as throw the animal frame most completely out of its temper or course, and is consequently applied properly to virulent *disorders*, such as the small-pox. *Malady* has less of a technical sense than the other terms ; it refers more to the suffering than to the state of the body. There may be many *maladies* where there is no *disease* ; but *diseases* are themselves in general *maladies*. Our *maladies* are frequently born with us ; but our *diseases* may come upon us at any time of life. Blindness is in itself a *malady*, and

may be produced by a *disease* in the eye. Our *disorders* are frequently cured by abstaining from those things which caused them ; the whole science of medicine consists in finding out suitable remedies for our *diseases* ; our *maladies* may be lessened with patience, although they cannot always be alleviated or removed by art.

All these terms may be applied with a similar distinction to the mind as well as the body. The *disorders* are either of a temporary or a permanent nature ; but unless specified to the contrary, are understood to be temporary : *diseases* consist in vicious habits : our *distempers* arise from the violent operations of passion : our *maladies* lie in the injuries which the affections occasion. Any perturbation in the mind is a *disorder* : avarice is a *disease* : melancholy is a *distemper* as far as it throws the mind out of its bias ; it is a *malady* as far as it occasions suffering.

Strange *disorders* are bred in the mind of those men whose passions are not regulated by virtue. ARBUTHNOT.

The jealous man's *disease* is of so malignant a nature that it converts all it takes into its own nourishment. ARBUTHNOT.

A person that is crazed, though with pride or malice, is a sight very mortifying to human nature ; but when the *distemper* arises from any indiscreet fervours of devotion, it deserves our compassion in a more particular manner. ADDISON.

Phillips has been always praised without contradiction as a man modest, blameless, and pious, who bore narrowness of fortune without discontent, and tedious and painful *maladies* without impatience. JOHNSON.

DISORDERLY, *v. Irregular.*

TO DISOWN, *v. To deny.*

TO DISOWN, *v. To disclaim.*

TO DISPARAGE, DETRACT,
TRADUCE, DEPRECIATE,
DEGRADE, DECRY.

DISPARAGE, compounded of *dis* and *parage*, from *paris* equal, signifies to make unequal or below what it ought to be.

DETRACT, *v. To asperse.*

TRADUCE, in Latin *traduco* or *transduco*, signifies to carry from one another that which is unfavorable.

DEPRECIATE, from the Latin

of truth; whatever *derogates* from the dignity of a man in any office is apt to *degrade* the office itself.

The man who scruples not breaking his word in little things, would not suffer in his own conscience so great pain for failures of consequence, as he who thinks every little offence against truth and justice a *disparagement*. STEELE.

I think we may say, without *derogating* from those wonderful performances (the *Iliad* and *Æneid*), that there is an unquestionable magnificence in every part of *Paradise Lost*, and indeed a much greater than could have been formed upon any Pagan system. ADDISON.

Of the mind that can deliberately pollute itself with ideal wickedness, for the sake of spreading the contagion in society, I wish not to conceal or excuse the depravity. Such *degradation* of the dignity of genius cannot be contemplated but with grief and indignation.

JOHNSON.

DISPARITY, INEQUALITY.

DISPARITY, from *dis* and *par*, in Greek *παρά* with or by, signifies an unfitness of objects to be by one another.

INEQUALITY, from the Latin *æquus*, even, signifies having no regularity.

The *disparity* applies to two objects which should meet or stand in coalition with each other; the *inequality* is applicable to those that are compared with each other: the *disparity* of age, situation, and circumstances, is to be considered with regard to persons entering into the matrimonial connexion; the *inequality* in the portion of labor which is to be performed by two persons, is a ground for the *inequality* of their recompense: there is a great *inequality* in the chance of success, where there is a *disparity* of acquirements in rival candidates: the *disparity* between David and Goliath was such as to render the success of the former more strikingly miraculous: the *inequality* in the conditions of men is not attended with a corresponding *inequality* in their happiness.

You formerly observed to me, that nothing made a more ridiculous figure in a man's life than the *disparity* we often find in him, sick and well. POPE.

Inequality of behaviour, either in prosperity or adversity, are alike ungraceful in man that is born to die. STEELE.

DISPASSIONATE, COOL.

DISPASSIONATE is taken negatively, it marks merely the absence of

passion; COOL (*v. Cool*) is taken positively, it marks an entire freedom from passion.

Those who are prone to be passionate must learn to be *dispassionate*; those who are of a *cool* temperament will not suffer their passions to be roused. *Dispassionate* solely respects the angry or irritable sentiment; *cool* respects every perturbed feeling: when we meet with an angry disputant it is necessary to be *dispassionate*, in order to avoid quarrels; in the moment of danger our safety often depends upon our *coolness*.

As to violence the lady (Madame D'Acker) has infinitely the better of the gentleman (M. de la Motte). Nothing can be more polite, *dispassionate*, or sensible, than his manner of managing the dispute. POPE.

I conceived this poem, and gave loose to a degree of resentment, which perhaps I ought not to have indulged, but which in a cooler hour I cannot altogether condemn. COWPER.

TO DISPATCH, *v. To hasten.*

TO DISPEL, DISPERSE.

DISPEL, from the Latin *pello* to drive, signifies to drive away.

DISPERSE signifies merely to cause to come asunder.

Dispel is a more forcible action than to *disperse*: we destroy the existence of a thing by *dispelling* it; we merely destroy the junction or cohesion of a body by *dispersing* it: the sun *dispels* the clouds and darkness; the wind *disperses* the clouds, or a surgeon *disperses* a tumor.

Dispel is used figuratively; *disperse* only in the natural sense: gloom, ignorance, and the like, are *dispelled*; books, people, papers, and the like, are *dispersed*.

As when a western whirlwind, charg'd with storms,

*Dispel*s the gathering clouds that Notus forms.

POPE.

The foe *dispers'd*, their bravest warriors kill'd,
Fierce as a whirlwind now I swept the field.

POPE.

TO DISPENSE, DISTRIBUTE.

DISPENSE, from the Latin *pendo*, to pay or bestow, signifies to bestow in different directions; and DISTRIBUTE, from the Latin *tribuo*, to bestow, signifies the same thing.

Dispense is an indiscriminate action; *distribute* is a particularizing action:

we *dispense* to all; we *distribute* to each individually: nature *dispenses* her gifts bountifully to all the inhabitants of the earth; a parent *distributes* among his children different tokens of his parental tenderness.

Dispense is an indirect action that has no immediate reference to the receivers; *distribute* is a direct and personal action communicated by the giver to the receiver: Providence *dispenses* his favors to those who put a sincere trust in him; a prince *distributes* marks of his favor and preference among his courtiers.

Though nature weigh our talents, and *dispense*
To every man his modicum of sense;
Yet much depends, as in the tiller's toil,
On culture, and the sowing of the soil.

COWPER.

Pray be no niggard in *distributing* my love
Plentifully among our friends at the inn of court.

HOWEL.

TO DISPERSE, *v.* To *dispel*

TO DISPERSE, *v.* To *spread*.

TO DISPLAY, *v.* To *show*.

TO DISPLEASE, OFFEND, VEX.

DISPLEASE (*v.* *Dislike*, *displeasure*) naturally marks the contrary of pleasing.

OFFEND, from the Latin *offendo*, signifies to stumble in the way of.

VEX, in Latin *vero*, is a frequentative of *veho*, signifying literally to toss up and down.

These words express the painful sentiment which is felt by the supposed impropriety of another's conduct.

Displease is not always applied to that which personally concerns ourselves; although *offend* and *vex* have always more or less of what is personal in them: a superior may be *displeased* with one who is under his charge for improper behaviour towards persons in general; he will be *offended* with him for disrespectful behaviour towards himself: circumstances as well as actions serve to *displease*; a supposed intention or design is requisite in order to *offend*: we may be *displeased* with a person, or at a thing; one is mostly *offended* with the person; a child may be *displeased* at not having any particular liberty or indulgence granted to him; he may be

offended with his play-fellow for acts of incivility or unkindness.

Displease respects mostly the inward state of feeling; *offend* and *vex* have most regard to the outward cause which provokes the feeling: a humourous person may be *displeased* without any apparent cause; but a captious person will at least have some avowed trifle for which he is *offended*. *Vex* expresses more than *offend*; it marks in fact frequent efforts to *offend*, or the act of *offending* under aggravated circumstances: we often *intentionally displease* or *offend*; but he who *veres* has mostly that object in view in so doing: any instance of neglect *displeases*; any marked instance of neglect *offends*; any aggravated instance of neglect *veres*: the feeling of *displeasure* is more perceptible and vivid than that of *offence*; but it is less durable: the feeling of *veration* is as transitory as that of *displeasure*, but stronger than either. *Displeasure* and *veration* betray themselves by an angry word or look; *offence* discovers itself in the whole conduct: our *displeasure* is unjustifiable when it exceeds the measure of another's fault; it is a mark of great weakness to take *offence* at trifles; persons of the greatest irritability are exposed to the most frequent *verations*.

As epithets they admit of a similar distinction: it is very *displeasing* to parents not to meet with the most respectful attentions from children, when they give them counsel; and such conduct on the part of children is highly *offensive* to God: when we meet with an *offensive* object, we do most wisely to turn away from it: when we are troubled with *veracious* affairs, our best and only remedy is patience.

Meantime imperial Neptune heard the sound
Of raging billows breaking on the ground;
Displeas'd and fearing for his wat'ry reign,
He rear'd his awful head above the main.

DAVENANT.

Nathan's fable of the poor man and his lamb
had so good an effect as to convey instruction to
the ear of a king without *offending* it.

ANDERSON.

These and a thousand mixed emotions more,
From ever-changing views of good and ill,
Form'd infinitely various, vex the mind
With endless storm.

TRUMBULL.

DISPLEASURE, v. Dislike.

DISPLEASURE, ANGER, DISAPPROBATION.

DISPLEASURE, v. Dislike.

ANGER, v. Anger.

DISAPPROBATION is the reverse of *approbation* (v. *Assent*).

Between *displeasure* and *anger* there is a difference both in the degree, the cause, and the consequence, of the feeling: *displeasure* is always a softened and gentle feeling; *anger* is always a harsh feeling, and sometimes rises to vehemence and madness: *displeasure* is always produced by some adequate cause, real or supposed; but *anger* may be provoked by every or any cause, according to the temper of the individual: *displeasure* is mostly satisfied with a simple verbal expression; but *anger*, unless kept down with great force, always seeks to return evil for evil. *Displeasure* and *disapprobation* are to be compared in as much as they respect the conduct of those who are under the direction of others: *displeasure* is an act of the will, it is an angry sentiment; *disapprobation* is an act of the judgement, it is an opposite opinion: any mark of self-will in a child is calculated to excite *displeasure*; a mistaken choice in matrimony may produce *disapprobation* in the parent.

Displeasure is always produced by that which is already come to pass; *disapprobation* may be felt upon that which is to take place: a master feels *displeasure* at the carelessness of his servant; a parent expresses his *disapprobation* of his son's proposal to leave his situation: it is sometimes prudent to check our *displeasure*; and mostly prudent to express our *disapprobation*: the former cannot be expressed without inflicting pain; the latter cannot be withheld when required without the danger of misleading.

Man is the merriest species of the creation; all above or below him are serious; he sees things in a different light from other beings, and finds his mirth arising from objects that perhaps cause something like pity or *displeasure* in a higher nature.

ADDISON.

From *anger* in its full import, protracted into malevolence and exerted in revenge, arise many of the evils to which the life of man is exposed.

JOHNSON.

The Queen Regent's brothers knew her secret *disapprobation* of the violent measures they were driving on.

ROBERTSON.

DISPOSAL, DISPOSITION.

THESE words derive their different meanings from the verb to *dispose* (v. *To dispose*), to which they owe their common origin.

DISPOSAL is a personal act; it depends upon the will of the individual: **DISPOSITION** is an act of the judgement; it depends upon the nature of the things.

The removal of a thing from one's self is involved in a *disposal*; the good order of the things is comprehended in their *disposition*. The *disposal* of property is in the hands of the rightful owner; the success of a battle often depends upon the right *disposition* of an army.

In the reign of Henry the Second, if a man died without wife or issue, the whole of his property was at his own *disposal*.

BLACKSTONE.

In case a person made no *disposition* of such of his goods as were testable, he was and is said to die intestate.

BLACKSTONE.

TO DISPOSE, ARRANGE, DIGEST.

DISPOSE, in French *disposer*, Latin *disposui* preterite of *dispono* or *dis* and *pono*, signifies to place apart.

ARRANGE, v. To class.

DIGEST, in Latin *digestus* participle of *digero* or *dis* and *gero*, signifies to gather apart with design.

The idea of a systematic laying apart is common to all and proper to the word *dispose*.

We *dispose* when we *arrange* and *digest*; but we do not always *arrange* and *digest* when we *dispose*: they differ in the circumstances and object of the action. There is less thought employed in *disposing* than in *arranging* and *digesting*; we may *dispose* ordinary matters by simply assigning a place to each; in this manner trees are *disposed* on a row, but we *arrange* and *digest* by an intellectual effort; in the first case by putting those together which ought to go together; and in the latter case by both separating that which is dissimilar, and bringing together that which is similar; in this manner books are *arranged* in a library according to their size or their subject; the materials for a literary production.

gested; or the laws of the land are *digested*. What is not wanted should be neatly *disposed* in a suitable place: nothing contributes so much to beauty and convenience as the *arrangement* of every thing according to the way and manner in which they should follow: when writings are involved in great intricacy and confusion, it is difficult to *digest* them.

In an extended and moral application of these words, we speak of a person's time, talent, and the like, being *disposed* to a good purpose; of a man's ideas being properly *arranged*, and of being *digested* into a form. On the *disposition* of a man's time and property will depend in a great measure his success in life; on the *arrangement* of accounts greatly depends his facility in conducting business; on the habit of *digesting* our thoughts depends in a great measure the correctness of thinking.

'Then near the altar of the darting king,
Dispos'd in rank their becatomb they bring.

Pope.

When a number of distinct images are collected by these erratick and hasty surveys, the fancy is busied in *arranging* them. JOHNSON.

The marks and impressions of diseases, and the changes and devastations they bring upon the internal parts, should be very carefully examined and orderly *digested* in the comparative anatomy we speak of. BACON.

TO DISPOSE, *v.* To place.

DISPOSITION, TEMPER.

DISPOSITION from *dispose* (*v.* To *dispose*), signifies here the state of being *disposed*.

TEMPER, like *temperament*, from the Latin *temperamentum* and *tempero* to temper or manage, signifies the thing modelled or formed.

These terms are both applied to the mind and its bias; but *disposition* respects the whole frame and texture of the mind; *temper* respects only the bias or tone of the feelings.

The *disposition* is permanent and settled; the *temper* is transitory and fluctuating. The *disposition* comprehends the springs and motives of actions; the *temper* influences the actions for the time being: it is possible and not unfrequent to have a good *disposition* with a bad *temper*, and *vice versâ*. A good *disposition* makes

a man a useful member of society, but not always a good companion; a good *temper* renders him acceptable to all and peaceable with all, but essentially useful to none: a good *disposition* will go far towards correcting the errors of *temper*; but where there is a bad *disposition* there are no hopes of amendment.

My friend has his eye more upon the state and *disposition* of his children than their advancement or wealth. STUART.

The man who lives under an habitual sense of the Divine presence keeps up a perpetual *disposition* of temper. AUSTIN.

Alexander was a young man warm with any notion that by nature or accident had been connected with the sound of liberty, and by an eccentricity which such *dispositions* do not only avoid, a lover of contradiction, and no friend to any thing established. JOHNSON.

In coffee houses a man of any *temper* is in his element, for if he cannot talk he can be still more agreeable to his company as well as pleased in himself in being a hearer. STUART.

DISPOSITION, INCLINATION.

DISPOSITION in the former section is taken for the general frame of the mind; in the present case for its particular frame.

INCLINATION, *v.* Attachment.

The *disposition* is more positive than the *inclination*. We may always expect a man to do that which he is *disposed* to do: but we cannot always calculate upon his executing that to which he is merely *inclined*.

We indulge a *disposition*; we yield to an *inclination*. The *disposition* comprehends the whole state of the mind at the time; the *inclination* is particular, referring always to a particular object. After the performance of a serious duty, no one is expected to be in a *disposition* for laughter or merriment: it is becoming to suppress our *inclination* to laughter in the presence of those who wish to be serious; we should be careful not to enter into controversy with one who shows a *disposition* to be unfriendly. When a young person discovers any *inclination* to study, there are hopes of his improvement.

It is the duty of every man who would be true to himself, to obtain if possible a *disposition* to be pleased. STUART.

There never was a time, believe me, when I wanted an *inclination* to cultivate your esteem, and promote your interest.

MELNETH'S LETTERS TO COOPER.

DISPOSITION, *v. Disposal.*

TO DISPROVE, *v. To confute.*

TO DISPUTE, *v. To argue.*

TO DISPUTE, *v. To contend.*

TO DISPUTE, *v. To controvert.*

DISPUTE, *v. Difference.*

TO DISREGARD, NEGLECT,
SLIGHT.

DISREGARD signifies properly not to *regard*.

NEGLECT, in Latin *neglectus* participle of *negligo*, compounded of *nec* and *lego*, not to choose.

SLIGHT, from *light*, signifies to make light of or set light by.

We *disregard* the warnings, the words, or opinions of another; we *neglect* their injunctions or their precepts. To *disregard* results from the settled purpose of the mind; to *neglect* from a temporary forgetfulness or oversight. What is *disregarded* is seen and passed over; what is *neglected* is generally not thought of at the time required. What is *disregarded* does not strike the mind at all: what is *neglected* enters the mind only when it is before the eye: the former is an action employed on the present objects; the latter on that which is past: what we *disregard* is not esteemed; what we *neglect* is often esteemed, but not sufficiently to be remembered or practised: a child *disregards* the prudent counsels of a parent; he *neglects* to use the remedies which have been prescribed to him.

Disregard and *neglect* are frequently not personal acts; they respect the thing more than the person; *slight* is altogether an intentional act towards an individual.

We *disregard* or *neglect* things often from a heedlessness of temper; the consequence either of youth or habit: we *slight* a person from feelings of dislike or contempt. Young people should *disregard* nothing that is said to them by their superiors; nor *neglect* any thing which they are enjoined to do; nor *slight* any one to whom they owe personal attention.

The new notion that has prevailed of late years that the Christian religion is little more

than a good system of morality must in course draw on a *disregard* to spiritual exercises.

GIBSON.

Beauty's a charm, but soon the charm will pass,
While lilies lie neglected on the plain;
While dusky hyacinths for use remain. DRYDEN.

When once devotion fancies herself under the influence of a divine impulse, it is no wonder she *slights* human ordinances. ADDISON.

DISSATISFACTION, *v. Dislike.*

TO DISSEMBLE, *v. To conceal.*

DISSEMBLER, *v. Hypocrite.*

TO DISSEMINATE, *v. To spread.*

DISSENSION, CONTENTION, DISCORD.

DISSENSION marks either the act or the state of *dissenting*.

CONTENTION marks the act of *contending* (*v. To contend*).

DISCORD, *v. Contention.*

A collision of opinions produces *dissension*; a collision of interests produces *contention*; a collision of humours produces *discord*. A love of one's own opinion, combined with a *disregard* for the opinions of others, gives rise to *dissension*; selfishness is the main cause of *contention*; and an ungoverned temper that of *discord*.

Dissension is peculiar to bodies or communities of men; *contention* and *discord* to individuals. A Christian temper of conformity to the general will of those with whom one is in connexion would do away *dissension*; a limitation of one's desire to that which is attainable by legitimate means would put a stop to *contention*; a correction of one's impatient and irritable humour would check the progress of *discord*. *Dissension* tends not only to alienate the minds of men from each other, but to dissolve the bonds of society; *contention* is accompanied by anger, ill-will, envy, and many evil passions; *discord* interrupts the progress of the kind affections, and bars all tender intercourse.

At the time the poem we are now treating of was written the *dissensions* of the barons, who were then so many petty princes, ran very high.

ADDISON.

Because it is apprehended there may be great *contention* about precedence, the proposer humbly desires the assistance of the learned. SWIFT.

But shall celestial *discord* never cease?

'Tis better ended in a lasting peace. DRYDEN.

DISSENSION, *v. Difference.*

TO DISSENT, *v. To differ.*

DISSENTER, *v. Heretic.*

DISSERTATION, *v. Essay.*

TO DISSIPATE, *v. To spend.*

DISSOLUTE, *v. Loose.*

DISTANT, FAR, REMOTE.

DISTANT is employed as an adjunct or otherwise; FAR is used only as an adverb. We speak of *distant* objects, or objects being *distant*; but we speak of things only as being *far*.

Distant, in Latin *distans* compounded of *di* and *stans* standing asunder, is employed only for bodies at rest; *far*, in German *fern*, most probably from *gefahren* participle of *fahren*, in Greek *ποσειν* to go, signifies gone or removed away, and is employed for bodies either stationary or otherwise; hence we say that a thing is *distant*, or it goes, runs, or flies *far*.

Distant is used to designate great space; *far* only that which is ordinary: the sun is ninety four millions of miles *distant* from the earth; one person lives not very *far* off, or a person is *far* from the spot.

Distant is used absolutely to express an intervening space. REMOTE, in Latin *remotus* participle of *removere* to remove, rather expresses the relative idea of being gone out of sight. A person is said to live in a *distant* country or in a *remote* corner of any country.

They bear a similar analogy in the figurative application; when we speak of a *remote* idea it designates that which is less liable to strike the mind than a *distant* idea. A *distant* relationship between individuals is never altogether lost sight of; when the connexion between objects is very *remote* it easily escapes observation.

It is a pretty saying of Thales, "Falsehood is just as *far distant* from truth as the ears from the eyes," by which he would intimate that a wise man would not easily give credit to the reports of actions which he has not seen.

SPECTATOR.

O might a parent's careful wish prevail,
Far, far from Ilion should thy vessels sail,
And thou from camps *remote* the danger shun,
Which now, alas! too nearly threatens my son.

Pope.

DISTASTE, *v. Dislike.*

DISTEMPER, *v. Disorder.*

DISTINCT, *v. Different.*

DISTINCTION, *v. Difference.*

DISTINCTLY, *v. Clearly.*

TO DISTINGUISH, *v. To abstract.*

TO DISTINGUISH, DISCRIMINATE.

DISTINGUISH, *v. To abstract.*

DISCRIMINATE, *v. Discernment.*

To *distinguish* is the general; to *discriminate* is the particular term: the former is an indefinite; the latter a definite action. To *discriminate* is in fact to *distinguish* specifically; hence we speak of a *distinction* as true or false, but of a *discrimination* as nice.

We *distinguish* things as to their divisibility or unity; we *discriminate* them as to their inherent properties; we *distinguish* things that are alike or unlike, to separate or collect them; we *discriminate* things only that are different for the purpose of separating one from the other: we *distinguish* by means of the senses as well as the understanding; we *discriminate* by the understanding only: we *distinguish* things by their color, or we *distinguish* moral objects by their truth or falsehood; we *discriminate* the characters of men, or we *discriminate* their merits according to circumstances.

'Tis easy to *distinguish* by the sight

The color of the soil, and black from white.

Dryden.

A satire should expose nothing but what is corrigible; and make a due *discrimination* between those who are and those who are not the proper objects of it.

Admon.

TO DISTINGUISH, *v. To perceive.*

TO DISTINGUISH, *v. To signalize.*

DISTINGUISHED, CONSPICUOUS, NOTED, EMINENT, ILLUSTRIOUS.

DISTINGUISHED signifies having a mark of *distinction* by which

It is to be *distinguished* (v. *To abstract*.)

CONSPICUOUS, in Latin *conspicuus*, from *conspicio*, signifies easily to be seen.

NOTED, from *notus* known, signifies well known.

EMINENT, in Latin *eminens*, from *emineo* or *e* and *maneo*, signifies remaining or standing out above the rest.

ILLUSTRIOUS, in Latin *illustris*, from *lustro* to shine, signifies shone upon.

The idea of an object having something attached to it to excite notice is common to all these terms. *Distinguished* in its general sense expresses little more than this idea; the rest are but modes of the *distinguished*. A thing is *distinguished* in proportion as it is distinct or separate from others; it is *conspicuous* in proportion as it is easily seen; it is *noted* in proportion as it is widely known. In this sense a rank is *distinguished*; a situation is *conspicuous*; a place is *noted*. Persons are *distinguished* by external marks or by characteristic qualities; persons or things are *conspicuous* mostly from some external mark; persons or things are *noted* mostly by collateral circumstances.

A man may be *distinguished* by his decorations, or he may be *distinguished* by his manly air, or by his abilities: a person is *conspicuous* by the gaudiness of his dress; a house is *conspicuous* that stands on a hill: a person is *noted* for having performed a wonderful cure; a place is *noted* for its fine waters.

We may be *distinguished* for things good, bad, or indifferent: we may be *conspicuous* for our singularities or that which only attracts vulgar notice: we may be *noted* for that which is bad, and mostly for that which is the subject of vulgar discourse: we can be *eminent* and *illustrious* only for that which is really good and praiseworthy; the former applies however mostly to those things which set a man high in the circle of his acquaintance; the latter to that which makes him shine before the world. A man of *distinguished* talent will be apt to excite envy if he be not also *distinguished*

for his private virtue: affectation is never better pleased than when it can place itself in such a *conspicuous* situation as to draw all eyes upon itself: lovers of fame are sometimes contented to render themselves *noted* for their vices or absurdities: nothing is more gratifying to a man than to render himself *eminent* for his professional skill: it is the lot of but few to be *illustrious*, and those few are very seldom to be envied.

In an extended and moral application, these terms may be employed to heighten the character of an object; a favor may be said to be *distinguished*, piety *eminent*, and a name *illustrious*.

It has been observed by some writers that man is more *distinguished* from the animal world by devotion than by reason. ADDISON.

Before the gate stood Pyrrhus, threat'ning loud,
With glitt'ring arms *conspicuous* in the crowd.

DRYDEN.

Upon my calling in lately at one of the most *noted* Temple coffee houses, I found the whole room, which was full of young students, divided into several parties, each of which was deeply engaged in some controversy. BUDGELL.

Of Prior, *eminent* as he was both by his abilities and station, very few memorials have been left by his contemporaries. JOHNSON.

Hail, sweet Saturnian soil! of fruitful grain
Great parent, greater of *illustrious* men.

DRYDEN.

Amidst the agitations of popular government, occasions will sometimes be afforded for *eminent* abilities to break forth with peculiar lustre. But while public agitations allow a few individuals to be uncommonly *distinguished*, the general condition of the public remains calamitous and wretched. BLAIR.

Next add our cities of *illustrious* name,
Their costly labor and stupendous frame.

DRYDEN.

TO DISTORT, v. *To turn*.

DISTRACTED, v. *Absent*.

DISTRESS, v. *Adversity*.

TO DISTRESS, v. *To afflict*.

DISTRESS, ANXIETY, ANGUISH,
AGONY.

DISTRESS, v. *Adversity*.

ANXIETY, in French *anxiété*
ANGUISH, in French *angoisse*,
come from the Latin *ango*, *an*
strangle.

AGONY, in French *agonie*, Latin *agonia*, Greek *ἀγωνία*, from *ἀγωνίζω* to contend or strive, signifies a severe struggle with pain and suffering.

Distress is the pain felt when in a strait from which we see no means of extricating ourselves; *anxiety* is that pain which one feels on the prospect of an evil. The *distress* always depends upon some outward cause; the *anxiety* often lies in the imagination. The *distress* is produced by the present, but not always immediate evil; the *anxiety* respects that which is future; *anguish* arises from the reflection on the evil that is past; *agony* springs from witnessing that which is immediate or before the eye.

Distress is not peculiar to any age, where there is a consciousness of good and evil, pain and pleasure; *distress* will inevitably exist from some circumstance or another. *Anxiety*, *anguish*, and *agony*, belong to riper years: infancy and childhood are deemed the happy periods of human existence; because they are exempt from the *anxieties* attendant on every one who has a station to fill, and duties to discharge. *Anguish* and *agony* are species of *distress*, of the severer kind, which spring altogether from the maturity of reflection, and the full consciousness of evil. A child is in *distress* when it loses its mother, and the mother is also in *distress* when she misses her child. The station of a parent is, indeed, that which is most productive, not only of *distress*, but *anxiety*, *anguish*, and *agony*: the mother has her peculiar *anxieties* for the child, whilst rearing it in its infant state: the father has his *anxiety* for its welfare on its entrance into the world: they both suffer the deepest *anguish* when the child disappoints their dearest hopes, by running a career of vice, and finishing its wicked course by an untimely, and sometimes ignominious end: not unfrequently they are doomed to suffer the *agony* of seeing a child encircled in flames from which he cannot be snatched, or sinking into a watery grave from which he cannot be rescued.

How many, rack'd with honest passions, droop
In deep retir'd *distress*! How many stand

Around the death-bed of their dearest friends,
And point the parting anguish. THOMSON.

If you have any affection for me, let not your
anxiety, on my account, injure your health.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

In the *anguish* of his heart, Adam expostulates with his Creator for having given him an unmasked existence. ADDISON.

These are the charming *agonies* of love,
Whose misery delights. But through the heart
Should jealousy its venom once diffuse,
'Tis then delightful misery no more,
But *agony* unmixed. THOMSON.

TO DISTRESS, HARASS, PERPLEX.

DISTRESS, *v.* *Distress*.

HARASS, in French *harasser*, probably from the Greek *ἀγασσω* to beat.

PERPLEX, in Latin *perplexus*, participle of *perplector*, compounded of *per* and *plector*, to wind round and entangle.

A person is *distressed* either in his outward circumstances or his feelings; he is *harassed* mentally or corporally; he is *perplexed* in his understanding, more than in his feelings: a deprivation *distresses*; provocations and hostile measures *harass*; stratagems and ambiguous measures *perplex*: a besieged town is *distressed* by the cutting off its resources of water and provisions; the besieged are *harassed* by perpetual attacks; the besiegers are *perplexed* in all their manœuvres and plans, by the counter-manœuvres and contrivances of their opponents: a tale of woe *distresses*; continual alarms and incessant labor *harass*; unexpected obstacles and inextricable difficulties *perplex*.

We are *distressed* and *perplexed* by circumstances; we are *harassed* altogether by persons, or the intentional efforts of others: we may relieve another in *distress*, or may remove a *perplexity*; but the *harassing* ceases only with the cause which gave rise to it.

O friend! Ulysses' shouts invade my ear;
Distress'd he seems, and no assistance near. POPE.

Persons who have been long *harassed* with business and care, sometimes imagine that when life declines, they cannot make their retirement from the world too complete. BLAIR.

Would being end with our expiring breath,
How soon misfortunes would be puff'd away.

book can shiver us to the dust,
 sentence of the immortal soul,
 dark road perplexes still.

GENTLEMAN.

TRIBUTE, *v.* To dispense.

TRIBUTE, *v.* To divide.

DISTRICT, REGION, TRACT,

QUARTER.

DISTRICT, in Latin *districtus*,
stringo to bind separately, sig-
 nifies a certain part marked off speci-

ALLY, in Latin *regio* from *rego*
 signifies a portion that is with-

TRACT, in Latin *tractus*, from
trahere to draw, signifies a part drawn

QUARTER signifies literally a
 part.

These terms are all applied to coun-
 try: the former two comprehending
 a part marked out on political
 maps: the latter a geographical or
 indefinite division: *district* is
 smaller than a *region*; the former
 only to part of a country,
 the latter frequently applies to a
 whole country: a *quarter* is in-
 definite, and may be applied either
 to a quarter of the world or a particu-
 lar neighbourhood: a *tract* is the
 least portion of all, and compre-
 hends frequently no more than what
 lies within the compass of the eye.
 Consider the *district* only with
 reference to government: every magis-
 trate acts within a certain *district*: we
 speak of a *region* when considering the
 distances of climate, or the natu-
 ral properties which distinguish dif-
 ferent parts of the earth, as the *regions*
 of heat and cold: we speak of the
district simply to designate a point of
 compass; as a person lives in a
 certain *quarter* of the town that is
 north or south-east, or west, &c.:
 we speak of a *tract* to designate
 a road that runs on in a line as a
 main *tract*; hence this latter
 may be also applied to moral ob-

jects: the very inequality of representation, which
 has been often complained of, is perhaps the very
 which prevents us from thinking or acting
 wisely for *districts*. BURKE.

those *regions* and our upper light
 rests and impenetrable night
 the middle space. DAYDEN.

My timorous muse

Unambitious tracts pursues.

COWLEY.

There is no man in any rank who is always at
 liberty to act as he would incline. In some
 quarter or other he is limited by circumstances.

BLAIR.

DISTRUSTFUL, SUSPICIOUS,
 DIFFIDENT.

DISTRUSTFUL signifies full of
distrust, or of not putting *trust* in (*v.*
Belief).

SUSPICIOUS signifies having *sus-
 picion*, from the Latin *suspicio*, or
sub and *specio* to look at askance, or
 with a wry mind.

DIFFIDENT, from the Latin *diffi-
 do* or *disfido*, signifies having no
 faith.

Distrustful is said either of our-
 selves or others; *suspicious* is said only
 of others; *diffident* only of ourselves:
 to be *distrustful* of a person, is to
 impute no good to him; to be *sus-
 picious* of a person, is to impute posi-
 tive evil to him: he who is *distrust-
 ful* of another's honor or prudence,
 will abstain from giving him his con-
 fidence; he who is *suspicious* of an-
 other's honesty, will be cautious to
 have no dealings with him. *Dis-
 trustful* is a particular state of feel-
 ing; *suspicious* an habitual state of
 feeling: a person is *distrustful* of an-
 other, owing to particular circum-
 stances; he is *suspicious* from his na-
 tural temper.

As applied to himself, a person is
distrustful of his own powers, to
 execute an office assigned, or he is
 generally of a *diffident* disposition:
 it is faulty to *distrust* that in which
 we ought to trust; there is nothing
 more criminal than a *distrust* in Pro-
 vidence; on the other hand, there is
 nothing better than a *distrust* in our
 own powers to withstand temptation:
suspicion is justified more or less ac-
 cording to circumstances; but a too
 great proneness to *suspicion* is liable
 to lead us into many acts of injustice
 towards others: *diffidence* is becom-
 ing in youth, so long as it does not
 check their laudable exertions.

Before strangers, Pitt had something of the
 scholar's timidity and *distrust*. JOHNSON.

And oft, though wisdom wake, *suspicion* slumbers
 At wisdom's gate, and to simplicity
 Relinquish his charge. M^r

As an actor, Mr. Cunningham obtained

As disjunction is the common idea attached to both *separate* and *part*, they are frequently used in relation to the same objects: houses may be both *separated* and *parted*; they are *parted* by that which does not keep them at so great a distance, as when they are said to be *separated*: two houses are *parted* by a small opening between them; they are *separated* by an intervening garden: fields are with more propriety said to be *separated*; rooms are said more properly to be *parted*.

With regard to persons, *part* designates the actual leaving of the person; *separate* is used in general for that which lessens the society; the former is often casual, temporary, or partial; the latter is positive and serious: the *parting* is momentary; the *separation* may be longer or shorter: two friends *part* in the streets after a casual meeting; two persons *separate* on the road who had set out to travel together: men and their wives often *part* without coming to a positive *separation*: some are *separated* from each other in every respect but that of being directly *parted*: the moment of *parting* between friends is often more painful than the *separation* which afterwards ensues.

I pray let me retain some room, though never so little, in your thoughts, during the time of this our *separation*. HOWELL.

The prince pursu'd the *parting* deity
With words like these, " Ah whither do you fly ? "
Unkind and cruel to deceive your son. DRYDEN.

TO DIVIDE, DISTRIBUTE,
SHARE.

DIVIDE, *v.* To divide, separate.

DISTRIBUTE, in Latin *distributus*, from *distribuo*, or *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow apart.

SHARE, from the word *shear*, and the German *scheeren*, signifies simply to cut.

The act of *dividing* does not extend beyond the thing *divided*; that of *distributing* and *sharing* comprehends also the purpose of the action: we *divide* the thing; we *distribute* to the person: we may *divide* therefore without *distributing*; or we may *divide* in order to *distribute*: thus we *divide* our land into distinct fields for our private convenience; or we *divide* a

sum of money into so many parts, in order to *distribute* it among a given number of persons: on the other hand, we may *distribute* without *dividing*; for guineas, books, apples, and many other things may be *distributed*, which require no *division*.

To *share* is to make into parts the same as *divide*, and it is to give those parts to some persons, the same as *distribute*; but the person who *shares* takes a part himself; he who *distributes* gives it always to others: a loaf is *divided* in order to be eaten; bread is *distributed* in loaves among the poor; the loaf is *shared* by a poor man with his poorer neighbour, or the profits of a business are *shared* by the partners.

To *share* may imply either to give or receive; to *distribute* implies giving only: we *share* our own with another: or another *shares* what we have; but we *distribute* our own to others.

Nor cease your sowing till cold winter ends,
For this, though twelve bright signs Apollo
guides

The year, and earth in several climes *divides*.

DRYDEN.

Two urns by Jove's high throne have ever stood,
The source of evil one, and one of good;
From thence the cup of mortal man he fills
Blessings to these, to those *distributes* ill.

POPE.

Why grieves my son ? Thy anguish let me share,
Reveal the cause, and trust a parent's care.

POPE.

They will be so much the more careful to
determine properly, as they shall (will) be obliged
to *share* the expenses of maintaining the masters.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLEXY.

DIVINE, *v.* Ecclesiastic.

DIVINE, *v.* Godlike.

TO DIVINE, To guess.

DIVINE, *v.* Holy.

DIVINITY, *v.* Deity.

DIVISION, *v.* Part.

DIURNAL, *v.* Daily.

TO DIVULGE, *v.* To publish.

TO DO, *v.* To act.

TO DO, *v.* To make.

DOCILE, TRACTABLE, DUCTILE.

DOCILE, in Latin *docilis* from *doceo* to teach, is the Latin term for ready to be taught.

TRACTABLE, from the Latin

The **DOGMA**, from the Greek *δογμα* and *δοκεω* to think, signifies the thing thought, admitted, or taken for granted; this lies with a body or number of individuals.

TENET, from the Latin *teneo* to hold or maintain, signifies the thing held or maintained, and is a species of principle (*v. Doctrine*) specifically maintained in matters of opinion by persons in general.

The *doctrine* rests on the authority of the individual by whom it is framed; the *dogma* on the authority of the body by whom it is maintained; the *tenet* rests on its own intrinsic merits. Many of the *doctrines* of our blessed Saviour are held by faith in him; they are subjects of persuasion by the exercise of our rational powers: the *dogmas* of the Romish church are admitted by none but such as admit its authority: the *tenets* of republicans, ~~philosophers~~, and freethinkers, have been unblushingly maintained both in public and private.

Unpractis'd be to fawn or seek for pow'r
By *doctrines* fashion'd to the varying hour;
Far other aims his heart had learn'd to prize,
More skill'd to raise the wretched, than to rise.

GOLDSMITH.

There are in England abundance of men who tolerate in the true spirit of toleration. They think the *dogmas* of religion, though in different degrees, are all of moment, and that amongst them there is, as amongst all things of value, a just ground of preference.

BURKE.

One of the puritanical *tenets* was the illegality of all games of chance.

JOHNSON.

DOGMA, *v. Doctrine*.

DOGMATICAL, *v. Confident*.

DOLBFUL, *v. Pitiful*.

DOMESTIC, *v. Servant*.

DOMINEERING, *v. Imperious*.

DOMINION, *v. Power*.

DOMINIONS, *v. Territory*.

DONATION, *v. Benefaction*.

DONATION, *v. Gift*.

DOOM, *v. Destiny*.

DOUBLE-DEALING, *v. Deceit*.

DOUBT, *v. Demur*.

TO DOUBT, QUESTION.

DOUBT, in French *douter*, Latin *dubito* from *dubius*, which comes from

δύω and *διδύμιζω*, in the same manner as our frequentative double, signifying to have two opinions.

QUESTION, in Latin *questio*, from *quæro* to inquire, signifies to make a question.

Both these terms express the act of the mind in staying its decision. The *doubt* lies altogether in the mind; it is a less active feeling than *question*: by the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in deciding. We may *doubt* in silence; we cannot *question* without expressing it directly or indirectly.

He who suggests *doubts* does it with caution; he who makes a *question* throws in difficulties with a degree of confidence. *Doubts* insinuate themselves into the mind oftentimes involuntarily on the part of the *doubter*; *questions* are always made with an express design. We *doubt* in matters of general interest, on abstruse as well as common subjects; we *question* mostly in ordinary matters that are of a personal interest: we *doubt* the truth of a position; we *question* the veracity of an author. The existence of mermaids was *doubted* for a great length of time; but the testimony of creditable persons, who have lately seen them, ought now to put it out of all *doubt*. When the practicability of any plan is *questioned*, it is unnecessary to enter any farther into its merits.

The *doubt* is frequently confined to the individual; the *question* frequently respects others. We *doubt* whether we shall be able to succeed; we *question* another's right to interfere: we *doubt* whether a thing will answer the end proposed; we *question* the utility of any one making the attempt.

There are many *doubtful* cases in medicine, where the physician is at a loss to decide; there are many *questionable* measures proposed by those who are in or out of power which demand consideration. A disposition to *doubt* every thing is more inimical to the cause of truth, than the readiness to believe every thing; a disposition to *question* whatever is said done by others, is much more calculated to give offence than to pre-
deception.

TO DRAG, *v.* *To draw.*

TO DRAIN, *v.* *To spend.*

TO DRAW, DRAG, HAUL OR
HALE, PULL, PLUCK, TUG.

DRAW, comes from the Latin *traho* to draw, and the Greek *δρασσω* to lay hold of.

DRAG, through the medium of the German *tragen* to carry, comes also from *traho* to draw.

HAUL or HALE comes from the Greek *σλαω* to draw.

PULL is in all probability changed from *pello* to drive or thrust.

PLUCK is in the German *plucken*, &c.

TUG comes from *ziehen* to pull.

Draw expresses here the idea common to the first three terms, namely, of putting a body in motion from behind oneself or towards oneself; to *drag* is to *draw* a thing with violence, or to *draw* that which makes resistance; to *haul* is to *drag* it with still greater violence. We *draw* a cart; we *drag* a body along the ground; or *haul* a vessel to the shore. To *pull* signifies only an effort to *draw* without the idea of motion: horses *pull* very long sometimes before they can *draw* a heavily laden cart up hill. To *pluck* is to *pull* with a sudden twitch, in order to separate; thus feathers are *plucked* from animals. To *tug* is to *pull* with violence; thus men *tug* at the oar.

Furious he said, and tow'rd the Grecian crew,
(Seiz'd by the crest) the unhappy warrior *drew*;
Struggling he follow'd, while th' embroider'd
thong,

That ty'd his helmet, *dragg'd* the chief along.

Pope.

Some hoisting levers, some the wheels prepare,
And fasten to the horse's feet; the rest
With cables *haul* along the unwieldy beast.

Dryden.

Two magnets are placed, one of them in the roof and the other in the floor of Mahomet's burying-place at Mecca, and *pull* the impostor's iron coffin with such an equal attraction, that it hangs in the air between both of them. Addison.

Even children follow'd with endearing wile,
And *pluck'd* his gown, to share the good man's
smile. Goldsmith.

Clear'd, as I thought, and fully fix'd at length
To learn the cause, I *tugg'd* with all my strength.

Dryden.

In the moral application we may be *drawn* by any thing which can act

on the mind to bring us near to an object; we are *dragged* only by means of force; we *pull* a thing towards us by a direct effort. To *haul*, *pluck*, and *tug* are seldom used but in the physical application.

Hither we sail'd, a voluntary throng,

To avenge a private, not a public wrong;

What else to Troy the assembled nations *draws*,
But thine ungrateful! and thy brother's cause.

Pope.

'Tis long since I for my celestial wife,

Loath'd by the Gods have *dragg'd* a lingering
life.

Pope.

Hear this, remember, and our fury dread,

Nor *pull* th' unwilling vengeance on thy head.

Pope.

TO DREAD, *v.* *To apprehend.*

DREAD, *v.* *Awe.*

DREADFUL, *v.* *Fearful.*

DREADFUL, *v.* *Formidable.*

DREAM, REVERIE.

DREAM, in Dutch *drom*, &c. comes either from the Celtic *drem* a sight, or the Greek *δραμα* a fable, or as probably from the word *roam*, signifying to wander, in Hebrew *rom* to be agitated.

REVERIE, in French *reverie*, like the English *rave*, comes from the Latin *rabies*, signifying that which is wandering or incoherent.

Dreams and *reveries* are alike opposed to the reality, and have their origin in the imagination; but the former commonly passes in sleep, and the latter when awake: the *dream* may and does commonly arise when the imagination is in a sound state; the *reverie* is the fruit of a heated imagination: *dreams* come in the course of nature; *reveries* are the consequence of a peculiar ferment.

When the *dream* is applied to the act of one that is awake, it admits of another distinction from *reverie*. They both designate what is confounded, but the *dream* is less extravagant than the *reverie*. Ambitious men please themselves with *dreams* of future greatness; enthusiasts debase the purity of the Christian religion by blending their own wild *reveries* with the doctrines of the Gospel. He who indulges himself in idle *dreams* lays up a store of disappointment for himself when he recovers his recollection, and finds the

abade, to imply obscurity, which is most suitable to sorrow.

DISMAL, compounded of *dis* or *mal* and *malus*, signifies very evil.

When applied to natural objects they denote the want of necessary light: in this sense metals are more or less *dull* according as they are stained with dirt: the weather is either *dull* or *gloomy* in different degrees; that is *dull* when the sun is obscured by clouds, and *gloomy* when the atmosphere is darkened by fogs or thick clouds. A room is *dull*, *gloomy*, or *dismal*, according to circumstances: it is *dull* if the usual quantity of light and sound be wanting; it is *gloomy* if the darkness and stillness be very considerable; it is *dismal* if it be deprived of every convenience that fits it for a habitation; in this sense a dungeon is a *dismal* abode. *Sad* is not applied so much to sensible as moral objects, in which sense the distressing events of human life on the loss of a parent or a child is justly denominated *sad*.

In regard to the frame of mind which is designated by these terms, it will be easily perceived from the above explanation. As slight circumstances produce *dulness*, any change, however small, in the usual flow of spirits may be termed *dull*. *Gloom* weighs heavy on the mind, and gives a turn to the reflections and the imagination: desponding thoughts of futurity will spread a *gloom* over every other object. *Dismal* denotes a strong state of depression in the spirits. *Sad* indicates a wounded state of the heart; feelings of unmixed pain.

While man is a retainer to the elements and a sojourner in the body, it must be content to submit its own quickness and spirituality to the *dulness* of its vehicle. SOUTH.

Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, heav'nly goddess, sing!
That wrath which hurl'd to Pluto's gloomy
reign

The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain. POPE.
For nine long nights, through all the dusky air
The pyre's thick flaming shot a *dismal* glare.

POPE.

Henry II. of France, by a splinter unhappily thrust into his eye at a solemn jousting, was sent out of the world by a *sad* but very accidental death. SOUTH.

DULL, *v. Stupid.*

DUMB, *v. Silent.*

DUPLICITY, *v. Deceit.*

DURABLE, LASTING,
PERMANENT.

DURABLE is said of things that are intended to remain a shorter time than that which is **LASTING**; and **PERMANENT** expresses less than *durable*.

Durable, from the Latin *durus* hard, respects the texture of bodies, and marks the capacity to hold out; *lasting*, from the verb to *last* or the adjective *last*, signifies to remain the *last* or longest, and is applicable only to that which is supposed of the longest *duration*. *Permanent*, from the Latin *permaneo*, signifies remaining to the end.

Durable is naturally said of material substances; and *lasting* of those which are spiritual; although in ordinary discourse sometimes they exchange offices: *permanent* applies more to the affairs of men.

That which perishes quickly is not *durable*: that which ceases quickly is not *lasting*; that which is only for a time is not *permanent*. Stone is more *durable* than iron, and iron than wood: in the feudal times animosities between families used to be *lasting*: a clerk has not a *permanent* situation in an office. However we may boast of our progress in the arts, we appear to have lost the art of making things as *durable* as they were made in former times: the writings of the moderns will many of them be as *lasting* monuments of human genius as those of the ancients; one who is of a contented moderate disposition will generally prefer a *permanent* situation with small gains to one that is very lucrative but temporary and precarious.

If writings be thus *durable*, and may pass from age to age, through the whole course of time, how careful should an author be of not committing any thing to print that may corrupt posterity. ADDISON.

I must desire my fair readers to give a proper direction to their being admired; in order to which they must endeavour to make themselves the objects of a reasonable and *lasting* admiration. ANTHON.

Land comprehends all things in law of a permanent substantial nature. BLAQUE.

DURABLE, CONSTANT.

DURABILITY (*v. Durable*) lies in the thing.

CONSTANT (*v. Constancy*) lies in the person.

What is *durable* is so from its inherent property; what is *constant* is so by the power of the mind. No *durable* connections can be formed where avarice or lust prevails.

Some states have suddenly emerged, and even in the depths of their calamity have laid the foundation of a towering and *durable* greatness. BUCKE.

Since we cannot promise ourselves *constant* health, let us endeavour at such a temper, as may be our best support in the decay of it. STEELE.

DURATION, *v. Continuance.*

DURATION, TIME.

In the philosophical sense, according to Mr. Locke, **TIME** is that mode of **DURATION** which is formed in the mind by its own power of observing and measuring the passing objects.

In the vulgar sense in which *duration* is synonymous with time, it stands for the time of *duration*, and is more particularly applicable to the objects which are said to last; *time* being employed in general for whatever passes in the world.

Duration comprehends the beginning and end of any portion of *time*, that is the how long of a thing; *time* is employed more frequently for the particular portion itself, namely, the *time* when: we mark the *duration* of a sound from the *time* of its commencement to the time that it ceases: the *duration* of a prince's reign is an object of particular concern to his subjects if he be either very good or the reverse; the *time* in which he reigns is marked by extraordinary events: the historian computes the *duration* of reigns and of events in order to determine the antiquity of a nation; he fixes the exact *time* when each person begins to reign and when he dies, in order to determine the number of years that each reigned.

I think another probable conjecture (respecting the soul's immortality) may be raised from our appetite to *duration* itself. STEELE.

The *time* of the fool is long because he does not know what to do with it; that of the wise

man, because he distinguishes every moment of it with useful or amusing thoughts. ADDISON.

DUTIFUL, OBEDIENT, RESPECTFUL.

DUTIFUL signifies full of a sense of duty or full of what belongs to duty.

OBEDIENT signifies ready to obey.

RESPECTFUL signifies literally full of respect.

The *obedient* and *respectful* are but modes of the *dutiful*: we may be *dutiful* without being either *obedient* or *respectful*; but we are so far *dutiful* as we are either *obedient* or *respectful*. *Duty* denotes what is due from one being to another; it is independent of all circumstances: *obedience* and *respect* are relative *duties* depending upon the character and station of individuals: as we owe to no one so much as to our parents, we are said to be *dutiful* to no earthly being besides; and in order to deserve the name of *dutiful*, a child during the period of his childhood ought to make a parent's will to be his law, and at no future period ought that will ever to be an object of indifference: we may be *obedient* and *respectful* to others besides our parents, although to them *obedience* and *respect* are in the highest degree and in the first case due; yet servants are enjoined to be *obedient* to their masters, wives to their husbands, and subjects to their king.

Respectful is a term of still greater latitude than either, for as the characters of men as much as their stations demand *respect*, there is a *respectful* deportment due towards every superior.

For one cruel parent we meet with a thousand *undutiful* children. ADDISON.

The *obedience* of children to their parents is the basis of all government, and set forth as the measure of that *obedience* which we owe to those whom Providence has placed over us.

ADDISON.

Let your behaviour towards your superiors in dignity, age, learning, or any distinguished excellence, be full of *respect* and deference.

CHATHAM.

DUTY, OBLIGATION.

DUTY, as we see in the preceding section, consists altogether of what is right or due from one being to another.

OBLIGATION, from the Latin *obligo* to bind, signifies the bond or necessity which lies in the thing.

All *duty* depends upon moral *obligation* which subsists between man and man, or man and his Maker; in this abstract sense, therefore, there can be no *duty* without a previous *obligation*, and where there is an *obligation* it involves a *duty*; but in the vulgar acceptation, *duty* is applicable to the conduct of men in their various relations; *obligation* only to particular circumstances or modes of action: we have *duties* to perform as parents and children, as husbands and wives, as rulers and subjects, as neighbours and citizens: the debtor is under an *obligation* to discharge a debt; and he who has promised is under an *obligation* to fulfil his promise: a conscientious man, therefore, never loses sight of the *obligations* which he has at different times to discharge.

The *duty* is not so peremptory as the *obligation*; the *obligation* is not so lasting as the *duty*: our affections impel us to the discharge of *duty*; interest or necessity impels us to the discharge of an *obligation*: it may therefore sometimes happen that the man whom a sense of *duty* cannot actuate to do that which is right, will not be able to withstand the *obligation* under which he has laid himself.

The ways of Heav'n, judg'd by a private breast
Is often what's our private interest,
And therefore those who would that will obey,
Without their interest must their *duty* weigh.

DRYDEN.

No man can be under an *obligation* to believe any thing, who hath not sufficient means whereby he may be assured that such a thing is true.

TILLOTSON.

TO DWELL, *v.* To Abide.

E.

EACH, *v.* All.

EAGER, EARNEST, SERIOUS.

EAGER, *v.* Avidity.

EARNEST most probably comes from the thing *earnest*, in Saxon *thornest* a pledge, or token of a per-

son's real intentions, whence the word has been employed to qualify the state of any one's mind, as settled or fixed.

SERIOUS, in Latin *serius* or *sine risu*, signifies without laughter.

Eager is used to qualify the desires or passions; *earnest* to qualify the wishes or sentiments; the former has either a physical or moral application, the latter altogether a moral application: a child is *eager* to get a plaything; a hungry person is *eager* to get food; a covetous man is *eager* to seize whatever comes within his grasp: a person is *earnest* in solicitation; *earnest* in exhortation; *earnest* in devotion.

Eagerness is mostly faulty; it cannot be too early restrained; we can seldom have any substantial reason to be *eager*: *earnestness* is always taken in the good sense; it denotes the inward conviction of the mind, and the warmth of the heart when awakened by important objects.

A person is said to be *earnest*, or in *earnest*; a person or thing is said to be *serious*: the former characterizes the temper of the mind, the latter characterizes the object itself. In regard to persons, in which alone they are to be compared, *earnest* expresses more than *serious*; the former is opposed to lukewarmness, the latter to unconcernedness: we are *earnest* as to our wishes or our persuasions; we are *serious* as to our intentions: the *earnestness* with which we address another depends upon the force of our conviction; the *seriousness* with which we address them depends upon our sincerity, and the nature of the subject: the preacher *earnestly* exhorts his hearers to lay aside their sins; he *seriously* admonishes those who are guilty of irregularities.

The panting steeds impatient fury breathe,
But snort and tremble at the gulf beneath;
Eager they view'd the prospect dark and deep,
Vast was the leap, and headlong hung the steep.

POPE.

Then even superior to ambition, we
With *earnest* eye anticipate those scenes
Of happiness and wonder.

THOMSON.

It is hardly possible to sit down to the *serious* perusal of Virgil's works, but a man shall rise more disposed to virtue and goodness.

WARREN

EAGERNESS, *v.* Avidi

shred plenty the rich owner bless,
pleasures crown his happiness.
DRYDEN.

ful peasant to the wars is press'd,
He fallow in inglorious rest. DRYDEN.

he tortur'd wave here find repose,
; still amid the shaggy rocks,
on o'er the scatter'd fragments.
THOMSON.

E, EASINESS, FACILITY, LIGHTNESS.

E (*v. Ease*) denotes either the state of a person or quality; **EASINESS**, from *easy*, having *ease*, denotes simple abstract quality which serves to characterize the thing: a person is *easy*, or he has an *easiness* of action: *ease* is said of that which is borne, or that which is done; and **FACILITY**, from the *facilis* easy, most commonly of that which is done; the former in relation to the thing as before, the latter either to the person or the thing: we speak of the *easiness* of the action of a person's *facility* in doing; we judge of the *easiness* of a thing by comparing it with others more difficult; we judge of a person's *facility* by comparing him with others, more or less skilful.

E and **LIGHTNESS** are both of what is to be borne; the former in a general, the latter in a particular sense. Whatever presses the form is not *easy*; that which is by excess of weight is not *easy*; a coat may be *easy* from its weight, it can be *light* only from its weight.

The same distinction exists between the derivatives, to *ease*, *facilitate*, *lighten*; to *ease* is to make *easy*; to *facilitate* is to make *easy* from pain, as to *ease* a person of his labor; to *facilitate* is to make a thing more practicable or less difficult, as to *facilitate* a person's business; to *lighten* is to take off an undue weight, as to *lighten* a person's burdens.

It is the utmost that can be hoped from a weak and unactive habit. JOHNSON.

Learning is more subject to mistake and dissent than anticipated judgement, contrary to the *easiness* or difficulty of any understanding. JOHNSON.

One must have remarked the *facility* with which the kindness of others is sometimes shown by those to whom he never could have expected it. JOHNSON.

Trifles, light as air,
Are to the jealous confirmations strong,
As proofs of holy writ. SHAKESPEARE.

EASINESS, *v. Ease*.

EASY, READY.

EASY (*v. Ease, easiness*) signifies here a freedom from obstruction in ourselves.

READY, in German *bereit*, Latin *paratus*, signifies prepared.

Easy marks the freedom of being done; *ready* the disposition or willingness to do; the former refers mostly to the thing or the manner, the latter to the person: the thing is *easy* to be done; the person is *ready* to do it: it is *easy* to make professions of friendship in the ardor of the moment; but every one is not *ready* to act up to them, when it interferes with his convenience or interest.

As epithets both are opposed to difficult, but agreeably to the above explanation of the terms; the former denotes a freedom from such difficulties or obstacles as lie in the nature of the thing itself; the latter an exemption from such as lie in the temper and character of the person; hence we say a person is *easy* of access whose situation, rank, employments, or circumstances, do not prevent him from admitting others to his presence; he is *ready* to hear when he himself throws no obstacles in the way, when he lends a willing ear to what is said. So likewise a task is said to be *easy*; a person's wit, or a person's reply, to be *ready*: a young man who has birth and fortune, wit and accomplishments, will find an *easy* admittance into any circle: the very name of a favourite author will be a *ready* passport for the works to which it may be affixed.

When used adverbially, they bear the same relation to each other. A man is said to comprehend *easily*, who from whatever cause finds the thing *easy* to be comprehended; he pardons *readily* who has a temper *ready* to pardon.

An *easy* manner of conversation is the most desirable quality a man can have. STERLE.

The scorpion ready to receive thy laws,
Yields half his region and contracts his claws.
DAN.

traho to draw, signifies ready to be drawn.

DUCTILE, from *duco* to lead, signifies ready to be led.

The idea of submitting to the directions of another is comprehended in the signification of all these terms: *docility* marks the disposition to conform our actions in all particulars to the will of another, and lies altogether in the will; *tractability* and *ductility* are modes of *docility*, the former in regard to the conduct, the latter in regard to the principles and sentiments: *docility* is in general applied to the ordinary actions of the life, where simply the will is concerned; *tractability* is applicable to points of conduct in which the judgement is concerned; *ductility* to matters in which the character is formed: a child ought to be *docile* with its parents at all times; it ought to be *tractable* when acting under the direction of its superiors; it ought to be *ductile* to imbibe good principles: the want of *docility* may spring from a defect in the disposition; the want of *tractableness* may spring either from a defect in the temper, or from self conceit; the want of *ductility* lies altogether in a natural stubbornness of character: *docility*, being altogether independent of the judgement, is applicable to the brutes as well as to men; *tractableness* and *ductility* is applicable mostly to thinking and rational objects only, though sometimes extended to inanimate or moral objects: the ox is a *docile* animal; the humble are *tractable*; youth is *ductile*.

The Persians are not wholly void of martial spirit; and if they are not naturally brave, they are at least extremely *docile*, and might with proper discipline be made excellent soldiers.

SIR WM. JONES.

Their reindeer form their riches; these their tents,
Their robes, their beds, and all their homely wealth,
Supply their wholesome fare, and cheerful cups;
Obedient at their call, the *docile* tribe
Yield to the sledge their necks. THOMSON.

The people, without being servile, must be *tractable*. BURKE.

The will was then (before the fall) *ductile* and pliant to all the motions of right reason. SOUTH.

DOCTRINE, PRECEPT, PRINCIPLE.

DOCTRINE, in French *doctrine*,

Latin *doctrina*, from *dceo* to teach, signifies the thing taught.

PRECEPT, from the Latin *preceptio*, signifies the thing laid down.

PRINCIPLE, in French *principe*, Latin *principium*, signifies the beginning of things, that is, their first or original component parts.

The *doctrine* requires a teacher; the *precept* requires a superior with authority; the *principle* requires only an illustrator. The *doctrine* is always framed by some one; the *precept* is enjoined or laid down by some one; the *principle* lies in the thing itself. The *doctrine* is composed of *principles*; the *precept* rests upon *principles* or *doctrines*. Pythagoras taught the *doctrine* of the metempsychosis, and enjoined many *precepts* on his disciples for the regulation of their conduct, particularly that they should abstain from eating animal food, and be only silent hearers for the first five years of their scholarship: the former of these rules depended upon the preceding *doctrine* of the soul's transmigration to the bodies of animals; the latter rested on that simple *principle* of education, the entire devotion of the scholar to the master.

We are said to believe in *doctrines*; to obey *precepts*; to imbibe or hold *principles*. The *doctrine* is that which constitutes our faith; the *precept* is that which directs the practice: both are the subjects of rational assent, and suited only to the matured understanding: *principles* are often admitted without examination; and imbibed as frequently from observation and circumstances, as from any direct personal efforts; children as well as men get *principles*.

This seditious, unconstitutional *doctrine* of electing kings is now publicly taught, avowed, and printed. BURKE.

Pythagoras's first rule directs us to worship the gods, as is ordained by law, for that is the most natural interpretation of the *precept*. ADDISON.

If we had the whole history of *seal*, from the days of Cain to our times, we should see it filled with so many scenes of slaughter and bloodshed, as would make a wise man very careful not to suffer himself to be actuated by such a *principle*, when it regards matters of opinion and speculation. ADDISON.

DOCTRINE, DOGMA, TENET.

THE DOCTRINE originates with the individual.

the episcopal functions, are entitled *ecclesiastics*. There are but few denominations of Christians who have not appointed teachers who are called *divines*. Professors or writers on *theology* are peculiarly denominated *theologians*.

Our old English monks seldom let any of their kings depart in peace, who had endeavoured to diminish the power or wealth of which the *ecclesiastics* were in those times possessed.

ADDISON.

Nor shall I dwell on our excellence in metaphysical speculations; because, he that reads the works of our *divines* will easily discover how far human subtilty has been able to penetrate.

JOHNSON.

I looked on that sermon (of Dr. Price's) as the public declaration of a man much connected with literary caballers, intriguing philosophers, and political *theologians*.

BURKE.

TO ECLIPSE, OBSCURE.

ECLIPSE, in Greek *εκλειπσις*, comes from *εκλειπω* to fail, signifying to cause a failure of light.

OBSCURE, from the adjective *obscure* (*v. Dark*), signifies to cause the intervention of a shadow.

In the natural as well as the moral application *eclipse* is taken in a particular and relative signification; *obscure* is used in a general sense. Heavenly bodies are *eclipsed* by the intervention of other bodies between them and the beholder; things are in general *obscured* which are in any way rendered less striking or visible. To *eclipse* is therefore a species of *obscuring*: that is always *obscured* which is *eclipsed*; but every thing is not *eclipsed* which is *obscured*.

So figuratively *reputation* is *eclipsed* by the intervention of superior merit; it is often *obscured* by an ungracious exterior in the possessor, or by the unfortunate circumstances of his life.

Sarcasms may *eclipse* thine own,
But cannot blur my lost renown.

BUTLER.

Among those who are the most richly endowed by nature and accomplished by their own industry, how few are there whose virtues are not *obscured* by the ignorance, prejudice, or envy of their beholders.

ADDISON.

ECONOMICAL, *v. Oeconomical*.

ECSTACY, RAPTURE, TRANSPORT.

THERE is a strong resemblance in the meaning and application of these words. They all express an extraor-

dinary elevation of the spirits, or an excessive tension of the mind.

The ECSTACY marks a passive state, from the Greek *εκστασις* and *εξίημι* to stand, or be out of oneself, out of one's mind. The RAPTURE from the Latin *rapio*, to seize or carry away; and TRANSPORT from *trans* and *porto* to carry beyond oneself, rather designate an active state, a violent impulse with which it hurries itself forward. An *ecstasy* and *rapture* are always pleasurable, or arise from pleasurable causes: *transport* respects either pleasurable or painful feelings: joy occasions *ecstasies* or *raptures*: joy and anger have their *transports*.

An *ecstasy* benumbs the faculties; it will take away the power of speech and often of thought; it is commonly occasioned by sudden and unexpected events: *rapture*, on the other hand, often invigorates the powers, and calls them into action; it frequently arises from deep thought: the former is common to all persons of ardent feelings, but more particularly to children, ignorant people, or to such as have not their feelings under control; *rapture*, on the contrary, is applicable to persons with superior minds, to circumstances of peculiar importance. *Transports* are but sudden bursts of passion, which generally lead to intemperate actions and are seldom indulged even on joyous occasions except by the volatile and passionate: a reprieve from the sentence of death will produce an *ecstasy* of delight in the pardoned criminal. Religious contemplation is calculated to produce holy *raptures* in a mind strongly imbued with pious zeal: in *transports* of rage men have committed enormities which have cost them bitter tears of repentance ever after.

What followed was all *ecstasy* and trance,
Immortal pleasures round my swimming eyes did dance.

DAYKEN.

By swift degrees the love of nature works,
And warms the bosom, till at last sublim'd
To rapture and enthusiastic heat,
We feel the present Deity.

THOMSON.

When all thy mercies, O my God!
My rising soul surveys,
Transported with the view, I'm lost
In wonder, love and praise.

ADDISON.

EDGE, *v. Border*.

EDICT, *v.* Decree.

EDIFICE, STRUCTURE, FABRIC.

EDIFICE, in Latin *edificium* from *edifico* or *edes* and *facio*, to make a house, signifies properly the house made.

STRUCTURE, from the Latin *structura* and *struo* to raise, signifies the raising a thing, or the thing raised.

FABRIC, from the Latin *fabrico*, signifies the *fabricating* or the thing *fabricated*.

Edifice in its proper sense is always applied to a building; *structure* and *fabric* are either employed as abstract actions, or the results and fruits of actions: in the former case they are applied to many objects besides buildings; *structure* referring to the act of raising or setting up together; *fabric* to that of framing or contriving.

As the *edifice* bespeaks the thing itself, it requires no modification, since it conveys of itself the idea of something superior: the word *structure* must always be qualified; it is employed only to designate the mode of action: the *fabric* is itself a species of epithet, it designates the object as something contrived by the power of art or by design. The *edifices* dedicated to the service of religion have in all ages been held sacred: it is the business of the architect to estimate the merits or demerits of the *structure*: when we take a survey of the vast *fabric* of the universe, the mind becomes bewildered with contemplating the infinite power of its Divine author.

When employed in the abstract sense of actions, *structure* is limited to objects of magnitude, or such as consist of complicated parts; *fabric* is extended to every thing in which art or contrivance is requisite; hence we may speak of the *structure* of vessels, and the *fabric* of cloth, iron ware, and the like.

The levellers only pervert the natural order of things; they load the *edifice* of society, by setting up in the air what the solidity of the *structure* requires to be on the ground. **BURKE.**

In the whole *structure* and constitution of things, God hath shown himself to be favourable to virtue, and inimical to vice and guilt. **BLAIR.**

By destiny compell'd, and in despair,
The Greeks grew weary of the tedious war,
And, by Minerva's aid, a *fabric* rear'd. **DRYDEN.**

EDUCATION, INSTRUCTION,
BREEDING.

INSTRUCTION and **BREEDING** are to **EDUCATION** as parts to a whole; the *instruction* respects the communication of knowledge, and *breeding* respects the manners or outward conduct; but *education* comprehends not only both these, but the formation of the mind, the regulation of the heart, and the establishment of the principles: good *instruction* makes one wiser; good *breeding* makes one more polished and agreeable; good *education* makes one really good. A want of *education* will always be to the injury if not to the ruin of the sufferer: a want of *instruction* is of more or less inconvenience, according to circumstances: a want of *breeding* only unfits a man for the society of the cultivated. *Education* belongs to the period of childhood and youth; *instruction* may be given at different ages; good *breeding* is best learnt in the early part of life.

A mother tells her infant that two and two make four, the child remembers the proposition, and is able to count four for all the purposes of life, till the course of his education brings him among philosophers, who fright him from his former knowledge, by telling him that four is a certain aggregate of units. **JOHNSON.**

To illustrate one thing by its resemblance to another, has been always the most popular and efficacious art of *instruction*. **JOHNSON.**

My *breeding* abroad hath shown me more of the world than yours has done. **WENTWORTH.**

TO EFFACE, *v.* To blot out.

TO EFFECT, *v.* To accomplish.

EFFECT, CONSEQUENCE.

THE EFFECT and the **CONSEQUENCE** agree in expressing that which follows any thing, but the former marks what follows from a connexion between the two objects; the *consequence* is not thus limited; the *effect* is that which necessarily flows out of the cause, between which the connexion is so intimate that we cannot think of the one without the other. In the nature of things, causes will have *effects*; and for every *effect* there will be a cause: the *consequence*, on the other hand, may be either casual or natural; it is that on which we can calculate. *Effect* applies either

E physical or moral objects, *consequence* only to moral subjects.

There are many diseases which are *the effects* of mere intemperance: an *imprudent* step in one's first setting *out* in life is often attended with fatal *consequences*. A mild answer has the *effect* of turning away wrath: the loss of character is the general *consequence* of an irregular life.

A passion for praise produces very good *effects*. ADDISON.

Were it possible for any thing in the Christian faith to be erroneous, I can find no ill *consequences* in adhering to it. ADDISON.

TO EFFECT, PRODUCE, PERFORM.

The two latter are in reality included in the former; what is *effected* is both *produced* and *performed*; but what is *produced* or *performed* is not always *effected*.

EFFECT, in Latin *effectus*, participle of *efficio*, compounded of *e* and *facio*, signifies to make out any thing.

PRODUCE, from the Latin *produco*, signifies literally to draw forth.

PERFORM, compounded of *per* and *form*, signifies to form thoroughly or carry through.

To *produce*, signifies to bring something forth or into existence; to *perform*, to do something to the end: to *effect* is to *produce* by *performing*: whatever is *effected* is the consequence of a specific design; it always requires therefore a rational agent to *effect*: what is *produced* may follow incidentally, or arise from the action of an irrational agent or an inanimate object; what is *performed* is done by specific efforts; it is therefore, like *effect*, the consequence of design, and requires a rational agent.

Effect respects both the end and the means by which it is brought about: *produce* respects the end only; *perform*, the means only. No person ought to calculate on *effecting* a reformation in the morals of men, without the aid of religion: changes both in individuals and communities are often *produced* by trifles.

To *effect* is said of that which emanates from the mind of the agent himself; to *perform*, of that which is marked out by rule, or prescribed by another. We *effect* a purpose; we

perform a part, a duty or office. A true Christian is always happy when he can *effect* a reconciliation between parties who are at variance: it is a laudable ambition to strive to *perform* one's part creditably in society.

The united powers of hell are joined together for the destruction of mankind, which they *effected* in part. ADDISON.

Though prudence does in a great measure *produce* our good or ill fortune, there are many unforeseen occurrences which pervert the finest schemes that can be laid by human wisdom. ADDISON.

Where there is a power to *perform*, God does not accept the will. SOUTH.

EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, EFFECTUAL, EFFICACIOUS.

EFFECTIVE signifies capable of *effecting*; **EFFICIENT** signifies literally *effecting*; **EFFECTUAL** and **EFFICACIOUS** signify having the *effect*, or possessing the power to *effect*. The former two are used only in regard to physical objects, the latter two in regard to moral objects. An army or a military force is *effective*; a cause is *efficient*; the remedy or cure is *effectual*; the medicine is *efficacious*.

The end or result is *effectual*, the means are *efficacious*. No *effectual* stop can be put to the vices of the lower orders, while they have a vicious example from their superiors: a seasonable exercise of severity on an offender is often very *efficacious* in quelling a spirit of insubordination. When a thing is not found *effectual*, it is requisite to have recourse to farther measures; that which has been proved to be *inefficacious* should never be adopted.

I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberties of France, until I was informed how it had been combined with government, with the discipline of the armies, and the collection of an *effective* revenue. BURKE.

No searcher has yet found the *efficient* cause of sleep. JOHNSON.

Nothing so *effectually* deadens the taste of the sublime, as that which is light and radiant. BURKE.

He who labours to lessen the dignity of human nature, destroys many *efficacious* motives for practising worthy actions. WATSON.

EFFECTS, *v.* *Goods*.

EFFECTUAL, *v.* *Effect*.

EFFEMINATE, *v.* *Form*.

quence speaks one's own feelings; it comes from the heart, and speaks to the heart: *oratory* is an imitative art; it describes what is felt by another. *Rhetoric* is the affectation of *oratory*.

An afflicted parent who pleads for the restoration of her child that has been torn from her, will exert her *eloquence*; a counsellor at the bar, who pleads the cause of his client, will employ *oratory*; vulgar partisans are full of *rhetoric*.

Eloquence often consists in a look or an action; *oratory* must always be accompanied with verbosity. There is a dumb *eloquence* which is not denied even to the brutes, and which speaks more than all the studied graces of speech and action employed by the *orator*.

Between *eloquence* and *oratory* there is the same distinction as between nature and art: the former can never be perverted to any base purposes; it always speaks truth: the latter will as easily serve the purposes of falsehood as of truth.

The political partisan who paints the miseries of the poor in glowing language and artful periods, may often have *oratory* enough to excite dissatisfaction against the government, without having *eloquence* to describe what he really feels.

Soft *elocution* does thy style renown,
And the sweet accents of the peaceful gown,
Gentle or sharp according to thy choice
To laugh at follies or to lash at vice. DAYKEN.

Some other poets know the art of speaking well; but Virgil, beyond this, knew the admirable secret of being *eloquently* silent. WALSH.

As harsh and irregular sounds is not harmony,
So neither is hanging a cushion *oratory*. SWIFT.

Be but a person in credit with the multitude,
he shall be able to make popular rambling stuff
pass for high *rhetoric* and moving preaching.

SOUTH.

ELOQUENCE, *v. Elocution.*

TO ELUCIDATE, *v. To explain.*

TO ELUDE, *v. To escape.*

TO ELUDE, *v. To avoid.*

TO EMANATE, *v. To arise.*

TO EMBARRASS, PERPLEX,
ENTANGLE.

EMBARRASS, *v. Difficulty.*

PERPLEX, *v. To distress.*

ENTANGLE, *v. To disengage.*

9

Embarrass respects the manners or circumstances; *perplex* the views and conduct; *entangle* is said of particular circumstances. *Embarrassments* depend altogether on ourselves: the want of prudence and presence of mind are the common causes; *perplexities* depend on extraneous circumstances as well as ourselves; extensive dealings with others are mostly attended with *perplexities*: *entanglements* arise mostly from the evil designs of others.

That *embarrasses* which interrupts the even course or progress of one's actions: that *perplexes* which interferes with one's decisions: that *entangles* which binds a person in his actions. Pecuniary difficulties *embarrass*, or contending feelings produce *embarrassment*: contrary counsels or interests *perplex*: law-suits *entangle*. Steadiness of mind prevents *embarrassment* in the outward behaviour. Firmness of character is requisite in the midst of *perplexities*: caution must be employed to guard against *entanglements*.

Cervantes had so much kindness for Don Quixote, that however he *embarrasses* him with absurd distresses, he gives him so much sense and virtue as may preserve our esteem.

JOHNSON.

It is scarcely possible in the regularity and compulsion of the present time, to image the tumult of absurdity and clamor of contradiction which *perplexed* doctrine, disordered practice, and disturbed both public and private quiet in the time of the rebellion.

JOHNSON.

I presume you do not *entangle* yourself in the particular controversies between the Romanists and us.

CLARENDON.

EMBARRASSMENTS, *v. Difficulties.*

TO EMBELLISH, *v. To adorn.*

EMBLEM, *v. Figure.*

TO EMBOLDEN, *v. To encourage.*

TO EMBRACE, *v. To clasp.*

TO EMBRACE, *v. To comprize.*

EMBRYO, FŒTUS.

EMBRYO, in French *embryon*, Greek *εμβρυον*, from *βρυω* to germinate, signifies the thing germinated. FŒTUS, in French *fetus*, Latin *fatus*, from *foveo* to cherish, signifies the

IMOLUMENT, v. Gain.

IMOTION, v. Agitation.

IMPHASIS, v. Stress.

EMPIRE, KINGDOM.

THOUGH these two words obviously to two species of states, where princes assume the title of either or king, yet the difference between them is not limited to this action.

The word **EMPIRE** carries with it the idea of a state that is vast, and composed of many different people; while **KINGDOM** marks a state limited in extent, and united in composition. In *kingdoms* there is uniformity of fundamental laws; no difference in regard to particular modes of jurisprudence being only variations from custom, which do not effect the unity of political administration. From this uniformity, also, in the functions of government, we may trace the origin of the words *empire* and *kingdom*: since there is but one prince or sovereign ruler, although there may be many employed in the administration. With *empires* it is different: one part is sometimes governed by fundamental laws, very different from those by which another part of the same *empire* is governed; which diversity destroys the unity of government, and makes the division of the state to consist in the assignment of certain chiefs to the command of a superior general or emperor.

From this very right of commanding, then, it is evident that the *empire* and *emperor* derive their origin; and hence it is that there may be many princes or sovereigns in *kingdoms* in the same *empire*.

For a farther illustration of these differences, we need only look to their application from the earliest ages in which they were used, down to the present period. The word *king* had its existence long prior to that of *emperor*, being doubtless derived, through the channel of the northern languages, from the Hebrew *cohen* a priest, since in the early ages of primitive simplicity, the lust of dominion had led to the extension of power and consequence to the priest who performed the sacer-

dotal office was unanimously regarded as the fittest person to discharge the civil functions for the community. So in like manner among the Romans the corresponding word *rex*, which comes from *rego*, and the Hebrew *regna* to feed, signifies a pastor or shepherd, because he who filled the office acted both spiritually and civilly as their guide. Rome therefore was first a *kingdom*, while it was formed of only one people: it acquired the name of *empire* as soon as other nations were brought into subjection to it, and became members of it; not by losing their distinctive character as nations, but by submitting themselves to the supreme command of their conquerors.

For the same reason the German *empire* was so denominated, because it consisted of several states independent of each other, yet all subject to one ruler or emperor; so likewise the Russian *empire*, the Ottoman *empire*, and the Mogul *empire*, which are composed of different nations: and on the other hand the *kingdom* of Spain, of Portugal, of France, and of England, all of which, though divided into different provinces, were, nevertheless, one people, having but one ruler. While France, however, included many distinct countries within its jurisdiction, it properly assumed the name of an *empire*; and England having by a legislative act united to itself a country distinct both for its laws and customs, has likewise, with equal propriety, been denominated the British *empire*.

A *kingdom* can never reach to the extent of an *empire*, for the unity of government and administration which constitutes its leading feature cannot reach so far; and at the same time requires more time than the simple exercise of superiority, and the right of receiving certain marks of homage, which suffice to form an *empire*. Although a *kingdom* may not be free, yet an *empire* can scarcely be otherwise than despotic in its form of government. Power, when extended and ramified, as it must unavoidably be in an *empire*, derives no aid from the personal influence of the sovereign, and requires therefore to be dealt out in portions far too great

* Vile Abbé Baudeau: "Empire, royaume."

ntly belong to another; but one *uses* is supposed to be his *own* property. On this ground *we* speak of *employing* persons, *all* as things; but we speak of things only, and not persons. *person*, the time, the strength, the power, are *employed*; houses, *ure*, and all materials, are *used*, *rich* either necessities or conveniences are composed. It is a part of *us* to *employ* the short portion *ne* well, which is allotted to us in this sublunary state, and to *use* things of this world so as not to *lose* them. No one is exculpated the guilt of an immoral action, *offering* himself to be *employed* as instrument to serve the purposes *another*: we ought to *use* our *it* endeavours to abstain from all *action* with such as wish to *im-* *pose* us in their guilty practices.

Bedlike Hector! all thy force *employ*;
 He all th' united bands of Troy. POPE.
 & the broad belt, with gay embroid'ry
 grac'd,
 'd, the corslet from his breast unbrac'd;
 suck'd the blood, and sov'reign balm in-
 fus'd,
 Chiron gave, and Æsculapius us'd.
 POPE.

EMPLOYMENT, *v.* Business.

EMPOWER, *v.* Commission.

EMPTY, VACANT, VOID,
 DEVOID.

EMPTY, in Saxon *empti*, not im-
 bly derived from the Latin *inopis*
 or wanting.

VACANT, in Latin *vacans* or *vaco*,
now *bekak* to empty.

VOID and DEVOID, in Latin
vacuus, and Greek *διδω*, signifies soli-
 tude bereft.

Empty is the term in most general
vacant, *void*, and *devoid*, are
 used in particular cases: *empty*
vacant have either a proper or
 improper application; *void* or *de-*
void is a moral acceptation.

Empty, in the natural sense, marks
 the absence of that which is substan-
 tial or adapted for filling; *vacant*
 denotes or marks the absence of
 that which should occupy or make
 up a thing. That which is hollow
 is *empty*; that which respects
 the space may be *vacant*. A

house is *empty* which has no inha-
 bitants; a seat is *vacant* which is
 without an occupant: a room is *empty*
 which is without furniture; a space
 on paper is *vacant* which is free from
 writing.

In the figurative application *empty*
 and *vacant* have a similar analogy: a
 dream is said to be *empty*, or a title
empty; a stare is said to be *vacant*
 or an hour *vacant*. *Void* or *devoid*
 are used in the same sense as *vacant*,
 as qualifying epithets, but not pre-
 fixed as adjectives, and always fol-
 lowed by some object; thus we speak
 of a creature as *void* of reason, and
 of an individual as *devoid* of common
 sense.

To honor Thetis' son he bends his care,
 And plunges the Greeks in all the woes of war;
 Then bids an empty phantom rise to sight,
 And thus commands the vision of the night.
 POPE.

An inquisitive man is a creature naturally
 very *vacant* of thought in itself, and therefore
 forced to apply itself to foreign assistance.

STEELE.

My next desire is, *void* of care and strife,
 To lead a soft, secure, inglorious life. DRYDEN.
 We Tyrians are not so *devoid* of sense,
 Nor so remote from Phœbus' influence.
 DRYDEN.

EMPTY, *v.* Hollow.

EMULATION, *v.* Competition.

TO ENCHANT, *v.* To charm.

TO ENCIRCLE, *v.* To surround.

TO ENCLOSE, *v.* To circumscribe.

ENCOMIUM, EULOGY,

PANEGYRIC.

ENCOMIUM, in Greek *εγκωμιον*,
 signified a set or form of verses, used
 for the purposes of praise.

EULOGY, in Greek *εὐλογία* from
eu and *λογος*, signifies well spoken, or
 a good word for any one.

PANEGYRIC, in Greek *πανηγυρι-*
κος, from *πας* the whole, and *αγορα*
 an assembly, signifies that which is
 spoken before an assembly, a solemn
 oration.

The idea of praise is common to
 all these terms; but the first seems
 more properly applied to the thing, or
 the unconscious object; the second to
 the person in general, or to the cha-
 racters and actions of men in general
 the third to the person of some par-

by his pecuniary embarrassments to raise money at a great loss.

We may be *impelled*, *urged*, and *stimulated* to that which is bad; we are never *instigated* to that which is good: we may be *impelled* by curiosity to pry into that which does not concern us; we may be *urged* by the entreaties of those we are connected with to take steps of which we afterwards repent; we may be *stimulated* by a desire of revenge to many foul deeds; but those who are not hardened in vice require the *instigation* of persons more abandoned than themselves, before they will commit any desperate act of wickedness.

The *encouragement* and *incitement* are the abstract nouns either for the act of *encouraging* or *inciting*, or the thing that *encourages* or *incites*: the *encouragement* of laudable undertakings is itself laudable; a single word or look may be an *encouragement*: the *incitement* of passion is at all times dangerous, but particularly in youth; money is said to be an *incitement* to evil. *Incentive*, which is another derivative from *incite*, has a higher application for things that *incite* than the word *incitement*; the latter being mostly applied to sensible, and the former to spiritual objects: savoury food is an *incitement* to sensualists to indulge in gross acts of intemperance: a religious man wants no *incentives* to virtues; his own breast furnishes him with those of the noblest kind. *Impulse* is the derivative from *impel*, which denotes the act of *impelling*; *stimulus*, which is the root of the word *stimulate*, naturally designates the instrument, namely, the spur or goad with which one is *stimulated*: hence we speak of acting by a blind *impulse*, or wanting a *stimulus* to exertion,

Every man *encourages* the practice of that vice which he commits in appearance, though he avoids it in fact. HAWKESWORTH.

He that prosecutes a lawful purpose, by lawful means, acts always with the approbation of his own reason: he is *animated* through the course of his endeavours by an expectation which he knows to be just. JOHNSON.

While a rightful claim to pleasure or to affluence must be procured either by slow industry or uncertain hazard, there will always be multitudes whom cowardice or impatience *incite* to more safe and speedy methods of getting wealth. JOHNSON.

Thus, while around the wave-subjected soil
Impels the natives to repeated toil,
Industrious habits in each bosom reign.

GOLDSMITH.

The magistrate cannot urge obedience upon such potent grounds as the minister. SOUTH.

For every want that *stimulates* the breast
Becomes a source of pleasure when redrest.

GOLDSMITH.

There are few *instigations* in this country to a breach of confidence. HAWKESWORTH.

TO ENCOURAGE, ADVANCE, PROMOTE, PREFER, FORWARD.

TO ENCOURAGE, *v.* To encourage, animate.

ADVANCE, *v.* To advance.

PROMOTE, from the Latin *promoveo*, signifies to move forward.

PREFER, from the Latin *præferro* or *fero* and *præ* to set before, signifies to set up before others.

TO FORWARD is to put forward.

The idea of exerting one's influence to the advantage of an object is included in the signification of all these terms, which differ in the circumstances and mode of the action: to *encourage*, *advance*, and *promote*, are applicable to both persons and things; *prefer* to persons only; *forward* to things only.

First as to persons, *encourage* is partial as to the end, and indefinite as to the means: we may *encourage* a person in any thing however trivial, and by any means: thus we may *encourage* a child in his rudeness, by not checking him; or we may *encourage* an artist or man of letters in some great national work; but to *advance*, *promote*, and *prefer*, are more general in their end, and specific in the means: a person may *advance* himself, or may be *advanced* by others; he is *promoted* and *preferred* only by others: a person's *advancement* may be the fruit of his industry, or result from the efforts of his friends; *promotion* and *preferment* are the work of one's friends; the former in regard to offices in general, the latter mostly in regard to ecclesiastical situations: it is the duty of every one to *encourage*, to the utmost of his power, those among the poor who strive to obtain an honest livelihood; it is every man's duty to *advance* himself in life by every legitimate means; it is the duty and the pleasure of every good

man in the state to *promote* those who show themselves deserving of *promotion*; it is the duty of a minister to accept of *preferment* when it offers, but it is not his duty to be solicitous for it.

When taken in regard to things *encourage* is used in an improper or figurative acceptation; the rest are applied properly: if we *encourage* an undertaking, we give courage to the undertaker; but when we *advance* a cause, or *promote* an interest, or *forward* a purpose, they properly convey the idea of keeping things alive, or in a motion towards some desired end: to *advance* is however generally used in relation to whatever admits of extension and aggrandizement; *promote* is applied to whatever admits of being brought to a point of maturity or perfection; *forward* is but a partial term, employed in the sense of *promote* in regard to particular objects: thus we *advance* religion or learning; we *promote* an art or an invention; we *forward* a plan.

Religion depends upon the *encouragement* of those that are to dispense and assert it.

South.

No man's lot is so unalterably fixed in this life, but that a thousand accidents may either forward or disappoint his *advancement*.

HUGHES.

Your zeal in *promoting* my interest deserves my warmest acknowledgements.

BEATTIE.

If I were now to accept *preferment* in the church, I should be apprehensive that I might strengthen the hands of the gossayers.

BEATTIE.

The great *encouragement* which has been given to learning for some years last past, has made our own nation as glorious upon this account as for its late triumphs and conquests.

ADDISON.

I love to see a man zealous in a good matter, and especially when his zeal shows itself for *advancing* morality, and *promoting* the happiness of mankind.

ADDISON.

It behoves us not to be wanting to ourselves in *forwarding* the intention of nature by the culture of our minds.

BERKELEY.

TO ENCOURAGE, EMBOLDEN.

TO ENCOURAGE is to give courage, and to EMBOLDEN to make bold; the former impelling to action in general, the latter to that which is more difficult or dangerous: we are *encouraged* to persevere; the resolution is thereby confirmed: we are *emboldened* to begin; the spirit of enter-

prise is roused. Success *encourages*; the chance of escaping danger *emboldens*.

Outward circumstances, however trivial, serve to *encourage*; the urgency of the occasion, or the importance of subject, serves to *embolden*: a kind word or a gentle look *encourages* the suppliant to tender his petition; where the cause of truth and religion is at stake, the firm believer is *emboldened* to speak out with freedom: timid dispositions are not to be *encouraged* always by trivial circumstances, but sanguine dispositions are easily *emboldened*; the most flattering representations of friends are frequently necessary to *encourage* the display of talent; the confidence natural to youth is often sufficient of itself to *embolden* men to great undertakings.

Intrepid through the midst of danger go,
Their friends *encourage* and amaze the foe.

DRYDEN.

Embolden'd then, nor hesitating more,
Fast, fast, they plunge amid the flashing wave.

THOMSON.

TO ENCROACH, INTRENCH, INTRUDE, INVADE, INFRINGE.

ENCROACH, in French *encroacher*, is compounded of *en* or *in* and *crouch* cringe or creep, signifying to creep into any thing.

INTRENCH, compounded of *in* and *trench*, signifies to *trench* or dig beyond one's own ground into another's ground.

INTRUDE, from the Latin *intrudo*, signifies literally to thrust upon; and INVADE, from *invado*, signifies to march in upon.

INFRINGE, from the Latin *infringo* compounded of *in* and *frango*, signifies to break in upon.

All these terms denote an unauthorized procedure; but the two former designate gentle or silent actions, the latter violent if not noisy actions.

Encroach is often an imperceptible action, performed with such art as to elude observation; it is, according to its derivation, an insensible creeping into: *intrench* is in fact a species of *encroachment*, namely, that perceptible species which consists in exceeding the boundaries in marking out the ground or space: it should be one of the first objects of a parent to check the first indications of an *encroaching* dis-

position in their children; according to the building laws, it is made actionable for any one to *intrench* upon the street or public road with their houses or gardens.

Encroach and *intrench* respect property only; *intrude*, *invade*, and *infringe*, are used with regard to other objects: *intrude* and *invade* designate an unauthorized entry; the former in violation of right equity or good manners; the latter in violation of public law: the former is more commonly applied to individuals; the latter to nations or large communities: unbidden guests *intrude* themselves sometimes into families to their no small annoyance: an army never *invades* a country without doing some mischief: nothing evinces greater ignorance and impertinence than to *intrude* one's self into any company where we may of course expect to be unwelcome; in the feudal times, when civil power was invested in the hands of the nobility and petty princes, they were incessantly *invading* each other's territories.

Invade has likewise an improper as well as a proper acceptation; in the former case it bears a close analogy to *infringe*: we speak of *invading* rights, or *infringing* rights; but the former is an act of greater violence than the latter: by a tyrannical and arbitrary exercise of power the rights of the subject are *invaded*; by gradual steps and imperceptible means their liberties may be *infringed*: *invade* is used only for public privileges; *infringe* is applied also to private and individual.

King John of England *invaded* the rights of the Barons in so senseless and arbitrary a manner as to provoke their resistance, and thus promote the cause of civil liberty; it is of importance to the peace and well-being of society that men should, in their different relations, stations, and duties, guard against any *infringement* on the sphere or department of such as come into the closest connexion with them.

It is observed by one of the fathers that he who restrains himself in the use of things lawful will never *encroach* upon things forbidden.

JOHNSON.

Religion *entrenches* upon none of our privileges, *invades* none of our pleasures. SOUTH.

One of the chief characteristics of the golden age, of the age in which neither care nor danger had intruded on mankind, is the community of possessions.

JOHNSON.

No sooner were his eyes in slumber bound,
When from above a more than mortal sound
Invades his ears.

DRYDEN.

The King's partisans maintained that, while the prince commands no military force, he will in vain by violence attempt an *infringement* of laws so clearly defined by means of late disputes.

HUME.

TO ENCUMBER, *v.* To clog.

ENCYCLOPEDIA, *v.* Dictionary.

END, *v.* Aim.

TO END, CLOSE, TERMINATE.

To bring any thing to its last point is the common idea in the signification of these terms.

To END is the simple action of putting an *end* to, without any collateral idea; it is therefore the generic term. To CLOSE is to *end* gradually. To TERMINATE is to *end* in a specific manner. There are persons even in civilized countries so ignorant as, like the brutes, to *end* their lives as they began them, without one rational reflection: the Christian *closes* his career of active duty only with the failure of his bodily powers. A person *ends* a dispute, or puts an *end* to it, by yielding the subject of contest; he *terminates* the dispute by entering into a compromise.

Greece in her single heroes strove in vain,
Now hosts oppose thee, and thou must be slain:
So shall my days in one sad tenor run,
And *end* with sorrows as they first began. POPE.

Orestes, Acamas, in front appear,
And CEnomans and Thoön *close* the rear.

POPE.

As I had a mind to know how each of these roads *terminated*, I joined myself with the assembly that were in the flower and vigour of their age, and called themselves the band of lovers.

ANDERSON.

END, EXTREMITY.

BOTH these words imply the last of those parts which constitute a thing; but the END designates that part generally; the EXTREMITY marks the particular point. The *extremity* is from the Latin *extremus* the very last *end*, that which is outermost. Hence the *end* may be said of that which bounds any thing; but *extremity* of that which extends farthest

endeavour, the latter a continued strong *endeavour*. The *endeavour* is called forth by ordinary circumstances; the *effort* and *exertion* by those which are extraordinary. The *endeavour* flows out of the condition of our being and constitution; as rational and responsible agents we must make daily *endeavours* to fit ourselves for an hereafter; as willing and necessitous agents, we use our *endeavours* to obtain such things as are agreeable or needful for us: when a particular emergency arises we make a great *effort*; and when a serious object is to be obtained we make suitable *exertions*.

The *endeavour* is indefinite both as to the end and the means; the end may be immediate or remote; the means may be either direct or indirect: but in the *effort* the end is immediate; the means are direct and personal: we may either make an *endeavour* to get into a room, or we may make an *endeavour* to obtain a situation in life; but we make *efforts* to speak, or we make *efforts* to get through a crowd. The *endeavour* may call forth one or many powers; the *effort* calls forth but one power: the *endeavour* to please in society is laudable, if it do not lead to vicious compliances; it is a laudable *effort* of fortitude to suppress our complaints in the moment of suffering. The *exertion* is as comprehensive in its meaning as the *endeavour*, and as positive as the *effort*; but the *endeavour* is most commonly, and the *effort* always, applied to individuals only; whereas the *exertion* is applicable to nations as well as individuals. A tradesman uses his best *endeavours* to please his customers: a combatant makes desperate *efforts* to overcome his antagonist: a candidate for literary or parliamentary honours uses great *exertions* to surpass his rival; a nation uses great *exertions* to raise a navy or extend its commerce.

To walk with circumspection and steadiness in the right path ought to be the constant *endeavour* of every rational being. JOHNSON.

The influence of custom is such, that to conquer it will require the utmost *efforts* of fortitude and virtue. JOHNSON.

The discomfitures which the republic of as-

senius has suffered have uniformly called forth new *exertions*. BURKE.

ENDLESS, *v. Eternal*.

TO ENDOW, *v. To invest*.

ENDOWMENT, *v. Gift*.

ENDURANCE, *v. Patience*.

TO ENDURE, *v. To suffer*.

ENEMY, FOE, ADVERSARY, OPPONENT, ANTAGONIST.

ENEMY, in Latin *inimicus* compounded of *in* privative and *amicus* a friend, signifies one that is unfriendly.

FOE, in Saxon *fah* most probably from the old Teutonic *fian* to hate, signifies one that bears a hatred.

ADVERSARY, in Latin *adversarius* from *adversus* against, signifies one that takes part against another; *adversarius* in Latin was particularly applied to those who contested a point in law with another.

OPPONENT, in Latin *opponens* participle of *oppono* or *obpono* to place in the way, signifies one pitted against another.

ANTAGONIST, in Greek *ανταγωνιστης* compounded of *αντι* and *αγμιζωμαι* to contend against, signifies one struggling against another.

An *enemy* is not so formidable as a *foe*; the former may be reconciled, but the latter remains always deadly. An *enemy* may be so in spirit, in action, or in relation; a *foe* is always so in spirit, if not in action likewise: a man may be an *enemy* to himself, though not a *foe*. Those who are national or political *enemies* are often private friends, but a *foe* is never any thing but a *foe*. A single act may create an *enemy*, but continued warfare will create a *foe*.

Enemies are either public or private, collective or personal; in the latter sense the word *enemy* is most analogous in signification to that of *adversary*, *opponent*, *antagonist*. * *Enemies* seek to injure each other commonly from a sentiment of hatred; the heart is always more or less implicated: *adversaries* set up their claims, and frequently urge their pretensions with angry strife; but interest more than sentiment stimulates

* Vide Abbé Girard: " *Ennemi, adversaire, antagoniste.* "

to action: *opponents* set up different parties, and treat each other sometimes with acrimony; but their differences do not necessarily include any thing personal: *antagonists* are a species of *opponents* who are in actual engagement: emulation and direct exertion, but not anger, is concerned in making the *antagonist*. *Enemies* make war, aim at destruction, and commit acts of personal violence: *adversaries* are contented with appropriating to themselves some object of desire, or depriving their rival of it; cupidity being the moving principle, and gain the object: *opponents* oppose each other systematically and perpetually; each aims at being thought right in their disputes: taste and opinions are commonly the subjects of debate, self-love oftener than a love of truth is the moving principle: *antagonists* engage in a trial of strength; victory is the end; the love of distinction or superiority the moving principle; the contest may lie either in mental or physical exertion; may aim at superiority in a verbal dispute or in a manual combat. There are nations whose subjects are born *enemies* to those of a neighbouring nation: nothing evinces the radical corruption of any country more than when the poor man dares not show himself as an *adversary* to his rich neighbour without fearing to lose more than he might gain: the ambition of some men does not rise higher than that of being the *opponent* to ministers: Scaliger and Petau among the French were great *antagonists* in their day, as were Boyle and Bentley among the English; the Horatii and Curiatii were equally famous *antagonists* in their way.

Enemy and *foe* are likewise employed in a figurative sense for moral objects: our passions are our *enemies* when indulged; envy is a *foe* to happiness.

Pietarch says very finely, that a man should not allow himself to hate even his *enemies*.

ADDISON.

So frown'd the mighty combatants, that hell
Grew darker at their frown: no match'd they
stood;

For never but once more was either like
To meet so great a *foe*.

MILTON.

Those disputants (the persecutors) convince

their *adversaries* with a scotter commonly called a pile of fagots.

ADDISON.

The name of Boyle is indeed revered, but his works are neglected; we are contented to know that he conquered his *opponents*, without inquiring what cavils were produced against him.

JOHNSON.

Sir Francis Bacon observes that a well written book, compared with its rivals and *antagonists*, is like Moses's serpent that immediately swallowed up those of the Egyptians.

ADDISON.

ENERGY, FORCE, VIGOR.

ENERGY, in French *energie*, Latin *energia*, Greek *ενεργια* from *ενεργειν* to operate inwardly, signifies the power of producing positive effects.

FORCE, *v.* To compel.

VIGOR, from the Latin *vigeo* to flourish, signifies unimpaired power, or that which belongs to a subject in a sound or flourishing state.

With *energy* is connected the idea of activity; with *force* that of capability; with *vigor* that of health. *Energy* lies only in the mind; *force* and *vigor* are the property of either body or mind. Knowledge and freedom combine to produce *energy* of character; *force* is a gift of nature that may be increased by exercise; *vigor*, both bodily and mental, is an ordinary accompaniment of youth, but is not always denied to old age.

Our powers owe much of their *energy* to our hopes, possunt quia posse videntur. When success seems attainable, diligence is enforced.

JOHNSON.

On the passive main
Descends th' ethereal *force*, and with strong
gust
Turns from its bottom the discolour'd deep.

THOMSON.

No man at the age and *vigour* of thirty is
fond of sugar-plums and rattles.

BOYSE.

TO ENERVATE, *v.* To weaken.

TO ENFEEBLE, *v.* To weaken.

TO ENGAGE, *v.* To attract.

TO ENGAGE, *v.* To bind.

ENGAGEMENT, *v.* Battle.

ENGAGEMENT, *v.* Business.

ENGAGEMENT, *v.* Promise.

TO ENGENDER, *v.* To breed.

TO ENGRAVE, *v.* To imprint.

ENGRAVING, *v.* Picture.

TO ENGROSS, *v.* To absorb.

ENJOYMENT, FRUITION, GRATIFICATION.

ENJOYMENT, from *enjoy* to have the joy or pleasure, signifies either the act of *enjoying*, or the pleasure itself derived from that act.

FRUITION, from *fruor* to *enjoy*, is employed only for the act of *enjoying*; we speak either of the *enjoyment* of any pleasure, or of the *enjoyment* as a pleasure: we speak of those pleasures which are received from the *fruition*, in distinction from those which are had in expectation. The *enjoyment* is either corporeal or spiritual, as the *enjoyment* of music, or the *enjoyment* of study: but the *fruition* of eating, or any other sensible, or at least external object: hope intervenes between the desire and the *fruition*.

GRATIFICATION, from the verb to *gratify* make grateful or pleasant, signifies either the act of giving pleasure, or the pleasure received. *Enjoyment* springs from every object which is capable of yielding pleasure; by distinction however, and in the latter sense, from moral and rational objects: but the *gratification*, which is a species of *enjoyment*, is obtained through the medium of the senses. The *enjoyment* is not so vivid as the *gratification*: the *gratification* is not so permanent as the *enjoyment*. Domestic life has its peculiar *enjoyments*; brilliant spectacles afford *gratification*. Our capacity for *enjoyment* depends upon our intellectual endowments; our *gratification* depends upon the tone of our feelings, and the nature of our desires.

The *enjoyment* of fame brings but very little pleasure, though the loss or want of it be very sensible and afflicting. ADDISON.

The man of pleasure little knows the perfect joy he loses for the disappointing *gratifications* which he pursues. ADDISON.

Fame is a good so wholly foreign to our natures that we have no faculty in the soul adapted to it, nor any organ in the body to relish it; an object of desire placed out of the possibility of *fruition*. ADDISON.

TO ENLARGE, INCREASE, EXTEND.

ENLARGE signifies literally to make large or wide, and is applied to dimension and extent.

INCREASE, from the Latin *in-*

crecco to grow to a thing, is applicable to quantity, signifying to become greater in size by the junction of other matter.

EXTEND, in Latin *extendo*, or *ex* and *tendo*, signifies to stretch out, that is, to make greater in space. We speak of *enlarging* a house, a room, premises, or boundaries; of *increasing* the property, the army, the capital, expence; &c.; of *extending* the boundaries of an empire. We say the hole or cavity *enlarges*, the head or bulk *enlarges*, the number *increases*, the swelling, inflammation and the like, *increase*: so likewise in the figurative sense, the views, the prospects, the powers, the ideas, and the mind, are *enlarged*; pain, pleasure, hope, fear, anger, or kindness, is *increased*; views, prospects, connexions, and the like, are *extended*.

Great objects make
Great minds, *enlarging* as their views *enlarge*,
Those still more godlike, as these more divine.

YOUNG.

Good sense alone is a sedate and quiescent quality, which manages its possessions well, but does not *increase* them. JOHNSON.

The wise *extending* their inquiries wide,
See how both states are by connexion ty'd;
Fools view but part, and not the whole survey,
So crowd existence all into a day. JENYNS.

TO ENLIGHTEN, v. To illuminate.

TO ENLIST, v. To enrol.

TO ENLIVEN, v. To animate.

ENMITY, ANIMOSITY, HOSTILITY.

ENMITY lies in the heart; it is deep and malignant: **ANIMOSITY**, from *animus* a spirit, lies in the passions; it is fierce and vindictive: **HOSTILITY**, from *hostis* a political enemy, lies in the action; it is mischievous and destructive.

Enmity is something permanent; *animosity* is partial and transitory: in the feudal ages, when the darkness and ignorance of the times prevented the mild influence of Christianity, *enmities* between particular families were handed down as an inheritance from father to son; in free states, party spirit engenders greater *animosities* than private disputes.

Enmity is altogether personal; *hos-*

Latin monstrum and *monstrous* to show or make visible, signifies remarkable, or exciting notice.

The *enormous* contradicts our rules of estimating and calculating: the *prodigious* raises our minds beyond their ordinary standard of thinking: the *monstrous* contradicts nature and the course of things. What is *enormous* excites our surprise or amazement: what is *prodigious* excites our astonishment: what is *monstrous* does violence to our senses and understanding. There is something *enormous* in the present scale upon which property, whether public or private, is amassed and expended: the works of the ancients in general, but the Egyptian pyramids in particular, are objects of admiration, on account of the *prodigious* labor which was bestowed on them: ignorance and superstition have always been active in producing *monstrous* images for the worship of its blind votaries.

Jove's bird on sounding pinions beat the skies,
A bleeding serpent of enormous size,
His talons truss'd, alive and curling round,
He stung the bird whose throat receiv'd the wound.
POPE.

I dreamed that I was in a wood of so *prodigious* an extent, and cut into such a variety of walks and alleys, that all mankind were lost and bewildered in it.
ADDISON.

Nothing so *monstrous* can be said or feign'd
But with belief and joy is entertain'd.
DRYDEN.

ENOUGH, SUFFICIENT.

ENOUGH, in German *genug*, comes from *genügen*, to satisfy.

SUFFICIENT, in Latin *sufficiens*, participle of *sufficio*, compounded of *sub* and *facio*, signifies made or suited to the purpose.

He has *enough* whose desires are satisfied; he has *sufficient* whose wants are supplied. We may therefore frequently have *sufficiency* when we have not *enough*. A greedy man is commonly in this case he who has never *enough*, although he has more than a *sufficiency*. *Enough* is said only of physical objects of desire: *sufficient* is employed in a moral application, for that which serves the purpose. Children and animals never have *enough* food, nor the miser *enough* money: it is requisite to allow *sufficient* time for every thing that is to be done, if we wish it to be done well.

My loss of honour's great enough,
Thou need'st not brand it with a scoff. BUTLER.

The time present seldom affords sufficient employment for the mind of man. ADDISON.

ENRAPTURE, v. Charm.

TO ENROL, 'INLIST, REGISTER, RECORD.

ENROL, compounded of *en* or *in* and *roll*, signifies to place in a roll, that is, in a roll of paper or a book.

INLIST, compounded of *in* and *list*, signifies to put down in a list.

REGISTER, in Latin *registrum*, comes from *regeristum* participle of *regero*, signifying to put down in writing.

RECORD, in Latin *recordor*, compounded of *re* back or again, and *cor* the heart, signifies to bring back to the heart, or call to mind by a memorandum.

Enrol and *inlist* respect persons only; *register* respects persons and things; *record* respects things only. *Enrol* is generally applied to the act of inserting names in an orderly manner into any book; *inlist* is a species of *enrolling* applicable only to the military. The *enrolment* is an act of authority; the *enlisting* is the voluntary act of an individual. Among the Romans it was the office of the censor to *enrol* the names of all the citizens in order to ascertain their number, and estimate their property: in modern times soldiers are mostly raised by means of *inlisting*.

In the moral application of the terms, to *enrol* is to assign a certain place or rank; to *inlist* is to put one's self under a leader, or attach one's self to a party. Hercules was *enrolled* among the Gods; the common people are always ready to *inlist* on the side of anarchy and rebellion. To *enrol* and *register*, both imply writing down in a book; but the former is a less formal act than the latter. The insertion of the bare name or designation in a certain order is enough to constitute an *enrolment*; but *registering* comprehends the birth, family, and other collateral circumstances of the individual. The object of *registering* likewise differs from *enrolling*: what is *registered* is for future purposes, and is of permanent utility to society in general;

what is *enrolled* often serves only a particular or temporary end. Thus in numbering the people it is necessary simply to *enrol* their names; but when in addition to this it was necessary, as among the Romans, to ascertain their rank in the state, every thing connected with their property, their family, and their connexion, required to be *registered*; so in like manner, in more modern times, it has been found necessary for the good government of the state to *register* the births, marriages, and deaths of every citizen: it is manifest, therefore, that what is *registered*, as far as respects persons, may be said to be *enrolled*; but what is *enrolled* is not always *registered*.

Register, in regard to *record*, has a no less obvious distinction: the former is used for domestic and civil transactions, the latter for public and political events. What is *registered* serves for the daily purposes of the community collectively and individually; what is *recorded* is treasured up in a special manner for particular reference and remembrance at a distance. The number or names of streets, houses, carriages, and the like, are *registered* in different offices; the deeds and documents which regard grants, charters, privileges, and the like, either of individuals or particular towns, are *recorded* in the archives of nations. To *record* is, therefore, a formal species of *registering*: we *register* when we *record*; but we do not always *record* when we *register*.

In an extended and figurative application things may be said to be *registered* in the memory; or events *recorded* in history. We have a right to believe that the actions of good men are *registered* in heaven, and that their names are *enrolled* among the saints and angels; the particular sayings and actions of princes are *recorded* in history, and handed down to the latest posterity.

Anciently no man was suffered to abide in England above forty days, unless he were *enrolled* in some tithing or decennary. BLACKSTONE.

The time never was when I would have *listed* under the banners of any faction, though I might have carried a pair of colors, if I had not spurned them, in either legion.

SIR WM. JONES.

I hope you take care to keep an exact journal, and to *register* all occurrences and observations, for your friends here expect such a book of travels as has not often been seen. JOHNSON.

The medals of the Romans were their current money; when an action deserved to be *recorded* in coin, it was stamped perhaps upon an hundred thousand pieces of money, like our shillings or halfpence. ARBUTHNOT.

ENSAMPLE, *v.* Example.

TO ENSLAVE, CAPTIVATE.

To ENSLAVE is to bring into a state of *slavery*.

To CAPTIVATE is to make a *captive*.

There is as much difference between these terms as between *slavery* and *captivity*: he who is a *slave* is fettered both body and mind; he who is a *captive* is only constrained as to his body: hence to *enslave* is always taken in the bad sense; *captivate* mostly in the good sense: *enslave* is employed literally or figuratively; *captivate* only figuratively: we may be *enslaved* by persons, or by our gross passions; we are *captivated* by the charms or beauty of an object.

The will was then (before the fall) subordinate but not *enslaved* to the understanding. SOUTH.

Men should beware of being *captivated* by a kind of savage philosophy, women by a thoughtless gallantry. ARBUTHNOT.

TO ENSURE, *v.* To follow.

TO ENTANGLE, *v.* To embarrass.

TO ENTANGLE, *v.* To insnare.

ENTERPRISE, *v.* Attempt.

ENTERPRIZING, ADVENTUROUS.

THESE terms mark a disposition to engage in that which is extraordinary and hazardous; but ENTERPRIZING, from *enterprize* (*v.* Attempt), is connected with the understanding; and ADVENTUROUS, from *adventure*, venture or trial, is a characteristic of the passions. The *enterprising* character conceives great projects, and pursues objects that are difficult to be obtained; the *adventurous* character is contented with seeking that which is new, and placing himself in dangerous and unusual situations. An *enterprising* spirit belongs to the commander of an army, or the ruler of a nation; an *adventurous* disposition is suitable to men of low degree.

Peter the Great possessed, in a peculiar manner, an *enterprising* genius; Robinson Crusoe was a man of an *adventurous* turn. *Enterprising* characterizes persons only; but *adventurous* is also applied to things, to signify containing *adventures*; hence a journey, or a voyage, or a history, may be denominated *adventurous*.

One Wood, a man *enterprising* and rapacious, had obtained a patent, empowering him to coin one hundred and eighty thousand pounds of halfpence and farthings for the kingdom of Ireland. JONKSON.

But 'tis enough
In this late age, *advent'rous* to have touch'd
Light on the numbers of the Samian sage;
High heaven forbids the bold presumptuous
strain. THOMSON.

TO ENTER UPON, *v. To begin.*

TO ENTERTAIN, *v. To amuse.*

ENTERTAINMENT, *v. Amusement.*

ENTERTAINMENT, *v. Feast.*

ENTHUSIAST, FANATIC,
VISIONARY.

THE ENTHUSIAST, FANATIC, and VISIONARY, have disordered imaginations; but the *enthusiast* is only affected inwardly with an extraordinary fervor, the *fanatic* and *visionary* betray that fervor by some outward mark; the former by singularities of conduct, the latter by singularities of doctrine. *Fanatics* and *visionaries* are therefore always more or less *enthusiasts*; but *enthusiasts* are not always *fanatics* or *visionaries*. *Ενθουσιασται* among the Greeks, from *εν* in and *θεος* God, signified those supposed to have, or pretending to have Divine inspiration. *Fanatici* were so called among the Latins, from *fana* the temples in which they spent an extraordinary portion of their time; they, like the *εθουσιασται* of the Greeks, pretended to revelations and inspirations, during the influence of which they indulged themselves in many extravagant tricks, cutting themselves with knives, and distorting themselves with every species of antic gesture and grimace.

Although we are professors of a pure religion, yet we cannot boast an exemption from the extravagancies which are related of the poor heathens; we

have many who indulge themselves in similar practices, under the idea of honouring their Maker and Redeemer. There are *fanatics* who profess to be under extraordinary influences of the spirit; and there are *enthusiasts* whose intemperate zeal disqualifies them for taking a beneficial part in the sober and solemn services of the church. *Visionary* signifies properly one who deals in *visions*, that is, in the pretended appearance of supernatural objects; a species of *enthusiasts* who have sprung up in more modern times. The leaders of sects are commonly *visionaries*, having adopted this artifice to establish their reputation and doctrines among their deluded followers; Mahomet was one of the most successful *visionaries* that ever pretended to divine inspiration; and since his time there have been *visionaries* particularly in England, who have raised religious parties, by having recourse to the same expedient: of this description was Swedenborg, Huntington, Brothers, and the like.

Fanatic was originally confined to those who were under religious frenzy, but the present age has presented us with the monstrosity of *fanatics* in irreligion and anarchy. *Enthusiast* is applied in general to every one who is filled with an extraordinary degree of fervor: *visionary* to one who deals in fanciful speculation. The former may sometimes be innocent, if not laudable, according to the nature of the object; the latter is always censurable: the *enthusiast* has always a warm heart; the *visionary* has only a fanciful head. The *enthusiast* will mostly be on the side of virtue even though in an error; the *visionary* pleads no cause but his own. The *enthusiast* suffers his imagination to follow his heart; the *visionary* makes his understanding bend to his imagination. Although in matters of religion, *enthusiasm* should be cautiously guarded against, yet we admire to see it roused in behalf of one's country and one's friends: *visionaries*, whether in religion, politics, or science, are dangerous as members of society, and offensive as companions.

C cherish true religion as precious as you will
fly with abhorrence and contempt superstition
and enthusiasm. CHATHAM.

uable are applied to the same in relation to itself; *like* or *used* to the minds of two or three; hence we say they are *alike* in station, in sentiment, in wishes, *uniform* is applied to the temper, character, or conduct: hence *is* said to preserve a *uniformity* of behaviour towards those whom he regards; friendship requires that the parties be *equal* in station, *alike* in mind, and *uniform* in their conduct; wisdom points out to us an *evenness* of life, from which we must not depart either to the right or to the left, without disturbing our peace; the *equability* of our temper is one of the most trying circumstances.

Sty is the life of conversation; and he is *lost* who assumes to himself any part of another, as he who considers himself as the rest of society. STEELE.

nature is insufficient (in the marriage alliance) it be steady and *uniform*, and united with an *evenness* of temper. SPECTATOR.

Swift's works is found an *equable* tenour of language, which rather trickles than flows. JOHNSON.

How familiar as in life he came;
How different, yet how *like* the same. POPE.

EQUIP, *v.* To fit.

EQUITABLE, *v.* Fair.

EQUITY, *v.* Justice.

EQUIVOCAL, *v.* Ambiguous.

EQUIVOCATE, *v.* To evade.

ERASER, *v.* Time.

ERADICATE, EXTIRPATE,
EXTERMINATE.

ERADICATE, from *radix* the root, is to get out by the root: EXTERMINATE, from *ex* and *stirps* the stock, is to get out the stock, to destroy it thoroughly. In the natural world we may *eradicate* noxious weeds, but we pull them from the soil; but we can never *extirpate* noxious weeds, as they always disperse their seeds and spring up again. These words are seldomer used in the physical than in the moral world; where the former is applied to objects as are conceived to be

plucked up by the roots, as habits, vices, abuses, evils; and the latter to whatever is united or supposed to be united into a race or family, and is destroyed root and branch. Youth is the season when vicious habits may be thoroughly *eradicated*; by the universal deluge the whole human race was *extirpated*, with the exception of Noah and his family.

EXTERMINATE, in Latin *exterminatus*, participle of *extermino*, from *ex* or *extra* and *terminos*, signifies to cast out of the boundaries, that is, out of existence. It is used only in regard to such things as have life, and designates a violent and immediate action; *extirpate*, on the other hand, may designate a progressive action: the former may be said of individuals, but the latter is employed in the collective sense only. Plague, pestilence, famine, *extirpate*: the sword *exterminates*.

It must be every man's care to begin by *eradicating* those corruptions which, at different times, have tempted him to violate conscience. BLAIR.

Go thou, inglorious, from th' embattled plain;
Ships thou hast store, and nearest to the main.
A nobler care the Grecians shall employ,
To combat, conquer, and *extirpate* Troy. POPE.

So violent and black were Haman's passions,
that he resolved to *exterminate* the whole nation
to which Mordecai belonged. BLAIR.

TO ERASE, *v.* To blot out.

TO ERECT, *v.* To build.

TO ERECT, *v.* To institute.

TO ERECT, *v.* To lift.

ERRAND, *v.* Message.

ERROR, MISTAKE, BLUNDER.

ERROR, in French *erreur*, Latin *error*, from *erro* to wander, marks the act of wandering, as applied to the rational faculty. A MISTAKE is a taking amiss or wrong.

BLUNDER is not improbably changed from blind, signifying the thing done blindly.

Error in its universal sense is the general term, since every deviation from what is right in rational agents is termed *error* which is strictly opposed to truth: *error* is the lot of humanity; into whatever we attempt to

Vice oft is hid in virtue's fair disguise,
And in her borrow'd form escapes inquiring eyes.
SPECTATOR.

It is a vain attempt
To bind the ambitious and unjust by treaties;
These they elude a thousand specious ways.
THOMSON.

The Earl Rivers had frequently inquired for
his son (Savage), and had always been amused
with evasive answers.
JOHNSON.

TO ESCHEW, *v.* To avoid.

TO ESCORT, *v.* To accompany.

ESPECIALLY, PARTICULARLY,
PRINCIPALLY, CHIEFLY.

ESPECIALLY and PARTICULARLY are exclusive or superlative in their import; they refer to one object out of many that is superior to all: PRINCIPALLY and CHIEFLY are comparative in their import; they designate in general the superiority of some objects over others. *Especially* is a term of stronger import than *particularly*, and *principally* expresses something less general than *chiefly*: we ought to have God before our eyes at all times, but *especially* in those moments when we present ourselves before him in prayer; the heat is very oppressive in all countries under the torrid zone, but *particularly* in the deserts of Arabia, where there is a want of shade and moisture; it is *principally* among the higher and lower orders of society that we find vices of every description to be prevalent; patriots who declaim so loudly against the measures of government do it *chiefly* (may I not say solely?) with a view to their own interest.

All love has something of blindness in it, but
the love of money *especially*.
SOURN.

Particularly let a man dread every grove act
of sin.
SOURN.

Neither Pythagoras nor any of his disciples
were, properly speaking, practitioners of physic,
since they applied themselves *principally* to the
theory.
JAMES.

The reformers gained credit *chiefly* among
persons in the lower and middle classes.
ROBERTSON.

TO ESPY, *v.* To find.

ESSAY, *v.* Attempt.

ESSAY, TREATISE, TRACT,
DISSERTATION.

ALL these words are employed by

authors to characterize compositions varying in their form and contents. **ESSAY**, which signifies a trial or attempt (*v.* *Attempt*), is here used to designate in a specific manner an author's attempt to illustrate any point; it is most commonly applied to small detached pieces, which contain only the general thoughts of a writer on any given subject, and afford room for amplification into details also; though by Locke in his "*Essay on the Understanding*," Beattie in his "*Essay on Truth*," and other authors, it is modestly used for their connected and finished endeavours to elucidate a doctrine. A **TREATISE** is more systematic than an *essay*; it treats on the subject in a methodical form, and conveys the idea of something labored, scientific, and instructive. A **TRACT** is only a species of small *treatise*, drawn up upon particular occasions, and published in a separate form: they are both derived from the Latin *tractus*, participle of *trahere* to draw, manage, or handle. **DISSERTATION**, from *disserere* to argue, is with propriety applied to performances of an argumentative nature.

Essays are either moral, political, philosophical, or literary; they are the crude attempts of the youth to digest his own thoughts, or they are the more mature attempts of the man to communicate his thoughts to others: of the former description are the prize *essays* in schools; and of the latter are the *essays* innumerable which have been published on every subject, since the days of Bacon to the present day: *treatises* are mostly written on ethical, political, or speculative subjects, such as Fenelon's, Milton's, or Locke's *treatise* on education; De Lolme's *treatise* on the constitution of England; Colquhoun's *treatise* on the police: *dissertations* are employed on disputed points of literature, as Bentley's *dissertation* upon the epistles of Phalaris, De Paw's *dissertations* on the Egyptians and Chinese: *tracts* are ephemeral productions, mostly on political and religious subjects, which seldom survive the occasion which gave them birth; of this description are the pamphlets which daily issue from the press, for or against the mea-

one hand, and its necessarily unprofitable consumption on the other; he who *rates* his abilities too high is in danger of despising the means which are essential to secure success; and he who *rates* them too low is apt to neglect the means, from despair of success.

To those who have skill to *estimate* the excellence and difficulty of this great work (Pope's translation of Homer) it must be very desirable to know how it was performed. JOHNSON.

From the age of sixteen the life of Pope, as an author, may be *computed*. ADDISON.

Sooner we learn and seldomer forget
What critics scorn, than what they highly *rate*.
HEGUES.

ETERNAL, ENDLESS, EVERLASTING.

THE ETERNAL is set above time, the ENDLESS lies within time; it is therefore by a strong figure that we apply *eternal* to any thing sublunary; although *endless* may with propriety be applied to that which is heavenly: that is properly *eternal* which has neither beginning nor end; that is *endless* which has a beginning, but no end: God is, therefore, an *eternal*, but not an *endless* being: there is an *eternal* state of happiness or misery, which awaits all men, according to their deeds in this life; but their joys or sorrows may be *endless* as regards the present life.

That which is *endless* has no cessation; that which is EVERLASTING has neither interruption nor cessation: the *endless* may be said of existing things; the *everlasting* naturally extends itself into futurity: hence we speak of *endless* disputes, an *endless* warfare; an *everlasting* memorial, an *everlasting* crown of glory.

Distance immense between the powers that shine
Above, *eternal*, deathless, and divine,
And mortal man! POPE.

The faithful Mydon, as he turn'd from fight
His flying coursers, sunk to *endless* night. POPE.

Back from the car he tumbles to the ground,
And *everlasting* shades his eyes surround.
POPE.

EUCCHARIST, *v.* Lord's Supper.

EULOGY, *v.* Encomium.

TO EVADE, *v.* To escape.

TO EVADE, EQUIVOCATE, PREVARICATE.

EVADE, *v.* To escape.

EQUIVOCATE, *v.* Ambiguity.

PREVARICATE, in Latin *prevaricatus* participle of *præ* and *varicor* to go loosely, signifies to shift from side to side.

These words designate an artful mode of escaping the scrutiny of an enquirer: we *evade* by artfully turning the subject or calling off the attention of the enquirer; we *equivocate* by the use of *equivocal* expressions; we *prevaricate* by the use of loose and indefinite expressions: we avoid giving satisfaction by *evading*; we give a false satisfaction by *equivocating*; we give dissatisfaction by *prevaricating*.

Evading is not so mean a practice as *equivocating*: it may be sometimes prudent to *evade* a question which we do not wish to answer; but *equivocations* are employed for the purposes of falsehood and interest: *prevarications* are still meaner; and are resorted to mostly by criminals in order to escape detection.

Whenever a trader has endeavoured to *evade* the just demands of his creditors, this hath been declared by the legislature to be an act of bankruptcy. BLACKSTONE.

When Satan told Eve 'Thou shalt not surely die,' it was in his *equivocation* 'Thou shalt not incur present death.' BROWN'S VULGAR ERRORS.

There is no *prevaricating* with God when we are on the very threshold of his presence.

CUMBERLAND.

TO EVAPORATE, *v.* To emit.

EVASION, SHIFT, SUBTERFUGE.

EVASION (*v.* To evade) is here taken only in the bad sense; SHIFT and SUBTERFUGE are modes of *evasion*: the *shift* signifies that gross kind of *evasion* by which one attempts to *shift* off an obligation from one's self; the *subterfuge*, from *subter* under and *fugio* to fly, is a mode of *evasion* in which one has recourse to some screen or shelter.

The *evasion*, in distinction from the others, is resorted to for the gratification of pride or obstinacy: whoever wishes to maintain a bad cause must have recourse to *evasions*; candid minds despise all *evasions*: the *shift* is the trick of a knave; it always serves a paltry low purpose; he who has not courage to turn open thief will use any *shifts* rather than not get money dishonestly: the *subterfuge* is

occurro, signifies that which runs or comes in the way.

These terms are expressive of what passes in the world, which is the sole signification of the term *event*; whilst to that of the other terms are annexed some accessory ideas: the *incident* is a personal *event*; the *accident* an unpleasant *event*; the *adventure* an extraordinary *event*; the *occurrence* an ordinary or domestic *event*: the *event* in its ordinary and limited acceptation excludes the idea of chance; *accident* excludes that of design; the *incident*, *adventuré*, and *occurrence*, are applicable in both cases.

The *event* affects nations and communities as well as individuals; the *incident* and *adventure* affect particular individuals; the *accident* and *occurrence* affect persons or things particularly or generally, individually or collectively: the making of peace, the loss of a battle, or the death of a prince, are national *events*; the forming a new acquaintance and the revival of an old one are *incidents* that have an interest for the parties concerned; an escape from shipwreck, an encounter with wild beasts or savages, are *adventures* which individuals are pleased to relate, and others to hear; a fire, the fall of a house, the breaking of a limb, are *accidents* or *occurrences*; a robbery or the death of individuals are properly *occurrences* which afford subject for a newspaper, and excite an interest in the reader.

Event, when used for individuals, is always of greater importance than an *incident*. The settlement of a young person in life, the adoption of an employment, or the taking a wife, are *events* but not *incidents*; whilst on the other hand the setting out on a journey or the return, the purchase of a house or the dispatch of a vessel, are characterized as *incidents* and not *events*.

It is farther to be observed that *accident*, *event*, and *occurrence* are said only of that which is supposed really to happen: *incidents* and *adventures* are often fictitious; in this case the *incident* cannot be too important; nor the *adventure* too marvellous. History records the *events* of nations; plays require to be full of *incident* in

order to render them interesting; romances and novels derive most of their charms from the extravagance of the *adventures* which they describe; periodical works supply the public with information respecting daily *occurrences*.

These *events*, the permission of which seems to accuse his goodness now, may in the consummation of things both magnify his goodness and exalt his wisdom.

ADDISON.

I have told before you only small *incidents* seemingly frivolous, but they are principally evils of this nature which make marriages unhappy.

STEELE.

To make an episode, 'take any remaining *adventure* of your former collection,' in which you could no way involve your hero; or any unfortunate *accident* that was too good to be thrown away.

POPE.

I think there is somewhere in Montaigne mention made of a family book, wherein all the *occurrences* that happened from one generation of that house to another were recorded.

STEELE.

EVENT; ISSUE; CONSEQUENCE.

THE EVENT (*v. Event*) terminates; the ISSUE (*v. To arise*) flows out; the CONSEQUENCE (*v. Consequence*) follows.

The *event* respects great undertakings; the *issue* of particular efforts; the *consequence* respects every thing which can produce a *consequence*. Hence we speak of the *event* of a war; the *issue* of a negotiation; and the *consequences* of either. The measures of government are often unjustly praised or blamed according to the *event*; the fate of a nation sometimes hangs on the *issue* of a battle; its conquest is one of the *consequences* which follows the defeat of its armies. We must be prepared for the *event* which is frequently above our control: we must exert ourselves to bring about a favorable *issue*: address and activity will go far towards ensuring success; but if after all our efforts we still fail, it is our duty to submit with patient resignation to the *consequences*.

It has always been the practice of mankind to judge of actions by the event.

JOHNSON.

A mild, unraffed, self possessing mind is a blessing more important to real felicity than all that can be gained by the triumphant issue of some violent contest.

BLAKE.

Henley in one of his advertisements had mentioned Pope's treatment of Savage; this was supposed by Pope to be the consequence of a compliment made by Savage to Henley, and was

of the greatest benefit; in this respect, therefore, the *misfortune* is but a partial *evil*: of *evil* it is likewise observable, that it has no respect to the sufferer as a moral agent; but *misfortune* is used in regard to such things as are controllable or otherwise by human foresight. The *evil* which befalls a man is opposed only to the good which he in general experiences; but the *misfortune* is opposed to the good fortune or the prudence of the individual. Sickness is an *evil*, let it be endured or caused by whatever circumstances it may; it is a *misfortune* for an individual to come in the way of having this *evil* brought on himself: his own relative condition in the scale of being is here referred to.

The *harm* and *mischiefs* are species of minor *evils*; the former of which is much less specific than the latter both in the nature and cause of the *evil*. A person takes *harm* from circumstances that are not known; the *mischiefs* is done to him from some positive and immediate circumstance. He who takes cold takes *harm*; the cause of which, however, may not be known or suspected: the fall from a horse is attended with *mischiefs*, if it occasion a fracture or any *evil* to the body. *Evil* and *misfortune* respect persons only as the objects; *harm* and *mischiefs* are said of inanimate things as the object. A tender plant takes *harm* from being exposed to the cold air: *mischiefs* is done to it when its branches are violently broken off or its roots are laid bare.

Misfortune is the incidental property of persons who are its involuntary subjects; but *evil*, *harm*, and *mischiefs*, are the inherent and active properties of things that flow out of them as effects from their causes: *evil* is said either to lie in a thing or attend it as a companion or follower; *harm* properly lies in the thing; *mischiefs* properly attends the thing as a consequence. In political revolutions there is *evil* in the thing and *evil* from the thing; *evil* when it begins, *evil* when it ends, and *evil* long after it has ceased: it is a dangerous question for any young person to put to himself—what *harm* is there in this or that indulgence? He who is disposed to put this question

to himself will not hesitate to answer it according to his own wishes: the *mischiefs* which arise from the unskillfulness of those who undertake to be their own coachmen are of so serious a nature that in course of time they will probably deter men from performing such unsuitable offices.

Yet think not thus, when freedom's ills I state,
I mean to flatter kings or court the great.

GOLDSMITH.

A misery is not to be measured from the nature of the *evil*, but from the temper of the sufferer.

ADDISON.

Misfortune stands with her bow ever bent
Over the world; and he who wounds another
Directs the goddess, by that part where he
wounds,

There to strike deep her errors in himself.

YOUNG.

To me the labours of the field resign;
Me Paris injured; all the war be mine,
Fall he that must, beneath his rival's arms,
And leave the rest secure of future *harm*.

Pope.

To mourn a *mischiefs* that is past and gone,
Is the next way to draw new *mischiefs* on.

SHAKESPEARE.

EVIL, *v.* Bad.

TO EVINCE, *v.* To argue.

TO EVINCE, *v.* To prove.

EXACT, *v.* Accurate.

EXACT, EXTORT.

EXACT, in Latin *exactus*, participle of *exigo* to drive out, signifies the exercise of simple force; but EXTORT, from *extortus*, participle of *extorqueo* to wring out, marks the exercise of unusual force. In the application, therefore, to *exact* is to demand with force, it is commonly an act of injustice: to *extort* is to get with violence, it is an act of tyranny. The collector of the revenue *exact*s when he gets from the people more than he is authorized to take: an arbitrary prince *extorts* from his conquered subjects whatever he can grasp at. In the figurative sense, deference, obedience, applause, and admiration, are *exact*ed: a confession, an acknowledgement, a discovery, and the like, are *extorted*.

While to the established church is given that protection and support which the interests of religion render proper and due, yet no rigid conformity is *exact*ed.

BLAIR.

If I err in believing that the souls of men are immortal, not while I live would I wish to have this delightful error *extorted* from me. STERNE.

tions and inquiries are both made by means of questions ; but the former is an official act for a specific end, the latter is a private act for purposes of convenience or pleasure. Students undergo *examinations* from their teachers ; they pursue their *inquiries* for themselves.

An *examination* or an *inquiry* may be set on foot on any subject : but the *examination* is direct ; it is the setting of things before the view, corporeal or mental, in order to obtain a conclusion : the *inquiry* is indirect ; it is a circuitous method of coming to the knowledge of what was not known before. The student *examines* the evidences of Christianity, that he may strengthen his own belief ; the government institute an *inquiry* into the conduct of subjects. A *research* is a remote *inquiry* ; an *investigation* is a minute *inquiry* ; a *scrutiny* is a strict *examination*. Learned men of inquisitive tempers make their *researches* into antiquity : magistrates *investigate* doubtful and mysterious affairs ; physicians *investigate* the causes of diseases ; men *scrutinize* the actions of those whom they hold in suspicion. Acuteness and penetration are peculiarly requisite in making *researches* ; patience and perseverance are the necessary qualifications of the *investigator* ; a quick discernment will essentially aid the *scrutinizer*.

The body of man is such a subject as stands the utmost test of *examination*. ADDISON.

If you *search* purely for truth, it will be indifferent to you where you find it. BUDGELL.

Inquiries after happiness are not so necessary and useful to mankind as the arts of consolation. ADDISON.

To all inferior animals 'tis giv'n
To enjoy the state allotted them by heav'n ;
No vain *researches* e'er disturb their rest.

JENYNS.

We have divided natural philosophy into the *investigation* of causes, and the production of effects. BACON.

Before I go to bed, I make a *scrutiny* what peccant humours have reigned in me that day.

HOWELL.

TO EXAMINE, *v.* To discuss.

TO EXAMINE, SEARCH,
EXPLORE.

EXAMINE, *v.* Examination.

SEARCH, *v.* Examination.

EXPLORE, in Latin *exploro*, com-

pounded of *ex* and *ploro*, signifies properly to burst out, whether in lamentation or in *examination*.

These words are here considered as they designate the looking upon places or objects, in order to get acquainted with them. To *examine* expresses a less effort than to *search*, and this expresses less than to *explore*.

We *examine* objects that are near ; we *search* those that are hidden or removed at a certain distance ; we *explore* those that are unknown or very distant. The painter *examines* a landscape in order to take a sketch of it ; the botanist *searches* after curious plants ; the inquisitive traveller *explores* unknown regions.

The writer *examines* the books from which he intends to draw his authorities ; the antiquarian *searches* every corner in which he hopes to find a monument of antiquity ; the classic *explores* the learning and wisdom of the ancients.

Men will look into our lives, and *examine* our actions, and inquire into our conversations : by these they will judge the truth and reality of our profession.

TILLOTSON.

Not thou, nor they shall *search* the thoughts,
that roll

Up in the close recesses of my soul. POPE.

Hector, he said, my courage bids me meet

This high achievement, and *explore* the fleet.

POPE.

EXAMPLE, PATTERN, ENSAMPLE.

EXAMPLE, in Latin *exemplum*, very probably changed from *exsimul* and *exsimulo* or *simulo*, signifies the thing framed according to a likeness.

PATTERN, *v.* Copy.

ENSAMPLE signifies that which is done according to a *sample* or *example*.

All these words are taken for that which ought to be followed : but the *example* must be followed generally ; the *pattern* must be followed particularly, not only as to what, but how a thing is to be done : the former serves as a guide to the judgement ; the latter to guide the actions. The *example* comprehends what is either to be followed or avoided ; the *pattern* only that which is to be followed or copied : the *ensample* is a species of *example*, the word being employed only in the solemn style. The *example* may be presented either in the

the Dutch and Italians *excelled* the English in painting.

We may *surpass* without any direct or immediate effort; we cannot *excel* without effort. Nations as well as individuals will *surpass* each other in particular arts and sciences, as much from local and adventitious circumstances, as from natural genius and steady application; no one can expect to *excel* in learning, whose indolence gets the better of his ambition. The derivatives *excessive* and *excellent* have this obvious distinction between them, that the former always signifies *exceeding* in that which ought not to be *exceeded*; and the latter *exceeding* in that where it is honourable to *exceed*: he who is habitually *excessive* in any of his indulgences, must be insensible to the *excellence* of a temperate life.

TRANSCEND, from *trans* beyond and *scendo* or *scando* to climb, signifies climbing beyond; and OUTDO, signifies doing out of the ordinary course: the former, like *surpass*, refers rather to the state of things; and *outdo*, like *excel*, to the exertions of persons: the former rises in sense above *surpass*; but the latter is only employed in particular cases, that is, to *excel* in action: *excel* is however confined to that which is good; *outdo* to that which is good or bad. The genius of Homer *transcends* that of almost every other poet: Heliogabalus *outdid* every other emperor in extravagance.

Man's boundless avarice *exceeds*,
And on his neighbours round about him *feeds*.

WALKER.

Dryden often *surpasses* expectation, and Pope never falls below it. JENSON.

To him the king: How much thy years *excel*
In arts of counsel, and in speaking well. PERE,
Auspicious prince, in arms a mighty name,
But yet whose actions far *transcend* your fame.

DRYDEN.

The last and crowning instance of our love to our enemies is to pray for them. For by this a man would fain to *outdo* himself. BOURN.

TO EXCEL, *v.* To exceed.

EXCELLENCE, SUPERIORITY.

EXCELLENCE is an absolute term; SUPERIORITY is a relative term: many may have *excellence* in the same degree, but they must have *superiority* in different degrees; *superiority* is often superior. *excellence*, but

in many cases they are applied to different objects.

There is a moral *excellence* attainable by all who have the will to strive after it; but there is an intellectual and physical *superiority* which is above the reach of our wishes, and is granted to a few only.

None envy withers at another's joy,
And hates that *excellence* it cannot reach.

THOMSON.

To be able to benefit others is a condition of freedom and *superiority*. TILLOTSON.

EXCEPT, *v.* Besides.

EXCEPT, *v.* Unless.

EXCEPTION, *v.* Objection.

EXCESS, SUPERFLUITY, REDUNDANCY.

EXCESS is that which exceeds any measure; SUPERFLUITY from *super* and *fluo* to flow over; and REDUNDANCY, from *redundo* to stream back or over, signifies an *excess* of a good measure. We may have an *excess* of heat or cold, wet or dry, when we have more than the ordinary quantity; but we have a *superfluity* of provisions when we have more than we want. *Excess* is applicable to any object; but *superfluity* and *redundancy* are species of *excess*; the former applicable in a particular manner to that which is an object of our desire; and *redundancy* to matters of expression or feeling. We may have an *excess* of prosperity or adversity; a *superfluity* of good things; and a *redundancy* of speech or words.

It is wisely ordered in our present state that joy and fear, hope and grief, should act alternately as checks and balances upon each other, in order to prevent an *excess* in any of them.

BLAKE.

When by force or policy, by wisdom, or by fortune, property and *superiority* were introduced and established, then they whose possessions swelled above their wants naturally laid out their *superfluties* on pleasure. JOHNSON.

The defect or *redundance* of a syllable might be easily covered in the recitation. TYRWHITT.

EXCESSIVE, IMMODERATE, INTEMPERATE.

THE EXCESSIVE is beyond measure; the IMMODERATE, from *modus* a mode or measure, is without measure; the INTEMPERATE, from *tempus* a time or term, is that which is not kept within bounds.

Exert is often used only for an individual act of calling forth into action; *exercise* always conveys the idea of repeated or continued exertion: thus a person who calls to another *exerts* his voice; he who speaks aloud for any length of time *exercises* his lungs.

How has Milton represented the whole Godhead, *exerting* itself towards man in its full benevolence, under the threefold distinction of a Creator, a Redeemer, and Comforter. ADDISON.

God made no faculty, but also provided it with a proper object upon which it might *exercise* itself. SOUTH.

EXERTION, *v. Endeavour.*

TO EXHALE, *v. To emit.*

TO EXHAUST, *v. To spend.*

TO EXHIBIT, *v. To give.*

TO EXHIBIT, *v. To show.*

EXHIBITION, *v. Show.*

TO EXHILARATE, *v. To animate.*

TO EXHORT, PERSUADE.

EXHORT, in Latin *exhortor*, compounded of *ex* and *hortor*, from the Greek *ωπται* perfect passive of *ωπ* to excite or impel.

PERSUADE, *v. Conviction.*

Exhortation has more of impelling in it; *persuasion* more of drawing: a superior *exhorts*; his words carry authority with them, and rouse to action: a friend and an equal *persuades*; he wins and draws by the agreeableness or kindness of his expressions. *Exhortations* are employed only in matters of duty or necessity; *persuasions* are employed in matters of pleasure or convenience.

Their plumes still

In loose libations stretch'd, to trust the void
Trembling refuse, till down before them fly
The parent guides, and chide, *exhort*, command. THOMSON.

Gay's friends *persuaded* him to sell his share in the South Sea stock, but he dreamed of dignity and splendor. JOHNSON.

EXIGENCY, EMERGENCY.

NECESSITY is the idea which is common to the signification of these terms: the former, from the Latin *exigo* to demand, expresses what the case demands; and the latter, from *emergo* to arise out of, denotes what rises out of the case.

The *exigency* is more common, but less pressing; the *emergency* is imperious when it comes, but comes less frequently: a prudent traveller will never carry more money with him than what will supply the *exigencies* of his journey; and in case of an *emergency* will rather borrow of his friends than risk his property.

Savage was again confined to Bristol, where he was every day hunted by bailiffs. In this *exigence* he once more found a friend who sheltered him in his house. JOHNSON.

When it was formerly the fashion to husband a lie and to trump it up in some extraordinary *emergency*, it generally did execution; but at present every man is on his guard. ADDISON.

TO EXILE, *v. To banish.*

TO EXIST, *v. To be.*

TO EXIST, LIVE.

EXIST, *v. To be.*

LIVE, through the medium of the Saxon *libbad*, and the other northern dialects, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *leb* the heart, which is the seat of animal life.

Existence is the property of all things in the universe; *life*, which is the inherent power of motion, is the particular property communicated by the Divine Being to some parts only of his creation: *exist*, therefore, is the general, and *live* the specific, term: whatever *lives*, *exists* according to a certain mode; but many things *exist* without *living*: when we wish to speak of things in their most abstract relation, we say they *exist*; when we wish to characterize the form of *existence*, we say they *live*.

Existence, in its proper sense, is the attribute which we commonly ascribe to the Divine Being, and it is that which is immediately communicable by himself; *life* is that mode of *existence* which he has made to be communicable by other objects besides himself: *existence* is taken only in its strict and proper sense, independent of all its attributes and appendages; but *life* is regarded in connexion with the means by which it is supported, as animal life, or vegetable life. In like manner, when speaking of spiritual objects, *exist* retains its abstract sense, and *live* is employed to denote an active principle: animosities should never *exist* in the mind;

TO EXPEDITE, *v.* To hasten.

EXPEDITIOUS, *v.* Diligent.

TO EXPEL, *v.* To banish.

TO EXPEND, *v.* To spend.

EXPENSE, *v.* Cost.

EXPERIENCE, EXPERIMENT,
TRIAL, PROOF.

EXPERIENCE, EXPERIMENT, from the Latin *experior*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *perio* or *pario*, signifies to bring forth, that is, the thing brought to light, or the act of bringing to light.

TRIAL signifies the act of *trying*, from *try*, in Latin *tento*, Hebrew *tur*, to explore, examine, search.

PROOF signifies either the act of *proving*, from the Latin *probo* to make good, or the thing made good, *proved* to be good.

By all the actions implied in these terms, we endeavour to arrive at a certainty respecting some unknown particular: the *experience* is that which has been tried; the *experiment* is the thing to be tried: the *experience* is certain, as it is a deduction from the past for the service of the present; the *experiment* is uncertain, and serves a future purpose: *experience* is an unerring guide, which no man can desert without falling into error; *experiments* may fail, or be superseded by others more perfect.

Experience serves to lead us to moral truth; the *experiment* aids us in ascertaining speculative truth: we profit by *experience* to rectify practice; we make *experiments* in theoretical inquiries: he, therefore, who makes *experiments* in matters of *experience* rejects a steady and definite mode of coming at the truth for one that is variable and uncertain, and that too in matters of the first moment: the consequences of such a mistake are obvious, and have been too fatally realized in the present age, in which *experience* has been set at nought by every wild speculator, who has recommended *experiments* to be made with all the forms of moral duty and civil society.

The *experiment*, *trial*, and *proof*, have equally the character of uncer-

tainty; but the *experiment* is employed only in matters of an intellectual nature; the *trial* is employed in matters of a personal nature, on physical as well as mental objects; the *proof* is employed in moral subjects: we make an *experiment* in order to know whether a thing be true or false; we make a *trial* in order to know whether it be capable or incapable, convenient or inconvenient, useful or the contrary; we put a thing to the *proof* in order to determine whether it be good or bad, real or unreal: *experiments* tend to confirm our opinions; they are the handmaids of science; the philosopher doubts every position which cannot be demonstrated by repeated *experiments*: *trials* are of absolute necessity in directing our conduct, our taste, and our choice; we judge of our strength or skill by *trials*; we judge of the effect of colors by *trials*, and the like: the *proof* determines the judgement, as in common life, according to the vulgar proverb, "The *proof* of the pudding is in the eating;" so in the knowledge of men and things, the *proof* of men's characters and merits is best made by observing their conduct.

A man may, by *experience*, be persuaded that his will is free; that he can do this, or not do it.

TILLOTSON.

Any one may easily make this *experiment*, and even plainly see that there is no bud in the corn which ants lay up.

ADDISON.

But he himself betook another way,
To make more *trial* of his hardiment,
And seek adventures, as he with prince Arthur went.

SPENSER.

O goodly usage of those ancient tymes!
In which the sword was servant unto right:
When not for malice and contentious crymes,
But all for praise and *proof* of manly might.

SPENSER.

EXPERIMENT, *v.* *Experience*.

EXPERT, *v.* *Clever*.

TO EXPIATE, *v.* To atone.

TO EXPIRE, *v.* To die.

TO EXPLAIN, EXPOUND,
INTERPRET.

EXPLAIN signifies to make *plain*, *v.* *Apparent*.

EXPOUND, from the Latin *expono*, compounded of *ex* and *pono*, signifies to set forth in detail.

given to children should consist of as few words as possible, so long as they are sufficiently explicit.

I know I meant just what you *explain*; but I did not *explain* my own meaning so well as you. POPE.

It is indeed the same system as mine, but *illustrated* with a ray of your own. POPE.

If our religious tenets should ever want a farther *elucidation*, we shall not call on atheism to *explain* them. BURKE.

EXPLANATION, *v. Definition.*

EXPLANATORY, EXPLICIT,
EXPRESS.

EXPLANATORY signifies containing or belonging to *explanation*, (*v. To explain*).

EXPLICIT, in Latin *explicatus* from *explico* to unfold, signifies unfolded or laid open.

EXPRESS, in Latin *expressus*, signifies the same as expressed or delivered in specific terms.

The *explanatory* is that which is superadded to clear up difficulties or obscurities. A letter is *explanatory* which contains an *explanation* of something preceding, in lieu of any thing new. The *explicit* is that which of itself obviates every difficulty; an *explicit* letter, therefore, will leave nothing that requires *explanation*: the *explicit* admits of a free use of words; the *express* requires them to be unambiguous. A person ought to be *explicit* when he enters into an engagement; he ought to be *express* when he gives commands.

An *explanatory* law stops the current of a precedent statute, nor does either of them admit extension afterwards. BACON.

Since the revolution the bounds of prerogative and liberty have been better defined, the principles of government more thoroughly examined and understood, and the rights of the subject more *explicitly* guarded by legal provisions, than in any other period of the English history. BLACKSTONE.

I have destroyed the letter I received from you by the hands of Lucius Aruntius, though it was much too innocent to deserve so severe a treatment; however, it was your *express* desire I should destroy it, and I have complied accordingly. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

EXPLICIT, *v. Explanatory.*

EXPLOIT, *v. Deed.*

TO EXPLORE, *v. To examine.*

EXPLOSION, *v. Eruption*,
EXPOSED, *v. Subject*,

TO EXPOSTULATE,
REMONSTRATE.

EXPOSTULATE, from *postulo* to demand, signifies to demand reasons for a thing.

REMONSTRATE, from *monstro* to show, signifies to show reasons against a thing.

We *expostulate* in a tone of authority; we *remonstrate* in a tone of complaint. He who *expostulates* passes a censure, and claims to be heard; he who *remonstrates* presents his case and requests to be heard. *Expostulation* may often be the precursor of violence; *remonstrance* mostly rests on the force of reason and representation: he who admits of *expostulation* from an inferior undermines his own authority; he who is deaf to the *remonstrances* of his friends is far gone in folly: the *expostulation* is mostly on matters of personal interest; the *remonstrance* may as often be made on matters of propriety. The Scythian ambassadors *expostulated* with Alexander against his invasion of their country; King Richard *expostulated* with Wat Tyler on the subject of his insurrection; Artabanus *remonstrated* with Xerxes on the folly of his projected invasion.

With the hypocrite it is not my business at present to *expostulate*. JOHNSON.

I have been but a little time conversant with the world, yet I have had already frequent opportunities of observing the little efficacy of *remonstrance* and complaint. JOHNSON.

TO EXPOUND, *v. To explain.*

EXPRESS, *v. Explanatory.*

TO EXPRESS, DECLARE, SIGNIFY,
TESTIFY, UTTER.

To EXPRESS, from the Latin *ex-primo* to press out, is said of whatever passes in the mind; to DECLARE (*v. To declare*) is said only of sentiments and opinions. A man *expresses* anger, joy, sorrow, and all the affections in their turn; he *declares* his opinion for or against any particular measure.

To *express* is the simple act of communication, resulting from our cir-

cumstances as social agents; to *declare* is a specific and positive act that is called for by the occasion: the former may be done in private, the latter is always more or less public. An *expression* of one's feelings and sentiments to those whom we esteem is the supreme delight of social beings; the *declaration* of our opinions may be prudent or imprudent, according to circumstances. Words, looks, gestures, or movements, serve to *express*; actions, as well as words, may sometimes *declare*: sometimes we cannot *express* our contempt in so strong a manner as by preserving a perfect silence when we are required to speak; an act of hostility, on the part of a nation, is as much a *declaration* of war as if it were *expressed* in positive terms.

Thus Roman youth deriv'd from ruin'd Troy,
In rude Satarian rhymes *express* their joy.

DAYDEN.

Th' noerring sun by certain signs *declares*,
What the late ev'n or early morn prepares.

DAYDEN.

To *express* and SIGNIFY are both said of words; but *express* has always regard to the agent, and the use which he makes of the words. *Signify*, from *signum* a sign, and *facio* to make, has respect to the things of which the words are made the usual signs: hence it is that a word may be made to *express* one thing, while it *signifies* another; and hence it is that many words, according to their ordinary *signification*, will not *express* what the speaker has in his mind, and wishes to communicate: the monosyllable *no* *signifies* simple negation; but according to the temper of the speaker, and the circumstances under which it is spoken, it may *express* ill nature, anger, or any other bad passion.

To *signify* and TESTIFY, like the word *express*, are employed in general for any act of communication otherwise than by words; but *express* is used in a stronger sense than either of the former. The passions and strongest movements of the soul are *expressed*; the simple intentions or transitory feelings of the mind are *signified* or *testified*. A person *expresses* his joy by the sparkling of his eye, and the vivacity of his counte-

nance; he *signifies* his wishes by a nod; he *testifies* his approbation by a smile. People of vivid sensibility must take care not to *express* all their feelings; those who expect a ready obedience from their inferiors must not adopt a haughty mode of *signifying* their will; nothing is more gratifying to an ingenuous mind than to *testify* its regard for merit, wherever it may discover itself.

Express may be said of all sentient beings, and, by a figure of speech, even of those which have no sense; *signify* is said of rational agents only. The dog has the most *expressive* mode of showing his attachment and fidelity to his master; a *significant* look or smile may sometimes give rise to suspicion, and lead to the detection of guilt. To *signify* and *testify*, though closely allied in sense and application, have this difference, that to *signify* is simply to give a sign of what passes inwardly, to *testify* is to give that sign in the presence of others. A person *signifies* by letter his intention of being at a certain place at a given time; he *testifies* his sense of favors conferred, by every mark of gratitude and respect.

UTTER, from the preposition *out*, signifying to bring out, differs from *express* in this, that the latter respects the thing which is communicated, and the former the means of communication. We *express* from the heart; we *utter* with the lips: to *express* an uncharitable sentiment is a violation of Christian duty; to *utter* an unseemly word is a violation of good manners: those who say what they do not mean, *utter* but not *express*; those who show by their looks what is passing in their hearts, *express* but do not *utter*.

As the Supreme Being has *expressed*, and as it were printed his ideas in the creation, men *express* their ideas in books.

ADDISON.

On him confer the Poet's sacred name,
Whose lofty voice *declares* the heavenly flame.

ADDISON.

If there be no cause *expressed* the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner. For the law judges in this respect, saith Sir Edward Coke, like Festus the Roman governor; that it is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to *signify* withal the crimes alledged against him.

BLACKSTONE.

What consolation can be had, Dryden has afforded, by living to repent, and to testify his repentance, (for his immoral writings). JOHNSON.
The multitude of angels, with a shout
Loud as from numbers without number, sweet
As from blessed voices, uttering joy. MILTON.

EXPRESSION, *v.* *Word.*

EXPRESSIVE, *v.* *Significant.*

TO EXPUNGE, *v.* *To blot out.*

TO EXTEND, *v.* *To enlarge.*

TO EXTEND, *v.* *To reach.*

EXTENSIVE, *v.* *Comprehensive.*

EXTENT, *v.* *Limit.*

TO EXTENUATE, PALLIATE.

EXTENUATE, from the Latin *tenuis* thin, small, signifies literally to make small.

PALLIATE, in Latin *palliatu*s, participle of *pallio*, from *pallium* a cloak, signifies to throw a cloak over a thing so that it may not be seen.

These terms are both applicable to the moral conduct, and express the act of lessening the guilt of any impropriety. To *extenuate* is simply to lessen guilt without reference to the means: to *palliate* is to lessen it by means of art. To *extenuate* is rather the effect of circumstances: to *palliate* is the direct effort of an individual. Ignorance in the offender may serve as an *extenuation* of his guilt, although not of his offence: it is but a poor *palliation* of a man's guilt, to say that his crimes have not been attended with the mischief which they were calculated to produce.

Savage endeavoured to *extenuate* the fact (of having killed Sinclair), by urging the suddenness of the whole action. JOHNSON.

Mons. St. Evremont has endeavoured to *palliate* the superstitions of the Roman Catholic religion. ANDERSON.

EXTERIOR, *v.* *Outside.*

EXTERIOR, *v.* *Outward.*

TO EXTERMINATE, *v.* *To eradicate.*

EXTERNAL, *v.* *Outward.*

TO EXTIRPATE, *v.* *To eradicate.*

TO EXTOL, *v.* *To praise.*

TO EXTORT, *v.* *To exact.*

EXTRANEOUS, EXTRINSIC,
FOREIGN.

EXTRANEOUS, compounded of *extraneus*, or *ex* and *terra*, signifies out of the land, not belonging to it.

EXTRINSIC, in Latin *extrinsecus*, compounded of *extra* and *secus*, signifies outward, external.

FOREIGN, from the Latin *foris* out of doors, signifies not belonging to the family.

The *extraneous* is that which forms no necessary or natural part of any thing: the *extrinsic* is that which forms a part or has a connection, but only in an indirect form; it is not an inherent or component part: the *foreign* is that which forms no part whatever, and has no kind of connection. A work is said to contain *extraneous* matter, which contains much matter not necessarily belonging to, or illustrative of the subject: a work is said to have *extrinsic* merit when it borrows its value from local circumstances, in distinction from the intrinsic merit, or that which lies in the contents.

Extraneous and *extrinsic* have a general and abstract sense; but *foreign* has a particular signification; they always pass over to some object either expressed or understood: hence we say *extraneous* ideas, or *extrinsic* worth; but that a particular mode of acting is *foreign* to the general plan pursued. Anecdotes of private individuals would be *extraneous* matter in a general history: the respect and credit which men gain from their fellow-citizens, by an adherence to rectitude, is the *extrinsic* advantage of virtue; the peace of a good conscience and the favor of God, are its *intrinsic* advantages: it is *foreign* to the purpose of one who is making an abridgement of a work, to enter into details in any particular part.

That which makes me believe is something *extraneous* to the thing that I believe. LOCKE.

Affluence and power are advantages *extrinsic* and adventitious. JOHNSON.

For loveliness
Needs not the aid of foreign ornaments;
But is when undress'd adorn'd the mind.

THEOPH.

EXTRAORDINARY, REMARK-
ABLE,

ARE epithets both opposed to the ordinary; and in that sense the EXTRAORDINARY is that which in its own nature is REMARKABLE: but things, however, may be *extraordinary* which are not *remarkable*, and the contrary. The *extraordinary* is that which is out of the ordinary course, but it does not always excite remark, and is not therefore *remarkable*, as when we speak of an *extraordinary* loan, an *extraordinary* measure of government: on the other hand, when the *extraordinary* conveys the idea of what deserves notice, it expresses much more than *remarkable*. There are but few *extraordinary* things, many things are *remarkable*: the *remarkable* is eminent; the *extraordinary* is supereminent: the *extraordinary* excites our astonishment; the *remarkable* only awakens our interest and attention. The *extraordinary* is unexpected; the *remarkable* is sometimes looked for: every instance of sagacity and fidelity in a dog is *remarkable*, and some *extraordinary* instances have been related which would almost stagger our belief.

The love of praise is a passion deep in the mind of every *extraordinary* person. HUGHES.

The heroes of literary history have been no less *remarkable* for what they have suffered than for what they have achieved. JOHNSON.

EXTRAVAGANT, PRODIGAL,
LAVISH, PROFUSE.

EXTRAVAGANT, from *extra* and *ragans*, signifies in general wandering from the line; and PRODIGAL, from the Latin *prodigus*, and *prodigo* to launch forth, signifies in general to send forth, or give out in great quantities.

LAVISH comes probably from the Latin *lavo* to wash, signifying to wash away in waste.

PROFUSE, from the Latin *profusus* participle of *profundo* to pour forth, signifies pouring out freely.

The idea of using immoderately is implied in all these terms, but *extravagant* is the most general in its meaning and application. The *extravagant* man spends his money without

reason; the *prodigal* man spends it in excesses; the former errs against plain sense, the latter violates the moral law: the *extravagant* man will ruin himself by his follies; the *prodigal* by his vices. One may be *extravagant* with a small sum where it exceeds one's means; one cannot be *prodigal* without great property. *Extravagance* is practised by both sexes; *prodigality* is peculiarly the vice of the male sex. *Extravagance* is opposed to meanness; *prodigality* to avarice. Those who know the true value of money as contributing to their own enjoyments, or those of others, will guard against *extravagance*. Those who lay a restraint on their passions can never fall into *prodigality*.

Extravagant and *prodigal* serve to designate habitual as well as particular actions; *lavish* and *profuse* are employed only to that which is particular: hence we say to be *lavish* of one's money, one's presents, and the like; to be *profuse* in one's entertainments, both of which may be modes of *extravagance*. An *extravagant* man, however, in the restricted sense, mostly spends upon himself to indulge his whims and idle fancies; but a man may be *lavish* and *profuse* upon others from a misguided generosity.

In a moral use of these terms, a man is *extravagant* in his praises who exceeds either in measure or application: he is *prodigal* of his strength who consumes it by an excessive use: he is *lavish* of his compliments who deals them out so largely and promiscuously as to render them of no service: he is *profuse* in his acknowledgments who repeats them oftener, or delivers them in more words, than are necessary.

Extravagant and *profuse* are said only of individuals; *prodigal* and *lavish* may be said of many in a general sense. A nation may be *prodigal* of its resources; a government may be *lavish* of the public money, as an individual is *extravagant* with his own, and *profuse* in what he gives another.

No one is to admit into his petitions to his Maker, things superfluous and *extravagant*.

SOUTH.

Here patriots live, who for their country's good,
In fighting fields, were *prodigal* of blood.

DAYDEN.

See where the winding vale its *lavish* stores
Irriguous spreads.

THOMSON.

Cicero was most liberally *profuse* in com-
mending the ancients and his contemporaries.

ADDISON AFTER PLUTARCH.

EXTREME, *v. Extremity.*

EXTREMITY, *v. End.*

EXTREMITY, EXTREME.

EXTREMITY is used in the proper or the improper sense; EXTREME in the improper sense: we speak of the *extremity* of a line or an avenue, the *extremity* of distress, but the *extreme* of the fashion.

In the moral sense, *extremity* is applicable to the outward circumstances; *extreme* to the opinions and conduct of men: in matters of dispute between individuals it is a happy thing to guard against coming to *extremities*; it is the characteristic of volatile tempers to be always in *extremes*, either the *extreme* of joy or the *extreme* of sorrow.

Savage suffered the utmost *extremities* of poverty, and often fasted so long that he was seized with faintness.

JOHNSON.

The two *extremes* to be guarded against are despotism, where all are slaves, and anarchy, where all would rule and none obey.

BLAIR.

TO EXTRICATE, *v. Disengage.*

EXTRINSIC, *v. Extraneous.*

EXUBERANT, LUXURIANT.

EXUBERANT, from the Latin *exuberans* or *ex* and *ubero*, signifies very fruitful or superabundant: LUXURIANT, in Latin *luxurians* from *luxus*, signifies expanding with unrestrained freedom. These terms are both applied to vegetation in a flourishing state; but *exuberance* expresses the excess, and *luxuriance* the perfection: in a fertile soil where plants are left unrestrainedly to themselves there will be an *exuberance*; plants are to be seen in their *luxuriance* only in seasons that are favorable to them: in the moral application, *exuberance* of intellect is often attended with a restless ambition that is incompatible both with the happiness and advancement of its possessor; *luxuriance* of ima-

gination is one of the greatest gifts which a poet can boast of.

Another Flora there of bolder hues
And richer sweets, beyond our garden's pride
Plays o'er the fields, and showers with sudden
hand

Exuberant spring.

THOMSON.

On whose *luxurious* herbage, half conceal'd,
Like a fall'n cedar, far diffus'd his train,
Cas'd in green scales, the crocodile extends.

THOMSON.

TO EYE, *v. To look.*

F.

FABLE, TALE, NOVEL, ROMANCE.

FABLE, in Latin *fabula* from *for* to speak or tell, and TALE, from *to tell*, both designate a species of narration; NOVEL is an extended *tale* that has *novelty*; ROMANCE, from the Italian *romanze*, is a wonderful *tale*, or a *tale* of wonders, such as was most in vogue in the dark ages of European literature.

Different species of composition are expressed by the above words: the *fable* is allegorical; its actions are natural, but its agents are imaginary: the *tale* is fictitious, but not imaginary; both the agents and actions are drawn from the passing scenes of life. Gods and goddesses, animals and men, trees, vegetables, and inanimate objects in general, may be made the agents of a *fable*; but of a *tale*, properly speaking, only men or supernatural spirits can be the agents: of the former description are the celebrated *fables* of Æsop; and of the latter the *tales* of Marmontel, the *tales* of the Genii, the Chinese *tales*, &c.: *fables* are written for instruction; *tales* principally for amusement: *fables* consist mostly of only one incident or action, from which a *novel* may be drawn; *tales* always of many, which excite an interest for an individual.

The *tale* when compared with the *novel* is a simple kind of fiction, it consists of but few persons in the drama; whilst the *novel*, on the contrary, admits of every possible variety in characters: the *tale* is told without much art or contrivance.

JOCULAR signifies after the manner of a *joke*.

JOCOSE signifies using or having *jokes*.

Facetious may be employed either for writing or conversation; the rest only in conversation: the *facetious* man deals in that kind of discourse which may excite laughter; a *conversable* man may instruct as well as amuse: the *pleasant* man says every thing in a *pleasant* manner; his *pleasantry* even on the most delicate subject is without offence: the person speaking is *jocose*; the thing said, or the manner of saying it, is *jocular*: it is not for any one to be always *jocose*, although sometimes one may assume a *jocular* air when we are not at liberty to be serious. A man is *facetious* from humour; he is *conversable* by means of information; he indulges himself in occasional *pleasantry*, or allows himself to be *jocose*, in order to enliven conversation; a useful hint is sometimes conveyed in *jocular* terms.

I have written nothing since I published, except a certain *facetious* history of John Gilpin.

COWPER.

But here my lady will object,
Your intervals of time to spend,
With so *conversable* a friend,
It would not signify a pin
Whatever climate you were in.

SWIFT.

Aristophanes wrote to please the multitude;
his *pleasantries* are coarse and unpolite.

WARTON.

Thus Venus sports,
When, cruelly *jocose*,
She ties the fatal noose,
And binds unequals to the brazen yokes.

CRERCH.

Pope sometimes condescended to be *jocular*
with servants or inferiors.

JOHNSON.

FACILITY, v. Ease.

FACT, v. Circumstance.

FACTION, PARTY.

*THESE two words equally suppose the union of many persons, and their opposition to certain views different from their own: but **FACTION**, from *factio* making, denotes an activity and secret machination against those whose views are opposed; and **PARTY**, from the verb to part or split, expresses only a division of opinion.

The term *party* has of itself nothing odious, that of *faction* is always so: any man, without distinction of

* Vide Beauzée: "Faction, parti."

rank, may have a *party* either at court or in the army, in the city or in literature, without being himself immediately implicated in raising it; but *factions* are always the result of active efforts: one may have a *party* for one's merit from the number and ardor of one's friends; but a *faction* is raised by busy and turbulent spirits for their own purposes: Rome was torn by the intestine *factions* of Cæsar and Pompey; France, during the Revolution, was successively governed by some ruling *faction* which raised itself upon the ruins of that which it had destroyed. *Factions* are not so prevalent in England as *parties*, owing to the peculiar excellence of the constitution; but there are not wanting *factious* spirits who, if they could overturn the present balance of power which has been so happily obtained, would have an opportunity of practising their arts alternately on the high and low, and carrying on their schemes by the aid of both. *Faction* is the demon of discord, armed with the power to do endless mischief, and intent alone on destroying whatever opposes its progress; woe to that state into which it has found an entrance: *party* spirit may show itself in noisy debate; but while it keeps within the legitimate bounds of opposition, it is an evil that must be endured.

It is the restless ambition of a few artful men that thus breaks a people into *factions*, and draws several well-meaning persons to their interest by a specious concern for their country.

ADDISON.

As men formerly became eminent in learned societies by their parts and acquisitions, they now distinguish themselves by the warmth and violence with which they espouse their respective *parties*.

ADDISON.

FACTIOUS, SEDITIOUS.

FACTIOUS, in Latin *factiosus* from *facio* to do, signifies the same as busy or intermeddling; ready to take an active part in matters not of one's own immediate concern.

SEDITIOUS, in Latin *seditiosus*, signifies prone to sedition (*v. Insurrection*).

Factious is an epithet to characterize the tempers of men; *seditious* characterizes their conduct: the *factious*

requisite for a minister of state are different from those which qualify a man for being a judge.

No fruit our palate courts, or flow'r our smell,
But on its fragrant bosom nations dwell ;
All form'd with proper *faculties* to share
The daily bounties of their Maker's care.

JENNYS.

Human *ability* is an unequal match for the
violent and unforeseen vicissitudes of the world.

BLAIR.

'Tis not, indeed, my talent to engage
In lofty trifles, or to swell my page
With wind and noise.

DAVIDSON.

TO FAIL, FALL SHORT, BE DEFICIENT.

FAIL, in French *faillir*, German, &c. *fehlen*, like the word fall, comes from the Latin *fallere* to deceive, and the Hebrew *repal* to fall or decay.

To *fail* marks the result of actions or efforts ; a person *fails* in his undertaking : FALL SHORT designates either the result of actions, or the state of things ; a person *falls short* in his calculation, or in his account ; the issue *falls short* of the expectation : to BE DEFICIENT marks only the state or quality of objects ; a person is *deficient* in good manners. People frequently *fail* in their best endeavours for want of knowing how to apply their abilities : when our expectations are immoderate, it is not surprising if our success *falls short* of our hopes and wishes : there is nothing in which people discover themselves to be more *deficient* than in keeping ordinary engagements.

To *fail* and *be deficient* are both applicable to the characters of men ; but the former is mostly employed for the moral conduct, the latter for the outward behaviour : hence a man is said to *fail* in his duty, in the discharge of his obligations, in the performance of a promise, and the like ; but to be *deficient* in politeness, in attention to his friends, in his address, in his manner of entering a room, and the like.

I would not willingly laugh but to instruct ; or if I sometimes *fail* in this point, when my mirth ceases to be instructive, it shall never cease to be innocent.

ANSWERS.

There is not in my opinion any thing more mysterious in nature than this instinct in animals, which thus rises above reason, and *falls* infinitely short of it.

ANSWERS.

While all creation speaks the pow'r divine,
Is it *deficient* in the main design ?

JENNYS.

FAILING, *v.* Failure.

FAILING, *v.* Imperfection.

FAILURE, FAILING.

THE FAILURE (*v.* To *fail*) speaks the action, or the result of the action ; the FAILING is the habit, or the habitual *failure* : the former is said of our undertakings, the latter of our moral character. The *failure* is opposed to the success ; the *failing* to the perfection. The merchant must be prepared for *failures* in his speculations ; the statesman for *failures* in his projects ; the result of which depends upon contingencies that are above human control. With our *failings*, however, it is somewhat different ; we must never rest satisfied that we are without them, nor contented with the mere consciousness that we have them.

Though some violations of the petition of rights may perhaps be imputed to him (Charles I.), these are more to be ascribed to the necessity of his situation, than to any *failure* in the integrity of his principles.

HUME.

There is scarcely any *failing* of mind or body, which instead of producing shame and discontent, its natural effects, has not one time or other gladdened vanity with the hope of praise.

JOURNALS.

FAILURE, MISCARRIAGE, ABORTION.

FAILURE (*v.* To *fail*) has always a reference to the agent and his design ; MISCARRIAGE, that is, the carrying or going wrong, is applicable to all sublunary concerns, without reference to any particular agent ; ABORTION, from the Latin *aborsus* to deviate from the rise, or to pass away before it become to maturity, is in the proper sense applied to the process of animal nature, and in the figurative sense, to the thoughts and designs which are conceived in the mind.

Failure is more definite in its signification, and limited in its application ; we speak of the *failure* of individuals, but of the *miscarriages* or things : the *failure* on the person so as to him some sentiment, passion, displeasure.

miscarriage is considered mostly in relation to the course of human events: hence the *failure* of Xerxes' expedition reflected disgrace upon himself; but the *miscarriage* of military enterprizes in general are attributable to the elements, or some such untoward circumstance. The *abortion*, in its proper sense, is a species of *miscarriage*; and in application a species of *failure*, as it applies only to the designs of conscious agents; but it does not carry the mind back to the agent, for we speak of the *abortion* of a scheme with as little reference to the schemer, as when we speak of the *miscarriage* of an expedition.

He that attempts to show, however modestly,
the *failures* of a celebrated writer, shall surely
irritate his admirers. JOHNSON.

The *miscarriages* of the great designs of
princes are recorded in the histories of the world.
JOHNSON.

All *abortion* is from infirmity and defect.
SOUTH.

FAILURE, *v.* *Insolvency.*

FAINT, LANGUID.

FAINT, from the French *faner* to fade, signifies that which is faded or withered, which has lost its spirit.

LANGUID, in Latin *languidus*, from *languo* to languish, signifies languished.

Faint is less than *languid*; *faintness* is in fact in the physical application the commencement of *languor*; we may be *faint* for a short time, and if continued and extended through the limbs it becomes *languor*; thus we say to speak with a *faint* tone, and have a *languid* frame. In the figurative application to make a *faint* resistance, to move with a *languid* air; to form a *faint* idea, to make a *languid* effort.

Low the woods
Bow their hoar head: and here the *languid* sun,
Faint from the west, emits his evening ray.
THOMSON.

FAIR, CLEAR.

FAIR, in Saxon *fagar*, comes probably from the Latin *pulcher* beautiful.

CLEAR, *v.* *Clear, bright.*

Fair is used in a positive sense; *clear* in a negative sense: there must some brightness in what is *fair*;

there must be no spots in what is *clear*. The weather is said to be *fair*, which is not only free from what is disagreeable, but somewhat enlivened by the sun; it is *clear* when it is free from clouds or mists. A *fair* skin approaches to the white; a *clear* skin is without spots or irregularities.

In the moral application, a *fair* fame speaks much in praise of a man; a *clear* reputation is free from faults. A *fair* statement contains every thing that can be said *pro* and *con*; a *clear* statement is free from ambiguity or obscurity. *Fairness* is something desirable and inviting; *clearness* is an absolute requisite, it cannot be dispensed with.

His *fair* large front, and eyes sublime, declar'd
Absolute rule. MILTON.

I thither went
With unexperienced thought, and laid me down
On the green bank, to look into the *clear*
Smooth lake. MILTON.

FAIR, HONEST, EQUITABLE, REASONABLE.

FAIR, *v.* *Fair, clear.*

HONEST, in Latin *honestus*, comes from *honor* honor.

EQUITABLE signifies having equity, or according to equity.

REASONABLE signifies having reason, or according to reason.

Fair is said of persons or things; *honest* mostly characterizes the person, either as to his conduct or his principle. When *fair* and *honest* are both applied to the external conduct, the former expresses more than the latter: a man may be *honest* without being *fair*; he cannot be *fair* without being *honest*. *Fairness* enters into every minute circumstance connected with the interests of the parties, and weighs them alike for both; *honesty* is contented with a literal conformity to the law, it consults the interest of one party: the *fair* dealer looks to his neighbour as well as himself, he wishes only for an equal share of advantage; a man may be an *honest* dealer while he looks to no one's advantage but his own: the *fair* man always acts from a principle of right; the *honest* man may be so from a motive of fear.

When these epithets are employed to characterize the man generally, *fair-*

ness expresses less than *honesty*; the former is employed only in regard to commercial transactions or minor personal concerns; the latter ranks among the first moral virtues, and elevates a man high above his fellow creatures: a man is *fair* who is ready to allow his competitor the same advantages as he enjoys himself in every matter however trivial: or he is *honest* in all his looks, words, and actions; neither his tongue nor his countenance ever belie his heart. A *fair* man makes himself acceptable.

"An *honest* man's the noblest work of God."

When *fair* is employed as an epithet to qualify things, or to designate their nature, it approaches very near in signification to *equitable* and *reasonable*; they are all opposed to what is unjust: *fair* and *equitable* suppose two objects put in collision; *reasonable* is employed abstractedly; what is *fair* and *equitable* is so in relation to all circumstances; what is *reasonable* is so of itself. An estimate is *fair* in which profit and loss, merit and demerit, with every collateral circumstance, is duly weighed; a judgement is *equitable* which decides suitably and advantageously for both parties; a price is *reasonable* which does not exceed the limits of reason or propriety. A decision may be either *fair* or *equitable*; but the former is said mostly in regard to trifling matters, even in our games and amusements, and the latter in regard to the important rights of mankind. It is the business of the umpire to decide *fairly* between the combatants or the competitors for a prize: it is the business of the judge to decide *equitably* between men whose property is at issue.

A demand, a charge, a proposition, or an offer, may be said to be either *fair* or *reasonable*: but the former term always bears a relation to what is right between man and man; the latter to what is right in itself according to circumstances.

If the worldling prefer those means which are the *fairest*, it is not because they are *fair*, but because they seem to him most likely to prove successful.

Bacon.

Should be at length, so truly good and great,
Prevail, and rule with *honest* views the state,

Then must he toll for an ungrateful race,
Submit to clamour, libel, and disgrace.

Jeffers.

A man is very unlikely to judge equitably when his passions are agitated by a sense of wrong.

Johnson.

The reasonableness of a test is not hard to be proved.

Johnson.

FAITH, *v.* *Belief*.

FAITH, CREED.

FAITH (*v.* *Belief*) denotes either the principle of trusting, or the thing trusted.

CREED, from the Latin *credo* to believe, denotes the thing believed.

These words are synonymous when taken for the thing trusted in or believed; but they differ in this, that *faith* has always a reference to the principle in the mind; *creed* only respects the thing which is the object of *faith*: the former is likewise taken generally and indefinitely; the latter particularly and definitely, signifying a set form: hence we say to be of the same *faith*, or to adopt the same *creed*. The holy martyrs died for the *faith*, as it is in Christ Jesus; every established form of religion will have its peculiar *creed*. The Church of England has adopted that *creed* which it considers as containing the purest principles of Christian *faith*.

St. Paul affirms, that a sinner is at first justified and received into the favour of God, by a sincere profession of the Christian *faith*.

Trentham.

Supposing all the great points of religion were formed into a kind of *creed*, I would then ask whether it would not require an infinitely greater measure of *faith* than any set of articles which they so violently oppose? Addison.

FAITH, FIDELITY.

THOUGH derived from the same source (*v.* *Belief*), they differ widely in meaning: FAITH here denotes a mode of action, namely, an acting true to the *faith* which others repose in us; FIDELITY, a disposition of the mind to adhere to that *faith* which others repose in us. We keep our *faith*, we show our *fidelity*.

Faith is a public concern, it depends on promises; *fidelity* is a private or personal concern, it depends upon relationships and oaths. A breach of *faith* is a crime which brings a stain on a nation ought to be kept even with

A breach of *fidelity* attaches disgrace to the individual; for *fidelity* is due from a subject to a prince, or from a servant to his master, or from married people one to another. No treaty can be made with him who will keep no *faith*; no confidence can be placed in him who discovers no *fidelity*. The Danes kept no *faith* with the English; fashionable husbands and wives in the present day seem to think there is no *fidelity* due to each other.

The pit resounds with shrieks, a war succeeds
For breach of public *faith*, and unexampled
deeds. DRYDEN.

When one hears of negroes who upon the
death of their masters hang themselves upon
the next tree, who can forbear admiring their
fidelity, though it expresses itself in so dreadful
a manner? ADDISON.

FAITHFUL, TRUSTY.

FAITHFUL signifies full of *faith* or *fidelity* (*v. Faith, fidelity*).

TRUSTY signifies fit or worthy to be *trusted* (*v. Belief*).

Faithful respects the principle altogether; it is suited to all relations and stations, public and private: *trusty* includes not only the principle, but the mental qualifications in general; it applies to those in whom particular *trust* is to be placed. It is the part of a Christian to be *faithful* to all his engagements; it is a particular excellence in a servant to be *trusty*. *Faithful* is applied in the improper sense to an unconscious *agent*; *trusty* may be applied with equal propriety to things as to persons. We may speak of a *faithful* saying, or a *faithful* picture; a *trusty* sword, or a *trusty* weapon.

What we hear
With weaker passion will affect the heart.
Than when the *faithful* eye beholds the part.
FRANCIS.

He took the quiver and the *trusty* bow
Achates used to bear. DRYDEN.
The steeds they left their *trusty* servants hold.
POPE.

FAITHLESS, UNFAITHFUL.

FAITHLESS is mostly employed to denote a breach of *faith*; and UNFAITHFUL to mark the want of *fidelity* (*v. Faith, fidelity*). The former is positive; the latter is rather negative, implying a deficiency. A prince, a government, a people, or an individual is said to be *faithless*; a

husband, a wife, a servant, or any individual, *unfaithful*. Messus Tullius, the Alban Dictator, was *faithless* to the Roman people when he withheld his assistance in the battle, and strove to go over to the enemy; a man is *unfaithful* to his employer, who sees him injured by others without doing his utmost to prevent it. A woman is *faithless* to her husband who breaks the marriage vow; she is *unfaithful* to him when she does not discharge the duties of a wife to the best of her abilities.

The sire of men and monarch of the sky
Th' advice approv'd, and bade Minerva fly,
Dissolve the league, and all her arts employ
To make the breach the *faithless* act of Troy.
POPE.

At length ripe vengeance o'er their head impends,
But Jove himself the *faithless* race defends.
POPE.

If e'er with life I quit the Trojan plain,
If e'er I see my sire and spouse again,
This bow, *unfaithful* to my glorious arms,
Broke by my hand shall feed the blazing flames.
POPE.

FAITHLESS, PERFIDIOUS, TREACHEROUS.

FAITHLESS (*v. Faithless*) is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; a breach of good *faith* is expressed by them all, but *faithless* expresses no more: the others include accessory ideas in their signification.

PERFIDIOUS, in Latin *perfidiosus*, signifies literally breaking through *faith* in a great degree, and now implies the addition of hostility to the breach of *faith*.

TREACHEROUS, most probably changed from *traitorous*, comes from the Latin *trado* to betray, and signifies one species of active hostile breach of *faith*.

A *faithless* man is *faithless* only for his own interest; a *perfidious* man is expressly so to the injury of another. A friend is *faithless* who consults his own safety in time of need; he is *perfidious* if he profits by the confidence reposed in him to plot mischief against the one to whom he has made vows of friendship. *Faithlessness* does not suppose any particular efforts to deceive; it consists of merely violating that *faith* which the relation produces; *perfidy* is never so complete as when it has most ef-

fectually assumed the mask of sincerity. Whoever deserts his friend in need is guilty of *faithlessness*; but he is guilty of *perfidy* who draws from him every secret in order to effect his ruin.

Incle was not only a *faithless* but a *perfidious* lover. *Faithlessness*, though a serious offence, is unhappily not unfrequent; there are too many men who are unmindful of their most important engagements; but we may hope for the honor of humanity, that there are not many instances of *perfidy*, which exceeds every other vice in atrocity, as it makes virtue itself subservient to its own base purposes.

Perfidy may lie in the will to do; *treachery* lies altogether in the thing done; one may therefore be *perfidious* without being *treacherous*. A friend is *perfidious* whenever he evinces his *perfidy*; but he is said to be *treacherous* only in the particular instance in which he betrays the confidence and interests of another. I detect a man's *perfidy*, or his *perfidious* aims, by the manner in which he attempts to draw my secrets from me; I am made acquainted with his *treachery* not before I discover that my confidence is betrayed and my secrets are divulged. On the other hand we may be *treacherous* without being *perfidious*. *Perfidy* is an offence mostly between individuals; it is rather a breach of fidelity (*v. Faith, fidelity*) than of faith; *treachery* on the other hand includes breaches of private or public faith. A servant may be both *perfidious* and *treacherous* to his master; a citizen may be *treacherous*, but not *perfidious* towards his country.

It is said that in the South Sea Islands, when a chief wants a human victim, their officers will sometimes invite their friends or relations to come to them, when they take the opportunity of suddenly falling upon them and dispatching them: here is *perfidy* in the individual who acts this false part; and *treachery* in the act of betraying him who is murdered. When the schoolmaster of Falerii delivered his scholars to Camillus, he was guilty of *treachery* in the act, and of *perfidy* towards those who had reposed confidence in him. When Romulus ordered the Sabine women

to be seized, it was an act of *treachery*, but not of *perfidy*; so in like manner, when the daughter of Tarpeius opened the gates of the Roman citadel to the enemy.

Old Priam, fearful of the war's event,
This hapless Polydore to Thracia sent,
From noise and tumults, and destructive war,
Committed to the *faithless* tyrant's care.

DAYDEN.

When a friend is turned into an enemy, the world is just enough to accuse the *perfidiousness* of the friend, rather than the indiscretion of the person who confided in him. AMERSON.

Shall then the Grecians fly, oh dire disgrace!
And leave unpunish'd this *perfidious* race? FORGE.
And had not Heav'n the fall of Troy design'd,
Enough was said and done t' inspire a better mind:

Then had our lances pierc'd the *treach'rous* wood,
And Ilion towers, and Priam's empire, stood.

DAYDEN.

FALL, DOWNFALL, RUIN.

FALL and DOWNFALL, from the German *fallen*, has the same derivation as fail (*v. To fail*).

RUIN, *v. Destruction*.

Whether applied to physical objects or the condition of persons, *fall* expresses less than *downfall*, and this less than *ruin*. The *fall* applies to that which is erect; the *downfall* to that which is elevated: every thing which is set up, although as trifling as a stick, may have a *fall*; but we speak of the *downfall* of the loftiest trees or the tallest spires. The *fall* may be attended with more or less mischief, or even with none at all; but the *downfall* and the *ruin* are accompanied with the dissolution of the bodies that *fall*. The higher a body is raised, and the greater the art that is employed in the structure, the completer the *downfall*; the greater the structure the more extended the *ruin*. In the figurative application we may speak of the *fall* of man from a state of innocence, a state of ease, or a state of prosperity, or his *downfall* from greatness or high rank. He may recover from his *fall*, but his *downfall* is commonly followed by the entire *ruin* of his concerns, and often of himself. The *fall* of kingdoms, and the *downfall* of empires, must always be succeeded by their *ruin* as an inevitable result.

The *fall* -

The rape of nations, and the fall

own feelings for the operations of Divine grace. The ideas of ghosts and apparitions are mostly attributable to the *illusions* of the senses and the imagination.

There is indeed no transaction which offers stronger temptations to *fallacy* and sophistication than epistolary intercourse. JOHNSON.

As when a wandering fire,
Hovering and blazing with *delusive* light,
Misleads th' amaz'd night-wanderer from his way. MILTON.

Fame, glory, wealth, honour, have in the prospect pleasing *illusions*. STEELE.

FALSEHOOD, *v. Fiction.*

FALSEHOOD, *v. Untruth.*

FALSITY, *v. Untruth.*

TO FALTER, *v. To hesitate.*

FAME, REPUTATION, RENOWN.

FAME, from the Greek *φῆμι* to say, is the most noisy and uncertain; it rests upon report: REPUTATION (*v. Character, reputation*) is silent and solid; it lies more in the thoughts, and is derived from observation.

RENOWN, in French *renommée*, from *nom* a name, signifies the reverberation of a name; it is as loud as *fame*, but more substantial and better founded: hence we say that a person's *fame* is gone abroad; his *reputation* is established; and he has got *renown*.

Fame may be applied to any object, good, bad, or indifferent; *reputation* is applied only to real eminence in some department; *renown* is employed only for extraordinary men and brilliant exploits. The *fame* of a quack may be spread among the ignorant multitude by means of a lucky cure; the *reputation* of a physician rests upon his tried skill and known experience; the *renown* of a general is proportioned to the magnitude of his achievements.

Europe with Afric in his *fame* shall join,
But neither shore his conquests shall confine. DRYDEN.

Pope doubtless approached Addison, when the *reputation* of their wit first brought them together, with the respect due to a man whose abilities were acknowledged. JOHNSON.

Well constituted governments have always made the profession of a physician both honourable and advantageous. Homer's Machaon and

Virgil's Iaptes were men of *renown*, heroes in war. JOHNSON.

The artist finds greater returns in profit, as the author in *fame*. ADDISON.

How doth it please and fill the memory,
With deeds of brave *renown*, while on each hand
Historic urns and breathing statues rise,
And speaking busts. DYER.

FAME, REPORT, RUMOUR,
HEARSAY.

FAME (*v. Fame*) has a reference to the thing which gives birth to it; it goes about of itself without any apparent instrumentality. The REPORT, from *re* and *porto*, to carry back, or away from an object, has always a reference to the *reporter*. RUMOUR, in Latin *rumor* from *ruo* to rush or to flow, has a reference to the flying nature of words that are carried; it is therefore properly a flying *report*. HEARSAY refers to the receiver of that which is said: it is limited therefore to a small number of speakers, or reporters. The *fame* serves to form or establish a character either of a person or a thing; it will be good or bad according to circumstances; the *fame* of our Saviour's miracles went abroad through the land: the *report* serves to communicate information of events; it may be more or less correct according to the veracity or authenticity of the *reporter*; *reports* of victories mostly precede the official confirmation: the *rumor* serves the purposes of fiction; it is more or less vague, according to the temper of the times and the nature of the events; every battle gives rise to a thousand *rumors*: the *hearsay* serves for information or instruction, and is seldom so incorrect as it is familiar.

Space may produce new worlds, whereof so rise,
There went a *fame* in heav'n, that he ere long
Intended to create. MILTON.

What liberties any man may take in imputing words to me which I never spoke, and what credit Cæsar may give to such *reports*, these are points for which it is by no means in my power to be answerable.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

For which of you will stop
The vent of hearing, when loud *rumour*
Speaks? SHAKESPEARE.

What influence can a mother have over a daughter, from whose example the daughter can only have *hearsay* benefits? RICHARDSON.

FAMILIAR, *v. Conversant*

More skill'd in the mean arts of vice,
The whirling troque or law-forbidden dice.
FRANCIS.

FAMOUS, CELEBRATED, RENOWNED, ILLUSTRIOUS.

FAMOUS signifies literally having *fame* or the cause of *fame*; it is applicable to that which causes a noise or sensation, to that which is talked of, written upon, discussed, and thought of; to that which is reported of far and near; to that which is circulated among all ranks and orders of men.

CELEBRATED signifies literally kept in the memory by a *celebration* or memorial, and is applicable to that which is praised and honored with solemnity.

RENOWNED signifies literally possessed of a name, and is applicable to whatever extends the name, or causes the name to be often repeated.

ILLUSTRIOUS signifies literally what has or gives a lustre: it is applicable to whatever confers dignity.

Famous is a term of indefinite import; it conveys of itself frequently neither honor nor dishonor, since it is employed indifferently as an epithet for things praiseworthy or otherwise; it is the only one of these terms which may be used in a bad sense. The others rise in a gradually good sense.

* The *celebrated* is founded upon merit and the display of talent in the arts and sciences; it gains the subject respect: the *renowned* is founded upon the possession of rare or extraordinary qualities, upon successful exertions and an accordance with public opinion; it brings great honor or glory to the subject: the *illustrious* is founded upon those solid qualities which not only render one known but distinguished; it ensures regard and veneration.

A person may be *famous* for his eccentricities; *celebrated* as an artist, a writer, or a player; *renowned* as a warrior or a statesman; *illustrious* as a prince, a statesman, or a senator.

The maid of Orleans, who was decried by the English, and idolized by the French, is equally *famous* in both nations. There are *celebrated* authors whom to censure even in that which

is censurable, would endanger one's reputation. The *renowned* heroes of antiquity have, by the perusal of their exploits, given birth to a race of modern heroes not inferior to themselves. Princes may shine in their life-time, but they cannot render themselves *illustrious* to posterity except by the monuments of goodness and wisdom which they leave after them.

I thought it an agreeable change to have my thoughts diverted from the greatest among the dead and fabulous heroes, to the most *famous* among the real and living.
ADDISON.

Whilst I was in this learned body I applied myself with so much diligence to my studies; that there are very few *celebrated* books either in the learned or modern tongues which I am not acquainted with.
ADDISON.

Castor and Pollux first in martial force,
One bold on foot, and one *renown'd* for horse.
POPE.

The reliefs of the envious man are those little blemishes that discover themselves in an *illustrious* character.
ADDISON.

FANATIC, v. Enthusiast.

FANCIFUL, FANTASTICAL, WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS.

FANCIFUL signifies full of *fancy* (v. *Conceit*).

FANTASTICAL signifies belonging to the phantasy, which is the immediate derivative from the Greek.

WHIMSICAL signifies either like a whim, or having a whim.

CAPRICIOUS signifies having *caprice*.

Fanciful and *fantastical* are both employed for persons and things; *whimsical* and *caprice* is mostly employed for persons, or what is personal. *Fanciful*, in regard to persons, is said of that which is irregular in the taste or judgement; *fantastical* is said of that which violates all propriety, as well as regularity: the former may consist of a simple deviation from rule; the latter is something extravagant. A person may, therefore, sometimes be advantageously *fanciful*, although he can never be *fantastical* but to his discredit. Lively minds will be *fanciful* in the choice of their dress, furniture, or equipage: the affectation of singularity frequently renders people *fantastical* in their manners as well as their dress.

* Vide Abbé Girard; "Fameux, illustre, celebre, renommé."

Eager he rises, and in *fancy* hears
The voice celestial murmuring in his ears. POPE.

Grief has a natural eloquence belonging to it,
and breaks out in more moving sentiments than
can be supplied by the finest *imagination*.

ADDISON.

Does airy *fancy* cheat
My mind, well pleas'd with the deceit? CARRER.

There are forms which naturally create respect
in the beholders, and at once inflame and cha-
stize the *imagination*. STEELE.

FANTASTICAL, *v.* *Fanciful*.

FAR, *v.* *Distant*.

FARE, PROVISION.

FARE, from the German *fahren* to
go or be, signifies in general the con-
dition or thing that comes to one.

PROVISION, from *provide*, signi-
fies the thing provided for one.

These terms are alike employed for
the ordinary concerns of life, and may
either be used in the limited sense for
the food one procures, or in general
for whatever necessary or convenience
is procured: to the term *fare* is an-
nexed the idea of accident; *provision*
includes that of design: a traveller on
the continent must frequently be con-
tented with humble *fare*, unless he has
the precaution of carrying his *provi-
sions* with him.

This night at least with me forget your care,
Chestnuts, and curds, and cream, shall be your
fare. DRYDEN.

The winged nation wanders through the skies,
And o'er the plains and shady forest flies;
They breed, they brood, instruct, and educate,
And make *provision* for the future state.
DAYDEN.

FARMER, HUSBANDMAN,
AGRICULTURIST.

FARMER, from the Saxon *feorm*
food, signifies one managing a *farm*, or
cultivating the ground for a subsist-
ence: HUSBANDMAN is one fol-
lowing *husbandry*, that is, the tillage
of land by manual labor; the *farmer*,
therefore, conducts the concern, and
the *husbandman* labors under his di-
rection: AGRICULTURIST, from
the Latin *ager* a field, and *colo* to till,
signifies any one engaged in the art of
cultivation. The *farmer* is always a
practitioner; the *agriculturist* may be
a mere theorist: the *farmer* follows
husbandry solely as a means of living;

the *agriculturist* follows it as a
science: the former tills the land
upon given admitted principles; the
latter frames new principles, or alters
those that are established. Betwixt
the *farmer* and the *agriculturist* there
is the same difference as between
practice and theory: the former may
be assisted by the latter, so long as
they can go hand in hand; but in the
case of a collision, the *farmer* will be
of more service to himself and his
country than the *agriculturist*: *farm-
ing* brings immediate profit from per-
sonal service; *agriculture* may only
promise future, and consequently con-
tingent advantages.

To check this plague, the skillful *farmer* chaff
And blazing straw before his orchard burns.

THOMSON,

An improved and improving *agriculture*,
which implies a great augmentation of labor,
has not yet found itself at a stand. BURKE,

Old *husbandmen* I at Sabinum know,
Who, for another year, dig, plough, and sow.

DENNAM.

TO FASCINATE, *v.* *To charm*,

FASHION, *v.* *Custom*.

OF FASHION, OF QUALITY,
OF DISTINCTION.

THESE epithets are employed pro-
miscuously in colloquial discourse;
but not with strict propriety: * by men
of fashion are understood such men as
live in the *fashionable* world, and keep
the best company; by men *of quality*
are understood men of rank or title;
by men *of distinction* are understood
men of honourable superiority, whe-
ther by wealth, office, or pre-eminence
in society.

Gentry and merchants, though not
men *of quality*, may, by their mode of
living, be men *of fashion*; and by the
office they hold in the state, they may
likewise be men *of distinction*.

The free manner in which people *of fashion*
are discoursed on at such meetings (of trades-
people), is but a just reproach of their failures in
this kind (in payment). STEELE.

The single dress of a lady *of quality* is often
the product of an hundred climates. ADDISON.

It behoves men *of distinction*, with their
power and example, to provide over the public
diversions in such a manner as to check any
thing that tends to the corruption of manners.

STEELE,

* Vide Trusler: "Of Fashion, Of Quality, Of Distinction."

nary occasions, a wind is said to be *favorable* which carries us to the end of our voyage; but it is said to be *propitious* if the rapidity of our passage forwards any great purpose of our own.

You have indeed every *favorable* circumstance for your advancement that can be wished.
MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CIOCCIO.

But ah! what use of valour can be made,
When Heaven's *propitious* powers refuse their aid.
DRYDEN.

FAULT, *v. Blemish.*

FAULT, *v. Error.*

FAULTY, *v. Culpable.*

TO FAWN, *v. To coax.*

FEALTY, *v. Homage.*

TO FEAR, *v. To apprehend.*

FEARFUL, *v. Afraid.*

FEARLESS, *v. Bold.*

FEARFUL, DREADFUL, FRIGHTFUL, TREMENDOUS, TERRIBLE, TERRIFIC, HORRIBLE, HORRID.

FEARFUL here signifies full of that which causes *fear* (*v. Alarm*): DREADFUL, or full of what causes *dread* (*v. Apprehension*); FRIGHTFUL, or full of what causes *fright* (*v. Afraid*) or *apprehension*; TREMENDOUS, or causing *trembling*; TERRIBLE, or TERRIFIC, causing *terror* (*v. Alarm*); HORRIBLE, or HORRID, causing *horror*. The application of these terms is easily to be discovered by what has been said on these words: the first two affect the mind more than the senses; all the others affect the senses more than the mind: a contest is *fearful* when the issue is important, but the event doubtful; the thought of death is *dreadful* to one who feels himself unprepared. The *frightful* is less than the *tremendous*; the *tremendous* than the *terrible*; the *terrible* than the *horrible*: shrieks may be *frightful*; thunder and lightning may be *tremendous*; the roaring of a lion is *terrible*; the glare of his eye *terrific*; the actual spectacle of killing is *horrible* or *horrid*. In their general application, these terms are often employed promiscuously to characterize what-

ever produces very strong impressions: hence we may speak of a *frightful*, *dreadful*, *terrible*, or *horrid* dream; or *frightful*, *dreadful*, or *terrible* tempest; *dreadful*, *terrible*, or *horrid* consequences.

She wept the terrors of the *fearful* wave,
Too oft, alas! the wandering lover's grave.

FALCONER.

And dar'st thou threat to snatch my prize away,
Due to the deeds of many a *dreadful* day.

POPE.

Frightful convulsions with'd his tortur'd limbs.
FERGUSON.

Out of the limb of the murdered monarchy has arisen a vast, *tremendous*, unformed spectre, in a far more *terrific* guise than which ever yet overpowered the imagination of man. BURKE.

Deck'd in sad triumph for the mournful field,
O'er her broad shoulders hangs his *horrid* shield.
POPE.

FEASIBLE, *v. Colorable.*

FEAST, BANQUET, CAROUSAL, ENTERTAINMENT, TREAT.

As FEASTS, in the religious sense, from *festus*, are always days of leisure, and frequently of public rejoicing, this word has been applied to any social meal for the purposes of pleasure: this is the idea common to the signification of all these words, of which *feast* seems to be the most general; and for all of which it may frequently be substituted, although they have each a distinct application: *feast* conveys the idea merely of enjoyment: BANQUET is a splendid *feast*, attended with pomp and state; it is a term of noble use, particularly adapted to poetry and the high style: CAROUSAL, in French *carousee*, in German *geräusch* or *kausch* intoxication, from *rauschen* to intoxicate, is a drunken *feast*: ENTERTAINMENT and TREAT convey the idea of hospitality.

A *feast* may be given by princes or their subjects, by nobility or commonalty: the *banquet* is confined to men of high estate; and more commonly spoken of in former times, when ranks and distinctions were less blended than they are at present: the dinner which the Lord Mayor of London annually gives is properly denominated a *feast*; the mode in which Cardinal Wolsey received the French ambassadors might entitle every meal he gave to be denominated a *banquet*. A *feast*

Catholics, there are many days which are kept holy, and consequently by them denominated *feasts*, which in the English reformed church are only observed as *holidays*, or days of exemption from public business; of this description are the Saints' days, on which the public offices are shut: on the other hand, Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, are regarded in both churches more as *feasts* than as *holidays*.

Feast, as a technical term, is applied only to certain specified *holidays*; a *holiday* is an indefinite term, it may be employed for any day or time in which there is a suspension of business; there are, therefore, many *feasts* where there are no *holidays*, and many *holidays* where there are no *feasts*: a *feast* is altogether sacred; a *holiday* has frequently nothing sacred in it, not even in its cause; it may be a simple, ordinary transaction, the act of an individual: a **FESTIVAL** has always either a sacred or a serious object. A *feast* is kept by religious worship; a *holiday* is kept by idleness; a *festival* is kept by mirth and festivity: some *feasts* are *festivals*, as in the case of the carnival at Rome; some *festivals* are *holidays*, as in the case of weddings and public thanksgivings.

First, I provide myself a nimble thing,
To be my page, a varlet of crafts;
Next, two new suits for *feasts* and gala days.

CUMBERLAND.

It happen'd on a summer's *holiday*,
That to the green wood shade he took his way.

DRYDEN.

Many worthy persons urged how great the harmony was between the *holidays* and their attributes (if I may call them so), and what a confusion would follow if Michaelmas-day, for instance, was not to be celebrated when stubble geese are in their highest perfection. WALPOLE.

In so enlightened an age as the present, I shall perhaps be ridiculed if I hint, as my opinion, that the observation of certain *festivals* is something more than a mere political institution.

WALPOLE.

FEAT, *v.* Deed.

FEEBLE, *v.* Weak.

TO FEEL, BE SENSIBLE, CONSCIOUS.

FROM the simple idea of a sense, the word **FEEL** has acquired the most extensive signification and application in our language, and may be employed indifferently for all the other terms, but not in all cases: to *feel* is said

of the whole frame, inwardly and outwardly; it is the accompaniment of existence: to **BE SENSIBLE**, from the Latin *sentio*, is said only of the senses. It is the property of all living creatures to *feel* pleasure and pain in a greater or less degree: those creatures which have not the sense of hearing will not *be sensible* of sounds.

In the moral application, to *feel* is peculiarly the property or act of the heart; to *be sensible* is that of the understanding: an ingenious mind *feels* pain when it is *sensible* of having committed an error: one may, however, *feel* as well as *be sensible* by means of the understanding: a person *feels* the value of another's service; is *sensible* of his kindness: one *feels* or is *sensible* of what passes outwardly; one is **CONSCIOUS** only of what passes inwardly, from *con* or *cum* and *scio* to know to oneself: we *feel* the force of another's remark; we are *sensible* of the evil which must spring from the practice of vice; we are *conscious* of having fallen short of our duty.

The devout man does not only believe, but *feels* there is a Deity.

ADDISON.

There is, doubtless, a faculty in spirits by which they apprehend one another, as our senses do material objects; and there is no question but our souls, when they are disembodied, will, by this faculty, be always *sensible* of the Divine presence.

ADDISON.

A creature of a more exalted kind
Was wanting yet, and then was man design'd;
Conscious of thought, of more capacious breast,
For empire form'd, and fit to rule the rest.

DRYDEN.

FEELING, SENSATION, SENSE.

FEELING and **SENSATION** express either the particular act, or the general property of *feeling*; **SENSE** expresses the general property, or the particular mode of *feeling*. *Feeling* is, as before (*v.* *To feel*), the general, *sensation* and *sense* are the special terms: the *feeling* is either physical or moral; the *sensation* is mostly physical; the *sense* physical in the general, and moral in the particular application.

We speak either of the *feeling* or *sensation* of cold, the *feeling* or *sense* of virtue: it is not easy to describe the *feelings* which are excited by the cutting of cork or the sharpening a saw; the *sensation* which per-

for the most mysterious things in nature upon natural, or, as they please to term it, rational principles.

To win me from his tender arms,
Unnumber'd suitors came,
Who prais'd me for imputed charms,
And felt or feign'd a flame. GODFREY.

An affected delicacy is the common improvement in those who pretend to be refined above others. STANLEY.

TO FEIGN, *v.* To invent.

TO FELICITATE, CONGRATULATE.

FELICITATE, from the Latin *felix* happy, signifies to make happy, and is applicable only to ourselves; CONGRATULATE, from *gratus* pleasant or agreeable, is to make agreeable, and is applicable either to ourselves or others: we *felicitate* ourselves on having escaped the danger; we *congratulate* others on their good fortune.

The astronomers, indeed, expect her (night) with impatience, and *felicitate* themselves upon her arrival. JOHNSON.

The fierce young hero who had overcome the Curia, instead of being congratulated by his sister for his victory, was upbraided by her for having slain her lover. ARISTOTEL.

FELICITY, *v.* Happiness.

FELLOWSHIP, SOCIETY.

BOTH these terms are employed to denote a close intercourse; but FELLOWSHIP is said of men as individuals, SOCIETY of them collectively: we should be careful not to hold *fellowship* with any one of bad character, or to join the *society* of those who profess bad principles.

All becomes it me
To wear at once thy garter and thy chain,
Though by my former dignity I swear,
That, were I reinstated in my throne,
Thus to be join'd in *fellowship* with thee
Would be the first ambition of my soul. GILBERT WATTS.

Unhappy he! who from the first of joys,
Society, cut off, is left alone,
Amid this world of death. THOMSON.

FELON, *v.* Criminal.

FEMALE, FEMININE,
EFFEMINATE.

FEMALE is said of the sex itself, and FEMININE of the characteristics of the sex. *Female* is opposed to male, *feminine* to masculine.

In the *female* character we expect to find that which is *feminine*. The

female dress, manners, and habits, have engaged the attention of all essayists, from the time of Addison to the present period.

The *feminine* is natural to the *female*; the *effeminate* is unnatural to the male. A *feminine* air and voice, which is truly grateful to the observer in the one sex, is an odious mark of *effeminacy* in the other. Beauty and delicacy are *feminine* properties; robustness and vigor are masculine properties; the former therefore when discovered in a man entitle him to the epithet of *effeminate*.

Once more her haughty soul the tyrant bends,
To prayers and mean submissions she descends;
No female arts or aids she left untried,
Her conquests unexplor'd, before she died. DARWIN.

Her heavenly form
Angelic; but more soft and feminine
Her graceful innocence. MILTON.

Our martial ancestors, like some of their modern successors, had no other amusement (but hunting) to entertain their vacant hours; displaying all arts as *effeminacy*. BLACKSTONE.

FEMININE, *v.* Female.

FENCE, GUARD, SECURITY.

FENCE, from the Latin *fendo*, to send or keep off, serves to prevent the attack of an external enemy. GUARD, which is but a variety of *ward*, from the German *wahren* to see, and *wachen* to watch, signifies that which keeps from any danger. SECURITY implies that which secures or prevents injury, mischief, and loss.

The *fence* in the proper sense is an inanimate object; the *guard* is a living agent; the former is of permanent utility, the latter acts to a partial extent: in the figurative sense they retain the same distinction. Modesty is a *fence* to a woman's virtue; the love of the subject is the monarch's greatest *safeguard*. There are prejudices which favor religion and subordination, that act as *fences* against the introduction of licentious principles into the juvenile or unenlightened mind; a proper sense of an overruling providence will serve as a *guard* to prevent the admission of improper thoughts. The *guard* only stands at the entrance, to prevent the ingress of evil: the *security* stops up all avenues, it locks up with firm *guard* serves to prevent the ingress of every thing that may have an

idea of what is creative, and is peculiarly applicable to animals. We may say that the ground is either *fertile* or *fruitful*, but not *prolific*: we may speak of a female of any species being *fruitful* and *prolific*, but not *fertile*; we may speak of nature as being *fruitful*, but neither *fertile* nor *prolific*. A country is *fertile* as it respects the quality of the soil; it is *fruitful* as it respects the abundance of its produce: it is possible, therefore, for a country to be *fruitful* by the industry of its inhabitants, which was not *fertile* by nature.

An animal is said to be *fruitful* as it respects the number of young which it has; it is said to be *prolific* as it respects its generative power. Some women are more *fruitful* than others; but there are many animals more *prolific* than human creatures. The lands in Egypt are rendered *fertile* by means of mud which they receive from the overflowing of the Nile: they consequently produce harvests more *fruitful* than in almost any other country. Among the Easterns barrenness was reckoned a disgrace, and every woman was ambitious to be *fruitful*: there are some insects, particularly amongst the noxious tribes, which are so *prolific*, that they are not many hours in being before they begin to breed.

In the figurative application they admit of a similar distinction. A man is *fertile* in expedients who readily contrives upon the spur of the occasion; he is *fruitful* in resources who has them ready at his hand; his brain is *prolific* if it generates an abundance of new conceptions. A mind is *fertile* which has powers that admit of cultivation and expansion: an imagination is *fruitful* that is rich in stores of imagery; a genius is *prolific* that is rich in invention. Females are *fertile* in expedients and devices; ambition and avarice are the most *fruitful* sources of discord and misery in public and private life; novel-writers are the most *prolific* class of authors.

Why should I mention those, whose oozy soil
Is render'd *fertile* by the o'overflowing Nile.

JENNYS.

When first the soil receives the *fruitful* seed,
Make no delay, but cover it with speed. DAYDEN.

And where in pomp the sun-burnt people ride
On painted barges o'er the teeming tide,

Which pouring down from Ethiopian lands,
Makes green the soil, with silene and black *pro-*
lific sands. DAYDEN.

To every work Warburton brought a memory
full fraught, together with a fancy *fertile* of
combinations. JOHNSON.

The philosophy received from the Greeks has
been *fruitful* in controversies, but barren of
works. BACON.

Parent of Night! all-seeing sun,
Prolific beam, whose rays dispense
The various gifts of Providence. GAY.

FERVOR, ARDOR.

FERVOR, from *ferveo* to boil, is not so violent a heat as ARDOR, from *ardeo* to burn. The affections are properly *fervent*; the passions are *ardent*: we are *fervent* in feeling, and *ardent* in acting: the *fervor* of devotion may be rational; but the *ardor* of zeal is mostly intemperate. The first martyr, Stephen, was filled with a holy *fervor*; St. Peter, in the *ardor* of his zeal, promised his master to do more than he was able to perform.

The joy of the Lord is not to be understood
of high raptures and transports of religious
 fervor. BLAIR.

Do men hasten to their devotions with that
order that they would to a lowd play? SCOTT.

FESTIVAL, v. Feast.

FESTIVITY, MIRTH.

THERE is commonly MIRTH with FESTIVITY, but there may be frequently *mirth* without *festivity*. The *festivity* lies in the outward circumstances: *mirth* in the temper of the mind. *Festivity* is rather the producer of *mirth* than the *mirth* itself. *Festivity* includes the social enjoyments of eating, drinking, dancing, cards, and other pleasures: *mirth* includes in it the buoyancy of spirits; which is engendered by a participation in such pleasures: but *festivity* may be accompanied with intemperance.

Phidratas, fearing that the *festivity* of his
guests would be interrupted by the misconduct of
Thrasippus, rose from his seat, and intreated him
to stay. CUMINGHAM.

Low lies that house where nut-brown draughts
inspir'd,
Where greybeard *mirth* and smiling toil retir'd.
GOLDSMITH.

TO FETCH, v. To bring.

FETTER, v. Chain.

FEUD, v. Quarrel.

simplest kind, by which a word acquires other meanings besides that which is originally affixed to it; as when the term *head*, which properly signifies a part of the body, is applied to the leader of an army. The *allegory* is a continued *metaphor* when attributes, modes, and actions, are applied to the objects thus *figured*, as in the *allegory* of sin and death in Milton.

The *emblem* is that sort of *figure* of thought by which we make corporeal objects to stand for moral properties; thus the dove is represented as the *emblem* of meekness, or the beehive is made the *emblem* of industry: the *symbol* is that species of *emblem* which is converted into a constituted sign among men; thus the olive and laurel are the *symbols* of peace, and have been recognized as such among barbarous as well as enlightened nations. The *type* is that species of *emblem* by which one object is made to represent another mystically; it is, therefore, only employed in religious matters, particularly in relation to the coming, the office, and the death of our Saviour; in this manner the offering of Isaac is considered as a *type* of our Saviour's offering himself as an atoning sacrifice.

The spring bears the same *figure* among the seasons of the year, that the morning does among the divisions of the day, or youth among the stages of life. ADDISON.

No man had a happier manner of expressing the affections of one sense by metaphors taken from another than Milton. BURKE.

Virgil has cast the whole system of Platonic philosophy, so far as regards the soul of man, into beautiful *allegories*. ADDISON.

The stork's the *emblem* of true piety. BEAUMONT.

I need not mention the justness of thought which is observed in the generation of these *symbolical* persons (in Milton's *allegory* of sin and death). ADDISON.

All the remarkable events under the law were *types* of Christ. BLAIR.

FIGURE, *v.* Form.

FILTHY, *v.* Nasty.

FINAL, CONCLUSIVE.

FINAL, in French *final*, Latin *finalis*, from *finis* the end, signifies having an end.

CONCLUSIVE (*v.* *Conclusive*) signifies shutting up, or coming to a conclusion.

Final designates simply the circumstance of being the last; *conclusive* the mode of finishing or coming to the last: a determination is *final* which is to be succeeded by no other; a reasoning is *conclusive* that puts a stop to farther question. The *final* is arbitrary; it depends upon the will to make it so or not: the *conclusive* is relative; it depends upon the circumstances and the understanding: a person gives a *final* answer at option; but in order to make an answer *conclusive* it must be satisfactory to all parties.

Neither with us in England hath there been (till very lately) any *final* determination upon the right of authors at the common law.

BLACKSTONE.

I hardly think the example of Abraham's complaining, that unless he had some children of his body, his steward Eliezer of Damascus would be his heir, is quite *conclusive* to show that he made him so by will. BLACKSTONE.

FINAL, *v.* Last.

TO FIND, FIND OUT, DISCOVER, ESPY, DESCRY.

FIND, in German *finden*, &c. is most probably connected with the Latin *venio*, signifying to come in the way.

DISCOVER, *v.* To detect.

ESPY, in French *espier*, comes from the Latin *espicio*, signifying to see a thing out.

DESCRY, from the Latin *discerno*, signifies to distinguish a thing from others.

To *find* signifies simply to come within sight of a thing, which is the general idea attached to all these terms: they vary, however, either in the mode of the action or in the object. What we *find* may become visible to us by accident, but what we *find out* is the result of an effort. We may *find* any thing as we pass along, in the streets; but we *find out* mistakes in an account by carefully going over it, or we *find out* the difficulties which we meet with in learning, by redoubling our diligence. What is *found*

venting machines, instruments, and various matters of use or elegance; of *discovering* the operations and laws of nature. Many fruitless attempts have been made to *find* the longitude: men have not been so unsuccessful in *finding out* various arts, for communicating their thoughts, commemorating the exploits of their nations, and supplying themselves with luxuries; nor have they failed in every species of machine or instrument which can aid their purpose. Harvey *discovered* the circulation of the blood: Toricelli *discovered* the gravity of the air: Newton *discovered* the principle of universal gravitation: by geometry the properties of figures are *discovered*; by chemistry the properties of compound substances: but the geometrician *finds* by reasoning the solution of any problem; or by investigating, he *finds out* a clearer method of solving the same problems; or he *invents* an instrument by which the proof can be deduced from ocular demonstration. Thus the astronomer *discovers* the motions of the heavenly bodies, by means of the telescope which has been *invented*.

Long practice has a sure improvement *found*,
With kindled fires to burn the barren ground.
DRYDEN.

Since the harmonic principles were *discovered*,
music has been a great independent science.
SKWARD.

The sire of gods and men, with hard decrees,
Forbids our plenty to be bought with ease;
Himself *invented* first the shining share,
And whetted human industry by care. DRYDEN.

TO FIND FAULT WITH, BLAME, OBJECT TO.

ALL these terms denote not simply feeling, but also expressing dissatisfaction with some person or thing. To FIND FAULT with signifies here to point out a *fault*, either in some person or thing; to BLAME is said only of the person; OBJECT is applied to the thing only: we *find fault* with a person for his behaviour; we *find fault* with our seat, our conveyance, and the like; we *blame* a person for his temerity or his improvidence; we *object* to a measure that is proposed. We *find fault* with or *blame* that which has been done; we *object* to that which is to be done.

Finding fault is a familiar action applied to matters of personal con-

venience or taste; *blame* and *object to*, particularly the latter, are applied to serious objects. *Finding fault* is often the fruit of a discontented temper; there are some whom nothing will please, and who are ever ready to *find fault* with whatever comes in their way: *blame* is a matter of discretion; we *blame* frequently in order to correct: *objecting to* is an affair either of caprice or necessity; some capriciously *object to* that which is proposed to them merely from a spirit of opposition; others *object to* a thing from substantial reasons.

Tragi-comedy you have yourself *found fault*
with very justly. BUNDEL.

It is a most certain rule in reason and moral philosophy, that where there is no choice, there can be no *blame*. SOUTH.

TO FIND OUT, *v.* To *find* (*descry*).

TO FIND OUT, *v.* To *find* (*invent*).

FINE, *v.* *Beautiful*.

FINE, DELICATE, NICE.

It is remarkable of the word FINE (*v. Beautiful*), that it is equally applicable to large and small objects: DELICATE, in Latin *delicatus*, from *deliciæ* delights, and *delicio* to allure, is applied only to small objects. *Fine*, in the natural sense, denotes smallness in general. *Delicate* denotes a degree of *fineness* that is agreeable to the taste. Thread is said to be *fine* as opposed to the coarse and thick; silk is said to be *delicate*, when to *fineness* of texture it adds softness. The texture of a spider's web is remarkable for its *fineness*; that of the ermine's fur is remarkable for its *delicacy*. In writing, all up-strokes must be *fine*; but in superior writing they will be *delicately fine*. When applied to colors, the *fine* is coupled with the grand and the strong; *delicate* with what is minute, soft, and fair: black and red may be *fine* colors; white and pink *delicate* colors. The tulip is reckoned one of the *finest* flowers; the white moss-rose is a *delicate* flower. A *fine* painter delineates with boldness; but the artist who has a *delicate* taste, throws *delicate* touches into the grandest delineations.

In their moral application these terms admit of the same distinction: the *fine* approaches either to the great or to the weak; the *delicate*

Far to prohibit and dispense,
To find out or to make offence,
To set what characters they please,
And mulcts on sin, or godliness,
Must prove a pretty thriving trade. **BUTLER.**

It must be confessed, that as for the laws of men, gratitude is not enjoined by the sanction of penalties. **SOUTH.**

The Earl of Hereford, being tried secundum leges Normannorum, could only be punished by a forfeiture of his inheritance. **TYRANWORTH.**

In the Roman law, if a lord manumits his slave, gross ingratitude in the person so made free forfeits his freedom. **SOUTH.**

FINESSE, *v.* Artifice.

FINICAL, SPRUCE, FOPPISH.

THESE epithets are applied to such as attempt at finery by improper means. The **FINICAL** is insignificantly fine; the **SPRUCE** is laboriously and artfully fine; the **FOPPISH** is fantastically and affectedly fine. The *finical* is said mostly of manners and speech; the *spruce* is said of the dress; the *foppish* of dress and manners.

A *finical* gentleman clips his words and screws his body into as small a compass as possible to give himself the air of a delicate person: a *spruce* gentleman strives not to have a fold wrong in his frill or cravat, nor a hair of his head to lie amiss: a *foppish* gentleman seeks by extravagance in the cut of his clothes, and by the tawdriness in their ornaments, to render himself distinguished for finery. A little mind, full of conceit of itself, will lead a man to be *finical*: a vacant mind that is anxious to be pleasing will not object to the employment of rendering the person *spruce*: a giddy vain mind, eager after applause, impels a man to every kind of *foppery*.

At the top of the building (Blenheim house) are several cupolas and little turrets that have but an ill effect, and make the building look at once *finical* and heavy. **POPE.**

Methinks I see thee *spruce* and fine,
With coat embroider'd richly shine. **SWIFT.**

The learned, full of inward pride,
The *fops* of outward show decide. **GAY.**

TO FINISH, *v.* To close.

TO FINISH, *v.* To compleat.

FINISHED, *v.* Compleat.

FINITE, LIMITED.

FINITE, from *finis* an end, is the

natural property of things; and **LIMITED**, from *limes* a boundary, is the artificial property: the former is opposite only to the *infinite*; but the latter, which lies within the *finite*, is opposed to the *unlimited* or the *infinite*. This world is *finite*, and space *infinite*; the power of a prince is *limited*. It is not in our power to extend the bounds of the *finite*, but the *limited* is mostly under our control. We are *finite* beings, and our capacities are variously *limited* either by nature or circumstances.

Methinks this single consideration of the progress of a *finite* spirit to perfection will be sufficient to extinguish all envy in inferior natures, and all contempt in superior. **ANSON.**

Those complaints which we are apt to make of our *limited* capacity and narrow view, are just as unreasonable as the childish complaints of our not being formed with a microscopic eye. **BLAIR.**

FIRE, HEAT, WARMTH, GLOW.

In the proper sense these words are easily distinguished, but not so easily in the improper sense; and as the latter depends principally upon the former, it is not altogether useless to enter into some explanation of their physical meaning.

FIRE is with regard to **HEAT** as the cause to the effect; it is itself an inherent property in some material bodies, and when in action communicates *heat*: * *fire* is perceptible to us by the eye, as well as the touch; *heat* is perceptible only by the touch; we distinguish *fire* by means of the flame it sends forth, or by the changes which it produces upon other bodies; but we discover *heat* only by the sensations which it produces in ourselves.

Fire has within itself the power of communicating *heat* to other bodies at a distance from it; but *heat*, when it lies in bodies without *fire*, is not communicable or even perceptible, except by coming in contact with the body. *Fire* is producible in some bodies at pleasure, and when in action will communicate itself without any external influence; but *heat* is always to be produced and kept in being by some external agency: *fire* spreads; but *heat* dies away. *Fire* is producible only in certain bodies: *heat* may be produced in many.

* Vide Herbert: "Heat, Power, Warmth." 24.

ed to something else, and not easily torn; that is *solid* which is able to bear, and does not easily give way; that is *stable* which is able to make a stand against resistance, or the effects of time. A pillar which is *firm* on its base, *fixed* to a wall made of *solid* oak, is likely to be *stable*. A man stands *firm* in battle who does not flinch from the attack: he is *fixed* to a spot by the order of his commander. An army of *firm* men form a *solid* mass, and by their heroism may deserve the *stablest* monument that can be erected.

In the moral sense, *firmness* is used only for the purpose, or such actions as depend on the purpose; *fixed* is used either for the mind, or for outward circumstances; *solid* is applicable to things in general, in an absolute sense; *stable* is applicable to things in a relative sense. Decrees are more or less *firm*, according to the source from which they spring; none are *firm*, compared with those which arise from the will of the Almighty: laws are *fixed* in proportion as they are connected with a constitution in which it is difficult to innovate. That which is *solid* is so of its own nature, but does not admit of degrees: a *solid* reason has within itself an independent property, which cannot be increased or diminished. That which is *stable* is so by comparison with that which is of less duration; the characters of some men are more *stable* than those of others, and youth will not have so *stable* a character as manhood.

A friendship is *firm* when it does not depend upon the opinion of others; it is *fixed* when the choice is made and grounded in the mind; it is *solid* when it rests on the only *solid* basis of accordancy in virtue and religion; it is *stable* when it is not liable to decrease or die away with time.

In one *firm* orb the bands were rang'd around,
A cloud of heroes blacken'd all the ground.

Pope.

Unmov'd and silent, the whole war they wait,
Serenely dreadful, and as *fix'd* as fate.

Pope.

But these fantastic errors of our dream
Lead us to *solid* wrong.

Cowley.

The prosperity of no man on earth is *stable*
and assured.

Blair.

FIRM, *v.* Hard.

FIRMNESS, *v.* Constancy.

FIT, *v.* Becoming.

FIT, APT, MEET.

FIT (*v.* Becoming) is either an acquired or a natural property; APT, in Latin *aptus*, from the Greek *επιτε* to correct, is a natural property; MEET, from to meet or measure, signifying measured, is a moral quality. A house is *fit* for the accommodation of the family according to the plan of the builder; the young mind is *apt* to receive either good or bad impressions. *Meet* is a term of rare use, except in spiritual matters or in poetry: it is *meet* to offer our prayers to the supreme disposer of all things.

Nor holy rapture wanted they to praise
Their maker in *fit* strains pronounc'd or sung.

MILTON.

If you hear a wise sentence or an *apt* phrase
commit it to your memory.

SIR HENRY SIDNEY.

My image, not imparted to the brute
Whose fellowship therefore not *meet* for thee,
Good reason was thou freely shouldst dislike.

MILTON.

FIT, *v.* Expedient.

TO FIT, EQUIP, PREPARE, QUALIFY.

To FIT (*v.* Fit, becoming) signifies to adopt means in order to make *fit*, and conveys the general sense of all the other terms; they differ principally in the means and circumstances of *fitting*: to EQUIP is to *fit* out by furnishing the necessary materials: to PREPARE, from the Latin *preparo*, compounded of *præ* and *paro* to get before hand, is to take steps for the purpose of *fitting* in future: to QUALIFY, from the Latin *qualifico*, or *facio* and *qualis* to make it as it should be, is to *fit* or furnish with the moral requisites.

To *fit* is employed for ordinary cases; to *equip* is employed only for expeditions: a house is *fitted* up for the residence of a family; a vessel is *equipped* with every thing requisite for a voyage: to *fit* is for an immediate purpose; to *prepare* is for a remote purpose. A person *fits* himself for taking orders when he is at the university: he *prepares* himself at school before he goes to the university. *fit* is to adopt positive a

inasmuch as that which was wrong is set right.

When things were thus far *adjusted* towards a peace, all other differences were soon *accommodated*.
ADDISON.

FITTED, *v.* *Competent*.

TO FIX, FASTEN, STICK.

FIX, *v.* *To fix, settle*.

FASTEN is to make *fast*.

STICK is to make *stick* (*v.* *Stick*).

Fix is a generic term; *fasten* and *stick* are but modes of *fixing*: we *fix* whatever we make to remain in a given situation; we *fasten* if we *fix* it firmly: we *stick* when we *fix* a thing by means of *sticking*. A post is *fixed* in the ground; it is *fastened* to a wall by a nail; it is *stuck* to another board by means of glue. Shelves are *fixed*: a horse is *fastened* to a gate: bills are *stuck*. What is *fixed* may be removed in various ways: what is *fastened* is removed by main force: what is *stuck* must be separated by contrivance.

On mules and dogs the infection first began,
And last the vengeful arrows *flew* in man.

Pope.

As the bold bound that gives the lion chace,
With beating bosom, and with eager pace,
Hangs on his haunch, or *fastens* on his heels,
Guards as he turns, and circles as he wheels.

Pope.

Some lines more moving than the rest,
Stuck to the point that pierc'd her breast. Swift.

TO FIX, SETTLE, ESTABLISH.

FIX, in Latin *fixi* perfect of *figo*, and in Greek *πρυο*, signifies simply to make to keep its place.

SETTLE, which is a frequentative of *set*, signifies to make to sit or be at rest.

ESTABLISH, from the Latin *stabilis*, signifies to make stable or keep its ground.

Fix is the general and indefinite term: to *settle* and *establish* are to *fix* strongly. *Fix* and *settle* are applied either to material or spiritual objects, *establish* only to moral objects. A post may be *fixed* in the ground in any manner, but it requires time for it to *settle*. A person may either *fix* himself, *settle* himself, or *establish* himself: the first case refers simply to his taking up his abode, or choosing a certain spot; the second refers to his permanency of stay; and the third to the business which he raises or renders permanent.

The same distinction exists between these words in their farther application to the conduct of men. We may *fix* one or many points, important or unimportant, it is a mere act of the will; we *settle* many points of importance; it is an act of deliberation: thus we *fix* the day and hour of doing a thing; we *settle* the affairs of our family: so likewise to *fix* is properly the act of one; to *settle* may be the joint act of many: thus a parent *fixes* on a business for his child, or he *settles* the marriage contract with another parent. To *fix* and *settle* are personal acts, and the objects are mostly of a private nature; but *establish* is an indirect action, and the object mostly of a public nature: thus we *fix* our opinions; we *settle* our minds; or we are instrumental in *establishing* laws, institutions, and the like. It is much to be lamented that any one should remain *unsettled* in his faith; and still more so, that the best form of faith is not universally *established*.

While wavering councils thus his mind engage,
Fluctuates in doubtful thought the Pylian sage,
To join the host or to the gen'ral haste,
Debating long, he *fixes* on the last. Pope.

Warm'd in the brain the brazen weapon lies,
And shades eternal *settle* o'er his eyes. Pope.

I would *establish* but one general rule to be observed in all conversation, which is this, that "men should not talk to please themselves, but those that hear them." Steele.

TO FIX, DETERMINE, SETTLE, LIMIT.

To FIX (*v.* *To fix, settle*) is here the general term; to DETERMINE, *v.* *To decide*; to SETTLE, *v.* *To fix*; to LIMIT, *v.* *To bound*; are here modes of *fixing*. They all denote the acts of conscious agents, but differ in the object and circumstances of the action: we may *fix* any object by any means, and to any point, we may *fix* material objects or spiritual objects, we may either *fix* by means of our senses, or our thoughts; but we can *determine* only by means of our thoughts. To *fix*, in distinction from the rest, is said in regard to a single point or a line; but to *determine* is always said of one or more points, or a whole: we *fix* where a thing shall begin; but we *determine* where it shall begin, and where it shall end,

Fall fifty guards each *flaming* pile attend,
Whose umber'd arms, by fits, thick *flashes* send.
Pope.

Have we not seen round Briton's peopled shore,
Her useful sons exchange'd for useless ore,
Seen all her triumphs but destruction haste,
Like *flaring* tapers brightening as they waste.
Goldsmithe.

Ev'n in the height of noon oppress'd, the sun
Sheds weak and blunt, his wide refracted ray,
Whence *glaring* oft, with many a broaden'd orb
He frights the nations. Thomson.

FLARE, *v.* *Flame.*

FLASH, *v.* *Flame.*

FLAT, LEVEL.

FLAT, in German *flach*, is connected with *platt*, broad, and that with the Latin *latus*, and Greek *πλατος*.

LEVEL, in all probability from the *libella* and *libra* a balance, signifies the evenness of a balance.

Flat is said of a thing with regard to itself; it is opposed to the round or protuberant; *level* as it respects another; it is opposed to the uneven: a country is *flat* which has no elevation; a wall is *level* with the roof of a house when it rises to the height of the roof.

A *flat* can hardly look well on paper.

COUNTESS OF HERTFORD.

At that black hour, which gen'ral horror sheds
On the low *level* of the inglorious throng.

Young.

FLAT, *v.* *Inspid.*

TO FLATTER, *v.* *To adulate.*

FLATTERER, SYCOPHANT, PARASITE.

FLATTERER, *v.* *To adulate.*

SYCOPHANT, in Greek *συκοφαντης*, signified originally an informer on the matter of figs, but has now acquired the meaning of an obsequious and servile person.

PARASITE, in Greek *παρσιτες*, from *παρα* and *σιτος* corn or meat, originally referred to the priests who attended feasts, but it is now applied to a hanger-on at the tables of the great.

The *flatterer* is one who flatters by words; the *sycophant* and *parasite* is therefore always a *flatterer*, and something more, for the *sycophant* adopts every mean artifice by which he can ingratiate himself, and the *parasite* submits to every degradation and servile

compliance by which he can obtain his base purpose. These terms differ more in the object than in the means: the former having general purposes of favor; and the latter particular and still lower purposes to answer. Courtiers may be *sycophants* in order to be well with the prince, and obtain preferment; but they are seldom *parasites*, who are generally poor and in want of support.

Flatterers are the bosom enemies of princes.

South.

By a revolution in the state, the fawning *sycophant* of yesterday is converted into the austere critick of the present hour.

BURKE.

The first of pleasures
Were to be rich myself; but next to this
I hold it best to be a *parasite*,
And feed upon the rich.

CUMBERLAND.

FLAVOR, *v.* *Taste.*

FLAW, *v.* *Blemish.*

FLEETING, *v.* *Temporary.*

FLEETNESS, *v.* *Swiftness.*

FLEXIBLE, PLIABLE, PLIANT, SUPPLE.

FLEXIBLE, in Latin *flexibilis*, from *flecto* to bend, signifies able to be bent.

PLIABLE signifies able to be *plied* or folded: PLIANT signifies literally *plying*, bending, or folding.

SUPPLE, in French *souple*, from the intensive syllable *sub* and *ply*, signifies very *pliable*.

* *Flexible* is used in a natural or moral sense; *pliable* in the familiar and natural sense only; *pliant* in the higher and moral application only: what can be bent in any degree as a stick is *flexible*; what can be bent as wax, or folded like cloth, is *pliable*. *Supple*, whether in a proper or a figurative sense, is an excess of *pliability*; what can be bent backward and forward, like ozier twig, is *supple*.

In the moral application, *flexible* is indefinite both in degree and application; it may be greater or less in point of degree: whereas *pliant* supposes a great degree of *pliability*; and *suppleness*, a great degree of *pliancy* or *pliability*: it applies likewise to the outward actions, to the temper, the resolution, or the pri

* Vide Roubaud: "Flexible, souple, docile."

when a poet *flourishes* he is the ornament of his country, the pride of human nature, the boast of literature: when a city *flourishes* it attains all the ends of civil association; it is advantageous not only to its own members, but to the world at large. No one *thrives* without merit: what is gained by the *thriving* man is gained by those qualities which entitle him to all he has. To *prosper* admits of a different view: one may *prosper* by that which is bad, or *prosper* in that which is bad, or become bad by *prospering*; the attainment of one's ends, be they what they may, constitutes the *prosperity*; a man may *prosper* by means of fraud and injustice; he may *prosper* in the attainment of inordinate wealth or power: and he may become proud, unfeeling, and selfish, by his *prosperity*: so great an enemy has *prosperity* been considered to the virtue of man, that every good man has trembled to be in that condition.

There have been times in which no power has been brought so low as France. Few have ever *flourished* in greater glory. BURKE.

Every *thriving* grazier can think himself but ill dealt with, if within his own country he is not courted. SOUTH.

Betimes inure yourself to examine how your estate *prosper*s. WENTWORTH.

TO FLOW, *To arise.*

TO FLOW, STREAM, GUSH.

FLOW, in Latin *fluo*, and Greek *ελυν* or *φλυς*, to be in a ferment, is in all probability connected with *flu*, which signifies literally to *flow*.

STREAM, in German *stroemen*, from *riemen* a thong, signifies to run in a line.

GUSH comes from the German *giessen*, &c. to pour out with force.

Flow is here the generic term; the two others are specific terms expressing different modes: water may *flow* either in a large body or in a long but narrow course; they *stream* in a long narrow course only: thus, waters *flow* in seas, rivers, rivulets, or in a small pond; they *stream* only out of spouts, or small channels: they *flow* gently or otherwise; they *stream* gently; but they *gush* with a force: thus, the blood *flows* from a wound which comes from it in any manner; it *streams* from a

wound when it runs as it were in a channel; it *gushes* from a wound when it runs with impetuosity, and in as large quantities as the cavity admits.

Down his wan cheek a briny torrent *flows*. POPE.
Fire *stream* in lightning from his sanguine eyes. POPE.

Sunk in his sad companions' arms he lay,
And in short pantings sobb'd his soul away
(Like some vile worm extended on the ground),
While life's torrent *gush'd* from out the wound. POPE.

FLUCTUATE, WAVER.

FLUCTUATE, in Latin *fluctuo*, from *fluctus* a wave, signifies to rise in waves.

To WAVER is a frequentative of to *wave*, which is formed from the substantive *wave*, signifying to move like a *wave*.

To *fluctuate* conveys the idea of strong agitation; to *waver*, that of constant motion backward and forward: when applied in the moral sense, to *fluctuate* designates the action of the spirits or the opinions; to *waver* is said only of the will or opinions: he who is alternately merry and sad in quick succession is said to be *fluctuating*; or he who has many opinions in quick succession is said to *fluctuate*; but he who cannot form an opinion, or come to a resolution, is said to *waver*.

Fluctuations and *waverings* are both opposed to a manly character: but the former evinces the uncontrolled influence of the passions, the total want of that equanimity which characterizes the Christian; the latter denotes the want of fixed principle, or the necessary decision of character: we can never have occasion to *fluctuate*, if we never raise our hopes and wishes beyond what is attainable; we can never have occasion to *waver*, if we know and feel what is right, and resolve never to swerve from it.

The tempter, but with show of zeal and love
To man, and indignation at his wrong,
New part puts on, and as to passion mov'd
Fluctuates disturb'd. MILTON.

Let a man, without trepidation or *wavering*,
proceed in discharging his duty. BLAIR.

FLUID, LIQUID.

THE FLUID, from *fluo* to *flow*, signifies that which from its nature *flows*;

likewise the huntsmen and hunters *follow* the dogs in the chase; the dogs *pursue* the hare. In application to things, *follow* is taken more in the passive, and *pursue* more in the active sense: a man *follows* the plan of another, and *pursues* his own plan; he *follows* his inclinations, and *pursues* an object.

"Now, now," said he, "my son, no more delay, I yield, I *follow* where Heav'n shows the way."

DRYDEN.

Still close they *follow*, close the rear engage,
Æneas storms, and Hector foams with rage.

POPE.

The same Rutilians who with arms *pursue*
The Trojan race are equal foes to you.

DRYDEN.

The felicity is when any one is so happy as to find out and *follow* what is the proper bent of his genius.

STEELE.

Look round the habitual world, how few
Know their own good, or knowing it *pursue*.

DRYDEN.

TO FOLLOW, IMITATE.

FOLLOW, *v.* To *follow*, succeed.

IMITATE, in Latin *imitatus* participle of *imito*, from the Greek *μιμνησκειν* to mimic and *μιμος* alike, signifies to do or make alike.

Both these terms denote the regulating our actions by something that offers itself to us, or is set before us; but we *follow* that which is either internal or external; we *imitate* that only which is external: we either *follow* the dictates of our own minds or the suggestions of others; but we *imitate* the conduct of others: in regard to external objects we *follow* either a rule or an example; but we *imitate* an example only: we *follow* the footsteps of our forefathers; we *imitate* their virtues and their perfections: it is adviseable for young persons, as closely as possible to *follow* the good example of those who are older and wiser than themselves; it is the bounden duty of every Christian to *imitate* the example of our blessed Saviour to the utmost of his power.

To *follow* and *imitate* may both be applied to that which is good or bad: the former to all the actions; but the latter only to the behaviour or the external manners: we may *follow* a person in his career of virtue or vice; we *imitate* his gestures, tone of voice, and the like. Parents should be

guarded in all their words and actions; for whatever may be their example, whether virtuous or vicious, it will in all probability be *followed* by their children: those who have the charge of young people should be particularly careful to avoid all bad habits of gesture, voice, or speech; as there is a much greater propensity to *imitate* what is ridiculous than what is becoming.

And I with the same greediness did seek,
As water when I thirst, to swallow Greek;
Which I did only learn that I might know
Those great examples which I *follow* now.

DEKHAM.

The *imitators* of Milton seem to place all the excellency of that sort of writing in the use of uncouth or antique words.

JOHNSON.

FOLLOWER, ADHERENT, PARTISAN.

A FOLLOWER is one who *follows* a person generally; an ADHERENT is one who *adheres* to his cause; a PARTISAN is the follower of a party: the *follower* follows either the person, the interests, or the principles of any one; thus the retinue of a nobleman, or the friends of a statesman, or the friends of any man's opinions, may be styled his *followers*; but the *adherent* is that kind of *follower* who espouses the interests of another, as the *adherents* of Charles I.: a *follower* follows near or at a distance; but the *adherent* is always near at hand; the *partisan* hangs on or keeps at a certain distance: the *follower* follows from various motives; the *adherent* adheres from a personal motive; the *partisan* from a partial motive: Charles I. had as many *adherents* as he had *followers*; the rebels had as many *partisans* as they had *adherents*.

The mournful *followers*, with assistant care,
The groaning hero to his chariot bear.

POPE.

The religion in which Pope lived and died was that of the church of Rome, to which in his correspondence with Racine he professes himself a sincere *adherent*.

JOHNSON.

With Addison, the wits, his *adherents* and *followers*, were certain to concur.

JOHNSON.

They (the Jacobins) then proceed in argument as if all those who disapprove of their new abuses must of course be *partisans* of the old.

BURKE.

FOLLY, FOOLERY.

FOLLY is the abstract of foolish and characterizes the thing; FOOL

Idiots are still in request in most of the courts of Germany, where there is not a prince of any great magnificence who has not two or three dressed, distinguished, undisputed *fools* in his retinue. ADDISON.

Homer has described a Vulcan that is a *buffoon* among his gods, and a Thersites among his mortals. ADDISON.

FOOLERY, *v. Folly.*

FOOLHARDY, ADVENTUROUS,
RASH.

FOOLHARDY signifies having the hardihood of a *fool*.

ADVENTUROUS signifies ready to *venture*.

RASH, in German *rasch*, which signifies swift, comes from the Arabic *rauschen* to go swiftly.

The *foolhardy* expresses more than the *adventurous*; and the *adventurous* than the *rash*.

The *foolhardy* man *ventures* in defiance of consequences: the *adventurous* man *ventures* from a love of the arduous and the bold; the *rash* man *ventures* for want of thought: courage and boldness become *foolhardihood* when they lead a person to run a fruitless risk; an *adventurous* spirit sometimes leads a man into unnecessary difficulties; but it is a necessary accompaniment of greatness. There is not so much design, but there is more violence and impetuosity in *rashness* than in *foolhardihood*: the former is the consequence of an ardent temper which will admit of correction by the influence of the judgement; but the latter comprehends the perversion of both the will and the judgement.

An infidel is *foolhardy*, who risks his future salvation for the mere gratification of his pride; Alexander was an *adventurous* prince, who delighted in enterprizes in proportion as they presented difficulties; he was likewise a *rash* prince, as was evinced by his jumping into the river Cydnus while he was hot, and by his leaping over the wall of Oxdracæ and exposing himself singly to the attack of the enemy.

If any yet be so *foolhardy*,
T' expose themselves to vain jeopardy,
If they come wounded off and lame,
No honour's got by such a maim. BUTLER.

* Vile Truism: "To forbid, prohibit."

2 L.

'Twas an old way of recreating,
Which learned butchers called bearbaiting,
A bold *advent'rous* exercise. BUTLER.

Why wilt thou, then, renew the vain pursuit,
And rashly catch at the forbidden fruit? PARSON.

FOOLISH, *v. Irrational.*

FOOLISH, *v. Simple.*

FOOTSTEP, *v. Mark.*

FOPPISH, *v. Finical.*

TO FORBEAR, *v. To abstain.*

TO FORBID, PROHIBIT, INTERDICT.

THE *for* in FORBID, from the German *ver*, is negative, signifying to bid not to do.

The *pro* in PROHIBIT, and *inter* in INTERDICT, have both a similarly negative sense: the former verb, from *habeo* to have, signifies to have or hold that a thing shall not be done, to restrain from doing; the latter, from *dico* to say, signifies to say that a thing shall not be done.

Forbid is the ordinary term; *prohibit* is the judicial term; *interdict* the moral term.

To *forbid* is a direct and personal act; to *prohibit* is an indirect action that operates by means of extended influence: both imply the exercise of power or authority of an individual; but the former is more applicable to the power of an individual, and the latter to the authority of government. A parent *forbids* his child marrying when he thinks proper; the government *prohibits* the use of spirituous liquors. *Interdict* is a species of *forbidding* applied to more serious concerns; we may be *interdicted* the use of wine by a physician.

A thing is *forbidden* by a word; it is *prohibited* by a law: hence that which is immoral is *forbidden* by the express word of God; that which is illegal is *prohibited* by the laws of man. We are *forbidden* in the Scripture from even indulging a thought of committing evil; it is the policy of every government to *prohibit* the importation and exportation of such commodities as are likely to affect the internal trade of the country.* To *forbid* or *interdict* are opposed command; to *prohibit*, to allow.

the *ancestors* of a nation as well as of any particular person.

We passed slightly over three or four of our immediate *forefathers* whom we knew by tradition. ADDISON.

Each in his narrow cell for ever laid,
The rude *forefathers* of the hamlet sleep. GRAY.

Suppose a gentleman, full of his illustrious family, should see the whole line of his *progenitors* pass in review before him; with how many varying passions would he behold shepherds, soldiers, princes, and beggars, walk in the procession of five thousand years? ADDISON.

O majestic night!
Nature's great *ancestor*! YOUNG.

It is highly laudable to pay respect to men who are descended from worthy *ancestors*. ADDISON.

TO FOREGO, *v.* To give up.

FORGOING, *v.* Antecedent.

FOREIGN, *v.* Extraneous.

FOREIGNER, *v.* Stranger.

FORERUNNER, PRECURSOR,
MESSENGER, HARBINGER.

FORERUNNER and PRECURSOR signify literally the same thing, namely, one *running before*; but the *forerunner* is properly applied only to one who runs before to any spot to communicate intelligence; and it is figuratively applied to things which in their nature, or from a natural connection, precede others; *precursor* is only employed in this figurative sense: thus imprudent speculations are said to be the *forerunners* of a man's ruin; the ferment which took place in men's minds was the *precursor* of the revolution.

MESSENGER signifies literally one bearing *messages*: and HARBINGER, from the Teutonic *her-binger*, signifies a provider of a *herberge* or *inn* for princes.

Both the terms are employed for persons: but the *messenger* states what has been or is; the *harbinger* announces what is to be. Our Saviour was the *messenger* of glad tidings to all mankind; the prophets were the *harbingers* of the Messiah. A *messenger* may be employed on different offices; a *harbinger* is a *messenger* who acts in a specific office. The angels are represented as *messengers* on different occasions. John the Baptist was the *harbinger* of our Sa-

viour, who prepared the way of the Lord.

Loss of sight is the misery of life, and usually the *forerunner* of death. SOUTH.

Gospeller was a name of contempt given by the papists to the Lollards, the puritans of early times, and the *precursors* of protestantism.

JOHNSON.

His words are bonds, his oaths are oracles,
His tears pure *messengers* sent from his heart. SHAKESPEARE.

Sin, and her shadow death; and misery,
Death's *harbinger*. MILTON.

FORESIGHT, FORECAST, PREMEDITATION.

FORESIGHT, from seeing before, denotes the simple act of the mind in seeing a thing before it happens: FORECAST, from casting the thoughts onward, signifies coming at the knowledge of a thing beforehand by means of calculation: PREMEDITATION, from *meditate*, signifies obtaining the same knowledge by force of meditating, or reflecting deeply. *Foresight* is the general and indefinite term; we employ it either on ordinary or extraordinary occasions; *forecast* and *premeditation* mostly in the latter case: all business requires *foresight*; state concerns require *forecast*: *foresight* and *forecast* respect what is to happen; they are the operations of the mind in calculating futurity: *premeditation* respects what is to be said or done; it is a preparation of the thoughts and designs for action: by *foresight* and *forecast* we guard against evils and provide for contingencies; by *premeditation* we guard against errors of conduct. A man betrays his want of *foresight* who does not provide against losses in trade; he shows his want of *forecast* who does not provide against old age; he shows his want of *premeditation* who acts or speaks on the impulse of the moment; the man therefore who does a wicked act without *premeditation* lessens his guilt.

The wary crane *foresees* it first, and sails
Above the storm, and leaves the lowly vales. DAYDEN.

Let him *forecast* his work with timely care,
Which else is huddled, when the skies are fair. DAYDEN.

The tongue may fall and falter in *im-*
extemporal expressions, but the pen is
greater advantage of *premeditation* is
subject to error.

justice in demanding retribution. *Forgive* is the familiar term; *pardon* is adapted to the serious style. Individuals *forgive* each other personal offences; they *pardon* offences against law and morals: the former is an act of Christian charity; the latter an act of clemency: the former is an act that is confined to no condition; the latter is peculiarly the act of a superior. He who has the right of being offended has an opportunity of *forgiving* the offender; he who has the authority of punishing the offence may *pardon*. Next to the principle of not taking offence easily, that of *forgiving* real injuries should be instilled into the infant mind: it is the happy prerogative of the monarch that he can extend his *pardon* to all criminals, except to those whose crimes have rendered them unworthy to live: they may be both used in relation to our Maker, but with a similar distinction in sense. God *forgives* the sins of his creatures as a father pitying his children; he *pardons* their sins as a judge extending mercy to criminals, as far as is consistent with justice.

* *Pardon*, when compared with REMISSION, is the consequence of offence; it respects principally the person offending; it depends upon him who is offended; it produces reconciliation when it is sincerely granted and sincerely demanded. *Remission* is the consequence of the crime; it has more particular regard to the punishment; it is granted either by the prince or magistrates; it arrests the execution of justice. *Remission*, like *pardon*, is peculiarly applicable to the sinner with regard to his Maker. ABSOLUTION is taken in no other sense: it is the consequence of the fault or the sin, and properly concerns the state of the culprit; it properly loosens him from the tie with which he is bound; it is pronounced either by the civil judge or the ecclesiastical minister; it re-establishes the accused or the penitent in the rights of innocence.

The *pardon* of sin obliterates that which is past, and restores the sinner to the Divine favor; it is promised throughout Scripture to all men on the

condition of faith and repentance: *remission* of sin only averts the Divine vengeance, which otherwise would fall upon those who are guilty of it; it is granted peculiarly to Christians upon the ground of Christ's expiatory sacrifice, which satisfies Divine justice for all offences: *absolution* of sin is the work of God's grace on the heart; it acts for the future as well as the past, by lessening the dominion of sin, and making those free who were before in bondage. The Roman Catholics look upon *absolution* as the immediate act of the Pope, by virtue of his sacred relationship to Christ; but the Protestants look to Christ only as the dispenser of this blessing to men, and his ministers simply as messengers to declare the divine will to men.

No more Achilles draws
His conqu'ring sword in any woman's cause.
The gods command me to *forgive* the past,
But let this first invasion be the last. PORN.

A being who has nothing to *pardon* in himself may reward every man according to his works; but he whose very best actions must be seen with a grain of allowance, cannot be too mild, moderate, and *forgiving*. ANDREW.

Round in his urn the bleeded balls he rolls,
Absolves the just, and dooms the guilty souls. DAYDEN.

The soft Neapman race will soon repent
Their anger, and *remitt* the punishment. DAYDEN.

FORLORN, v. Forsaken.

FORM, FIGURE, CONFORMATION.

FORM, in French *forme*, Latin *forma*, most probably from *φορμα* and *φορμα* to bear, signifies properly the image borne or stamped.

FIGURE (v. *Figure*) signifies the image feigned or conceived.

CONFORMATION, in French *conformation*, in Latin *conformatio*, from *conform*, signifies the image disposed or put together.

† *Form* is the generic term; *figure* and *conformation* are special terms. The *form* is the work either of nature or art; it results from the arrangement of the parts: the *figure* is the work of design; it includes the general contour or outline: the *conformation* includes such a disposition of the parts of a body as is adapted for per-

* Vide Abbé Girard: "Absolution, pardon, remission."

† Vide Girard: "Figures, figure, forme, conformation."

action, or to characterize things. Things may be *formed* either by persons or things; they are *composed* and *constituted* only by conscious agents: thus persons *form* things, or things *form* one another: thus we *form* a circle, or the reflection of the light after rain *forms* a rainbow. Persons *compose* and *constitute*: thus a musician *composes* a piece of music, or men *constitute* laws. *Form* in regard to persons is the act of the will and determination; *compose* is a work of the intellect; *constitute* is an act of power. We *form* a party, we *form* a plan; we *compose* a book; men *constitute* governments, offices, &c.

When employed to characterize things, *form* signifies simply to have a *form*, be it a simple or a complex *form*: *compose* and *constitute* are said only of those things which have complex *forms*; the former as respecting the material, the latter the essential parts of an object: thus we may say that an object *forms* a circle, or a semicircle, or the segment of a circle: a society is *composed* of individuals; but law and order *constitute* the essence of society: so letters and syllables *compose* a word; but sense is essential to *constitute* a word.

All animals of the same kind which *form* a society are more knowing than others. ARISTOTEL.

Nor did Israel 'scape
Th' infection, when their borrow'd gold com-
posed
The calf in Oriel. MILTON.

To receive and to communicate assistance
constitutes the happiness of human life.

JOHNSON.

FORM, CEREMONY, RITE, OBSERVANCE.

FORM, *v.* *Form*, *figure*.

CEREMONY, in Latin *ceremonia*, is supposed to signify the rites of Ceres.

RITE, in Latin *ritus*, is probably changed from *ratus*, signifying a custom that is esteemed.

OBSERVANCE signifies the thing observed.

All these terms are employed with regard to particular modes of action in civil society. *Form* is here, as in the preceding sections, the most general in its sense and application; *ceremony*, *rite*, and *observance*, are

particular kinds of *form*, suited to particular occasions. *Form*, in its distinct application, respects all modes of acting and speaking, that is adopted by society at large, in every transaction of life; *ceremony* respects those *forms* of outward behaviour which are made the expressions of respect and deference; *rite* and *observance* are applied to national *ceremonies* in matters of religion. A certain *form* is requisite for the sake of order, method, and decorum, in every social matter, whether in affairs of state, in a court of law, in a place of worship, or in the private intercourse of friends. So long as distinctions are admitted in society, and men are agreed to express their sentiments of regard and respect to each other; it will be necessary to preserve the *ceremonies* of politeness which have been established. Every country has adopted certain *rites* founded upon its peculiar religious faith, and prescribed certain *observances* by which individuals could make a public profession of their faith. Administering oaths by the magistrate is a necessary *form* in law; kissing the king's hand is a *ceremony* practised at court; baptism is one *rite* of initiation into the Christian church, and confirmation another; prayer, reading the Scriptures, and preaching, are different religious *observances*.

As the *ceremony*, the *rite*, and the *observance*, respect religion, the first may be said either of an individual or a community; the second is said only of a community; the *observance*, more properly of the individual either in public or private. The *ceremony* of kneeling during the time of prayer is the most becoming posture for a suppliant, whether in public or private. The discipline of a Christian church consists in its *rites*, to which every member, either as a layman or a priest, is obliged to conform. Public worship is an *observance* which a Christian thinks himself at liberty to neglect.

It betrays either gross ignorance or wilful impertinence; in the man who sets at nought any of the established *forms* of society. When *ceremonies* are too numerous, they detract from the ease of social intercourse.

absence of *ceremony* destroys all decency. In public worship the excess of *ceremony* is apt to extinguish the warmth and spirit of devotion; but the want of *ceremony* deprives it of all solemnity.

You may discover tribes of men without policy, or laws, or cities, or any of the arts of life; but no where will you find them without some *form* of religion. BLAIR.

And what have kings that privates have not too,
Save *ceremony*? SHAKESPEARE.

Live thou to mourn thy love's unhappy fate,
To bear my mangled body from the foe,
Or buy it back, and fun'ral rites bestow. DRYDEN.

Incorporated minds will always feel some inclination towards exterior acts and ritual observances. JOHNSON.

TO FORM, *v.* To make.

FORMAL, CEREMONIOUS.

FORMAL and CEREMONIOUS, from *form* and *ceremony* (*v.* *Form*, *ceremony*), are either taken in an indifferent sense with respect to what contains *form* and *ceremony*, or in a bad sense, as expressing the excess of *form* and *ceremony*. A person expects to have a *formal* dismissal before he considers himself as dismissed; people of fashion pay each other *ceremonious* visits, by way of keeping up a distant intercourse. Whatever communications are made from one government to another must be made in a *formal* manner. It is the business of the church to regulate the *ceremonious* part of religion.

Formal, in the bad sense, is opposed to easy: *ceremonious* to the cordial. A *formal* carriage prevents a person from indulging himself in the innocent familiarities of friendly intercourse; a *ceremonious* carriage puts a stop to all hospitality and kindness. Princes, in their *formal* intercourse with each other, know nothing of the pleasures of society; *ceremonious* visitants give and receive entertainments, without tasting any of the enjoyments which flow from the reciprocity of kind offices.

I have not thought fit to return them any *formal* answer. ADDISON.

From the moment one sets up for an author, one must be treated as *ceremoniously*, that is, as unfaithfully, "as a king's favourite, or as a log." POPE.

FORMER, *v.* Antecedent.

FORMERLY, IN TIMES PAST,
OR OLD TIMES, DAYS OF YORE,
ANCIENTLY, OR ANCIENT
TIMES.

FORMERLY supposes a less remote period than IN TIMES PAST; and that less remote than IN DAYS OF YORE and ANCIENTLY. The two first may be said of what happens within the age of man; the last two are extended to many generations and ages. Any individual may use the word *formerly* with regard to himself: thus we enjoyed our health better *formerly* than now. An old man may speak of *times past*, as when he says he does not enjoy himself as he did in *times past*. OLD TIMES, *days of yore*, and *anciently*, are more applicable to nations than to individuals; and all these express different degrees of remoteness. As to our present period, the age of Queen Elizabeth may be called *old times*; the days of Alfred, and still later, the *days of yore*: the earliest period in which Britain is mentioned to be ANCIENT TIMES.

Men were *formerly* disputed out of their doubts. ADDISON.

In *times of old*, when time was young,
And poets their own verses sung,
A verse could draw a stone or beam. SWIFT.

Thus Edgar proud, in *days of yore*,
Held monarchs labouring at the oar. SWIFT.

In *ancient times* the sacred plough employ'd
The kings and awful fathess of mankind. THOMSON.

FORMIDABLE, DREADFUL,
TERRIBLE, SHOCKING.

FORMIDABLE is applied to that which is apt to excite fear (*v.* *To apprehend*); DREADFUL (*v.* *To apprehend*) is applied to what is calculated to excite dread; TERRIBLE (*v.* *Alarm*) is applied to that which excites terror; SHOCKING, from *shake*, is applied to that which violently shakes or agitates (*v.* *To agitate*). The *formidable* acts neither suddenly nor violently; the *dreadful* may act violently, but not suddenly: thus the appearance of an army may be *formidable*; that of a field of battle is *dreadful*. The *terrible* and *shock-*

ing act both suddenly and violently; but the former acts both on the senses and the imagination, the latter on the moral feelings: thus the glare of a tyger's eye is *terrible*; the unexpected news of a friend's death is *shocking*.

France continued not only powerful but *formidable* to the hour of the ruin of the monarchy.
BOSSU.

Think, timely think, on the last *dreadful* day.
DRYDEN.

When men are arrived at thinking of their very dissipation with pleasure, how few things are there that can be *terrible* to them. STERNE.

Nothing could be more *shocking* to a generous nobility, than the entrusting to mercenary hands the defence of those territories which had been acquired or preserved by the blood of their ancestors.
ROBERTSON.

TO FORSAKE, v. To abandon.

FORSAKEN, FORLORN, DESTITUTE.

To be **FORSAKEN** (*v. To abandon*) is to be deprived of the company and assistance of others; to be **FORLORN**, from the German *verlohren* lost, is to be *forsaken* in time of difficulty, to be without a guide in an unknown road; to be **DESTITUTE**, from the Latin *destitutus*, is to be deprived of the first necessities of life.

To be *forsaken* is a partial situation; to be *forlorn* and *destitute* is a permanent condition. We may be *forsaken* by a fellow traveller on the road; we are *forlorn* when we get into a deserted path, with no one to direct us; we are *destitute* when we have no means of subsistence, nor the prospect of obtaining the means. It is particularly painful to be *forsaken* by the friend of our youth, and the sharer of our fortunes; the orphan, who is left to travel the road of life without counsellor or friend, is of all others in the most *forlorn* condition; if to this be added poverty, his misery is aggravated by becoming *destitute*.

But fearful for themselves, my countrymen
Left me *forsaken* in the Cyclops' den. DRYDEN.

Conscience made them (Joseph's brethren) recollect, that they who had once been deaf to the supplications of a brother were now left friendless and *forlorn*. BLAKE.

Friendless and *destitute*; Dr. Goldsmith was exposed to all the miseries of indigence in a foreign country. JOHNSON.

TO FORSWEAR, PERJURE, SUBORN.

FORSWEAR is Saxon; **PERJURE** is Latin; the preposition *for* and *per* are both privative, and the words signify literally to swear contrary to the truth; this is, however, not their only distinction: to *forswear* is applied to all kinds of oaths; to *perjure* is employed only for such oaths as have been administered by the civil magistrate.

A soldier *forswears* himself who breaks his oath of allegiance by desertion; and a subject *forswears* himself who takes an oath of allegiance to his Majesty which he afterwards violates: a man *perjures* himself in a court of law who swears to the truth of that which he knows to be false. *Forswear* is used only in the proper sense: *perjure* may be used figuratively with regard to lover's vows; he who deserts his mistress to whom he has pledged his affection is a *perjured* man.

Forswear and *perjure* are the acts of individuals; **SUBORN**, from the Latin *subornare*, signifies to make to *forswear*: a *perjured* man has all the guilt upon himself; but he who is *suborned* shares his guilt with the *suborner*.

False as thou art, and more than false, *forsworn*!

Not sprung from noble blood, nor goddess-born;
Why should I owe? what wrong have I to fear?

DANIEL.

Be gone, for ever leave this happy sphere;
For *perjur'd* lovers have no mansions here. LEE.

They were *suborn'd*;
Malcolm, and Donalbain, the king's two sons,
Are slain away and laid. SHAKESPEARE.

TO FORTIFY, v. To strengthen.

FORTITUDE, v. Courage.

FORTUNATE, LUCKY, PROSPEROUS, SUCCESSFUL.

FORTUNATE signifies having *fortune* (*v. Chance, fortune*).

LUCKY signifies having *luck*, which is in German *gluck*, and in all probability comes from *gelingen* or *lingen*, to succeed.

PROSPEROUS, v. To flourish
SUCCESSFUL signifies full of success, enabled to succeed.

The *fortunate* and *lucky* are both

pleasure; as when one *indulges* an affection, by making the will and the outward conduct bend to its gratifications.

He who *fosters* pride in his breast lays up for himself a store of mortification in his intercourse with the world; it is the duty of a man to *cherish* sentiments of tenderness and kindness towards the woman whom he has made the object of his choice; nothing evinces the innate depravity of the human heart more forcibly than the spirit of malice, which some men *harbour* for years together; any affection of the mind, if *indulged* beyond the bounds of discretion, will become a hurtful passion, that may endanger the peace of society as much as that of the individual.

The greater part of those who live but to infuse malignity, and multiply enemies, have no hopes to *foster*, no designs to promote, nor any expectations of attaining power by insolence.

JOHNSON.

As social inclinations are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and interest of every individual to *cherish* and improve them to the benefit of mankind.

BERKELEY.

This is scorn,
Which the fair soul of gentle Athenais
Would ne'er have *harbour'd*.
LXX.

The king (Charles I.) would *indulge* no refinements of casuistry, however plausible, in such delicate subjects, and was resolved, that what depredations *never* fortune should commit upon him, she never should bereave him of his honour.

HUME.

FOUL, *v.* Nasty.

TO FOUND, GROUND, REST,
BUILD.

FOUND, in French *fonder*, Latin *fundo*, comes from *fundus* the *ground*, and, like the verb GROUND, properly signifies to make firm in the *ground*, to make the *ground* the support.

To *found* implies the exercise of art and contrivance in making a support; to *ground* signifies to lay so deep that it may not totter; it is merely in the moral sense that they are here considered, as the verb to *ground* with this signification is never used otherwise. *Found* is applied to outward circumstances; *ground* to what passes inwardly: a man *founds* his charge against another upon cer-

tain facts that are come to his knowledge; he *grounds* his belief upon the most substantial evidence: a man should be cautious ~~not~~ to make any accusations which are not well *found-ed*; nor to indulge any expectations which are not well *grounded*: monarchs commonly *found* their claims to a throne upon the right of primogeniture; Christians *ground* their hopes of immortality on the word of God.

To *found* and *ground* are said of things which demand the full exercise of the mental powers; to REST is an action of less importance: whatever is *founded* requires and has the utmost support; whatever is *rested* is more by the will of the individual: a man *founds* his reasoning upon some unequivocal fact; he *rests* his assertion upon mere hearsay. To *found*, *ground*, and *rest*, have always an immediate reference to the thing that supports; to BUILD has an especial reference to that which is supported, to the superstructure that is raised: we should not say that a person *founds* an hypothesis, without adding something, as observations, experiments, and the like, upon which it was *found-ed*; but we may speak of his simply *building* systems, supposing them to be the mere fruit of his distempered imagination; or we may say that a system of astronomy has been *built* upon the discovery of Copernicus respecting the motion of the earth.

The only sure principles we can lay down for regulating our conduct must be *founded* on the Christian religion.

BLAIR.

I know there are persons who look upon these wonders of art (in ancient history) as fabulous; but I cannot find any *ground* for such a suspicion.

ADDISON.

Our distinction must *rest* upon a steady adherence to rational religion, when the multitude are deviating into licentious and criminal conduct.

BLAIR.

They who from a mistaken zeal for the honour of Divine revelation, either deny the existence, or vilify the authority of natural religion, are not aware, that by disallowing the sense of obligation, they undermine the foundation on which revelation *builds* its power of commanding the heart.

BLAIR.

TO FOUND, *v.* To institute.

FOUNDATION, GROUND, BASIS.
FOUNDATION and GROUND

fication. *Temper*, which is applicable only to the mind, is taken in the general or particular state of the individual. The *frame* comprehends either the whole body of mental powers, or the particular disposition of those powers in individuals; the *temper* comprehends the general or particular state of feeling as well as thinking in the individual. The mental *frame* which receives any violent concussion is liable to derangement; it is necessary for those who govern to be well acquainted with the *temper* of those whom they govern. By reflection on the various attributes of the Divine Being, a man may easily bring his mind into a *frame* of devotion: by the indulgence of a fretful repining *temper*, a man destroys his own peace of mind, and offends his Maker.

Temperament and *constitution* mark the general state of the individual; the former comprehends a mixture of the physical and mental; the latter has a purely physical application. A man with a warm *temperament* owes his warmth of character to the rapid impetus of the blood; a man with a delicate *constitution* is exposed to great fluctuations in his health; the whole *frame* of a new-born infant is peculiarly tender. Men of fierce *tempers* are to be found in all nations; men of sanguine *tempers* are more frequent in warm climates; the *constitutions* of females are more tender than those of the male, and their *frames* are altogether more susceptible.

The soul
Contemplates what she is, and whence she came,
And almost comprehends her own amazing
frame.

JENYNS.

'Tis he
Sets superstition high on virtue's throne,
Then thinks his Maker's *temper* like his own.

JENYNS.

There is a great tendency to cheerfulness in religion; and such a *frame* of mind is not only the most lovely, but the most commendable in a virtuous person.

ANDERSON.

The sole strength of the sound from the shouting of multitudes so amazes and confounds the imagination, that the best established *tempers* can scarcely forbear being borne down.

BURKE.

I have always more need of a laugh than a cry, being somewhat disposed to melancholy by my *temperament*.

COWPER.

How little our *constitution* is able to bear a

remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in! LOCKE.

TO FRAME, *v.* *To invent.*

FRANK, CANDID, INGENUOUS,
FREE, OPEN, PLAIN.

FRANK, in French *franc*, German, &c. *frank*, is connected with the word *frech* bold, and *frei* free.

CANDID, *v.* *Candid.*

INGENUOUS comes from the Latin *ingenuus*, which signifies literally free-born, as distinguished from the *liberti* who were afterwards made *free*: hence the term has been employed by a figure of speech to denote nobleness of birth or character. According to Girard, *ingenu* in French is taken in a bad sense; and Dr. Trussler, in translating his article *sincérité*, *franchise*, *naïveté*, *ingénuité*, has erroneously assigned the same office to our word *ingenuous*; but this, however, in its use has kept true to the original, by being always an epithet of commendation.

FREE is to be found in most of the northern languages under different forms, and is supposed by Adelung to be connected with the preposition *from*, which denotes a separation or enlargement.

OPEN, *v.* *Candid.*

PLAIN, *v.* *Apparent*, also *evident*.

All these terms convey the idea of a readiness to communicate and be communicated with; they are all opposed to concealment, but under different circumstances. The *frank* man is under no constraint; his thoughts and feelings are both set at ease, and his lips are ever ready to give utterance to the dictates of his heart; he has no reserve: the *candid* man has nothing to conceal; he speaks without regard to self-interest or any partial motive; he speaks nothing but the truth: the *ingenuous* man throws off all disguise; he scorns all artifice, and brings every thing to light; he speaks the whole truth. *Frankness* is acceptable in the general transactions of society; it inspires confidence, and invites communication: *candor* is of peculiar use in matters of dispute; it serves the purposes of equity, and invites to conciliation: *ingenuousness*

sees in imminent danger. A *free* speaker is in danger of being hated; a *plain* dealer must at least be respected.

My own private opinion with regard to such recreations (as poetry and music) I have given with all the *frankness* imaginable. STEELE.

If you have made any better remarks of your own, communicate them with *candour*; if not make use of those I present you with. ADDISON.

We see an *ingenuous* kind of behaviour not only make up for faults committed, but in a manner expiate them in the very commission. STEELE.

We cheer the youth to make his own defence,
And *freely* tell us what he was and whence. DRYDEN.

If I have abused your goodness by too much *freedom*, I hope you will attribute it to the *openness* of my temper. POPE.

Pope hardly drank tea without a stratagem: if at the house of his friends he wanted any accommodation, he was not willing to ask for it in *plain* terms, but would mention it remotely as something convenient. JOHNSON.

FRAUD, *v. Deceit.*

FRAUDULENT, *v. Fallacious.*

FREAK, WHIM.

FREAK most probably comes from the German *frech*, bold and petulant. WHIM from Teutonic *wimmem* to whine or whimper: but they have at present somewhat deviated from their original meaning; for a *freak* has more of childishness and humour than boldness in it, a *whim* has more of eccentricity than childishness in it. Fancy and fortune are both said to have their *freaks*, as they both deviate most widely in their movements from all rule; but *whims* are at most but singular deviations of the mind from its ordinary and even course. Females are most liable to be seized with *freaks*, which are in their nature sudden and not to be calculated upon: men are apt to indulge themselves in *whims* which are in their nature strange and often laughable. We should call it a *freak* for a female to put on the habit of a male, and so accoutred to sally forth into the streets: we term it a *whim* in a man who takes a resolution never to shave himself any more.

But the long pomp, the midnight masquerade,
With all the *freaks* of wanton wealth array'd,
In these ere trifles half their wish obtain,
The toiling pleasure sickens into pain. GOLDENITZ.

'Tis all bequeath'd to public uses,
To public uses! There's a *whim*!
What had the public done for him? SWIFT.

FREE, *v. Communicative.*

FREE, *v. Frank.*

FREE, LIBERAL.

IN the former section (*v. Frank*) FREE is only considered as it respects communication by words, in the present case it respects actions and sentiments. In all its acceptations *free* is a term of dispraise, and LIBERAL that of commendation. To be *free* signifies to act or think at will; to be *liberal* is to act according to the dictates of an enlarged heart and an enlightened mind. A clown or a fool may be *free* with his money, and may squander it away to please his humour, or gratify his appetite; but the nobleman and the wise man will be *liberal* in rewarding merit, in encouraging industry, and in promoting whatever can contribute to the ornament, the prosperity, and improvement of his country. A man who is *free* in his sentiments thinks as he pleases; the man who is *liberal* thinks according to the extent of his knowledge. The *free* thinking man is wise in his own conceit, he despises the opinions of others; the *liberal* minded thinks modestly on his own personal attainments, and builds upon the wisdom of others.

The *freethinker* circumscribes all knowledge within the conceptions of a few superlatively wise heads; the *liberal* minded is anxious to enlarge the boundaries of science by making all the thinking world in all ages to contribute to the advancement of knowledge. With the *freethinker* nothing is good that is old or established; with the *liberal* man nothing is good because it is new, nothing bad because it is old. Men of the least knowledge and understanding are the most *free* in their opinions, in which description of men this age abounds above all others; such men are exceedingly anxious to usurp the epithet *liberal* to themselves; but the good sense of mankind will prevail against partial endeavours, and assign this title to none but men of comprehensive talents, sound judgements, extensive experience, and deep erudition.

It seems as if *freedom* of thought

of established government: in this manner is Europe *set free* from the iron yoke of the French usurper by its ancient rulers. A country is *delivered* from the grasp and oppression of the invader; in this manner has Spain been *delivered*, by the wisdom and valor of an illustrious British general at the head of a band of British heroes.

When applied in a spiritual sense *free* is applied to sin; *set free* is employed for obligation and responsibility; *deliver* is employed for external circumstances. God, as our Redeemer, *frees* us from the bondage and consequences of sin, by the dispensations of his atoning grace; but he does not *set* us *free* from any of our moral obligations or moral responsibility as *free* agents; as our Preserver he *delivers* us from dangers and misfortunes, trials and temptations.

She then
Sent Iris down to *free* her from the strife
Of labouring nature, and dissolve her life.

DRYDEN.

When heav'n would kindly *set* us *free*,
And earth's enchantment end;
It takes the most effectual means,
And robs us of a friend.

YOUNG.

However desirous Mary was of obtaining *deliverance* from Darnley's caprices, she had good reasons for rejecting the method by which they proposed to accomplish it.

ROBERTSON.

The inquisitor rang a bell, and ordered Nicolas to be forthwith *liberated*.

CUMBERLAND.

FREE, FAMILIAR.

FREE has already been considered as it respects the words, actions, and sentiments (*v. Free*); in the present case it is coupled with FAMILIARITY in as much as they respect the outward behaviour or conduct in general of men one to another.

To be *free* is to be disengaged from all the constraints which the ceremonies of social intercourse impose; to be *familiar* is to be upon the footing of a *familiar*, of a relative, or one of the same family. Neither of these terms can be admitted as unexceptionable; but *freedom* is that which is in general totally unauthorized; *familiarity* sometimes shelters itself under the sanction of long, close, and friendly intercourse.

Free is a term of much more extensive import than *familiar*; a man

may be *free* towards another in a thousand ways; but he is *familiar* towards him only in his manners and address. A man who is *free* looks upon every thing as his which he chooses to make use of; a *familiar* man only wants to share with another and to stand upon an equal footing. A man who is *free* will take possession of another man's house or room in his absence, and will make use of his name or his property as it suits his convenience; his *freedom* always turns upon that which contributes to his own indulgence: a man who is *familiar* will smile upon you, take hold of your arm, call you by some friendly name, and seek to enjoy with you all the pleasures of social intercourse; his *familiarity* always turns upon that which will increase his own importance. There cannot be two greater enemies to the harmony of society than *freedom* and *familiarity*; both of which it is the whole business of politeness to destroy; for no man can be *free* without being in danger of infringing upon what belongs to another, nor *familiar* without being in danger of obtruding himself to the annoyance of others.

Upon equality depends the *freedom* of discourse, and consequently the ease and good humour of every society.

TYRREWHITT.

Familiar converse improved general civilities into an unfeigned passion on both sides.

STERLE.

FREE, EXEMPT.

FREE, *v. Free, liberal*.

EXEMPT, in Latin *exemptus*, participle of *eximo*, signifies set out or disengaged from a part.

The condition and not the conduct of men is here considered. *Freedom* is either accidental or intentional; the *exemption* is always intentional: we may be *free* from disorders, or *free* from troubles; we are *exempt*, that is *exempted* by government, from serving in the militia. *Free* is applied to every thing from which any one may wish to be *free*; but *exempt*, on the contrary, to those burdens which we should share with others: we may be *free* from imperfections, *free* from inconveniencies, *free* from the interruptions of others; but *exempt* from any office or tax. We may likewise be said to

burden of a vessel is estimated by the number of tons which it can carry.

Haste, my dear father (tis no time to wait),
And load my shoulders with a willing freight.

DAYDEN.

The surging air receives
Its plamy burden.

THOMSON.

TO FREQUENT, RESORT TO, HAUNT.

FREQUENT comes from *frequent*, in Latin *frequens* crowded, signifies to come in numbers, or come often to the same place.

RESORT, in French *ressortir*, compounded of *re* and *sortir*, signifies to go backward and forward.

HAUNT, in French *hanter*.

Frequent is more commonly used for an individual who goes often to a place; *resort* and *haunt* for a number of individuals. A man is said to *frequent* a public place; but several persons may *resort* to a private place: men who are not fond of home *frequent* taverns; in the first ages of Christianity, while persecution raged, the disciples used to *resort* to private places for purposes of worship.

Frequent and *resort* are indifferent actions; but *haunt* is always used in a bad sense. A man may *frequent* a theatre, a club, or any other social meeting, innocent or otherwise; people from different quarters may *resort* to a fair, a church, or any other place where they wish to meet for a common purpose; but those who *haunt* any place go to it in privacy for some bad purpose. Our Saviour *frequented* the synagogues: the followers of the prophet Mahomet *resort* to his tomb at Mecca: thieves *haunt* the darkest and most retired parts of the city in order to concert their measures for obtaining plunder.

For my own part I have ever regarded our inns of court as nurseries of statesmen and lawgivers, which makes me often *frequent* that part of the town.

BUDGELL.

Home is the *resort*
Of love, of joy, of peace, and plenty, where
Supporting and supported, polish'd friends
And dear relations mingle into bliss. THOMSON.
But harden'd by affronts, and still the same,
Lost to all sense of honour and of fame,
Thou yet canst love to *haunt* the great man's
board,
And think no supper good but with a lord.

LEWIS.

FREQUENTLY, *v.* Often.

FRESH, NEW, RECENT.

ADELUNG supposes the German word *frisch* to be derived from *frieren* to freeze, as the idea of coolness is prevalent in its application to the air; it is therefore figuratively applied to that which is in its first pure and best state.

NEW, in German *neu*, comes from the Latin *novus*, and the Greek *νέος*.

RECENT, in Latin *recens*, is supposed to come from *re* and *candeo* to whiten or give a fair color to, because what is *new* looks so much fairer than what is old.

The *fresh* is properly opposed to the stale, as the *new* is to the old: the *fresh* has undergone no change; the *new* has not been long in being. Meat, beer, and provisions in general, are said to be *fresh*; but that which is substantial and durable, as houses, clothes, books, and the like, are said to be *new*.

Recent is taken only in the improper application; the other two admit of both applications in this case: the *fresh* is said in relation to what has lately preceded; *new* is said in relation to what has not long subsisted; *recent* is used for what has just passed in distinction from that which has long gone by. A person gives *fresh* cause of offence who has already offended; a thing receives a *new* name in lieu of the one which it has long had; a *recent* transaction excites an interest which cannot be excited by one of later date. *Fresh* intelligence arrives every day; it quickly succeeds the event itself: that intelligence which is *recent* to a person at a distance is already old to one who is on the spot. *Fresh* circumstances continually arise to confirm the report; *new* changes continually take place to supersede the things that were established.

Lo! great Æneas rushes to the fight,
Sprung from a god, and more than mortal bold;
He *fresh* in youth, and I in arms grown old.

Pope.

Seasons but change new pleasures to produce,
And elements contend to serve our use. JENYNS.

The courage of the Parliament was increased by two *recent* events which had happened in their favor.

HUME.

TO FRET, *v.* To rub.

PRETFUL, *v.* Captious.

FREQUENTLY, *v.* Commonly.

terms is evident from their explanations: the wishes, the expectations, the intentions, and promises, of an individual, are appropriately said to be *fulfilled*; national projects, or undertakings, prophecies, and whatever is of general interest, are said to be *accomplished*: the fortune, or the prospects of an individual, or whatever results successfully from specific efforts, is said to be *realized*: the *fulfilment* of wishes may be as much the effect of good fortune as of design; the *accomplishment* of projects mostly results from extraordinary exertion, as the *accomplishment* of prophecies results from a miraculous exertion of power; the *realization* of hopes results more commonly from the slow process of moderate well combined efforts than from any thing extraordinary.

The palsied dotard looks round him, perceives himself to be alone; he has survived his friends, and he wishes to follow them; his wish is *fulfilled*; he drops torpid and insensible into that gulf which is deeper than the grave. HAWKSWORTH.

God bless you, sweet boy! and *accomplish* the joyful hope I conceived of you.

SIR PHILIP SYDNEY.

After my fancy had been buried in attempting to *realise* the scenes that Shakspeare drew, I regretted that the labor was ineffectual.

HAWKSWORTH.

TO FULFIL, *v.* To keep.

FULLY, *v.* Largely.

FULNESS, PLENITUDE.

ALTHOUGH PLENITUDE is no more than a derivative from the Latin for FULNESS, yet the latter is used either in the proper sense to express the state of objects that are *full*, or in the improper sense to express great quantity, which is the accompaniment of *fulness*; the former only in the higher style and in the improper sense: hence we say in the *fulness* of one's heart, in the *fulness* of one's joy, or the *fulness* of the Godhead bodily; but the *plenitude* of glory, the *plenitude* of power.

All mankind

Must have been lost, adjudg'd to death and hell,
By doom severe, had not the Son of God,
In whom the *fulness* dwells of love divine,
His dearest meditation thus renew'd. MILTON.

The most beneficent Being is he who hath an absolute *fulness* of perfection in himself, who gave existence to the universe, and so cannot be supposed to want that which he communicated

without diminishing from the *plenitude* of his own power and happiness. GRAY.

FUNCTION, *v.* Office.

FUNERAL, OBSEQUIES.

FUNERAL, in Latin *funus*, is derived from *funis* a cord, because lighted cords, or torches, were carried before the bodies which were interred by night; the *funeral*, therefore, denotes the ordinary solemnity which attends the consignment of a body to the grave.

OBSEQUIES, in Latin *exequie*, are both derived from *sequor*, which, in its compound sense, signifies to perform or execute; they comprehend, therefore, *funerals* attended with more than ordinary solemnity.

We speak of the *funeral* as the last sad office which we perform for a friend; it is accompanied by nothing but by mourning and sorrow: we speak of the *obsequies* as the tribute of respect which can be paid to the person of one who was high in station or public esteem: the *funeral*, by its frequency, becomes so familiar an object that it passes by unheeded; the *obsequies* which are performed over the remains of the great, attract our notice from the pomp and grandeur with which they are conducted.

That pluck'd my nerves, those tender strings of life,

Which, pluck'd a little more, will toll the bell
That calls my few friends to my *funeral*.

YOUNG.

Some in the flow'r-strown grave the corpse have lay'd,

And annual *obsequies* around it paid. JAYNS.

FURIOUS, *v.* Violent.

TO FURNISH, *v.* To provide.

FURNITURE, *v.* Goods.

FURY, *v.* Anger.

FURY, *v.* Madness.

FUTILE, *v.* Trifling.

G.

TO GAIN, *v.* To acquire.

GAIN, PROFIT, EMOLUMENT,
LUCRE.

GAIN signifies in general what is gained (*v.* To acquire).

Gape and *stare* are taken in the bad sense; the former indicating the astonishment of gross ignorance; the latter not only ignorance but impertinence: *gaze* is taken always in a good sense, as indicating laudable feeling of astonishment, pleasure, or curiosity: a clown *gapes* at the pictures of wild beasts which he sees at a fair; an impertinent fellow *stares* at every woman he looks at, and *stures* a modest woman out of countenance: a lover of the fine arts will *gaze* with admiration and delight at the productions of Raphael or Titian; when a person is stupified by affright, he gives a vacant *stare*: those who are filled with transport *gaze* on the object of their ecstasy.

It was now a miserable spectacle to see us nodding and *gaping* at one another, every man talking and no man heard.

SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE.

Astonish'd Annus just arrives by chance
To see his fall, nor farther dares advance;
But, fixing on the maid his horrid eye,
He *stares* and shakes, and finds it vain to fly.

DRYDEN.

For, while expecting there the queen, he rais'd
His wond'ring eyes, and round the temple *gas'd*,
Admir'd the fortune of the rising town,
The striving artists, and their art's renown.

DRYDEN.

GARRULOUS, *v. Talkative.*

TO GASP, *v. To palpitate.*

TO GATHER, COLLECT.

TO GATHER, in Saxon *gatherian* probably contracted from *get here*, signifies simply to bring to one spot. TO COLLECT (*v. To assemble, collect*) annexes also the idea of binding or forming into a whole; we *gather* that which is scattered in different parts: thus stones are *gathered* into a heap; vessels are *collected* so as to form a fleet. *Gathering* is a mere act of necessity or convenience; *collecting* is an act of design or choice: we *gather* apples from a tree, or a servant *gathers* the books from the table; the antiquarian *collects* coins, or the bibliomaniac *collects* rare books.

As the small ant (for she instructs the man,
And preaches labour) *gathers* all she can.

CRABBE.

The royal bee, queen of the rosy bower,
Collects her precious sweets from every flower.

C. JOHNSON.

GAUDY, *v. Showy.*

GAY, *v. Cheerful.*

GAY, *v. Showy.*

TO GAZE, *v. To gape.*

GENDER, SEX.

GENDER, in Latin *genus*, signifies properly a *genus* or kind. SEX, in French *sexe*, Latin *sexus*, comes from the Greek $\sigma\epsilon\chi$, signifying the habit or nature. The *gender* is that distinction in words which marks the distinction of *sex* in things: there are therefore, three *genders*, but only two *sexes*. By the inflections of words are denoted whether things are of this or that *sex*, or of no *sex*. The *genders* therefore, are divided in grammar into *masculine*, *feminine*, and *neuter*; and things are divided into male and female *sex*.

GENERAL, UNIVERSAL.

THE GENERAL is to the UNIVERSAL what the part is to the whole. What is *general* includes the greater part or number; what is *universal* includes every individual or part. The *general* rule admits of many exceptions; the *universal* rule admits of none. Human government has the *general* good for its object: the government of Providence is directed to *universal* good. *General* is opposed to particular, and *universal* to individual. A scientific writer will not content himself with *general* remarks, when he has it in his power to enter into particulars; the *universal* complaint which we hear against men for their pride, shows that in every individual it exists to a greater or less degree. It is a *general* opinion that women are not qualified for scientific pursuits, but Madame Dacier, the Marchioness of Chatelet, and Madame de Graigny, each in her way, form exceptions no less honourable to their whole sex, than to themselves in particular: it is a *universal* principle, that children ought to honour their parents; the intention of the Creator in this respect is manifested in such a variety of forms as to admit of no question. *General* philosophy considers the properties common to all bodies, and regards the distinct properties of

particular bodies, only in as much as they confirm abstract *general* views. *Universal* philosophy depends on *universal* science or knowledge, which belongs only to the infinite mind of the Creator. *General* grammar embraces in it all principles, that are supposed to be applicable to all languages: *universal* grammar is a thing scarcely attainable by the stretch of human power. What man can become so thoroughly acquainted with all existing languages, as to reduce all their particular idioms to any system?

GENERALLY, *v.* Commonly.

GENERATION, AGE.

THE GENERATION is said of the persons; the AGE is said of the time.

Those who are born at the same time constitute the *generation*; that period of time which comprehends the *age* of man is the *age*: there may therefore be many *generations* spring up in the course of an *age*; a fresh *generation* is springing up every day, which in the course of an *age* pass away, and are succeeded by fresh *generations*.

We consider man in his *generation* as to the part which he has to perform. We consider the *age* in which we live as to the manners of men and the events of nations.

I often lamented that I was not one of that happy *generation* who demolished the convents.

JOHNSON.

Throughout every *age*, God hath pointed his peculiar displeasure against the confidence of presumption, and the arrogance of prosperity.

BLAIR.

GENERATION, *v.* Race.

GENEROUS, *v.* Beneficent.

GENIUS, *v.* Intellect.

GENIUS, *v.* Taste.

GENTEEL, POLITE.

GENTEEL, in French *gentil*, Latin *gentilis*, signifies literally one belonging to the same family, or the next akin to whom the estate would fall, if there were no children; hence by an extended application it denoted to be of some family.

POLITE, *v.* Civil.

Gentility respects rank in life; *politeness* the refinement of the mind and outward behaviour.

A *genteel* education is suited to the station of a gentleman; a *polite* education fits for polished society and conversation, and raises the individual among his equals.

There may be *gentility* without *politeness*; and *vice versa*. A person may have *genteel* manners, a *genteel* carriage, a *genteel* mode of living as far as respects his general relation with society; but a *polite* behaviour and a *polite* address, which qualify him for every relation in society, and enable him to shine in connection with all orders of men, is independent of either birth or wealth; it is in part a gift of nature, although it is to be acquired by art.

The equipage, the servants, the house, and the furniture, may be such as to entitle a man to the name of *genteel* who is wanting in all the forms of real good-breeding; while fortune may sometimes frown upon the polished gentleman, whose *politeness* is a recommendation to him wherever he goes.

A lady of genius will give a *genteel* air to her whole dress by a well-fancied suit of knots, as a judicious writer gives a spirit to a whole sentence by a single expression.

GAY.

In this Isle remote,
Our painted ancestors were slow to learn,
To arms devote, in the *politer* arts,
Nor skilled, nor studious.

SOMERVILLE.

GENTILE, HEATHEN, PAGAN.

* THE Jews comprehended all strangers under the name of Goim, nations or GENTILES: among the Greeks and Romans they were designated by the name of barbarians. By the name *Gentile* was understood especially those who were not of the Jewish religion, including, in the end, even the Christians; for, as Fleury remarks, there were some among these uncircumcised *Gentiles* who worshipped the true God, and were permitted to dwell in the holy land provided they observed the law of nature and abstinence.

Some learned men pretend that the *Gentiles* were so named from their having only a natural law, and such as

* Vide Roubaud: "Gentile, païens."

they imposed on themselves, in opposition to the Jews and Christians, who have a positive revealed law to which they are obliged to submit.

Frisch and others derive the word **HEATHEN** from the Greek *ἄθεος*, *athēos*, which is corroborated by the translation in the Anglosaxon law of the word *hæthne* by the Greek *ἄθεος*. Adelung, however, thinks it to be more probably derived from the word *heide* a field, for the same reason as **PAGAN** is derived from *pagus* a village, because when Constantine banished idolators from the towns they repaired to the villages, and secretly adhered to their religious worship, whence they were termed by the Christians of the fourth century *Pagani*, which, as he supposes, was translated literally into the German *heidener* a villager or worshipper in the field. Be this as it may, it is evident that the word *Heathen* is in our language more applicable than *Pagan*, to the Greeks, the Romans, and the cultivated nations who practised idolatry; and, on the other hand, *Pagan* is more properly employed for the rude and uncivilized people who worship false Gods.

The *Gentile* does not expressly believe in a Divine Revelation; but he either admits of the truth in part, or is ready to receive it: the *Heathen* adopts a positively false system that is opposed to the true faith: the *Pagan* is the species of *Heathen* who obstinately persists in a worship which is merely the fruit of his own imagination. The *Heathens* or *Pagans* are *Gentiles*; but the *Gentiles* are not all either *Heathens* or *Pagans*. Confucius and Socrates, who rejected the plurality of Gods, and the followers of Mahomet, who adore the true God, are, properly speaking, *Gentiles*. The worshippers of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, and all the deities of the ancients, are termed *Heathens*. The worshippers of Fo, Brama, Xaca, and all the deities of savage nations, are termed *Pagans*.

The *Gentiles* were called to the true faith, and obeyed the call: many of the illustrious *Heathens* would have doubtless done the same, had they enjoyed the same privilege: there are many *Pagans* to this day who reject

this advantage, to pursue their own blind imaginations.

There might be several among the *Gentiles* in the same condition that Cornelius was before he became a Christian.
TILLOTSON.

Not that I believe that all virtues of the *Heathens* were counterfeit, and destitute of an inward principle of goodness. God forbid we should pass so hard a judgement upon those excellent men, Socrates, and Epictetus, and Antoninus.
TILLOTSON.

And nations laid in blood; dread sacrifice
To Christian pride! which had with horror
shock'd

The darkest *Pagans*, offered to their gods.

YOUNG.

GENTLE, TAME.

GENTLENESS lies rather in the natural disposition: **TAMENESS** is the effect either of art or circumstances. Any unbroken horse may be *gentle*, but not *tame*: a horse that is broken in will be *tame*, but not always *gentle*.

Gentle, as before observed (*v. Genteel*), signifies literally well born, and is opposed either to the fierce or the rude: *tame*, in German *zähm*, from *zaum* a bridle, signifies literally curbed or kept under, and is opposed either to the wild or the spirited.

Animals are in general said to be *gentle* who show a disposition to associate with man, and conform to his will; they are said to be *tame*, if either by compulsion or habit they are brought to mix with human society. Of the first description there are individuals in almost every species who are more or less entitled to the name of *gentle*; of the latter description are many species, as the dog, the sheep, the hen, and the like.

In the moral application *gentle* is always employed in the good, and *tame* in the bad, sense: a *gentle* spirit needs no control; it amalgamates freely with the will of another: a *tame* spirit is without any will of its own; it is alive to nothing but submission; it is perfectly consistent with our natural liberty to have *gentleness*, but *tameness* is the accompaniment of slavery. The same distinction marks the use of these words when applied to the outward conduct or the language: the *gentle* bespeaks something positively good; the *tame* bespeaks the want of an essential good: the former

TO GIBE, *v.* *To Scoff.*

GIDDINESS, *v.* *Lightness.*

GIFT, PRESENT, DONATION.

GIFT is derived from to *give*, in the sense of what is communicated to another gratuitously of one's property.

PRESENT is derived from to *pre-sent*, signifying the thing *presented* to another.

DONATION, from the French *donation*, and the Latin *dono* to present or *give*, is a species of *gift*.

The *gift* is an act of generosity or condescension; it contributes to the benefit of the receiver: the *present* is an act of kindness, courtesy, or respect; it contributes to the pleasure of the receiver. The *gift* passes from the rich to the poor, from the high to the low, and creates an obligation; the *present* passes either between equals, or from the inferior to the superior. Whatever, we receive from God, through the bounty of his Providence, we entitle a *gift*; whatever we receive from our friends, or whatever princes receive from their subjects, are entitled *presents*. We are told by all travellers that it is a custom in the east, never to approach a great man without a *present*; the value of a *gift* is often heightened by being given opportunely. The value of a *present* often depends upon the value we have for the giver; the smallest *present* from an esteemed friend is of more worth in our eyes, than the costliest *presents* that monarchs receive.

The *gifts* of heav'n my following song pursues,
Aerial honey and ambrosial dews. DRYDEN.

Have what you ask, your *presents* I receive;
Land, where and when you please, with ample leave. DRYDEN.

The *gift* is private, and benefits the individual; the *donation* is public, and serves some general purpose: what is given to relieve the necessities of any poor person is a *gift*; what is given to support an institution is a *donation*. The clergy are indebted to their patrons for the livings which are in their *gift*: it has been the custom of the pious and charitable, in all ages, to make *donations* for the support of almshouses, hospitals, infirmaries,

and such institutions as serve to diminish the sum of human misery.

And she shall have them, if again she sue
Since you the giver and the *gift* refuse.

DRYDEN.

The ecclesiastics were not content with the *donations* made them by the Saxon princes and nobles. HUME.

GIFT, ENDOWMENT, TALENT.

GIFT, *v.* *Gift.*

ENDOWMENT signifies the thing with which one is endowed.

TALENT, *v.* *Faculty.*

Gift and *endowment* both refer to the act of *giving* and *endowing*, and of course include the idea of something given, and something received: the word *talent* conveys no such collateral idea. When we speak of a *gift*, we refer in our minds to a *giver*; when we speak of an *endowment*, we refer in our minds to the receiver; when we speak of a *talent*, we only think of its intrinsic quality.

The *gift* is either supernatural or natural; the *endowment* is only natural. The primitive Christians received various *gifts* through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as the *gift* of tongues, the *gift* of healing, &c. There are some men who have a peculiar *gift* of utterance; beauty of person, and corporeal agility, are *endowments* with which some are peculiarly invested.

The word *gift* excludes the idea of any thing acquired by exertion; it is that which is communicated to us altogether independent of ourselves, and enables us to arrive at that perfection in any art, which could not be attained any other way. Speech is denominated a general *gift*, inasmuch as it is given to the whole human race, in distinction from the brutes; but the *gift* of utterance is a peculiar *gift* granted to individuals, in distinction from others, which may be exerted for the benefit of mankind. *Endowments*, though inherent in us, are now independent of exertions; they are qualities which admit of improvement by being used; they are in fact the *gifts* of nature, which serve to adorn and elevate the possessor, when employed for a good purpose. *Talents* are either natural or acquired,

sensual indulgences; he *yields* to the force of temptation.

CEDE, from the Latin *cedo* to *give*, is properly to *surrender* by virtue of a treaty: we may *surrender* a town as an act of necessity; but the *cession* of a country is purely a political transaction: thus, generals frequently *surrender* such towns as they are not able to defend; and governments *cede* such countries as they find it not convenient to retain. To CONCEDE, which is but a variation of *cede*, is a mode of *yielding* which may be either an act of discretion or courtesy; as when a government *concedes* to the demands of the people certain privileges, or when an individual *concedes* any point in dispute for the sake of peace.

The peaceable man will *give up* his favourite schemes: he will *yield* to an opponent rather than become the cause of violent embroilments.

BLAIR.

On my experience, Adam, freely taste,
And fear of death deliver to the winds. MILTON.

The young, half-seduced by persuasion, and half-compelled by ridicule, *surrender* their convictions, and consent to live as they see others around them living.

BLAIR.

As to the magic power which the devil imparts for these *concessions* of his votaries, theologians have different opinions.

CUMBERLAND.

TO GIVE UP, ABANDON, RESIGN, FOREGO.

THESE terms differ from the preceding (*v. To give up*), inasmuch as they designate actions entirely free from foreign influence. A man GIVES UP, ABANDONS (*v. To abandon*), and RESIGNS (*v. To abandon*), from the dictates of his own mind, independent of all control from others. To *give up* and *abandon* both denote a positive decision of the mind; but the former may be the act of the understanding or the will, the latter is more commonly the act of the will and the passions: to *give up* is applied to familiar cases; *abandon* to matters of importance: one *gives up* an idea, an intention, a plan, and the like; one *abandons* a project, a scheme, a measure of government.

To *give up* and *resign* are applied either to the outward actions, or merely to the inward movements: but the former is active, it determinately fixes the conduct; the latter seems to

be rather passive, it is the leaning of the mind to the circumstances: a man *gives up* his situation by a positive act of his choice; he *resigns* his office when he feels it inconvenient to hold it: so, likewise, we *give up* expectations, and *resign* hopes. In this sense, FOREGO, which signifies to let go, is comparable with *resign*, inasmuch as it expresses a passive action; but we *resign* that which we have, and we *forego* that which we might have: thus, we *resign* the claims which we have already made; we *forego* the claims which we might make: the former may be a matter of prudence; the latter is always an act of virtue and forbearance. When applied reflectively, to *give up* is used either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; *abandon* always in a bad sense; *resign* always in a good sense: a man may *give himself up*, either to studious pursuits, to idle vagaries, or vicious indulgences; he *abandons* himself to gross vices; he *resigns* himself to the will of Providence, or to the circumstances of his condition: a man is said to be *given up* to his lusts who is without any principle to control him in the gratification; he is said to be *abandoned*, when his outrageous conduct bespeaks an entire insensibility to every honest principle; he is said to be *resigned* when he discovers composure and tranquillity in the hour of affliction.

Upon his friend telling him, he wondered he *gave up* the question, when he had visibly the better of the dispute; I am never ashamed, says he, to be confuted by one who is master of fifty legions.

ADAMSON.

For Greece we grieve, *abandoned* by her fate,
To drink the dregs of thy unmeasur'd hate.

Pope.

The praise of artful numbers I *resign*,
And hang my pipe upon the sacred pine.

DRYDEN.

Then, pilgrim, turn, thy cares *forego*;
All earth-born cares are wrong.

GOLDSMITH.

GLAD, PLEASED, JOYFUL, CHEERFUL.

GLAD is obviously a variation of *glee* and *glow* (*v. Fire*).

PLEASED, from to *please*, marks the state of being *pleased*.

JOYFUL bespeaks its own meaning, either as full of *joy* or productive of great *joy*.

CHEERFUL, *v. Cheerful*.

Glad denotes either a partial state,

immortality of the soul) at such a time (that of death). This passage, I think, evidently *glances* upon Aristophanes, who writ a comedy on purpose to ridicule the discourses of that divine philosopher.

ANDERSON.

The author, in the whole course of his poem, has infinite *allusions* to places of Scripture.

ANDERSON.

GLANCE, *v.* Look.

GLANCE, *v.* Glimpse.

GLARE, *v.* Flame.

TO GLARE, *v.* To shine.

GLARING, BAREFACED.

GLARING is here used in the figurative sense, drawn from its natural signification of broad light, which strikes powerfully upon the senses.

BAREFACED signifies literally having a *bare* or *uncovered face*, which denotes the absence of all disguise or all shame.

Glaring designates the thing; *barefaced* characterizes the person: a *glaring* falsehood is that which strikes the observer in an instant to be falsehood; a *barefaced* lie or falsehood betrays the effrontery of him who utters it. A *glaring* absurdity will be seen instantly without the aid of reflection; a *barefaced* piece of impudence characterizes the agent as more than ordinarily lost to all sense of decorum.

The *glaring* side is that of enmity. BURKE.

The animosities increased, and the parties appeared *barefaced* against each other.

CLARENDON.

GLEAM, GLIMMER, RAY, BEAM.

GLEAM is in Saxon *gleomen*, German *glimmen*, &c. GLIMMER is a variation of the same.

RAY is connected with the word row.

BEAM comes from the Teutonic *baum*, a tree.

Certain portions of light are designated by these terms, but the *gleam* and *glimmer* are indefinite; the *ray* and *beam* are definite. The *gleam* is properly the commencement of light, or that portion of opening light which interrupts the darkness: the *glimmer* is an unsteady *gleam*: *ray* and *beam* are portions of light which emanate from some luminous body; the former from all luminous bodies in general,

the latter more particularly from the sun; the former is, as its derivation denotes, a row of light issuing in a greater or less degree from any body; the latter is a great row of light, like a pole issuing from a body. There may be a *gleam* of light visible on the wall of a dark room, or a *glimmer* if it be moveable; there may be *rays* of light visible at night on the back of a glow-worm, or *rays* of light may break through the shutters of a closed room; the sun in the height of its splendor sends forth its *beams*. *Gleam* and *ray* may be applied figuratively; *beam* only in the natural sense: a *gleam* of light may break in on the benighted understanding; but a *glimmer* of light rather confuses; *rays* of light may dart into the mind of the most ignorant savage who is taught the principles of Christianity by the pure practice of its professors.

A dreadful *gleam* from his bright armour came,
And from his eye-balls flash'd the living flame.

Pope.

The *glimmering* light which shot into the chaos from the utmost verge of the creation, is wonderfully beautiful and poetic.

ANDERSON.

A sudden ray shot beaming o'er the plain,
And show'd the shores, the navy, and the main.

Pope.

The stars shine smarter; and the moon adorn,
As with unborrow'd beams, her horns.

DRYDEN.

TO GLIDE, *v.* To slip.

GLIMMER, *v.* Gleam.

GLIMPSE, GLANCE.

THE GLIMPSE is the action of the object appearing to the eye; the GLANCE is the action of the eye seeking the object: one catches a *glimpse* of an object; one casts a *glance* at an object: the latter therefore is properly the means for obtaining the former, which is the end: we get a *glimpse* by means of a *glance*. The *glimpse* is the hasty, imperfect, and sudden view which we get of an object; the *glance* is the hasty and imperfect view which we take of an object: the former may depend upon a variety of circumstances; the latter depends upon the will of the agent. We can seldom do more than get a *glimpse* of objects in a carriage that is going with rapidity: when we do not wish to be observed to look we take but a *glance* of an object.

Of the state with which practice has not ac-

by keeping them under too severe a control. *Sullenness* shows itself mostly by an unseemly reserve; *moroseness* shows itself by the hardness of the speech, and the roughness of the voice. *Sullenness* is altogether a sluggish principle, that leads more or less to inaction; *moroseness* is a harsh feeling, that is not contented with exacting obedience unless it inflicts pain.

Moroseness is a defect of the temper; but *SPLEEN*, from *splen*, is a defect in the heart: the one betrays itself in behaviour, the other more in conduct. A *morose* man is an unpleasant companion; a *splenetic* man is a bad member of society: the former is ill-natured to those about him, the latter is ill-humoured with all this world. *Moroseness* vents itself in temporary expressions: *spleen* indulges itself in perpetual bitterness of expression.

Th' unwilling heralds act their lord's commands,
Pensive they walk along the barren sands,
Arriv'd, the hero in his tent they find
With gloomy aspect, on his arm reclin'd. *Pope.*
At this they ceased; the stern debate expl'd:
The chiefs in sullen majesty retir'd. *Pope.*

The *morose* philosopher is so much affected by these and some other authorities, that he becomes a convert to his friend, and desires he would take him with him when he went to his next ball. *BURKE.*

Whilst in that *splenetic* mood, we amused ourselves in a sour critical speculation of which we ourselves were the objects, a few months effected a total change in our variable minds. *BURKE.*

GLORY, HONOR.

GLORY is something dazzling and widely diffused. The Latin word *gloria*, anciently written *glosia*, is in all probability connected with our words *gloss*, *glaze*, *glitter*, *glow*, through the medium of the northern words *gleissen*, *glotzen*, *glänzen*, *glühen*, all which come from the Hebrew *gehel*, a live coal. That the moral idea of *glory* is best represented by light is evident from the *glory* which is painted round the head of our Saviour.

HONOR is something less splendid, but more solid, and probably comes from the Hebrew *hon* wealth or substance.

Glory impels to extraordinary efforts and to great undertakings. *Honor* induces to a discharge of one's duty. Excellence in the attainment, and success in the exploit, bring

glory; a faithful exercise of one's talents reflects *honor*. *Glory* is connected with every thing which has a peculiar public interest; *honor* is more properly obtained within a private circle. *Glory* is not confined to the nation or life of the individual by whom it is sought; it spreads over all the earth, and descends to the latest posterity: *honor* is limited to those who are connected with the subject of it, and eye-witnesses to his actions. *Glory* is attainable but by few, and may be an object of indifference to any one; *honor* is more or less within the reach of all, and must be disregarded by no one. A general at the head of an army goes in pursuit of *glory*; the humble citizen who acts his part in society so as to obtain the approbation of his fellow citizens is in the road for *honor*. A nation acquires *glory* by the splendor of its victories, and its superiority in arts as well as arms; it obtains *honor* by its strict adherence to equity and good faith in all its dealings with other nations. Our own nation has acquired *glory* by the help of its brave warriors; it has gained *honor* by the justice and generosity of its government. The military career of Alexander was *glorious*; his humane treatment of the Persian princesses who were his prisoners was an *honorable* trait in his character. The abolition of the slave trade by the English government was a *glorious* triumph of Christianity over the worst principles of human nature; the national conduct of England during the revolutionary period reflects *honor* on the English name.

Glory is a sentiment, selfish in its nature, but salutary or pernicious in its effect, according as it is directed; *honor* is a principle disinterested in its nature, and beneficial in its operations. A thirst for *glory* is seldom indulged but at the expense of others, as it is not attainable in the plain path of duty; there are but few opportunities of acquiring it by elevated acts of goodness, and still fewer who have the virtue to embrace the opportunities that offer: a love of *honor* can never be indulged but to the advantage of others; it is restricted by fixed laws; it requires a sacrifice of every selfish consideration, and a due

GODLIKE, DIVINE, HEAVENLY.

GODLIKE bespeaks its own meaning, as like *God*, or after the manner of *God*.

DIVINE, in Latin *divinus* from *divus* or *Deus*, signifies appertaining to *God*.

HEAVENLY, or **HEAVENLIKE**, signifies like or appertaining to *heaven*.

Godlike is a more expressive, but less common term than *divine*: the former is used only as an epithet of peculiar praise for an individual; *divine* is generally employed for that which appertains to a superior being, in distinction from that which is human. Benevolence is a *godlike* property: the *Divine* image is stamped on the features of man, whence the face is called by Milton 'the human face *Divine*.' As *divine* is opposed to human, so is *heavenly* to earthly: the *Divine* Being distinguishes the Creator from all other beings; but a *heavenly* being denotes the angels or inhabitants of *heaven*, in distinction from earthly beings or the inhabitants of earth. A *divine* influence is to be sought for only by prayer to the Giver of all good things; but a *heavenly* temper may be acquired by a steady contemplation of *heavenly* things, and an abstraction from those which are earthly: the *Divine* will is the foundation of all moral law and obligation; *heavenly* joys are the fruit of all our labors in this earthly course.

Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and *godlike* reason,
To rust in us unus'd. SHAKESPEARE.

Of all that see or read thy comedies,
Whoever in those glasses looks may find
The spots return'd, or graces of his mind;
And by the help of so *divine* an art,
At leisure view and dress his nobler part.
WALLER.

Reason, alas! It does not know itself;
But man, vain man! would with his short-sight'd
plummet
Fathom the vast abyss of *heavenly* justice.
DRYDEN.

GODLY, RIGHTEOUS.

GODLY is a contraction of *godlike* (v. *Godlike*).

RIGHTEOUS signifies conformable to *right* or truth.

These epithets are both used in

a spiritual sense, and cannot, without an indecorous affectation of religion, be introduced into any other discourse than that which is properly spiritual. *Godliness*, in the strict sense, is that outward deportment which characterizes a heavenly temper; prayer, reading of the Scriptures, public worship, and every religious act, enters into the signification of *godliness*, which at the same time supposes a temper of mind, not only to delight in, but to profit by such exercises: *righteousness* on the other hand comprehends Christian morality, in distinction from that of the heathen or unbeliever; a *righteous* man does *right*, not only because it is *right*, but because it is agreeable to the will of his Maker, and the example of his Redeemer: *righteousness* is therefore to *godliness* as the effect to the cause. The *godly* man goes to the sanctuary, and by converse with his Maker assimilates all his affections to the character of that Being whom he worships; when he leaves the sanctuary he proves the efficacy of his *godliness* by his *righteous* converse with his fellow creatures. It is easy however for men to mistake the means for the end, and to rest with *godliness* without *righteousness*, as too many are apt to do who seem to make their whole duty to consist in an attention to religious observances, and in the indulgence of extravagant feelings.

It hath been the great design of the devil and his instruments in all ages to undermine religion, by making an unhappy separation and divorce between *godliness* and morality. But let us not deceive ourselves; this was always religion, and the condition of our acceptance with *God*, to endeavour to be like *God* in purity and holiness, in justice and *righteousness*. TILLOTSON.

GOLD, GOLDEN.

THESE terms are both employed as epithets, but **GOLD** is the substantive used in composition, and **GOLDEN** the adjective, in ordinary use. The former is strictly applied to the metal of which the thing is made, as a *gold* cup, or a *gold* coin; but the latter to whatever appertains to *gold*, whether properly or figuratively: as the *golden* lion, the *golden* crown, the *golden* age, or a *golden* harvest.

GOLDEN, v. *Gold*.

Unless men were endowed by nature with some sense of duty or moral obligation, they could reap no *benefit* from revelation. BLAIR.

The true art of memory is the art of attention. No man will read with much *advantage* who is not able at pleasure to evacuate his mind. JOHNSON.

GOODHUMOUR, *v.* *Goodnature*.

GOODNATURE, GOODHUMOUR.

GOODNATURE and GOODHUMOUR both imply the disposition to please and be pleased; but the former is habitual and permanent, the latter is temporary and partial: the former lies in the nature and frame of the mind; the latter in the state of the humours or spirits. A *good-natured* man recommends himself at all times for his *goodnature*; a *good-humoured* man recommends himself particularly as a companion: *good-nature* displays itself by a readiness in doing kind offices; *goodhumour* is confined mostly to the ease and cheerfulness of one's outward deportment in social converse: *goodnature* is apt to be guilty of weak compliances: *goodhumour* is apt to be succeeded by fits of peevishness and depression. *Goodnature* is applicable only to the character of the individual; *goodhumour* may be said of a whole company: it is a mark of *goodnature* in a man who will not disturb the *goodhumour* of the company he is in, by resenting the affront that is offered him by another.

I concluded, however unaccountable the assertion might appear at first sight, that *goodnature* was an essential quality in a satirist.

ADDISON.

When Virgil said "He that did not hate Bavius might love Mævius," he was in perfect *goodhumour*.

ADDISON.

GOOD-OFFICE, *v.* *Benefit*.

GOODS, *v.* *Commodity*.

GOODS, FURNITURE, CHATTELS, MOVEABLES, EFFECTS.

ALL these terms are applied to such things as belong to an individual: the first term is the most general, both in sense and application; all the rest are species.

FURNITURE comprehends all household goods; wherefore in regard to an individual, supposing the house to contain all he has, the general is

put for the specific term, as when one speaks of a person's moving his GOODS for his *furniture*: but in the strict sense *goods* comprehends more than *furniture*, including not only that which is adapted for the domestic purposes of a family, but also every thing which is of value to a person: the chairs and tables are a part of *furniture*; papers, books, and money, are included among the *goods*: it is obvious therefore that *goods*, even in its most limited sense, is of wider import than *furniture*.

CHATTELS, which is probably changed from *cattle*, is a term not in ordinary use, but still sufficiently employed to deserve notice. The *chattels* comprehends that species of *goods* which is in a special manner separated from one's person and house; a man's cattle, his implements of husbandry, the alienable rights which he has in land or buildings, are all comprehended under *chattels*: hence the propriety of the expression to seize a man's *goods* and *chattels*, as denoting the disposable property which he has about his person or at a distance. MOVEABLES comprehends all the other terms in the limited application to property, as far as it admits of being removed from one place to the other; it is opposed either to fixtures, when speaking of *furniture*, or to land as contrasted to *goods* and *chattels*.

EFFECTS is a term of nearly as extensive a signification as *goods*, but not so extensive an application: whatever a man has that is of any supposed value, or convertible into money, is entitled his *goods*; whatever a man has that can effect, produce, or bring forth money by sale, is entitled his *effects*: *goods* therefore is applied only to that which a man has at his own disposal; *effects* more properly to that which is left at the disposal of others. A man makes a sale of his *goods* on his removal from any place; his creditors or executors take care of his *effects* either on his bankruptcy or decease: *goods*, in this case, is seldom employed but in the limited sense of what is removeable; but *effects* includes every thing personal, freehold, and copyhold.

Now I give up my shop and dispose of all my poetical goods at once; I must therefore desire

late is a species of *governing* simply by judgement; the word is applicable to things of minor moment, where the force of authority is not so requisite: one *governs* the affairs of a nation, or a large body where great interests are involved; we *regulate* the concerns of an individual, or we *regulate* in cases where good order or convenience only is consulted: so likewise in regard to ourselves, we *govern* our passions, but we *regulate* our affections. They are all properly used to denote the acts of conscious agents, but by a figure of personification they may be applied to inanimate or moral objects: the price of one market *governs* the price of another, or *governs* the seller in his demand; fashion and caprice *rule* the majority, or particular fashions *rule*; the time of one clock *regulates* that of many others.

Whence can this very motion take its birth,
Not sure from matter, from dull clods of earth?
But from a living spirit lodg'd within,
Which *governs* all the bodily machine. JENYNS.

When I behold a factious band agree,
To call it freedom when themselves are free;
Each wanton judge new penal statutes draw;
Laws grind the poor, and rich men *rule* the law;
I fly from petty tyrants to the throne. GOLDSMITH.
Distracting thoughts by turns his bosom *ru'd*,
Now fir'd by wrath, and now by reason cool'd.

Pope.

Though a sense of moral good and evil be
deeply impressed on the heart of man, it is not of
sufficient power to *regulate* his life. BLAIR.

GOVERNMENT, ADMINISTRATION.

BOTH these terms may be employed either to designate the act of GOVERNING and ADMINISTERING, or the persons *governing* and *administering*. In both cases *government* has a more extensive meaning than *administration*: the *government* includes every exercise of authority; the *administration* implies only that exercise of authority which consists in putting the laws or will of another in force: hence, when we speak of the *government*, as it respects the persons, it implies the whole body of constituted authorities; and the *administration*, only that part which puts in execution the intentions of the whole: the *government* of a country therefore may remain unaltered, while the *administration* undergoes many

changes: it is the business of the *government* to make treaties of peace and war; and without a *government* it is impossible for any people to negotiate: it is the business of the *administration* to *administer* justice, to regulate the finances, and to direct all the complicated concerns of a nation; without an *administration* all public business would be at a stand.

Government is an art above the attainment of an ordinary genius. SCOTT.

What are we to do if the *government* and the whole community is of the same description? BURKE.

In treating of an invisible world, and the *administration* of *government* there carried on by the Father of spirits, particulars occur which appear incomprehensible. BLAIR.

GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION.

GOVERNMENT is here as in the former article (*v* *Government*) the generic term; CONSTITUTION the specific. *Government* implies generally the act of *governing* or exercising authority under any form whatever; *constitution* implies any *constituted* or fixed form of *government*: we may have a *government* without a *constitution*; we cannot have a *constitution* without a *government*. In the first formation of society *government* was placed in the hands of individuals who exercised authority according to discretion rather than any fixed rule or law: here then was *government* without a *constitution*: as time and experience proved the necessity of some established form, and the wisdom of enlightened men discovered the advantages and disadvantages of different forms, *government* in every country assumed a more definite shape, and became the *constitution* of the country; hence then the union of *government* and *constitution*. *Governments* are divided by political writers into three classes, monarchical, aristocratic, and republican: but these three general forms have been adopted with such variations and modifications as to render the *constitution* of every country something peculiar to itself.

Political squabblers have always chosen to consider *government* in its limited sense as including only the supreme or executive authority, and the *constitution* as that which is set up by

his most unworthy creatures from the infinite goodness of his Divine nature; it is to his special *grace* that we attribute every good feeling by which we are prevented from committing sin: the term *favor* is employed indiscriminately with regard to man or his Maker; those who are in power have the greatest opportunity of conferring *favours*; but all we receive at the hands of our Maker must be acknowledged as a *favor*. The Divine *grace* is absolutely indispensable for men as sinners; the Divine *favor* is perpetually necessary for men as his creatures dependant upon him for every thing.

But say I could repent and could obtain,
By act of *grace*, my former state, how soon
Would height recal high thoughts? MILTON.

A bad man is wholly the creature of the world.
He hangs upon its *favor*. BLAIR.

GRACE, CHARM.

GRACE is altogether corporeal; CHARM is either corporeal or mental: the *grace* qualifies the action of the body; the *charm* is an inherent quality in the body itself. A lady moves, dances, and walks with *grace*; the *charms* of her person are equal to those of her mind.

Savage's method of life particularly qualified him for conversation, of which he knew how to practise all the *graces*. JOHNSON.

Music has *charms* to soothe the savage breast
CONGREVE.

GRACEFUL, COMELY, ELEGANT.

A GRACEFUL figure is rendered so by the deportment of the body. A COMELY figure has that in itself which pleases the eye. *Gracefulness* results from nature, improved by art; *comeliness* is mostly the work of nature. It is possible to acquire *gracefulness* by the aid of the dancing master, but for a *comely* form we are indebted to nature aided by circumstances. *Grace* is a quality pleasing to the eye; but ELEGANCE, from the Latin *eligo*, *electus*, select and choice, is a quality of a higher nature, that inspires admiration; *elegant* is applicable, like *graceful*, to the motion of the body, or like *comely*, to the person, and is extended in its meaning also to the words and even to the dress. A person's step is *graceful*; his air or his movements are *elegant*; the *grace* of

an action lies chiefly in its adaptation to the occasion.

Grace is in some degree a relative quality; the *gracefulness* of an action depends on its suitability to the occasion: *elegance* is a positive quality; it is, properly speaking, beauty in regard to the exterior of the person; an *elegance* of air and manner is the consequence not only of superior birth and station, but also of superior natural endowments.

The first who approached her was a youth of *graceful* presence and courtly air, but dressed in a richer habit than had ever been seen in Acadia. STEELE.

Isidas the son of Phœbidas was at this time in the bloom of his youth, and very remarkable for the *comeliness* of his person. ADDISON.

The natural progress of the works of men is from rudeness to convenience, from convenience to *elegance*, and from *elegance* to nicety. JOHNSON.

GRACEFUL, *v.* Becoming.

GRACIOUS, MERCIFUL, KIND.

GRACIOUS, when compared to MERCIFUL, is used only in the spiritual sense; the latter is applicable to the conduct of man as well as of the Deity.

Grace is exerted in doing good to an object that has merited the contrary; *mercy* is exerted in withholding the evil which has been merited. God is *gracious* to his creatures in affording them not only an opportunity to address him, but every encouragement to lay open their wants to him; their unworthiness and sinfulness are not made impediments of access to him. God is *merciful* to the vilest of sinners, and lends an ear to the smallest breath of repentance; in the moment of executing vengeance he stops his arm at the voice of supplication: he expects the same *mercy* to be extended by man towards his offending brother.

Grace, in the lofty sense in which it is here admitted, cannot with propriety be made the attribute of any human being, however elevated his rank: nothing short of infinite wisdom as well as goodness can be supposed capable of doing good to offenders without producing ultimate evil. Were a king to attempt any display of *grace* by bestowing favors on criminals, his conduct would be highly

grandeur are rarely in a temper of mind to take a just view of themselves and of all things that surround them; they forget that there is any thing above this, in comparison with which it sinks into insignificance and meanness. The *grandeur* of European courts is lost in a comparison with the *magnificence* of Eastern princes.

Grandeur is applicable to the works of nature as well as art, of mind as well as matter; *magnificence* is altogether the creature of art. A structure, a spectacle, an entertainment, and the like, may be *grand* or *magnificent*; but a scene, a prospect, a conception, and the like, is *grand*, but not *magnificent*.

There is a kind of *grandeur* and respect, which the meanest and most insignificant part of mankind endeavour to procure in the little circle of their friends and acquaintance. ADDISON.

The wall of China is one of those eastern pieces of *magnificence* which makes a figure even in the map of the world, although an account of it would have been thought fabulous, were not the wall itself extant. ADDISON.

TO GRANT, *v.* To admit.

TO GRANT, *v.* To allow.

TO GRANT, *v.* To give.

TO GRASP, *v.* To lay hold.

GRATEFUL, *v.* Acceptable.

GRATIFICATION, *v.* Enjoyment.

TO GRATIFY, INDULGE,
HUMOUR.

To GRATIFY, make *grateful* or *pleasant* (*v.* Acceptable), is a positive act of the choice. To INDULGE, from the Latin *indulgeo* and *dulcis* to sweeten or make palatable, is a negative act of the will, a yielding of the mind to circumstances. One *gratifies* the appetites; one *indulges* the humours. To *gratify* and *indulge*, as individual acts, may be both allowable; but to *gratify* is unrestricted by any moral consideration; *indulging* always involves the sacrifice of some general rule of conduct or principle of action. We may sometimes *gratify* a laudable curiosity, and *indulge* ourselves by a salutary recreation; but *gratifying* as a habit becomes a vice, and *indulging* as a habit is a weakness. A person who is in search of pleasure *gratifies* the desires as they

rise; he lives for the *gratification*, and depends upon it for his happiness. He who has higher objects in view, than the momentary *gratification*, will be careful not to *indulge* himself too much in such things as will wean him from his purpose.

To *gratify* is a selfish act; we *gratify* ourselves only, but not others: to *indulge* is often a kind action; we *indulge* others as well as ourselves: to HUMOUR is to *indulge* or fall in with the *humour*; it may be selfish or prudent. The sensualist *gratifies* his passions, and sacrifices not only his own substantial happiness, but the peace of others to the *gratification*: a good parent *indulges* his child in whatever he knows is not hurtful: it is sometimes necessary to *humour* the temper in some measure, the better to correct it. Things *gratify*; persons only *indulge*: we are *gratified* with any spectacle which we witness; we are *indulged* with the opportunity of witnessing this spectacle through the kindness of a friend.

It is certainly a very important lesson to learn how to enjoy ordinary things, and to be able to relish your being, without the transport of some passion, or *gratification* of some appetite.

STERLE.

Still in short intervals of pleasing woe,
Regardful of the friendly dues I owe;
I to the glorious dead for ever dear,
Indulge the tribute of a grateful tear.

PORR.

A skilful manager of the rabble, with two or three popular empty words, such as 'right of the subject, and liberty of conscience,' well tuned and *humoured*, may whistle them backwards and forwards till he is weary.

SOUTH.

TO GRATIFY, *v.* To satisfy.

GRATITUDE, *v.* Thankfulness.

GRATUITOUS, VOLUNTARY.

GRATUITOUS is opposed to that which is obligatory. VOLUNTARY is opposed to that which is compulsory, or involuntary. A gift is *gratuitous* which flows entirely from the free will of the giver, independent of right: an offer is *voluntary* which flows from the free will, independent of all external constraint. *Gratuitous* is therefore to *voluntary* as a species to the genus. What is *gratuitous* is *voluntary*, although what is *voluntary* is not always *gratuitous*. The *gratuitous* is properly the *voluntary* in regard to the disposal of one's property: and the *voluntary* is applicable to all other actions.

where bodies are deposited. GRAVE, from the German *graben*, &c. has a reference to the hollow made. TOMB, from *tumulus* and *tumeo* to swell, has a reference to the rising that is made. SEPULCHRE, from *sepelio* to bury, has a reference to the use for which it is employed. From this explanation it is evident, that these terms have a certain propriety of application: to sink into the *grave* is an expression that carries the thoughts where the body must rest in death: to inscribe on the *tomb*, or to encircle the *tomb* with flowers, carries our thoughts to the external of that place in which the body is interred. To inter in a *sepulchre*, or to visit or enter a *sepulchre*, reminds us of a place in which bodies are deposited.

The path of glory leads but to the grave. GRAY.

Nor you, ye proud, impute to these the fault,
If mem'ry o'er their tombs no trophies raise.

GRAY.

The Lay itself is either lost or buried, perhaps
for ever in one of those *sepulchres* of MSS.
which by courtesy are called libraries.

TYRWHITT.

GRAVE, *v.* Sober.

GRAVITY, *v.* Weight.

GREAT, LARGE, BIG.

GREAT, derived through the medium of the northern languages from the Latin *crassus* thick, and *cresco* to grow, is applied to all kinds of dimensions in which things can grow or increase. LARGE, in Latin *largus* wide, is probably derived from the Greek *εὐρύς* and *εὐρύω* to flow plentifully; for *largior* signifies to give freely, and *large* has in English a similar sense: it is properly applied to space, extent, and quantity. BIG, from the German *bauch* belly, and the English *bulk*, denotes *great* as to expansion or capacity. A house, a room, a heap, a pile, an army, &c. is *great* or *large*; an animal or a mountain is *great* or *big*: a road, a city, a street, and the like, is termed rather *great* than *large*. *Great* is used generally in the improper sense; *large* and *big* are used only occasionally: a noise, a distance, a multitude, a number, a power, and the like, is termed *great*, but not *large*: we may, however speak of a *large* portion, a *large* share, a *large*

quantity; or of a mind *big* with conception, or of an event *big* with the fate of nations.

At one's first entrance into the Pantheon at Rome, how the imagination is filled with something *great* and amazing; and at the same time how little in proportion one is affected with the inside of a Gothic cathedral, although it be five times *larger* than the other.

ADDISON.

We are not a little pleased to find every green leaf swarm with millions of animals, that at their *largest* growth are not visible to the naked eye.

ADDISON.

An animal no *bigger* than a mite cannot appear perfect to the eye, because the sight takes it in at once.

ADDISON.

Among all the figures of architecture, there are none that have a *greater* air than the concave and the convex.

ADDISON.

Sure be that made us with such *large* discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not

That capability and godlike reason,

To rust in us unus'd.

SHAKESPEARE.

Amazing clouds on clouds continual heap'd,

Or whirl'd tempestuous by the gusty wind,

Or silent borne along heavy and slow,

With the *big* stores of streaming oceans charg'd.

THOMSON.

GREAT, GRAND, SUBLIME.

THESE terms are synonymous only in the moral application. GREAT simply designates extent; GRAND includes likewise the idea of excellence and superiority. A *great* undertaking characterizes only the extent of the undertaking; a *grand* undertaking bespeaks its superior excellence: *great* objects are seen with facility; *grand* objects are viewed with admiration. It is a *great* point to make a person sensible of his faults; it should be the *grand* aim of all to aspire after moral and religious improvement.

Grand and SUBLIME are both superior to *great*; but the former marks the dimension of *greatness*; the latter, from the Latin *sublimis*, designates that of height. A scene may be either *grand* or *sublime*: it is *grand* as it fills the imagination with its immensity; it is *sublime* as it elevates the imagination beyond the surrounding and less important objects. There is something *grand* in the sight of a vast army moving forward, as it were by one impulse; there is something peculiarly *sublime* in the sight of huge mountains and craggy cliffs of ice, shaped into various fantastic

ing commence when the *lamentation* ceases.

As epithets, *grievous*, *mournful*, and *lamentable*, have a similar distinction. What presses hard on the person, the property, the connexions, and circumstances of a person is *grievous*; what touches the tender feelings, and tears asunder the ties of kindred and friendship, is *mournful*; whatever excites a painful sensation in our minds is *lamentable*. Famine is a *grievous* calamity for a nation; the violent separation of friends by death is a *mournful* event at all times, but particularly so for those who are in the prime of life and the fulness of expectation; the ignorance which some persons discover even in the present cultivated state of society is truly *lamentable*. *Grievous* misfortunes come but seldom, although they sometimes fall thickly on an individual; a *mournful* tale excites our pity from the persuasion of its veracity; but *lamentable* stories are often fabricated for sinister purposes.

Achates, the companion of his breast,
Goes *grieving* by his side, with equal cares oppress'd. DRYDEN.

My brother's friends and daughter left behind,
False to them all, to Paris only kind;
For this I *mourn*, till grief or dire disease
Shall waste the form, whose crime it was to please. POPE.

So close in poplar shades, her children gone,
The mother nightingale *laments* alone. DRYDEN.

GRIEVED, *v.* Sorry.

GRIM, *v.* Hideous.

TO GRIPE, *v.* To lay hold.

TO GRIPE, *v.* To press.

GRISLY, *v.* Hideous.

TO GROAN, MOAN.

GROAN and MOAN are both an onomatopœia, from the sounds which they express. *Groan* is a deep sound produced by hard breathing: *moan* is a plaintive long-drawn sound produced by the organs of utterance. The *groan* proceeds involuntarily as an expression of severe pain, either of body or mind: the *moan* proceeds often from the desire of awakening attention or exciting compassion. Dying *groans* are uttered in the agonies of death:

the *moans* of a wounded sufferer are sometimes the only resource he has left to make his destitute case known.

The plain ox, whose toll,
Patient and ever ready, clothes the land
With all the pomp of harvest, shall be bleed,
And struggling groan beneath the cruel hands
E'en of the clown he feeds? THOMSON.

The fair Alexis lov'd, but lov'd in vain,
And underneath the beechen shade, alone,
Thus to the woods and mountains made his
moan. DAYDEN.

GROSS, COARSE.

GROSS derives its meaning in this application from the Latin *crassus* thick from fat, or that which is of common materials.

COARSE, *v.* Coarse.

These terms are synonymous in the moral application. *Grossness* of habit is opposed to delicacy; *coarseness* to softness and refinement. A person becomes *gross* by an unrestrained indulgence of his sensual appetites; particularly in eating and drinking; he is *coarse* from the want of polish either as to his mind or manners. A *gross* sensualist approximates very nearly to the brute; he sets aside all moral considerations; he indulges himself in the open face of day in defiance of all decency: a *coarse* person approaches nearest to the savage, whose roughnesses of humour and inclination have not been refined down by habits of restraining his own will, and complying with the will of another. A *gross* expression conveys the idea of that which should be kept from the view of the mind, which shocks the moral feeling; a *coarse* expression conveys the idea of an unseemly sentiment in the mind of the speaker. The representations of the Deity by any sensible image is *gross*, because it gives us a low and grovelling idea of a superior being; the doing a kindness, and making the receiver at the same time sensible of your superiority and his dependance, indicates great *coarseness* in the character of the favourer.

A certain preparation is requisite for the enjoyment of devotion in its whole extent: not only must the life be reformed from *gross* enormities, but the heart must have undergone that change which the Gospel demands. BLAIR.

The refined pleasures of a pious mind are, in
2 M

What a dreadful thing is a standing army, for the conduct of the whole, or any part of which, no one is *responsible*.
BURKE.

No man's mistake will be able to warrant an unjust surmise, much less justify a false censure.
SOUTH.

GUARD, *v. Fence*.

TO GUARD, DEFEND, WATCH.

GUARD is but a variation of *ward*, which comes from the Teutonic *wakren* to look to.

DEFEND, *v. Apology*, and to *defend*.

WATCH and WAKE, through the medium of the northern languages, are derived from the Latin *vigil* watchful, *vigeo* to flourish, and the Greek *αγאלλω* to exult or be in spirits.

Guard seems to include in it the idea of both *defend* and *watch*, in as much as one aims to keep off danger, by personal efforts; *guard* comprehends the signification of *defend*, in as much as one employs one's eyes and attention to detect the danger. *Guard* comprehends the idea of *watch*; one *defends* and *watches*, therefore, when one *guards*; but one does not always *guard* when one *defends* or *watches*.

To *defend* is employed in a case of actual attack; to *guard* is to *defend*, by preventing the attack: the soldier *guards* the palace of the king in time of peace; he *defends* the power and kingdom of his prince in time of war, or the person of the king in the field of battle: one *guards* in cases where resistance is requisite, and attack is threatened; one *watches* in cases where an unresisting enemy is apprehended: soldiers or armed men are employed to *guard* those who are in custody; children are set to *watch* the corn which is threatened by the birds: hence it is that those are termed *guards* who surround the person of the monarch, and those are termed *watchmen* who are employed by night, to *watch* for thieves and give the alarm, rather than make any attack.

In the improper application they have a similar sense: modesty *guards* female honor; it enables her to present a bold front to the daring violator: clothing *defends* against the inclemency of the weather: a person who wants to escape *watches* his op-

portunity to slip out unobserved. The love of his subjects is the king's greatest safeguard; walls are no *defence* against an enraged multitude; it is necessary for every man to set a *watch* upon his lips, lest he suffer that to escape from him of which he may afterwards repent.

Modesty is not only an ornament, but also a guard to virtue.
ADDISON.

Forthwith on all sides to his aid was run,
By angels many and strong, who interpos'd
Defence.
MILTON.

But see the well-plum'd bear comes nodding on,
Stately and slow, and properly attended
By the whole sable tribe, that painful watch
The sick man's door, and live upon the dead.
BLAIR.

GUARD, SENTINEL.

THESE terms are all employed to designate those who are employed for the protection of either persons or things.

The GUARD has been explained above (*v. To guard*); the SENTINEL, in French *sentinelle*, is properly a species of *guard*, namely, a military *guard* in the time of a campaign: any one may be set as *guard* over property, who is empowered to keep off every intruder by force; but the *sentinel* acts in the army as the watch (*v. To guard*) in the police, rather to observe the motions of the enemy, than to repel any force.

Fast as he could, he sighing quits the walls,
And thus descending, on the *guards* he calls.
POPE.

One of the *sentinels*, who stood on the stage to prevent disorder, burst into tears.
STEELE.

Conscience is the *sentinel* of virtue. JOHNSON.

GUARD, GUARDIAN.

THESE words are derived from the verb *guard* (*v. To guard*); but they have acquired a distinct office.

GUARD is used either in the literal or figurative sense; GUARDIAN only in the improper sense. *Guard* is applied either to persons or things; *guardian* only to persons. In application to persons, the *guard* is temporary; the *guardian* is fixed and permanent: the *guard* only *guards* against external evils; the *guardian* takes upon him the office of parent, counselor, and director: when a house is in danger of being attacked, a person may sit up as a *guard*; when the parent is

The Bible is our best *guide* for moral practice; the doctrines as interpreted in the articles of the established church are the best *rule* of faith for every Christian.

You must first apply to religion as the *guide* of life, before you can have recourse to it as the refuge of sorrow. BLAIR.

There is something so wild, and yet so solemn, in Shakspeare's speeches of his ghosts and fairies, and the like imaginary persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, though we have no *rule* by which to judge them. ADDISON.

GUILT, *v. Deceit.*

GUILTLESS, INNOCENT, HARMLESS.

GUILTLESS, without *guilt*, is more than INNOCENT: *innocence*, from *noceo* to hurt, extends no farther than the quality of not hurting by any direct act; *guiltless* comprehends the quality of not intending to hurt: it is possible, therefore, to be *innocent* without being *guiltless*, though not *vice versa*: he who wishes for the death of another is not *guiltless*, though he may be *innocent* of the crime of murder. *Guiltless* seems to regard a man's general condition; *innocent* his particular condition: no man is *guiltless* in the sight of God, for no man is exempt from the guilt of sin; but he may be *innocent* in the sight of men, or *innocent* of all such intentional offences as render him obnoxious to his fellow creatures. *Guiltlessness* was that happy state of perfection which men lost at the fall; *innocence* is that relative or comparative state of perfection which is attainable here on earth: the highest state of *innocence* is an ignorance of evil.

Ah! why should all mankind
For one man's fault thus *guiltless* be condemn'd,
If *guiltless*? But from me what can proceed
But all corrupt? MILTON.

When Adam sees the several changes of nature about him, he appears in a disorder of mind suitable to one who had forfeited both his *innocence* and his happiness. ADDISON.

Guiltless is in the proper sense applicable only to the condition of man; and when applied to things, it still has a reference to the person: *innocent* is equally applicable to persons or things; a person is *innocent* who has not committed any injury, or has

not any direct purpose to commit any injury; or a conversation is *innocent* which is free from what is hurtful. *Innocent* and HARMLESS both recommend themselves as qualities negatively good; they designate a freedom either in the person or thing to injure, and differ only in regard to the nature of the injury: *innocence* respects moral injury, and *harmless* physical injury: a person is *innocent* who is free from moral impurity and wicked purposes; he is *harmless* if he have not the power or disposition to commit any violence; a diversion is *innocent* which has nothing in it likely to corrupt the morals; a game is *harmless* which is not likely to inflict any wound, or endanger the health.

But from the mountain's grassy side,
A *guiltless* feast I bring;
A scrip with fruits and herbs supplied,
And water from the spring. GOLDSMITH,

A man should endeavour to make the sphere of his *innocent* pleasures as wide as possible, that he may retire into them with safety.

ADDISON.

Full on his breast the Trojan arrow fell,
But *harmless* bounded from the plated steel.

ADAMSON,

GUILTY, *v. Criminal.*

GUISE, HABIT.

GUISE and wise are both derived from the northern languages, and denote the manner; but the former is employed for a particular or distinguished manner of dress.

HABIT, from the Latin *habitus* a habit, fashion, or form, is taken for a settled or permanent mode of dress.

The *guise* is that which is unusual, and often only occasional; the *habit* is that which is usual amongst particular classes: a person sometimes assumes the *guise* of a peasant, in order the better to conceal himself; he who devotes himself to the clerical profession puts on the *habit* of a clergyman.

Anubis, Sphinx,
Idols of antique *guise*, and horned Pan,
Terrific, monstrous shapes! DYER,

For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich,
And as the sun breaks through the darkest cloud
So honour appeareth in the meanest *habit*.

SHAKESPEARE

GULF, ABYSS.

GULF, in Greek *αλυσος* from *αλναι*

either *happiness* or *felicity*, both as to the degree and nature of the enjoyment. *Happiness* is the thing adapted to our present condition, and to the nature of our being, as a compound of body and soul; it is impure in its nature, and variable in degree; it is sought for by various means and with great eagerness; but it often lies much more within our reach than we are apt to imagine: it is not to be found in the possession of great wealth, of great power, of great dominions, of great splendor, or the unbounded indulgence of any one appetite or desire; but it is to be found in moderate possessions, with a heart tempered by religion and virtue, for the enjoyment of that which God has bestowed upon us: it is, therefore, not so unequally distributed as some have been led to conclude.

Happiness admits of degrees, since every individual is placed in different circumstances, either of body or mind, which fit him to be more or less *happy*. *Felicity* is not regarded in the same light; it is that which is positive and independent of all circumstances: domestic *felicity*, and conjugal *felicity*, are regarded as moral enjoyments, abstracted from every thing which can serve as an alloy. *Bliss* is that which is purely spiritual; it has its source in the imagination, and rises above the ordinary level of human enjoyments: of earthly *bliss* little is known but in poetry; of heavenly *bliss* we form but an imperfect conception from the utmost stretch of our powers. *Blessedness* is a term of spiritual import which refers to the happy condition of those who enjoy the Divine favor, and are permitted to have a foretaste of heavenly *bliss*, by the exaltation of their minds above earthly *happiness*. *Beatitude* denotes the quality of *happiness* only which is most exalted; namely, heavenly *happiness*.

Ah! whither now are fled
Those dreams of greatness? those unsold hopes
Of happiness?
TOMSON.

No greater *felicity* can genius attain than
that of having purified intellectual pleasure,
separated mirth from indecency, and wit from
licentiousness.
JOHNSON.

The fond soul,
Wrapt in gay visions of unreal bliss,
Still paints th' illusive form.
THOMSON.

In the description of heaven and hell we are

scarcely interested, as we are all to reside here-
after either in the regions of horror or of *bliss*.

JOHNSON.

So solid a comfort to men, under all the troubles and afflictions of this world, is that firm assurance which the Christian religion gives us of a future *happiness*, as to bring even the greatest miseries which in this life we are liable to, in some sense, under the notion of *blessedness*.

TILLOTSON.

As in the next world, so in this, the only solid blessings are owing to the goodness of the mind, not the extent of the capacity; friendship here is an emanation from the same source as *beatitude* there.
POM.

HAPPINESS, *v. Well-being.*

HAPPY, FORTUNATE.

HAPPY and FORTUNATE are both applied to the external circumstances of a man; but the former conveys the idea of that which is abstractedly good, the latter implies rather what is agreeable to one's wishes. A man is *happy* in his marriage, in his children, in his connections, and the like: he is *fortunate* in his trading concerns. *Happy* excludes the idea of chance; *fortunate* excludes the idea of personal effort: a man is *happy* in the possession of what he gets; he is *fortunate* in getting it.

In the improper sense they bear a similar analogy. A *happy* thought, a *happy* expression, a *happy* turn, a *happy* event, and the like, denotes a degree of positive excellence; a *fortunate* idea, a *fortunate* circumstance, a *fortunate* event, are all relatively considered, with regard to the wishes and views of the individual.

O *happy*, if he knew his *happy* state,
The swain, who, free from business and debate,
Receives his easy food from nature's hand,
And just returns of cultivated land.
DRYDEN.

Visit the gayest and most *fortunate* on earth
only with sleepless nights, disorder any single
organ of the senses, and you shall (will) presently
see his gaiety vanish.
BLAIR.

HARANGUE, *v. Address.*

TO HARASS, *v. To distress.*

TO HARASS, *v. To weary.*

HARBINGER, *v. Fore-runner.*

HARBOR, HAVEN, PORT.

THE idea of a resting-place for vessels is common to these terms, of which HARBOR is general, and the two others specific in their signification.

Harbor, from the Teutonic *herber*-

solid man holds no purposes that are not well founded. A man is *hardened* in that which is bad, by being made insensible to that which is good: a man is *confirmed* in any thing good or bad, by being rendered less disposed to lay it aside; his mind is *consolidated* by acquiring fresh motives for action.

I see you labouring through all your inconveniences of the rough roads, the *hard* saddle, the trotting horse, and what not. POPE.

The loosen'd ice
Rustles no more; but to the sedge bank
Fast grows, or gathers round the pointed stone,
A crystal pavement, by the breath of heaven
Cemented firm. THOMSON.

A copious manner of expression gives strength and weight to our ideas, which frequently makes impressions upon the mind, as iron does upon *solid* bodies, rather by repeated strokes than a single blow. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

HARD, CALLOUS, HARDENED, OB DURATE.

HARD is here, as in the former case (*v. Hard*), the general term, and the rest particular: *hard*, in its most extensive physical sense, denotes the property of resisting the action of external force, so as not to undergo any change in its form, or separation in its parts: CALLOUS is that species of the *hard*, in application to the skin, which arises from its dryness, and the absence of all nervous susceptibility. *Hard* and *calious* are likewise applied in the moral sense: but *hard* denotes the absence of tender feeling, or the property of resisting any impression which tender objects are apt to produce; *calious* denotes the property of not yielding to the force of motives to action. A *hard* heart cannot be moved by the sight of misery, let it be presented in ever so affecting a form: a *calious* mind is not to be touched by any persuasions however powerful.

Hard does not designate any circumstance of its existence or origin: we may be *hard* from a variety of causes; but *callousness* arises from the indulgence of vices, passions, and the pursuit of vicious practices. When we speak of a person as *hard*, it simply determines what he is: if we speak of him as *calious*, it refers also to what he was, and from what he is become so.

Callous, HARDENED, and OB DURATE, are all employed to designate the morally depraved state of a man's character: but *callousness* belongs properly to the heart and affections; *hardened* to both the heart and the understanding; *obdurate* more particularly to the will. *Callousness* is the first stage of *hardness* in moral depravity; it may exist in the infant mind, on its first tasting the poisonous pleasures of vice, without being acquainted with its remote consequences. A *hardened* state is the work of time; it arises from a continued course of vice, which becomes as it were habitual, and unfits the whole person for admitting of any other impressions: *obduracy* is the last stage of moral *hardness*, which supposes the whole mind to be obstinately bent on vice. A child discovers himself to be *calious*, in whom the tears and entreaties of a parent cannot awaken a single sentiment of contrition; a youth discovers himself to be *hardened* who begins to take a pride and a pleasure in his vicious career; a man shows himself to be *obdurate* when he betrays a settled and confirmed purpose to pursue his abandoned course, without regard to consequences.

Such woes
Not e'en the *hardest* of our foes could bear,
Nor stern Ulysses tell without a tear. DRYDEN.

By degrees the sense grows *calious*, and loses
that exquisite relish of trifles. BENJELKY.

His *harden'd* heart, nor prayers, nor threatenings
move;
Fate and the gods had stopp'd his ears to love. DRYDEN.

Round he throws his baleful eyes,
That witness'd huge affliction and dismay,
Mix'd with *obdurate* pride and steadfast hate. MILTON.

HARD, HARDY, INSENSIBLE, UNFRELING.

HARD (*v. Hard*) may either be applied to that which makes resistance to external impressions, or that which presses with a force upon other objects: HARDY, which is only a variation of *hard*, is applicable only in the first case: thus, a person's skin may be *hard*, which is not easily acted upon; but the person is said to be *hardy* who can withstand the elements:

our power to *expedite* a business : we *dispatch* a great deal of business within a given time. *Expedition* is requisite for one who executes ; *dispatch* is most important for one who determines and directs. An inferior officer must proceed with *expedition* to fulfil the orders, or execute the purposes of his commander ; a general or minister of state *dispatches* the concerns of planning, directing, and instructing. Hence it is we speak only of *expediting* a thing ; but we may speak of *dispatching* a person, as well as a thing.

Every man *hastens* to remove his property in case of fire. Those who are anxious to bring any thing to an end will do every thing in their power to *accelerate* its progress. Those who are sent on any pressing errand will do great service by using *speed*. The success of a military progress depends often on the *expedition* with which it is conducted. In the counting-house and the cabinet, *dispatch* is equally important ; as we cannot do more than one thing at a time, it is of importance to get that quickly concluded to make way for another.

Where with like *haste*, though several ways they run,
Some to undo, and some to be undone. DENHAM.

Let the aged consider well, that by every intemperate indulgence they *accelerate* decay.

BLAIR.

The coachman was ordered to drive, and they hurried with the utmost *expedition* to Hyde Park Corner. JOHNSON.

And as, in races, it is not the large stifle, or high lift, that makes the *speed* ; so, in business, the keeping close to the matter, and not taking of it too much at once, procureth *dispatch*.

BACON.

TO HASTEN, HURRY.

HASTEN, *v. To hasten.*

HURRY, in French *harier*, probably comes from the Hebrew *charrer* or *harrer* to be inflamed, or be in a hurry.

To *hasten* and *hurry* both imply to move forward with quickness in any matter ; but the former may proceed with some design and good order, but the latter always supposes perturbation and irregularity. We *hasten* in the communication of good news, when we make efforts to convey it in the shortest time possible ; we *hurry* to get to an end, when we impa-

tiently and inconsiderately press forward without making choice of our means. To *hasten* is opposed to delay or a dilatory mode of proceeding ; it is frequently indispensable to *hasten* in the affairs of human life : to *hurry* is opposed to deliberate and cautious proceeding ; it must always be prejudicial and unwise to *hurry* : men may *hasten* ; children *hurry*.

As epithets, *hasty* and *hurried* are both employed in the bad sense ; but *hasty* implies merely an overquickness of motion which outstrips consideration ; *hurried* implies a disorderly motion which springs from a distempered state of mind. Irritable people use *hasty* expressions ; they speak before they think : deranged people walk with *hurried* steps ; they follow the blind impulse of undirected feeling.

Homer, to preserve the unity of action, *hastens* into the midst of things, as Horace has observed.

ADDISON.

Now 'tis nought
But restless *hurry* through the busy air,
Beat by unnumber'd wings. THOMSON.

HASTINESS, *v. Rashness.*

HASTY, *v. Cursory.*

HASTY, *v. Angry.*

TO HATE, DETEST.

HATE, *v. Antipathy.*

DETEST, *v. To abhor.*

The alliance between these terms in signification is sufficiently illustrated in the articles referred to. Their difference consists more in sense than application.

To *hate* is a personal feeling directed towards the object independently of its qualities ; to *detest* is a feeling independent of the person, and altogether dependent upon the nature of the thing. What one *hates*, one *hates* commonly on one's own account ; what one *detests*, one *detests* on account of the object : hence it is that one *hates*, but not *detests*, the person who has done an injury to one's self ; and that one *detests*, rather than *hates*, the person who has done injuries to others. Joseph's brethren *hated* him because he was more beloved than they ; we *detest* a traitor to his country because of the enormity of his offence.

Who knows whether indignation may not succeed to terror, and the revival of high sentiments, spurning away the illusion of safety purchased at the expence of glory, may not drive us to a generous despair. **BURKE.**

The wise will determine from the gravity of the case; the irritable, from sensibility to oppression; the *highminded*, from disdain and indignation at abusive power in unworthy hands. **BURKE.**

TO HAUL OR HALR, *v.* To draw.

TO HAUNT, *v.* To frequent.

TO HAZARD, RISK, VENTURE.

HAZARD, *v.* Chance.

RISK, *v.* Danger.

VENTURE is the same as adventure (*v.* Event).

All these terms denote actions performed under an uncertainty of the event; but *hazard* bespeaks a want of design and choice on the part of the agent; to *risk* implies a choice of alternatives; to *venture*, a calculation and balance of probabilities: one *hazards* and *risks* under the fear of an evil; one *ventures* with the hope of a good. He who *hazards* an opinion or an assertion does it from presumptuous feelings and upon slight grounds; chances are rather against him than for him that it may prove erroneous: he who *risks* a battle does it often from necessity; he who chooses the least of two evils, although the event is dubious, yet he fears less from a failure than from inaction: he who *ventures* on a mercantile speculation does it from a love of gain; he flatters himself with a favorable event, and acquires boldness from the prospect.

There are but very few circumstances to justify us in *hazarding*; there may be several occasions which render it necessary to *risk*, and very many cases in which it may be advantageous to *venture*.

They list with women each degen'rate name,
Who dares not *hazard* life for future fame.

DRYDEN.

If the adventurer *risques* honour, he *risques* more than the knight. **HAWKESWORTH.**

Socrates, in his discourse before his death, says, he did not know whether his body shall (would) remain after death, but he thought so, and had such hopes of it that he was very willing to *venture* his life upon these hopes. **TILLOTSON.**

HAZARD, *v.* Chance.

HEAD, *v.* Chief.

HEADSTRONG, *v.* Obstinate.

HEADY, *v.* Obstinate.

TO HEAL, *v.* To cure.

HEALTHY, WHOLESOME, SALUBRIOUS, SALUTARY.

HEALTHY signifies not only having *health*, but also causing *health*.

WHOLESOME, like the German *heilsam*, signifies making whole, keeping whole or sound.

SALUBRIOUS and SALUTARY, from the Latin *salus* safety or *health*, signify likewise contributive to *health* or good in general.

These epithets are all applicable to such objects as have a kindly influence on the bodily constitution: *healthy* is the most general and indefinite; it is applied to exercise, to air, situation, climate, and most other things, but food, for which *wholesome* is commonly substituted: the life of a farmer is reckoned the most *healthy*; and the simplest diet is the most *wholesome*. *Healthy* and *wholesome* are rather negative in their sense; *salubrious* and *salutary* are positive: that is *healthy* and *wholesome* which does no injury to the *health*; that is *salubrious* which serves to improve the *health*; and that is *salutary* which serves to remove a disorder: climates are *healthy* or *unhealthy*, according to the constitution of the person; water is a *wholesome* beverage for those who are not dropsical; bread is a *wholesome* diet for human beings; the air and climate of southern France has been long famed for its *salubrity*, and has induced many invalids to repair thither for the benefit of their *health*; the effects have not been equally *salutary* in all cases: it is the concern of government that the places destined for the public education of youth should be in *healthy* situations; that their diet should be *wholesome* rather than delicate; and that in all their disorders care should be taken to administer the most *salutary* remedies.

Wholesome and *salutary* have likewise an extended and moral application; *healthy* and *salubrious* are employed only in the proper sense: *wholesome* in this case seems to convey the idea of making whole again what has not been sound; but *salutary* re-

WARM, *v. Fire.*

SINCERE, *v. Candid.*

CORDIAL, from *cors* the heart, signifies according to the heart.

Hearty and *warm* express a stronger feeling than *sincere*; *cordial* is a mixture of the *warm* and *sincere*. There are cases in which it may be peculiarly proper to be *hearty*, as when we are supporting the cause of religion and virtue; there are other cases in which it is peculiarly proper to be *warm*, as when the affections ought to be roused in favor of our friends; in all cases we ought to be *sincere*, when we express either a sentiment or a feeling; and it is peculiarly happy to be on terms of *cordial* regard with those who stand in any close relation to us. The man himself should be *hearty*; the heart should be *warm*; the professions *sincere*; and the reception *cordial*.

Yet should some neighbour feel a pain
Just in the parts where I complain,
How many a message would he send,
What *hearty* prayers that I should mend.

SWIFT.

Youth is the season of *warm* and generous emotions.

BLAIR.

I have not since we parted been at peace,
Nor known one joy *sincere*.

ROWE.

With a gratitude the most *cordial*, a good man looks up to that Almighty Benefactor, who aims at no end but the happiness of those whom he blesses.

BLAIR.

HEAT, *v. Fire.*

HEATHEN, *v. Gentiles.*

TO HEAVE, *v. To lift.*

TO HEAVE, SWELL.

HEAVE is used either transitively or intransitively, as a reflective or a neuter verb; SWELL is used only as a neuter verb. *Heave* implies raising, and *swell* implies distension: they differ therefore very widely in sense, but they sometimes agree in application. The bosom is said both to *heave* and to *swell*; because it happens that the bosom *swells* by *heaving*; the waves are likewise said to *heave* themselves or to *swell*, in which there is a similar correspondence between the actions: otherwise most things which *heave* do not *swell*, and those which *swell* do not *heave*.

He *heaves* for breath, he staggers to and fro,

And clouds of burning smoke his nostrils loudly
blow.

DRYDEN.

Mean time the mountain billows, to the clouds
In dreadful tumult, *swell'd* surge above surge.

THOMSON.

HEAVENLY, *v. Celestial.*

HEAVENLY, *v. Godlike.*

HEAVINESS, *v. Weight.*

HEAVY, DULL, DROWSY.

HEAVY is allied to both DULL and DROWSY, but the latter have no close connexion with each other.

Heavy and *dull* are employed as epithets both for persons and things; *heavy* characterizes the corporeal state of a person; *dull* qualifies the spirits or the understanding of the subject. A person has a *heavy* look whose temperament seems composed of gross and weighty materials which weigh him down and impede his movements; he has a *dull* countenance in whom the ordinary brightness and vivacity of the mind is wanting: *heavy* is either a characteristic of the constitution, or only a temporary state arising from external or internal causes; *dull* as it respects the frame of the spirits, is a partial state, as it respects the mental vigor, it is a characteristic of the individual. It is a misfortune frequently attached to those of a corpulent habit to be very *heavy*: there is no one who from the changes of the atmosphere may not be occasionally *heavy*. Those who have no resources in themselves are always *dull* in solitude: those who are not properly instructed, or have a deficiency of capacity, will appear *dull* in all matters of learning.

Heavy is either properly or improperly applied to things which are conceived to have an undue proportion of tendency to pressure or leaning downwards: *dull* is in like manner employed for whatever fails in the necessary degree of brightness or vivacity; the weather is *heavy* when the air is full of thick and weighty materials; it may be *dull* from the intervention of clouds.

Heavy and *drowsy* are both employed in the sense of sleepy; but the former is only a particular state, the latter particular or general; all persons may be occasionally *heavy* or *drowsy*; some are habitually *drowsy*.

HEEDLESS, *v. Negligent.*

TO HEIGHTEN, RAISE,
AGGRAVATE.

TO HEIGHTEN is to make *higher* (*v. Haughty*). To RAISE is to cause to rise (*v. To arise*). To AGGRAVATE (*v. To aggravate*) is to make *heavy*. *Heighten* refers more to the result of the action of making *higher*; *raise* to the mode: we *heighten* a house by *raising* the roof; as *raising* conveys the idea of setting up aloft, which is not included in the word *heighten*. On the same ground a head-dress may be said to be *heightened*, which is made *higher* than it was before; and a chair or a table is *raised* that is set upon something else: but in speaking of a wall, we may say, that it is either *heightened* or *raised*, because the operation and result must in both cases be the same. In the improper sense of these terms they preserve a similar distinction: we *heighten* the value of a thing; we *raise* its price: we *heighten* the grandeur of an object; we *raise* a family.

Heighten and *aggravate* have connection with each other only in application to offences: the enormity of an offence is *heightened*, the guilt of the offender is *aggravated* by particular circumstances. The horrors of a murder are *heightened* by being committed in the dead of the night; the guilt of the perpetrator is *aggravated* by the addition of ingratitude to murder.

Purity and virtue *heighten* all the powers of fruition. BLAIR.

I would have our conceptions *raised* by the dignity of thought and sublimity of expression, rather than by a train of robes or a plume of feathers. ADDISON.

The counsels of pusillanimity very rarely put off, whilst they are always sure to *aggravate*, the evils from which they would fly. BURKE.

HEINOUS, FLAGRANT, FLAGITIOUS, ATROCIOUS.

HEINOUS, in French *heinous*, Greek *αἰσῆς* or *δαιμῆς* terrible.

FLAGRANT, in Latin *flagrans* burning, is a figurative expression for what is excessive and violent in its nature.

FLAGITIOUS, in Latin *flagitiosus*, from *flagitium* infamous, denotes peculiarly infamous.

ATROCIOUS, in Latin *atrox* cruel, from *ater* black, signifies exceedingly black.

These epithets, which are applied to crimes, seem to rise in degree. A crime is *heinous* which seriously offends against the laws of men; a sin is *heinous* which seriously offends against the will of God: an offence is *flagrant* which is in direct defiance of established opinions and practice: it is *flagitious* if a gross violation of the moral law, or coupled with any grossness: a crime is *atrocious* which is attended with any aggravating circumstances. Lying is a *heinous* sin; gaming and drunkenness are *flagrant* breaches of the Divine law; the murder of a whole family is in the fullest sense *atrocious*.

There are many authors who have shown wherein the malignity of a lie consists, and set forth in proper colours the *heinousness* of the offence. ADDISON.

If any *flagrant* deed occur to smite a man's conscience, on this he cannot avoid resting with anxiety and terror. BLAIR.

It is recorded of Sir Matthew Hale, that he for a long time concealed the consecration of himself to the stricter duties of religion, lest by some *flagitious* action he should bring piety into disgrace. JOHNSON.

The wickedness of a loose or profane author is more *atrocious* than that of the giddy libertine. JOHNSON.

TO HELP, ASSIST, AID, SUCCOUR, RELIEVE.

HELP, in Saxon *helpan*, German *helfen*, probably from the Greek *φίλλω* to do good to, to *help*.

ASSIST, in Latin *assisto*, or *ad* and *sisto*, signifies to place one's self by another so as to give him our strength.

AID, in Latin *adjuvo*, that is the intensive syllable *ad* and *juvo*, signifies to profit towards a specific end.

SUCCOUR, in Latin *succurro* to run to the *help*.

RELIEVE, *v. To alleviate.*

The idea of communicating to the advantage of another is common to all these terms. *Help* is the generic term; the rest specific: *help* may be substituted for the others, and in many cases where they would not be applicable. The first three are employed either to produce a positive good or to remove an evil; the two latter only to remove an evil. We *help* a person to prosecute his work,

members of the establishment, who hold though they do not avow *heretical* notions.

The *heretic* is considered as such with regard to the Catholic Church or the whole body of Christians, holding the same fundamental principles; but the *schismatic* and *sectarian* are considered as such with regard to particular established bodies of Christians. *Schism*, from the Greek *σχίζω* to split, denotes an action, and the *schismatic* is an agent who splits for himself in his own individual capacity: the *sectarian* does not expressly perform a part, he merely holds a relation; he does not divide any thing himself, but belongs to that which is already cut or divided. The *schismatic* therefore takes upon himself the whole moral responsibility of the *schism*; but the *sectarian* does not necessarily take an active part in the measures of his *sect*: whatever guilt attaches to *schism* attaches to the *schismatic*; he is a voluntary agent, who acts from an erroneous principle, if not an unchristian temper: the *sectarian* is often an involuntary agent; he follows that to which he has been incidentally attached. It is possible, therefore, to be a *schismatic*, and not a *sectarian*; as also to be a *sectarian*, and not a *schismatic*. Those professed members of the establishment who affect the title of evangelical, and wish to palm upon the Church the peculiarities of the Calvinistic doctrine, and to ingraft their own modes and forms into its discipline, are *schismatics*, but not *sectarians*; on the other hand, those who by birth and education are attached to a *sect*, are *sectarians*, but not always *schismatics*. Consequently, *schismatic* is a term of much greater reproach than *sectarian*.

The *schismatic* and *sectarian* have a reference to any established body of Christians of any country; but *dissenter* is a term applicable only to the inhabitants of Great Britain, and bearing relation only to the established Church of England: it includes not only those who have individually and personally renounced the doctrines of the Church, but those who are in a state of *dissent* or difference from it. *Dissenters* are not necessarily either

schismatics or *sectarians*, for British Roman Catholics and the Presbyterians of Scotland are all *dissenters*, although they are the reverse of what is understood by *schismatic* and *sectarian*: it is equally clear that all *schismatics* and *sectarians* are not *dissenters*, because every established community of Christians, all over the world, have had individuals or smaller bodies of individuals setting themselves up against them: the term *dissenter* being in a great measure technical, it may be applied individually or generally without conveying any idea of reproach: the same may be said of *nonconformist*, which is a more special term, including only such as do not *conform* to some established or national religion: consequently, all members of the Romish Church, or of the Kirk of Scotland, are excluded from the number of *nonconformists*; whilst on the other hand, all British-born subjects not adhering to these two forms, and at the same time renouncing the established form of their country, are of this number, among whom may be reckoned Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, and all other such *sects* as have been formed since the reformation.

It is certain if our zeal were true and genuine, we should be much more angry with a sinner than a *heretic*.
ADDISON.

The *schismatics* disturb the sweet peace of our Church.
HOWEL.

In the house of Sir Samuel Luke, one of Cromwell's officers, Butler observed so much of the character of the *Sectaries* that he is said to have written or began his poem at this time.

JOHNSON.

Of the *Dissenters*, Swift did not wish to infringe the toleration, but he opposed their incroachments.

JOHNSON.

Watts is at least one of the few poets with whom youth and ignorance may be safely pleased; and happy will that reader be, whose mind is disposed, by his verses or his prose, to imitate him in all but his *nonconformity*.

JOHNSON.

TO HESITATE, *v.* To demur.

TO HESITATE, FALTER,
STAMMER, STUTTER.

HESITATE, *v.* To demur.

FALTER or FAULTER seems to signify to commit a *fault* or blunder,

or it may be a frequentative of to fall, signifying to stumble.

STAMMER, in the Teutonic *stammern*, comes most probably from the Hebrew *salem* to obstruct.

STUTTER is but a variation of *stammer*.

A defect in utterance is the idea which is common in the signification of all these terms: they differ either as to the cause or the mode of the action. With regard to the cause, a *hesitation* results from the state of the mind, and an interruption in the train of thoughts; *falter* arises from a perturbed state of feeling; *stammer* and *stutter* arise either from an incidental circumstance, or more commonly from a physical defect in the organs of utterance. A person who is not in the habits of public speaking, or of collecting his thoughts into a set form, will be apt to *hesitate* even in familiar conversation; he who first addresses a public assembly will be apt to *falter*. Children who first begin to read will *stammer* at hard words: and one who has an impediment in his speech will *stutter* when he attempts to speak in a hurry.

With regard to the mode or degree of the action, *hesitate* expresses less than *falter*; *stammer* less than *stutter*.

The slightest difficulty in uttering words constitutes a *hesitation*; a pause or the repetition of a word may be termed *hesitating*: but to *falter* supposes a failure in the voice as well as the lips when they refuse to do their office. *Stammering* and *stuttering* are confined principally to the useless moving of the mouth; he who *stammers* brings forth sounds, but not the right sounds, without trials and efforts; he who *stutters* remains for some time in a state of agitation without uttering a sound.

To look with solicitude and speak with *hesitation* is attainable at will; but the show of wisdom is ridiculous when there is nothing to cause doubt, as that of valour when there is nothing to be feared. JOHNSON.

And yet was every *faultering* tongue of man,
Almighty Father! silent in thy praise,
Thy works themselves would raise a general
voice. THOMSON.

Will *stamm'ring* tongues and *stagg'ring* feet
produce. DRYDEN.

* Vide Roubaud: "Hérétique, hétérodoxe."

TO HESITATE, *v.* To scruple.

HESITATION, *v.* Demur.

HETERODOXY, HERESY.

HETERODOXY, from the Greek *heteros* and *doxa*, signifies another or a different doctrine.

HERESY, from the Greek *heresis*, a choice, signifies an opinion adopted by individual choice.

* To be of a different persuasion is *heterodoxy*; to have a faith of one's own is *heresy*; the *heterodoxy* characterizes the opinions formed; the *heresy* characterizes the individual forming the opinion: the *heterodoxy* exists independently and for itself; the *heresy* sets itself up against others. As all division supposes error either on one side or on both, the words *heterodoxy* and *heresy* are applied only to human opinions, and strictly in the sense of a false opinion, formed in distinction from that which is better founded; but the former respects any opinions, important or otherwise; the latter refers only to matters of importance: the *heresy* is therefore a fundamental error. There has been much *heterodoxy* in the Christian world at all times, and among these have been *heresies* denying the plainest and most serious truths which have been acknowledged by the great body of Christians since the Apostles.

All wrong notions in religion are ranked under the general name of *heterodox*. GORDON.

Those who have been present at public disputes in the University, know that it is usual to maintain *heresies* for argument's sake. ANSON.

HIDDEN, *v.* Secret.

TO HIDE, *v.* To conceal.

TO HIDE, *v.* To cover.

HIDE, *v.* Skin.

HIDEOUS, GHASTLY, GRIM,
GRISLY.

HIDEOUS comes probably from *hide*, signifying fit only to be hidden from the view.

GHASTLY signifies like a ghost.

GRIM, in German *grimm*, signifies fierce.

GRISLY, from *grizzle*, signifies grizzled, or motley coloured.

An unseemly exterior is characterized by these terms; but the *hideous* respects natural objects, and the *ghastly* more properly that which is supernatural or what resembles it. A mask with monstrous grinning features looks *hideous*: a human form with a visage of deathlike paleness is *ghastly*. The *grim* is applicable only to the countenance; dogs or wild beasts may look very *grim*: *grisly* refers to the whole form, but particularly to the color; as blackness or darkness has always something terrific in it, a *grisly* figure having a monstrous assemblage of dark colour, is particularly calculated to strike terror. *Hideous* is applicable to objects of hearing also, as a *hideous* roar; but the rest to objects of sight only.

From the broad margin to the centre grow
Shelves, rocks, and whirlpools, *hideous* to the
view. FALCONER.

And death

Grinn'd horribly a *ghastly* smile. MILTON.
Even hell's *grim* king Alickides' pow'r confest. POPE.

All parts resound with tumults, plaints, and
fears,
And *grisly* death in sundry shapes appears. POPE.

HIGH, *v.* Haughty.

HIGH, TALL, LOFTY.

HIGH, in German *hoch*, comes from the Hebrew *agag* to be *high*.

TALL, in Welsh *tal*, is derived by Davis from the Hebrew *talal* to elevate.

LOFTY is doubtless derived from *lift*, and that from the Latin *levatus* raised.

High is the term in most general use, which seems likewise in the most unqualified manner to express the idea of extension upwards, which is common to them all. Whatever is *tall* and *lofty* is *high*, but every thing is not *tall* or *lofty* which is *high*. *Tall* and *lofty* both designate a more than ordinary degree of the *high*; but the *tall* is peculiarly applicable to what shoots up or stands up in a perpendicular direction: but *lofty* is said of that which is extended in breadth as well as in *height*; that which is lifted up or raised by an accretion of matter or an expansion in the air. By this

rule we say that a house is *high*, a chimney *tall*, a room *lofty*.

Trees are in general said to be *high* which exceed the ordinary standard of *height*; they are opposed to the low. A poplar is said to be *tall*, not only from its exceeding others in *height*, but from its perpendicular and spiral manner of growing; it is opposed to that which is bulky. A man and a horse are likewise said to be *tall*; but a hedge, a desk, and other common objects, are *high*. A hill is *high*, but a mountain is *lofty*; churches are in general *high*, but the steeples or the domes of cathedrals are *lofty*, and the spires are *tall*.

With the *high* is associated no idea of what is striking; but the *tall* is coupled with the aspiring or that which strives to out-top: the *lofty* is always coupled with the grand, and that which commands admiration.

High at their head he saw the chief appear.
And bold Merion to excite their rear. POPE.

Prostrate on earth their beauteous bodies lay,
Like mountain firs, as *tall* and straight as they. POPE.

Even now, O king! 'tis giv'n thee to destroy
The *lofty* tow'rs of wide extended Troy. POPE.

High and *lofty* have a moral acception, but *tall* is taken in the natural sense only: *high* and *lofty* are applied to persons or what is personal, with the same difference in degree as before: a *lofty* title or *lofty* pretension conveys more than a *high* title or a *high* pretension. Men of *high* rank should have *high* ideas of virtue and personal dignity, and keep themselves clear from every thing low and mean; a *lofty* ambition often soars too *high* to serve the purpose of its possessor; the greater is his fall when he finds himself compelled to descend.

When you are tried in scandal's court,
Stand *high* in honor, wealth, or wit,
All others who inferior sit
Conceive themselves in conscience bound
To join and drag you to the ground. SWIFT.

Without thee, nothing *lofty* can I sing;
Come then, and with thyself thy genius bring. DRYDEN.

HIGHMINDED, *v.* Haughty.

HIGHSOUNDING, *v.* Noisy.

HILARITY, *v.* Mirth.

ply to the cessation of motion ; we may be *hindered*, therefore, by being *stopped* ; but we may also be *hindered* without being expressly *stopped*, and we may be *stopped* without being *hindered*. If the *stoppage* do not interfere with any other object in view, it is a *stoppage*, but not a *hindrance* ; as when we are *stopped* by a friend whilst walking for pleasure : but if *stopped* by an idler in the midst of urgent business, so as not to be able to proceed according to our business, this is both a *stoppage* and a *hindrance* : on the other hand, if we are interrupted in the regular course of our proceeding, but not compelled to stand still or give up our business for any time, this may be a *hindrance*, but not a *stoppage* : in this manner, the conversation of others in the midst of our business, may considerably retard its progress, and so far *hinder*, but not expressly put a *stop* to the whole concern.

Is it not the height of wisdom and goodness too, to *hinder* the consummation of those soul-waiting sins, by obliging us to withstand them in their first infancy ?

SOURN.

A signal omen *stopp'd* the passing host,
Their martial fury in their wonder lost.

PORR.

TO HINDER, *v.* To retard.

TO HINT, *v.* To allude.

TO HINT, SUGGEST, INTIMATE,
INSINUATE.

HINT, *v.* To allude

SUGGEST, *v.* To allude.

TO INTIMATE is to make one *intimate*, or specially acquainted with ; to communicate one's most inward thoughts.

INSINUATE, from the Latin *sinus* the bosom, is to introduce gently into the mind of another.

All these terms denote indirect expressions of what passes in one's own mind. We *hint* at a thing from fear and uncertainty ; we *suggest* a thing from prudence and modesty ; we *intimate* a thing from indecision ; we *insinuate* a thing from artifice. A person who wants to get at the certain knowledge of any circumstance *hints* at it frequently in the presence of those who can give him the information ; a man who will not offend others by an assumption of superior wisdom

suggests his ideas on a subject, instead of setting them forth with confidence ; when a person's mind is not made up on any future action, he only *intimates* what may be done ; he who has any thing offensive to communicate to another, will choose to *insinuate* it, rather than declare it in express terms. *Hints* are thrown out ; they are frequently characterized as broken : *suggestions* are offered ; they are frequently termed idle or ill-grounded : *intimations* are given, and are either slight or broad : *insinuations* are thrown out ; they are commonly designated as slanderous, malignant, and the like.

'To *hint* is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense ; it is commonly resorted to by tale-bearers, mischief-makers, and all who want to talk of more than they know : it is rarely necessary to have recourse to *hints* in lieu of positive inquiries and declarations, unless the term be used in regard to matters of science or morals, when it designates loose thoughts, casually offered, in distinction from those which are systematized and formally presented : upon this ground, a distinguished female writer of the present day modestly entitles her book, ' *Hints* towards forming the Character of a Young Princess.' To *suggest* is oftener used in the good than the bad sense : while one *suggests* doubts, queries, difficulties, or improvements in matters of opinion, it is truly laudable, particularly for young persons ; but to *suggest* any thing to the disadvantage of another is even worse than to speak ill of him openly, for it bespeaks cowardice as well as ill-nature. To *intimate* is taken either in a good or an indifferent sense ; it commonly passes between relatives or persons closely connected in the communication of their half-formed intentions or of doubtful intelligence. To *insinuate* is always taken in the bad sense ; it is the resource of an artful and malignant enemy to wound the reputation of another, whom he does not dare openly to accuse. A person is said to take a *hint*, to follow a *suggestion*, to receive an *intimation*, to disregard an *insinuation*.

Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,
Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike.

PORR.

porary and partial action is here expressed by *hold*, in distinction from *keep*, which is used to express something definite and permanent: the money-lender *keeps* the property as his own, if the borrower forfeits it by breach of contract. When a person purchases any thing, he is expected to *keep* it, or pay the value of the thing ordered, if the tradesman fulfil his part of the engagement. What is *detained* is *kept* either contrary to the will, or without the consent, of the possessor: when things are suspected to be stolen, the officers have the right of *detaining* them until inquiry be instituted. What is *retained* is continued to be *kept*; it supposes, however, some alteration in the terms or circumstances under which it is *kept*: a person *retains* his seat in a coach, notwithstanding he finds it disagreeable; or a lady *retains* some of the articles of millinery, which are sent for her choice, but she returns the rest.

All are used in a moral application except *detain*; in this case they are marked by a similar distinction. A person is said to *hold* an office, by which simple possession is implied; he may *hold* it for a long or a short time, at the will of others, or by his own will, which are not marked: he *keeps* a situation, or he *keeps* his post, by which his continuance in the situation, or at the post, are denoted: he *retains* his office, by which is signified that he might have given it up, or lost it, had he not been led to continue. In like manner, with regard to one's sentiments or feelings, a man is said to *hold* certain opinions, which are ascribed to him as a part of his creed; he *keeps* the opinions which no one can induce him to give up; he *retains* his old attachments, notwithstanding the lapse of years, and change of circumstances, which have intervened, and were naturally calculated to wean him.

It is a certain sign of a wise government, when it can *hold* men's hearts by hopes. **BACON.**

The proof is best when men *keep* their authority towards their children, but not their purse. **BACON.**

Haste! goddess, haste! the flying host *detain*,
Nor let one sail be hoisted on the main. **Pope.**

Ideas are retained by renovation of that impression which time is always wearing away.

JOHNSON.

TO HOLD, OCCUPY, POSSESS.

HOLD, *v.* To hold.

OCCUPY, in Latin *occupo*, or *oc* and *cipio* to hold or keep, so that it cannot be held by others.

POSSESS, in Latin *possideo*, or *potis* and *sedeo*, signifies to sit as master of.

We *hold* a thing for a long or a short time; we *occupy* it for a permanence: we *hold* it for ourselves or others; we *occupy* it only for ourselves: we *hold* it for various purposes; we *occupy* only for the purpose of converting it to our private use. Thus a person may *hold* an estate, or, which is the same thing, the title deeds to an estate *pro tempore*, for another person's benefit; but he *occupies* an estate if he enjoys the fruit of it. On the other hand, to *occupy* is only to *hold* under a certain compact; but to *possess* is to *hold* as one's own. The tenant *occupies* the farm when he *holds* it by a certain lease, and cultivates it for his subsistence: but the landlord *possesses* the farm who *possesses* the right to let it, and to receive the rent. We may *hold* by force, or fraud, or right; we *occupy* either by force or right; we *possess* only by right. Hence we say figuratively, to *hold* a person in esteem or contempt, to *occupy* a person's attention, or to *possess* his affection.

He (the eagle) drives them from his fort, the
towering seat,

For ages of his empire which in peace
Unstain'd he *holds*.

THOMSON.

In the Frogs of Aristophanes, three entire acts are *occupied* by a contest between *Æschylus* and *Euripides*.

CUMBERLAND.

But now the feather'd youth their former bounds
Ardent disdain, and weighing oft their wings,
Demand the free possession of the sky.

THOMSON.

TO HOLD, SUPPORT, MAINTAIN.

HOLD, *v.* To hold, keep.

SUPPORT, *v.* To countenance.

MAINTAIN, *v.* To assist, maintain.

Hold is here, as in the former article, a term of very general import; he who *supports* and *maintains* must *hold*, though not *vice versa*.

Hold and *support* are employed in the proper sense, *maintain* in the improper sense. To *hold* is a term un-

dage to the solemnity of the scene, which excites a reverential regard to the individual in the mind of the beholder, and the most exalted sentiments of that religion which he thus adorns by his outward profession.

Habitual preparation for the Sacrament consists in a permanent habit or principle of *holiness*.

SOUTH.

About an age ago, it was the fashion in England for every one that would be thought religious, to throw as much *sanctity* as possible into his face.

ADDISON.

HOLLOW, EMPTY.

HOLLOW, from *hole*, signifies being like a hole.

EMPTY, *v. Empty*.

Hollow respects the body itself; the absence of its own materials produces hollowness: *empty* respects foreign bodies; their absence in another body constitutes *emptiness*. *Hollowness* is therefore a preparative to *emptiness*, and may exist independently of it; but *emptiness* presupposes the existence of *hollowness*: what is *empty* must be *hollow*; but what is *hollow* need not be *empty*. *Hollowness* is often the natural property of a body; *emptiness* is a contingent property: that which is *hollow* is destined by nature to contain; but that which is *empty* is deprived of its contents by a casualty: a nut is *hollow* for the purpose of receiving the fruit; it is *empty* if it contain no fruit.

They are both employed in a moral acceptation, and in a bad sense; the *hollow*, in this case, is applied to what ought to be solid or sound; and *empty* to what ought to be filled: a person is *hollow* whose goodness lies only at the surface, whose fair words are without meaning; a truce is *hollow* which is only an external cessation from hostilities: a person is *empty* who is without the requisite portion of understanding and knowledge; an excuse is *empty* which is unsupported by fact and reason; a pleasure is *empty* which cannot afford satisfaction.

The shocks of an earthquake are much more dreadful than the highest and loudest blusters of a storm; for there may be some shelter against the violence of the one, but no security against the *hollowness* of the other.

SOUTH.

The creature man,
Condemn'd to sacrifice his childish years
To babbling ignorance and empty fears. PARN.

HOLY, PIOUS, DEVOUT, RELIGIOUS.

HOLY, *v. Holiness*.

PIOUS, in Latin *pius*, is most probably changed from *dius* or *deus*, signifying regard for the gods.

DEVOUT, in Latin *devotus*, from *devoveo* to engage by a vow, signifies *devoted* or consecrated.

RELIGIOUS, in Latin *religiosus*, comes from *religio* and *religo* to bind, because religion binds the mind, and produces in it a fixed principle.

A strong regard to the Supreme Being is expressed by all these epithets; but *holy* conveys the most comprehensive idea; *pious* and *devout* designate most fervor of mind; *religious* is the most general and abstract in its signification. A *holy* man is in all respects heavenly-minded; he is more fit for heaven than earth: *holiness*, to whatever degree it is possessed, abstracts the thoughts from sublunary objects, and fixes them on things that are above; it is therefore a Christian quality, which is not to be attained in its full perfection by human beings, in their present imperfect state, and is attainable by some to a much greater degree than by others. Our Saviour was a perfect pattern of *holiness*; his apostles after him, and innumerable saints and good men, both in and out of the ministry, have striven to imitate his example, by the *holiness* of their life and conversation: in such, however, as have exclusively *devoted* themselves to his service, this *holiness* may shine brighter than in those who are entangled with the affairs of the world.

Pious is a term more restricted in its signification, and consequently more extended in application than *holy*: *piety* is not a virtue peculiar to Christians, it is common to all believers in a Supreme Being; it is the homage of the heart and the affections to a superior Being: from a similarity in the relationship between a heavenly and an earthly parent, *devotedness* of the mind has in both cases been denominated *piety*. *Piety* towards God naturally produces *piety* towards parents; for the obedience of the heart, which gives rise to the virtue in the one, seems instantly to

dictate the exercise of it in the other. The difference between *holiness* is obvious from this, that our Saviour and his apostles are characterized as *holy*, but not *pious*, because *piety* is swallowed up in *holiness*. On the other hand, Jew and Gentile, Christian and Heathen, are alike termed *pious*, when they cannot be called *holy*, because *piety* is not only a more practicable virtue, but because it is more universally applicable to the dependant condition of man.

Devotion is a species of *piety* peculiar to the worshipper; it bespeaks that devotedness of mind which displays itself in the temple, when the individual seems by his outward services solemnly to *devote* himself, soul and body, to the service of his Maker. *Piety*, therefore, lies in the heart, and may appear externally; but *devotion* does not properly exist except in an external observance: a man *piously* resigns himself to the will of God, in the midst of his afflictions; he prays *devoutly* in the bosom of his family.

Religious is a term of less import than either of the other terms; it denotes little more than the simple existence of *religion*, or a sense of *religion* in the mind: the *religious* man is so, more in his principles than in his affections; he is *religious* in his sentiments, in as much as he directs all his views according to the will of his Maker; and he is *religious* in his conduct, in as much as he observes the outward formalities of homage that are due to his Maker. A *holy* man fits himself for a higher state of existence, after which he is always aspiring; a *pious* man has God in all his thoughts, and seeks to do his will; a *devout* man bends himself in humble adoration, and pays his vows of prayer and thanksgiving; a *religious* man conforms in all things to what the dictates of his conscience require from him, as a responsible being, and a member of society.

When applied to things, they preserve a similar distinction: we speak of the *holy* sacrament; of a *pious* discourse, a *pious* ejaculation; of a *devout* exercise, a *devout* air; a *religious* sentiment, a *religious* life, a *religious* education, and the like.

The holiest man, by conversing with the world, inevitably draws something of soil and taint from it. SOMER.

In every age the practice has prevailed of substituting certain appearances of *piety* in the place of the great duties of humanity and mercy. BLAIR.

A state of temperance, sobriety, and justice, without *devotion*, is a lifeless insipid condition of virtue. ARNDT.

Devotion expresses not so much the performance of any particular duty, as the spirit which must animate all religious duties. BLAIR.

HOLY, SACRED, DIVINE.

HOLY, *v.* Holiness.

SACRED, in Latin *sacer*, is derived either from the Greek *agios* holy or *sacros* whole, perfect, and the Hebrew *sacah* pure.

DIVINE, *v.* Godlike.

Holy is here, as in the former article, a term of higher import than either *sacred* or *divine*: whatever is most intimately connected with religion and religious worship, in its purest state, is *holy*, is unhallowed by a mixture of inferior objects, is elevated in the greatest possible degree, so as to suit the nature of an infinitely perfect and exalted Being. Among the Jews, the *holy of holies* was that place which was intended to approach the nearest to the heavenly abode, consequently was preserved as much as possible from all contamination with that which is earthly: among the Christians, that religion or form of religion is termed *holy*, which is esteemed purest in its doctrine, discipline, and ceremonies; by the Roman Catholics this title is applied to their own form; by the Church of England it has been adopted to designate its religious system. Upon this ground we speak of the church as a *holy* place, of the sacrament as the *holy* sacrament, and the ordinances of the church as *holy*.

Sacred is less than *holy*; the *sacred* derives its sanction from human institutions, and is connected rather with our moral than our religious duties: what is *holy* is altogether spiritual, and abstracted from the earthly; what is *sacred* may be simply the human purified from what is gross and corrupt: what is *holy* must be regarded with awe, and treated with every possible mark of reverence; what is sa-

cred must not be violated nor infringed upon. The laws are *sacred*, but not *holy*; a man's word should be *sacred*, though not *holy*: for neither of these things is to be revered, but both are to be kept free from injury or external violence. The *holy* is not so much opposed to, as it is set above, every thing else; the *sacred* is opposed to the profane: the Scriptures are properly denominated *holy*, because they are the word of God, and the fruit of his *Holy* Spirit; but other writings may be termed *sacred* which appertain to religion, in distinction from the profane, which appertain only to worldly matters.

Divine is a term of even less import than *sacred*; it signifies either belonging to the Deity, or being like the Deity; but from the looseness of its application it has lost in some respects the dignity of its meaning. The *divine* is often contrasted with the human: but there are many human things which are denominated *divine*: Milton's poem is entitled a *divine* poem, not merely on account of the subject, but from the exalted manner in which the poet has treated his subject: what is *divine*, therefore, may be so superlatively excellent as to be conceived of as having the stamp of inspiration from the Deity, which of course, as it respects human performances, is but an hyperbolical mode of speech.

From the above explanation of these terms, it is clear that there is a manifest difference between them, and yet that their resemblance is sufficiently great for them to be applied to the same objects. We speak of the *Holy* Spirit, and of *Divine* inspiration; by the first of which epithets is understood not only what is superhuman, but what is a constituent part of the Deity; by the second is represented merely in a general manner the source of the inspiration as coming from the Deity, and not from man. Subjects are denominated either *sacred* or *divine*, as when we speak of *sacred* poems, or *divine* hymns; *sacred* here characterizes the subjects of the poems, as those which are to be held *sacred*; and *divine* designates the subject of the hymns as not being ordinary or merely human: it is clear, therefore, that

what is *holy* is in its very nature *sacred*, but not *vice versa*; and that what is *holy* and *sacred* is in its very nature *divine*; but the *divine* is not always either *holy* or *sacred*.

To fit us for a due access to the *holy* Sacrament, we must add actual preparation to habitual.

SOUTH.

Religion properly consists in a reverential esteem of things *sacred*.

SOUTH.

When a man resteth and assurth himself upon *Divine* protection, he gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain.

BACON.

HOLY-DAY, *v.* Feast.

HOMAGE, FEALTY, COURT.

HOMAGE, in French *hommage*, comes from *homme* a man, signifying a man's, that is, an inferior's, act of acknowledging superiority. *Homage*, in the technical sense, was an oath taken, or a service performed, by the tenant to his lord, on being admitted to his land; or by inferior princes to a sovereign, whereby they acknowledged his sovereignty, and promised fidelity: in its extended and figurative sense, it comprehends any solemn mark of deference, by which the superiority of another is acknowledged.

FEALTY, changed from *fidelity*, is a lower species of *homage*, consisting only of an oath; it was made formerly by tenants, who were bound thereby to personal service under the feudal system; it is never taken otherwise than in the proper sense.

COURT, which derives its meaning from the verb to *court*, woo, and seek favor, is a species of *homage*, complaisance, or deference, which is assumed for a specific purpose; it is not only voluntary, but depends upon the humor and convenience of the courter.

Homage is paid or done to superior endowments; *court* is paid to the contingent, not the real, superiority of the individual. *Homage* consists in any form of respect which is admitted in civil society; the Romans did *homage* to the talent of Virgil, by always rising when he entered the theatre; men do *homage* to the wisdom of another, when they do not venture to contradict his assertions, or call in question his opinions. Court

is every thing or nothing, as circumstances require; he who pays his court consults the will and humour of him to whom it is paid, while he is consulting his own interest.

We cannot avoid observing the homage which the world is constrained to pay to virtue. BLAIR.

Man disobeying,
Disloyal breaks his fealty. MIZTON.

Virtue is the universal charm; even its shadow
is courted. BLAIR.

HONEST, *v. Fair.*

HONEST, *v. Sincere.*

HONESTY, UPRIGHTNESS, INTEGRITY, PROBITY.

HONESTY, *v. Fair.*

UPRIGHTNESS, from *upright*, in German *aufrichtig* or *aufgerichtet*, from *aufrichten* to set up, signifies in a straight direction, not deviating nor turning aside.

Honest is the most familiar and universal term; it is applied alike to actions and principles, to a mode of conduct or a temper of mind: *upright* is applied to the conduct, but always with reference to the moving principle. As it respects the conduct, *honesty* is a much more homely virtue than *uprightness*: a man is said to be *honest* who in his dealings with others does not violate the laws; thus a servant is *honest* who does not take any of the property of his master, or suffer it to be taken; a tradesman is *honest* who does not sell bad articles; and people in general are denominated *honest* who pay what they owe, and do not adopt any methods of defrauding others: *honesty* in this sense, therefore, consists in negatives; but *uprightness* is positive, and extends to all matters which are above the reach of the law, and comprehends not only every thing which is known to be hurtful, but also whatever may chance to be hurtful. To be *honest* requires nothing but a knowledge of the first principles of civil society; it is learned, and may be practised, by the youngest and most ignorant: but to be *upright* supposes a superiority of understanding or information, which qualifies a person to discriminate between that which may or may not injure another. An *honest* man is contented with not overcharging another

for that which he sells to him; but an *upright* man seeks to provide him with that which shall fully answer his purpose: a man will not think himself *dishonest* who leaves another to find out defects which it is possible may escape his notice; but an *upright* man will rather suffer a loss himself than expose another to an error which may be detrimental to his interests. From this difference between *honesty* and *uprightness* arises another, namely, that the *honest* man may be *honest* only for his own convenience, out of regard to his character, or a fear of the laws; but the *upright* man is always *upright*, from his sense of what is right, and his concern for others.

Honest, in its extended sense, as it is applied to principles, or to the general character of a man, is of a higher cast than the common kind of *honesty* abovementioned; *uprightness*, however, in this case, still preserves its superiority. An *honest* principle is the first and most universally applicable principle which the mind forms of what is right and wrong; and the *honest* man, who is so denominated on account of his having this principle, is looked upon with respect, in as much as he possesses the foundation of all moral virtue in his dealings with others. *Honest* is here the generic term, and *uprightness* the specific term; the former does not exclude the latter, but the latter includes the former. There may be many *honest* men and *honest* minds; but there are not so many *upright* men nor *upright* minds. The *honest* man is rather contrasted with the rogue, and an *honest* principle is opposed to the selfish or artful principle: but the *upright* man or the *upright* mind can be compared or contrasted with nothing but itself. An *honest* man will do no harm if he know it; but an *upright* man is careful not to do to another what he would not have another do to him.

Honesty is a feeling that actuates and directs by a spontaneous impulse; *uprightness* is a principle that regulates or puts every thing into an even course. *Honesty* can be dispensed with in no case; but *uprightness* is called in question only in certain cases. We characterize a servant or the lowest person as *honest*: but we do

not entitle any one in so low a capacity as *upright*, since *uprightness* is exercised in matters of higher moment, and rests upon the evidence of a man's own mind; a judge, however, may with propriety be denominated *upright*, who scrupulously adheres to the dictates of an unbiassed conscience in the administration of justice.

Uprightness is applicable only to principles and actions; INTEGRITY, from the Latin *integer* whole, is applicable to the whole man or his character; and PROBITY, from *probus* or *prohibus* restraining, that is, restraining from evil, is in like manner used only in the comprehensive sense. *Uprightness* is the straightness of rule by which actions and conduct in certain cases is measured; *integrity* is the wholeness or unbrokenness of a man's character throughout life in his various transactions; *probity* is the excellence and purity of a man's character in his various relations. When we call a man *upright*, we consider him in the detail; we bear in mind the uniformity and fixedness of the principle by which he is actuated: when we call him a man of *integrity*, we view him in the gross, not in this nor that circumstance of life, but in every circumstance in which the rights and interests of others are concerned. *Uprightness* may therefore be looked upon in some measure as a part of *integrity*; with this difference, that the acting principle is in the one case only kept in view, whereas in the other case the conduct and principle are both included. The distinction between these terms is farther evident by observing their different application. We do not talk of a man's *uprightness* being shaken, or of his preserving his *uprightness*; but of his *integrity* being shaken, and his preserving his *integrity*. We may, however, ascribe the particular conduct of any individual as properly to the *integrity* of his principles or mind, as to the *uprightness* of his principles. A man's *uprightness* displays itself in his dealings, be they ever so minute; but the *integrity* of his character is seen in the most important concerns of life. A judge shows his *uprightness* in his daily administration of

justice, when he remains uninfluenced by any partial motive; he shows his *integrity* when he resists the most powerful motives of personal interest and advantage out of respect to right and justice.

Integrity and *probity* are both general and abstract terms; but the former is relative, the latter is positive: *integrity* refers to the external injuries by which it may be assailed or destroyed; it is goodness tried and preserved: *probity* is goodness existing of itself, without reference to any thing else. There is no *integrity* where private interest is not in question; there is no *probity* wherever the interests of others are injured: *integrity* therefore includes *probity*, but *probity* does not necessarily suppose *integrity*. *Probity* is a free principle, that acts without any force; *integrity* is a defensive principle, that is obliged to maintain itself against external force. *Probity* excludes all injustice; *integrity* excludes in a particular manner that injustice which would favor one's self. *Probity* respects the rights of every man, and seeks to render to every one what is his due; it does not wait to be asked, it does not require any compulsion; it voluntarily enters into all the circumstances and conditions of men, and measures out to each his portion: *probity* therefore forbids a man being malignant, hard, cruel, ungenerous, unfair, or any thing else which may press unequally and unjustly on his neighbour: *integrity* is disinterested; it sacrifices every personal consideration to the maintenance of what is right: a man of *integrity* will not be contented to abstain from selling himself for gold; he will keep himself aloof from all private partialities or resentments, all party cabals or intrigue, which are apt to violate the *integrity* of his mind. We look for *honesty* and *uprightness* in citizens; it sets every question at rest between man and man: we look for *integrity* and *probity* in statesmen, or such as have to adjust the rights of many; they contribute to the public as often as to the private good.

Were I to take an estimate of the comparative value of these four terms, I should denominate *honesty* a current

our parents by holding a similar sentiment in a less degree.

To *honor* and *respect* are extended to other objects besides our Maker and our parents; but *reverence* is confined to objects of a religious description, "We *honor* the king and all that are put in authority under him," by rendering to them the tribute that is due to their station; we *respect* all who possess superior qualities: the former is an act of duty, it flows out of the constitution of civil society; the latter is a voluntary act flowing out of the temper of the mind towards others. To *respect*, as I have before observed, signifies merely to feel *respect*; but to show *respect*, or a mark of *respect*, supposes an outward action which brings it still nearer to *honor*. It is a mark of *honor* in subjects to keep the birth-day of their Sovereign; it is a mark of *respect* to any individual to give him the upper seat in a room or at a table. Divine *honors* were formerly paid by the Romans to some of their emperors: *respect* is always paid to age in all Christian countries; among the heathens it differed according to the temper of the people.

Of learning, as of virtue, it may be affirmed that it is at once *honored* and neglected.

JOHNSON.

The foundation of every proper disposition towards God must be laid in *reverence*, that is, admiration mixed with awe.

BLAIR.

Establish your character on the *respect* of the wise, not on the flattery of dependents.

BLAIR.

HONOR, DIGNITY.

HONOR (*v. Honor*) may be taken either for that which intrinsically belongs to a person, or for that which is conferred on him.

DIGNITY, from the Latin *dignus* worthy, signifying worthiness, may be equally applied to what is extrinsic or intrinsic in a man.

In the first case *honor* has a reference to what is esteemed by others; *dignity* to that which is esteemed by ourselves: a sense of *honor* impels a man to do that which is esteemed *honorable* among men; a sense of *dignity* to do that which is consistent with the worth and greatness of his nature: the former strives to elevate himself as

an individual; the latter to raise himself to the standard of his species: the former may lead a person astray; but the latter is an unerring guide. It is *honor* which makes a man draw his sword upon his friend: it is *dignity* which makes him despise every paltry affront from others, and apologize for every apparent affront on his own part. This distinction between the terms is kept up in their application to what is extraneous of a man: the *honor* is that which is conferred on him by others; but the *dignity* is the worth or value which is added to his condition: hence we always speak of *honors* as conferred or received; but *dignities* as possessed or maintained. *Honors* may sometimes be casual; but *dignities* are always permanent: an act of condescension from the sovereign is an *honor*; but the *dignity* lies in the elevation of the office. Hence it is that *honors* are mostly civil or political; *dignities* ecclesiastical.

When a proud aspiring man meets with *honors* and preferments, these are the things which are ready to lay hold of his heart and affections.

SOUTH.

Him Tallus next in *dignity* succeeds. DRYDEN.

HOPE, EXPECTATION, TRUST, CONFIDENCE.

HOPE, in German *hoffen*, probably comes from the Greek *opsis* to look at with pleasure.

EXPECTATION, *v. To await.*

TRUST, *v. Belief.*

CONFIDENCE, *v. To confide.*

Anticipation of futurity is the common idea expressed by all these words. *Hope* is welcome; *expectation* is either welcome or unwelcome: we *hope* only for that which is good; we *expect* the bad as well as the good. In bad weather we *hope* it will soon be better; but in a bad season we *expect* a bad harvest, and in a good season a good harvest. *Hope* is simply a presentiment; it may vary in degree, more according to the temper of the mind than the nature of the circumstances; some *hope* where there is no ground for *hope*, and others despair where they might *hope*: *expectation* is a conviction that excludes doubt; * we *expect* in proportion as that conviction is positive: we *hope*

* See Eberhardt: "Hoffnung, Erwartung, vertrauen, schein.".

same in signification, is employed either in poetry or in application to moral objects : a room is *hot* ; a furnace or the tail of a comet *fiery* ; a coal *burning* ; the sun *ardent*.

In the figurative application, a temper is *hot* or *fiery* ; rage is *burning* ; the mind is *ardent* in pursuit of an object. A zeal may be *hot*, *fiery*, *burning*, and *ardent* ; but in the first three cases, it denotes the intemperance of the mind when *heated* by religion or politics ; the latter is admissible so long as it is confined to a good object.

Let loose the raging elements. Breath'd hot
From all the boundless furnace of the sky,
And the wide glittering waste of burning sand,
A suffocating wind the pilgrim smites
With instant death. THOMSON.

E'en the camel feels,
Shot through his wither'd heart, the *fiery* blast. THOMSON.

The royal eagle draws his vigorous young,
Strong pounc'd, and *ardent* with paternal fire. THOMSON.

HOUSE, v. Family.

HOWEVER, YET, NEVERTHELESS, NOTWITHSTANDING.

THESE conjunctions are in grammar termed adversative, because they join sentences together that stand more or less in opposition to each other. HOWEVER is the most general and indefinite ; it serves as a conclusive deduction drawn from the whole.

The truth is *however* not yet all come out ; by which is understood that much of the truth has been told, and much *yet* remains to be told : so likewise in similar sentences ; I am not *however* of that opinion ; where it is implied either that many hold the opinion, or much may be said of it ; but be that as it may, I am not of that opinion : *however* you may rely on my assistance to that amount ; that is, at all events, let whatever happen, you may rely on so much of my assistance : *however*, as is obvious from the above examples, connects not only one single proposition, but many propositions either expressed or understood. YET, NEVERTHELESS, and NOTWITHSTANDING, are mostly employed to set two specific propositions either in contrast or direct opposition to each other ; the two

latter are but species of the former, pointing out the opposition in a more specific manner.

There are cases in which *yet* is peculiarly proper ; others in which *nevertheless*, and others in which *notwithstanding*, is preferable. *Yet* bespeaks a simple contrast ; Addison was not a good speaker, *yet* he was an admirable writer ; Johnson was a man of uncouth manners, *yet* he had a good heart and a sound head : *nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* could not in these cases have been substituted. *Nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* are mostly used to imply effects or consequences opposite to what might naturally be expected to result. He has acted an unworthy part ; *nevertheless* I will be a friend to him as far as I can ; that is, although he has acted an unworthy part, I will be no less his friend as far as lies in my power. *Notwithstanding* all I have said, he still persists in his own imprudent conduct, that is, all I have said *notwithstanding* or not restraining him from it, he still persists. He is still rich *notwithstanding* his loss ; that is, his loss *notwithstanding*, or *not standing* in the way of it, he is still rich. From this resolution of the terms, more than from any specific rule, we may judge of their distinct applications, and clearly perceive that in such cases as those above-cited the conjunctions *nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* could not be substituted for each other, nor *yet* for either : in other cases, *however*, where the objects are less definitely pointed out, they may be used indifferently. The Jesuits piqued themselves always upon their strict morality, and *yet* (*notwithstanding* or *nevertheless*) they admitted of many things not altogether consonant with moral principle : you know that these are but tales, *yet* (*notwithstanding*, *nevertheless*) you believe them.

However it is but just sometimes to give the world a representation of the bright side of human nature. HUGHES.

He had not that reverence for the queen as might have been expected from a man of his wisdom and breeding ; *yet* he was impudently solicitous to know what her Majesty said of him in private. CLARENDON.

There will always be something that we shall wish to have finished ; and be *nevertheless* unwilling to begin. JOHNSON.

to others from a sense of their desert ; a *modest* man demands nothing for himself, from an unconsciousness of desert in himself.

Between *humble* and *submissive* there is this prominent feature of distinction, that the former marks a temper of mind, the latter a mode of action ; the former is therefore often the cause of the latter, but not so always : we may be *submissive*, because we are *humble* : but we may likewise be *submissive* from fear, from interested motives, from necessity, from duty, and the like ; and on the other hand, we may be *humble* without being *submissive*, when we are not brought into connexion with others. A man is *humble* in his closet when he takes a review of his sinfulness : he is *submissive* to his master whose displeasure he dreads.

As *humility* may display itself in the outward conduct, it approaches still nearer to *submissive* in application : hence we say a *humble* air, and a *submissive* air ; the former to denote a man's sense of his own comparative littleness, the latter to indicate his readiness to submit to the will of another : a man therefore carries his *humble* air about with him to all his superiors, nay, indeed to the world at large ; but he puts on his *submissive* air only to the individual who has the power of controlling him. Upon the same principle, if I *humbly* ask a person's pardon, or *humbly* solicit any favor, I mean to express a sense of my own unworthiness, compared with the individual addressed ; but when a counsellor *submissively* or with *submission* addresses a judge on the bench, it implies his willingness to *submit* to the decision of the bench ; or if a person *submissively* yields to the wishes of another, it is done with an air that bespeaks his readiness to conform his actions to a prescribed rule.

In God's holy house, I prostrate myself in the *humblest* and decenter way of genuflection I can imagine.

HOWEL.

Sedition itself is *modest* in the dawn, and only toleration may be petitioned, where nothing less than empire is design'd.

SOUTH.

And potent Rajahs, who themselves preside
O'er realms of wide extent ! But here *sub-*
missive

Their homage pay ; alternate kings and slaves !

SOMERVILLE.

TO HUMBLE, HUMILIATE, DEGRADE.

HUMBLE and HUMILIATE are both drawn from the same source (*v. Humble, modest*).

DEGRADE, *v. To abase.*

Humble is commonly used as the act either of persons or things : a person may *humble* himself or he may be *humbled* : *humiliate* is employed to characterize things ; a thing is *humiliating* or an *humiliation*. No man *humbles* himself by the acknowledgement of a fault ; but it is a great *humiliation* for a person to be dependant on another for a living when he has it in his power to obtain it for himself : to *humble* is to bring down to the ground ; it supposes a certain eminence, either created by the mind, or really existing in the outward circumstances : to *degrade* is to let down lower ; it supposes steps for ascending or descending. He who is most elevated in his own esteem may be most *humbled* ; misfortunes may *humble* the proudest conqueror : he who is most elevated in the esteem of others, may be the most *degraded* ; envy is ever on the alert to *degrade*. A lesson in the school of adversity is *humbling* to one who has known nothing but prosperity : terms of peace are *humiliating* : low vices are peculiarly *degrading* to a man of rank.

Deep horror seizes ev'ry human breast,
Their pride is *humbled*, and their fear confess'd.

DAYDEN.

A long habit of *humiliation* does not seem a very good preparative to manly and vigorous sentiments.

BURKE.

Who but a tyrant (a name expressive of every thing which can vitiate and *degrade* human nature) could think of seizing on the property of men unaccused and unheard ?

BURKE.

TO HUMILIATE, *v. To humble.*

HUMOR, *v. Liquid.*

HUMOR, TEMPER, MOOD.

HUMOR literally signifies moisture or fluid, in which sense it is used for the fluids of the human body ; and as far as these *humors* or their particular state is connected with, or has its influence on, the animal spirits and the moral feelings, so far is *humor* applicable to moral agents.

TEMPER (*v. Disposition*) is less specific in its signification; it may with equal propriety, under the changed form of temperament, be applicable to the general state of the body or the mind.

MOOD, which is but a change from *mode* or manner, has an original signification not less indefinite than the former; it is applied however only to the mind. As the *humors* of the body are the most variable parts of the animal frame, *humor* in regard to the mind denotes but a partial and transitory state when compared with the *temper*, which is a general and habitual state. The *humor* is so fluctuating that it varies in the same mind perpetually; but the *temper* is so far confined that it always shows itself to be the same whenever it shows itself at all: the *humor* makes a man different from himself; the *temper* makes him different from others. Hence we speak of the *humor* of the moment; of the *temper* of youth or of old age: so likewise, to accommodate one's self to the *humor* of a person; to manage his *temper*: to put one into a certain *humor*; to correct or sour the *temper*. *Humor* is not less partial in its nature than in its duration; it fixes itself often on only one object, or respects only one particular direction of the feelings: *temper* extends to all the actions and opinions as well as feelings of a man; it gives a colouring to all he says, does, thinks, and feels. We may be in a *humor* for writing, or reading; for what is gay or what is serious; for what is noisy or what is quiet: but our *temper* is discoverable in our daily conduct; we may be in a good or ill *humor* in company, but in domestic life and in our closest relations we show whether we are good or ill *tempered*. A man shows his *humor* in different or trifling actions; he shows his *temper* in the most important actions: it may be a man's *humor* to sit while others stand, or to go unshaven while others shave; but he shows his *temper* as a Christian or otherwise in forgiving injuries or harbouring resentments; in living peaceably, or indulging himself in contentions.

The same distinction is kept up between the terms when applied to bo-

dies of men. A nation may have its *humor* and its *temper* as much as an individual: the former discovers itself in the manners and fashions; the latter in its public spirit towards its government or other nations. It has been the unlucky *humor* of the present day to banish ceremony, and consequently decency, from all companies: the *temper* of the times is somewhat more sober now than it was during the heat of the revolutionary mania.

Humor and *mood* agree in denoting a particular and temporary state of feeling; but they differ in the cause: the former being attributable rather to the physical state of the body; and the latter to the moral frame of the mind: the former therefore is independent of all external circumstances, or at all events, of any that are reducible to system; the latter is guided entirely by events, or the view which the mind takes of events. The *humor* is therefore generally taken in a bad sense, unless actually qualified by some epithet to the contrary: the *mood* is always taken in an indifferent sense. There is no calculating on the *humor* of a man; it depends upon his *mood* whether he performs ill or well: it is necessary to suppress *humor* in a child; we discover by the melancholy *mood* of a man that something distressing has happened to him.

True modesty is ashamed to do any thing that is opposite to the *humour* of the company.

ADAMS.

There are three or four single men who suit my *temper* to a hair.

COWPER.

Strange as it may seem, the most ludicrous lines I ever wrote have been written in the saddest mood.

COWPER.

HUMOR, CAPRICE.

HUMOR, *v. Humor*.

CAPRICE, *v. Fantastical*.

Humor is general; *caprice* is particular: *humor* may be good or bad; *caprice* is always taken in a bad sense. *Humor* is always independant of fixed principle; it is the feeling or impulse of the moment: *caprice* is always opposed to fixed principle, or rational motives of acting; it is the feeling of the individual setting at nought all rule, and defying all reason. The feeling only is perverted when the *humor* predominates; the judgement and

will is perverted by *caprice*: a child shows its *humor* in fretfulness and impatience; a man betrays his *caprice* in his intercourse with others, in the management of his concerns, in the choice of his amusements.

Indulgence renders children and subordinate persons *humorsome*; prosperity or unlimited power is apt to render a man *capricious*: a *humorsome* person commonly objects to be pleased, or is easily displeased; a *capricious* person likes and dislikes, approves and disapproves the same thing in quick succession. *Humor*, when applied to things, has the sense of wit; whence the distinction between *humorsome* and *humorous*: the former implying the existence of *humor* or perverted feeling in the person; the latter implying the existence of *humor* or wit in the person or thing. *Caprice* is improperly applied to things to designate their total irregularity and planlessness of proceeding; as, in speaking of fashion, we notice its *caprice*, when that which has been laid aside is again taken into use: diseases are termed *capricious* which act in direct opposition to all established rule.

You'll ask me, why I rather choose to have
A weight of carrion flesh than to receive
Three thousand ducats; I'll not answer that,
But say, it is my *humor*. SHAKESPEARE.

Men will submit to any rule by which they
may be exempted from the tyranny of *caprice*
and chance. JOHNSON.

HUMOR, *v. Wit.*

TO HUMOR, *v. To qualify.*

HUNT, CHACE.

THE leading idea in the word HUNT is that of searching after; the leading idea in the word CHACE is that of driving away, or before one. In the strict sense, the *hunt* is made for objects not within sight; the *chace* is made after such objects only as are within sight: we may *hunt*, therefore, without *chasing*; we may *chase* without *hunting*: a person *hunts* after, but does not *chase* that which is lost: a boy *chases*, but does not *hunt* a butterfly. When applied to field sports, the *hunt* commences as soon as the huntsman begins to look for the game; the *chace* commences as soon as it is

found: on this ground, perhaps, it is, that *hunt* is used in familiar discourse, to designate the specific act of taking this amusement; and *chace* is used only in particular cases where the peculiar idea is to be expressed: a fox *hunt*, or a stag *hunt*, is said to take place on a particular day; or that there has been no *hunting* this season, or that the *hunt* has been very bad: but we speak, on the other hand, of the pleasures of the *chace*; or that the *chace* lasted very long; the animal gave a long *chace*.

Come hither, boy! we'll *hunt* to-day
The bookworm, ravaging beast of prey.

PARNELL.

Greatness of mind and fortune too
Th' Olympic trophies show;
Both their several parts must do
In the noble *chace* of fame.

COWLEY.

TO HURL, *v. To cast.*

HURRICANE, *v. Breeze.*

TO HURRY, *v. To hasten.*

HURT, *v. Injury.*

HURT, *v. Sorry.*

HURTFUL, *v. Disadvantage.*

HURTFUL, PERNICIOUS, NOXIOUS, NOISOME.

HURTFUL signifies full of *hurt*, or causing plenty of *hurt*.

PERNICIOUS, *v. Destructive.*

NOXIOUS and NOISOME, from the Latin *noxius* and *noceo* to hurt, signifies the same originally as *hurtful*.

Between *hurtful* and *pernicious* there is the same distinction as between *hurting* and *destroying*: that which is *hurtful* may *hurt* in various ways; but that which is *pernicious* necessarily tends to destruction: confinement is *hurtful* to the health; bad company is *pernicious* to their morals; or the doctrines of freethinkers are *pernicious* to the well-being of society. *Noxious* and *noisome* are species of the *hurtful*: things may be *hurtful* both to body and mind; *noxious* and *noisome* only to the body: that which is *noxious* inflicts a direct injury; that which is *noisome* inflicts it indirectly: *noxious* insects are such as wound; *noisome* vapours are such as tend to create disorders: Ireland is said to be free from every *noxious* weed or animal; where

nations are employed on distant and strange objects: hence the *thoughts* are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; the *imagination*s, wild and extravagant. The *thoughts* engage the mind as circumstances give rise to them; they are always supposed to have a foundation in some thing: the *imagination*s, on the other hand, are often the mere fruit of a disordered brain; they are always regarded as unsubstantial, if not unreal; they frequently owe their origin to the suggestions of the appetites and passions; whence they are termed the *imagination*s of the heart.

Every one finds that many of the *ideas* which he desired to retain have slipped away irretrievably.

JOHNSON.

O calm

The warring passions, and tumultuous *thoughts*
That rage within thee!

ROWE.

Different climates produce in men by a different mixture of the humours, a different and unequal course of *imagination*s and passions.

TRIPLE.

IDEA, *v.* Perception.

IDEAL, IMAGINARY.

IDEAL does not strictly adhere to the sense of its primitive *idea* (*v.* *Idea*): the *idea* is the representation of a real object in the mind; but *ideal* signifies belonging to the *idea* independant of the reality or the external object. IMAGINARY preserves the signification of its primitive *imagination* (*v.* *Fancy*, also *v.* *Idea*), as denoting what is created by the mind itself.

The *ideal* is not directly opposed to, but abstracted from, the reality: the *imaginary*, on the other hand, is directly opposed to the reality; it is the unreal thing formed by the *imagination*. *Ideal* happiness is the happiness which is formed in the mind, without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something possible to be realised; it may be above nature, but not in direct contradiction to it: the *imaginary* is that which is opposite to some positive existing reality; the pleasure which a lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is altogether *imaginary*.

There is not, perhaps, in all the stores of *ideal* anguish, a thought more painful than the consciousness of having propagated corruption.

JOHNSON.

Superior beings know well the vanity of those *imaginary* perfections that swell the heart of man.

ADDISON.

IDIOM, *v.* Language.

IDIOT, *v.* Fool.

IDLE, LAZY, INDOLENT.

IDLE is in German *eitel* vain.

LAZY, in German *lässig*, comes from the Latin *lassus* weary, because weariness naturally engenders *laziness*.

INDOLENT, in Latin *indolens*, signifies without feeling, having apathy or unconcern.

A propensity to inaction is the common idea by which these words are connected; they differ in the cause and degree of the quality: *idle* expresses less than *lazy*, and *lazy* less than *indolent*: one is termed *idle* who will do nothing useful; one is *lazy* who will do nothing at all without great reluctance; one is *indolent* who does not care to do any thing or set about any thing. There is no direct inaction in the *idler*; for a child is *idle* who will not learn his lesson, but he is active enough in that which pleases himself: there is an aversion to corporeal action in a *lazy* man, but not always to mental action; he is *lazy* at work, *lazy* in walking, or *lazy* in sitting; but he may not object to any employment, such as reading or thinking, which leaves his body entirely at rest: an *indolent* man, on the contrary, fails in activity from a defect both in the mind and the body; he will not only not move, but he will not even think, if it give him trouble; and trifling exertions of any kind are sufficient, even in prospect, to deter him from attempting to move.

Idleness is common to the young and the thoughtless, to such as have not steadiness of mind to set a value on any thing which may be acquired by exertion and regular employment; the *idle* man is opposed to one that is diligent: *laziness* is frequent among those who are compelled to work for others; it is a habit of body superinduced upon one's condition; those who should labor are often the most unwilling to move at all, and since the spring of the mind which should impel them to action is wanting, and

as they are continually under the necessity of moving at the will of another, they acquire an habitual reluctance to any motion, and find their comfort in entire inaction : hence *laziness* is almost confined to servants and the labouring classes ; *laziness* is opposed to industry : *indolence* is a physical property of the mind, a want of motive or purpose to action : the *indolent* man is not so fond of his bodily ease as the *lasy* man, but he shrinks from every species of exertion still more than the latter ; *indolence* is a disease most observable in the higher classes, and even in persons of the highest intellectual endowments, in whom there should be the most powerful motives to exertion ; the *indolent* stands in direct opposition to nothing but the general term active.

The life of a common player is most apt to breed an habitual *idleness* ; as they have no serious employment to occupy their hands or their heads, they grow averse to every thing which would require the exercise of either : the life of a common soldier is apt to breed *laziness* ; he who can sit or lie for twenty hours out of the twenty-four, will soon acquire a disgust to any kind of labor, unless he be naturally of an active turn : the life of a rich man is most favorable to *indolence* ; he who has every thing provided at his hand, not only for the necessities, but the comforts of life, may soon become averse to every thing that wears the face of exertion ; he may become *indolent*, if he be not unfortunately so by nature.

As pride is sometimes hid under humility, *idleness* is often covered by turbulence and hurry.
JOHNSON.

The daw,
The rook, and magpie, to the grey-grown oaks,
That the calm village in their verdant arms
Sheltering embrace, direct their *lasy* flight.
THOMSON.

Nothing is so opposite to the true enjoyment of life as the relaxed and feeble state of an *indolent* mind.
BLAIR.

IDLE, LEISURE, VACANT.

IDLE, *v. Idle.*

LEISURE, otherwise spelt *leasure*, comes from *lease*, as in the compound *release*, and the Latin *laxo* to make lax or loose, that is, loosed or set free.

VACANT, *v. Free.*

The *idle* is opposed here to the busy ; the *leisure* simply to the employed : he therefore who is *idle*, instead of being busy, commits a fault ; which is not always the case with him who is at *leisure* or free from his employment. *Idle* is therefore always taken in a sense more or less unfavourable ; *leisure* in a sense perfectly indifferent : if a man says of himself that he has spent an *idle* hour in this or that place in amusement, company, and the like, he means to signify he would have spent it better if any thing had offered ; on the other hand, he would say that he spends his *leisure* moments in a suitable relaxation : he who values his time will take care to have as few *idle* hours as possible ; but since no one can always be employed in severe labor, he will occupy his *leisure* hours in that which best suits his taste.

Idle and *leisure* are said in particular reference to the time that is employed ; *vacant* is a more general term, that simply qualifies the thing : an *idle* hour is without any employment ; a *vacant* hour is in general free from the employments with which it might be filled up ; a person has *leisure* time according to his wishes ; but he may have *vacant* time from necessity, that is, when he is in want of employment.

Life is sustained with so little labour, that the tediousness of *idle* time cannot otherwise be supported (than by artificial devices).
JOHNSON.

The plant that shoots from seed, a sullen tree
At *leisure* grows, for late posterity.
DRYDEN.

Idleness dictates expedients, by which life may be passed unprofitably, without the tediousness of many *vacant* hours.
JOHNSON.

IDLE, VAIN.

IDLE, *v. Idle, lazy.*

VAIN, in Latin *vanus*, probably changed from *vacaneus*, signifies empty.

These epithets are both opposed to the solid or substantial ; but *idle* has a more particular reference to what ought or ought not to engage the time or attention ; *vain* seems to qualify the thing without any such reference. A pursuit may be termed either *idle* or *vain* : in the former case, it reflects immediately on the agent for not em-

ploying his time on something more serious; but in the latter case, it simply characterizes the pursuit as one that will be attended with no good consequences: when we consider ourselves as beings who have but a short time to live, and that every moment of that time ought to be thoroughly well spent, we should be careful to avoid all *idle* concerns; when we consider ourselves as rational beings, who are responsible for the use of those powers with which we have been invested by our Almighty Maker, we shall be careful to reject all *vain* concerns: an *idle* effort is made by one who does not care to exert himself for any useful purpose, who works only to please himself; a *vain* effort may be made by one who is in a state of desperation.

And let no spot of *idle* earth be found,
But cultivate the genius of the ground. DRYDEN.

Deluded by *rain* opinions, we look to the advantages of fortune as our ultimate goods.
BLAIR.

IGNOMINY, *v.* Infamy.

IGNORANT, ILLITERATE,
UNLEARNED, UNLETTERED.

IGNORANT, in Latin *ignorans*, from the privative *ig* or *in* and *noru*, or the Greek *γινωσκω*, signifies not knowing things in general, or not knowing any particular circumstance.

UNLEARNED, ILLITERATE, and UNLETTERED, are compared with *ignorant* in the general sense.

Ignorant is a comprehensive term; it includes any degree from the highest to the lowest, and consequently includes the other terms, *illiterate*, *unlearned*, and *unlettered*, which express different forms of *ignorance*. *Ignorance* is not always to one's disgrace, since it is not always one's fault; the term is not therefore directly reproachful: the poor *ignorant* savage is an object of pity, rather than condemnation; but when *ignorance* is coupled with self-conceit and presumption, it is a perfect deformity: hence the word *illiterate*, which is used only in such cases as become a term of reproach: an *ignorant* man who sets up to teach others, is termed an *illiterate* preacher; and quacks, from the very nature of their

calling, are altogether an *illiterate* race of men. The words *unlearned* and *unlettered* are disembursed from any unfavourable associations. A modest man, who makes no pretensions to learning, may suitably apologize for his supposed deficiencies by saying he is an *unlearned* or *unlettered* man; the former is, however, a term of more familiar use than the latter. A man may be described either as generally *unlearned*, or as *unlearned* in particular sciences or arts; as *unlearned* in history; *unlearned* in philosophy; *unlearned* in the ways of the world: a poet may describe his muse as *unlettered*.

He said, and sent Cyllenius with command
To free the ports, and open the Punic land
To Trojan guests: but, ignorant of fate,
The queen might force them from her town and state.
DRYDEN.

Because this doctrine may have appeared to the *unlearned* light and whimsical, I must take leave to unfold the wisdom and antiquity of my first proposition in these my essays, to wit, that "every worthless man is a dead man."

ADDISON.

Ajax, the haughty chief, the *unlettered* soldier, had no way of making his anger known but by gloomy sullenness.
JOHNSON.

ILL, *v.* Badly.

ILLNESS, *v.* Sickness.

ILLITERATE, *v.* Ignorant.

TO ILLUMINATE, ILLUMINE,
ENLIGHTEN.

ILLUMINATE, in Latin *illuminatus*, participle of *illumino*, and ENLIGHTEN, from the noun *light*, both denote the communication of light; the former in the natural, the latter in the moral sense. We *illuminate* by means of artificial lights; the sun *illuminates* the world by its own light: preaching and instruction *enlighten* the minds of men. *Illumine* is but a poetic variation of *illuminate*; as, the Sun of Righteousness *illuminated* the benighted world: *illuminations* are employed as public demonstrations of joy: no nation is now termed *enlightened* but such as have received the light of the Gospel.

Reason our guide, what can she more reply,
Than that the sun *illuminates* the sky? PUSP.

But if neither you nor I can gather so much from these places, they will tell us, it is because we are not inwardly *enlightened*.
BOURN.

What in me is dark
Illumine ; what is low, raise and support.
 MILTON.

TO ILLUMINE, *v.* *To illuminate.*

TO ILLUSTRATE, *v.* *To explain.*

ILLUSTRIOUS, *v.* *Distinguished.*

ILLUSTRIOUS, *v.* *Famous.*

ILL WILL, *v.* *Hatred.*

IMAGE, *v.* *Likeness.*

IMAGINARY, *v.* *Ideal.*

IMAGINATION, *v.* *Fancy.*

IMAGINATION, *v.* *Idea.*

TO IMAGINE, *v.* *To conceive.*

TO IMAGINE, *v.* *To think.*

IMBECILITY, *v.* *Debility.*

TO IMITATE, *v.* *To follow.*

TO IMITATE, COPY, COUNTER-
 FEIT.

TO IMITATE, *v.* *To follow.*

COPY, *v.* *Copy.*

COUNTERFEIT, from the Latin *contra* and *facio*, signifies to make in opposition to the reality.

The idea of taking a likeness of some object is common to all these terms ; but *imitate* is the generic copy, and *counterfeit* the specific : to *imitate* is to take a general likeness ; to *copy*, to take an exact likeness ; to *counterfeit*, to take a false likeness : to *imitate* is, therefore, almost always used in a good or an indifferent sense ; to *copy* mostly, and to *counterfeit* always, in a bad sense : to *imitate* an author's style is at all times allowable for one who cannot form a style for himself ; but to *copy* an author's style would be a too slavish adherence even for the dullest writer. To *imitate* is applicable to every object, for every external object is susceptible of *imitation* ; and in man the *imitative* faculty displays itself alike in the highest and the lowest matters, in works of art and moral conduct : to *copy* is applicable only to certain objects which will admit of a minute likeness being taken ; thus, an artist may be said to *copy* from nature, which is almost the only circumstance in which *copying* is justifiable, except when it is a mere manual act ; to *copy* any thing in

others, whether it be their voice, their manners, their language, or their works, is inconsistent with the independence which belongs to every rational agent : to *counterfeit* is applicable but to few objects, and happily practicable but in few cases ; we may *counterfeit* the coin, or we may *counterfeit* the person, or the character, or the voice, or the hand-writing, of any one for whom we would wish to pass ; but if the likeness be not very exact, the falsehood is easily detected.

Poetry and music have the power of *imitating* the manners of men. SIR W. JONES.

The mind, impressible and soft, with ease
 Imbibes and copies what she hears and sees.

COWPER.

I can *counterfeit* the deep tragedian,
 Speak and look big, and pry on every side.

SHAKESPEARE.

TO IMITATE, MIMICK, MOCK,
 APE.

IMITATE, *v.* *To follow.*

MIMICK, from the Greek *μιμω*, has the same origin as *imitate*.

MOCK, in French *moquer*, Greek *μαρτυρα* to laugh at.

To APE signifies to *imitate* like an *ape*.

To *imitate* is here the general term : to *mimic* and to *ape* are both species of vicious *imitation*.

One *imitates* that which is deserving of *imitation*, or the contrary : one *mimicks* either that which is not an authorized subject of *imitation*, or which is imitated so as to excite laughter. A person wishes to make that his own which he *imitates*, but he *mimicks* for the entertainment of others.

The force of example is illustrated by the readiness with which people *imitate* each other's actions when they are in close intercourse : the trick of *mimickry* is sometimes carried to such an extravagant pitch that no man, however sacred his character, or exalted his virtue, can screen himself from being the object of this species of buffoonery : to *ape* is a serious though an absurd act of *imitation* ; to *mimic* is a jocose act of *imitation* : to *mock* is an ill-natured and vulgar act of *imitation*. The *ape imitates* to please himself, but the *mimic imitates*

to please others. The *ape* seriously tries to come as near the original as he can; the *mimic* tries to render it as ridiculous as possible: the former *apes* out of deference to the person *aped*; the latter *mimicks* out of contempt or disregard.

Mimickry belongs to the merry-andrew or buffoon; *aping* to the weakling who has no originality in himself. Show-people display their talents in *mimicking* the cries of birds or beasts, for the entertainment of the gaping crowd; weak and vain people, who wish to be admired for that which they have not in themselves, *ape* the dress, the manners, the voice, the mode of speech, and the like, of some one who is above them. *Mimickry* excites laughter from that which is burlesque in it; *aping* excites laughter from that which is absurd and unsuitable in it; *mockery* excites laughter from the malicious temper of those who enjoy it.

Because we sometimes walk on two!
I hate the *imitating* crew.

GAY.

Nor will it less delight th' attentive sage
T' observe that instinct which unerring guides
The brutal race which *mimicks* reason's love.

SOMERVILLE.

A courtier any *ape* surpasses;
Behold him humbly cringing wait
Upon the minister of state.
View him soon after to inferiors
Aping the conduct of superiors.

SWIFT.

IMMATERIAL, *v. Incorporeal.*IMMATERIAL, *v. Unimportant.*IMMEDIATELY, *v. Directly.*IMMENSE, *v. Enormous.*IMMINENT, IMPENDING,
THREATENING.

IMMINENT, in Latin *imminens*, from *maneo* to remain, signifies resting or coming upon.

IMPENDING, from the Latin *pendo* to hang, signifies hanging.

THREATENING is used in the sense of the verb to *threaten*.

All these terms are used in regard to some evil that is exceedingly near: *imminent* conveys no idea of duration; *impending* excludes the idea of what is momentary. A person may be in *imminent* danger of losing his life in one instant, and the danger may be over the next instant: but the *im-*

pending danger is that which has been long in existence, and gradually approaching; we can seldom escape imminent danger by any efforts of one's own; but we may be successfully warned to escape from an *impending* danger. *Imminent* and *impending* are said of dangers that are not discoverable; but a *threatening* evil gives intimations of its own approach; we perceive the *threatening* tempest in the blackness of the sky; we hear the *threatening* sounds of the enemy's clashing swords.

The *threatening* voice and fierce gestures with which these words were uttered, struck Montezuma. He saw his own danger was *imminent*, the necessity unavoidable. ROBERTSON.

There was an opinion, if we may believe the Spanish historians, almost universal among the Americans, that some dreadful calamity was *impending* over their heads. ROBERTSON.

IMMODERATE, *v. Excessive.*IMMODEST, *v. Indecent.*

IMMODEST, IMPUDENT, SHAMELESS.

IMMODEST signifies the want of *modesty*: IMPUDENT and SHAMELESS signify without *shame*.

Immodest is less than either *impudent* or *shameless*: an *immodest* girl lays aside the ornament of her sex, and puts on another garb that is less becoming; but her heart need not be corrupt until she becomes *impudent*: she wants a good quality when she is *immodest*; she is possessed of a positively bad quality when she is *impudent*. There is always hope that an *immodest* woman may be sensible of her error, and amend; but of an *impudent* woman there is no such chance, she is radically corrupt.

Impudent may characterize the person or the thing: *shameless* characterizes the person. A person's air, look, and words, are *impudent*, that is contrary to all modesty: the person herself is *shameless* that is devoid of all sense of *shame*.

Music diffuses a calm all around us, and makes us drop all those *immodest* thoughts which would be an hindrance to us in the performance of the great duty of thanksgiving. SPECTATOR.

I am at once equally fearful of sparing you, and of being too *impudent* a corrector. POPE.
The sole remorse his greedy heart can feel,
Is if one life escapes his murdering steel;

*Shameless by force or fraud to work his way,
And so less prompt to flatter than betray.*
CUMBERLAND.

TO IMPAIR, INJURE.

IMPAIR comes from the Latin *im* and *pejoro* or *pejer* worse, signifying to make worse.

INJURE, from *in* and *jus* against right, signifies to make otherwise than it ought to be.

Impair seems to be in regard to *injure* as the species to the genus; what is *impaired* is *injured*, but what is *injured* is not necessarily *impaired*. To *impair* is a progressive mode of *injuring*: to *injure* may take place either by a process, or by an instantaneous act: straining of the eyes *impairs* the sight, but a blow *injures* rather than *impairs* the eye. A man's health may be *impaired* or *injured* by his vices, but his limbs are *injured* rather than *impaired* by a fall. The circumstances are *impaired* by a succession of misfortunes; they are *injured* by a sudden turn of fortune.

It is painful to consider that this sublime enjoyment of friendship may be *impaired* by innumerable causes.
JOHNSON.

Who lives to nature rarely can be poor,
O what a patrimony this! a being
Of such inherent strength and majesty,
Not world's powerest can raise it; worlds destroy'd
can't *injure*.
YOUNG.

TO IMPART, *v.* To communicate.IMPASSABLE, *v.* Impervious.TO IMPEACH, *v.* To accuse.TO IMPEDE, *v.* To hinder.IMPEDIMENT, *v.* Difficulty.TO IMPEL, *v.* To actuate.TO IMPEL, *v.* To encourage.IMPENDING, *v.* Imminent.IMPERATIVE, *v.* Commanding.

IMPERFECTION, DEFECT,
FAULT, VICE.

IMPERFECTION denotes either the abstract quality of *imperfect*, or the thing which constitutes it *imperfect*.

DEFECT, *v.* Blemish.FAULT, *v.* Fault.VICE, *v.* Crime.

These terms are applied either to persons or things. An *imperfection* in a person arises from his want of per-

fection, and the infirmity of his nature; there is no one without some point of *imperfection* which is obvious to others, if not to himself; he may strive to diminish it, although he cannot expect to get altogether rid of it: a *defect* is a deviation from the general constitution of man; it is what may be natural to the man as an individual, but not natural to man as a species; in this manner we may speak of a *defect* in speech, or a *defect* in temper. The *fault* and *vice* rise in degree and character above either of the former terms; they both reflect disgrace more or less on the person possessing them; but the *fault* always characterizes the agent, and is said in relation to an individual; the *vice* characterizes the action, and may be considered abstractedly: hence we speak of a man's *faults* as the things we may condemn in him; but we may speak of the *vices* of drunkenness, lying, and the like, without any immediate reference to any one who practises these *vices*. When they are both employed for an individual, their distinction is obvious: the *fault* may lessen the amiability or excellence of the character; the *vice* is a stain; a single act destroys its purity, an habitual practice is a pollution.

In regard to things the distinction depends upon the preceding explanation in a great measure, for we can scarcely use these words without thinking on man as a moral agent, who was made the most perfect of all creatures, and became the most *imperfect*; and from our *imperfection* has arisen, also, a general *imperfection* throughout all the works of creation. The word *imperfection* is therefore the most unqualified term of all: there may be *imperfection* in regard to our Maker; or there may be *imperfection* in regard to what we conceive of *perfection*: and in this case, the term simply and generally implies whatever falls short in any degree or manner of *perfection*. *Defect* is a positive degree of *imperfection*; it is contrary both to our ideas of *perfection*, or our particular intention: thus, there may be a *defect* in the system; a *defect* in the materials of which a thing is made; or a *defect* in the mode of making it; the

defect, however, whether said of persons or things, characterizes rather the object than the agent. *Fault*, on the other hand, when said of things, always refers to the agent: thus we may say there is a *defect* in the glass, or a *defect* in the spring; but there is a *fault* in the workmanship, or a *fault* in the putting together, and the like. The *vice*, with regard to things, is properly a serious or radical *defect*; the former lies in the constitution of the whole, the latter may lie in the parts; the former lies in the essences, the latter lies in the accidents: there may be a *defect* in the shape or make of a horse; but the *vice* is said in regard to his soundness or unsoundness, his docility or indocility.

It is a pleasant story that we forsooth who are the only *imperfect* creatures in the universe, are the only beings that will not allow of *imperfect*ion. STEELE.

The low race of men take a secret pleasure in finding an eminent character levelled to their condition by a report of its *defects*, and keep themselves in countenance, though they are excelled in a thousand virtues, if they believe that they have in common with a great person any one *fault*. ADDISON.

I did myself the honour this day to make a visit to a lady of quality, who is one of those that are ever railing at the *vices* of the age. STEELE.

IMPERFECTION, WEAKNESS, FRAILITY, FAILING, FOIBLE.

THE IMPERFECTION (*v. Imperfection*) has already been considered as that which in the most extended sense abridges the moral *perfection* of ~~man~~ the rest are but modes of *imperfect*ion varying in degree and circumstances. The WEAKNESS is a positive and strong degree of *imperfect*ion which is opposed to strength; it is what we do not so necessarily look for, and therefore distinguishes the individual who is liable to it. The FRAILITY is another strong mode of *imperfect*ion which characterizes the fragility of man, but not of all men; it differs from the *weakness* in respect to the object. A *weakness* lies more in the judgement or in the sentiment; the *frailty* lies more in the moral features of an action. It is a *weakness* in a man to yield to the persuasions of any one against his better judgement; it is a *frailty* in a man to yield to intem-

perance or illicit indulgences. The FAILING and the FOIBLE are the smallest degrees of *imperfect*ion to which the human character is liable: we have all our *failings* in temper, and our *foibles* in our habits and our prepossessions; and he, as Horace observes, is the best who has the fewest. For our *imperfect*ions we must seek superior aid: we must be most on our guard against those *weaknesses* to which the softness or susceptibility of our minds may most expose us; and against those *frailties* into which the violence of our evil passions may bring us: ~~towards~~ towards the *failings* and *foibles* of others we may be indulgent, but ambitious to correct them in ourselves.

You live in a reign of human infirmity where every one has *imperfect*ions. BLAIR.

The folly of allowing ourselves to delay what we know cannot finally be escaped, in one of the general *weaknesses* which, to a greater or less degree, prevail in every mind. JOHNSON.

There are circumstances which every man must know will prove the occasions of calling forth his latent *frailties*. BLAIR.

Never allow small *failings* to dwell on your attention so much as to deface the whole of an amiable character. BLAIR.

IMPERIOUS, *v. Commanding*.

IMPERIOUS, LORDLY, DOMINEERING, OVERBEARING.

ALL these epithets imply an unseemly exercise or affectation of power or superiority. IMPERIOUS, from *impero* to command, characterizes either the disposition to command without adequate authority, or to convey one's commands in an offensive manner: LORDLY, signifying like a *lord*, characterizes the manner of acting the *lord*: and DOMINEERING, from *dominus* a *lord*, denotes the manner of ruling like a *lord*, or rather of attempting to rule: hence the temper or tone is denominated *imperious*; the air or deportment is *lordly*; the tone is *domineering*. A woman of an *imperious* temper commands in order to be obeyed: she commands with an *imperious* tone in order to enforce obedience. A person assumes a *lordly* air in order to display his own importance: he gives orders in a *domineering* tone in order to make others feel their inferiority. There is always

something offensive in *imperiousness*; there is frequently something ludicrous in that which is *lordly*; and a mixture of the ludicrous and offensive in that which is *domineering*: the *lordly* is an affectation of grandeur where there are the fewest pretensions; and the *domineering* is an affectation of authority where it least exists: the *ordly* is applied even to the brutes who set themselves up above those of their kind; the *domineering* is applied to servants and ignorant people, who have the opportunity of commanding without knowing how to command. A turkey cock struts about the yard in a *lordly* style: an upper servant *domineers* over all that are under him.

The first three of these terms are employed for such as are invested with some sort of power, or endowed with some sort of superiority, however trifling; but **OVERBEARING** is employed for men in the general relations of society, whether superiors or equals. A man of an *imperious* temper and some talent will frequently be so *overbearing* in the assemblies of his equals as to awe the rest into silence, and carry every measure of his own without contradiction. As the petty airs of superiority here described are most common among the uncultivated part of mankind, we may say that the *imperious* temper shows itself peculiarly in the domestic circle; that the *lordly* air shows itself in public; that the *domineering* tone is most remarkable in the kitchen; and the *overbearing* behaviour in villages.

I reflected within myself how much society would suffer if such insolent *overbearing* characters as Leontine were not held in restraint.

CUMBERLAND.

Thy willing victim, Carthage, burning loose
From all that pleading nature could oppose;
From a whole city's tears, by rigid faith
Imperious call'd, and honour's dire command.

THOMSON.

No more the Varus and the Atax feel
The *lordly* burden of the Latian keel. ROWE.

He who has sunk so far below himself as to have given up his assent to a *domineering* error is fit for nothing but to be trampled on. SOUTH.

**IMPERTINENT, RUDE, SAUCY,
IMPUDENT, INSOLENT.**

IMPERTINENT, in Latin *in* and *pertinens* not belonging to one, sig-

nifies being or wanting to do what i does not belong to one to be or do.

RUDE, in Latin *rudus* rude, and *raudus* a ragged stone, in the Greek *ραβδος* a rough stick, signifies literally unpolished; and in an extended sense, wanting all culture.

SAUCY comes from *sauce*, and the Latin *salsus*, signifying literally salt; and in an extended sense, stinging like salt.

IMPUDENT, *v. Assurance*.

INSOLENT, from the Latin *in* and *solens* contrary to custom, signifies being or wanting to be contrary to custom.

Impertinent is allied to *rude*, as respects one's general relations in society, without regard to station; it is allied to *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, as respects the conduct of inferiors.

He who does not respect the laws of civil society in his intercourse with individuals, and wants to assume to himself what belongs to another, is *impertinent*: if he carry this *impertinence* so far as to commit any violent breach of decorum in his behaviour, he is *rude*. *Impertinence* seems to spring from a too high regard of one's self: *rudeness* from an ignorance of what is due to others. An *impertinent* man will ask questions for the mere gratification of curiosity; a *rude* man will stare in one's face in order to please himself. An *impertinent* man will take possession of the best seat without regard to the right or convenience of another: a *rude* man will burst into the room of another, or push his person, in violation of a ceremony.

Impertinent, in comparison with the other terms, *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, is the most general and indefinite: whatever one does or says that is not compatible with our humble station is *impertinent*; *saucy* is a sharp kind of *impertinence*; *impudent* an unblushing kind of *impertinence*; *insolence* is an outrageous kind of *impertinence*, it runs counter to all established order: thus, the terms seem to rise in sense. A person may be *impertinent* in words or actions: he is *saucy* in words or looks: he is *impudent* or *insolent* in words, tones, gesture, looks, and every species of

action. A person's *impertinence* discovers itself in not giving the respect which is due to his superiors in general, strangers, or otherwise; as when a common person sits down in the room in the presence of a man of rank: *sauciness* discovers itself towards particular individuals, in certain *relations*; as in the case of servants who are *saucy* to their masters, or children who are *saucy* to their teachers: *impudence* and *insolence* are the strongest degrees of *impertinence*; but the former is more particularly said of such things as reflect disgrace upon the offender, and spring from a low depravity of mind, such as the abuse of one's superiors, and a vulgar defiance of those to whom one owes obedience and respect: *insolence*, on the contrary, originates from a haughtiness of spirit, and a misplaced pride, which breaks out into a contemptuous disregard of the station of those by whom one is offended; as in the case of a servant who should offer to strike his master, or of a criminal who sets a magistrate at defiance.

Self-conceit is the grand source of *impertinence*, it makes persons forget themselves; the young thereby forget their youth; the servant forgets his relationship to his master; the poor and ignorant man forgets the distance between himself and those who are elevated by education, rank, power, or wealth: the *impertinent*, therefore, act towards their equals as if they were inferiors, and towards their superiors as if they were their equals: an angry pride that is offended with reproof commonly provokes *sauciness*: an insensibility to shame, or an unconsciousness of what is honorable either in one's self or others, gives birth to *impudence*: uncontrolled passions, and bloated pride, are the ordinary stimulants to *insolence*.

It is publicly whispered as a piece of *impertinent* pride in me, that I have hitherto been *saucily* civil to every body, as if I thought nobody good enough to quarrel with.

LADY M. W. MONTAGUE.

My house should no such *rude* disorders know,
As from high drinking consequently flow.

POMFRET.

Whether he knew the thing or no,
His tongue externally would go:
For he had *impudence* at will.

GAY.

He claims the bull with lawless *insolence*,
And having seiz'd his horns, accosts the prince.
DRAKE.

IMPERVIOUS, IMPASSABLE,
INACCESSIBLE.

IMPERVIOUS, from the Latin *im*, *per*, and *via*, signifies not having a way through; IMPASSABLE, not to be passed through; INACCESSIBLE, not to be approached. A wood is *impervious*; the trees, branches, and leaves, are entangled to such a degree as to admit of no passage at all: a river is *impassable* that is so deep that it cannot be forded: a rock or a mountain is *inaccessible* the summit of which is not to be reached by any path whatever. What is *impervious* is so for a permanency; what is *impassable* is commonly so only for a time: roads are frequently *impassable* in the winter that are *passable* in the summer, while a thicket is *impervious* during the whole of the year: *impassable* is likewise said only of that which is to be passed by living creatures, but *impervious* may be extended to inanimate objects; a wood may be *impervious* to the rays of the sun.

The monster, Cacus, more than half a beast,
This bold *impervious* to the sun posess'd.

DRAKE.

But lest the difficulty of passing back
Stay his return perhaps over this gulf,
Impassable, impervious, let us try
Advent'rous work.

MILTON.

At least our envious foe hath fail'd who thought
All like himself rebellious, by whose aid
This *inaccessible* high strength, the seat
Of Deity Supreme, us disposess'd,
He trusted to have seiz'd.

MILTON.

IMPETUOUS, *v.* Violent.

IMPIOUS, *v.* Irreligious.

IMPLACABLE, UNRELENTING,
RELENTLESS, INEXORABLE.

IMPLACABLE, unappeasable, signifies not to be allayed nor softened.

UNRELENTING or RELENTLESS, from the Latin *lenio* to soften, or to make pliant, signifies not rendered soft.

INEXORABLE, from *oro* to pray, signifies not to be turned by prayers.

Inflexibility is the idea expressed in common by these terms, but they differ in the causes and circumstances

with which it is attended. Animosit-
ties are *implacable* when no misery
which we occasion can diminish their
force, and no concessions on the part
of the offender can lessen the spirit of
revenge: the mind or character of a
man is *unrelenting*, when it is not to
be turned from its purpose by a view
of the pain which it inflicts: a man
is *inexorable* who turns a deaf ear to
every solicitation or entreaty that is
made to induce him to lessen the rigor
of his sentence. A man's angry pas-
sions render him *implacable*; it is not
the magnitude of the offence, but the
temper of the offended that is here in
question; by *implacability* he is ren-
dered insensible to the misery he occa-
sions, and to every satisfaction which
the offender may offer him: fixedness
of purpose renders a man *unrelenting*
or *relentless*; the *unrelenting* temper
is not less callous to the misery pro-
duced, than the *implacable* temper;
but it is not grounded always on re-
sentment for personal injuries, but
sometimes on a certain principle of
right and a sense of necessity: the
inexorable man adheres to his rule, as
the *unrelenting* man does to his pur-
pose; the former is insensible to any
workings of his heart which might
shake his purpose, the latter turns a
deaf ear to all the solicitations of
others which would go to alter his de-
crees: savages are mostly *implacable*
in their animosities; Titus Manlius
Torquatus displayed an instance of
unrelenting severity towards his son;
Cæcus and Rhodomanthus were the
inexorable judges of hell.

Implacable and *unrelenting* are said
only of animate beings in whom is
wanting an ordinary portion of the
tender affections: *inexorable* may be
improperly applied to inanimate ob-
jects; justice and death are both re-
presented as *inexorable*.

Implacable as the enmity of the Mexicans
was, they were so unacquainted with the science
of war that they knew not how to take the proper
measures for the destruction of the Spaniards.

ROBERTSON.

These are the realms of *unrelenting* fate.

DRYDEN.

Acca, 'tis past, he swims before my sight,
Inexorable death, and claims his right.

DRYDEN.

TO IMPLANT, INGRAFT,
INCULCATE, INSTIL,
INFUSE.

To *plant* is properly to fix plants
in the ground; to **IMPLANT** is, in
the improper sense, to fix principles
in the mind. *Graft* is to make one
plant grow on the stock of another;
to **INGRAFT** is to make particular
principles flourish in the mind, and
form a part of the character. *Calco* is
in Latin to tread; and **INCULCATE**,
to stamp into the mind. *Stillo*, in
Latin, is literally to fall dropwise:
instillo, to **INSTIL**, is, in the improper
sense, to make sentiments as it were
drop into the mind. *Fundo*, in Latin,
is literally to pour in a stream: *in-
fundo*, to **INFUSE**, is in the improper
sense to pour principles or feelings into
the mind.

To *implant*, *ingraft*, and *inculcate*,
are said of abstract opinions, or rules
of right and wrong; *instil* and *infuse*
of such principles that influence the
heart, the affections, and the passions.
It is the business of the parent in early
life to *implant*; it is the business of
the teacher to *ingraft*. The belief of
a Deity, and all the truths of Divine
Revelation, ought to be *implanted* in
the mind of the child as soon as it
can understand any thing, if it have
not enjoyed this privilege in its earliest
infancy: the task of *ingrafting* these
principles afterwards into the mind is
attended with considerable difficulty
and uncertainty of success. *Instil* is
a corresponding act with *implant*: we
implant the belief; we *instil* the feel-
ing which is connected with this be-
lief. It is not enough to have an ab-
stract belief of a God *implanted* into
the mind: we must likewise have a
love, and a fear of him, and reverence
for his holy name and Word, *instilled*
into the mind.

To *instil* is a gradual process which
is the natural work of education; to
infuse is a more arbitrary and imme-
diate act. Sentiments are *instilled*
into the mind, not altogether by the
personal efforts of any individual, but
likewise by collateral endeavours; they
are however *infused* at the express
will, and with the express endeavour
of some person. By the reading of

the Scriptures, an attendance on public worship, and the influence of example, combined with the instructions of the parent, religious sentiments are *instilled* into the mind; by the counsel and conversation of an intimate friend, an even current of the feeling becomes *infused* into the mind. *Instil* is applicable only to permanent sentiments; *infuse* may be said of any partial feeling: hence we speak of *infusing* a poison into the mind by means of insidious and mischievous publications; or *infusing* a jealousy by means of crafty insinuations, or *infusing* an ardor into the minds of soldiers by means of spirited addresses coupled with military successes.

With various seeds of art deep in the mind
Implanted. THOMSON.

The reciprocal attraction in the minds of men is a principle *ingrafted* in the very first formation of the soul, by the Author of our nature.

BERKELEY.

To preach practical sermons, as they are called, that is, sermons upon virtues and vices, without *inculcating* the great Scripture truths of redemption, grace, &c., which alone can enable and incite us to forsake sin and follow after righteousness; what is it, but to put together the wheels and set the hands of a watch, forgetting the spring which is to make them all go?

BISHOP HORN.

The apostle often makes mention of sound doctrine in opposition to the extravagant and corrupt opinions, which false teachers, even in those days, *instilled* into the minds of their ignorant and unwary disciples.

BEVERIDGE.

No sooner grows

The soft *infusion* prevalent and wide,
Than all alive, at once their joy o'erflows
In music unconfin'd.

THOMSON.

TO IMPLICATE, INVOLVE.

IMPLICATE, from *plico* to fold, denotes to fold into a thing; and **INVOLVE**, from *volvo* to roll, signifies to roll into a thing: by which explication we perceive, that to *implicate* marks something less entangled than to *involve*: for that which is folded may be folded only once, but that which is rolled is rolled many times. In application therefore to human affairs, people are said to be *implicated* who have taken ever so small a share in a transaction; but they are *involved* only when they are deeply concerned: the former is likewise especially applied to criminal transac-

tions, the latter to those things which are in themselves troublesome: thus a man is *implicated* in the guilt of robbery who should stand by and see it done, without interfering for its prevention; as law suits are of all things the most intricate and harassing, he who is engaged in one is properly *involved* in it, or he who is in debt in every direction is strictly said to be *involved* in debt.

That which can exalt a wife only by degrading a husband, will appear on the whole not worth the acquisition, even though it could be made without provoking jealousy by the *implication* of contempt. HAWKESWORTH.

Those who cultivate the memory of our Revolution, will take care how they are *involved* with persons who, under pretext of zeal towards the Revolution and constitution, frequently wander from their true principles. BURKE.

TO IMPLORE, *v.* To beseech.

TO IMPLY, *v.* To signify.

TO IMPORT, *v.* To signify.

IMPORTANCE, CONSEQUENCE, WEIGHT, MOMENT.

IMPORTANCE, from *porto* to carry, signifies the carrying or bearing with, or in itself.

CONSEQUENCE, from *consequor* to follow, or result, signifies the following, or resulting from.

WEIGHT signifies the *quantum* that the thing weighs.

MOMENT, from *momentum*, signifies the force that puts in motion.

The *importance* is what things have in themselves; they may be of more or less *importance*, according to the value which is set upon them: this may be real or unreal; it may be estimated by the experience of their past utility, or from the presumption of their utility for the future: the idea of *importance*, therefore, enters into the meaning of the other terms more or less. *Consequence* is the *importance* from its *consequence*. This term therefore is peculiarly applicable to such things, the *consequences* of which may be more immediately discerned either from the neglect or the attention: it is of *consequence* for a letter to go off on a certain day, for the affairs of an individual may be more or less affected by it; an hour's delay sometimes in the departure of a mili-

ceed insidiously and circuitously to undermine the faith of others: an *attacker* always proceeds with more or less violence. To *impugn* is not necessarily taken in a bad sense; we may sometimes *impugn* absurd doctrines by a fair train of reasoning: to *attack* is always objectionable, either in the mode of the action, or its object, or in both; it is a mode of proceeding oftener employed in the cause of falsehood than truth: when there are no arguments wherewith to *impugn* a doctrine, it is easy to *attack* it with ridicule and scurrility.

TO IMPUTE, *v.* *To ascribe.*

INABILITY, DISABILITY.

INABILITY denotes the absence of *ability* in the most general and abstract sense. DISABILITY implies the absence of *ability* only in particular cases: the *inability* lies in the nature of the thing, and is irremediable; the *disability* lies in the circumstances, and may sometimes be removed: weakness, whether physical or mental, will occasion an *inability* to perform a task; there is a total *inability* in an infant to walk and act like a man: a want of knowledge or of the requisite qualifications may be a *disability*; in this manner minority of age or an objection to take certain oaths may be a *disability* for filling a public office.

It is not from *inability* to discover what they ought to do that men err in practice. BLAIR.

Want of age is a legal *disability* to contract a marriage. BLACKSTONE.

INACCESSIBLE, *v.* *Impervious.*

INACTIVE, INERT, LAZY, SLOTHFUL, SLUGGISH.

A RELUCTANCE to bodily exertion is common to all these terms. INACTIVE is the most general and unqualified term of all; it expresses simply the want of a stimulus to exertion: INERT is something more positive, from the Latin *iners* or *sine arte* without art or mind; it denotes a specific deficiency either in body or mind.

LAZY (*v.* *Idle*). SLOTHFUL, from *slow*, that is, full of slowness; and SLUGGISH from *slug*, that is, like a *slug*, drowsy and heavy: all rise

upon one another to denote an expressly defective temperament of the body which directly impedes action.

To be *inactive* is to be indisposed to action; that is, to the performance of any office, to the doing any specific business: to be *inert* is somewhat more; it is to be indisposed to movement: to be *lazy* is to move with pain to one's self: to be *slothful* is never to move otherwise than slowly: to be *sluggish* is to move in a sleepy and heavy manner.

A person may be *inactive* from a variety of incidental causes, as timidity, ignorance, modesty, and the like, which combine to make him averse to enter upon any business, or take any serious step; a person may be *inert* from temporary indisposition; but *laziness*, *slothfulness*, and *sluggishness* are inherent physical defects: *laziness* is however not altogether independent of the mind or the will; but *slothful* and *sluggish* are purely the offspring of nature, or, which is the same thing, habit superinduced upon nature. A man of a mild character is frequently *inactive*; he wants that ardor which impels perpetually to action; he wishes for nothing with sufficient warmth to make action agreeable; he is therefore *inactive* by a natural consequence: some diseases, particularly of the melancholy kind, are accompanied with a strong degree of *inertness*; since they seem to deprive the frame of its ordinary powers to action, and to produce a certain degree of torpor: *lazy* people move as if their bodies were a burden to themselves; they are fond of rest, and particularly averse to be put in action; but they will sometimes move quickly, and perform much when once impelled to move: *slothful* people never vary their pace; they have a physical impediment in themselves to quick motion: *sluggish* people are hardly brought into action; it is their nature to be in a state of stupor.

What laws are these? Instruct us if you can;
There's one design'd for brutes, and one for man,
Another guides *inactive* matter's course.

JENYNS.

Informer of the planetary train,
Without whose quickening glance their cum-
brous orbs
Were brute, unlovely mass, inert and dead.

THOMSON.

opinion on any one subject, because he can have made himself master of none.

Incapable is applied sometimes to the moral character, to signify the absence of that which is bad; *insufficient* and *incompetent* always convey the idea of a deficiency in that which is at least desirable: it is an honor to a person to be *incapable* of falsehood, or *incapable* of doing an ungenerous action; but to be *insufficient* and *incompetent* are, at all events, qualities not to be boasted of, although they may not be expressly disgraceful. These terms are likewise applicable to things, in which they preserve a similar distinction: intidelity is *incapable* of affording a man any comfort; when the means are *insufficient* for obtaining the ends, it is madness to expect success; it is a sad condition of humanity when a man's resources are *incompetent* to supply him with the first necessities of life.

Inadequate is relative in its signification, like *insufficient* and *incompetent*; but the relation is different. A thing is *insufficient* which does not suffice either for the wishes, the purposes, or necessities, of any one, in particular or in general cases; thus, a quantity of materials may be *insufficient* for a particular building: *incompetency* is an *insufficiency* for general purposes, in things of the first necessity; thus, an income may be *incompetent* to support a family: *inadequacy* is still more particular, for it denotes any deficiency which is measured by comparison with the object to which it refers; thus, the strength of an animal may be *inadequate* to the labor which is required, or a reward may be *inadequate* to the service.

Were a human soul *incapable* of farther enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly. ADDISON.

When God withdraws his hand, and lets nature sink into its original weakness and *insufficiency*, all a man's delights fail him. SOUTH.

All the attainments possible in our present state are evidently *inadequate* to our capacities of enjoyment. JOHNSON.

INCESSANTLY, UNCEASINGLY,
UNINTERRUPTEDLY, WITHOUT
INTERMISSION.

INCESSANTLY and UNCEAS-

INGLY are but variations from the same word, *cease*.

UNINTERRUPTEDLY, *v.* To disturb.

INTERMISSION, *v.* To subside.

Continuity, but not duration, is denoted by these terms: *incessantly* is the most general and indefinite of all; it signifies without ceasing, but may be applied to things which admit of certain intervals: *unceasingly* is definite, and signifies never ceasing; it cannot therefore be applied to what has any cessation. In familiar discourse, *incessantly* is an extravagant mode of speech, by which one means to denote the absence of those ordinary intervals which are to be expected; as when one says a person is *incessantly* talking; by which is understood, that he does not allow himself the ordinary intervals of rest from talking: *unceasingly*, on the other hand, is more literally employed for a positive want of cessation; a noise is said to be *unceasing* which literally never ceases; or complaints are *unceasing* which are made without any pauses or intervals. *Incessantly* and *unceasingly* are said of things which act of themselves; *uninterruptedly* is said of that which depends upon other things: it rains *incessantly*, marks a continued operation of nature, independent of every thing; but to be *uninterruptedly* happy, marks one's freedom from every foreign influence which is unfriendly to one's happiness.

Incessantly and the other two words are employed either for persons or things; *without intermission* is however mostly employed for persons: things act and re-act *incessantly* upon one another; a man of a persevering temper goes on laboring *without intermission*, until he has effected his purpose.

Surfent, misdiet, and unthrifty waste,
Vain feastes, and ydle superfluite,
All thow this sence's fort assaile *incessantly*.

SPENCER.

Impell'd, with steps *unceasing*, to pursue
Some fleeting good that mocks me with the view.
GOLDSMITH.

She draws a close incumbent cloud of death,
Uninterrupted by the living winds. THOMSON.

For any one to be always in a laborious, hazardous posture of defence, *without intermission*, must needs be intolerable. SOUTH.

INCIDENT, *v.* Circumstance.

INCIDENT, *v.* Event.

lities of things; *incoherency* to words or thoughts: things are made *inconsistent* by an act of the will; a man acts or thinks *inconsistently*, according to his own pleasure: *incongruity* depends upon the nature of the things; there is something very *incongruous* in blending the solemn and decent service of the church with the extravagant rant of Methodism: *incoherence* marks the want of coherence in that which ought to follow in a train; extemporary effusions from the pulpit are often distinguished most by their *incoherence*.

Every individual is so unequal to himself that man seems to be the most wavering and *inconsistent* being in the universe. HUGHES.

The solemn introduction of the Phoenix, in the last scene of Sampson Agonistes, is *incongruous* to the personage to whom it is ascribed. JOHNSON.

Be but a person in credit with the multitude, he shall be able to make rambling *incoherent* stuff pass for high rhetoric. SOUTH.

INCONSTANT, *v.* *Changeable*.

INCONTROVERTIBLE, *v.* *Indubitable*.

TO INCONVENIENCE, ANNOY, MOLEST.

To INCONVENIENCE is to make not *convenient* (*v.* *Convenient*).

To ANNOY, from the Latin *noceo* to hurt, is to do some hurt to. To MOLEST, from the Latin *moles* a mass or weight, signifies to press with a weight.

We *inconvenience* in small matters, or by omitting such things as might be *convenient*; we *annoy* or *molest* by doing that which is positively painful: we are *inconvenienced* by a person's absence; we are *annoyed* by his presence if he renders himself offensive: we are *inconvenienced* by what is temporary; we are *annoyed* by that which is either temporary or durable; we are *molested* by that which is weighty and oppressive: we are *inconvenienced* simply in regard to our circumstances; we are *annoyed* mostly in regard to our corporeal feelings; we are *molested* mostly in regard to our minds: the removal of a seat or a book may *inconvenience* one who is engaged in business; the buzzing of a fly, or the stinging of a knat, may

annoy; the impertinent freedom, or the rude insults of ill-disposed persons, may *molest*.

I have often been tempted to inquire what happiness is to be gained, or what *inconvenience* to be avoided, by this stated recession from the town in the summer season. JOHNSON.

Against the capitol I met a lion,
Who glar'd upon me, and went surly by,
Without *annoying* me. SHAKESPEARE.

See all with skill acquire their daily food,
Produce their tender progeny and feed,
With care parental, whilst that care they need,
In these lov'd offices completely blest,
No hopes beyond them, nor vain fears *molest*. JENYNS.

INCORPOREAL, UNBODIED, IMMATERIAL, SPIRITUAL.

INCORPOREAL, from *corpus* a body, marks the quality of not belonging to the body, or having any properties in common; UNBODIED denotes the state of being without the body, or not inclosed in a body: a thing may therefore be *incorporeal* without being *unbodied*; but not *vice versa*: the soul of man is *incorporeal*, but not *unbodied*, during his natural life.

Incorporeal is always used, in regard to living, particularly by way of comparison, with *corporeal* or human beings: hence we speak of *incorporeal* agency, or *incorporeal* agents, in reference to such beings as are supposed to act in this world without the help of the body; but IMMATERIAL is applied to inanimate objects; men are *corporeal* as men, spirits are *incorporeal*; the body is the *material* part of man, the soul his *immaterial* part: whatever external object acts upon the senses is *material*; but the action of the mind on itself, and its results, are all *immaterial*: the trees, the earth, sun, moon, &c. are termed *material*; but the impressions which they make on the mind, that is, our ideas of them, are *immaterial*.

The *incorporeal* and *immaterial* have always a relative sense; the SPIRITUAL is that which is positive: God is a *spiritual*, not properly an *incorporeal* nor *immaterial* being: the angels are likewise designated, in general, as the *spiritual* inhabitants of Heaven; although, when spoken of in regard, they may be denominated *incorporeal*.

ity: the former however in external matters, as dress, words, and looks; the latter in conduct and disposition. A person may be *indecent* for want of either knowing or thinking better; but a female cannot be *immodest* without radical corruption of principle. The *indecency* may be a partial; the *immodesty* is a positive and entire breach of the moral law. *Indecency* belongs to both sexes; *immodesty* is peculiarly applicable to the misconduct of females.

Indecency is less than *immodesty*, but more than *indelucy*: they both respect the outward behaviour; but the former springs from illicit or uncurbed desire; the *indelucy* from the want of education. It is a great *indecency* for a man to marry again very quickly after the death of his wife; but a still greater *indecency* for a woman to put such an affront on her deceased husband: it is a great *indelucy* in any one to break in upon the retirement of such as are in sorrow and mourning. It is *indecent* for females to expose their persons as many do whom we cannot call *immodest* women; it is *indelicate* for females to engage in masculine exercises.

The Dubistan contains more ingenuity and wit, more *indecency* and blasphemy, than I ever saw collected in one single volume.

SIR WM. JONES.

Immodest words admit of no defence,
For want of decency is want of sense.

ROSCOMMON.

Your papers would be chargeable with something worse than *indelucy*, did you treat the detestable sin of uncleanness in the same manner as you rally self-love.

SPECTATOR.

INDELICATE, *v.* *Indecent*.

TO INDICATE, *v.* *To show*.

INDICATION, *v.* *Mark*.

INDIFFERENCE, INSENSIBILITY,
APATHY.

INDIFFERENCE signifies *no difference*; that is, having *no difference* of feeling for one thing more than another.

INSENSIBILITY, from *sense* and *able*, signifies incapable of feeling.

APATHY, from the Greek privative and *πάθος*, feeling, implies with-

Indifference is a partial state of the mind; *apathy* and *insensibility* are general states of the mind; he who has *indifference* is not to be awakened to feeling by some objects, though he may by others; but he who has not *sensibility* is incapable of feeling; and he who has *apathy* is without any feeling. *Indifference* is mostly a temporary state; *insensibility* is either a temporary or a permanent state; *apathy* is always a permanent state: *indifference* is either acquired or accidental; *insensibility* is either produced or natural; *apathy* is natural. A person may be in a state of *indifference* about a thing the value of which he is not aware of, or acquire an *indifference* for that which he knows to be of comparatively little value: he may be in a state of *insensibility* from the lethargic torpor which has seized his mind; or he may have an habitual *insensibility* arising either from the contractedness of his powers, or the physical bluntness of his understanding, and deadness of his passions; his *apathy* is born with him, and forms a prominent feature in the constitution of his mind.

Indifference is often the consequence of *insensibility*; for he who is *not sensible* or alive to any feeling must naturally be without choice or preference: but *indifference* is not always *insensibility*, since we may be *indifferent* to one thing because we have an equal liking to another. In like manner *insensibility* may spring from *apathy*, for he who has no feeling is naturally not to be awakened to feeling, that is, he is unfeeling or *insensible* by constitution; but since his *insensibility* may spring from other causes besides those that are natural, we may be *insensible* without having *apathy*. Moreover it is observable that between *insensibility* and *apathy* there is this farther distinction, that the former refers only to our capacity for being moved by the outward objects that surround us; whereas *apathy* denotes an entire internal deadness of all the feelings: but we may be *insensible* to the present external objects from the total absorption of all the powers and feelings in one distant object.

I could never prevail with myself to exchange

of itself; it is the coming or joining of one thing to another so as to *increase* the whole. A merchant *increases* his property by *adding* his gains in trade every year to the mass; but he receives an *accession* of property either by inheritance or any other contingency. In the same manner a monarch *increases* his dominions by *adding* one territory to another, or by various *accessions* of territory which fall to his lot.

When we speak of the *increase*, we think of the whole and its relative magnitude at different times; when we speak of the *addition*, we think only of the part and the agency by which this part is joined; when we speak of the *accession*, we think only of the circumstance by which one thing becomes thus joined to another. *Increase* of happiness does not depend upon *increase* of wealth; the miser makes daily *additions* to the latter without making any to the former: sudden *accessions* of wealth are seldom attended with any good consequences, as they turn the thoughts too violently out of their sober channel and bend them too strongly on one's present possessions and good fortune.

Augmentation is another term for *increase*, which differs less in sense than in application: the latter is generally applied to all objects that admit such a change: but the former is applied only to objects of higher import or cases of a less familiar nature. We may say that a person experiences an *increase* or an *augmentation* in his family; or that he has had an *increase* or an *augmentation* of his salary, or that there is an *increase* or *augmentation* of the number: in all which cases the former term is most adapted to the colloquial, and the latter to the grave style.

At will I crop the year's *increase*,
My latter life is rest and peace. DRYDEN.

The ill state of health into which Tullia is fallen is a very severe *addition* to the many and great disquietudes that afflict my mind.

MALROMI'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

There is nothing in my opinion more pleasing in religion than to consider that the soul is to shine for ever with new *accessions* of glory.

ADDISON.

Ambitious Turnus in the press appears,
And aggravating crimes, *augments* their fears. DRYDEN.

INCREDULITY, *v. Unbelief.*

INCURSION, *v. Invasion.*

INDEBTED, OBLIGED.

INDEBTED is more binding and positive than OBLIGED: we are *indebted* to whoever confers an essential service: we are *obliged* to him who does us any service. A man is *indebted* to another for the preservation of his life; he is *obliged* to him for an ordinary act of civility: a *debt* whether of legal or moral right must in justice be paid; an *obligation* which is only moral, ought in reason to be returned. Whether we be *indebted* to another expressly for a certain sum of money, or whether we be *indebted* to him for our natural existence, or for the main comfort of our lives, we are bound to make him a suitable compensation as far as lies in our power; but when we are simply *obliged*, we owe another particular good will. According to an old proverb in this case, one good turn deserves another. We may be *indebted* to things; we are *obliged* to persons only: we are *indebted* to Christianity, not only for a superior faith, but also for a superior system of morality; we ought to be *obliged* to our friends who admonish us of our faults with a friendly temper. A nation may be *indebted* to an individual, but men are *obliged* to each other only as individuals: the English nation is *indebted* to Alfred for the groundwork of its free constitution; the little courtesies which pass between friends in their social intercourse with each other lay them under *obligations* which it is equally agreeable to receive and to pay.

A grateful mind
By owing owes not, but still pays at once
Indebted and discharged. MILTON.

We are each of us so civil and *obliging*, that
Neither thinks he is *obliged*. POPE.

INDECENT, IMMODEST, INDELICATE.

INDECENT is the contrary of *decent* (*v. Becoming*), IMMODEST the contrary of *modest* (*v. Modest*), INDELICATE the contrary of *delicate* (*v. Fine*).

Indecency and *immodesty* violate the fundamental principles of *modesty*

such positive disease of mind or body. The *careless* person is neither averse to labor or thought nor devoid of desire, but wants in reality that *care* or thought which is requisite for his state or condition. *Carelessness* is rather an error of the understanding, or of the conduct, than the will; since the *careless* would *care*, be concerned for, or interested about things, if he could be brought to reflect on their importance, or if he did not for a time forget himself.

Hence reasoners more refin'd but not more wise,
Their whole existence fabulous suspect,
And truth and falsehood in a lump reject;
Too *indolent* to learn what may be known,
Or else too proud that ignorance to own.

JENNYS.

With what unequal tempers are we fram'd,
One day the soul, *supine* with ease and falsehood,
Revels secure.

ROWE.

Sullen, methinks, and slow the morning breaks,
As if the sun were *listless* to appear.

DRYDEN.

Pert love with her by joint commission rules,
Who by false arts and popular deceits,
The *careless*, fond, unthinking mortal cheats.

POMEROY.

INDUBITABLE, UNQUESTION-
ABLE, INDISPUTABLE, UNDE-
NIABLE, INCONTROVERTIBLE,
IRREFRAGABLE.

INDUBITABLE signifies admitting of no doubt (*v. Doubt*); UNQUESTIONABLE, admitting of no question (*v. Doubt*); INDISPUTABLE, admitting of no dispute (*v. To controvert*); UNDENIABLE, not to be denied (*v. To deny, disown*); INCONTROVERTIBLE, not to be controverted (*v. To controvert*): IRREFRAGABLE, from *frango* to break, signifies not to be broken, destroyed, or done away. They are all opposed to uncertainty; but they do not imply absolute certainty, for they all express the strong persuasion of a person's mind rather than the absolute nature of the thing: when a fact is supported by such evidence as admits of no kind of doubt, it is termed *indubitable*; when the truth of an assertion rests on the authority of a man whose character for integrity stands unimpeached, it is termed *unquestionable* authority; when a thing is believed to exist on the evidence of every man's senses, it is termed *undeniable*; when a sentiment has always been held as either true or false, without dispute, it is termed *indisput-*

able; when arguments have never been controverted, they are termed *incontrovertible*; and when they have never been satisfactorily answered, they are termed *irrefragable*.

A full or a thin house will *indubitably* express the sense of a majority. HAZELWORTH.

From the *unquestionable* documents and dictates of the law of nature, I shall evince the obligation lying upon every man to show gratitude.

SOURN.

Truth, knowing the *indisputable* claim she has to all that is called reason, thinks it below her to ask that upon courtesy in which she can plead a property.

SOURN.

So *undeniable* is the truth of this (*viz.* the hardness of our duty), that the scene of virtue is laid in our natural aversion to things excellent.

SOURN.

Our distinction must rest upon a steady adherence to the *incontrovertible* rules of virtue.

BLAIR.

There is none who walks so surely, and upon such *irrefragable* grounds of prudence, as he who is religious.

SOURN.

TO INDUE, *v. To invest.*

TO INDUCE, *v. To actuate.*

TO INDUCE, *v. To encourage, animate.*

TO INDULGE, *v. To foster.*

TO INDULGE, *v. To gratify.*

INDULGENT, FOND.

INDULGENT, *v. To gratify.*

FOND, *v. Amorous.*

Indulgence lies more in forbearing from the exercise of authority; *fondness* in the outward behaviour and endearments: they may both arise from an excess of kindness or love; but the former is of a less objectionable character than the latter. *Indulgence* may be sometimes wrong; but *fondness* is seldom right: an *indulgent* parent is seldom a prudent parent; but a *fond* parent does not rise above a fool: all who have the care of young people should occasionally relax from the strictness of the disciplinarian, and show an *indulgence* where a suitable opportunity offers; a *fond* mother takes away from the value of *indulgences* by an invariable compliance with the humors of her children: however, when applied generally or abstractedly, they are both taken in a good sense.

God then thro' all creation gives, we find,
Sufficient marks of an *indulgent* mind.

JENNYS

2 Q 2

*Opprobrious, with his robe of righteousness
Arrayed, cover'd from his father's sight.*

MILTON.

INFANTINE, *v. Childish.*

INFATUATION, *v. Intoxication.*

INFECTION, *v. Contagion.*

INFERENCE, *v. Conclusion.*

INFERIOR, *v. Second.*

INFERIOR, *v. Subject.*

INFIDELITY, *v. Unbelief.*

INFINITE, *v. Boundless.*

INFIRM, *v. Weak.*

INFIRMITY, *v. Debility.*

INFLUENCE, *v. Credit.*

INFLUENCE, AUTHORITY,
ASCENDANCY, SWAY.

INFLUENCE, *v. Credit.*

AUTHORITY, in Latin *auctoritas*, from *auctor* the author or prime mover of a thing, signifies that power which is vested in the prime mover.

ASCENDANCY, from *ascend*, signifies having the upper hand.

SWAY, like our word *swing* and the German *schweben*, comes from the Hebrew *za* to move.

These terms imply power, under different circumstances: *influence* is altogether unconnected with any right to direct; *authority* includes the idea of right necessarily: superiority of rank, talent, or property, personal attachment, and a variety of circumstances give *influence*; it commonly acts by persuasion, and employs engaging manners, so as to determine in favor of what is proposed: superior wisdom, age, office, and relation, give *authority*; it determines of itself, it requires no collateral aid: *ascendancy* and *sway* are modes of *influence*, differing only in degree; they both imply an excessive and improper degree of *influence* over the mind, independent of reason: the former is, however, more gradual in its process, and consequently more confirmed in its nature; the latter may be only temporary, but may be more violent. A person employs many arts, and for a length of time, to gain the *ascendancy*; but he exerts a *sway* by a violent stretch of power. It is of great importance for those who have *influence*,

to conduct themselves consistently with their rank and station; men are apt to regard the warnings and admonitions of a true friend as an odious assumption of *authority*, while they voluntarily give themselves up to the *ascendancy* which their valet or their mistress has gained over them, and who exert the most unwarrantable *sway* to serve their own interested and vicious purposes.

Influence and *ascendancy* are said likewise of things as well as persons: true religion will have an *influence* not only on the outward conduct of a man, but the inward affections of his heart; and that man is truly happy in whose mind it has the *ascendancy* over every other principle.

The *influence* of France as a republic is equal to a war.

BURKE.

Without the force of *authority* the power of soldiers grows pernicious to their master.

TEMPLE.

France, since her revolution, is under the *sway* of a sect, whose leaders, at one stroke, have demolished the whole body of jurisprudence.

BURKE.

If you allow any passion, even though it be esteemed innocent, to acquire an absolute *ascendant*, your inward peace will be impaired.

BLAIR.

TO INFORM, MAKE KNOWN,
ACQUAINT, APPRIZE.

THE idea of bringing to the knowledge of one or more persons is common to all these terms. INFORM, from the Latin *informo* to fashion the mind, comprehends this general idea only, without the addition of any collateral idea; it is therefore the generic term, and the rest specific: to *inform* is to communicate what has lately happened, or the contrary; but to MAKE KNOWN is to bring to light what has long been *known* and purposely concealed: to *inform* is to directly or indirectly communicate to one or many; to *make known* is mostly to communicate indirectly to many: one *informs* the public of one's intentions, by means of an advertisement in one's own name; one *makes known* a fact through a circuitous channel, and without any name. To *inform* may be either a personal address or otherwise; to ACQUAINT and APPRIZE are immediate and personal communication. One *informs* the government,

plication an important distinction. The **INFORMANT** being he who informs for the benefit of others, and the **INFORMER** to the molestation of others. What the *informant* communicates is for the benefit of the individual, and what the *informer* communicates is for the benefit of the whole. The *informant* is thanked for his civility in making the communication; the *informer* undergoes a great deal of odium, but is thanked by no one, not even by those who employ him. We may all be *informants* in our turn, if we know of any thing of which another may be informed; but none are *informers* who do not inform against the transgressors of any law.

Every member of society feels and acknowledges the necessity of detecting crimes, yet scarce any degree of virtue or reputation is able to secure an *informer* from public hatred.
JOHNSON.

Aye (says our Artist's *informant*), but at the same time he declared you (Hogarth) were as good a portrait painter as Vandyke. PILKINGTON.

INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE,
NOTICE, ADVICE.

INFORMATION (*v. To inform*) signifies the thing of which one is informed: **INTELLIGENCE**, from the Latin *intelligo* to understand, signifies that by which one is made to understand: **NOTICE**, from the Latin *notitia*, is that which brings to the knowledge: **ADVICE** (*v. Advice*) signifies that which is made known. These terms come very near to each other in signification, but differ in application: *information* is the most general and indefinite of all; the three others are but modes of *information*. Whatever is communicated to us is *information*, be it public or private, open or concealed; *notice*, *intelligence*, and *advice* are mostly public, but particularly the former. *Information* and *notice* may be communicated by word of mouth or by writing; *intelligence* is mostly communicated by writing or printing; *advices* are mostly sent by letter: the *information* is mostly an informal mode of communication: the *notice*, *intelligence*, and *advice*, are mostly formal communications. A servant gives his master *information*, or one friend sends another *information* from the country;

magistrates or officers give *notice* of such things as concern the public to know and to observe; spies give *intelligence* of all that passes under their notice; or *intelligence* is given in the public prints of all that passes worthy of notice: a military commander sends *advice* to his government of the operations which are going forward under his direction; or one merchant gives *advice* to another of the state of the market.

Information, as calculated to influence, ought to be correct: those who are too eager to know what is passing, are often misled by false *information*. *Notice*, as it serves either to warn or direct, ought to be timely, no law of general interest is carried into effect without giving timely *notice*. *Intelligence*, as the first intimation of an interesting event, ought to be early; *advices*, as entering into the detail, ought to be clear and particular; official *advices* often arrive to contradict non-official *intelligence*.

Information and *intelligence*, when applied as characteristics of men, have a farther distinction: the man of *information* is so denominated only on account of his knowledge; but a man of *intelligence* is so denominated on account of his understanding as well as experience and information. It is not possible to be *intelligent* without *information*; but we may be well *informed* without being remarkable for *intelligence*: a man of *information* may be an agreeable companion, and fitted to maintain conversation; but an *intelligent* man will be an instructive companion, and most fitted for conducting business.

There, centering in a focus round and neat,
Let all your rays of *information* meet.

COWPER.

My lion, whose jaws are at all hours open to *intelligence*, informs me that there are a few enormous weapons still in being. STERLE.

At his years
Death gives short *notice*.

THOMSON.

As he was dictating to his hearers with great authority, there came in a gentleman from Garraway's, who told us that there were several letters from France just come in, with *advice* that the king was in good health. ADDISON.

INFORMER, v. Informant.

INFRACTION, v. Infring

quent nobleness of the character which is inborn: the latter respects the genius or mental powers which are inborn. Truth is coupled with freedom or nobility of birth; the *ingenuous*, therefore, bespeaks the inborn freedom, by asserting the noblest right, and following the noblest impulse, of human nature, namely, that of speaking the truth; *genius* is altogether a natural endowment, that is born with us, independent of external circumstances; the *ingenious* man, therefore, displays his powers as occasion may offer. We love the *ingenuous* character, on account of the qualities of his heart; we admire the *ingenious* man on account of the endowments of his mind. One is *ingenuous* as a man; one is *ingenious* as an author: a man confesses an action *ingenuously*; he defends it *ingeniously*.

Compare the *ingenuous* pliability to virtuous counsels which is in youth, to the confirmed obstinacy in an old sinner. SOUTH.

Ingenious to their ruin, every age
Improves the arts and instruments of rage. WALLER.

TO INGRAFT, *v.* To implant.

TO INGRATIATE, *v.* To insinuate.

TO INGULF, *v.* To absorb.

TO INHABIT, *v.* To abide.

INHERENT, INBRED, INBORN, INNATE.

THE INHERENT, from *hæro* to stick, denotes a permanent quality or property, as opposed to that which is adventitious and transitory. INBRED denotes that property which is derived principally from habit or by a gradual process, as opposed to the one acquired by actual efforts. INBORN denotes that which is purely natural, in opposition to the artificial. *Inherent* is in its sense the most general; for what is *inbred* and *inborn* is naturally *inherent*; but all is not *inbred* and *inborn* which is *inherent*. Inanimate objects have *inherent* properties; but the *inbred* and *inborn* exist only in that which receives life; solidity is an *inherent*, but not an *inbred* or *inborn*, property of matter: a love of truth is an *inborn* property of the human mind; it is consequently

inherent, in as much as nothing can totally destroy it. That which is *inbred* is bred or nurtured in us from our birth; that which is *inborn* is simply born in us: a property may be *inborn*, but not *inbred*; it cannot, however, be *inbred* and not *inborn*. Habits which are ingrafted into the natural disposition are properly *inbred*; whence the vulgar proverb that "what is *bred* in the bone will never be out of the flesh;" to denote the influence which parents have on the characters of their children, both physically and morally. Propensities, on the other hand, which are totally independent of education or external circumstances, are properly *inborn*, as an *inborn* love of freedom; hence, likewise, the properties of animals are *inbred* in them, in as much as they are derived through the medium of the breed of which the parent partakes.

Inborn and INNATE, from the Latin *natus* born, are precisely the same in meaning, yet they differ somewhat in application. Poetry and the grave style have adopted *inborn*; philosophy has adopted *innate*: genius is *inborn* in some men; nobleness is *inborn* in others: there is an *inborn* talent in some men to command, and an *inborn* fitness in others to obey. Mr. Locke and his followers are pleased to say, there is no such thing as *innate* ideas; and if they only mean that there are no sensible impressions on the soul, until it is acted upon by external objects, they may be right: but if they mean to say that there are no *inborn* characters or powers in the soul, which predispose it for the reception of certain impressions, they contradict the experience of the learned and the unlearned in all ages, who believe, and that from close observation on themselves and others, that man has, from his birth, not only the general character, which belongs to him in common with his species, but also those peculiar characteristics which distinguish individuals from their earliest infancy: all these characters or characteristics are, therefore, not supposed to be produced, but elicited, by circumstances; and the ideas, which are but the *germs* forms that the soul assumes connection with the body, as

No plough shall hurt the globe, no pruning
hook the vine. DRYDEN.

With *harmless* play amidst the bows he pass'd.
DRYDEN.

But furious Dido, with dark thoughts involv'd,
Shook at the mighty mischief she resolv'd.
DRYDEN.

INJURY, *v.* *Injustice.*

INJUSTICE, INJURY, WRONG.

INJUSTICE (*v.* *Justice*), INJURY (*v.* *Disadvantage*), and WRONG, signifying the thing that is *wrong*, are all opposed to the right; but the *injustice* lies in the principle, the *injury* in the action that *injures*. There may, therefore, be *injustice* where there is no specific *injury*; and, on the other hand, there may be *injury*, where there is no *injustice*. When we think worse of a person than we ought to think, we do him an act of *injustice*; but we do not, in the strict sense of the word, do him an *injury*: on the other hand, if we say any thing to the discredit of another, it will be an *injury* to his reputation if it be believed; but it may not be an *injustice*, if it be strictly conformable to truth, and that which one is compelled to say.

The violation of justice, or a breach of the rule of right, constitutes the *injustice*; but the quantum of ill which falls on the person constitutes the *injury*. Sometimes a person is dispossessed of his property by fraud or violence, this is an act of *injustice*; but it is not an *injury*, if, in consequence of this act, he obtains friends who make it good to him beyond what he has lost: on the other hand, a person suffers very much through the inadvertence of another, which to him is a serious *injury*, although the offender has not been guilty of *injustice*.

The *wrong* partakes both of *injustice* and *injury*; it is in fact an *injury* done by one person to another, in express violation of justice. The man who seduces a woman from the path of virtue does her the greatest of all *wrongs*. One repents of *injustice*, repairs *injuries*, and redresses *wrongs*.

A lie is properly a species of *injustice*, and a violation of the right of that person to whom the false speech is directed. SCOTT.

Lawrence I'd show with as much studious care,
As I would dens where hungry lions are;
And rather put up *injuries* than be
A plague to him who'd be a plague to me.

POMFRET.

The humble man, when he receives a wrong,
Refers revenge to whom it doth belong. WALLER.

INNATE, *v.* *Inherent.*

INNER, *v.* *Inward.*

INNOCENT, *v.* *Guiltless.*

INOFFENSIVE, *v.* *Unoffending.*

INORDINATE, *v.* *Irregular.*

TO INQUIRE, *v.* *To ask.*

INQUIRY, *v.* *Examination.*

INQUISITIVE, *v.* *Curious.*

INROAD, *v.* *Invasion.*

INSANITY, *v.* *Derangement.*

INSCRUTABLE, *v.* *Unsearchable.*

INSENSIBILITY, *v.* *Indifference.*

INSENSIBLE, *v.* *Hard.*

INSIDE, INTERIOR.

THE INSIDE may be said of bodies of any magnitude, small or large; the INTERIOR is peculiarly appropriate to bodies of great magnitude. We may speak of the *inside* of a nut shell, but not of its *interior*: on the other hand, we speak of the *interior* of St. Paul's, or the *interior* of a palace. This difference of application is not altogether arbitrary: for *inside* literally signifies the side that is inward; but *interior* signifies the space which is more inward than the rest, which is inclosed in an inclosure: consequently cannot be applied to any thing but any large space that is inclosed.

As for the *inside* of their nest, none but themselves were concerned in it, according to the inviolable laws established among these animals (the ants). ADAMSON.

The gates are drawn back, and the *interior* of the fane is discovered. CUMBERLAND.

INSIDIOUS, TREACHEROUS.

INSIDIOUS, in Latin *insidiosus*, from *insidia* stratagem or ambush, from *insideo* to lie in wait or ambush.

TREACHEROUS is changed from *traiterous*, and derived from *trado* to betray, signifying in general the disposition to betray.

The *insidious* man is not so bad as

the *treacherous* man; for the former only lies in wait to ensnare us, when we are off our guard; but the latter throws us off our guard, by lulling us into a state of security, in order the more effectually to get us into his power: an enemy is, therefore, denominated *insidious*, but a friend is *treacherous*. The *insidious* man has recourse to various little artifices, by which he wishes to effect his purpose, and gain an advantage over his opponent; the *treacherous* man pursues a system of direct falsehood, in order to ruin his friend: the *insidious* man objects to a fair and open contest; but the *treacherous* man assails in the dark him whom he should support. The opponents to Christianity are fond of *insidious* attacks upon its sublime truths, because they have not always courage to proclaim their own shame; the *treachery* of some men depends for its success on the credulity of others; as in the case of the Trojans, who listened to the tale of Sinon, the Grecian spy.

Deceit, that friendship's mask *insidious* wears.

JENYNS.

The world must think him in the wrong,
Would say he made a *treach'rous* use
Of wit, to flatter and seduce.

SWIFT.

INSIGHT, INSPECTION.

THE INSIGHT is what we receive: the INSPECTION is what we give: one gets a view into a thing by the *insight*; one takes a view over a thing by an *inspection*. The *insight* serves to increase our own knowledge: the *inspection* enables us to instruct others. An inquisitive traveller tries to get an *insight* into the manners, customs, laws, and government of the countries which he visits; by *inspection* a master discovers the errors which are committed by his scholars, and sets them right.

Angels both good and bad have a full *insight*
Into the activity and force of natural causes.

SCOTT.

Something no doubt is designed; but what that
is, I will not presume to determine from an *in-*
spection of men's hearts.

SCOTT.

INSIGNIFICANT, *v.* Unimportant.

TO INSINUATE, *v.* To hint.

TO INSINUATE, INGRATIATE.

INSINUATE (*v.* To hint), and IN-

GRATULATE, from *gratus* grateful or acceptable, are employed to express the endeavour to gain favor; but they differ in the circumstances of the action. A person who *insinuates* adopts every art to steal into the good will of another; but he who *ingratiates* adopts unartificial means to conciliate good will. A person of *insinuating* manners wins upon another imperceptibly, even so as to convert dislike into attachment; a person with *ingratiating* manners procures good will by a permanent intercourse. *Insinuate* and *ingratiate* differ in the motive, as well as the mode, of the action: the motive is, in both cases, self-interest; but the former is unlawful, and the latter allowable. In proportion as the object to be attained by another's favor is base, so is it necessary to have recourse to *insinuation*; whilst the object to be attained is that which may be avowed, *ingratiating* will serve the purpose. Low persons *insinuate* themselves into the favor of their superiors, in order to obtain an influence over them: it is commendable in a young person to wish to *ingratiate* himself with those who are entitled to his esteem and respect.

Insinuate may be used in the improper sense for unconscious agents; *ingratiate* is always the act of a conscious agent. Water will *insinuate* itself into every body that is in the smallest degree porous; there are few persons of so much apathy, that it may not be possible, one way or another, to *ingratiate* one's self into their favor.

The same character of despotism *insinuated*
itself into every court of Europe.

BURKE.

My resolution was now to *ingratiate* myself
with men whose reputation was established.

JOHNSON.

INSINUATION, REFLECTION.

THESE both imply personal remarks, or such remarks as are directed towards an individual; but the former is less direct and more covert than the latter. The INSINUATION always deals in half words; the REFLECTION is commonly open. They are both levelled at the individual with no good intent: but the *insinuation* is general, and may be employed to convey any unfavorable sentiment;

the *reflection* is particular, and commonly passes between intimates, and persons in close connexion.

The *insinuation* respects the honor, the moral character, or the intellectual endowments, of the person; the *reflection* respects his particular conduct or feelings towards another. Envious people throw out *insinuations* to the disparagement of others, whose merits they dare not openly question; when friends quarrel, they deal largely in *reflections* on the past.

The prejudiced admirers of the ancients are very angry at the least *insinuation* that they had any idea of our barbarous tragi-comedy.

TWINING.

The ill natured man gives utterance to *reflections* which a good natured man stifles.

ADDISON.

INSIPID, DULL, FLAT.

INSIPID, in Latin *insipidus*, from *in* and *sapere* to taste, signifies without savor.

DULL, *v. Dull.*

FLAT, *v. Flat.*

A want of spirit in the moral sense is designated by these epithets, which borrow their figurative meaning from different properties in nature: the taste is referred to in the word *insipid*; the properties of colors are considered under the word *dull*; the property of dimensions is referred to by the word *flat*. As the want of flavor in any meat constitutes it *insipid*, and renders it worthless, so does the want of mind or character in a man render him equally *insipid*, and devoid of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature: as the beauty and perfection of colors consist in their brightness, the absence of this essential property, which constitutes *dulness*, renders them uninteresting objects to the eye; so the want of spirit in a moral composition, which constitutes its *dulness*, deprives it at the same time of that ingredient which should awaken attention: as in the natural world objects are either elevated or *flat*, so in the moral world the spirits are either raised or depressed, and such moral representations as are calculated to raise the spirits are termed spirited, whilst those which fail in this object are termed *flat*. An *insipid* writer is without sentiment of any kind or

degree; a *dull* writer fails in vivacity and vigor of sentiment; a *flat* performance is wanting in the property of provoking mirth, which should be its peculiar ingredient.

To a covetous man all other things but wealth are *insipid*. SOUTHW.

But yet beware of councils when too full,
Number makes long disputes, and graveness
dull. DENHAM.

The senses are disgusted with their old entertainments, and existence turns *flat* and *insipid*. GROVE.

TO INSIST, PERSIST.

BOTH these terms, being derived from the Latin *sisto* to stand, express the idea of resting or keeping to a thing; but INSIST signifies to rest on a point, and PERSIST, from *per* through or by (*v. To continue*), signifies to keep on with a thing, to carry it through. We *insist* on a matter by maintaining it; we *persist* in a thing by continuing to do it; we *insist* by the force of authority or argument; we *persist* by the mere act of the will. A person *insists* on that which he conceives to be his right: or he *insists* on that which he conceives to be right: but he *persistent* in that which he has no will to give up. To *insist* is therefore an act of discretion: to *persist* is mostly an act of folly or caprice; the former is always taken in a good or indifferent sense; the latter mostly in a bad sense. A parent ought to *insist* on all matters that are of essential importance to his children; a spoiled child *persistent* in its follies from perversity of humour.

This natural tendency of despotic power to ignorance and barbarity, though not *invited* upon by others, is, I think, an inconsiderable argument against that form of government.

ADDISON.

A great deal may be done by a course of beneficence obstinately *persisted* in. GROVE.

TO INSNARE, ENTRAP, ENTANGLE, ENVEIGLE.

THE idea of getting any object artfully into one's power is common to all these terms: To INSNARE is to take in or by means of a *snare*; to ENTRAP is to take in a *trap* or by means of a *trap*; to ENTANGLE is to take in a *tangle*, or by means of *tangled* thread; to ENVEIGLE is to take in by means of making blind, from the French *aveugle* blind.

INSPECTION, *v. Insight.*

INSPECTION, SUPERINTENDANCE, OVERSIGHT.

THE office of looking into the conduct of others is expressed by both these terms; but the former comprehends little more than the preservation of good order; the latter includes the arrangement of the whole.

The monitor of a school has the INSPECTION of the conduct of his school fellows, but the master has the SUPERINTENDANCE of the school. The officers of an army *inspect* the men, to see that they observe all the rules that have been laid down to them; a general or superior officer has the *superintendence* of any military operation. Fidelity is peculiarly wanted in an *inspector*, judgement and experience in a *superintendent*. *Inspection* is said of things as well as persons; OVERSIGHT only of persons: one has the *inspection* of books in order to ascertain their accuracy; one has the *oversight* of persons to prevent irregularity: there is an *inspector* of the customs, and an *overseer* of the poor.

This author proposes that there should be examiners appointed to *inspect* the genius of every particular boy. BUDGE.

When female minds are embittered by age or solitude, their malignity is generally exerted in a spiteful *superintendence* of tribes. JOHNSON.

TO INSPIRE, *v. To animate.*

INSTANCE, *v. Example.*

INSTANT, MOMENT.

INSTANT, from *sto* to stand, signifies the point of time that stands over us, or as it were over our heads.

MOMENT, from the Latin *momentum*, is any small particle, particularly a small particle of time.

The *instant* is always taken for the time present; the *moment* is taken generally for either past, present, or future. A dutiful child comes the *instant* he is called; a prudent person embraces the favorable *moment*. When they are both taken for the present time, the *instant* expresses a much shorter space than the *moment*; when we desire a person to do a thing this *instant*, it requires haste; if we desire him to do it this *moment*, it

only admits of no delay. *Instantaneous* relief is necessary on some occasions to preserve life; a *moment's* thought will furnish a ready wit with a suitable reply.

Some circumstances of misery are so powerfully ridiculous, that neither kindness nor duty can withstand them; they force the friend, the dependant, or the child, to give way to *instantaneous* motions of merriment. JOHNSON.

I can easily overlook any present momentary sorrow, when I reflect that it is in my power to be happy a thousand years hence. BRERLEY.

INSTANTANEOUSLY, *v. Directly.*

INSTANTLY, *v. Directly.*

TO INSTIGATE, *v. To encourage.*

TO INSTIL, *v. To implant.*

TO INSTITUTE, ESTABLISH, FOUND, ERECT.

INSTITUTE, in Latin *institutus*, participle of *instituo*, from *in* and *statuo* to place or appoint, signifies to dispose or fix a specific end.

ESTABLISH, *v. To fix.*

FOUND, *v. To found.*

ERECT, *v. To build.*

To *institute* is to form according to a certain plan; to *establish* is to fix in a certain position what has been formed; to *found* is to lay the foundation; to *erect* is to make *erect*. Laws, communities, and particular orders, are *instituted*: schools, colleges, and various societies, are *established*; in the former case something new is supposed to be framed; in the latter case it is supposed only to have a certain situation assigned to it. The order of the Jesuits was *instituted* by Ignatius de Loyola: schools were *established* by Alfred the Great in various parts of his dominions. The act of *instituting* comprehends design and method; that of *establishing* includes the idea of authority. The inquisition was *instituted* in the time of Ferdinand; the Church of England is *established* by authority. To *institute* is always the immediate act of some agent; to *establish* is sometimes the effect of circumstances. Men of public spirit *institute* that which is for the public good; a communication or trade between certain places becomes *established* in course of time. An *institution* is properly of a public nature, but *establishments* are as often private:

people; the *insurrection* in Madrid, in the year 1801, against the infamous usurpation of Bonaparte, has led to the most important results that ever sprung from any commotion. Rome was the grand theatre of *seditions*, which were set on foot by the Tribunes: England has been disgraced by one *rebellion*, which ended in the death of its king.

Sedition is common to all forms of government, but flourishes most in republics, since there it can scarcely be regarded as a political or moral offence: *rebellion* exists properly in none but monarchical states; in which the allegiance that men owe to their sovereign requires to be broken with the utmost violence, in order to be shaken off. *Insurrections* may be made by nations against a foreign dominion, or by subjects against their government: *sedition* and *rebellion* are carried on by subjects only against their government: *revolt* is carried on only by nations against a foreign dominion; upon the death of Alexander the Great most of his conquered countries *revolted* from his successor.

Elizabeth enjoyed a wonderful calm (excepting some short gusts of *insurrection* at the beginning) for near upon forty-five years together.

HOWELL.

When the Roman people began to bring in plebeians to the office of chiefest power and dignity, then began those *seditions* which so long distempered, and at length ruined, the state.

TEMPLE.

If that *rebellion*
Came like itself, in base and abject routs,
You reverend father, and these noble lords,
Had not been here to dress the ugly forms
Of base and bloody *insurrection*. SHAKESPEARE.

Our self-love is ever ready to *revolt* from our better judgement, and join the enemy within.

STEELE.

INTEGRITY, *v.* *Honesty*.

INTELLECT, GENIUS, TALENT.

INTELLECT, in Latin *intellectus* from *intelligo* to understand, signifies the gift of understanding, as opposed to mere instinct or impulse.

GENIUS, in Latin *genius*, from *gigno* to be born, signifies that which is peculiarly born with us.

TALENT, *v.* *Faculty*.

Intellect is here the generic term, as it includes in its own meaning that of the two others: there cannot be

genius or *talent* without *intellect*; but there may be *intellect* without *genius* or *talent*: a man of *intellect* distinguishes himself from the common herd of mankind, by the acuteness of his observation, the accuracy of his judgement, the originality of his conceptions, and other peculiar attributes of mental power; *genius* is a particular bent of the *intellect*, which distinguishes a man from every other individual; *talent* is a particular modulus or modification of the *intellect*, which is of practical utility to the possessor. *Intellect* sometimes runs through a family, and becomes as it were an hereditary portion: *genius* is not of so communicable a nature; it is that tone of the thinking faculty which is altogether individual in its character; it is opposed to every thing artificial, acquired, circumstantial, or incidental; it is a pure spark of the Divine flame, which raises the possessor above all his fellow mortals; it is not expanded, like *intellect*, to many objects; for in its very nature it is contracted within a very short space; and, like the rays of the sun, when concentrated within a focus, it gains in strength what it loses in expansion.

We consider *intellect* as it generally respects speculation and abstraction; but *genius* as it respects the operations of the imagination; *talent* as it respects the exercise or acquirements of the mind. A man of *intellect* may be a good writer; but it requires a *genius* for poetry to be a poet, a *genius* for painting to be a painter, a *genius* for sculpture to be a statuary, and the like: it requires a *talent* to learn languages; it requires a *talent* for the stage to be a good actor; some have a *talent* for imitation, others a *talent* for humour. *Intellect*, in its strict sense, is seen only in a mature state; *genius* or *talent* may be discovered in its earliest dawn: we speak in general of the *intellect* of a man only; but we may speak of the *genius* or *talent* of a youth: *intellect* qualifies a person for conversation, and affords him great enjoyment; *genius* qualifies a person for the most exalted efforts of the human mind; *talent* qualifies a person for the active duties and employments of life.

termeddle are of a different description: one may *interfere* for the good of others, or to gratify one's self; one never *intermeddles* but for selfish purposes: the first three terms are, therefore, always used in a good sense; the fourth in a good or bad sense, according to circumstances; the last always in a bad sense.

To *interfere* has nothing conciliating in it like *intercede*, nothing authoritative in it like *interpose*, nothing responsible in it like *mediate*; it may be useful, or it may be injurious; it may be authorized or unauthorized; it may be necessary, or altogether impertinent: when we *interfere* so as to make peace between men, it is useful; but when we *interfere* unreasonably, it often occasions differences rather than removes them.

Intercede, and the others, are said in cases where two or more parties are concerned; but *interfere* and *intermeddle* are said of what concerns only one individual: one *interferes* and *intermeddles* rather in the concern, than between the persons; and, on that account, it becomes a question of some importance to decide when we ought to *interfere* in the affairs of another: with regard to *intermeddle*, it always is the unauthorized act of one who is busy in things that ought not to concern him.

Virgil recovered his estate by Mæcenas's *intercession*.
DRYDEN.

Those few you see escap'd the storm, and fear,
Unless you *interpose*, a shipwreck here.

DRYDEN.

It is generally better (in negotiating) to deal by speech than by letter, and by the *mediation* of a third than by a man's self.

BACON.

Religion *interferes* not with any rational pleasure.

SOUTH.

The sight *intermeddles* not with that which affects the smell.

SOUTH.

INTERCHANGE, EXCHANGE, RECIPROCITY.

THE INTERCHANGE is a frequent and mutual *exchange* (*v. Change*); the EXCHANGE consists of one act only; the *interchange* consists of many acts: the *interchange* is used only in the moral sense; *exchange* is used mostly in the proper sense: an *interchange* of civilities keeps alive good will; an *exchange* of

commodities is a convenient mode of trade.

The *interchange* is an act; the RECIPROCITY is an abstract property: by an *interchange* of sentiment, friendships are engendered; the *reciprocity* of good services is what renders them doubly acceptable to those who do them, and to those who receive them.

Kindness is preserved by a constant *interchange* of pleasures.
JOHNSON.

The whole course of nature is a great *exchange*.
SOUTH.

The services of the poor, and the protection of the rich, become *reciprocally* necessary. BLAIR.

INTERCOURSE, COMMUNICATION, CONNEXION, COMMERCE.

INTERCOURSE, in Latin *intercursus*, signifies literally a running between.

COMMUNICATION, *v. To communicate*.

CONNEXION, *v. To connect*.

COMMERCE, from *com* and *mers* a merchandize, signifies literally an exchange of merchandize, and generally an interchange.

The *intercourse* and *commerce* subsist only between persons; the *communication* and *connexion* between persons and things. The *intercourse* with persons may be carried on in various forms; either by an interchange of civilities, which is a friendly *intercourse*; an exchange of commodities, which is a *commercial intercourse*; or an exchange of words, which is a verbal and partial *intercourse*: the *communication*, in this sense, is a species of *intercourse*; namely, that which consists in the *communication* of one's thoughts to another: the *connexion* consists of a permanent *intercourse*; since one who has a regular *intercourse* for purposes of trade with another is said to have a *connexion* with him, or to stand in *connexion* with him. There may, therefore, be a partial *intercourse* or *communication* where there is no *connexion*, nothing to bind or link the parties to each other; but there cannot be a *connexion* which is not kept up by continual *intercourse*.

The *commerce* is a species of general but close *intercourse*; it may consist

either of frequent meeting and regular co-operation, or in cohabitation: in this sense we speak of the *commerce* of men one with another, or the *commerce* of man and wife, of parents and children, and the like.

As it respects things, *communication* is said of places in the proper sense; *connexion* is used for things in the proper or improper sense: there is said to be a *communication* between two rooms when there is a passage open from one to the other; one house has a *connexion* with another when there is a common passage or thoroughfare to them: a *communication* is kept up between two countries by means of regular or irregular conveyances; a *connexion* subsists between two towns when the inhabitants trade with each other, intermarry, and the like.

The world is maintained by *intercourse*.

SOUTH.

How happy is an intellectual being, who, by prayer and meditation opens this *communication* between God and his own soul.

ADDISON.

A very material part of our happiness or misery arises from the *connexions* we have with those around us.

BLAIR.

I should venture to call politeness benevolence in trifles, or the preference of others to ourselves, in little, daily, and hourly occurrences in the *commerce* of life.

CHATHAM.

INTEREST, CONCERN.

THE INTEREST, from the Latin *interest* to be amongst, or have a part or a share in a thing, is more comprehensive than CONCERN (*v. Affair*). We have an *interest* in whatever touches or comes near to our feelings or our external circumstances; we have a *concern* in that which respects our external circumstances. The *interest* is that which is agreeable; it consists of either profit, advantage, gain, or amusement; it binds us to an object, and makes us think of it: the *concern*, on the other hand, is something involuntary or painful; we have a *concern* in that which we are obliged to look to, which we are bound to from the fear of losing or of suffering. It is the *interest* of every man to cultivate a religious temper; it is the *concern* of all to be on their guard against temptation.

INTERVAL.

Their *interest* no priest nor sorcerer
Forgets.

DENNIS.

And could the marble rocks but know,
They'd strive to find some secret way unknown,
Maugre the senseless nature of the stone,
Their pity and concern to show.

POMPEY.

TO INTERFERE, *v. To intercede.*

INTERIOR, *v. Inside.*

INTERIOR, *v. Inward.*

INTERLOPER, *v. Intruder.*

TO INTERMEDDLE, *v. To intercede.*

INTERMEDIATE, INTERVENING.

INTERMEDIATE signifies being in the midst, between two objects; INTERVENING signifies coming between: the former is applicable to space and time; the latter either to time or circumstances.

The *intermediate* time between the commencement and the termination of a truce is occupied with preparations for the renewal of hostilities; *intervening* circumstances sometimes change the views of the belligerent parties, and dispose their minds to peace.

A right opinion is that which connects truth by the shortest train of *intermediate* propositions.

JOHNSON.

Hardly would any transient gleams of *intervening* joy be able to force its way through the clouds, if the successive scenes of distress through which we are to pass were laid before our view.

BLAIR.

INTERMENT, *v. Burial.*

TO INTERMINGLE, *v. To mix.*

INTERMISSION, *v. Cessation.*

TO INTERMIX, *v. To subside.*

TO INTERMIX, *v. To mix.*

INTERNAL, *v. Inward.*

TO INTERPOSE, *v. To intercede.*

INTERPOSITION, *v. Intervention.*

TO INTERPRET, *v. To explain.*

TO INTERROGATE, *v. To ask.*

TO INTERRUPT, *v. To disturb.*

INTERVAL, RESPITE.

INTERVAL, in Latin *intervallum*, signifies literally the space between

the stakes which formed a Roman intrenchment; and, by an extended application, it signifies every space.

RESPIRE, probably contracted from *respirit*, a breathing again.

Every *respite* requires an *interval*; but there are many *intervals* where there is no *respite*. The *interval* respects time only; *respite* includes the idea of action within that time which may be more or less agreeable: *intervals* of ease are a *respite* to one who is oppressed with labor; the *interval* which is sometimes granted to a criminal before his execution is in the properest sense a *respite*.

Any uncommon exertion of strength, or perseverance in labour, is succeeded by a long *interval* of languor. JOHNSON.

Give me leave to allow myself no *respite* from labor. SPECTATOR.

INTERVENING, *v.* *Intermediate*.

INTERVENTION, INTERPOSITION.

THE INTERVENTION, from *inter* between, and *venio* to come, is said of inanimate objects; the INTERPOSITION, from *inter* between, and *pono* to place, is said only of rational agents. The light of the moon is obstructed by the *intervention* of the clouds; the life of an individual is preserved by the *interposition* of a superior: human life is so full of contingencies, that when we have formed our projects we can never say what may *intervene* to prevent their execution; when a man is engaged in an unequal combat, he has no chance of escaping but by the timely *interposition* of one who is able to rescue.

Reflect also on the calamitous *intervention* of picture cleaners (to originals). BARRY.

Death ready stands to *interpose* his dart.

MILTON.

INTERVIEW, *v.* *Meeting*.

INTIMACY, *v.* *Acquaintance*.

INTIMATE, *v.* *To hint*.

INTIMIDATE, *v.* *To frighten*.

INTOXICATION, DRUNKENNESS, INFATUATION.

INTOXICATION, from the Latin *toricum* a poison, signifies imbued with a poison.

DRUNKENNESS signifies the state of having drunk over much.

INFATUATION, from *fatuus* foolish, signifies making foolish.

Intoxication and *drunkenness* are used either in the proper or the improper sense; *infatuation* in the improper sense only: *intoxication* is a general state; *drunkenness* a particular state: *intoxication* may be produced by various causes; *drunkenness* is produced only by an immoderate indulgence in some *intoxicating* liquor: a person may be *intoxicated* by the smell of strong liquors, or by vapors which produce a similar effect; he becomes *drunken* by the drinking of wine or other spirits. In the improper sense a deprivation of one's reasoning faculties is the common idea in the signification of all these terms: the *intoxication* and *drunkenness* spring from the intemperate state of the feelings; the *infatuation* springs from the ascendancy of the passions over the reasoning powers: a person is *intoxicated* with success, *drunk* with joy, and *infatuated* by an excess of vanity, or an impetuosity of character.

A person who is naturally *intoxicated* reels and is giddy; he who is in the moral sense *intoxicated* is disorderly and unsteady in his conduct: a *drunken* man is deprived of the use of all his senses, and in the moral sense he is bewildered and unable to collect himself: an *infatuated* man is not merely foolish but wild; he carries his folly to the most extravagant pitch.

This plan of empire was not taken up in the first *intoxication* of unexpected success.

BURKE.

Passion is the *drunkenness* of the mind.

SOUTH.

A sure destruction impends over those *infatuated* princes, who, in the conflict with this new and unheard of power, proceed as if they were engaged in a war that bore a resemblance to their former contests.

BURKE.

TO INTRENCH, *v.* *To encroach*.

INTREPID, *v.* *Bold*.

INTRICACY, *v.* *Complexity*.

INTRINSIC, REAL, GENUINE, NATIVE.

INTRINSIC, in Latin *intrinsecus*, signifies on the inside, that is, lying in the thing itself.

ants; it is the fault of young persons, who have formed any opinions for themselves, to *obtrude* them upon every one who will give them a hearing.

In the moral acceptation they preserve the same distinction. In moments of devotion, the serious man endeavours to prevent the *intrusion* of improper ideas in his mind. The guilty conscience *obtrudes* itself upon a mind even in the season of greatest merriment.

The *intrusion* of scruples, and the recollection of better notions, will not suffer some to live contented with their own conduct. JOHNSON.

Artists are sometimes ready to talk to an incidental enquirer as they do to one another, and to make their knowledge ridiculous by injudicious *obtrusion*. JOHNSON.

INTRUDER, INTERLOPER.

AN INTRUDER (*v. To intrude*) thrusts himself in: an INTERLOPER, from *laufen*, runs in between and takes his station. The *intruder* therefore is only for a short space of time, and in an unimportant degree; but the *interloper* abridges another of his essential rights and for a permanency. A man is an *intruder* who is an unbidden guest at the table of another: he is an *interloper* when he joins any society in such manner as to obtain its privileges, without sharing its burdens. *Intruders* are always offensive in the domestic circle: *interlopers* in trade are always regarded with an evil eye.

I would not have you to offer it to the doctor, as eminent physicians do not love *intruders*. JOHNSON.

Some proposed to vest the trade to America in exclusive companies, which interest would render the most vigilant guardians of the Spanish commerce, against the encroachments of *interlopers*. ROBERTSON.

TO INVADE, *v. To encroach*.

INVALID, PATIENT.

INVALID, in Latin *invalidus*, signifies literally one not strong or in good health; PATIENT from the Latin *patiens* suffering, signifies one suffering under disease. The *invalid* is a general, and the *patient* a particular term: a person may be an *invalid* without being a *patient*: he may be a *patient* without being an *invalid*. An *invalid* is so denominated from his wanting his ordinary share of health

and strength; but the *patient* is one who is labouring under some bodily suffering. Old soldiers are called *invalids* who are no longer able to bear the fatigues of warfare: but they are not necessarily *patients*. He who is under the surgeon's hands for a broken limb is a *patient*, but not necessarily an *invalid*.

TO INVALIDATE, *v. To weaken*.

INVASION, INCURSION, IRRUPTION, INROAD.

THE idea of making a forcible entrance into a foreign territory is common to all these. INVASION, from *vado* to go, expresses merely this general idea, without any particular qualification: INCURSION, from *curro* to run, signifies a hasty and sudden invasion: IRRUPTION, from *rumpo* to break, signifies a particularly violent invasion: INROAD, from *in* and *road*, signifies a making a road or way for one's self, which includes invasion and occupation. *Invasion* is said of that which passes in distant lands; Alexander *invaded* India; Hannibal crossed the Alps, and made an *invasion* into Italy: *incursion* is said of neighbouring states; the borderers on each side the Tweed used to make frequent *incursions* into England or Scotland. *Invasion* is the act of a regular army; it is a systematic military movement: *irruption* is the irregular and impetuous movement of undisciplined troops. The *invasion* of France by the Allies is one of the grandest military movements that the world has ever witnessed; the *irruption* of the Goths and Vandals into Europe has been acted over again by the late revolutionary armies of France.

The *invasion* may be partial and temporary; one *invades* from various causes, but not always from hostility to the inhabitants: an *inroad* is made by a conqueror who determines to dispossess the existing occupier of the land: *invasion* is therefore to *inroad* only as a means to an end. He who *invades* a country, and gets possession of its strong places so as to have an entire command of the land, is said to make *inroads* into that country; but since it is possible to get forcible possession of a country by other

others, or occasioned by the suggestions of others; it is *framed* inasmuch as it required to be duly disposed in all its parts, so as to be consistent; it is *fabricated* inasmuch as it runs in direct opposition to the actual circumstances, and therefore has required the skill and labor of a workman; it is *forged* inasmuch as it seems by its utter falsehood and extravagance to have caused as much severe action in the brain, as what is produced by the fire in a furnace or *forge*.

Pythagoras *invented* the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid. BARTELET.

Their savage eyes turn'd to a modest gaze
By the sweet power of music; therefore, the poet
Did *feign* that Orpheus drew trees, stones, and
floods. SHAKESPEARE.

Nature bath *fram'd* strange fellows in her time.
SHAKESPEARE.

The very idea of the *fabrication* of a new government is enough to fill us with horror.

BURKE.

As chymists gold from brass by fire would draw,
Pretexts are into treason *forg'd* by law.

DENHAM.

TO INVERT, *v.* To overturn.

TO INVEST, ENDUE OR ENDOW.

To INVEST, from *vestio*, signifies to clothe in any thing.

INDUE or ENDOW, from the Latin *induo*, signifies to put on any thing. One is *invested* with that which is external: one is *endued* with that which is internal. We *invest* a person with an office or a dignity: one *endues* a person with good qualities. The *investment* is a real external action; but *endue* may be merely fictitious or mental. The king is *invested* with supreme authority; a lover *endues* his mistress with every earthly perfection. *Endow* is but a variation of *endue*, and yet it seems to have acquired a distinct office: we may say that a person is *endued* or *endowed* with a good understanding; but as an act of the imagination *endow* is not to be substituted for *endue*: for we do not say that it *endows* but *endues* things with properties.

A strict and efficacious constitution, indeed, which *invests* the church with no power at all, but where men will be so civil as to obey it.

SOUTH.

As in the natural body, the eye does not speak, nor the tongue see; so neither in the

spiritual, in every one *endued* also with the gift and spirit of government. SOUTH.

INVESTIGATION, *v.* Examination.

INVIDIOUS, ENVIOUS.

INVIDIOUS, in Latin *invidiosus*, from *invidia* and *invideo* not to look at, signifies looking at with an evil eye: ENVIOUS is literally only a variation of *invidious*. *Invidious* in its common acceptation signifies causing ill will; *envious* signifies having ill will.

A task is *invidious* that puts one in the way of giving offence; a look is *envious* that is full of *envy*. *Invidious* qualifies the thing; *envious* qualifies the temper of the mind. It is *invidious* for one author to be judge against another who has written on the same subject: a man is *envious* when the prospect of another's happiness gives him pain.

For I must speak what wisdom would conceal,
And truths *invidious* to the great reveal. POPE.

They that desire to excel in too many matters
out of levity and vain glory, are ever *envious*.

BACON.

TO INVIGORATE, *v.* To strengthen.

INVINCIBLE, UNCONQUERABLE, INSUPERABLE, INSURMOUNTABLE.

INVINCIBLE signifies not to be vanquished (*v.* To conquer): UNCONQUERABLE not to be conquered: INSUPERABLE not to be overcome: INSURMOUNTABLE not to be surmounted. Persons or things are in the strict sense *invincible* which can withstand all force; but as in this sense nothing created can be termed *invincible*, the term is employed to express strongly whatever can withstand human force in general; on this ground the Spaniards termed their Armada *invincible*. The qualities of the mind are termed *unconquerable* which are not to be gained over or brought under the control of one's own reason, or the judgement of another: hence obstinacy is with propriety denominated *unconquerable* which will yield to no foreign influence. The particular disposition of the mind or turn of thinking is termed *insuperable*, in as much as it baffles our resolution or wishes to

his own fancied superiority of intelligence and illumination. *Foolish, absurd, and preposterous*, rise in degree: a violation of common sense is implied by them all, but they vary according to the degree of violence which is done to the understanding: *foolish* is applied to any thing, however trivial, which in the smallest degree offends our understandings: the conduct of children is therefore often *foolish*, but not *absurd* and *preposterous*, which are said only of serious things that are opposed to our judgments: it is *absurd* for a man to persuade another to do that which he in like circumstances would object to do himself; it is *preposterous* for a man to expose himself to the ridicule of others, and then be angry with those who will not treat him respectfully.

The schemes of freethinkers are altogether *irrational*, and require the most extravagant credulity to embrace them. ADDISON.

The same well meaning gentleman took occasion at another time to bring together such of his friends as were addicted to a *foolish* habitual custom of swearing, in order to show them the *absurdity* of the practice. ADDISON.

By a *preposterous* desire of things in themselves, indifferent men forego the enjoyment of that happiness which those things are instrumental to obtain. BERKELEY.

IRREFRAGABLE, *v.* *Indubitable*.

IRREGULAR, DISORDERLY,
INORDINATE, INTEMPERATE.

IRREGULAR, that is literally *not regular*, marks merely the absence of a good quality: DISORDERLY, that is literally out of order, marks the presence of a positively bad quality. What is *irregular* may be so from the nature of the thing; what is *disorderly* is rendered so by some external circumstance. Things are planted *irregularly* for want of design: the best troops are apt to be *disorderly* in a long march. *Irregular* and *disorderly* are taken in a moral as well as a natural sense: INORDINATE, which signifies also put out of order, is employed only in the moral sense. What is *irregular* is contrary to the rule that is established, or ought to be; what is *disorderly* is contrary to the order that has existed; what is *inordinate* is contrary to the order that is prescribed; what is INTEMPE-

RATE is contrary to the temper or spirit that ought to be encouraged. Our habits will be *regular* which are not conformable to the laws of social society; our practices will be *disorderly* when we follow the blind impulse of passion. Our desires will be *inordinate*, when they are not under the control of reason, guided by religion; our indulgencies will be *intemperate* when we consult nothing but our appetites. Young people are apt to contract *irregular* habits if not placed under the care of discreet and sober people, and made to conform to the regulations of domestic life: children are naturally prone to become *disorderly*, if not perpetually under the eye of a master: it is the lot of human beings in all ages and stations to have *inordinate* desires, which require a constant check so as to prevent *intemperate* conduct of any kind.

In youth there is a certain *irregularity* and agitation by no means unbecoming.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

The minds of bad men are *disorderly*. BLAIR.

Inordinate passions are the great disturbers of life.

IRRELIGIOUS, PROFANE,
IMPIOUS.

As epithets to designate the character of the person, they seem to rise in degree: the IRRELIGIOUS is negative; the PROFANE and IMPIOUS are positive; the latter being much stronger than the former. All men who are not positively actuated by principles of religion are *irreligious*; who, if we include all such as show a disregard to the outward observances of religion, form a too numerous class: *profanity* and *impiety* are however of a still more heinous nature; they consist not in the mere absence of regard for religion, but in a positive contempt of it and open outrage against its laws; the *profane* man treats what is sacred as if it were *profane*; what a believer holds in reverence, and utters with awe, is pronounced with an air of indifference or levity, and as a matter of common discourse, by a *profane* man; he knows no difference between sacred and *profane*; but as the former may be converted into a source of scandal to-

vidia from *invideo*, compounded of *in* privative and *video* to see, signifies not looking at, or looking at in a contrary direction.

We are *jealous* of what is our own; we are *envious* of what is another's. *Jealousy* fears to lose what it has; *envy* is pained at seeing another have. Princes are *jealous* of their authority; subjects are *jealous* of their rights: courtiers are *envious* of those in favor; women are *envious* of superior beauty.

The *jealous* man has an object of desire, something to get and something to retain; he does not look beyond the object that interferes with his enjoyment: a *jealous* husband may therefore be appeased by the declaration of his wife's animosity against the object of his *jealousy*. The *envious* man sickens at the sight of enjoyment; he is easy only in the misery of others: all endeavours, therefore, to satisfy an *envious* man are fruitless. *Jealousy* is a noble or an ignoble passion according to the object; in the former case it is emulation sharpened by fear; in the latter case it is greediness stimulated by fear: *envy* is always a base passion, having the worst passions in its train.

Jealous is applicable to bodies of men as well as individuals; *envious* to the individuals only. Nations are *jealous* of any interference on the part of any other power in their commerce, government, or territory; individuals are *envious* of the rank, wealth, and honors of each other.

Every man is more *jealous* of his natural than his moral qualities. HAWKESWORTH.

The *envious* man is in pain upon all occasions which should give him pleasure. ADDISON.

TO JEER, *v.* To scoff.

TO JEST, JOKE, MAKE GAME, SPORT.

JEST is in all probability abridged from *gesticulate*, because the ancient mimics used much *gesticulation* in breaking their *jests* on the company.

JOKE, in Latin *jocus*, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *tsechek* to laugh.

To MAKE GAME signifies here to make the subject of the game or play (*v.* *Play*).

To SPORT signifies here to *sport* with, or convert into a subject of amusement.

One *jests* in order to make others laugh; one *jokes* in order to please one's self. The *jest* is directed at the object; the *joke* is practised with the person or on the person. One attempts to make a thing laughable or ridiculous by *jesting* about it, or treating it in a *jesting* manner; one attempts to excite good humour in others, or indulge it in oneself by *joking* with them. *Jests* are therefore seldom harmless: *jokes* are frequently allowable. The most serious subject may be degraded by being turned into a *jest*; but the melancholy or dejection of the mind may be conveniently dispelled by a *joke*. Court fools and buffoons used formerly to break their *jests* upon every subject by which they thought to entertain their employers: those who know how to *joke* with good-nature and discretion may contribute to the mirth of the company: to *make game* of is applicable only to persons: to *make a sport* of or *sport* with, is applied to objects in general, whether persons or things; both are employed like *jest* in the bad sense, of treating a thing more lightly than it deserves.

To *jest* consists of words or corresponding signs; it is peculiarly appropriate to one who acts a part: to *joke* consists not only of words, but of simple actions, which are calculated to produce mirth; it is peculiarly applicable to the social intercourse of friends: to *make game* of consists more of laughter than any; it has not the ingenuity of the *jest*, nor the good-nature of the *joke*; it is the part of the fool who wishes to make others appear what he himself really is: to *sport* with or to *make sport* of, consists not only of simple actions, but of conduct; it is the error of a weak mind that does not know how to set a due value on any thing; the fool *sports* with his reputation, when he risks the loss of it for a bauble.

But those who aim at ridicule,
Should fix upon some certain rule,
Which fairly hints they are in *jest*. SWIFT.

How fond are men of rule and place,
Who court it from the mean and base,
They love the cellar's vulgar *joke*,
And lose their hours in ale and smoke. GAY.

UMPIRE is most probably a corruption from empire, signifying one who has authority.

ARBITER and ARBITRATOR, from *arbitror* to think, signify one who decides.

Judge is the generic term, the others are only species of the *judge*. The *judge* determines in all matters disputed or undisputed; he pronounces what is law for the future as well as what will be law; the *umpire* and *arbiter* are only *judges* in particular cases that admit of dispute: there may be *judges* in literature, in arts, and civil matters; *umpires* and *arbiters* are only *judges* in civil matters. The *judge* pronounces, in matters of dispute, according to a written law or a prescribed rule; the *umpire* decides in all matters of contest; and the *arbiter* or *arbitrator* in all matters of litigation, according to his own judgment. The *judge* acts under the appointment of government; the *umpire* and *arbitrator* are appointed by individuals: the former is chosen for his skill; he adjudges the palm to the victor according to the merits of the case: the latter is chosen for his impartiality; he consults the interests of both by equalizing their claims.

The office of an English *judge* is one of the most honourable in the state; he is the voice of the legislator, and the organ for dispensing justice; he holds the balance between the king and the subject: the characters of those who have filled this office have been every way fitted to raise it in the estimation of all the world. An *umpire* has no particular moral duty to discharge, nor important office; but he is of use in deciding the contested merits of individuals; among the Romans and Greeks, the *umpire* at their games was held in high estimation. The office of an *arbiter*, although not so elevated as a *judge* in its literal sense, has often the important duty of a Christian peacemaker; and as the determinations of an *arbiter* are controlled by no external circumstances, the term is applied to monarchs, and even to the Creator as the sovereign *Arbiter* of the world.

Palæmon shall be *judge* how ill you rhyme.

DRYDEN.

To pray'r, repentance, and obedience due,

Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut,
And I will place within them as a guide,
My *umpire* conscience. MILTON.

You once have known me,
"Twixt warring monarchs and contending states,
The glorious *arbiter*. LEWIS.

I am not out of the reach of people who
oblige me to act as their *judge* or their *arbitrator*.
MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

JUDGMENT, DISCRETION, PRUDENCE.

THESE terms are all employed to express the various modes of practical wisdom, which serve to regulate the conduct of men in ordinary life. The JUDGMENT is that faculty which enables a person to distinguish right and wrong in general: DISCRETION and PRUDENCE serve the same purpose in particular cases. The *judgment* is conclusive; it decides by positive inference; it enables a person to discover the truth: *discretion* is intuitive (*v. Discernment*); it discerns or perceives what is in all probability right. The *judgment* acts by a fixed rule; it admits of no question or variation: the *discretion* acts according to circumstances, and is its own rule. The *judgment* determines in the choice of what is good: the *discretion* sometimes only guards against error or direct mistakes; it chooses what is nearest to the truth. The *judgment* requires knowledge and actual experience; the *discretion* requires reflection and consideration: a general exercises his *judgment* in the disposition of his army, and in the mode of attack; whilst he is following the rules of military art he exercises his *discretion* in the choice of officers for different posts, in the treatment of his men, in his negotiations with the enemy, and various other measures which depend upon contingencies.

Discretion looks to the present; *prudence*, which is the same as providence or foresight, calculates on the future: *discretion* takes a wide survey of the case that offers; it looks to the moral fitness of the thing, as well as the consequences which may follow from it; it determines according to the real propriety of the thing, as well as the ultimate advantages which it may produce: *prudence* looks only to the good or evil which may result

hand, when a regard to *equity* leads to the direct violation of any law, it ceases to be either *equity* or *justice*. The rights of property are alike to be preserved by both *justice* and *equity*: but the former respects only those general and fundamental principles which are universally admitted in the social compact, and comprehended under the laws; the latter respects those particular principles which belong to the case of individuals: *justice* is, therefore, properly a virtue belonging only to a large and organized society: *equity* must exist wherever two individuals come in connexion with each other. When a father disinherits his son, he does not violate *justice*, although he does not act consistently with *equity*; the disposal of his property is a right which is guaranteed to him by the established laws of civil society; but the claims which a child has by nature over the property of his parent, become the claims of *equity* which the latter is not at liberty to set at nought without the most substantial reasons. On the other hand, when Cyrus adjudged the coat to each boy as it fitted him, without regard to the will of the younger from whom the large coat had been taken, it is evident that he committed an act of *injustice*, without performing an act of *equity*; since all violence is positively *unjust*, and what is positively *unjust*, can never be equitable: whence it is clear that *justice*, which respects the absolute and unalienable rights of mankind, can at no time be superseded by what is supposed to be *equity*; although *equity* may be conveniently made to interpose where the laws of *justice* are either too severe or altogether silent. On this ground, supposing I have received an injury, *justice* demands reparation; it listens to no palliation, excuse, or exception: but supposing the reparation which I have a right to demand involves the ruin of him who is more unfortunate than guilty, can I in *equity* insist on the demand? *Justice* is that which public law requires; *equity* is that which private law or the law of every man's conscience requires.

They who supplicate for mercy from others, can never hope for *justice* through themselves.

BURKE.

Every rule of *equity* demands
That vice and virtue from the Almighty's hands
Should due rewards and punishments receive.

JENYNS.

TO JUSTIFY, *v.* To apologize.

JUSTNESS, CORRECTNESS.

JUSTNESS, from *jus* law (*v.* *Justice*), is the conformity to established principle: CORRECTNESS, from *rectus* right or straight (*v.* *Correct*), is the conformity to a certain mark or line: the former is used in the moral or improper sense only; the latter is used in the proper or improper sense. We estimate the value of remarks by their *justness*, that is, their accordance to certain admitted principles. The *correctness* of the outline is of the first importance in drawing; the *correctness* of dates enhances the value of a history. It has been *justly* observed by the moralists of antiquity, that money is the root of all evil; partisans seldom state *correctly* what they see and hear.

Few men, possessed of the most perfect sight, can describe visual objects with more spirit and *justness* than Mr. Blacklock the poet born blind.

BURKE.

I do not mean the popular eloquence which cannot be tolerated at the bar, but that *correctness* of style and elegance of method which at once pleases and persuades the hearer.

SIR WM. JONES.

JUVENILE, *v.* Youthful.

K.

KEEN, *v.* Acute.

KEEN, *v.* Sharp.

TO KEEP, *v.* To hold.

TO KEEP, PRESERVE, SAVE.

KEEP, *v.* To hold, keep.

PRESERVE, compounded of *pre* and the Latin *servo* to keep, signifies to keep away from all mischief.

SAVE signifies to keep safe.

The idea of having in one's possession is common to all these terms; which is, however, the simple meaning of *keep*: to *preserve* is to keep with care, and free from all injury; to *save* is to keep laid up in a safe place, and free from destruction. Things are kept at all times, and under all circumstances; they are preserved in circumstances of peculiar difficulty

MURDER, in German *mord*, &c. is connected with the Latin *mors* death.

ASSASSINATE, signifies to *kill* after the manner of an *assassin*; which word probably comes from the *Levant*, where a prince of the Arsacides or *assassins*, who was called the old man of the mountains, lived in a castle between Antioch and Damascus, and brought up young men to lie in wait for passengers.

SLAY or **SLAUGHTER**, in German *schlagen*, &c. probably from *liegen* to lie, signifying to lay low.

To *kill* is the general and indefinite term, signifying simply to take away life; to *murder* is to *kill* with open violence and injustice; to *assassinate* is to *murder* by surprise, or by means of lying in wait; to *slay* is to *kill* in battle: to *kill* is applicable to men, animals, and also vegetables; to *murder* and *assassinate* to men only; to *slay* mostly to men, but sometimes to animals; to *slaughter* only to animals in the proper sense, but it may be applied to men in the improper sense, when they are *killed* like brutes, either as to the numbers or to the manner of *killing* them.

The fierce young hero who had overcome the Curiatii, being upbraided by his sister for having slain her lover, in the height of his resentment kills her. ANDERSON.

Murders and executions are always transacted behind the scenes in the French theatre. ANDERSON.

The women interposed with so many prayers and entreaties, that they prevented the mutual slaughter which threatened the Romans and the Sabines. ANDERSON.

On this vain hope, adulterers, thieves rely,
And to this altar vile assassins fly. JEFFERSON.

KIND, *v.* *Affectionate*.

KIND, *v.* *Gracious*.

KIND, **SPECIES**, **SORT**.

KIND, most probably from the Teutonic *kind* a child, signifying related, or of the same family.

SPECIES, in Latin *species*, from *specio* to behold, signifies literally the form or appearance, and in an extended sense that which comes under a particular form.

SORT, in Latin *sors* a lot, signifies that which constitutes a particular lot or parcel.

Kind and *species* are both employed

in their proper sense; *sort* has been diverted from its original meaning by colloquial use: *kind* is properly employed for animate objects, particularly for mankind, and improperly for moral objects; *species* is a term used by philosophers, classing things according to their external or internal properties. *Kind*, as a term in vulgar use, has a less definite meaning than *species*, which serves to form the groundwork of science: we discriminate things in a loose or general manner by saying that they are of the animal or vegetable *kind*; of the canine or feline *kind*; but we discriminate them precisely if we say that they are a *species* of the arbutus, of the pomegranate, of the dog, the horse, and the like. By the same rule we may speak of a *species* of madness, a *species* of fever, and the like; because diseases have been brought under a systematic arrangement: but, on the other hand, we should speak of a *kind* of language, a *kind* of feeling, a *kind* of influence; and in similar cases where a general resemblance is to be expressed.

Sort may be used for either *kind* or *species*; it does not necessarily imply any affinity, or common property in the objects, but simple assemblage, produced as it were by *sors*, chance: hence we speak of such *sort* of folks or people; such *sort* of practices; different *sorts* of grain; the various *sorts* of merchandizes: and in similar cases where things are *sorted* or brought together, rather at the option of the person, than according to the nature of the thing.

An ungrateful person is a *kind* of thoroughfare or common shore for the good things of the world to pass into. SCOTT.

If the French should succeed in what they propose, and establish a democracy in a country circumstanced like France, they will establish a very bad government, a very bad *species* of tyranny. BURKE.

The French made and recorded a *sort* of institute, and digest of anarchy, called the rights of man. BURKE.

KINDNESS, *v.* *Benefit*.

KINDNESS, *v.* *Benevolence*.

KINDRED, **RELATIONSHIP**, **AFFINITY**, **CONSANGUINITY**.

The idea of a state in which persons

The attainment of *knowledge* is, of itself, a pleasure, independent of the many extrinsic advantages which it brings to every individual, according to the station of life in which he is placed; the pursuits of *science* have a peculiar interest for men of a peculiar turn: those who thirst after general *knowledge* may not have a reach of intellect to take the comprehensive survey of nature, which is requisite for a *scientific* man. *Learning* is less dependant on the genius, than on the will of the individual; men of moderate talents have overcome the deficiencies of nature, by labor and perseverance, and have acquired such stores of *learning* as have raised them to a respectable station in the republic of letters. Profound *erudition* is obtained but by few; a retentive memory, a patient industry, and deep penetration, are requisites for one who aspires to the title of an *erudite* man.

Knowledge, in the unqualified and universal sense, is not always a good: Pope says, "A little *knowledge* is a dangerous thing:" it is certain we may have a *knowledge* of evil as well as good, and as our passions are ever ready to serve us an ill turn, they will call in our imperfect or superficial *knowledge* to their aid. *Science* is more exempt from this danger; but the *scientific* man who forgets to make experience his guide, as many are apt to do in the present day, will wander in the regions of idle speculation, and sink in the quicksands of scepticism. *Learning* is more generally and practically useful to the morals of men than *science*; while it makes us acquainted with the language, the sentiments, and manners of former ages: it serves to purify the sentiments, to enlarge the understanding, and exert the powers; but the pursuit of that *learning* which consists merely in the *knowledge* of words, or in the study of editions, is even worse than a useless employment of the time. *Erudition* is always good, it does not merely serve to ennoble the possessor, but it adds to the stock of important *knowledge*; it serves the cause of religion and morality, and elevates the views of men to the grandest objects of inquiry.

Can *knowledge* have no bound, but must advance

So far, to make us wish for ignorance? DENHAM.
O sacred poesy, thou spirit of Roman arts,
The soul of science, and the queen of souls.

B. JOHNSON.

As *learning* advanced, new works were adopted into our language, but I think with little improvement of the art of translation. JOHNSON.

Two of the French clergy with whom I passed my evenings, were men of deep *erudition*.

BURKE.

L.

LABOR, *v.* Work.

TO LABOR, TAKE PAINS OR TROUBLE, USE ENDEAVOUR.

LABOR, in Latin *labor*, comes, in all probability, from *labo* to falter or faint, because *labor* causes faintness.

To TAKE PAINS is to expose oneself to the *pains*; and to TAKE the TROUBLE is to impose the *trouble*.

ENDEAVOUR (*v.* To endeavour).

The first three terms suppose the necessity for a painful exertion: but to *labor* expresses more than to *take pains*, and this more than to *trouble*; to *use endeavour* excludes every idea of pain or inconvenience: great difficulties must be conquered; great perfection or correctness requires *pains*: a concern to please will give *trouble*; but we *use endeavours* wherever any object is to be obtained, or any duty to be performed. To *labor* is either a corporeal or a mental action; to *take pains* is principally an effort of the mind or the attention; to *take trouble* is an effort either of the body or mind: a faithful minister of the Gospel *labors* to instil Christian principles into the minds of his audience; and heal all the breaches which the angry passions make between them: when a child is properly sensible of the value of improvement, he will take the utmost *pains* to profit by the instruction of the master: he who is too indolent to *take the trouble* to make his wishes known to those who would comply with them, cannot expect others to *trouble* themselves with inquiring into their necessities: a good name is of such value to every man that he ought to *use* his best *endeavours* to preserve it unblemished.

of expressing our thoughts, but under different circumstances. *Language* is the most general term in its meaning and application; it conveys the general idea without any modification, and is applied to other modes of expression, besides that of words, and to other objects besides persons; the *language* of the eyes frequently supplies the place of that of the *tongue*; the deaf and dumb use the *language* of signs; birds and beasts are supposed to have their peculiar *language*: *tongue*, *speech*, and the others, are applicable only to human beings. *Language* is either written or spoken; but a *tongue* is conceived of mostly as a something to be spoken; and *speech* is, in the strict sense, that only which is spoken or uttered. A *tongue* is a totality, or an entire assemblage, of all that is necessary for the expressions; it comprehends not only words, but modifications of meaning, changes of termination, modes and forms of words, with the whole scheme of syntactical rules; a *tongue* therefore comprehended, in the first instance, only those *languages* which were originally formed: the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, are in the proper sense *tongues*; but those which are spoken by Europeans, and owe their origin to the former, commonly bear the general denomination of *languages*.

Speech is an abstract term, implying either the power of uttering articulate sounds: as when we speak of the gift of *speech*, which is denied to those who are dumb, or the words themselves which are spoken; as when we speak of the parts of *speech*, or the particular mode of expressing one's self; as when we say that a man is known by his *speech*. *Idiom* and *dialect* are not properly a *language*, but the properties of *language*: the *idiom* is the peculiar construction and turn of a *language*, which distinguishes it altogether from others; it is that which enters into the composition of the *language*, and cannot be separated from it. The *dialect* is that which is engrafted on a *language* by the inhabitants of particular parts of a country, and admitted by its writers and learned men to form an incidental part of the *language*; as the *dialects* which originated with the

Ionians, the Athenians, the Æolians, and were afterwards amalgamated into the Greek tongue; as also the *dialects* of the high and low German which are distinguished by similar peculiarities.

Languages simply serve to convey the thoughts: *tongues* consist of words, written or spoken: *speech* consists of words spoken: *idioms* are the expression of national manners, customs, and turns of sentiment, which are the most difficult to be transferred from one language to another: *dialects* do not vary so much in the words themselves, as in the forms of words; they are prejudicial to the perspicuity of a *language*, but add to its harmony.

Nor do they trust their tongue alone,
But speak a *language* of their own. SWIFT.

What if we could discourse with people of all the nations upon the earth in their own mother tongue? Unless we know Jesus Christ, also, we should be lost for ever. BEVERIDGE.

When *speech* is employed only as the vehicle of falsehood, every man must disunite himself from others. JOHNSON.

The *language* of this great poet is sometimes obscured by old words, transpositions, and foreign *idioms*. ADDISON.

Every art has its *dialect*, uncatch and ungrateful to all whom custom has not reconciled to its sound. JOHNSON.

LANGUID, *v.* *Faint*.

TO LANGUISH, *v.* *To flag*.

LARGE, *v.* *Great*.

LARGE, WIDE, BROAD.

LARGE (*v.* *Great*) is applied in a general way to express every dimension; it implies not only abundance in solid matter, but also freedom in the space, or extent of a plane superficies.

WIDE, in German *weit*, is most probably connected with the French *vide*, and the Latin *viduus* empty, signifying properly an empty or open space unincumbered by any obstructions.

BROAD, in German *breit*, probably comes from the noun *bret*, board; because it is the peculiar property of a board, that is to say, it is the *width* of what is particularly long. Many things are *large*, but not *wide*; as a *large* town, a *large* circle, a *large* ball, a *large* nut: other things are both *large* and *wide*; as a *large*

difficult matters requires caution. Jealous people strive not to be the *last* in any thing; the *latest* intelligence which a man gets of his country is acceptable to one who is in distant quarters of the globe; it requires resolution to take a *final* leave of those whom one holds near and dear.

The supreme Author of our being has so formed the soul of man that nothing but himself can be its *last*, adequate, and proper happiness.

ADDISON.

A pleasant comedy which paints the manners of the age is a durable work, and is transmitted to the *latest* posterity.

HUME.

Final causes lie more bare and open to our observation, as there are often a greater variety that belong to the same effect.

ADDISON.

The *ultimate* end of man is the enjoyment of God, beyond which he cannot form a wish.

GRAVE.

LASTING, *v.* Durable.

LASTLY, AT LAST, AT LENGTH.

LASTLY, like *last* (*v.* *Last*), respects the order of succession: AT LAST or AT LENGTH refer to what has preceded. When a sermon is divided into many heads, the *lastly* comprehends the *last* division. When an affair is settled after much difficulty it is said to be *at last* settled; and if it be settled after a protracted continuance, it is said to be settled *at length*.

Lastly, opportunities do sometimes offer in which a man may wickedly make his fortune without fear of temporal damage. In such cases what restraint do they lie under who have no regard beyond the grave?

BERKELEY.

At last being satisfied they had nothing to fear they brought out all their corn every day.

ADDISON.

A neighbouring king had made war upon this female republic several years with various success, and *at length* overthrew them in a very great battle.

ADDISON.

LATENT, *v.* Secret.

LATEST, *v.* Last.

LAUDABLE, PRAISEWORTHY, COMMENDABLE.

LAUDABLE, from the Latin *laudo* to praise, is in sense literally PRAISEWORTHY, that is *worthy of praise*, or to be praised (*v.* *To praise*.)

COMMENDABLE signifies entitled to *commendation*.

Laudable is used in a general application; *praiseworthy* and *commendable* are applied to individuals: things are *laudable* in themselves; they are *praiseworthy* or *commendable* in this or that person.

That which is *laudable* is entitled to encouragement and general approbation; an honest endeavour to be useful to one's family or one's self is at all times *laudable*, and will ensure the support of all good people. What is *praiseworthy* obtains the respect of all men: as all have temptations to do that which is wrong, the performance of one's duty is in all cases *praiseworthy*; but particularly so in those cases where it opposes one's interests and interferes with one's pleasures. What is *commendable* is not equally important with the two former; it entitles a person only to a temporary or partial expression of good will and approbation: the performance of those minor and particular duties which belong to children and subordinate persons is in the proper sense *commendable*.

It is a *laudable* ambition to wish to excel in that which is good; it is very *praiseworthy* in a child to assist its parent as occasion may require; silence is *commendable* in a young person when he is reproved.

Nothing is more *laudable* than an enquiry after truth.

ADDISON.

Ridicule is generally made use of to laugh men out of virtue and good sense by attacking every thing *praiseworthy* in human life.

ADDISON.

Edmund Waller was born to a very fair estate by the parsimony or frugality of a wise father and mother, and he thought it so *commendable* an advantage that he resolved to improve it with his utmost care.

CLARENDON.

TO LAUGH AT, RIDICULE.

LAUGH, through the medium of the Saxon *hlakan*, old German *lahan*, Greek *γίλᾶω*, comes from the Hebrew *lahak*, with no variation in the meaning.

RIDICULE, from the Latin *rideo*, has the same original meaning.

Both these verbs are used here in the improper sense for *laughter*, blended with more or less of contempt: but the former displays itself

"speak the best sense in the world, and deport himself in the most graceful manner before a prince, yet if the tail of his shirt happen, as I have known it happen to a very wise man, to hang out behind, more people will *laugh* at that than attend to the other." This is the *ludicrous*. The same can seldom be said of the *ridiculous*; for as this springs from positive moral causes, it reflects on the person to whom it attaches in a less questionable shape, and produces positive disgrace. Persons very rarely appear *ridiculous* without being really so; and he who is really *ridiculous* justly excites contempt.

Droll and COMICAL are in the proper sense applied to things which cause *laughter*, as when we speak of a *droll* story, or a *comical* incident, or a COMIC song. They may be applied to the person; but not so as to reflect disadvantageously on the individual, as in the former terms.

They'll not show their teeth in way of smile,
Though Nestor swear the jest be *laughable*.

SHAKESPEARE.

The action of the theatre, though modern states esteem it but *ludicrous* unless it be satirical and biting, was carefully watched by the ancients that it might improve mankind in virtue.

BACON.

Infelix paupertas has nothing in it more intolerable than this, that it renders men *ridiculous*.

SOUTH.

A comic subject loves an humble verse,
Thyestes scorns a low and comic style.

ROSCOMMON.

In the Augustine age itself, notwithstanding the censure of Horace, they preferred the low buffoonery and *drollery* of Plautus to the delicacy of Terence.

WARTON.

LAVISH, *v. Extravagant*.

LAW, *v. Maxim*.

LAWFUL, LEGAL, LEGITIMATE,
LICIT.

LAWFUL, from *law*, and the French *loi*, comes from the Latin *lex*, in the same manner as LEGAL or LEGITIMATE, all signifying in the proper sense belonging to *law*. They differ therefore according to the sense of the word *law*; *lawful* respects the *law* in general defined or undefined; *legal* respects only the civil *law* which is defined; and *legitimate* respects

the laws or rules of science as well as civil matters in general. LICIT, from the Latin *licet* to be allowed, is used only to characterize the moral quality of actions: the *lawful* properly implies conformable to or enjoined by *law*; the *legal* what is in the form or after the manner of *law*, or binding by *law*: it is not *lawful* to coin money with the king's stamp; a marriage is not *legal* in England which is not solemnized according to the rites of the established church: men's passions impel them to do many things which are *unlawful* or *illicit*; their ignorance leads them into many things which are *illegal* or *illegitimate*. As a good citizen and a true Christian, every man will be anxious to avoid every thing which is *unlawful*: it is the business of the lawyer to define what is *legal* or *illegal*: it is the business of the critic to define what is *legitimate* verse in poetry; it is the business of the linguist to define the *legitimate* use of words: it is the business of the moralist to point out what is *illicit*. As usurpers have no *lawful* authority, no one is under any obligation to obey them: when a claim to property cannot be made out according to the established *laws* of the country it is not *legal*: the cause of *legitimate* sovereigns is at length brought to a happy issue; it is to be hoped that men will never be so unwise as ever to revive the question: the first inclination to an *illicit* indulgence should be carefully suppressed.

According to this spiritual doctor of politics, if his Majesty does not owe his crown to the choice of his people, he is no *lawful* king.

BURKE.

Swift's mental powers declined till (1741) it was found necessary that *legal* guardians should be appointed to his person and fortune.

JOHNSON.

Upon the whole I have sent this my offspring into the world in as decent a dress as I was able; a *legitimate* one, I am sure it is.

MOORE.

The King of Prussia charged some of the officers, his prisoners, with maintaining an *illicit* correspondence.

SMOLLETT.

LAX, *v. Loose*.

TO LAY, *v. To put*.

TO LAY OR TAKE HOLD OF,

CATCH, SEIZE, SNATCH,

GRASP, GRIPE.

To LAY or TAKE HOLD OF

a slight degree : that which *bends* forms a curvature ; it does not all *lean* the same way : a house *leans* when the foundation gives way ; a tree may grow so as to *incline* to the right or the left, or a road may *incline* this or that way ; a tree or a road *bends* when it turns out of the straight course.

In the improper sense the judgment *leans*, the will *inclines*, the will or conduct *bends*, in consequence of some outward action. A person *leans* to this or that side of a question which he favors ; he *inclines* or is *inclined* to this or that mode of conduct ; he *bends* to the will of another. It is the duty of a judge to *lean* to the side of mercy as far as is consistent with justice : whoever *inclines* too readily to listen to the tales of distress which are continually told to excite compassion, will find himself in general deceived ; an *unbending* temper is the bane of domestic felicity.

Like you a courtier born and bred,
Kings *lean'd* their ear to what I said. GAY.

Say what you want ; the Latins you shall find,
Not forc'd to goodness, but by will *factin'd*.
DRYDEN.

And as on corn when western gusts descend,
Before the blast the lofty harvest *bend*. POPE.

LEARNING, *v.* Knowledge.

LEARNING, *v.* Letters.

TO LEAVE, *v.* To let.

TO LEAVE, QUIT, RELINQUISH.

LEAVE, in Saxon *leafve*, in old German *laube*, Latin *linguo*, Greek *λεπω*, signifies either to *leave* or be wanting, because one is wanting in the place which one *leaves*.

QUIT, in French *quitter*, from the Latin *quietus* rest, signifies to rest or remain, to give up the hold of.

RELINQUISH, *v.* To abandon.

We *leave* that to which we may intend to return ; we *quit* that to which we return no more : we may *leave* a place voluntarily or otherwise ; but we *relinquish* it unwillingly. We *leave* persons or things ; we *quit* and *relinquish* things only. I *leave* one person in order to speak to another ; I *leave* my house for a short time ; I *quit* it not to return to it.

Leave and *quit* may be used in the

improper as well as the proper sense. A prudent man *leaves* all questions about minor matters in religion and politics to men of busy restless tempers : it is a source of great pleasure to a contemplative mind to revisit the scenes of early childhood, which have been long *quitted* for the busy scenes of active life : a miser is loath to *relinquish* the gain which has added so greatly to his stores and his pleasures. It is the privilege of the true Christian to be able to *leave* all the enjoyments of this life, not only with composure, but with satisfaction ; dogs have sometimes evinced their fidelity, even to the remains of their masters, by not *quitting* the spot where they are laid ; prejudices, particularly in matters of religion, acquire so deep a root in the mind that they cannot be made to *relinquish* their hold by the most persuasive eloquence and forcible reasoning.

Why *leave* we not the fatal Trojan shore,
And measure back the seas we cross'd before ?

POPE.

The sacred wrestler, till a blessing giv's,
Quits not his hold, but halting conquers heav'n.

WALLER.

Although Charles *relinquished* almost every power of the crown, he would neither give up his friends to punishment, nor desert what he esteemed his religious duty.

HUME.

TO LEAVE, TAKE LEAVE, BID
FAREWELL, OR ADIEU.

LEAVE is here general as before (*v.* To leave) ; it expresses simply the idea of separating one's self from an object, whether for a time, or otherwise ; to TAKE LEAVE and BID FAREWELL imply a separation for a perpetuity.

To *leave* is an unqualified action, it is applied to objects of indifference, or otherwise, but supposes in general no exercise of one's feelings. We *leave* persons as convenience requires ; we *leave* them on the road, in the field, in the house, or wherever circumstances direct ; we *leave* them with or without speaking ; but to *take leave* is a parting ceremony between friends, on their parting for a considerable time ; to *bid farewell* or ADIEU is a still more solemn ceremony, when the parting is expected to be final. When applied to things, *leave* such as we do not wish to

to bear with, signifies not to put a stop to.

The removal of hindrance or constraint on the actions of others, is implied by all these terms; but *let* is a less formal action than *leave*, and this than *suffer*. I *let* a person pass in the road by getting out of his way: I *leave* a person to decide on a matter according to his own discretion, by declining to interfere: I *suffer* a person to go his own way, over whom I am expected to exercise a control. It is in general most prudent to *let* things take their own course: in the education of youth, the greatest art lies in *leaving* them to follow the natural bent of their minds and turn of the disposition, and at the same time not *suffering* them to do any thing prejudicial to their character or future interests.

Then to invoke

The Goddess, and *let* in the fatal home,
We all consent.

DENHAM.

This crime I could not *leave* unpunished.

DENHAM.

If Pope had *suffered* his heart to be alienated from her, he could have found nothing that might fill her place.

JOHNSON.

LETHARGIC, *v. Sleepy.*

LETTER, *v. Character.*

LETTER, EPISTLE.

ACCORDING to the origin of these words, LETTER, in Latin *literæ*, signifies any document composed of written *letters*; and EPISTLE, in Greek *ἐπιστολή* from *ἐπιστάλλω* to send, signifies the *letter* sent or addressed; consequently the former is the generic, the latter the specific term. *Letter* is altogether familiar, it may be used for whatever is written by one friend to another in domestic life, or for the public documents of this description, which have been emanated from the pen of writers, as the *letter* of Madame de Savigny, the *letters* of Pope or of Swift; and even those which were written by the ancients, as the *letters* of Cicero, Pliny, and Seneca; but in strict propriety those are entitled *epistles* as a term most adapted to whatever has received the sanction of ages, and by the same rule, likewise, whatever is peculiarly solemn in its contents has acquired the same epithet, as the *epistles* of St. Paul, St. Peter, St. John,

St. Jude; and by an analogous rule, whatever poetry is written in the *epistolary* form is denominated an *epistle* rather than a *letter*, whether of ancient or modern date, as the *epistles* of Horace, or the *epistles* of Boileau; and finally, whatever is addressed by way of dedication is denominated a dedicatory *epistle*. Ease and a friendly familiarity should characterize the *letter*: sentiment and instruction are always conveyed by an *epistle*.

LETTERS, LITERATURE,
LEARNING.

LETTERS and LITERATURE signify knowledge, derived through the medium of written *letters* or books, that is, information: LEARNING (*v. knowledge*) is confined to that which is communicated, that is, scholastic knowledge. Men of *letters*, or the republic of *letters*, comprehends all who devote themselves to the cultivation of their minds: *literary* societies have for their object the diffusion of general information: *learned* societies propose to themselves the higher object of extending the bounds of science, and increasing the sum of human knowledge. Men of *letters* have a passport for admittance into the highest circles: *literary* men can always find resources for themselves in their own society: *learned* men or men of *learning* are more the objects of respect and admiration than of imitation.

To the greater part of mankind, the duties of life are inconsistent with much study; and the hours which they would spend upon *letters* must be stolen from their occupations and families.

JOHNSON.

He that recalls the attention of mankind to any part of *learning* which time has left behind it, may be truly said to advance the *literature* of his own age.

JOHNSON.

TO LEVEL, *v. To aim.*

LEVEL, *v. Even.*

LEVEL, *v. Flat.*

LEVITY, *v. Lightness.*

LEXICON, *v. Dictionary.*

LIABLE, *v. Subject.*

LIBERAL, *v. Beneficent.*

LIBERAL, *v. Free.*

TO LIBERATE, *v. To free.*

TO LIFT, RAISE, ERECT,
ELEVATE, EXALT.

LIFT, *v.* To lift.

RAISE, signifies to cause to rise.

ERECT, in Latin *erectus*, participle of *erigo* or *e* and *rego*, probably from the Greek *εστημι*, signifies literally to extend or set forth in the height.

ELEVATE is a variation from the same source as *lift*.

EXALT comes from the Latin *altus* high, and the Hebrew *olah* to ascend, and signifies to cause to be high (*v.* *High*).

The idea of making one thing higher than another is common to these verbs, which differ in the circumstances of the action. To *lift* is to take off from the ground; to *raise* and *erect* are to place in a higher position, while in contact with the ground: we *lift* up a stool; we *raise* a chair, by giving it longer legs; we *erect* a monument by heaping one stone on another.

Whatever is to be carried is *lifted*; whatever is to be situated higher is to be *raised*; whatever is to be constructed above other objects is *erected*. A ladder is *lifted* upon the shoulders to be conveyed from one place to another; a standard ladder is *raised* against a building; a scaffolding is *erected*.

These terms are likewise employed in a moral acceptation; *exalt* and *elevate* are used in no other sense. *Lift* expresses figuratively the artificial action of setting aloft; as in the case of *lifting* a person into notice: to *raise* preserves the idea of making higher by the accession of wealth, honor, or power; as in the case of persons who are *raised* from beggary to a state of affluence: to *erect* retains its idea of artificially constructing, so as to produce a solid as well as lofty mass; as in the case of *erecting* a tribunal, *erecting* a system of spiritual dominion. A person cannot *lift* himself, but he may *raise* himself; individuals *lift* or *raise* up each other; but communities, or those only who are invested with power, have the opportunity of *erecting*.

To *lift* is seldom used in a good sense; to *raise* is used in a good or an indifferent sense; to *elevate* and *exalt* are always used in the best

sense. A person is seldom *lifted* up for any good purpose, or from any merit in himself; it is commonly to suit the ends of party that people are *lifted* into notice, or *lifted* into office; a person may be *raised* for his merits, or *raise* himself by his industry, in both which cases he is entitled to esteem: one is *elevated* by circumstances, but still more so by one's character and moral qualities; one is rarely *exalted* but by means of superior endowments. To *elevate* may be the act of individuals for themselves; to *exalt* must be the act of others. There are some to whom *elevation* of rank is due, and others who require no adventitious circumstances to *elevate* them; the world have always agreed to *exalt* great power, great wisdom, and great genius.

Now rosy morn ascends the court of Jove,
Lifts up her light, and opens day above. **Pope.**

Rais'd in his mind the Trojan hero stood,
And long'd to break from out his ambient cloud.
DRYDEN.

From their assistance, happler walls expect,
Which, wand'ring long, at last thou shalt erect.
DRYDEN.

Prudence operates on life in the same manner
as rules on composition; it produces vigilance
rather than *elevation*. **JOHNSON.**

A creature of a more *exalted* kind
Was wanting yet, and then was man design'd.
DRYDEN.

LIGHTNESS, *v.* *Ease*.

LIGHTNESS, LEVITY,
FLIGHTINESS, VOLATILITY,
GIDDINESS.

LIGHTNESS, from *light*, signifies the abstract quality.

LEVITY, in Latin *levitas*, from *levis* light, signifies the same.

VOLATILITY, in Latin *volatilitas*, from *volo* to fly, signifies flitting, or ready to fly swiftly on.

FLIGHTINESS, from *flighty* and *fly*, signifies the readiness to fly.

GIDDINESS, from *giddy*, in Saxon *gidig*.

Lightness is taken either in the natural or metaphorical sense; the rest only in the moral sense: *lightness* is said of the outward carriage or the inward temper; *levity* is only of the outward carriage: a

Should folly there her *likeness* view,
I fret not that the mirror's true. MOORE.

So, faint *resemblance*! on the marble tomb
The well-dissembled lover stooping stands,
For ever silent, and for ever sad. THOMSON.

Rochefoucault frequently makes use of the
antithesis, a mode of speaking the most tire-
some of any, by the *similarity* of the periods.
WATSON.

As it add-eth deformity to an ape to be so like
a man, so the *similitude* of superstition to reli-
gion makes it the more deformed. BACON.

LIKENESS, PICTURE, IMAGE,
EFFIGY.

IN the former article LIKENESS
is considered as an abstract term, but
in connexion with the words *picture*
and *image* it signifies the representa-
tion of *likeness*.

PICTURE, in Latin *pictura*, from
pingo to paint, signifies the thing
painted.

IMAGE, in Latin *imago*, contracted
from *imitago*, comes from *imitor* to
imitate, signifying an imitation.

EFFIGY, in Latin *effigies* or *effingo*,
signifies the thing feigned after an-
other.

Likeness is a general and indefinite
term; *picture* and *image* express
something positively *like*. The *like-
ness* is the work of art; it is sketched
by the pencil, and is more or less
real: the *picture* is either the work of
art or nature; it may be drawn by
the pencil or the pen, or it may be
found in the incidental resemblances
of things; it is more or less exact:
the *image* lies in the nature of things,
and is more or less striking. It is the
peculiar excellence of the painter to
produce a *likeness*; the withering and
falling off of the leaves from the trees
in autumn is a *picture* of human
nature in its decline; children are
frequently the very *image* of their
parents.

The *likeness* is that which is to
represent the actual *likeness*; but the
effigy is an artificial or arbitrary *like-
ness*; it may be represented on paper,
or in the figure of a person. Artists
produce *likenesses*; boys attempt to
produce *effigies*.

God, Moses first, then David, did inspire,
To compose anthems for his heav'nly quire;
To th' one the style of friend he did impart,
On th' other stamp'd the *likeness* of his heart.
DENHAM.

Or else the comic muse
Holds to the world a *picture* of itself. THOMSON.

The mind of man is an *image*, not only of
God's spirituality, but of his infinity. SOUTH.

I have read somewhere that one of the popes
refused to accept an edition of a saint's works,
which were presented to him, because the saint,
in his *effigies* before the book, was drawn with-
out a beard. ADDISON.

LIKEWISE, *v.* *Also*.

LIMB, *v.* *Member*.

TO LIMIT, *v.* *To bound*.

TO LIMIT, *v.* *To fix*.

LIMIT, EXTENT.

LIMIT is a more specific and defi-
nite term than EXTENT: by the
former we are directed to the point
where any thing ends; by the latter
we are led to no particular point, but
to the whole space included: the
limits are in their nature something
finite; the *extent* is either finite or in-
finite: we therefore speak of that
which exceeds the *limits*, or comes
within the *limits*; and of that which
comprehends the *extent*, or is accord-
ing to the *extent*: a plenipotentiary or
minister must not exceed the *limits* of
his instruction; when we think of the
immense *extent* of this globe, and that
it is among the smallest of an infinite
number of worlds, the mind is lost in
admiration and amazement: it does
not fall within the *limits* of a periodi-
cal work to enter into historical de-
tails; a complete history of any coun-
try is a work of great *extent*.

Whatever a man accounts his treasure an-
swers all his capacities of pleasure. It is the
utmost *limit* of enjoyment. SOUTH.

It is observable that, either by nature or habit,
our faculties are fitted to images of a certain ex-
tent. JOHNSON.

LIMIT, *v.* *Term*.

LIMITED, *v.* *Finite*.

TO LINGER, TARRY, LOITER,
LAG, SAUNTER.

LINGER, from *longer*, signifies to
make the time longer in doing a thing.

TARRY, from *tardus* slow, is to
make the thing slow.

LOITER may probably come from
lentus slow.

LAG, from *lie*, signifies to lie back
SAUNTER, from *sancta terra*
Holy Land; because, in the tin

as a long *roll* of saints : *catalogue* involves more details than a simple *list* ; it specifies not only names, but dates, qualities, and circumstances. A *list* of books contains their titles ; a *catalogue* of books contains an enumeration of their size, price, number of volumes, edition, &c. : a *roll* of saints simply specifies their names ; a *catalogue* of saints enters into particulars of their ages, deaths, &c. : a *register* contains more than either ; for it contains events, with dates, actors, &c. in all matters of public interest.

After I had read over the *list* of the persons elected into the Tiers Etat, nothing which they afterwards did could appear astonishing. BURKE.

It appears from the ancient *rolls* of parliament, and from the manner of choosing the lords of articles, that the proceedings of that high court must have been in a great measure under their direction. ROBERTSON.

Aye ! in the *catalogue* ye go for men,
As hounds, and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels,
cats,
All by the name of dogs. SHAKESPEARE.

I am credibly informed by an antiquary, who has searched the *registers*, that the maids of honour, in Queen Elizabeth's time, were allowed three rumps of beef for their breakfast.

ADDISON.

TO LISTEN, *v.* To attend.

LISTLESS, *v.* Indolent.

LITERATURE, *v.* Letters.

LITTLE, SMALL, DIMINUTIVE.

LITTLE, in low German *litje*, Dutch *lettel*, is, in all probability, connected with light, in Saxon *leoht*, old German *lihto*, Sweden *lätt*, &c.

SMALL is, with some variations, to be found in most of the northern dialects, in which it signifies, as in English, a contracted space or quantity.

DIMINUTIVE, in Latin *diminutivus*, signifies made *small*.

Little is properly opposed to the great (*v.* Great), *small* to the large, and *diminutive* is a species of the *small*, which is made so contrary to the course of things : a child is said to be *little* as respects its age as well as its size ; it is said to be *small* as respects its size only ; it is said to be *diminutive* when it is exceedingly *small* considering its age : *little* children cannot be left with safety to themselves ; *small* children are plea-

santer to be nursed than large ones : if we look down from any very great height the largest men will look *diminutive*.

The talent of turning men into ridicule, and exposing to laughter those one converses with, is the qualification of *little* ungenerous temper.

ADDISON.

He whose knowledge is at best but limited, and whose intellect proceeds by a *small diminutive* light, cannot but receive an additional light by the conceptions of another man. SOUTH.

TO LIVE, *v.* To exist.

LIVELIHOOD, LIVING, SUBSISTENCE, MAINTENANCE, SUSTENANCE.

THE means of *living* or supporting life is the idea common to all these terms, which vary according to the circumstances of the individual and the nature of the object which constitutes the means : the LIVELIHOOD is the thing sought after by the day ; a labourer earns a *livelihood* by the sweat of his brow : a SUBSISTENCE is obtained by irregular efforts of various descriptions ; beggars meet with so much that they obtain something better than a precarious and scanty *subsistence* : LIVING is obtained by more respectable and less severe efforts than the two former ; tradesmen obtain a good *living* by keeping shop ; artists procure a *living* by the exercise of their talents : MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, and SUSTENANCE, differ from the other three in as much as they do not comprehend what one gains by one's own efforts, but by the efforts of others : the *maintenance* is that which is permanent ; it supplies the place of *living* : the *support* may be casual, and vary in degree : the object of most public charities is to afford a *maintenance* to such as cannot obtain a *livelihood* or *living* for themselves ; it is the business of the parish to give *support*, in time of sickness and distress, to all who are legal parishioners. The *maintenance* and *support* are always granted ; but the *sustenance* is that which is taken or received : the former comprehends the means of obtaining food ; the *sustenance* comprehends that which sustains the body which supplies the place of food.

A man may as easily know where to find one

In respect to the terms by which it is held, according to the ecclesiastical law: there are many *livings* which are not *benefices*, although not *vice versa*.

In consequence of the Pope's interference, the best *livings* were filled by Italian, and other foreign, clergy. BLACKSTONE.

Estates held by feudal tenure, being originally gratuitous donations, were at that time denominated *beneficia*; their very name, as well as constitution, was borrowed, and the care of the souls of a parish thence came to be denominated a *benefice*. BLACKSTONE.

LIVING, *v. Livelihood.*

LOAD, *v. Freight.*

TO LOAD, *v. To clog.*

LOAD, *v. Weight.*

TO LOATH, *v. To abhor.*

LOATH, *v. Averse.*

LOATHING, *v. Disgusting.*

LODGE, *v. Harbor.*

LODGINGS, APARTMENTS.

LODGING, from a place to *lodge* or dwell in, comprehends single rooms, or many rooms, or in fact any place which can be made to serve the purpose; APARTMENTS respect only suits of rooms: *apartments*, therefore, are, in the strict sense, *lodgings*; but all *lodgings* are not *apartments*: on the other hand, the word *lodgings* is mostly used for rooms that are let out to hire, or that serve a temporary purpose; but the word *apartments* may be applied to the suites of rooms in any large house: hence the word *lodging* becomes on one ground restricted in its use, and *apartments* on the other: all *apartments* to let out for hire are *lodgings*; but *apartments* not to let out for hire are not *lodgings*.

LOFTINESS, *v. Pride.*

LOFTY, *v. High.*

TO LOITER, *v. To linger.*

LONELY, *v. Alone.*

TO LONG FOR, *v. To desire.*

LOOK, *v. Air.*

LOOK, GLANCE.

LOOK, *v. Air.*

GLANCE, *v. To glance at.*

Look is the generic and *glance* the specific term; that is to say, a casual or momentary *look*: a *look* may be characterized as severe or mild, fierce or gentle, angry or kind; a *glance* as hasty or sudden, imperfect or slight: so likewise we speak of taking a *look*, or catching a *glance*.

Here the soft flocks, with the same harmless look
They wore alive. THOMSON.

The tiger, darting fierce
Impetuous on his prey, the glance has doom'd.
THOMSON.

TO LOOK, SEE, BEHOLD, VIEW, EYE.

LOOK, in Saxon *locan*, upper German *lügen*, comes from *lux* light, and the Greek *laō* to see.

SEE, in German *sehen*.

BEHOLD, compounded of the intensive *be* and *hold*, signifies to *hold*, or fix the eye on an object.

VIEW, from the French *voir*, and the Latin *video*, signifies simply to *see*.

To EYE, from the noun *eye*, naturally signifies to fathom with the *eye*.

We *look* voluntarily; we *see* involuntarily: the eye *sees*; the person *looks*: absent people often *see* things before they are fully conscious that they are at hand: we may *look* without *seeing*, and we may *see* without *looking*: near-sighted people often *look* at that which is too distant to strike the visual organ. To *behold* is to *look* at for a continuance; to *view* is to *look* at in all directions; to *eye* is to *look* at earnestly, and by side glances: that which is *seen* may disappear in an instant; it may strike the *eye* and be gone; but what is *looked* at must make some stay; consequently lightning, and things equally fugitive and rapid in their flight, may be *seen*, but cannot be *looked* at.

To *look* at is the familiar, as well as the general term, in regard to the others: we *look* at things in general, which we wish to *see*, that is, to *see* clearly, fully, and in all their parts; but we *behold* that which excites a moral or intellectual interest; we *view* that which demands intellectual attention; we *eye* that which gratifies any particular passion: an inquisitive child *looks* at things which are new to it, but does not *behold* them; we *look* at

less; he has no part and takes no part in what he sees; he *looks on*, because the thing is before him, and he has nothing else to do: a *spectator* may likewise be unconcerned, but in general he derives amusement, if nothing else, from what he sees. A clown may be a *looker-on*, who with open mouth gapes at all that is before him, without understanding any part of it; but he who *looks on* to draw a moral lesson from the whole is in the moral sense not an uninterested *spectator*.

The BEHOLDER has a nearer interest than the *spectator*; and the OBSERVER has an interest not less near than that of the *beholder*, but somewhat different: the *beholder* has his affections roused by what he sees; the *observer* has his understanding employed in that which passes before him: the *beholder* indulges himself in contemplation; the *observer* is busy in making it subservient to some proposed object: every *beholder* of our Saviour's sufferings and patience was struck with the conviction of his Divine character, not excepting even some of those who were his most prejudiced adversaries; every calm *observer* of our Saviour's words and actions was convinced of his Divine mission.

Lookers-on many times see more than gamblers. BACON.

But high in heaven they sit, and gaze from far,
The tame *spectators* of his deeds of war. POPE.

Objects imperfectly discerned take forms from the hope or fear of the *beholder*. JOHNSON.

Swift was an exact *observer* of life. JOHNSON.

TO LOOK FOR, *v.* To await.

LOOSE, VAGUE, LAX, DISSOLUTE, LICENTIOUS.

LOOSE is in German *los*, &c. Latin *laxus*, Greek *αλαστος*, and Hebrew *chalatz*, to make free.

VAGUE, in Latin *vagus*, signifies wandering.

LAX, in Latin *laxus*, has a similar origin with *loose*.

DISSOLUTE, in Latin *dissolutus* participle of *dissolvo*, signifies *dissolved* or set free.

LICENTIOUS signifies having the licence or power (*v.* *Leave*, *liberty*) to do as one pleases.

Loose is the generic, the rest are

specific terms; they are all opposed to that which is bound or adheres closely: *loose* is employed either for moral or intellectual subjects; *vague* only for intellectual objects; *lax* sometimes for what is intellectual, but oftener for the moral; *dissolute* and *licentious* only for moral matters: whatever wants a proper connexion, or linking together of the parts, is *loose*; whatever is scattered and remotely separated is *vague*: a style is *loose* where the words and sentences are not made to coalesce, so as to form a regularly connected series; assertions are *vague* which have but a remote connexion with the subject referred to: by the same rule, *loose* hints thrown out at random may give rise to speculation and conjecture, but cannot serve as the ground of any conclusion; ignorant people are apt to credit every *vague* rumour, and to communicate it as a certainty.

Opinions are *loose*, either inasmuch as they want logical precision, or as they fail in moral strictness; suggestions and surmises are in their nature *vague*, as they spring from a very remote channel, or are produced by the wandering nature of the imagination; opinions are *lax*, inasmuch as they have a tendency to lessen the moral obligation, to *loosen* the moral tie: *loose* notions arise from the unrestrained state of the will, from the influence of the unruly passions; *lax* notions from the error of the judgment: *loose* principles affect the moral conduct of the individual; *lax* principles affect the speculative opinions of men, either as individuals or in society: one is *loose* in practice, and *lax* in speculation or in discipline: the *loose* man sins against his conscience; he sets himself free from that to which he knows that he ought to submit: the *lax* man errs, but he affects to defend his error. A *loose* man injures himself, but a *lax* man injures society at large. *Dissoluteness* is the excess of *looseness*; *licentiousness* is the consequence of *luxury*, or the freedom from external constraint.

Looseness of character, if indulged, soon sinks into *dissoluteness* of morals; and *luxury* of discipline is quickly followed by *licentiousness* of manners.

A young man of *loose* character

Loss is here the generic term; *damage* and *detriment* are species or modes of *loss*. The person sustains the *loss*, the thing suffers the *damage* or *detriment*. Whatever is gone from us which we wish to retain is a *loss*; hence, we may sustain a *loss* in our property, in our reputation, in our influence, in our intellect, and every other object of possession: whatever renders an object less serviceable or valuable, by any external violence, is a *damage*; as a vessel suffers a *damage* in a storm: whatever is calculated to cross a man's purpose is a *detriment*; the bare want of a good name may be a *detriment* to a young tradesman; the want of prudence is always a great *detriment* to the prosperity of a family.

What trader would purchase such airy satisfaction (as the charms of conversation) by the *loss* of solid gain? JOHNSON.

The ants were still troubled with the rain, and the next day they took a world of pains to repair the *damage*. ADDISON.

The expenditure should be with the least possible *detriment* to the morals of those who expend. BURKE.

LOUD, NOISY, HIGHSOUNDING, CLAMOROUS.

LOUD is doubtless connected through the medium of the German *laut* a sound, and *lauschen* to listen, with the Greek *αλυνω* to hear, because sounds are the object of hearing.

NOISY, having a *noise*, like *noisome* and *noxious*, comes from the Latin *noceo* to hurt, signifying in general offensive, that is, to the sense of hearing, of smelling, and the like.

HIGHSOUNDING signifies the same as pitched upon an elevated key, so as to make a great noise, to be heard at a distance.

CLAMOROUS, from the Latin *clamo* to cry, signifies crying with a loud voice.

Loud is here the generic term, since it signifies a great sound, which is the idea common to them all. As an epithet for persons, *loud* is mostly taken in an indifferent sense; all the others are taken for being *loud* beyond measure: *noisy* is to be intemperately *loud*; *highsounding* is only to be *loud* from the bigness of one's word: *clamorous* is to be disagreeably and painfully *loud*. We must speak

loudly to a deaf person in order to make ourselves heard: children will be *noisy* at all times if not kept under control: flatterers are always *highsounding* in their eulogiums of princes: children will be *clamorous* for what they want, if they expect to get it by dint of *noise*; they will be turbulent in case of refusal, if not under proper discipline. In the improper application, *loud* is taken in as bad a sense as the rest; the *loudest* praises are the least to be regarded: the applause of a mob is always *noisy*: *highsounding* titles serve only to excite contempt, where there is not some corresponding sense: it is the business of an opposition party to be *clamorous*, which serves the purpose of exciting turbulence among the ignorant.

The clowns, a boist'rous, rude, ungovern'd crew,
With furious haste to the *loud* summons flew.

DAYDEN.

O leave the *noisy* town.

DAYDEN.

I am touched with sorrow at the conduct of some few men, who have lent the authority of their *highsounding* names to the designs of men with whom they could not be acquainted.

BURKE.

Clam'rous around the royal hawk they fly.

DAYDEN.

LOVE, v. Affection.

LOVE, FRIENDSHIP.

LOVE (v. *Affection*) is a term of very extensive import; it may be either taken in the most general sense for every strong and passionate attachment, or only for such as subsist between the sexes; in either of which cases it has features by which it has easily distinguished from FRIENDSHIP.

Love subsists between members of the same family; it springs out of their natural relationship, and is kept alive by their close intercourse and constant interchange of kindnesses: *friendship* excludes the idea of any tender and natural relationship; nor is it, like *love*, to be found in children, but is confined to maturer years; it is formed by time, by circumstances, by congruity of character, and sympathy of sentiment. *Love* always operates with ardor; *friendship* is remarkable for firmness and constancy. *Love* is peculiar to no station; it is

has fallen from the high estate to which we thought him entitled.

So every passion, but fond *love*,
Unto its own redress does move. WALLER.

For natural affection soon doth cease,
And quenched is with Cupid's greater flame,
But faithful *friendship* doth them both suppress,
And them with mastering discipline doth tame. SPENSER.

LOVELY, *v. Amiable.*

LOVER, SUITOR, WOOER.

LOVER signifies literally one who *loves*, and is applicable to any object; there are *lovers* of money, and *lovers* of wine, *lovers* of things individually, and things collectively, that is, *lovers* of particular women in the good sense, or *lovers* of women in the bad sense. The SUITOR is one who *sues* and strives after a thing; it is equally undefined as to the object, but may be employed for such as *sue* for favors from their superiors, or *sue* for the affections and person of a female. The WOOER is only a species of *lover*, who *wooes* or solicits the kind regards of a female. When applied to the same object, namely, the female sex, the *lover* is employed for persons of all ranks, who are equally alive to the tender passion of *love*: *sutor* is a title adapted to that class of life where all the genuine affections of human nature are adulterated by a false refinement, or entirely lost in other passions of a guilty nature. *Wooer* is a tender and passionate title, which is adapted to that class of beings that live only in poetry and romance. There is most sincerity in the *lover*, he simply proffers his *love*; there is most ceremony in the *sutor*, he prefers his *suit*; there is most ardor in the *wooer*, he make his vows.

It is very natural for a young friend, and a young *lover*, to think the persons they *love* have nothing to do but to please them. POPE.

What pleasure can it be to be thronged with petitioners, and those perhaps *sutors* for the same thing? SOUTH.

I am glad this parcel of *wooners* are so reasonable, for there is not one of them but I dote on his very absence. SHAKESPEARE.

LOVING, *v. Amorous.*

LOW, *v. Humble.*

LOW, MEAN, ABJECT.

LOW, *v. Humble.*

MEAN, in German *gemein*, &c. comes from the Latin *communis* common (*v. Common*).

ABJECT, in French *abject*, Latin *abjectus*, participle of *abjicio* to cast down, signifies literally brought low.

Low is a much stronger term than *mean*; for what is *low* stands more directly opposed to what is high, but what is *mean* is intermediate: the *low* is applied only to a certain number or description; but the *mean*, like the common, is applicable to the great bulk of mankind. A man of *low* extraction falls below the ordinary level; he is opposed to a noble man: a man of *mean* birth does not rise above the ordinary level; he is upon a level with the majority. When employed to designate the character, they preserve the same distinction: the *low* is that which is positively sunk in itself; but the *mean* is that which is comparatively *low*, in regard to the outward circumstances and relative condition of the individual. Swearing and drunkenness are *low* vices; boxing, cudgelling, and wrestling, are *low* games: a misplaced economy in people of property is *mean*; a condescension to those who are beneath us for our own petty advantages is *meanness*. A man is commonly *low* by virtue of his birth, his education, or his habits; but *meanness* is a defect of nature which sinks a person in spite of every external advantage.

The *low* and *mean* are qualities whether of the condition or the character; but *abject* is a peculiar state into which a man is thrown: a man is in the course of things *low*; he is voluntarily *mean*, and involuntarily *abject*. The *lowness* discovers itself in one's actions and sentiments; the *mean* and *abject* in one's spirit; the latter being much more powerful and oppressive than the former: the *mean* man stoops in order to get; the *abject* man crawls in order to submit: the *lowest* man will sometimes have a consciousness of what is due to himself; he will even rise above his condition: the *mean* man sacrifices his dignity to his convenience; he is always below himself: the *abject* man altogether forgets that he has any dignity; he is kept down by the pressure of ad-

cal performances, a fashionable *rage* for any whim of the day. *Fury*, though commonly signifying *rage* bursting out, yet it may be any impetuous feeling displaying itself in extravagant action: as the divine *fury* supposed to be produced upon the priestess of Apollo, by the inspiration of the god, and the Bacchanalian *fury* which depicts the influence of wine upon the body and mind.

In the improper application, to inanimate objects, the words *rage* and *fury* preserve a similar distinction: the *rage* of the heat denotes the excessive height to which it is risen; the *fury* of the winds indicates their violent commotion and turbulence: so in like manner the *raging* of the tempest characterizes figuratively its burning anger; and the *fury* of the flames marks their impetuous movements, their wild and rapid spread.

'Twas no false heraldry when *madness* drew
Her pedigree from those who too much knew.

DENHAM.

What *phrensy*, shepherd, has thy soul possess'd?

DRYDEN.

First Socrates

Against the *rage* of tyrants single stood,
Invincible!

THOMSON.

Confin'd their *fury* to those dark abodes.

DRYDEN.

MAGISTERIAL, MAJESTIC, STATELY, POMPOUS, AUGUST, DIGNIFIED.

MAGISTERIAL, from *magister* a master, and MAJESTIC, from *majestas*, are both derived from *magis* more or *major* greater, that is, more or greater than others; but they differ in this respect, that the *magisterial* is something assumed, and is therefore often false; the *majestic* is natural, and consequently always real: an upstart, or an intruder into any high station or office, may put on a *magisterial* air, in order to impose on the multitude; but it will not be in his power to be *majestic*, which never shows itself in a borrowed shape; none but those who have a superiority of character, of birth, or outward station, can be *majestic*: a petty magistrate in the country may be *magisterial*; a king or queen cannot uphold their station without a *majestic* deportment.

The STATELY and POMPOUS are most nearly allied to the *magisterial*; the AUGUST and DIGNIFIED to the *majestic*: the former being merely extrinsic and assumed; the latter intrinsic and inherent. *Magisterial* respects the authority which is assumed; *stately* regards the splendor and rank; *pompous* regards the personal importance, with all the appendages of greatness and power: a person is *magisterial* in the exercise of his office, and the distribution of his commands; he is *stately* in his ordinary intercourse with his inferiors and equals; he is *pompous* on particular occasions of appearing in public: a person demands silence in a *magisterial* tone; he marches forward with a *stately* air; he comes forward in a *pompous* manner, so as to strike others with a sense of his importance.

Majestic is an epithet that characterizes the exterior of an object; *august* is that which marks an essential characteristic in the object; *dignified* serves to characterize the action: the form of a female is termed *majestic* which has something imposing in it, suited to the condition of majesty, or the most elevated station in society; a monarch is entitled *august* in order to describe the extent of his empire; an assembly is denominated *august* to bespeak its high character, and its weighty influence in the scale of society; a reply is termed *dignified* when it upholds the individual and personal character of a man, as well as his relative character in the community to which he belongs: the two former of these terms are associated only with grandeur of outward circumstances; the last is applicable to men of all stations, who have each in his sphere a *dignity* to maintain which belongs to man as an independent moral agent.

Government being the noblest and most mysterious of all arts, is very unfit for those to talk *magisterially* of who never bore any share in it.

SOURA.

Then Aristides lifts his honest front,
In pure *majestic* poverty rever'd.

THOMSON.

Such seems thy gentle bright, made only proud
To be the basis of that *pompous* load.

DANIEL.

There is for the most part as much real enjoyment under the meanest cottage, as within the walls of the stateliest palace.

SOURA.

unqualified term; to *form* signifies to give a *form* to a thing, that is, to *make* it after a given *form*; to *produce* is to bring forth into the light, to call into existence; to *create* is to bring into existence by an absolute exercise of power: to *make* is the simplest action of all, and comprehends a simple combination by the smallest efforts; to *form* requires care and attention, and greater efforts; to *produce* requires time, and also labor: whatever is put together so as to become another thing, is *made*; a chair or a table is *made*: whatever is put into any distinct *form* is *formed*; the potter *forms* the clay into an earthen vessel: whatever emanates from a thing, so as to become a distinct object, is *produced*; fire is often *produced* by the violent friction of two pieces of wood with each other. The process of *making* is always performed by some conscious agent, who employs either mechanical means, or the simple exercise of power: a bird *makes* its nest; man *makes* various things, by the exercise of his understanding and his limbs; the Almighty Maker has *made* every thing by his word. The process of *forming* does not always require a conscious agent; things are likewise *formed* of themselves; or they are *formed* by the active operations of other bodies; melted lead, when thrown into water, will *form* itself into various little bodies; hard substances are *formed* in the human body which give rise to the disease termed the gravel. What is *produced* is oftener *produced* by the process of nature, than by any express design; the earth *produces* all kinds of vegetables from seed; animals, by a similar process, *produce* their young. *Create*, in this natural sense of the term, is employed as the act of an intelligent being, and that of the Supreme Being only; it is the act of *making* by a simple effort of power, without the use of materials, and without any process.

They are all employed in the moral sense, and with a similar distinction: *make* is indefinite; we may *make* a thing that is difficult or easy, simple or complex; we may *make* a letter, or *make* a poem; we may *make* a

word, or *make* a sentence. To *form* is the work either of intelligence, or of circumstances: education has much to do in *forming* the habits, but nature has more to do in *forming* the disposition and the mind altogether; sentiments are frequently *formed* by young people before they have sufficient maturity of thought and knowledge to justify them in coming to any decision. To *produce* is the effect of great mental exertion; or it is the natural operation of things: no industry could ever *produce* a poem or a work of the imagination: but a history or a work of science may be *produced* by the force of mere labor. All things, both in the moral and intellectual world, are linked together upon the simple principle of cause and effect, by which one thing is the *producer*, and the other the thing *produced*: quarrels *produce* hatred, and kindness *produces* love; as heat *produces* inflammation and fever, or disease *produces* death. Since genius is a spark of the Divine power that acts by its own independent agency, the property of *creation* has been figuratively ascribed to it: the *creative* power of the human mind is a faint emblem of that power which brought every thing into existence out of nothing.

In every treaty those concessions which he (Charles I.) thought he could not maintain; he never could by any motive or persuasion be induced to *make*. HUME.

Homer's and Virgil's heroes do not *form* a resolution without the conduct and direction of some deity. ANDERSON.

A supernatural effect is that which is above any natural power, that we know of, to *produce*. TILLOTSON.

A wondrous hieroglyphic robe she wore,
In which all colours and all figures were,
That nature or that fancy can create. COWLEY.

TO MAKE KNOWN, *v.* To inform.
MALADY, *v.* Disorder.

MALEDICTION, CURSE,
IMPRECATION, EXECRATION,
ANATHEMA.

MALEDICTION, from *male* and *dico*, signifies a saying ill, that is, declaring an evil wish against a person.

CURSE, in Saxon *kursian*, comes in all probability from the Greek

supra to sanction or ratify, signifying a bad wish declared upon oath, or in a solemn manner.

IMPRECATION, from *im* and *preco*, signifies a praying down evil upon a person.

EXECRATION, from the Latin *execror*, that is, *è sacris excludere*, signifies the same as to excommunicate, with every form of solemn imprecation.

ANATHEMA, in Greek *αναθημα*, signifies a setting out, that is, a putting out of a religious community as a penance.

The *malediction* is the most indefinite and general term, signifying simply the declaration of evil; *curse* is a solemn denunciation of evil: the former is employed mostly by men; the latter by God or man: the rest are species of the *curse* pronounced only by man. The *malediction* is caused by simple anger; the *curse* is occasioned by some grievous offence: men, in the heat of their passion, will utter *maledictions* against any object that offends them; God pronounced a *curse* upon Adam, and all his posterity, after the fall.

The *curse* differs in the degree of evil pronounced or wished; the *imprecation* and *execration* always imply some positive great evil, and, in fact, as much evil as can be conceived by man in his anger; the *anathema* respects the evil which is pronounced according to the canon law, by which a man is not only put out of the church, but held up as an object of offence. The *malediction* is altogether an unallowed expression of private resentment; the *curse* was admitted, in some cases, according to the Mosaic law; and that, as well as the *anathema*, at one time formed a part of the ecclesiastical discipline of the Christian church; the *imprecation* formed a part of the heathenish ceremony of religion; but the *execration* is always the informal expression of the most violent personal anger.

With many praises of his good play, and many *maledictions* on the power of chance, he took up the cards and threw them in the fire.

MACKENZIE.

But know, that ere your promis'd walls you build,

7 *curse*s shall severely be fulfill'd. DRYDEN.

Thus either host their imprecations join'd.

Pope.

I have seen in Babylon a man that has held up his face in a posture of adoration towards heaven to utter execrations and blasphemies.

STEELE.

The bare *anathemas* of the church fall like so many *bruta fulmina* upon the obstinate and schismatical.

SCOTT.

MALEFACTOR, *v.* Criminal.

MALEVOLENT, MALICIOUS, MALIGNANT.

THESE words have all their derivation from *malus* bad; that is, MALEVOLENT, wishing ill; MALICIOUS (*v.* *Malice*), having an evil disposition; and MALIGNANT, having an evil tendency.

Malevolence has a deep root in the heart, and is a settled part of the character; we denominate the person *malevolent*, to designate the ruling temper of his mind: *maliciousness* may be applied as an epithet to particular parts of a man's character or conduct; one may have a *malicious* joy or pleasure in seeing the distresses of another: *malignity* is not employed to characterize the person, but the thing; the *malignity* of a design is estimated by the degree of mischief which was intended to be done. Whenever *malevolence* has taken possession of the heart, all the sources of goodwill are dried up; a stream of evil runs through the whole frame, and contaminates every moral feeling; the being who is under such an unhappy influence neither thinks nor does any thing but what is evil: a *malicious* disposition is that branch of *malevolence* which is the next to it in the blackness of its character; it differs, however, in this, that *malice* will, in general, lie dormant, until it is provoked; but *malevolence* is as active and unceasing in its operations for mischief, as its opposite, *benevolence*, is in wishing and doing good.

Malicious and *malignant* are both applied to things; but the former is applied to those which are of a personal nature, the latter to objects purely inanimate: a story or tale is termed *malicious*, which emanated from a *malicious* disposition; a star is termed *malignant*, which is supposed to have a bad or *malignant* influence.

I have often known very lasting *malvolence*
excited by unlucky censures. JOHNSON.

Greatness, the earnest of *malicious* Fate
For future woe, was never meant a good.

SOUTHERN.

Still horror reigns, a dreary twilight round,
Of struggling night and day *malignant* mix'd.

THOMSON.

MALICE, RANCOR, SPITE, GRUDGE, PIQUE.

MALICE, in Latin *malitia*, from *malus* bad, signifies the very essence of badness lying in the heart; RANCOR (*v. Hatred*) is only continued *hatred*: the former requires no external cause to provoke it, it is inherent in the mind; the latter must be caused by some personal offence. *Malice* is properly the love of evil for evil's sake, and is, therefore, confined to no number or quality of objects, and limited by no circumstance; *rancor*, as it depends upon external objects for its existence, so it is confined to such objects only as are liable to cause displeasure or anger: *malice* will impel a man to do mischief to those who have not injured him, and are perhaps strangers to him; *rancor* can subsist only between those who have had sufficient connection to be at variance.

SPITE, from *spit*, the sharp instrument with which one pierces bodies, denotes a petty kind of *malice*, or disposition to offend another in trifling matters; it may be in the temper of the person, or it may have its source in some external provocation: children often show their *spite* to each other.

GRUDGE, connected with *grumble* and *growl*, and PIQUE, from *pike*, denoting the prick of a pointed instrument, are employed for that particular state of *rancorous* or *spiteful* feeling which is occasioned by personal offences: the *grudge* is that which has long existed; the *pique* is that which is of recent date: a person is said to owe another a *grudge* for having done him a disservice; or he is said to have a *pique* towards another, who has shown him an affront.

If any chance has hither brought the name
Of Palamedes, not unknown to fame,
Who suffer'd from the malice of the times.

DARWIN.

Party spirit fills a nation with spleen and *rancor*. ADDISON.

Can heav'nly minds such high resentment show,
Or exercise their *spite* in human woe. DRYDEN.

The god of wit, to show his *grudge*,
Clap'd asses' ears upon the judge.

SWIFT.

You may be sure the ladies are not wanting,
on their side, in cherishing and improving these
important *piques*, which divide the town almost
into as many parties as there are families.

LADY M. W. MONTAGUE.

MALICIOUS, *v. Malevolent.*

MALIGNANT, *v. Malevolent.*

TO MANAGE, *v. To concert.*

TO MANAGE, *v. To conduct.*

MANAGEMENT, *v. Care.*

MANAGEMENT, *v. Economy.*

MANFUL, *v. Manly.*

TO MANGLE, *v. To mutilate.*

MANIA, *v. Derangement.*

MANIFEST, *v. Apparent.*

TO MANIFEST, *v. To discover.*

TO MANIFEST, *v. To prove.*

MANLY, MANFUL.

MANLY, or like a man, is opposed to juvenile, and of course applied only to youths; but MANFUL, or full of manhood, is opposed to effeminate, and is applicable more properly to grown persons: a premature *manliness* in young persons is hardly less unseemly than a want of *manfulness* in one who is called upon to display his courage.

I love a *manly* freedom as much as any of
the band of cashiers of kings. BURKE.

I opposed his whim *manfully*, which I think
you will approve of. CUMBERLAND.

MANNER, *v. Air.*

MANNER, *v. Custom.*

MANNER, *v. Way.*

MANNERS, MORALS.

MANNERS (*v. Air, manner*) respect the minor forms of acting with others and towards others; MORALS include the important duties of life: *manners* have, therefore, been denominated minor *morals*. By an attention to good *manners* we render ourselves good companions; by an observance of good *morals* we be-

or the *print* of the foot is made on the ground. The *impression* is made by means more or less violent, as when an *impression* is made upon wood by the axe or hammer; or by means gradual and natural, as by the dripping of water on stone. The *stamp* is made by means of direct pressure with an artificial instrument.

Mark is of such universal application, that it is confined to no objects whatever, either in the natural or moral world; *print* is mostly applied to material objects, the face of which undergoes a lasting change, as the *printing* made on paper or wood; *impression* is more commonly applied to such natural objects as are particularly solid; *stamp* is generally applied to paper, or still softer and more yielding bodies. *Impression* and *stamp* have both a moral application: events or speeches make an *impression* on the mind: things bear a certain *stamp* which bespeaks their origin. Where the passions have obtained an ascendancy, the occasional good *impressions* which are produced by religious observances but too frequently die away; the Christian religion carries with itself the *stamp* of truth.

De la Chambre asserts positively that from the *marks* on the body, the configuration of the planets at a nativity may be gathered. WALSH.

From hence Astrea took her flight, and here
The *prints* of her departing steps appear.

DRYDEN.

No man can offer at the change of the government established, without first gaining new authority, and in some degree debasing the old by appearance and *impressions* of contrary qualities in those who before enjoyed it.

TEMPLE.

Adult'rate metals to the sterling *stamp*
Appear not meaner, than mere human lines
Compar'd with those whose inspiration shines.

ROSCOMMON.

MARK, SIGN, NOTE, SYMPTOM,
TOKEN, INDICATION.

MARK, *v.* *Mark*, *impression*.

SIGN, in Latin *signum*, Greek *σημα* from *σημα* to punctuate, signifies the thing that points out

SYMPTOM, in Latin *symptoma*, Greek *συμπτωμα* from *συμ-πτω* to fall out in accordance, signifies what presents itself to confirm one's opinion.

TOKEN, *v.* *To betoken*.

INDICATION, in Latin *indicatio*

from *indica*, and the Greek *σημα* to point out, signifies the thing which points out.

The idea of an external object, which serves to direct the observer, is common to all these terms; the difference consists in the objects that are employed. Any thing may serve as a *mark*, a stroke, a dot, a stick set up, and the like; it serves simply to guide the senses: the *sign* is something more complex; it consists of a figure or representation of some object, as the twelve *signs* of the Zodiac, or the *signs* which are affixed to houses of entertainment, or to shops. *Marks* are arbitrary; every one chooses his *mark* at pleasure: *signs* have commonly a connexion with the object that is to be observed: a house, a tree, a letter, or any external object may be chosen as a *mark*; but a tobacconist chooses the *sign* of a black man; the innkeeper chooses the head of the reigning prince. *Marks* serve in general simply to aid the memory in distinguishing the situation of objects, or the particular circumstances of persons or things, as the *marks* which are set up in a garden to distinguish the ground that is occupied; they may, therefore, be private, and known only to the individual or individuals that make them, as the private *marks* by which a tradesman distinguishes his prices: they may likewise be changeable and fluctuating, according to the humor and convenience of the maker, as the private *marks* which are employed by the military on guard. *Signs*, on the contrary, serve to direct the understanding; they have either a natural, or an artificial resemblance to the object to be represented; they are consequently chosen, not by the will of one, but by the universal consent of a body; they are not chosen for the moment, but for a permanency, as in the case of language, either oral or written, in the case of the zodiacal *signs*, or the *sign* of the cross, the algebraical *signs*, and the like. It is clear, therefore, that many objects may be both a *mark* and a *sign*, according to the above illustration: the cross which is employed in books, by way of reference to notes, is a *mark* only, because it serves merely to guide the eye, or

been: a gift to a friend is a *mark* of one's affection and esteem: if it be permanent in its nature it becomes a *token*; friends who are in close intercourse have perpetual opportunities of showing each other *marks* of their regard by reciprocal acts of courtesy and kindness; when they separate for any length of time they commonly leave some *token* of their tender sentiments in each other's hands, as a pledge of what shall be, as well as an evidence of what has been.

Sign, as it respects *indication*, is said in abstract and general propositions: *indication* itself is only employed for some particular individual referred to; it bespeaks the act of the persons: but the *sign* is only the face or appearance of the thing. When a man does not live consistently with the profession which he holds, it is a *sign* that his religion is built on a wrong foundation; parents are gratified when they observe the slightest *indications* of genius or goodness in their children.

The ceremonial laws of Moses were the *marks* to distinguish the people of God from the Gentiles.

BACON.

So plain the *signs*, such prophets are the skies.

DRYDEN.

The sacrificing of the kings of France (as Laysel says) is the *sign* of their sovereign priesthood.

TEMPLE.

This fall of the French monarchy was far from being preceded by any exterior *symptoms* of decline.

BURKE.

The famous bull-fights are an evident *token* of the Quixotism and romantic taste of the Spaniards.

SOMERVILLE.

It is certain Virgil's parents gave him a good education, to which they were inclined by the early *indications* he gave of a sweet disposition and excellent wit.

WALSH.

MARK, TRACE, VESTIGE, FOOTSTEP, TRACK.

THE word MARK has already been considered at large in the preceding article, but it will admit of farther illustration when taken in the sense of that which is visible, and serves to show the existing state of things; the *mark* is here as before, the most general and unqualified term; the other terms varying in the circumstances or manner of the *mark*.

TRACE, in Italian *treccia*, Greek *τρέχων* to run, and Hebrew *darek* way, signifies any continued *mark*.

VESTIGE, in Latin *vestigium*, not improbably contracted from *pedis* and *stigma* or *stigma*, from *στίγμα* to imprint, signifies a print of the foot.

FOOTSTEP is taken for the place in which the foot has stepped, or the *mark* made by that step.

TRACK, derived from the same as trace, signifies the way run, or the *mark* produced by that running.

The *mark* is said of a fresh and uninterrupted line; the *trace* is said of that which is broken by time: a carriage in driving along the sand leaves *marks* of the wheels, but in a short time all *traces* of its having been there will be lost; the *mark* is produced by the action of bodies on one another in every possible form; the spilling of a liquid may leave a *mark* on the floor; the blow of a stick leaves a *mark* on the body; but the *trace* is a *mark* produced only by bodies making a progress or proceeding in a continued course: the ship that cuts the waves, and the bird that cuts the air, leaves no *traces* of their course behind; so men pass their lives, and after death leave no *traces* that they ever were. They are both applied to moral objects, but the *mark* is produced by objects of inferior importance; it excites a momentary observation, but does not carry us back to the past; its cause is either too obvious or too minute to awaken attention: a *trace* is generally a *mark* of something which we may wish to see. *Marks* of haste and imbecility in a common writer excite no surprise, and call forth no observation: in a writer of long standing celebrity, we look for *traces* of his former genius.

The *vestige* is a species of the *mark* caused literally by the foot of man, and consequently applied to such places as have been inhabited, where the active industry of man has left visible *marks*; it is a species of *trace*, inasmuch as it carries us back to that which was, but is not at present. We discover by *marks* that things have been; we discover by *traces* and *vestiges* what they have been: a hostile army always leaves sufficiently evident *marks* of its having passed through a country: there are *traces* of the Roman road.

the gown and surplice that of clerical men; the uniform of charity children is the *badge* of their condition; the peculiar habit of the Quakers and Methodists is the *badge* of their religion: the *stigma* consists not so much in what is openly imposed upon a person as what falls upon him in the judgement of others; it is the black *mark* which is set upon a person by the public, and is consequently the strongest of all *marks*, which every one most dreads, and every good man seeks least to observe. A simple *mark* may sometimes be such only in our own imagination; as when one fancies that dress is a *mark* of superiority, or the contrary; that the courtesies which we receive from a superior are *marks* of his personal esteem and regard: but the *stigma* is not what an individual imagines for himself, but what is conceived towards him by others; the office of a spy and informer is so odious, that every man of honest feeling holds the very name to be a *stigma*: although the *stigma* is in general the consequence of a man's real unworthiness, yet it is possible for particular prejudices and ruling passions to make that a *stigma* which is not so deservedly; as in the case of men's religious profession, inasmuch as it is not accompanied with any moral depravity; it is mostly unjust to attach a *stigma* to a whole body of men for their speculative views.

In these revolutionary meetings every counsel, in proportion as it is daring and violent and perfidious, is taken for the *mark* of superior genius.

BURKE.

The people of England look upon hereditary succession as a security for their liberty, not as a *badge* of servitude.

BURKE.

The cross which our Saviour's enemies thought was to *stigmatize* him with infamy, became the ensign of his renown.

BLAIR.

MARK, BUTT.

AFTER all that has been said upon the word MARK (*v. Mark, print*), it has this additional meaning in common with the word BUTT, that it implies an object aimed at: the *mark* is however literally a *mark* that is said to be shot at by the *marksman* with a gun or a bow; or it is metaphorically employed for the man who by his peculiar characteristics makes himself

the object of notice; he is the *mark* at which everyone's looks and thoughts are directed: the *butt*, from the French *bout* the end, is a species of *mark* in this metaphorical sense; but the former only calls forth general observation, the latter provokes the laughter and jokes of every one. Whoever renders himself conspicuous by his eccentricities either in his opinions or his actions, must not complain if he become a *mark* for the derision of the public: it is a man's misfortune rather than his fault if he become the *butt* of a company who are rude and unfeeling enough to draw their pleasures from another's pain.

A fluttering dove upon the top they tie,
The living *mark* at which their arrows fly.

DAYDEN.

I mean those honest gentlemen that are pelted by men, women, and children, by friends and foes, and in a word stand as *butts* in conversation.

ADDISON.

TO MARK, NOTE, NOTICE.

MARK is here taken in the intellectual sense, fixing as it were a *mark* (*v. Mark*) upon a thing so as to keep it in mind, which is in fact to fix one's attention upon it in such a manner as to be able to distinguish it by its characteristic qualities: to *mark* is therefore altogether an intellectual act: to NOTE has the same end as that of *marking*; namely, to aid the memory, but one *notes* a thing by making a written *note* of it; this is therefore a mechanical act: to NOTICE, on the other hand, is a sensible operation, from *notitia* knowledge, signifies to bring to one's knowledge, perception or understanding by the use of our senses. We *mark* and *note* that which particularly interests us: the former is that which serves a present purpose; *notice* to that which may be of use in future. The impatient lover *marks* the hours until the time arrives for meeting his mistress: travellers *note* whatever strikes them of importance to be remembered when they return home: to *notice* may serve either for the present or the future; we may *notice* things merely by way of amusement; as a child will *notice* the actions of animals, or we may *notice* a thing for the sake of bearing it in mind, as a person *notices* a particular road when he wishes to return.

Many who *mark* with such accuracy the course of time appear to have little sensibility of the decline of life. JOHNSON.

O treach'rous conscience! while she seems to sleep,
Unnoted, notes each moment misapply'd

YOUNG.

An Englishman's notice of the weather is the natural consequence of changeable skies and uncertain seasons. JOHNSON.

TO MARK, *v.* To show.

MARRIAGE, WEDDING,
NUPTIALS.

MARRIAGE, from *to marry*, denotes the act of *marrying*; WEDDING and NUPTIALS denote the ceremony of being *married*. To *marry*, in French *marrier*, and Latin *marito* to be joined to a male; hence *marriage* comprehends the act of choosing and being legally bound to a man or a woman; *wedding*, from *wed*, and the Teutonic *wetten* to promise or betroth, implies the ceremony of *marrying*, inasmuch as it is binding upon the parties. *Nuptials* comes from the Latin *nubo* to veil, because the Roman ladies were veiled at the time of *marriage*: hence it has been put for the whole ceremony itself. *Marriage* is an institution which, by those who have been blessed with the light of Divine Revelation, has always been considered as sacred: with some persons, particularly among the lower orders of society, the day of their *wedding* is converted into a day of riot and intemperance: among the Roman Catholics in England it is a practice for them to have their *nuptials* solemnized by a priest of their own persuasion as well as by the Protestant Clergyman.

O fatal maid! thy *marriage* is endow'd
With Phrygian, Latian, and Rutulian blood.

DRYDEN.

Ask any one how he has been employed to-day: he will tell you, perhaps, I have been at the ceremony of taking the manly robe: this friend invited me to a *wedding*; that desired me to attend the hearing of his cause.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Fir'd with disdain for Turnus dispossest, d,
And the new *nuptials* of the Trojan guest.

DRYDEN.

MARRIAGE, MATRIMONY,
WEDLOCK.

MARRIAGE (*v.* *Marriage*) is oftener an act than a state; MATRI-

MONY and WEDLOCK both describe states.

Marriage is taken in the sense of an act, when we speak of the laws of *marriage*, the day of one's *marriage*, the congratulations upon one's *marriage*, a happy or unhappy *marriage*, the fruits of one's *marriage*, and the like; it is taken in the sense of a state, when we speak of the pleasures or pains of *marriage*; but in this latter case *matrimony*, which signifies a *married* life abstractedly from all agents or acting persons, is preferable; so likewise, to think of *matrimony*, and to enter into the holy state of *matrimony*, are expressions founded upon the signification of the term. As *matrimony* is derived from *mater* a mother, because *married* women are in general mothers, it has particular reference to the domestic state of the two parties; broils are but too frequently the fruits of *matrimony*, yet there are few cases in which they might not be obviated by the good sense of those who are engaged in them. Hasty *marriages* cannot be expected to produce happiness; young people who are eager for *matrimony* before they are fully aware of its consequences will purchase their experience at the expense of their peace.

Wedlock is the old English word for *matrimony*, and is in consequence admitted in law, when one speaks of children born in *wedlock*; agreeably to its derivation it has a reference to the bond of union which follows the *marriage*: hence one speaks of living happily in a state of *wedlock*, of being joined in holy *wedlock*.

Marriage is rewarded with some honourable distinctions which celibacy is forbidden to usurp.

JOHNSON.

As love generally produces *matrimony*, so it often happens that *matrimony* produces love.

SPECTATOR.

The men who would make good husbands, if they visit public places, are frighted at *wedlock* and resolve to live single.

JOHNSON.

MARTIAL, WARLIKE, MILITARY, SOLDIER-LIKE.

MARTIAL, from *Mars*, the god of war, is the Latin term for belonging to war: WARLIKE signifies literally like *war*, having the image of war. In sense these terms approach

so near to each other, that they may be easily admitted to supply each other's place; but custom, the lawgiver of language, has assigned an office to each that makes it not altogether indifferent how they are used. *Martial* is both a technical and a more comprehensive term than *warlike*; on the other hand, *warlike* designates the temper of the individual more than *martial*: we speak of *martial* array, *martial* preparations, *martial* law, a court *martial*; but of a *warlike* nation, meaning a nation who is fond of war; a *warlike* spirit or temper, also a *warlike* appearance, in as much as the temper is visible in the air and carriage of a man.

MILITARY, from *miles*, signifies belonging to a soldier, and SOLDIER-LIKE like a soldier. *Military* in comparison with *martial* is a term of particular. *Martial* having always a reference to war in general; and *military* to the proceedings consequent upon that: hence we speak of *military* in distinction from naval, as *military* expeditions, *military* movements, and the like; but in characterizing the men, we should say that they had a *martial* appearance; but of a particular place, that it had a *military* appearance, if there were many soldiers. *Military*, compared with *soldier-like*, is used for the body, and the latter for the individual. The whole army is termed the *military*: the conduct of an individual is *soldier-like* or otherwise.

An active prince, and prone to *martial* deeds.

DRYDEN.

Lust from the Volscians fair Camilla came,
And led her *warlike* troops, a warrior dame.

DRYDEN.

The Tlascalans were like all unpollished nations, strangers to *military* order and discipline.

ROBERTSON.

The fears of the Spaniards led them to presumptuous and *unsoldier-like* discussions concerning the propriety of their general's measures.

ROBERTSON.

MARVEL, *v.* Wonder.

MASK, *v.* Cloak.

MASSACRE, *v.* Carnage.

MASSIVE, *v.* Bulky.

MASTER, *v.* Possessor.

MATERIAL, *v.* Corporeal.

MATERIALS, *v.* Matter.

MATRIMONY, *v.* Marriage.

MATTER, MATERIALS, SUBJECT.

MATTER and MATERIALS are both derived from the same source, namely, the Latin *materia*, which comes in all probability from *mater*, because *matter*, from which every thing is made, acts in the production of bodies like a mother.

SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectum*, participle of *subjicio* to lie, signifies the thing lying under and forming the foundation.

Matter in the physical application is taken for all that composes the sensible world in distinction from that which is spiritual or discernible only by the thinking faculty; hence *matter* is always opposed to mind.

In regard to *materials* it is taken in an indivisible as well as a general sense; the whole universe is said to be composed of *matter*, though not of *materials*: on the other hand *materials* consist of those particular parts of *matter* which serve for the artificial production of objects; and *matter* is said of those things which are the natural parts of the universe: a house, a table, and a chair, consist of *materials* because they are works of art; but a plant, a tree, an animal body, consist of *matter* because they are the productions of nature.

The distinction of these terms in their moral application is very similar: the *matter* which composes a moral discourse is what emanates from the author; but the *materials* are those with which one is furnished by others. The style of some writers is so indifferent that they disgrace the *matter* by the manner; periodical writers are furnished with *materials* for their productions out of the daily occurrences in the political and moral world. Writers of dictionaries endeavour to compress as much *matter* as possible into a small space; they draw their *materials* from every other writer.

Matter seems to bear the same relation to *subject* as the whole does to any particular part, as it respects moral objects: the subject is the groundwork of the *matter*; the *matter*

temper the world affords such abundant examples that it may almost seem unnecessary to specify any particulars, or else I would say it is *mean* in those who keep servants, to want to deprive them of any fair sources of emolument: it is *mean* for ladies in their carriages, and attended by their livery servants, to take up the time of a tradesman by bartering with him about sixpences or shillings in the price of his articles: it is *mean* for a gentleman to do that for himself which according to his circumstances he might get another to do for him. *Pitifulness* goes farther than *mean-ness*: it is not merely that which degrades, but unmans the person; it is that which is bad as well as low: when the fear of evil or the love of gain prompts a man to sacrifice his character and forfeit his veracity he becomes truly *pitiful*; Blifield in Tom Jones is the character whom all pronounce to be *pitiful*. *Sordidness* is peculiarly applicable to one's love of gain: although of a more corrupt, yet it is not of so degrading a nature as the two former: the *sordid* man does not deal in trifles like the *mean* man; and has nothing so low and vicious in him as the *pitiful* man. A continual habit of getting money will engender a *sordid* love of it in the human mind; but nothing short of a radically wicked character leads a man to be *pitiful*. We think lightly of a *mean* man: we hold a *pitiful* man in profound contempt: we hate a *sordid* man. *Mean-ness* descends to that which is insignificant and worthless: *pitifulness* sinks into that which is despicable: *sordidness* contaminates the mind with what is foul.

Nature I thought, perform'd too *mean* a part,
Forming her movements to the rules of art.

SWIFT.

The Jews tell us of a two-fold Messiah, a vile
and most *pitiful* fetch, invented only to evade
what they cannot answer.

PRIDEAUX.

This, my assertion proves he may be old,
And yet not *sordid*, who refuses gold.

DENNAM.

MEAN, MEDIUM.

MEAN is but a contraction of MEDIUM, which signifies in Latin the middle path. The *mean* is used abstractedly in all speculative matters: there is a *mean* in opinions between

the two extremes: this *mean* is doubtless the point nearest to truth. *Medium* is employed in practical matters; computations are often erroneous from being too high or too low: the *medium* is in this case the one most to be preferred. The moralist will always recommend the *mean* in all opinions that widely differ from each other: our passions always recommend to us some extravagant conduct either of insolent resistance or *mean* compliance; but discretion recommends the *medium* or middle course in such matters.

The man within the golden *mean*,
Who can his boldest wish contain,
Securely views the ruin'd cell

Where sordid want and sorrow dwell. FRANCIS.

He who looks upon the soul through its outward actions, often sees it through a deceitful *medium*.

ADDISON.

MEANING, *v.* Signification.

MEANS, *v.* Way.

MECHANIC, *v.* Artist.

TO MEDIATE, *v.* To intercede.

MEDIOCRITY, *v.* Moderation.

TO MEDITATE, *v.* To contemplate.

MEDIUM, *v.* Mean.

MEDLEY, *v.* Difference.

MEDLEY, *v.* Mixture.

MEEK, *v.* Soft.

MEET, *v.* Fit.

MEETING, *v.* Assembly.

MEETING, INTERVIEW.

MEETING, from to meet, is the act of meeting or coming in the company: INTERVIEW compounded of *inter* between, and *view* to view, is a personal view of each other. The *meeting* is an ordinary concern, and its purpose familiar; *meetings* are daily taking place between friends: the *interview* is extraordinary and formal; its object is commonly business; an *interview* sometimes takes place between princes, or commanders of armies.

I have not joy'd an hour since you departed,
For public miseries and private fears,
But this bless'd meeting has o'erpaid them all.

DAVIDSON.

membrance, recollection, and reminiscence, are operations or exertions of this power, which vary in their mode.

The *memory* is a power which exerts itself either independently of the will, or in conformity with the will; but all the other terms express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the *memory* exerts itself, but we do not say that we have any *remembrance* or *recollection* of objects.

Remembrance is the exercise of *memory* in a conscious agent; it may be the effect of repetition or habit, as in the case of a child who *remembers* his lesson after having learnt it several times; or of a horse who *remembers* the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind, as happens to intelligent beings continually as they exercise their thinking faculties.

In these cases *remembrance* is an involuntary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name, and *remembers* that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a particular tree, *remembers* all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree.

Remembrance is however likewise a voluntary act, and the consequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to *remember* what it has been told by its parent; or of a friend who *remembers* the hour of meeting another friend in consequence of the interest which it has excited in his mind: nay indeed experience teaches us that scarcely any thing in ordinary cases is more under the subservience of the will than the *memory*; for it is now become almost a maxim to say, that one may *remember* whatever one wishes.

The power of *memory*, and the simple exercise of that power in the act of *remembering*, are possessed in common, though in different degrees, by man and brute; but *recollection* and *reminiscence* are exercises of the *memory* that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judge-

ment and understanding. To *remember* is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to *recollect* is to *remember* afresh, to *remember* what has been *remembered* before. *Remembrance* busies itself with objects that are at hand; *recollection* carries us back to distant periods: simple *remembrance* is engaged in things that have but just left the mind, which are more or less easily to be recalled, and more or less faithfully to be represented; but *recollection* tries to retrace the faint images of things that have been so long unthought of as to be almost obliterated from the *memory*. In this manner we are said to *remember* in one half hour what was told us in the preceding half hour, or to *remember* what passes from one day to another; but we *recollect* the incidents of childhood; we *recollect* what happened in our native place after many years' absence from it. The *remembrance* is that homely every-day exercise of the *memory* which renders it of essential service in the acquirement of knowledge, or in the performance of one's duties; the *recollection* is that exalted exercise of the *memory* which affords us the purest of enjoyments and serves the noblest of purposes; the *recollection* of all the minute incidents of childhood is a more sincere pleasure than any which the present moment can afford.

Reminiscence, if it deserve any notice as a word of English use, is altogether an abstract exercise of the *memory*, which is employed on purely intellectual ideas in distinction from those which are awakened by sensible objects; the mathematician makes use of *reminiscence* in deducing unknown truths from those which he already knows.

Reminiscence among the disciples of Socrates was the *remembrance* of things purely intellectual, or of that natural knowledge which the souls had had before their union with the body; whilst the *memory* was exercised upon sensible things, or that knowledge which was acquired through the medium of the senses: therefore the Latins said that *reminiscence* belonged exclusively to man because it was purely intellectual, but that *memory*

was common to all animals because it was merely the depot of the senses ; but this distinction, from what has been before observed, is only preserved as it respects the meaning of *remembrance*. *Memory* is a generic term, as has been already shown ; it includes the common idea of reviving former impressions, but does not qualify the nature of the ideas revived : the term is however extended in its application to signify not merely a power but also a seat or resting place, as is likewise *remembrance* and *recollection* ; but still with this difference, that the *memory* is spacious, and contains every thing ; the *remembrance* and *recollection* are partial, and comprehend only passing events : we treasure up knowledge in our *memory* ; the occurrences of a preceding year are still fresh in our *remembrance* or *recollection*.

Remember thee !

Ab, thou poor ghost, while *memory* holds a seat
In this distracted globe. SHAKESPEARE.

Forgetfulness is necessary to *remembrance*.

JOHNSON.

Memory may be assisted by method, and the
decays of knowledge repaired by stated times of
recollection. JOHNSON.

Reminiscence is the retrieving a thing at present
forgot, or confusedly remembered, by setting
the mind to hunt over all its notions. SOUTH.

MENACE, v. Threat.

TO MEND, v. To amend.

MENIAL, v. Servant.

MENTAL, INTELLECTUAL.

THERE is the same difference between **MENTAL** and **INTELLECTUAL** as between *mind* and *intellect* : the *mind* comprehends the thinking faculty in general with all its operations ; the *intellect* includes only that part of it which consists in understanding and judgement : *mental* is therefore opposed to corporeal ; *intellectual* is opposed to sensual or physical : *mental* exertions are not to be expected from all ; *intellectual* enjoyments fall to the lot of comparatively few.

Objects, pleasures, pains, operations, gifts, &c. are denominated *mental* ; subjects, conversation, pursuits, and the like, are entitled *intellectual*. It is not always easy to distinguish our *mental* pleasures from

those corporeal pleasures which we enjoy in common with the brutes ; the latter are however greatly heightened by the former in whatever degree they are blended : in a society of well informed persons the conversation will turn principally on *intellectual* subjects.

To collect and reposit the various forms of things is far the most pleasing part of *mental* occupation. JOHNSON.

Man's more divine, the master of all these,
Lord of the wide world, and wide wat'ry seas,
Endued with *intellectual* sense and soul.

SHAKESPEARE.

TO MENTION, NOTICE.

MENTION from *mens* mind, signifies here to bring to mind.

NOTICE (*v. To mark*).

These terms are synonymous only in as much as they imply the act of calling things to another person's mind. We *mention* a thing in direct terms : we *notice* it indirectly or in a casual manner ; we *mention* that which may serve as information ; we *notice* that which may be merely of a personal or incidental nature. One friend *mentions* to another what has passed at a particular meeting : in the course of conversation he *notices* or calls to the *notice* of his companion the badness of the road, the wideness of the street, or the like.

The great critic I have before *mentioned*, though an heathen, has taken *notice* of the sublime manner in which the lawgiver of the Jews has described the creation. ADDISON.

MERCANTILE, COMMERCIAL.

MERCANTILE, from *merchandise*, respects the actual transaction of business, or a transfer of *merchandise* by sale or purchase ; **COMMERCIAL** comprehends the theory and practice of *commerce* : hence we speak in a peculiar manner of a *mercantile* house, a *mercantile* town, a *mercantile* situation, and the like ; but of a *commercial* education, a *commercial* people, *commercial* speculations, and the like.

Such is the happiness, the hope of which seduced me from the duties and pleasures of a *mercantile* life. JOHNSON.

The *commercial* world is very frequently put into confusion by the bankruptcy of merchants.

JOHNSON.

MERCENARY, v. Hireling.

MERCENARY, *v. Venal.*
 MERCHANTIZE, *v. Commodity.*
 MERCIFUL, *v. Gracious.*
 MERCILESS, *v. Hardhearted.*
 MERCY, *v. Clemency.*
 MERCY, *v. Pity.*
 MERE, *v. Bare.*
 MERIT, *v. Desert.*
 MERRIMENT, *v. Mirth.*
 MERRY, *v. Cheerful.*
 MERRY, *v. Lively.*

MESSAGE, ERRAND.

MESSAGE, from the Latin *missus*, participle of *mitto* to send, signifies the thing sent.

ERRAND, from *erro* to wander or go to a distance, signifies the thing for which one goes to a distance.

The *message* is properly any communication which is conveyed; the *errand* sent from one person to another is that which causes one to go: servants are the bearers of *messages*, and are sent on various *errands*. The *message* may be either verbal or written; the *errand* is limited to no form, and to no circumstance: one delivers the *message*, and goes the *errand*. Sometimes the *message* may be the *errand*, and the *errand* may include the *message*: when that which is sent consists of a notice or intimation to another, it is a *message*; and if that causes any one to go to a place, it is an *errand*: thus it is that the greater part of *errands* consist of sending *messages* from one person to another.

The scenes where ancient bards th' inspiring
 breath

Ecstatic felt, and, from this world retir'd,
 Convers'd with angels and immortal forms,
 On gracious *errands* bent. THOMSON.

Sometimes, from her eyes,
 I did receive fair speechless *messages*.
 SHAKESPEARE.

MESSENGER, *v. Harbinger.*

TO METAMORPHOSE, *v. To transfigure.*

METAPHORICAL, *v. Figurative.*

METHOD, *v. Order.*

METHOD, *v. System.*

METHOD, *v. Way.*

MIEN, *v. Air.*

MIGHTY, *v. Powerful.*

MILD, *v. Soft.*

MILITARY, *v. Martial.*

TO MIMICK, *v. To imitate.*

TO MIND, *v. To attend to.*

MINDFUL, REGARDFUL, OBSERVANT.

MINDFUL (*v. To attend to*) respects that which we wish from others; REGARDFUL (*v. To regard*) respects that which in itself demands *regard* or serious thought; OBSERVANT respects both that which is communicated by others, or that which carries its own obligations with itself: a child should always be *mindful* of its parents' instructions; they should never be forgotten: every one should be *regardful* of his several duties and obligations; they ought never to be neglected: one ought to be *observant* of the religious duties which one's profession enjoins upon him; they cannot with propriety be passed over. By being *mindful* of what one hears from the wise and good, one learns to be wise and good; by being *regardful* of what is due to oneself, and to society at large, one learns to pass through the world with satisfaction to one's own mind and esteem from others; by being *observant* of all rule and order, we afford to others a salutary example for their imitation.

Be *mindful*, when thou hast entomb'd the shoot,
 With store of earth around to feed the root.

DRYDEN.

No, there is none; no ruler of the stars
Regardful of my miseries. HILL.

Observant of the right, religious of his word.
 DRYDEN.

TO MINGLE, *v. To Mix.*

MINISTER, *v. Clergyman.*

MINISTER, AGENT.

MINISTER comes from *minus* less, as *magister* comes from *ma-* more; the one being less, and

of the lower station: *mirth* may be provoked wherever any number of persons is assembled; *merriment* cannot go forward any where so properly as at fairs, or common and public places. JOVIALITY or JOLLITY, and HILARITY, are species of *merriment* which belong to the convivial board, or to less refined indulgences: *joviality* or *jollity* is the unrefined, unlicensed indulgence in the pleasures of the table, or any social entertainments; *hilarity* is the same thing qualified by the cultivation and good sense of the company: we may expect to find much *joviality* and *jollity* at the public dinner of mechanics, watermen, or labourers: we may expect to find *hilarity* at a public dinner of noblemen: eating, drinking, and noise, constitute the *joviality*; the conversation, the songs, the toasts, and the public spirit of the company, constitute the *hilarity*.

'The highest gratification we receive here from company is *mirth*, which at the best is but a fluttering unquiet motion.

POPE.

He who best knows our natures by such afflictions recalls our wandering thoughts from idle *merriment*.

GRAY.

Now swarms the village o'er the *jovial* mead.

THOMSON.

With branches we the fane's adorn, and waste
In *jollity* the day ordain'd to be the last.

DRYDEN.

He that contributes to the *hilarity* of the vacant hour will be welcomed with ardour.

JOHNSON.

MISCARRIAGE, *v. Failure.*

MISCELLANY, *v. Mixture.*

MISCHANCE, *v. Calamity.*

MISCHIEF, *v. Evil.*

MISCHIEF, *v. Injury.*

TO MISCONSTRUE, MISINTERPRET.

MISCONSTRUE and MISINTERPRET signify to explain in a wrong way; but the former respects the sense of one's words or the implication of one's actions: those who indulge themselves in a light mode of speech towards children are liable to be *misconstrued*; a too great tenderness to the criminal may be easily *misinterpreted* into favor of the crime.

These words may likewise be employed in speaking of language in gene-

ral: but the former respects the literal transmission of foreign ideas into the native language; the latter respects the general sense which one affixes to any set of words, either in the native or the foreign language: the learners of a language will unavoidably *misconstrue* it at times; in all languages there are ambiguous expressions, which are liable to *misinterpretation*. *Misconstruing* is the consequence of ignorance; *misinterpretation* of particular words are oftener the consequence of prejudice and voluntary blindness, particularly in the explanation of the law or of the Scriptures.

In ev'ry act and turn of life he feels
Public calamities or household ills;
The judge corrupt, the long depending cause,
And doubtful issue of *misconstrued* laws.

PRIOR.

Some purposely misrepresent or put a wrong interpretation on the virtues of others.

ADDISON.

MISDEED, *v. Offence.*

MISDEMEANOUR, *v. Crime.*

MISDEMEANOUR, *v. Offence.*

MISERABLE, *v. Unhappy.*

MISERLY, *v. Avaricious.*

MISFORTUNE, *v. Calamity.*

MISFORTUNE, *v. Evil.*

MISHAP, *v. Calamity.*

TO MISINTERPRET, *v. To Misconstrue.*

TO MISS, *v. To lose.*

MISTAKE, *v. Error.*

MISUSE, *v. Abuse.*

TO MIX, MINGLE, BLEND, CONFOUND.

MIX is in German *mischen*, Latin *misceo*, Greek *μίσγω*, Hebrew *mazeg*. MINGLE, in Greek *μίσγω*, is but a variation of *mix*.

BLEND, in German *blenden* to dazzle, comes from *blind*, signifying to see confusedly, or confuse objects in a general way.

CONFOUND, *v. Confound.*

Mix is here a general and indefinite term, signifying simply to put together: but we may *mix* two or several things; we *mingle* several objects things are *mixed* so as to lose all distinction; but they may be *mingle*

assurance, is not incompatible with a confidence in ourselves; *diffidence* altogether unmans a person, and disqualifies him for his duty: a person is generally *modest* in the display of his talents to others; but a *diffident* man cannot turn his talents to his own use.

A man truly *modest* is as much so when he is alone as in company. BUDGELL.

Mere *bashfulness*, without merit, is awkwardness. ADDISON.

Diffidence and presumption both arise from the want of knowing, or rather endeavouring to know, ourselves. STEELE.

MODEST, *v.* Humble.

MODESTY, MODERATION, TEMPERANCE, SOBRIETY.

MODESTY, in French *modestie*, Latin *modestia*, and MODERATION, in Latin *moderatio* and *moderor*, both come from *modus* a measure, limit, or boundary; that is, forming a measure or rule.

TEMPERANCE, in Latin *temperantia*, from *tempus* time, signifies fixing a time (*v.* *Abstinent*).

SOBRIETY, *v.* *Abstinent*.

Modesty lies in the mind, and in the tone of feeling; *moderation* respects the desires: *modesty* is a principle that acts discretionally; *moderation* is a rule or line that acts as a restraint on the views and the outward conduct.

Modesty consists in a fair and medium estimate of one's character and qualification; it guards a man against too high an estimate; it recommends to him an estimate below the reality: *moderation* consists in a suitable regulation of one's desires, demands, and expectations; it consequently depends very often on *modesty* as its groundwork: he who thinks *modestly* of his own acquirements, his own performances, and his own merits, will be *moderate* in his expectations of praise, reward, and recompense: he on the other hand, who overrates his own abilities and qualifications, will equally overrate the use he makes of them, and consequently be *immoderate* in the price which he sets upon his services: in such cases, therefore, *modesty* and *moderation* are to each other as cause and effect; but

there may be *modesty* without *moderation*, and *moderation* without *modesty*. *Modesty* is a sentiment confined to one's self as the object, and consisting solely of one's judgement of what one is, and what one does; but *moderation*, as is evident from the above, extends to objects that are external of ourselves: *modesty*, rather than *moderation*, belongs to an author; *moderation*, rather than *modesty*, belongs to a tradesman, or a man who has gains to make and purposes to answer.

Modesty shields a man from mortifications and disappointments, which assail the self-conceited man in every direction: a *modest* man conciliates the esteem even of an enemy and a rival; he disarms the resentments of those who feel themselves most injured by his superiority; he makes all pleased with him by making them at ease with themselves: the self-conceited man, on the contrary, sets the whole world against himself, because he sets himself against every body; every one is out of humour with him, because he makes them ill at ease with themselves while in his company. *Moderation* protects a man equally from injustice on the one hand, and imposition on the other: he who is *moderate* himself makes others so; for every one finds his advantage in keeping within that bound which is as convenient to himself as to his neighbour; the world will always do this homage to real goodness, that they will admire it if they cannot practise it, and they will practise it to the utmost extent that their passions will allow them.

Moderation is the measure of one's desires, one's habits, one's actions, and one's words; *temperance* is the adaptation of the time or season for particular feelings, actions, or words: a man is said to be *moderate* in his principles, who adopts the medium or middle course of thinking; it rather qualifies the thing than the person: he is said to be *temperate* in his anger, if he do not suffer it to break out into any excesses; *temperance* characterizes the person rather than the thing.

A *moderate* man in politics or

which may be turned into *cash*, as convenience requires.

MONSTER, *v. Wonder.*

MONSTROUS, *v. Enormous.*

MONUMENT, MEMORIAL,
REMEMBRANCER.

MONUMENT, in Latin *monumentum* or *monimentum*, from *monco* to advise or remind, signifies the thing that puts in mind.

MEMORIAL, from *memory*, signifies the thing that helps the memory; and REMEMBRANCER, from *remember* (*v. Memory*), the thing that causes to *remember*.

From the above it is clear that these terms have, in their original derivation, precisely the same signification, and differ in their collateral acceptations: *monument* is applied to that which is purposely set up to keep a thing in mind; *memorial* and *remembrancer* are any things which are calculated to call a thing to mind: the *monument* is used to preserve a public object of notice from being forgotten; the *memorial* serves to keep an individual in mind: the *monument* is commonly understood to be a species of building; as a tomb which preserves the *memory* of the dead, or a pillar which preserves the *memory* of some public event: the *memorial* always consists of something which was the property, or in the possession, of another; as the picture, the handwriting, the hair, and the like. The *Monument* was built to commemorate the dreadful fire of London in the year 1666: friends who are at a distance are happy to have some token of each other's regard, which they likewise keep as *memorials* of their former intercourse.

The *monument*, in its proper sense, is always made of wood or stone for some specific purpose; but, in the improper sense, things may be converted into *monuments* when they serve the purpose of reminding the public of any circumstance: thus, the pyramids are *monuments* of antiquity; the actions of a good prince are more lasting *monuments* than either brass or marble.

Memorials are always of a private

nature, and at the same time such as remind us naturally of the object to which they have belonged; this object is generally some person, but it may likewise refer to some thing, if it be of a personal nature: our Saviour instituted the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper as a *memorial* of his death.

A *memorial* respects some object external of ourselves; the *remembrancer* is said of that which directly concerns ourselves and our particular duty: a man leaves *memorials* of himself to whomsoever he leaves his property; but the *remembrancer* is that which we acquire for ourselves: the *memorial* carries us back to another; the *remembrancer* brings us back to ourselves: the *memorial* revives in our minds what we owe to another; the *remembrancer* puts us in mind of what we owe to ourselves, it is that which recalls us to a sense of our duty: a gift is the best *memorial* we can give of ourselves to another; a sermon is often a good *remembrancer* of the duties which we have neglected to perform.

Any *memorial* of your good nature and friendship is most welcome to me. POPE.

If (in the Isle of Sky) the remembrance of papal superstition is obliterated, the *monuments* of papal piety are likewise effaced. JOHNSON.

When God is forgotten, his judgements are his *remembrancers*. COWPER.

MOOD, *v. Humour.*

MORALS, *v. Manners.*

MORBID, *v. Sick.*

MOREOVER, *v. Besides.*

MOROSE, *v. Gloomy.*

MORTAL, *v. Deadly.*

MORTIFICATION, *v. Vexation.*

TO MORTIFY, *v. To humble.*

MOTION, MOVEMENT.

THESE are both abstract terms to denote the act of *moving*, but MOTION is taken generally and abstractedly from the thing that *moves*; MOVEMENT, on the other hand, is taken in connexion with the agent or thing that *moves*: hence we speak of a state of *motion* as opposed to a state of rest, of perpetual *motion*, of laws of *motion*, and the like; on the other hand, to make a *motion*

when speaking of an army, a general *movement* when speaking of an assembly.

When *motion* is qualified by the thing that *moves*, it denotes continued *motion*; but *movement* implies only a particular *motion*: hence we say, the *motion* of the heavenly bodies, the *motion* of the earth; a person is in continual *motion*, or an army is in *motion*; but a person makes a *movement* who rises or sits down, or goes from one chair to another; the different *movements* of the springs and wheels of any instrument.

It is not easy to a mind accustomed to the inroads of troublesome thoughts to expel them immediately by putting better images into motion.

JOHNSON.

Nature I thought perform'd too mean a part,
Forming her *movements* to the rules of art.

PRIOR.

MOTIVE, *v. Cause.*

MOTIVE, *v. Principle.*

TO MOULD, *v. To form.*

TO MOUNT, *v. To arise.*

TO MOURN, *v. To grieve.*

MOURNFUL, SAD.

MOURNFUL signifies full of what causes *mourning*; SAD (*v. Dull*), signifies either a painful sentiment, or what causes this painful sentiment. The difference in the sentiment is what constitutes the difference between these epithets: the *mournful* awakens tender and sympathetic feelings: the *sad* oppresses the spirits and makes one heavy at heart; a *mournful* tale contains an account of others' distresses; a *sad* story contains an account of one's own distress; a *mournful* event befalls our friends and relatives; a *sad* misfortune befalls ourselves. Selfish people find nothing *mournful*, but many things *sad*: tender hearted people are always affected by what is *mournful*, and are less troubled about what is *sad*.

Narcissa follows ere his tomb is closed,
Her death invades his *mournful* right and
claiming,

The grief that started from my lids for him.

MILTON.

How *sad* a sight is human happiness
To those whose thoughts can pierce beyond an
hour!

YOUNG.

TO MOVE, *v. To stir.*

MOVEABLES, *v. Goods.*

MOVEMENT, *v. Motion.*

MOVING, AFFECTING, PATHETIC.

THE MOVING is in general whatever moves the affections or the passions; the AFFECTING and PATHETIC are what move the *affections* in different degrees. The good or bad feelings may be *moved*; the tender feelings only are *affected*. A field of battle is a *moving* spectacle: the death of king Charles was an *affecting* spectacle. The *affecting* acts by means of the senses, as well as the understanding; the *pathetic* applies only to what is addressed to the heart: hence, a sight or a description is *affecting*; but an address is *pathetic*.

There is something so *moving* in the very image of weeping beauty.

STEELE.

I do not remember to have seen any ancient or modern story more *affecting* than a letter of Ann of Boulogne.

ADDISON.

What think you of the bard's enchanting art,
Which whether he attempts to warm the heart
With fabled scenes, or charm the ear with
rhyme,

Breathes all *pathetic*, lovely, and sublime?

JENYNS.

MULCT, *v. Fine.*

MULTITUDE, CROWD, THRONG,
SWARM.

THE idea of many is common to all these terms, and peculiar to that of MULTITUDE, from the Latin *multus*; CROWD, from the verb to *crowd*, signifies the many that *crowd* together; and THRONG, from the German *drängen* to press, signifies the many that press together; and SWARM, from the German *schwärmen* to fly about, signifies running together in numbers. These terms vary, either in regard to the object, or the circumstance: *multitude* is applicable to any object; *crowd*, *throng*, and *swarm*, are in the proper sense applicable only to animate objects: the first two in regard to persons; the latter to animals in general, but particularly brutes. The *multitude* may be either in a stagnant or a moving state; all the rest denote a *multitude* in a moving state: the *crowd* is always pressing, generally eager and tumultuous; the *throng*

may be busy and active, but not always pressing or incommodious: it is always inconvenient, sometimes dangerous to go into a *crowd*; it is amusing to see the *throng* that is perpetually passing in the streets of the city: the *swarm* is more active than either of the two others; it is commonly applied to bees which fly together in numbers, but sometimes to human beings, to denote their very great numbers when scattered about; thus the children of the poor in low neighbourhoods *swarm* in the streets.

A *multitude* is incapable of framing orders.

TEMPLE.

'The *crowd* shall Cæsar's Indian war behold.

DRYDEN.

I shone amid the heav'nly *throng*.

MASON.

Numberless nations, stretching far and wide,
Shall (I foresee it) soon with Gothic *swarms* come
forth,

From ignorance's universal North.

SWIFT.

MUNIFICENT, *v. Beneficent.*

TO MURDER, *v. To kill.*

TO MURMUR, *v. To complain.*

TO MUSE, *v. To contemplate.*

TO MUSE, *v. To think.*

TO MUSTER, *v. To assemble.*

MUTABLE, *v. Changeable.*

MUTE, *v. Silent.*

TO MUTILATE, MAIM, MANGLE.

MUTILATE, in Latin *mutilatus*, from *mutilo* and *mutilus*, Greek *μυτιλος* without horns, signifies to take off any necessary part.

MAIM and MANGLE are in all probability derived from the Latin *mancus*, which comes from *manus*, signifying to deprive of a hand or to wound in general.

Mutilate has the most extended meaning; it implies the abridging of any limb: *mangle* is applied to irregular wounds in any part of the body: *maim* is confined to wounds in the hands. Men are exposed to be *mutilated* by means of cannon balls; they are in danger of being *mangled* when attacked promiscuously with the sword; they frequently get *maimed* when boarding vessels or storming places.

One is *mutilated* and *mangled* by active means; one becomes *maimed*

by natural infirmity: *mutilate* and *mangle* are applicable to moral objects; *maim* is employed only in the natural sense. In this case *mangle* is a much stronger term than *mutilate*; the latter signifies to lop off an essential part; to *mangle* is to *mutilate* it to such a degree as to render it useless or worthless. Every sect of Christians is fond of *mutilating* the Bible by setting aside such parts as do not favor its own scheme, and amongst them all the sacred Scriptures become literally *mangled*, and stripped of all its most important doctrines.

How Hales would have borne the *mutilations* which his *Plea of the Crown* has suffered from the Editor, they who know his character will easily conceive.

JOHNSON.

I have shown the evil of *maiming* and splitting religion.

BLAIR.

What have they (the French nobility) done that they should be hunted about, *mangled*, and tortured.

BURKE.

MUTINOUS, *v. Tumultuous.*

MUTUAL, RECIPROCAL.

MUTUAL, in Latin *mutuus* from *muto* to change, signifies exchanged so as to be equal or the same on both sides.

RECIPROCAL, in Latin *reciprocus* from *recipio* to take back, signifies giving backward and forward by way of return. *Mutual* supposes a sameness in condition at the same time: *reciprocal* supposes an alternation or succession of returns. * Exchange is free and voluntary; we give in exchange, and this action is *mutual*: return is made either according to law or equity; it is obligatory, and when equally obligatory on each in turn it is *reciprocal*. Voluntary disinterested services rendered to each other are *mutual*: imposed or merited services, returned from one to the other, are *reciprocal*: friends render one another *mutual* services; the services between servants and masters are *reciprocal*. The husband and wife pledge their faith to each other *mutually*; they are *reciprocally* bound to keep their vow of fidelity. The sentiment is *mutual*, the tie is *reciprocal*. *Mutual* applies mostly matters of will and opinion, a *mutual* affection, a *mutual* inclination

* Vide Roubaud: "Mutual, reciproque."

oblige, a *mutual* interest for each other's comfort, a *mutual* concern to avoid that which will displease the other; these are the sentiments which render the marriage state happy: *reciprocal* ties, *reciprocal* bonds, *reciprocal* rights, *reciprocal* duties; these are what every one ought to bear in mind as a member of society, that he may expect of no man more than what in equity he is disposed to return. *Mutual* applies to nothing but what is personal; *reciprocal* is applied to things remote from the idea of personality, as *reciprocal* verbs, *reciprocal* terms, *reciprocal* relations, and the like.

The soul and spirit that animates and keeps up society is *mutual* trust. SOUTH.

Life cannot subsist in society but by *reciprocal* concessions. JOHNSON.

MYSTERIOUS, *v.* *Dark*.

MYSTERIOUS, MYSTIC.

MYSTERIOUS (*v.* *Dark*), and MYSTIC, are but variations of the same original; the former however is more commonly applied to that which is supernatural, or veiled in an impenetrable obscurity; the latter to that which is natural, but in part concealed from the view; hence we speak of the *mysterious* plans of Providence: *mystic* schemes of theology or *mystic* principles.

As soon as that *mysterious* veil, which now covers fatality, was lifted up, all the gaiety of life would disappear. BLAIR.

And ye five other wand'ring fires that move
In *mystic* dance not without song
Resound his praise. MILTON.

MYSTERIOUS, *v.* *Secret*.

MYSTIC, *v.* *Mysterious*.

N.

NAKED, *v.* *Bare*.

TO NAME, CALL.

NAME is properly to pronounce some word, from the Latin *nomen*, Greek *ονομα*, Hebrew *nam*.

CALL, *v.* *To call*.

Both these words imply the direction of the sound to an object; but *naming* is confined to the use of some distinct and significant sound: *calling*

NAME.

is said of any sound whatever; we may *call* without *naming*, but we cannot *name* without *calling*. A person is *named* by his name, whether proper, patronymic, or whatever is usual; he is *called* according to the characteristics by which he is distinguished. The emperor Tiberius was *named* Tiberius; he was *called* a monster. William the First of England is *named* William; he is *called* the Conqueror. Helen went three times round the wooden horse in order to discover the snare, and, with the hope of taking the Greeks by surprise, *called* their principal captains, *naming* them by their names, and counterfeiting the voices of their wives. Many ancient nations in *naming* any one, *called* him the son of some one, as Richardson the son of Richard, and Robertson, the son of Robert.

Some haughty Greek who lives thy tears to see,
Embitters all thy woes, by *naming* me. PERR.

I lay the deep foundations of a wall,
And Ænos, nam'd from me, the city call.

DRYDEN.

NAME, APPELLATION, TITLE,
DENOMINATION.

NAME, *v.* *To name*.

APPELLATION, in French *appellation*, Latin *appellatio* from *appello* to call, signifies the thing called.

TITLE, in French *titre*, Latin *titulus*, from the Greek *τις* to honor, signifies that which is assigned for the purpose of honor.

DENOMINATION signifies that which *denominates* or distinguishes.

Name is a generic term, the rest are specific. Whatever word is employed to distinguish one thing from another is a *name*; therefore, an *appellation* and a *title* is a *name*, but not *vice versâ*. A *name* is either common or proper; an *appellation* is generally a common *name* given for some specific purpose as characteristic. Several kings of France had the *names* of Charles, Louis, Philip, but one was distinguished by the *appellation* of Stammerer, another by that of the Simple, and a third by that of the Hardy, arising from particular characters or circumstances. A *title* is a species of *appellation*, not drawn from any thing personal, but conferred as a ground of political distinc-

tion. An *appellation* may be often a term of reproach; but a *title* is always a mark of honor. An *appellation* is given to all objects, animate or inanimate; a *title* is given mostly to persons, sometimes to things. A particular house may have the *appellation* of the cottage, or the hall; as a particular person may have the *title* of Duke, Lord, or Marquis.

Denomination is to particular bodies, what *appellation* is to an individual; namely, a term of distinction, drawn from their peculiar characters and circumstances. The Christian world is split into a number of different bodies or communities, under the *denominations* of Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, Presbyterians, &c. which have their origin in the peculiar form of faith and discipline adopted by these bodies.

Then on your *name* shall wretched mortals call,
And offer'd victims at your altars fall. DRYDEN.

The *names* derived from the profession of the ministry in the language of the present age, are made but the *appellatives* of scorn. SOUTH.

We generally find in *titles* an intimation of some particular merit, that should recommend men to the high stations which they possess.

ADDISON.

It has cost me much care and thought to marshal and fix the people under their proper *denominations*.

ADDISON.

TO NAME, DENOMINATE,
STYLE, ENTITLE, DESIGNATE,
CHARACTERIZE.

To NAME (*v. To name, call*) signifies simply to give a *name* to, or to address or specify by the given *name*; to DENOMINATE is to give a specific *name* upon specific ground, to distinguish by the *name*; to STYLE, from the noun *style* or manner (*v. Diction, style*), signifies to address by a specific *name*; ENTITLE is to give the specific or appropriate *name*. Adam *named* every thing; we *denominate* the man who drinks excessively, 'a drunkard'; subjects *style* their monarch 'His Majesty'; books are *entitled* according to the judgment of the author. *Name, denominate, style, and entitle*, are the acts of conscious agents only.

To DESIGNATE, signifying to mark out, and CHARACTERIZE, signifying to form a *characteristic*, are

said only of things, and agree with the former only inasmuch as words may either *designate* or *characterize*: thus the word 'capacity' is said to *designate* the power of holding; and 'finesse' *characterizes* the people by whom it was adopted.

I could *name* some of our acquaintance who have been obliged to travel as far as Alexandria in pursuit of money.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

A fable in tragic or epic poetry is *denominated* simple, when the events it contains follow each in an unbroken tenour.

WARTON.

Happy those times
When lords were *still'd* fathers of families.

SHAKESPEARE.

TO NAME, *v. To nominate.*

NAME, REPUTATION, REPUTE,
CREDIT.

NAME is here taken in the improper sense for a *name* acquired in public by any peculiarity or quality in an object.

REPUTATION and REPUTE, from *reputo* or *re* and *puto* to think back, or in reference to some immediate object, signifies the state of being thought of by the public, or held in public estimation.

CREDIT (*v. Credit*) signifies the state of being believed or trusted in general.

The *name* implies something more specific than the *reputation*; and the *reputation* something more substantial than the *name*; a *name* may be acquired by some casualty or by some quality that has more show than worth; *reputation* is acquired only by time, and built only on merit: the *name* may be arbitrarily given, simply by way of distinction; the *reputation* is not given, but acquired, or follows as a consequence of one's honorable exertions. A physician sometimes gets a *name* by a single instance of professional skill, which by a combination of favorable circumstances he may convert to his own advantage in forming an extensive practice; but unless he have a commensurate degree of talent, this *name* will never ripen into a solid *reputation*.

Inanimate objects get a *name* reputation is applied only to or that which is personal. F

liberal in giving names to certain shops, certain streets, certain commodities, as well as to certain trades-people, and the like. Universities, academies, and public institutions, acquire a *reputation* for their learning, their skill, their encouragement and promotion of the arts or sciences: the *name* and *reputation* are of a more extended nature than the *repute* and the *credit*. Strangers and distant countries hear of the *name* and the *reputation*; but neighbours and those only who have the means of personal observation can take a part in the *repute* and *credit*. It is possible, therefore, to have a *name* and *reputation* without having *repute* and *credit*, and *vice versa*, for the objects which constitute the former are sometimes different from those which produce the latter. A manufacturer has a *name* for the excellence of a particular article of his own manufacture; a book has a *name* among wittlings and pretenders to literature: a good writer, however, seeks to establish his *reputation* for genius, learning, industry, or some praise-worthy characteristic: a preacher is in high *repute* among those who attend him: a master gains great *credit* from the good performances of his scholars.

Name and *repute* are taken either in a good or bad sense; *reputation* and *credit* are taken in the good sense only: a person or thing may get a good or an ill *name*; a person or thing may be in good or ill *repute*; the *reputation* may rise to different degrees of height, or it may sink again to nothing, but it never sinks into that which is bad; the *credit* may likewise be high or low, but when it becomes bad it is *discredit*. Families get an ill *name* for their meanness; houses of entertainment get a good *name* for their accommodation; houses fall into bad *repute* when said to be haunted; a landlord comes into high *repute* among his tenants, if he be considerate and indulgent towards them.

Who fears not to do ill, yet fears the *name*,
And free from conscience, is a slave to fame.

DENHAM.

Splendour of *reputation* is not to be counted
among the necessities of life.

JOHNSON.

Mutton has likewise been in great *repute*
among our valiant countrymen. ARBUTHNOT.

Would you true happiness attain,
Let honesty your passions rein,
So live in *credit* and esteem,
And the good *name* you lost, redeem. GAY.

TO NAP, *v.* To sleep.

NARRATION, *v.* Recital.

NARRATIVE, *v.* Account.

NARROW, *v.* Contracted.

NARROW, *v.* Straight.

NASTY, FILTHY, FOUL.

NASTY is connected with *nauseous*.
FILTHY and FOUL are variations
from the Greek φαλγες.

The idea of dirtiness is common to these terms, but in different degrees, and with different modifications. Whatever dirt is offensive to any of the senses, renders that thing *nasty* which is soiled with it: the *filthy* exceeds the *nasty*, not only in the quantity but in the offensive quality of the dirt; and the *foul* exceeds the *filthy* in the same proportion.

We look behind, then view his shaggy beard,
His clothes were tagg'd with thorns, and *filth* his
limbs besmear'd. DRYDEN.

Only our foe
Tempting affronts us with his *foul* esteem.

MILTON.

NATAL, NATIVE, INDIGENOUS.

NATAL, in Latin *natalis*, from *natus*, signifies belonging to one's birth, or the act of one's being born; but NATIVE, in Latin *nativus*, likewise from *natus*, signifies having the origin or beginning.

INDIGENOUS, in Latin *indigena*, from *inde* and *genitus*, signifies sprung from that place.

The epithet *natal* is applied only to the circumstance of a man's birth, as his *natal* day; his *natal* hour; a *natal* song; a *natal* star. *Native* has a more extensive meaning, as it comprehends the idea of one's relationship by origin to an object; as one's *native* country, one's *native* soil, *native* village, or *native* place, *native* language, and the like. *Indigenous* is the same with regard to plants, as *native* in regard to human beings or animals.

Safe in the hand of one disposing pow'r,
Or in the *natal*, or the mortal hour. POKK.

Nor can the grow'ning mind
In the dark dungeon of the limbs confin'd,
Assert the native skies or own its heav'nly kind.
DRYDEN.

NATION, *v. People.*

NATIVE, *v. Intrinsic.*

NATIVE, *v. Natal.*

NATIVE, NATURAL.

NATIVE (*v. Natal*) is to NATURAL as a species to the genus: every thing *native* is according to its strict signification *natural*; but many things are *natural* which are not *native*. Of a person we may say that his worth is *native*, to designate that it is some valuable property which is born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon his character; but we say of his disposition, that it is *natural*, as opposed to that which is acquired by habit. The former is always employed in a good sense, in opposition to what is artful, assumed, and unreal; the other is used in an indifferent sense, as opposed to whatever is the effect of habit or circumstances. When children display themselves with all their *native* simplicity, they are interesting objects of notice: when they display their *natural* turn of mind, it is not always that which tends to raise human nature in our esteem.

In heaven we shall pass from the darkness of our *native* ignorance into the broad light of everlasting day.
SOUTH.

Scripture ought to be understood according to the familiar, *natural* way of construction.
SOUTH.

NATURAL, *v. Native.*

NATURALLY, IN COURSE,
CONSEQUENTLY, OF COURSE.

THE connexion between events, actions, and things, is expressed by all these terms. NATURALLY signifies according to the *nature* of things, and applies therefore to the connexion which subsists according to the original constitution or inherent properties of things: IN COURSE signifies *in the course* of things, that is, in the regular order that things ought to follow: CONSEQUENTLY signifies by a *consequence*, that is, by a necessary law of dependance, which makes one thing follow another: OF

COURSE signifies on account of the *course* which things most commonly or even necessarily take. Whatever happens *naturally*, happens as we expect it; whatever happens *in course*, happens as we approve of it; whatever follows *consequently*, follows as we judge it right; whatever follows *of course*, follows as we see it necessarily. Children *naturally* imitate their parents: people *naturally* fall into the habits of those they associate with: both these circumstances result from the *nature* of things: whoever is made a peer of the realm, takes his seat in the upper house *in course*; he requires no other qualification to entitle him to this privilege, he goes *in*, or according to the established *course* of things; *consequently* as a peer, he is admitted without question; this is a decision of the judgment by which the question is at once determined: *of course* none are admitted who are not peers; this flows necessarily out of the constituted law of the land.

Naturally and *in course* describe things as they are; *consequently* and *of course*, represent them as they must be; *naturally* and *in course* state facts or realities; *consequently* and *of course*, state the inferences drawn from those facts, or *consequences* resulting from them; a mob is *naturally* disposed to riot, and *consequently* it is dangerous to appeal to a mob for its judgment; the nobility attend at court *in course*, that is, by virtue of their rank; soldiers leave the town *of course* at assize or election times, that is, because the law forbids them to remain. *Naturally* is opposed to the artificial or forced; *in course* is opposed to irregular: *naturally* excludes the idea of design or purpose; *in course* includes the idea of arrangement and social order: the former is applicable to every thing that has an independent existence; the latter is applied to the constituted order of society; the former is, therefore, said of every object, animate or inanimate, having *natural* properties, and performing *natural* operations; the latter only of persons and their establishment. Plants that require much air *naturally* thrive most in an open country: members of a society, who do not forfeit their title

cumstances render *necessary*; the *necessary* is that which is absolutely and unconditionally *necessary*.

Art has ever been busy in inventing things to supply the various *necessities* of our nature, and yet there are always numbers who want even the first *necessaries* of life. Habit and desire create *necessities*; nature only creates *necessaries*: a voluptuary has *necessities* which are unknown to a temperate man; the poor have in general little more than *necessaries*.

Those whose condition has always restrained them to the contemplation of their own *necessities* will scarcely understand why nights and days should be spent in study. JOHNSON.

To make a man happy, virtue must be accompanied with at least a moderate provision of all the *necessaries* of life, and not disturbed by bodily pains. BODDILL.

NECESSITY, NEED.

NECESSITY, *v.* *Necessary*.

NEED, in German *noth*, probably from the Greek *ανγκη* *necessity*.

Necessity respects the thing wanted; *need* the person wanting. There would be no *necessity* for punishments, if there were not evil doers; he is peculiarly fortunate who finds a friend in time of *need*. *Necessity* is more pressing than *need*: the former places in a positive state of compulsion to act; it is said to have no law, it prescribes the law for itself; the latter yields to circumstances, and leaves in a state of deprivation. We are frequently under the *necessity* of going without that of which we stand most in *need*.

Where *necessity* ends, curiosity begins.

JOHNSON.

One of the many advantages of friendship is, that one can say to one's friend the things that stand in *need* of pardon. FORT.

From these two nouns arise two epithets for each, which are worthy of observation, namely, *necessary* and *needful*, *necessitous* and *needy*. *Necessary* and *needful* are both applicable to the thing wanted; *necessitous* and *needy* to the person wanting: *necessary* is applied to every object indiscriminately; *needful* only to such objects as supply temporary or partial wants. Exercise is *necessary* to preserve the health of the body; restraint is *necessary* to preserve that of the mind; assistance is *needful* for

one who has not sufficient resources in himself: it is *necessary* to go by water to the continent; money is *needful* for one who is travelling.

The dissemination of knowledge is *necessary* to dispel the ignorance which would otherwise prevail in the world; it is *needful* for a young person to attend to the instructions of his teacher if he will improve.

Necessitous expresses more than *needy*: the former comprehends a general state of *necessity* or deficiency in the thing that is wanted or *needful*; *needy* expresses only a particular condition. The poor are in a *necessitous* condition, who are in want of the first *necessaries*, or who have not wherewithal to supply the most pressing *necessities*; adventurers are said to be *needy*, when their vices make them in *need* of that which they might otherwise obtain: it is charity to supply the wants of the *necessitous*, but those of the *needy* are sometimes not worthy of one's pity.

It seems to me most strange that men should fear,

Seeing that death, a *necessary* end,
Will come, when it will come. SHAKESPEARE.

Time, long expected, eas'd us of our load,
And brought the *needful* presence of a god.

DRYDEN.

Steele's imprudence of generosity, or vanity of profusion, kept him always incurably *necessitous*.

JOHNSON.

Charity is the work of Heaven, which is always laying itself out on the *needy* and the *impotent*.

SCOTT.

NECESSITY, *v.* *Occasion*.NEED, *v.* *Necessity*.NEED, *v.* *Poverty*.NEED, *v.* *Want*.NEFARIOUS, *v.* *Wicked*.TO NEGLECT, *v.* *To disregard*.

TO NEGLECT, OMIT.

NEGLECT, *v.* *To disregard*.

OMIT, in Latin *omitto*, or *ob* and *mitto*, signifies to put aside.

The idea of letting pass or slip, or of not using, is comprehended in the signification of both these terms; the former is, however, a culpable, the latter an indifferent, action. What we *neglect* ought not to be *neglected*; but what we *omit* may be *omitted*, or otherwise, as convenience requires.

engage the senses or the thoughts of the moment. One is *careless* in business, *thoughtless* in conduct, *heedless* in walking or running, *inattentive* in listening: *careless* and *thoughtless* persons neglect the necessary use of their powers; the *heedless* and *inattentive* neglect the use of their senses. *Careless* people are unfit to be employed in the management of any concerns; *thoughtless* people are unfit to have the management of themselves; *heedless* children are unfit to go by themselves; *inattentive* children are unfit to be led by others. One is *careless* and *inattentive* to provide for the good; one is *thoughtless* and *heedless* in not guarding against the evil: a *careless* person does not trouble himself about advancement; an *inattentive* person does not concern himself about improvement; a *thoughtless* person brings himself into distress; a *heedless* person exposes himself to accidents.

The two classes most apt to be negligent of this duty (religious retirement) are the men of pleasure, and the men of business. BLAIR.

My generous brother is of gentle kind,
He seems remiss, but bears a valiant mind.

POPE.

If the parts of time were not variously coloured, we should never discern their departure and succession, but should live *thoughtless* of the past, and *careless* of the future. JOHNSON.

There in the ruin, *heedless* of the dead,
The shelter-seeking peasant builds his shed.

GOLDSMITH.

In the midst of his glory the Almighty is not *inattentive* to the meanest of his subjects.

BLAIR.

TO NEGOTIATE, TREAT FOR OR ABOUT, TRANSACT.

THE idea of conducting business with others is included in the signification of all these terms; but they differ in the mode of conducting it, and the nature of the business to be conducted. NEGOTIATE, in the Latin *negotiatus*, participle of *negotior*, from *negotium*, is applied in the original mostly to merchandize or traffic, but it is more commonly employed in the complicated concerns of governments and nations. TREAT, from the Latin *tracto*, frequentative of *traho* to draw, signifies to turn over and over or set forth in all ways: these two

verbs, therefore, suppose deliberation: but TRANSACT, from *transactus*, participle of *transago*, to carry forward or bring to an end, supposes more direct agency than consultation or deliberation; this latter is therefore adapted to the more ordinary and less entangled concerns of commerce. *Negotiations* are conducted by many parties, and involve questions of peace or war, dominions, territories, rights of nations, and the like: *treaties* are often a part of *negotiations*; they are seldom conducted by more than two parties, and involve only partial questions, as in *treaties* about peace, about commerce, about the boundaries of any particular state. A congress carries on *negotiations* for the establishment of good order among the ruling powers of Europe; individual states *treat* with each other, to settle their particular differences. To *negotiate* mostly respects political concerns, except in the case of *negotiating* bills: to *treat*, as well as *transact*, is said of domestic and private concerns: we *treat* with a person about the purchase of a house; and *transact* our business with him by making good the purchase and paying down the money.

As nouns, *negotiation* expresses rather the act of deliberating than the thing deliberated: *treaty* includes the ideas of the terms proposed, and the arrangement of those terms: *transaction* expresses the idea of something actually done and finished. *Negotiations* are sometimes very long pending before the preliminary terms are even proposed, or any basis is defined; *treaties* of commerce are entered into by all civilized countries, in order to obviate misunderstandings, and enable them to preserve an amicable intercourse; the *transactions* which daily pass in a great metropolis, like that of London, are of so multifarious a nature, and so infinitely numerous, that the bare contemplation of them fills the mind with astonishment. *Negotiations* are long or short; *treaties* are advantageous or the contrary; *transactions* are honourable or dishonourable.

I do not love to mingle speech with any about news or worldly negotiations in God's holy house. HOWE.

What then worlds
In a far thinner element sustain'd,
And acting the same part with greater skill,
More rapid movement, and for noblest ends.
YOUNG.

More obvious ends to pass are not these stars,
The seats majestic, proud imperial thrones,
On which angelic delegates of heav'n
Discharge high trusts of vengeance or of love,
To clothe in outward grandeur grand designs.
YOUNG.

NOCTURNAL, *v. Nightly.*

NOISE, CRY, OUTCRY.

CLAMOR.

NOISE is any loud sound; CRY, OUTCRY, and CLAMOR, are particular kinds of noises, differing either in the cause or the nature of the sounds. A *noise* proceeds either from animate or inanimate objects; the *cry* proceeds only from animate objects. The report of a cannon, or the loud sounds occasioned by a high wind, are *noises*, but not *cries*; *cries* issue from birds, beasts, and men. A *noise* is produced often by accident; a *cry* is always occasioned by some particular circumstance: when many horses and carriages are going together they make a great *noise*; hunger and pain cause *cries* to proceed both from animals and human beings.

Noise, when compared with *cry*, is sometimes only an audible sound; the *cry* is a very loud *noise*: whatever disturbs silence, as the falling of a pin in a perfectly still assembly, is denominated a *noise*; but a *cry* is that which may often drown other *noises*, as the *cries* of people selling things about the streets. A *cry* is in general a regular sound, but *outcry* and *clamor* are irregular sounds; the former may proceed from one or many, the latter from many in conjunction. A *cry* after a thief becomes an *outcry* when set up by many at a time; it becomes a *clamor*, if accompanied with shouting, bawling, and *noises* of a mixed and tumultuous nature.

These terms may all be taken in an improper as well as a proper sense. Whatever is obtruded upon the public notice, so as to become the universal subject of conversation and writing, is said to make a *noise*; in this manner a new and good performer at the theatre makes a *noise* on his first appearance: a *noise* may, however, be

for or against; but a *cry*, *outcry*, and *clamor*, are always against the object, varying in the degree and manner in which they display themselves: the *cry* is less than the *outcry*, and this is less than the *clamor*. When the public voice is raised in an audible manner against any particular matter, it is a *cry*; if it be mingled with intemperate language it is an *outcry*; if it be vehement, and exceedingly *noisy*, it is a *clamor*: partisans raise a *cry* in order to form a body in their favor; the discontented are ever ready to set up an *outcry* against men in power; a *clamor* for peace in the time of war is easily raised by those who wish to thwart the government.

Nor was his ear less peal'd
With noises loud and ruinous. MILTON.
From either host, the mingled shouts and cries
Of Trojans and Rutillians rend the skies.
DRYDEN.

And now great deeds
Had been achiev'd, whereof all hell had rung,
Had not the snaky sorceress, that sat
Fast by hell gate, and kept the fatal key,
Ris'n, and with hideous outcry rush'd between.
MILTON.

Their darts with clamour at a distance drive,
And only keep the languish'd war alive.
DRYDEN.

NOISOME, *v. Hurtful.*

NOISY, *v. Loud.*

NOMENCLATURE, *v. Dictionary.*

TO NOMINATE, NAME.

NOMINATE comes immediately from the Latin *nominatus*, participle of *nomino*; NAME comes from the Teutonic, &c. *name*, and both from the Latin *nomen*, &c. (*v. To name*).

To *nominate* and to *name* are both to mention by *name*: but the former is to mention for a specific purpose; the latter is to mention for general purpose: persons only are *nominated*; things as well as persons are *named*: one *nominates* a person in order to propose him, or appoint him, to an office; but one *names* a person casually, in the course of conversation, or one *names* him in order to make some inquiry respecting him. To be *nominated* is a public act; to be *named* is generally private: one is *nominated* before an assembly; one is *named* in any place: to be *nominated* is an honor; to be *named* is either honourable, or the contrary, acc.

to the circumstances under which it is mentioned: a person is *nominated* as member of Parliament; he is *named* in terms of respect whenever he is spoken of.

Elizabeth *nominated* her commissioners to hear both parties. ROBERTSON.

Then Calchas (by Ulysses first inspir'd)
Was urg'd to name whom th' angry gods re-
quir'd. DENHAM.

NOTE, *v.* Mark.

TO NOTE, *v.* To mark.

NOTED, *v.* Distinguished.

NOTED, NOTORIOUS.

NOTED (*v.* Distinguished) may be employed either in a good or a bad sense; NOTORIOUS is never used but in a bad sense: men may be *noted* for their talents, or their eccentricities; they are *notorious* only for their vices: *noted* characters excite many and diverse remarks from their friends and their enemies; *notorious* characters are universally shunned.

An engineer of *noted* skill,
Engag'd to stop the growing ill. GAY.

What principles of ordinary prudence can
warrant a man to trust a *notorious* cheat?
SOUTH.

NOTE, *v.* Remark.

TO NOTICE, *v.* To attend to.

TO NOTICE, *v.* To mark.

TO NOTICE, *v.* To mention.

NOTICE, *v.* Information.

TO NOTICE, REMARK, OBSERVE.

To NOTICE (*v.* To attend to) is either to take or to give *notice*: to REMARK, compounded of *re* and *mark* (*v.* Mark), signifies to reflect or bring back any *mark* to our own mind, or communicate the same to another: to mark is to mark a thing once, but to *remark* is to mark it again.

OBSERVE (*v.* Looker on) signifies either to keep a thing present before one's own view, or to communicate our view to another.

In the first sense of these words, as the action respects ourselves, to *notice* and *remark* require simple attention, to *observe* requires examination. To *notice* is a more cursory action than to *remark*: we may *notice*

a thing by a single glance, or on merely turning one's head; but to *remark* supposes a reaction of the mind on an object: we *notice* that a person passes our door on a certain day and at a certain hour; but we *remark* that he goes past every day at the same hour: we *notice* that the sun sets this evening under a cloud, and we *remark* that it has done so for several evenings successively: we *notice* the state of a person's health or his manners in company; we *remark* his habits and peculiarities in domestic life. What is *noticed* and *remark-ed* strikes on the senses, and awakens the mind; what is *observed* is looked after and sought for: the former are often involuntary acts; we see, hear, and think, because the objects obtrude themselves uncalled for; but the latter is intentional as well as voluntary; we see, hear, and think, on that which we have watched. We *remark* things as matters of fact; we *observe* them in order to judge of, or draw conclusions from, them: we *remark* that the wind lies for a long time in a certain quarter; we *observe* that whenever it lies in a certain quarter it brings rain with it. A general *notices* any thing particular in the appearance of his army; he *remarks* that the men have not for a length of time worn contented faces; he consequently *observes* their actions, when they think they are not seen, in order to discover the cause of their dissatisfaction: people who have no curiosity are sometimes attracted to *notice* the stars or planets, when they are particularly bright; those who look frequently will *remark* that the same star does not rise exactly in the same place for two successive nights; but the astronomer goes farther, and *observes* all the motions of the heavenly bodies, in order to discover the scheme of the universe.

In the latter sense of these verbs, as respects the communication to others of what passes in our own minds, to *notice* is to make known our sentiments by various ways; to *remark* and *observe* are to make them known only by means of words: to *notice* is a personal act towards an individual, in which we direct our attention to him, as may happen either by a bow, a nod, a word, or

even a look ; but to *remark* and *observe* are said only of the thoughts which pass in our own minds, and are expressed to others: friends *notice* each other when they meet; they *remark* to others the impression which passing objects make upon their minds: the *observations* which intelligent people make are always entitled to *notice* from young persons.

The depravity of mankind is so easily discoverable, that nothing but the desert or cell can exclude it from *notice*. JOHNSON.

The glass that magnifies its objects contracts the sight to a point, and the mind must be fixed upon a single character, to *remark* its minute peculiarities. JOHNSON.

The course of time is so visibly marked, that it is *observed* even by the birds of passage. JOHNSON.

TO NOTIFY, *v.* To express.

NOTION, *v.* Conception.

NOTION, *v.* Opinion.

NOTION, *v.* Perception.

NOTORIOUS, *v.* Noted.

NOTWITHSTANDING, *v.* However.

NOVEL, *v.* Fable.

NOVEL, NEW.

NOVEL and NEW both come immediately from the Latin *novus* (*v.* *News*), and the former is to the latter as the species to the genus: every thing *novel* is *new*; but all that is *new* is not *novel*: what is *novel* is mostly strange and unexpected; but what is *new* is usual and expected: the freezing of the river Thames is a *novelty*; the frost in every winter is something *new* when it first comes: that is a *novel* sight which was either never seen before, or seen but seldom; that is a *new* sight which is seen for the first time: the entrance of the French king into the British capitol was a sight as *novel* as it was interesting; the entrance of a king into the capital of France was a *new* sight, after the revolution which had so long existed.

We are naturally delighted with *novelty*.

JOHNSON.

'Tis on some evening, sunny, grateful, mild,
When nought but balm is beaming through the
woods,

With yellow lustre bright, that the new tribes
Visit the spacious heav'ns. TAYLOR.

TO NOURISH, NURTURE,
CHERISH.

To NOURISH and NURTURE are but variations from the same verb *nutrio*.

CHERISH, *v.* Foster.

The thing *nourishes*, the person *nurtures* and *cherishes*: to *nourish* is to afford bodily strength, to supply the physical necessities of the body; to *nurture* is to extend one's care to the supply of all its physical necessities, to preserve life, occasion growth, and increase vigor: the breast of the mother *nourishes*; the fostering care and attention of the mother *nurtures*. To *nurture* is a physical act; to *cherish* is a mental as well as a physical act: a mother *nurtures* her infant while it is entirely dependant upon her; she *cherishes* her child in her bosom, and protects it from every misfortune, or affords consolation in the midst of all its troubles, when it is no longer an infant.

Alc, and ye elements, the eldest birth
Of nature's womb, that in quaternions run
Perpetual circle, multiform; and mix
And *nourish* all things. MILTON.

Of thy superfluous brood, she'll *cherish* kind
The alien offspring. SOMERVILLE.

NOXIOUS, *v.* Hurtful.

NUMB, BENUMBED, TORPID.

NUMB and BENUMBED come from the Hebrew *num* to sleep; the former denoting the quality, and the latter the state: there are but few things *numb* by nature; but there may be many things which may be *benumbed*. TORPID, in Latin *torpidus*, from *torpeo* to languish, is most commonly employed to express the permanent state of being *benumbed*, as in the case of some animals, which lie in a *torpid* state all the winter; or in the moral sense to depict the *benumbed* state of the thinking faculty; in this manner we speak of the *torpor* of persons who are *benumbed* by any strong affection, or by any strong external action.

The night, with its silence and darkness,
shows the winter, in which all the powers of
vegetation are *benumbed*. JOHNSON.

There must be a grand spectacle to
the imagination, grown *torpid* with the
joyment of sixty years' security.

ciple of *objicio* to lie in the way, signifies the thing that lies in one's way.

SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectus*, participle of *subjicio* to lie under, signifies the thing forming the groundwork.

The *object* puts itself forward; the *subject* is in the back ground: we notice the *object*; we observe or reflect on the *subject*: the *objects* are sensible; the *subject* is altogether intellectual; the eye, the ear, and all the senses, are occupied with the surrounding *objects*; the memory, the judgement, and the imagination, are supplied with *subjects* suitable to the nature of the operations.

When *object* is taken for that which is intellectual, it retains a similar signification; it is the thing that presents itself to the mind; it is seen by the mind's eye: the *subject*, on the contrary, is that which must be sought for, and when found it engages the mental powers: hence we say an *object* of consideration, an *object* of delight, an *object* of concern; a *subject* of reflection, a *subject* of mature deliberation, the *subject* of a poem, the *subject* of grief, of lamentation, and the like. When the mind becomes distracted by too great a multiplicity of *objects*, it can fix itself on no one individual *object* with sufficient steadiness to take a survey of it; in like manner, if a child have too many *objects* set before it, for the exercise of its powers, it will acquire a familiarity with none: religion and politics are interesting, but delicate *subjects* of discussion.

He, whose sublime pursuit is God and truth,
Burns like some absent and impatient youth,
To join the *object* of his warm desires. JENYNS.

The hymns and odes (of the inspired writers) excel those delivered down to us by the Greeks and Romans, in the poetry as much as in the *subject*. ADDISON.

TO OBJECT, OPPOSE.

To OBJECT (*v. Object*) is to cast in the way, to OPPOSE is to place in the way; there is, therefore, very little original difference, except that casting is a more momentary and sudden proceeding, placing is a more premeditated action; which distinction, at the same time, corresponds with the

use of the terms in ordinary life: to *object* to a thing is to propose or start something against it; but to *oppose* it is to set oneself up steadily against it: one *objects* to ordinary matters that require no reflection; one *opposes* matters that call for deliberation, and afford serious reasons for and against: a parent *objects* to his child's learning the classics, or to his running about the streets; he *opposes* his marriage when he thinks the connexion or the circumstances not desirable: we *object* to a thing from our own particular feelings; we *oppose* a thing because we judge it improper; capricious or selfish people will *object* to every thing that comes across their own humour; those who *oppose* think it necessary to assign, at least, a reason for their *opposition*.

About this time, an Archbishop of York *objected* to clerks (recommended to benefices by the Pope), because they were ignorant of English.

TYAHHITT.

'Twas of no purpose to *oppose*,
She'd bear to no excuse in prose. SWIFT.

OBJECTION, *v. Demur*.

OBJECTION, DIFFICULTY, EXCEPTION.

THE OBJECTION (*v. Demur*) is here general; it comprehends both the DIFFICULTY and the EXCEPTION, which are but species of the *objection*: the *objection* and the *difficulty* are started; the *exception* is made: the *objection* to a thing is in general that which renders it less desirable; but the *difficulty* is that which renders it less practicable: there is an *objection* against every scheme which incurs a serious risk; the want of means to begin, or resources to carry on a scheme, are serious *difficulties*.

The *objection* and *exception* both respect the nature, the moral tendency, or moral consequences of a thing; but the *objection* may be frivolous or serious; the *exception* is something serious: the *objection* is positive; the *exception* is relatively considered, that is, the thing *excepted* from other things, as not good, and consequently *objected* to. *Objections* are made sometimes to proposals for the mere sake of getting rid of engagement: those who do not give themselves trouble find a

my Lady Clare, your grandmother, with all duty
and oberrance. EARL STAFFORD.

OBSERVATIONS, *v. Notes.*

TO OBSERVE, *v. To keep.*

TO OBSERVE, *v. To notice.*

TO OBSERVE, WATCH.

OBSERVE, *v. To notice.*

WATCH, *v. To watch.*

These terms agree in expressing the act of looking at an object; but *observe* is not so strict a looking after as *to watch*: a general *observes* the motions of an enemy when they are in no particular state of activity; he *watches* the motions of an enemy when they are in a state of commotion: we *observe* a thing in order to draw an inference from it: we *watch* any thing in order to discover what may happen: we *observe* with coolness; we *watch* with eagerness: we *observe* carefully; we *watch* narrowly: the conduct of mankind in general is *observed*; the conduct of suspicious individuals is *watched*.

Nor must the ploughman less *observe* the skies.

DRYDEN.

For thou knowst

What hath been warn'd us, what malicious foe
Watches, no doubt, with greedy hope to find,
His wish and best advantage, us asunder.

MILTON.

TO OBSERVE, *v. To see.*

OBSERVER, *v. Looker on.*

OBSOLETE, *v. Old.*

OBSTACLE, *v. Difficulty.*

OBSTINATE, CONTUMACIOUS,

STUBBORN, HEADSTRONG,

HEADY.

OBSTINATE, in Latin *obstinatus*, participle of *obstino*, from *ob* and *stino*, *sto* or *sisto*, signifies standing in the way of another.

CONTUMACIOUS, *v. Contumacy.*

STUBBORN, or *stoutborn*, signifies stiff or immoveable by nature.

HEADSTRONG signifies strong in the head or the mind; and HEADY, full of one's own head.

Obstinacy is a habit of the mind; *contumacy* is either a particular state of feeling or a mode of action: *obstinacy* consists in an attachment to

one's own mode of acting; *contumacy* consists in a swelling contempt of others: the *obstinate* man adheres tenaciously to his own ways, and opposes reason to reason; the *contumacious* man disputes the right of another to control his actions, and opposes force to force. *Obstinacy* interferes with a man's private conduct, and makes him blind to right reason; *contumacy* is a crime against lawful authority; the *contumacious* man sets himself against his superiors: when young people are *obstinate* they are bad subjects of education; when grown people are *contumacious* they are troublesome subjects to the king.

The *stubborn* and the *headstrong* are species of the *obstinate*: the former lies altogether in the perversion of the will; the latter in the perversion of the judgement: the *stubborn* person wills what he wills; the *headstrong* person thinks what he thinks. *Stubbornness* is mostly inherent in the nature; a *headstrong* temper is commonly associated with violence and impetuosity of character. *Obstinacy* discovers itself in persons of all ages and stations; a *stubborn* and *headstrong* disposition betray themselves mostly in those who are bound to conform to the will of another.

The *obstinate* keep the opinions which they have once embraced in spite of all proof; but they are not hasty in forming their opinions, nor adopt them without a choice: the *headstrong* seize the first opinions that offer, and act upon them in spite of all remonstrance: the *stubborn* follow the ruling will or bent of the mind, without regard to any opinions; they are not to be turned by force or persuasion. If an *obstinate* child be treated with some degree of indulgence, there may be hopes of correcting his failing; but a *stubborn* and a *headstrong* child are troublesome subjects of education, who will baffle the utmost skill and patience: the former is insensible to all reason; the latter has blinded the little reason which he possesses: the former is unconscious of every thing, but the simple will and determination to do what he will: the latter is so preoccupied with his own favourite ideas as to set

absence; it is an *affront* to push past him with violence and rudeness.

Offences are either against God or man; the *trespass* is always an *offence* against man; the *transgression* is against the will of God or the laws of men; the *misdeemeanour* is more particularly against the established order of society; the *misdeed* is an *offence* against the Divine Law; the *affront* is an *offence* against good manners.

Slight provocations and frivolous *offences* are the most frequent causes of disquiet. BLAIR.

Forgive the barbarous *trespass* of my tongue. OTWAY.

To whom with stern regard thus Gabriel spake:
Why hast thou, Satan, broke the bounds pre-
scrib'd

To thy *transgressions*? MILTON.

Smaller faults in violation of a public law are comprized under the name of *misdeemeanour*.

BLACKSTONE.

Fierce famine is your lot, for this *misdeed*,
Reduc'd to grind the plates on which you feed. DRYDEN.

God may some time or other think it the concern of his justice and providence too to revenge the *affronts* put upon the laws of man. SOUTH.

TO OFFEND, *v. To displease.*

OFFENDER, DELINQUENT.

THE OFFENDER (*v. To displease*) is he who *offends* in any thing, either by commission or omission; the DELINQUENT, from *delinquo* to fail, signifies properly he who fails by omission, but it is extended to fail by the violation of a law. Those who go into a wrong place are *offenders*; those who stay away when they ought to go are *delinquents*: there are many *offenders* against the sabbath who commit violent and open breaches of decorum; there are still more *delinquents* who never attend a public place of worship.

When any *offender* is presented into any of the ecclesiastical courts he is cited to appear there. BURNARD.

The killing of a deer or boar, or even a hare, was punished with the loss of the *delinquent's* eyes. HUMER.

OFFENDING, OFFENSIVE.

OFFENDING signifies either actually *offending* or calculated to *offend* (*v. To displease*); OFFENSIVE signifies calculated to *offend* at all times; a person may be *offending* in

his manners to a particular individual, or use an *offending* expression on a particular occasion without any imputation on his character; but if his manners are *offensive*, it reflects both on his temper and education.

And tho' th' *offending* part felt mortal pain,
Th' immortal part its knowledge did retain.

DEMMAN.

Gentleness corrects whatever is *offensive* in our manners. BLAIR.

OFFENSIVE, *v. Obnoxious.*

OFFENSIVE, *v. Offending.*

TO OFFER, *v. To give.*

TO OFFER, BID, TENDER,
PROPOSE.

OFFER, *v. To give.*

BID, *v. To ask.*

TENDER, like the word *tend*, from *tendo* to stretch, signifies to stretch forth by way of *offering*.

PROPOSE, in Latin *proposui*, perfect of *propono* to place or set before, likewise characterizes a mode of *offering*.

Offer is employed for that which is literally transferrable, or for that which is indirectly communicable: *bid* and *tender* belong to *offer* in the first sense; *propose* belongs to *offer* in the latter sense. To *offer* is a voluntary and discretionary act; the *offer* may be accepted or rejected at pleasure; to *bid* and *tender* are specific modes of *offering* which depend on circumstances: one *bids* with the hope of its being accepted; one *tenders* from a prudential motive, and in order to serve specific purposes. We *offer* money to a poor person, it is an act of charity or good nature; we *bid* a price for the purchase of a house, it is a commercial dealing subject to the rules of commerce; we *tender* a sum of money by way of payment, it is a matter of prudence in order to fulfil an obligation. By the same rule one *offers* a person the use of one's horse; one *bids* a sum at an auction; one *tenders* one's services to the government.

To *offer* and *propose* are both employed in matters of practice or speculation; but the former is a less definite and decisive act than the latter; we *offer* an opinion by way of

discharging or completing an *office* or business, from *fungor*, viz. *finem* and *ago*, to put an end to or bring to a conclusion; it is extended in its acceptation to the *office* itself or the thing done. The *office* therefore in its strict sense is performed only by conscious or intelligent agents, who act according to their instructions; the *function*, on the other hand, is an operation of unconscious objects according to the laws of nature. The *office* of an herald is to proclaim public events or to communicate circumstances from one public body to another: the *function* of the tongue is to speak; that of the ear, to hear; that of the eye, to see. The word *office* is sometimes employed in the same application by the personification of nature, which assigns an *office* to the ear, to the tongue, to the eye, and the like. When the frame becomes overpowered by a sudden shock, the tongue will frequently refuse to perform its *office*; when the animal *functions* are impeded for a length of time, the vital power ceases to exist.

'Tis all men's *office* to speak patience
To those that wring under the load of sorrow.

SHAKESPEARE.

When rogues like these (a sparrow cries)
To honors and employments rise,
I court no favor, ask no place.

GAY.

Denham was made governor of Farnham
Castle for the king, but he soon resigned that
charge and retreated to Oxford.

JOHNSON.

Nature within me seems,
In all her *functions*, weary of herself.

MILTON.

The two *offices* of memory are collection and
distribution.

JOHNSON.

OFFICIOUS, *v.* Active.

OFFSPRING, PROGENY, ISSUE.

OFFSPRING is that which springs off or from; PROGENY that which is brought forth or out of; ISSUE that which issues or proceeds from; and all in relation to the family or generation of the human species. The *offspring* is a familiar term applicable to one or many children; *progeny* is employed only as a collective noun for a number; *issue* is used in an indefinite manner without particular regard to number. When we speak of the children themselves, we denominate them the *offspring*; when we

speak of the parents, we denominate the children their *progeny*. A child is said to be the only *offspring* of his parents, or he is said to be the *offspring* of low parents; a man is said to have a numerous or a healthy *progeny*, or to leave his *progeny* in circumstances of honor and prosperity. The *issue* is said only in regard to a man that is deceased: he dies with male or female *issue*; with or without *issue*; his property descends to his male *issue* in a direct line.

The same cause that has drawn the hatred of
God and man upon the father of Lyars may
justly entail it upon his *offspring* too.

SOURN.

The base degenerate from *offspring* ends,
A golden *progeny* from Heav'n descends.

DRYDEN.

Next him King Leyr, in happy place long
reigned,

But had no *issue* male him to succeed.

SPENCER.

OFTEN, FREQUENTLY.

OFTEN, or its contracted form *oft*, comes in all probability through the medium of the northern languages, from the Greek $\alpha\psi$ again, and signifies properly repetition of action.

FREQUENTLY, from *frequent* crowded or numerous, respects a plurality or number of objects.

An ignorant man *often* uses a word without knowing what it means; ignorant people *frequently* mistake the meaning of the words they hear. A person goes out very *often* in the course of a week; he has *frequently* six or seven persons to visit him in the course of that time. * By doing a thing *often* it becomes habitual; we *frequently* meet the same persons in the route which we *often* take.

Often from the careless back
Of herds and flocks a thousand tagging bills
Pluck hair and wool.

THOMSON.

Here *frequent* at the visionary hour,
When musing midnight reigns or silent noon,
Angelic harps are in full concert heard.

THOMSON.

OLD, *v.* Elderly.

OLD, ANCIENT, ANTIQUE,
ANTIQUATED, OLD-FASHIONED,
OBSOLETE.

OLD, in German *alt*, low German *old*, &c. comes from the Greek $\alpha\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ of yesterday.

* Vide Trusler: "Often, frequently."

ing to myself the protection of that Being who disposes of events. ANDERSON.

TO OMIT, *v.* *To neglect.*

ON ONE'S GUARD, *v.* *Aware.*

ONE, SINGLE, ONLY.

UNITY is the common idea of all these terms; and at the same time the whole signification of ONE, which is opposed to none; SINGLE, in Latin *singulus* each or one by itself, probably contracted from *sine angulo* without an angle, because what is entirely by itself cannot form an angle, signifies that *one* which is abstracted from others, and is particularly opposed to two, or a double which may form a pair; ONLY, contracted from *only*, signifying in the form of unity, is employed for that of which there is no more. A person has *one* child, is a positive expression that bespeaks its own meaning: a person has a *single* child, conveys the idea that there ought or might be more, that more was expected, or that once there were more: a person has an *only* child implies that he never had more.

For shame, Rutillians, can you bear the sight,
Of *one* expos'd for all, in *single* fight. DAYDEN.

Homely but wholesome roots
My daily food, and water from the
Nearest spring my *only* drink. FILMER.

ONLY, *v.* *One.*

ONLY, *v.* *Solitary.*

ONSET, *v.* *Attack.*

ONWARD, FORWARD, PROGRESSIVE.

ONWARD is taken in the literal sense of going nearer to an object: FORWARD is taken in the sense of going from an object, or going farther in the line before one: PROGRESSIVE has the sense of going gradually or step by step before one.

A person goes *onward* who does not stand still; he goes *forward* who does not recede; he goes *progressively* who goes *forward* at certain intervals.

Onward is taken only in the proper acceptation of travelling; the traveller who has lost his way feels it necessary to go *onward* with the hope of arriving at some point; *forward* is employed in the improper as well as the proper application; a traveller goes

forward in order to reach his point of destination as quickly as possible; a learner uses his utmost endeavours in order to get *forward* in his learning: *progressively* is employed only in the improper application to what requires time and labor in order to bring it to a conclusion; every man goes on *progressively* in his art, until he arrives at the point of perfection attainable by himself.

Remote, unfriended, melancholy, slow,
Or by the lazy Scheld, or wandering Po,
Or *onward* where the rude Corinthian boor,
Against the houseless stranger shuts the door,
Where'er I roam, whatever realms to see,
My heart untravell'd fondly turns to thee.

GOLDSMITH.

Harbood the chairman was much blamed for his rashness; he said the duty of the chair was always to set things *forward*. BURNET.

Reason *progressive*, instinct is complete.

YOUNG.

OPAKE, DARK.

OPAKE, in Latin *opacus*, comes from *ops* the earth, because the earth is the *darkest* of all bodies; the word *opaque* is to DARK as the species to the genus, for it expresses that species of *darkness* which is inherent in solid bodies, in distinction from those which emit light from themselves, or admit of light into themselves; it is therefore employed scientifically for the more vulgar and familiar term *dark*. On this ground, the earth is termed an *opaque* body in distinction from the sun, moon, or other luminous bodies: any solid substances, as a tree or a stone is an *opaque* body in distinction from glass which is a clear or transparent body.

But all sunshine, as when his beams at noon,
Culminate from th' equator as they now
Shot upward still, whence no way round
Shadow from body *opaque* can fall. MILTON.

OPEN, *v.* *Candid.*

OPEN, *v.* *Frank.*

OPENING, APERTURE, CAVITY.

OPENING signifies in general any place left *open* without defining any circumstances; the APERTURE is generally a specific kind of *opening* which is considered scientifically: there are *openings* in the wood when the trees are partly cut away; *openings* in streets by the removal of houses; or *openings* in a fence that

has been broken down; but anatomists speak of *apertures* in the skull or in the heart, and the naturalist describes the *apertures* in the nests of bees, ants, beavers, and the like; the *opening* or *aperture* is the commencement of an inclosure; the *CAVITY* is the whole inclosure: hence they are frequently as a part to the whole; many animals make a *cavity* in the earth for their nest with only a small *aperture* for their egress and ingress.

The scented dew
Betrays her early labyrinth, and deep
In scattered sullen openings, far behind,
With every breeze she hears the coming storm.

THOMSON.

In less than a minute he had thrust his little
person through the *aperture*, and again and again
perches upon his neighbour's cage. COWPER.

In the centre of every floor, from top to bottom
is the chief room, of no great extent, round
which there are narrow *cavities* or recesses.

JOHNSON.

OPERATION, *v.* Action.

OPERATION, *v.* Work.

OPINIATED OR OPINIATIVE,
CONCEITED, EGOISTICAL.

A FONDNESS for one's opinion bespeaks the *OPINIATED* man; a fond conceit of one's self bespeaks the *CONCEITED* man: a fond attachment to one's self bespeaks the *EGOISTICAL* man: a liking for one's self or one's own is evidently the common idea that runs through these terms; they differ in the mode and in the object.

An *opiniated* man is not only fond of his own *opinion*, but full of his own *opinion*: he has an *opinion* on every thing, which is the best possible *opinion*, and is delivered therefore freely to every one, that they may profit in forming their own *opinions*. A *conceited* man has a *conceit* or an idle fond *opinion* of his talent; it is not only high in competition with others, but it is so high as to be set above others. The *conceited* man does not want to follow the ordinary means of acquiring knowledge: his *conceit* suggests to him that his talent will supply labor, application, reading and study, and every other contrivance which men have commonly employed for their improvement; he sees by intu-

ition what another learns by experience and observation; he knows in a day what others want years to acquire; he learns of himself what others are contented to get by means of instruction. The *egoistical* man makes himself the darling theme of his own contemplation; he admires and loves himself to that degree that he can talk and think of nothing else; his children, his house, his garden, his rooms, and the like, are the incessant theme of his conversation, and become invaluable from the mere circumstance of belonging to him.

An *opiniated* man is the most unfit for conversation, which only affords pleasure by an alternate and equable communication of sentiment. A *conceited* man is the most unfit for co-operation, where a junction of talent and effort is essential to bring things to a conclusion; an *egoistical* man is the most unfit to be a companion or friend, for he does not know how to value or like any thing out of himself.

Down was he cast from all his greatness, as it
is pity but all such polittick *opiniators* should.

SCOTT.

No great measure at a very difficult crisis can
be pursued which is not attended with some mis-
chief; none but *conceited* pretenders in public
business hold any other language. BURKE.

To show their particular aversion to speaking
in the first person, the gentlemen of Port Royal
branded this form of writing with the name of
egotism. ADDISON.

OPINIATIVE, *v.* *Opiniated*.

OPINION, SENTIMENT, NOTION.

OPINION, in Latin *opinio* from *opinor*, and the Greek *συνεσις*, to think or judge, is the work of the head.

SENTIMENT, from *sentio* to feel, is the work of the heart.

NOTION, in Latin *notio*, from *nosco* to know, is a simple operation of the thinking faculty.

We form *opinions*: we have *sentiments*: we get *notions*. *Opinions* are formed on speculative matter; they are the result of reading, experience, and reflection: *sentiments* are entertained on matters of practice; they are the consequence of habits and circumstances: *notions* are gathered upon sensible objects, and arise out of the casualties of hearing and seeing. We have *opinions* on

religion as respects its doctrines; we have *sentiments* on religion as respects its practice and its precepts. The unity of the Godhead in the general sense, and the doctrine of the Trinity in the particular sense, are *opinions*; honor and gratitude towards the Deity, the sense of our dependance upon him, and obligations to him, are *sentiments*.

Opinions are more liable to error than *sentiments*: the former depend upon knowledge, and must therefore be inaccurate; the latter depend rather upon instinct, and a well organized frame of mind. *Notions* are still more liable to error than either; they are the immatured decisions of the uninformed mind on the appearances of things. The difference of *opinion* among men, on the most important questions of human life, is a sufficient evidence that the mind of man is very easily led astray in matters of opinion: whatever difference of *opinion* there may be among Christians, there is but one *sentiment* of love and good will among those who follow the example of Christ, rather than their own passions: the *notions* of a Deity are so imperfect among savages in general, that they seem to amount to little more than an indistinct idea of some superior invisible agent.

No, cousin, (said Henry IV. when charged by the Duke of Bouillon with having changed his religion) I have changed no religion, but an *opinion*.
HOWEL.

There are never great numbers in any nation who can raise a pleasing discourse from their own stock of *sentiments* and images.
JOHNSON.

This letter comes to your lordship, accompanied with a small writing, entitled a *notion*; for such alone can that piece be called which aspires no higher than to the forming a project.
SHAFTESBURY.

OPPONENT, *v. Enemy.*

OPPORTUNITY, *v. Occasion.*

TO OPPOSE, *v. To combat.*

TO OPPOSE, *v. To contradict.*

TO OPPOSE, *v. To object.*

TO OPPOSE, RESIST,
WITHSTAND, THWART.

OPPOSE, *v. To contradict.*

RESIST signifies literally to stand back, away from, or against.

With in WITHSTAND has the force of *re* in *resist*.

THWART, from the German *quer* cross, signifies to come across.

The action of setting one thing up against another is obviously expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the manner and the circumstances. To *oppose* is the most general and unqualified term; it simply denotes the relative position of two objects, and when applied to persons it does not necessarily imply any personal characteristic: we may *oppose* reason or force to force; or things may be *opposed* to each other which are in an *opposite* direction, as a house to a church. *Resist* is always an act of more or less force when applied to persons; it is mostly a culpable action, as when men *resist* lawful authority; *resistance* is in fact always bad, unless in case of actual self-defence. *Opposition* may be made in any form, as when we *oppose* a person's admittance into a house by our personal efforts; or we *oppose* his admission into a society by a declaration of our opinions. *Resistance* is always a direct action, as when we *resist* an invading army by the sword, or we *resist* the evidence of our senses by denying our assent; or, in relation to things, when wood or any hard substance *resists* the violent efforts of steel or iron to make an impression.

Withstand and *thwart* are modes of *resistance* applicable only to conscious agents. To *withstand* is negative; it implies not to yield to any foreign agency: thus, a person *withstands* the entreaties of another to comply with a request. To *thwart* is positive; it is actively to cross the will of another: thus, humoursome people are perpetually *thwarting* the wishes of those with whom they are in connection. Habitual *opposition*, whether in act or in spirit, is equally senseless; none but conceited or turbulent people are guilty of it. *Oppositionists* to government are dangerous members of society, and are ever preaching up *resistance* to constituted authorities. It is a happy thing when a young man can *withstand* the allure-

ments of pleasure. It is a part of a Christian's duty to bear with patience the untoward events of life that thwart his purposes.

So hot th' assault, so high the tumult rose,
While ours defend, and while the Greeks oppose.
DRYDEN.

Particular instances of second sight have been given with such evidence, as neither Bacon nor Boyle have been able to resist.
JOHNSON.

For twice five days the good old seer withstood
Th' intended treason, and was dumb to blood.
DRYDEN.

The understanding and will never disagreed
(before the fall); for the proposals of the one
never thwarted the inclinations of the other.
SOUTH.

OPPOSITE, *v. Adverse.*

OPPROBRIUM, *v. Infamy.*

TO OPPUGN, *v. To confute.*

OPTION, CHOICE.

OPTION is immediately of Latin derivation, and is consequently a term of less frequent use than the word CHOICE, which has been shown (*v. To choose*) to be of Celtic origin. The former term, from the Greek *otrouai* to see or consider, implies an uncontrolled act of the mind; the latter a simple leaning of the will. We speak of the *option* only as regards one's freedom from external constraint in the act of *choosing*: one speaks of the *choice* only as the simple act itself. The *option* or the power of *choosing* is given; the *choice* itself is made: hence we say a thing is at a person's *option*, or it is his own *option*, or the *option* is left to him, in order to designate his freedom of *choice* more strongly than is expressed by the word *choice* itself.

Whilst they talk we must make our *choice*,
they or the jacobins. We have no other *option*.
BURKE.

OPULENCE, *v. Riches.*

ORAL, *v. Verbal.*

ORATION, *v. Address.*

ORATORY, *v. Elocution.*

ORB, *v. Circle.*

TO ORDAIN, *v. To appoint.*

TO ORDER, *v. To appoint.*

ORDER, *v. Class.*

ORDER.

ORDER, *v. Command.*

ORDER, *v. Direction.*

ORDER, METHOD, RULE.

ORDER, *v. To dispose.*

METHOD, in French *methode*, Latin *methodus*, Greek *μῆθοδος*; from *μετα* and *οδος*; signifies the ready or right way to do a thing.

RULE comes from the Latin *regula* a rule, and *rego* to govern, direct, or make straight, the former expressing the act of making it straight or the thing by which it is made; the latter the abstract quality of being so made.

Order is applied in general to every thing that is disposed; *method* and *rule* are applied only to that which is done; the *order* lies in consulting the time, the place, and the object, so as to make them accord; the *method* consists in the right choice of means to an end; the *rule* consists in that which will keep us in the right way. Where there is a number of objects there must be *order* in the disposition of them: there must be *order* in a school as to the arrangement of the children and the arrangement of the business: where there is work to carry on, or any object to obtain, or any art to follow, there must be *method* in the pursuit; a tradesman or merchant must have *method* in keeping his accounts; a teacher must have a *method* for the communication of instruction: the *rule* is the part of the *method*; it is that on which the *method* rests; there cannot be *method* without *rule*, but there may be *rule* without *method*; the *method* varies with the thing that is to be done; the *rule* is that which is permanent and serves as a guide under all circumstances. We adopt the *method* and follow the *rule*. A painter adopts a certain *method* of preparing his colors according to the *rules* laid down by his art.

Order is said of every complicated machine, either of a physical or a moral kind: the *order* of the universe, by which every part is made to harmonize to the other part, and all individually to the whole collectively, is that which constitutes its principal beauty: as rational beings we aim at introducing the same *order* into the

moral scheme of society: *order* is therefore that which is founded upon the nature of things, and seems in its extensive sense to comprehend all the rest. *Method* is the work of the understanding, mostly as it is employed in the mechanical process; sometimes however, as respects intellectual objects. *Rule* is said either as it respects mechanical and physical actions or moral conduct.

The *order* of society is preserved by means of government, or authority: laws or *rules* are employed by authority as instruments in the preservation of order: no work should be performed, whether it be the building a house, or the writing a book, without *method*; this *method* will be more or less correct, as it is formed according to definite *rules*.

The term *rule* is, however, as before observed, employed distinctly from either *order* or *method*, for it applies to the moral conduct of the individual. The Christian religion contains *rules* for the guidance of our conduct in all the relations of human society.

As epithets, *orderly*, *methodical*, and *regular*, are applied to persons and even to things according to the above distinction of the nouns: an *orderly* man, or an *orderly* society, is one that adheres to the established *order* of things: the former in his domestic habits, the latter in their public capacity, their social meetings, and their social measures. A *methodical* man is one who adopts *method* in all he sets about; such a one may sometimes run into the extreme of formality, by being precise where precision is not necessary: we cannot speak of a *methodical* society, for *method* is, altogether a personal quality. A man is *regular*, in as much as he follows a certain *rule* in his moral actions, and thereby preserves a uniformity of conduct: a *regular* society is one founded by a certain prescribed *rule*.

A *disorderly* person in a family decomposes its domestic economy: a man who is *disorderly* in his business throws every thing into confusion. It is of peculiar importance for a person to be *methodical* who has the superintendence of other people's labor: much time is lost and much fruitless trouble occasioned by the want of *method*:

regularity of life is of as much more importance than *order* and *method*, as a man's durable happiness is to the happiness of the moment: the *orderly* and *methodical* respect only the transitory modes of things; but the *regular* concerns a man both for body and soul.

These terms are in like manner applied to that which is personal; we say, an *orderly* proceeding, or an *orderly* course for what is done in due order: a *regular* proceeding, or a *regular* course, which goes on according to a prescribed rule; a *methodical* grammar, a *methodical* delineation, and the like, for what is done according to a given *method*.

The *order* and *method* of nature is generally very different from our measures and proportions.

BURKE.

Their story I revolv'd; and reverent own'd
Their polish'd arts of rule, their human virtues.

MALLET.

TO ORDER, *v.* To place.

ORDER, *v.* Succession.

ORDINARY, *v.* Common.

ORIFICE, PERFORATION.

ORIFICE, in Latin *orificium* or *orificium*, from *os* and *factum*, signifies a made mouth, that is an opening made, as it were.

PERFORATION, in Latin *perforatio*, from *perforo*, signifies a piercing through.

These terms are both scientifically employed by medical men, to designate certain cavities in the human body; but the former respects that which is natural, the latter that which is artificial: all the vessels of the human body have their *orifices* which are so constructed as to open or close of themselves. Surgeons are frequently obliged to make *perforations* into the bones: sometimes *perforation* may describe what comes from a natural process, but it denotes a cavity made through a solid substance; but the *orifice* is particularly applicable to such openings as most resemble the mouth in form and use. In this manner the words may be extended in their application to other bodies besides animal substances, and in other sciences besides anatomy: hence we speak of the *orifice* of a

heavy body *outweighs* one that is light, when they are put into the same scale. *Overbalance* and *outweigh* are likewise used in the improper application; *preponderate* is never used otherwise: things are said to *overbalance* which are supposed to turn the scale to one side or the other; they are said to *outweigh* when they are to be weighed against each other; they are said to *preponderate* when one weighs every thing else down: the evils which arise from innovations in society commonly *overbalance* the good; the will of a parent should *outweigh* every personal consideration in the mind; which will always be the case where the power of religion *preponderates*.

Whatever any man may have written or done, his precepts or his valour will scarcely *overbalance* the unimportant uniformity which runs through his time. JOHNSON.

If endless ages can *outweigh* an hour,
Let not the laurel but the palm inspire. YOUNG.

Looks which do not correspond with the heart cannot be assumed without labor, nor continued without pain; the motive to relinquish them must, therefore, soon *preponderate*.

HAWKESWORTH.

TO OVERBEAR, BEAR DOWN,
OVERPOWER, OVERWHELM,
SUBDUE.

To OVERBEAR is to *bear* one's self *over* another, that is, to make another *bear* one's weight; to BEAR DOWN is literally to bring down by *bearing* upon; to OVERPOWER is to get the *power* over an object; to OVERWHELM, from *whelm* or *wheel*, signifies to turn quite round as well as over; to SUBDUE (*v. To conquer*) is literally to bring or put underneath. A man *overbears* by carrying himself higher than others, and putting to silence those who might claim an equality with him; an *overbearing* demeanor is most conspicuous in narrow circles where an individual, from certain casual advantages, affects a superiority over the members of the same community. To *bear down* is an act of greater violence: one *bears down* opposition; it is properly the opposing force to force, until one side yields: there may be occasions in which *bearing down* is fully justifiable and laudable. Mr. Pitt was often compelled to *bear*

down a factious party which threatened to overturn the government. *Overpower*, as the term implies, belongs to the exercise of power which may be either physical or moral: one may be *overpowered* by another, who in a struggle gets one into his power; or one may be *overpowered* in an argument, when the argument of one's antagonist is such as to bring one to silence. One is *overborne* or *borne down* by the exertion of individuals; one is *overpowered* by the active efforts of individuals, or by the force of circumstances; one is *overwhelmed* by circumstances or things only: one is *overborne* by another of superior influence; one is *borne down* by the force of his attack; one is *overpowered* by numbers, by entreaties, by looks, and the like; one is *overwhelmed* by the torrent of words, or the impetuosity of the attack.

Overpower and *overwhelm* denote a partial superiority; *subdue* denotes that which is permanent and positive: we may *overpower* or *overwhelm* for a time, or to a certain degree; but to *subdue* is to get an entire and lasting superiority. *Overpower* and *overwhelm* are said of what passes between persons nearly on a level; but *subdue* is said of those who are, or may be, reduced to a low state of inferiority: individuals or armies are *overpowered* or *overwhelmed*; individuals or nations are *subdued*: we may be *overpowered* in one engagement, and *overpower* our opponent in another; we may be *overwhelmed* by the suddenness and impetuosity of the attack, yet we may recover ourselves so as to renew the attack; but when we are *subdued* all power of resistance is gone.

To *overpower*, *overwhelm*, and *subdue*, are likewise applied to the moral feelings, as well as to the external relations of things: but the two former are the effects of external circumstances; the latter follows from the exercise of the reasoning powers: the tender feelings are *overpowered*; the mind is *overwhelmed* with painful feelings; the unruly passions are *subdued* by the force of religious contemplation: a person may be so *overpowered*, on seeing a dying friend, as to be unable to speak; a person may

The storm of hail and fire, with the darkness that *overspread* the land for three days, are described with great strength. ADDISON.

Most despotic governments are naturally *over-run* with ignorance and barbarity. ADDISON.

While Herod was absent, the thieves of Trachonites *raged* with their depredations all the parts of Judea and Cælo Syria that lay within their reach. PRIDEAUX.

OVERSIGHT, *v. Inadvertency.*

OVERSIGHT, *v. Inspection.*

TO OVERTHROW, *v. To beat.*

TO OVERTHROW, *v. To overturn.*

TO OVERTURN, OVERTHROW,
SUBVERT, INVERT, REVERSE.

To OVERTURN is simply to turn over, which may be more or less gradual: but to OVERTHROW is to throw over, which will be more or less violent. To *overturn* is to turn a thing either with its side or its bottom upward; but to SUBVERT is to turn that under which should be upward: to REVERSE is to turn that before which should be behind; and to INVERT is to place that on its head which should rest on its feet. These terms differ accordingly in their application and circumstances: things are *overturned* by contrivance and gradual means; infidels attempt to *overturn* Christianity by the arts of ridicule and falsehood: the French revolutionists *overthrew* their lawful government by every act of violence. To *overturn* is said of small matters; to *subvert* only of national or large concerns: the domestic economy may be *overturned*; religious or political establishments may be *subverted*: that may be *overturned* which is simply set up; that is *subverted* which has been established: an assertion may be *overturned*; the best sanctioned principles may by artifice be *subverted*.

To *overturn*, *overthrow*, and *subvert*, generally involve the destruction of the thing so *overturned*, *overthrown*, or *subverted*, or at least renders it for the time useless, and are, therefore, mostly unallowed acts; but *reverse* and *invert*, which have a more particular application, have a less specific character of propriety: we may *reverse* a proposition by taking the negative instead of the affirmative;

a decree may be *reversed* so as to render it nugatory; but both of these acts may be right or wrong, according to circumstances: likewise, the order of particular things may be *inverted* to suit the convenience of parties; but the order of society cannot be *inverted* without *subverting* all the principles on which civil society is built.

An age is rip'ning in revolving fate,
When Troy shall *overturn* the Grecian state.

DRYDEN.

Thus prudes, by characters *overthrown*,
Imagine that they take their own.

GAY.

Others, from public spirit, laboured to prevent a civil war, which, whatever party should prevail, must shake, and perhaps *subvert*, the Spanish power.

ROBERTSON.

Our ancestors affected a certain pomp of style, and this affectation, I suspect, was the true cause of their so frequently *inverting* the natural order of their words, especially in poetry.

TYRWHITT.

He who walks not uprightly has neither from the presumption of God's mercy *reversing* the decree of his justice, nor from his own purposes of a future repentance, any sure ground to set his foot upon.

SOUTH.

TO OVERWHELM, *v. To overbear.*

TO OVERWHELM, CRUSH.

To OVERWHELM (*v. To overbear*) is to cover with a heavy body, so that one should sink under it; to CRUSH is to destroy the consistency of a thing by violent pressure: a thing may be *crushed* by being *overwhelmed*, but it may be *overwhelmed* without being *crushed*; and it may be *crushed* without being *overwhelmed*: the girl Tarpeia, who betrayed the Capitoline hill to the Sabines, is said to have been *overwhelmed* with their arms, by which she was *crushed* to death: when many persons fall on one, he may be *overwhelmed*, but not necessarily *crushed*: when a waggon goes over a body, it may be *crushed*, but not *overwhelmed*.

Let not the political metaphysics of Jacobins break prison, to burst like a Levanter, to sweep the earth with their hurricane, and to break up the fountains of the great deep to *overwhelm* us.

BURKE.

Melt his cold heart, and wake dead nature in him,

Crush him in thy arms.

OWEN.

OUTCRY, *v. Noise.*

TO OUT-DO, *v. To exceed.*

a thousand *paces* was the Roman measurement for a mile ; a *step* or two designates almost the shortest possible distance.

To-morrow, to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in a stealing *pace* from day to day.

SHAKESPEARE.

Grace was in all her *steps*, heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love. MILTON.

TO PACIFY, *v.* To appease.

PAGAN, *v.* Gentile.

PAIN, PANG, AGONY, ANGUISH.

PAIN is to be traced, through the French and northern languages, to the Latin and Greek *πῶν* punishment, *πῶν* labor, and *πῶν* to be poor or in trouble. PANG is but a variation of *pain*, contracted from the Teutonic *peinigen* to torment.

AGONY comes from the Greek *ἀγών* to struggle or contend, signifying the labor or *pain* of a struggle.

ANGUISH comes from the Latin *ango*, contracted from *ante* and *ago*, to act against, or in direct opposition to, and signifies the *pain* arising from severe pressure.

Pain, which expresses the feeling that is most repugnant to the nature of all sensible beings, is here the generic, and the rest specific terms : *pain* and *agony* are applied indiscriminately to what is physical and mental ; *pang* and *anguish* mostly respect that which is mental : *pain* signifies either an individual feeling or a permanent state ; *pang* is only a particular feeling ; *agony* is sometimes employed for the individual feeling, but more commonly for the state ; *anguish* is always employed for the state. *Pain* is indefinite with regard to the degree ; it may rise to the highest, or sink to the lowest possible degree ; the rest are positively high degrees of *pain* : the *pang* is a sharp *pain* ; the *agony* is a severe and permanent *pain* ; the *anguish* is an overwhelming *pain*.

The causes of *pain* are as various as the modes of *pain*, or as the circumstances of sensible beings ; it attends disease and want in an infinite variety of forms : the *pangs* of conscience frequently trouble the man who is not yet hardened in guilt : *agony* and *anguish* are produced by violent causes, and disease in its most

terrible shape ; wounds and torments naturally produce corporeal *agony* ; a guilty conscience that is awakened to a sense of guilt will suffer mental *agony* : *anguish* arises altogether from moral causes ; the miseries and distresses of others, particularly of those who are nearly related, are most calculated to excite *anguish* ; a mother suffers *anguish* when she sees her child laboring under severe *pain*, or in danger of losing its life, without having the power to relieve it.

We should pass on from crime to crime heedless and remorseless, if misery did not stand in our way, and our own *pains* admonish us of our folly. JOHNSON.

What *pangs* the tender breast of Dido tore !

DRYDEN.

Thou shalt behold him stretch'd in all the *agonies*

Of a tormenting and a shameful death. OTWAY.

Are these the parting *pangs* which nature feels,
When *anguish* rends the heartstrings ? ROWE.

TO PAINT, DEPICT.

PAINT and DEPICT both come from the Latin *pingo* to represent forms and figures : as a verb, to *paint* is employed either literally to represent figures on paper, or to represent circumstances and events by means of words ; to *depict* is used only in this latter sense, but the former word expresses a greater exercise of the imagination than the latter : it is the art of the poet to *paint* nature in lively ; it is the art of the historian or narrator to *depict* a real scene of misery in strong colours. As nouns, *painting* rather describes the action or operation, and *picture* the result.

When we speak of a good *painting*, we think particularly of its execution as to drapery, disposition of colors, and the like ; but when we speak of a fine *picture*, we refer immediately to the object represented, and the impression which it is capable of producing on the beholder : *paintings* are confined either to oil-*paintings* or *paintings* in colors ; but every drawing, whether in pencil, in crayons, or in India ink, may produce a *picture* ; and we have likewise *pictures* in embroidery, *pictures* in tapestry, and *pictures* in Mosaic.

The *painting* is almost the natural man,
He is but outside. SHAKESPEARE.

A *picture* is a poem without words. ADDISON.

FLUTTER is a frequentative of *fly*, signifying to fly backward and forward in an agitated manner.

PANT, probably derived from *pent*, and the Latin *pendo* to hang in a state of suspense, so as not to be able to move backward or forward, as is the case with the breath when one *pants*.

GASP is a variation of *gape*, which is the ordinary accompaniment in the action of *gasping*.

These terms agree in a particular manner, as they respect the irregular action of the heart or lungs: the two former are said of the heart; and the two latter of the lungs or breath: to *palpitate* expresses that which is strong; it is a strong beating of the blood against the vessels of the heart: to *flutter* expresses that which is rapid; it is a violent and alternate motion of the blood backward and forward; fear and suspense produce commonly *palpitation*, but joy and hope produce a *fluttering*: *panting* is, with regard to the breath, what *palpitating* is with regard to the heart; *panting* is occasioned by the inflated state of the respiratory organs which renders this *palpitating* necessary: *gasping* differs from the former, in as much as it denotes a direct stoppage of the breath; a cessation of action in the respiratory organs.

No plays have oftener filled the eyes with tears, and the breast with *palpitation*, than those which are variegated with interludes of mirth.

JOHNSON.

She springs aloft, with elevated pride,
Above the tangling mass of low desires,
That bind the *fluttering* crowd. THOMSON.

All nature fades extinct, and she alone,
Heard, felt, and seen, possesses every thought,
Fills every sense, and *pants* in every vein.

THOMSON.

Had not the soul this outlet to the skies,
In this vast vessel of the universe,
How should we *gasp*, as in an empty void! YOUNG.

PANEGYRIC, *v. Encomium*.

PANG, *v. Pain*.

TO PANT, *v. To palpitate*.

PARABLE, ALLEGORY.

PARABLE, in French *parabole*, Greek παραβολη from παραβαλλω, signifies what is thrown out or set before one, in lieu of something which it resembles.

ALLEGORY, *v. Figure*.

* Both these terms imply a veiled mode of speech, which serves more or less to conceal the main object of the discourse by presenting it under the appearance of something else, which accords with it in most of the particulars: the *parable* is mostly employed for moral purposes; the *allegory* in describing historical events.

The *parable* substitutes some other subject or agent, who is represented under a character that is suitable to the one referred to. In the *allegory* are introduced strange and arbitrary persons in the place of the real personages, or imaginary characteristics, and circumstances are ascribed to real persons.

The *parable* is principally employed in the sacred writings; the *allegory* forms a grand feature in the productions of the eastern nations.

PARADE, *v. Show*.

PARASITE, *v. Flatterer*.

PARDON, *v. Excuse*.

TO PARDON, *v. To forgive*.

PARDONABLE, *v. Venial*.

TO PARE, *v. To peel*.

PARENTS, *v. Forefathers*.

PARK, *v. Forest*.

PARLIAMENT, *v. Assembly*.

PARSIMONIOUS, *v. Avaricious*.

PARSIMONY, *v. Economy*.

PARSON, *v. Clergyman*.

PART, DIVISION, PORTION, SHARE.

PART, in Latin *pars*, comes from the Hebrew *peresh* to divide.

DIVISION, *v. To divide*.

PORTION, in Latin *portio*, is supposed to be changed from *partio*, which comes from *partior* to distribute, and originally from *peresh*, as the word *part*.

SHARE, in Saxon *scyran* to divide, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *shar* to remain, that is, to remain after a *division*.

Part is a term not only of more general use, but of more comprehen-

the one English, and the other Latin, signify literally to take a *part* in a thing. The former is employed in the proper or improper sense; and the latter in the improper sense only: we may *partake* of a feast, or we may *partake* of pleasure, but we *participate* only in pleasure.

To *partake* is a selfish action; to *participate* is either a selfish or a benevolent action: we *partake* of that which pleases ourselves; we *participate* in that which pleases another: we *partake* of a meal with a friend; we *participate* in the gifts of Providence, or in the enjoyments which another feels.

To *partake* is the act of taking the thing, or getting the thing to one's self; to *SHARE* is the act of having a title to a *share*, or being in the habits of receiving a *share*: we may, therefore, *partake* of a thing without *sharing* it, and *share* it without *partaking*. We *partake* of things mostly through the medium of the senses; whatever, therefore, we take a *part* in, whether gratuitously or casually, that we may be said to *partake* of; in this manner we *partake* of an entertainment without *sharing* it: on the other hand, we *share* things that promise to be of advantage or profit, and what we *share* is what we claim; in this manner we *share* a sum of money which has been left to us in common with others.

All else of nature's common gift *partake*,
Unhappy Dido was alone awake. DRYDEN.

Our God, when heav'n and earth he did create,
Form'd man, who should of both *participate*. DENHAM.

Avoiding love, I had not found despair,
But *shar'd* with savage beasts the common air. DRYDEN.

TO PARTICIPATE, *v.* To *partake*.

PARTICULAR, *v.* *Circumstantial*.

PARTICULAR, *v.* *Exact*.

PARTICULAR, SINGULAR, ODD,
ECCENTRIC, STRANGE.

PARTICULAR, in French *particulier*, Latin *particularis* from *particula* a particle, signifies belonging to a particle or a very small part.

SINGULAR, in French *singulier*, Latin *singularis* from *singulus* every one, which very probably comes from

the Hebrew *sigelet*, *peculium*, or private.

ODD, probably changed from add, signifying something arbitrarily added.

ECCENTRIC, from *ex* and *centre*, signifies out of the centre or direct line.

STRANGE, in French *étrange*, Latin *extra*, and Greek *εξ* out of, signifies out of some other part, or not belonging to this part.

All these terms are employed either as characteristics of persons or things. What is *particular* belongs to some small *particle* or point to which it is confined; what is *singular* is *single*, or the only one of its kind; what is *odd* is without an equal or any thing with which it is fit to pair; what is *eccentric* is not to be brought within any rule or estimate, it deviates to the right and the left; what is *strange* is different from that which one is accustomed to see, it does not admit of comparison or assimilation. A person is *particular* as it respects himself; he is *singular* as it respects others; he is *particular* in his habits or modes of action; he is *singular* in that which is about him; we may be *particular* or *singular* in our dress; in the former case we study the minute points of our dress to please ourselves; in the latter case we adopt a mode of dress that distinguishes us from all others.

One is *odd*, *eccentric*, and *strange*, more as it respects established modes, forms, and rules, than individual circumstances: a person is *odd* when his actions or his words bear no resemblance to that of others; he is *eccentric* if he irregularly departs from the customary modes of proceeding; he is *strange* when that which he does makes him new or unknown to those who are about him. *Particularity* and *singularity* are not always taken in a bad sense; *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness*, are never taken in a good one. A person ought to be *particular* in the choice of his society, his amusements, his books, and the like; he ought to be *singular* in virtue, when vice is unfortunately prevalent: but *particularity* becomes ridiculous when it respects trifles; and *singularity* becomes culpable when it is not warranted by the most imperious necessity. As *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and

object can never be known from other *individual* objects, while it remains only *individual*. *Particular* is a term used in regard to *individuals*, and is opposed to the general: *individual* is a term used in regard to collectives; and is opposed to the whole or that which is divisible into parts.

Those *particular* speeches which are commonly known by the name of rants, are blemishes in our English tragedy. ADDISON.

To give thee being, I lent
Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart,
Substantial life, to have thee by my side,
Henceforth an *individual* solace dear. MILTON.

PARTICULAR, *v. Peculiar.*

PARTICULAR, *v. Special.*

PARTICULARLY, *v. Especially.*

PARTISAN, *v. Follower.*

PARTNER, *v. Colleague.*

PARTNERSHIP, *v. Association.*

PARTY, *v. Faction.*

PASSAGE, *v. Course.*

PASSIONATE, *v. Angry.*

PASSIVE, SUBMISSIVE.

PASSIVE, in Latin *passivus* from *patior*, and the Greek *πασχω* to suffer, signifies disposed to suffer.

SUBMISSIVE, *v. Humble.*

Passive is mostly taken in the bad sense for suffering indignity to another; *submissive* is mostly in a good sense for submitting to another, or suffering one's self to be directed by another; to be *passive* therefore is to be *submissive* to an improper degree.

When men attempt unjustly to enforce obedience from a mere love of rule, it is none but those who are deficient in spirit, who are *passive*, or who submit quietly to the imposition: when men lawfully enforce obedience, it is none but the unruly and self-willed who will not be *submissive*.

For high above the ground,
Their march was; and the *passive* air upbore
Their nimble tread. MILTON.

He in delight
Both of her beauty and *submissive* charms,
Smil'd with superior love. MILTON.

PASSIVE, *v. Patient.*

PAST-TIME, *v. Amusement.*

PATCH, *v. Part.*

PATHETIC, *v. Moving.*

PATIENCE, ENDURANCE, RESIGNATION.

PATIENCE applies to any troubles or pains whatever, small or great; RESIGNATION is employed only for those of great moment, in which our dearest interests are concerned: *patience* when compared with *resignation* is somewhat negative; it consists in the abstaining from all complaint or indication of what one suffers: but *resignation* consists in a positive sentiment of conformity to the existing circumstances, be they what they may. There are perpetual occurrences which are apt to harass the temper, unless one regards them with *patience*; the misfortunes of some men are of so calamitous a nature, that if they have not acquired the *resignation* of Christians, they must inevitably sink under them.

Patience applies only to the evils that actually hang over us; but there is a *resignation* connected with a firm trust in Providence which extends its views to futurity, and prepares us for the worst that may happen.

As *patience* lies in the manner and temper of suffering, and ENDURANCE in the act: we may have *endurance* and not *patience*: for we may have much to *endure* and consequently *endurance*: but if we do not *endure* it with an easy mind and without the disturbance of our looks and words, we have not *patience*: on the other hand we may have *patience* but not *endurance*: for our *patience* may be exercised by momentary trifles, which are not sufficiently great or lasting to constitute *endurance*.

Though the duty of *patience* and subjection, where men suffer wrongfully, might possibly be of some force in those times of darkness; yet modern Christianity teaches that then only men are bound to suffer when they are not able to resist. SOUTH.

There was never yet philosopher
That could endure the tooth-ache patiently. SHAKESPEARE.

My mother is in that dispirited state of *resignation* which is the effect of a long life, and the loss of what is dear to us. POPE.

PATIENT, *v. Invalid.*

PATIENT, PASSIVE.

PATIENT comes from *patiens*, the

end or the beginning; the shrieks of distress are sometimes so loud as to seem to *pierce* the ear.

For if when dead we are but dust or clay,
Why think of what posterity shall say?
Their praise or censure cannot us concern,
Nor ever *penetrate* the silent urn. JENYNS.

Subtle as lightning, bright, and quick and
fierce,
Gold through doors and walls did *pierce*.
COWLEY.

Mountains were *perforated*, and bold arches
thrown over the broadest and most rapid stream
(by the Romans). GIBBON.

But Capys, and the graver sort, thought fit,
The Greeks' suspected present to commit
To seas or flames, at least to search or bore
The sides, and what that space contains to ex-
plore. DENHAM.

PENETRATION, *v.* *Discernment*.

PENETRATION, ACUTENESS,
SAGACITY.

As characteristics of mind, these terms have much more in them in which they differ than in what they agree: *PENETRATION* is a necessary property of mind; it exists to a greater or less degree in every rational being that has the due exercise of its rational powers: *ACUTENESS* is an accidental property that belongs to the mind only, under certain circumstances. As *penetration* (*v.* *Discernment*) denotes the process of entering into substances physically or morally, so *acuteness*, which is the same as sharpness, denotes the fitness of the thing that performs this process; and as the mind is in both cases the thing that is spoken of, the terms *penetration* and *acuteness* are in this particular closely allied. It is clear, however, that the mind may have *penetration* without having *acuteness*, although one cannot have *acuteness* without *penetration*. If by *penetration* we are commonly enabled to get at the truth which lies concealed, by *acuteness* we succeed in piercing the veil that hides it from our view; the former is, therefore, an ordinary, and the latter an extraordinary gift.

SAGACITY, in Latin *sagacitas* and *sagis* to perceive quickly, comes in all probability from the Persian *sag* a dog, whence the term has been peculiarly applied to dogs, and from thence extended to all brutes which

discover an intuitive wisdom, and also to children, or uneducated persons, in whom there is more *penetration* than may be expected from the narrow compass of their knowledge; hence, properly speaking, *sagacity* is natural or uncultivated *acuteness*.

Fairfax having neither talents himself for cabal, nor *penetration* to discover the cabals of others, had given his entire confidence to Cromwell. HUME.

Chillingworth was an *acute* disputant against the papists. HUME.

Activity to seize, not *sagacity* to discern, is the requisite which youth value. BLAIR.

PENITENCE, *v.* *Repentance*.

PENMAN, *v.* *Writer*.

PENURIOUS, *v.* *Oeconomical*.

PEOPLE, NATION.

PEOPLE, in Latin *populus*, comes from the Greek *λαος* people, *πῶς* a multitude, and *πολις* many. Hence the simple idea of numbers is expressed by the word *people*; but the term *NATION*, from *natus*, marks the connexion of numbers by birth; *people* is, therefore, the generic, and *nation* the specific. A *nation* is a *people* connected by birth; there cannot, therefore, strictly speaking, be a *nation* without a *people*: but there may be a *people* where there is not a *nation*. * The Jews are distinguished as a *people* or a *nation*, according to the different aspects under which they are viewed: when considered as an assemblage, under the special direction of the Almighty, they are termed the *people* of God; but when considered in regard to their common origin, they are denominated the Jewish *nation*. The Americans, when spoken of in relation to Britain, are a distinct *people*, because they have each a distinct government; but they are not a distinct *nation*, because they have a common descent. On this ground the Romans are not called the Roman *nation*, because their origin was so various, but the Roman *people*, that is, an assemblage, living under one form of government.

In a still closer application *people* is taken for a part of the state, namely, that part of a state which consists of a multitude, in distinction

* Vide Barbaud; "Nation, people."

from its government; whence arises a distinction in the use of the terms; for we may speak of the British *people*, the French or the Dutch *people*, when we wish merely to talk of the mass; but we speak of the British *nation*, the French *nation*, and the Dutch *nation*, when public measures are in question, which emanate from the government, or the whole *people*. The English *people* have ever been remarkable for their attachment to rational liberty: the abolition of the slave trade is one of the most glorious acts of public justice, which was ever performed by the British *nation*. The impetuosity and volatility of the French *people* render them peculiarly unfit to legislate for themselves; the military exploits of the French *nation* will render them a highly distinguished *people* in the annals of history. Upon the same ground republican states are distinguished by the name of *people*; but kingdoms are commonly spoken of in history as *nations*. Hence we say the Spartan *people*, the Athenian *people*, the *people* of Genoa, the *people* of Venice; but the *nations* of Europe, the African *nations*, the English, French, German, and Italian *nations*.

It is too flagrant a demonstration how much vice is the darling of any *people*, when many amongst them are preferred for those practices for which in other places they can scarce be pardoned.

SOUTH.

When we read the history of *nations*, what do we read but the crimes and follies of men?

BLAIR.

PEOPLE, POPULACE, MOB, MOBILITY.

PEOPLE and POPULACE are evidently changes of the same word to express a number.

The signification of these terms is that of a number gathered together. *People* is said of any body supposed to be assembled, as well as really assembled: *populace* is said of a body only, when actually assembled. The voice of the *people* cannot always be disregarded; the *populace* in England are fond of dragging their favorites in carriages.

MOB and MOBILITY are from the Latin *mobilis*, signifying moveableness, which is the characteristic of the mul-

titude: hence Virgil's *mobile vulgus*. These terms, therefore, designate not only what is low, but tumultuous. A *mob* is at all times an object of terror: the *mobility*, whether high or low, are a fluttering order that mostly run from bad to worse.

The *people* like a headlong torrent go,
And every dam they break or overflow.

SHAKESPEARE.

The pliant *populace*,
These dapes of novelty, will bend before us.

MALLEY.

By the senseless and insignificant clink of misapplied words, some restless demagogues had inflamed the mind of the sottish *mob* to a strange, unaccountable abhorrence of the best of men.

SOUTH.

PEOPLE, PERSONS, FOLKS.

The term PEOPLE has already been considered in two acceptations (*v. People, Nation; People, Populace*), under the general idea of an assembly; but in the present case it is employed to express a small number of individuals: the word *people*, however, is always considered as one undivided body, and the word PERSON may be distinctly used either in the singular or plural: as we cannot say one, two, three, or four *people*: but we may say one, two, three, or four *persons*: yet on the other hand, we may indifferently say, such *people* or *persons*; many *people* or *persons*; some *people* or *persons*, and the like.

With regard to the use of these terms, which is altogether colloquial, *people* is employed in general propositions; and *persons* in those which are specific or referring directly to some particular individuals: *people* are generally of that opinion; some *people* think so; some *people* attended: there were but few *persons* present at the entertainment; the whole company consisted of six *persons*.

As the term *people* is employed to designate the promiscuous multitude, it has acquired a certain meanness of acceptance which makes it less suitable than the word *persons*, when *people* of respectability are referred to: were I to say, of any individuals, I do not know who the *people* are; it would not be so respectful as to say, I do not know who those *persons* are: in like manner one says from *people* of that stamp, better is not to be expected;

persons of their appearance do not frequent such places.

FOLKS, through the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Latin *vulgus*, the common *people*: it is not unusual to say good *people*, or good *folks*; and in speaking jocularly to one's friends, the latter term is likewise admissible: but in the serious style it is never employed except in a disrespectful manner: such *folks* (speaking of gamesters) are often put to sorry shifts.

Performance is even the duller for
His act; and, but in the plainer and simple
Kind of the *people*, the deed is quite out of
Use. SHAKESPEARE.

You may observe many honest inoffensive
persons strangely ran down by an ugly word.

SOUTH.

I paid some compliments to great *folks*, who
like to be complimented. HERRING.

TO PERCEIVE, DISCERN, DISTINGUISH.

PERCEIVE, in Latin *percipio*, or *per* and *cipio*, signifies to take hold of thoroughly.

DISCERN, *v. Discernment.*

DISTINGUISH, *v. Difference.*

To *perceive* is a positive, to *discern* a relative, action: we *perceive* things by themselves; we *discern* them amidst many others: we *perceive* that which is obvious; we *discern* that which is remote, or which requires much attention to get an idea of it. We *perceive* by a person's looks and words what he intends; we *discern* the drift of his actions. We may *perceive* sensible or spiritual objects; we commonly *discern* only that which is spiritual: we *perceive* light, darkness, colors, or the truth or falsehood of any thing; we *discern* characters, motives, the tendency and consequences of actions, &c. It is the act of a child to *perceive* according to the quickness of its senses; it is the act of a man to *discern* according to the measure of his knowledge and understanding.

To *discern* and *distinguish* approach the nearest in sense to each other; but the former signifies to see only one thing, the latter to see two or more in quick succession. We *discern* what lie in things; we *distinguish* things according to their outward marks: we *discern* things in order to understand their essences;

we *distinguish* in order not to confound them together. Experienced and discreet people may *discern* the signs of the times; it is just to *distinguish* between an action done from inadvertence, and that which is done from design. The conduct of people is sometimes so veiled by art, that it is not easy to *discern* their object: it is necessary to *distinguish* between practice and profession.

And lastly, turning inwardly her eyes,
Perceives how all her own ideas rise. JENYNS.

One who is actuated by party spirit, is almost under an incapacity of *discerning* either real blemishes or beauties. ADDISON.

Mr. Boyle observes, that though the mole be not totally blind (as is generally thought), she has not sight enough to *distinguish* objects.

ADDISON.

TO PERCEIVE, *v. To see.* PERCEPTIBLE, *v. Sensible.*

PERCEPTION, IDEA, CONCEPTION, NOTION.

PERCEPTION expresses either the act of *perceiving* (*v. To perceive*), or the impression produced by that act; in this latter sense it is analogous to an IDEA (*v. Idea*). The impression of an object that is present to us is termed a *perception*; the revival of that impression, when the object is removed, is an *idea*. A combination of *ideas* by which any image is presented to the mind is a CONCEPTION (*v. To comprehend*); the association of two or more *ideas*, so as to constitute it a decision, is a NOTION (*v. Opinion*). *Perceptions* are clear or confused, according to the state of the sensible organs, and the *perceptive* faculty; *ideas* are faint or vivid, vague or distinct, according to the nature of the *perception*; *conceptions* are gross or refined according to the number and extent of one's *ideas*; *notions* are true or false, correct or incorrect, according to the extent of one's knowledge. The *perception* which we have of remote objects is sometimes so indistinct as to leave hardly any traces of the image on the mind; we have in that case a *perception*, but not an *idea*: if we read the description of any object, we may have an *idea* of it; but we need not have any immediate *perception*: the *idea* in this case being complex, and

TO PERMIT, *v.* *To admit.*

TO PERMIT, *v.* *To consent.*

PERNICIOUS, *v.* *Destructive.*

PERNICIOUS, *v.* *Hurtful.*

TO PERPETRATE, COMMIT.

THE idea of doing something wrong is common to these terms; but PERPETRATE, from the Latin *perpetro*, compounded of *per* and *petro*, in Greek *πρᾶττω*, signifying thoroughly to compass or bring about, is a much more determined proceeding than that of COMMITTING. One may *commit* offences of various degree and magnitude; but one *perpetrates* crimes only, and those of the more heinous kind. A lawless banditti, who spend their lives in the *perpetration* of the most horrid crimes, are not to be restrained by the ordinary course of justice: he who *commits* any offence against the good order of society exposes himself to the censure of others, who may be his inferiors in certain respects.

Then shews the forest which, in after times,
Fierce Romulus, for *perpetrated* crimes,
A refuge made. DRYDEN.

The miscarriages of the great designs of princes are of little use to the bulk of mankind, who seem very little interested in admonitions against errors which they cannot *commit*.

JOHNSON.

PERPETUAL, *v.* *Continual.*

TO PERPLEX, *v.* *To distress.*

TO PERPLEX, *v.* *To embarrass.*

TO PERSEVERE, *v.* *To continue.*

TO PERSIST, *v.* *To continue.*

TO PERSIST, *v.* *To insist.*

PERSONS, *v.* *People.*

PERSPICUITY, *v.* *Clearness.*

TO PERSUADE, *v.* *To exhort.*

TO PERSUADE, ENTICE, PREVAIL UPON.

PERSUADE (*v.* *Conviction*) and ENTICE (*v.* *To allure*) are employed to express different means to the same end; namely, that of drawing any one to a thing: one *persuades* a person by means of words; one *entices* him either by words or actions; one may *persuade* either to a good or bad thing; but one *entices* commonly to that which

is bad; one uses arguments to *persuade*, and arts to *entice*.

Persuade and *entice* comprehend either the means or the end or both: PREVAIL UPON, comprehends no more than the end: we may *persuade* without *prevailing upon*, and we may *prevail upon* without *persuading*. Many will turn a deaf ear to all our *persuasions*, and will not be *prevailed upon*, although *persuaded*: on the other hand, we may be *prevailed upon* by the force of remonstrance, authority, and the like; and in this case we are *prevailed upon* without being *persuaded*. We should never *persuade* another to do that which we are not willing to do ourselves; credulous or good-natured people are easily *prevailed upon* to do things which tend to their own injury.

I beseech you let me have so much credit with you as to *persuade* you to communicate any doubt or scruple which occur to you, before you suffer them to make too deep an impression upon you. CLARENDON.

If gaming does an aged sire *entice*,
Then my young master swiftly learns the vice. DRYDEN.

Herod hearing of Agrippa's arrival in Upper Asia, went thither to him and *prevailed* with him to accept an invitation. PRIDEAUX.

PERSUASION, *v.* *Conviction.*

PERTINACIOUS, *v.* *Tenacious.*

TO PERUSE, *v.* *To read.*

PERVERSE, *v.* *Awkward.*

PEST, *v.* *Bane.*

PETITION, *v.* *Prayer.*

PETTY, *v.* *Trifling.*

PETULANT, *v.* *Captious.*

PHANTOM, *v.* *Vision.*

PHRASE, *v.* *Diction.*

PHRASE, *v.* *Sentence.*

PHRASEOLOGY, *v.* *Diction.*

PHRENSY, *v.* *Madness.*

TO PICK, *v.* *To choose.*

PICTURE, *v.* *Likeness.*

PICTURE, *v.* *Painting.*

PICTURE, PRINT, ENGRAVING.

PICTURE (*v.* *Painting*) is likeness taken by the hand of the PRINT is the copy of *ing* in a *printed state*; *or*

With ponderous clubs
As weak against the mountain heaps they push
Their beating breast in vain and piteous bray,
He lays them quivering on th' ensanguin'd plain.
THOMSON.

Cocytus nam'd, of lamentation loud,
Heard on the rueful stream. MILTON.

PITEOUS, *v.* *Pitiable*.

PITIABLE, PITEOUS, PITIFUL.

THESE three epithets drawn from the same word have shades of difference in sense and application.

PITIABLE signifies deserving of *pity*; PITEOUS, moving *pity*; PITIFUL, full of that which awakens *pity*: a condition is *pitiable* which is so distressing as to call forth *pity*; a cry is *piteous* which indicates such distress as can excite *pity*; a conduct is *pitiful* which marks a character entitled to *pity*.

The first of these terms is taken in the best sense of the term *pity*; the last two in its unfavorable sense: what is *pitiable* in a person is independent of any thing in himself; circumstances have rendered him *pitiable*; what is *piteous* and *pitiful* in a man arises from the helplessness and imbecility or worthlessness of his character; the former respects that which is weak; the latter that which is worthless in him: when a poor creature makes *piteous* moans, it indicates his incapacity to help himself as he ought to do out of his troubles; when a man of rank has recourse to *pitiful* shifts to gain his ends, he betrays the innate meanness of his soul.

Is it then impossible that a man may be found who without criminal, ill intention, or pitiable absurdity, shall prefer a mixed government to either of the extremes? BURKE.

I have in view, calling to mind with heed
Part of our sentence, that thy seed shall bruise
The serpent's head; *piteous* amends, unless
Be meant, whom I conjecture, our grand foe.
MILTON.

Bacon wrote a *pitiful* letter to King James I.
not long before his death. HOWE.

PITIFUL, *v.* *Pitiable*.

PITIFUL, *v.* *Mean*.

PITY, COMPASSION.

PITY is in all probability contracted from *piety*.

COMPASSION, in Latin *compe-*

sio, from *com* and *patior*, signifies to suffer in conjunction with another.

The pain which one feels at the distresses of another is the idea that is common to the signification of both these terms, but they differ in the object that causes the distress: the former is excited principally by the weakness or degraded condition of the subject; the latter by his uncontrollable and inevitable misfortunes. We *pity* a man of a weak understanding who exposes his weakness: we *compassionate* the man who is reduced to a state of beggary and want. *Pity* is kindly extended by those in higher condition to such as are humble in their outward circumstances; the poor are at all times deserving of *pity* when their poverty is not the positive fruit of vice: *compassion* is a sentiment which extends to persons in all conditions; the good Samaritan had *compassion* on the traveller who fell among thieves. *Pity*, though a tender sentiment, is so closely allied to contempt, that an ingenuous mind is always loath to be the subject of it, since it can never be awakened but by some circumstance of inferiority; it hurts the honest pride of a man to reflect that he can excite no interest but by provoking a comparison to his own disadvantage: on the other hand, such is the general infirmity of our natures, and such our exposure to the casualties of human life, that *compassion* is a pure and delightful sentiment, that is reciprocally bestowed and acknowledged by all with equal satisfaction.

Others extended naked on the floor,
Exh'd from human *pity* here they lie,
And know no end of misery till they die.

POMFRET.

His fate *compassion* in the victor bred;
Stern as he was, he yet rever'd the dead. PERR.

PITY, MERCY.

THE feelings one indulges, and the conduct one adopts, towards others who suffer for their demerits is the common idea which renders these terms synonymous; but PITY lays hold of those circumstances which do not affect the moral character, or which diminish the culpability of the individual: MERCY lays hold of those external circumstances which may

PLEADER, *v. Defender.*
 PLEASANT, *v. Agreeable.*
 PLEASANT, *v. Facetious.*
 PLEASED, *v. Glad.*
 PLEASING, *v. Agreeable.*
 PLEASURE, *v. Comfort.*

PLEASURE, JOY, DELIGHT,
 CHARM.

PLEASURE, from the Latin *placeo* to please or give content, is the generic term, involving in itself the common idea of the other terms.

JOY, *v. Glad.*

DELIGHT, in Latin *delicia*, comes from *delicio* to allure, signifying the thing that allures the mind.

Pleasure is a term of most extensive use; it embraces one grand class of our feelings or sensations, and is opposed to nothing but pain, which embraces the second class or division: *joy* and *delight* are but modes or modifications of *pleasure*, differing as to the degree, and as to the objects or sources. *Pleasure*, in its peculiar acceptation, is smaller in degree than either *joy* or *delight*, but in its universal acceptation it defines no degree: the term is indifferently employed for the highest as well as the lowest degree; whereas *joy* and *delight* can only be employed to express a positively high degree. *Pleasure* is produced by any or every object; every thing by which we are surrounded acts upon us more or less to produce it; we may have *pleasure* either from without or from within: *pleasure* from the gratification of our senses, from the exercise of our affections, or the exercise of our understandings; *pleasures* from our own selves, or *pleasures* from others: but *joy* is derived from the exercise of the affections; and *delight* either from the affections or the understanding. In this manner we distinguish the *pleasures* of the table, social *pleasures*, or intellectual *pleasures*; the *joy* of meeting an old friend; or the *delight* of pursuing a favorite object.

Pleasures are either transitory or otherwise; they may arise from momentary circumstances, or be attached to some permanent condition: all

earthly *pleasure* is in its nature fleeting; and heavenly *pleasure*, on the contrary, lasting. *Joy* is in its nature commonly short of duration, it springs from particular events; it is *pleasure* at high tide, but it may come and go as suddenly as the events which caused it: one's *joy* may be awakened and damped in quick succession; earthly *joys* are peculiarly of this nature, and heavenly *joys* are not altogether divested of this characteristic; they are supposed to spring out of particular occurrences, when the spiritual and holy affections are peculiarly called into action. *Delight* is not so fleeting as *joy*, but it may be less so than simple *pleasure*; *delight* arises from a state of outward circumstances which is naturally more durable than that of *joy*; but it is a state seldomer attainable, and not so much at one's command as *pleasure*: this last is very seldom denied in some form or another to every human being, but those only are susceptible of *delight* who have acquired a certain degree of mental refinement; we must have a strong capacity for enjoyment before we can find *delight* in the pursuits of literature, or the cultivation of the arts. *Pleasures* are often calm and moderate; they do not depend upon a man's rank or condition; they are within the reach of all, more or less, and more or less at one's command: *joys* are buoyant; they dilate the heart for a time, but they must and will subside; they depend likewise on casualties which are under no one's control: *delights* are ardent and excessive; they are within the reach of a few only, but depend less on external circumstances than on the temper of the receiver.

Pleasure may be had either by reflection on the past, or by anticipation of the future; *joy* and *delight* can be produced only by the present object: we have a *pleasure* in thinking on what we have once enjoyed, or what we may again enjoy; we experience *joy* on the receipt of particularly good news; one may experience *delight* from a musical entertainment. *Pleasure* and *delight* may be either individual or social; *joy* is rather of a social nature: we feel a *pleasure* in solitude when locked up only in our

The resty knaves are overrun with ease,
As plenty ever is the nurse of faction. ROWE.
And God said, let the waters generate
Reptile with spawn abundant, living soul.

MILTON.

Smooth to the shelving brink a copious flood
Rolls fair and placid. THOMSON.

Peaceful beneath primeval trees, that cast
Their ample shade o'er Niger's yellow stream,
Leans the huge elephant, wisest of brutes.
THOMSON.

PLIABLE, *v. Flexible.*

PLIANT, *v. Flexible.*

PLIGHT, *v. Situation.*

PLOT, *v. Combination.*

TO PLUCK, *v. To draw.*

PLUNDER, *v. Rapine.*

TO PLUNGE, DIVE.

PLUNGE is but a variation of pluck, pull, and the Latin *pello* to drive or force forward.

DIVE is but a variation of *dip*, which is under various forms to be found in the northern languages.

One *plunges* sometimes in order to *dive*; but one may *plunge* without *diving*, and one may *dive* without *plunging*: to *plunge* is to dart head-foremost into the water; to *dive* is to go to the bottom of the water, or towards it: it is a good practice for bathers to *plunge* into the water when they first go in, although it is not adviseable for them to *dive*; the ducks frequently *dive* into the water without ever *plunging*. Thus far they differ in their natural sense; but in the figurative application they differ more widely: to *plunge*, in this case, is an act of rashness; to *dive* is an act of design: a young man hurried away by his passions will *plunge* into every extravagance when he comes into possession of his estate; people of a prying temper seek to *dive* into the secrets of others.

The French *plunged* themselves into the calamities they suffer, to prevent themselves from settling into a British constitution. BURKE.

How he did seem to *dive* into their hearts
With humble and familiar courtesy.

SHAKESPEARE.

TO POINT, *v. To aim.*

TO POINT OUT, *v. To show.*

TO POISE, BALANCE.

POISE, in French *peser*, probably comes from *pes* a foot, on which the body is as it were *poised*.

BALANCE, in French *balancer*, from the Latin *bilanx*, or *bis* and *lanx* a pair of scales.

The idea of bringing into an equilibrium is common to both terms; but *poise* is a particular, and *balance* a more general term: a thing is *poised* as respects itself; it is *balanced* as respects other things: a person *poises* a plain stick in his hand when he wants it to lie even; he *balances* the stick if it has a particular weight at each end: a person may *poise* himself, but he *balances* others: when not on firm ground, it is necessary to *poise* one's self; when two persons are situated one at each end of a beam, they may *balance* one another.

Some evil, terrible and unforeseen,
Must sure ensue to *poise* the scale against
This vast profusion of exceeding pleasure.

HOWE.

This, O! this very moment let me die,
While hopes and fears in equal *balance* lie.

DAVENANT.

POISON, VENOM.

POISON, in French *poison*, comes from the Latin *potio* a potion or drink.

VENOM, in French *venim*, Latin *venenum*, comes probably from *venæ* the veins, because it circulates rapidly through the veins, and infects the blood in a deadly manner.

Poison is a general term; in its original meaning it signifies any potion which acts destructively upon the system: *venom* is a species of deadly or malignant *poison*: a *poison* may be either slow or quick; a *venom* is always most active in its nature: a *poison* must be administered inwardly to have its effect; a *venom* will act by an external application: the juice of the hellebore is a *poison*; the tongue of the adder and the tooth of the viper contain *venom*: many plants are unfit to be eaten on account of the *poisonous* quality which is in them; the Indians are in the habits of dipping the tips of their arrows in a *venomous* juice, which renders the slightest wound mortal.

general, a heavy burden upon the inhabitants; there are some persons who are not ashamed to live and die as *paupers*.

POPULACE, *v. People*.

PORT, *v. Harbor*.

TO PORTEND, *v. To augur*.

PORTION, *v. Deal*.

POSITION, *v. Place*.

POSITION, POSTURE.

POSITION (*v. Place*) is here used as respects persons, and in this sense is allied to POSTURE, which is a species of *posture*, that is, an artificial or a set *posture*: if a person stands tiptoe, in order to see to a greater distance, he may be said to put himself into that *position*; but if a dancer do the same, as a part of his performance, it becomes a *posture*: so, likewise, when one leans against the wall it is a leaning *position*; but when one theatrically bends his body backward or forward, it is a *posture*: one may, in the same manner, sit in an erect *position*, or in a reclining *posture*.

Every step, in the progression of existence, changes our *position* with respect to the things about us.

JOHNSON.

Milton has presented this violent spirit (Moloch) as the first that rises in that assembly to give his opinion upon their present *posture* of affairs.

ADDISON.

POSITION, *v. Tenet*.

POSITIVE, *v. Actual*.

POSITIVE, *v. Confident*.

POSITIVE, *v. Definite*.

POSITIVE, ABSOLUTE, PEREMPTORY.

POSITIVE, in Latin *positivus*, from *pono* to put or place, signifies placed or fixed, that is, fixed or established in the mind.

ABSOLUTE (*v. Absolute*) signifies uncontrolled by any external circumstances.

PEREMPTORY, in Latin *peremptorius*, from *perimo* to take away, signifies removing all further question.

Positive is said either of a man's convictions or temper of mind, or of his proceedings; *absolute* is said of his mode of proceeding, or his relative cir-

cumstances; *peremptory* is said of his proceeding. *Positive*, as respects a man's conviction, has been spoken of under the article of *confident* (*v. Confident*); in the latter sense it bears the closest analogy to *absolute* or *peremptory*: a *positive* mode of speech depends upon a *positive* state of mind; an *absolute* mode of speech depends upon the uncontrollable authority of the speaker; a *peremptory* mode of speech depends upon the disposition and relative circumstances of the speaker: a decision is *positive*; a command *absolute* or *peremptory*: what is *positive* excludes all question; what is *absolute* bars all resistance; what is *peremptory* removes all hesitation: a *positive* answer can be given only by one who has *positive* information; an *absolute* decree can issue only from one vested with *absolute* authority; a *peremptory* refusal can be given only by one who has the will and the power of deciding it without any controversy.

As adverbs, *positively*, *absolutely*, and *peremptorily*, have an equally close connexion: a thing is said not to be *positively* known, or *positively* determined upon, or *positively* agreed to; it is said not to be *absolutely* necessary, *absolutely* true or false, *absolutely* required; it is not to be *peremptorily* decided, *peremptorily* declared, *peremptorily* refused.

Positive and *absolute* are likewise applied to moral objects with the same distinction as before: the *positive* expresses what is fixed in distinction from the relative that may vary; the *absolute* is that which is independent of every thing; thus, pleasures and pains are *positive*; names in logic are *absolute*; cases in grammar are *absolute*.

The diminution or ceasing of pain does not operate like *positive* pleasure.

BURKE.

Those parts of the moral world which have not an *absolute*, may yet have a relative beauty, in respect of some other parts concealed from us.

ADDISON.

The Highlander gives to every question an answer so prompt and *peremptory*, that scepticism is dared into silence.

JOHNSON.

TO POSSESS, *v. To have*.

TO POSSESS, *v. To hold*.

POSSESSIONS, *n. Goods*.

niences of life : *indigence* is a particular state of *poverty*, which rises above it in such a degree, as to exclude the necessities as well as the conveniences; *want* and *need* are both partial states, that refer only to individual things which are *wanting* to any one. *Poverty* and *indigence* comprehend all the external circumstances of a man's life; but *want*, when taken by itself, denotes the *want* of food or clothing, and is opposed to abundance; *need*, when taken by itself, implies the want of money, or any other useful article; but they are both more commonly taken in connexion with the object which is *wanted*, and in this sense they are to the two former, as the genus to the species. *Poverty* and *indigence* are permanent states; *want* and *need* are temporary: *poverty* and *indigence* are the order of Providence, they do not depend upon the individual, and are, therefore, not reckoned as his fault; *want* and *need* arise more commonly from circumstances of one's own creation, and tend frequently to one's discredit. What man has not caused, man cannot so easily obviate; *poverty* and *indigence* cannot, therefore, be removed at one's will: but *want* and *need* are frequently removed by the aid of others. *Poverty* is that which one should learn to bear, so as to lessen its pains; *indigence* is a calamity which the compassion of others may in some measure alleviate, if they cannot entirely obviate; *want*, when it results from intemperance or extravagance, is not altogether entitled to any relief; but *need*, when it arises from casualties that are independent of our demerits, will always find friends.

It is a wise distribution of Providence which has made the rich and poor to be mutually dependent upon each other, and both to be essential to the happiness of the whole. Among all descriptions of *indigent* persons, none are entitled to more charitable attention, than those who in addition to their wants suffer under any bodily infirmity. The old proverb says, "That waste makes *want*," which is daily realized among men without making them wiser by experience. "A friend in *need*," according to an-

other vulgar proverb, "is a friend indeed," which, like all proverbial sayings, contains a striking truth; for nothing can be more acceptable than the assistance which we receive from a friend when we stand in *need* of it.

That the *poverty* of the Highlanders is gradually diminished cannot be mentioned among the unpleasant consequences of subjection.

JOHNSON.

If we can but raise him above *indigence*, a moderate share of good fortune and merit will be sufficient to open his way to whatever else we can wish him to obtain.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Want is a bitter and a hateful good,
Because its virtues are not understood,
Yet many things, impossible to thought,
Have been by *need* to full perfection brought.

DAYDEN.

TO POUND, *v.* To break.

TO POUR, SPILL, SHED.

POUR is probably connected with *pore*, and the Latin preposition *per* through, signifying to make to pass as it were through a channel.

SPILL and splash, and the German *spülen* are probably onomatopœias.

SHED comes from the German *scheiden* to separate, signifying to cast from.

We *pour* with design; we *spill* by accident: we *pour* water over a plant or a bed; we *spill* it on the ground. To *pour* is an act of convenience; to *spill* and *shed* are acts more or less hurtful; the former is to cause to run in small quantities; the latter in large quantities: we *pour* wine out of a bottle into a glass; but the blood of a person is said to be *spilt* or *shed* when his life is violently taken away: what is *poured* is commonly no part of the body from whence it is *poured*; but what is *shed* is no other than a component part; hence trees are said to *shed* their leaves, animals their hair, or human beings to *shed* tears.

Poetry is of so subtle a spirit, that in the pouring out of one language into another, it will evaporate.

DUNHAM.

O reputation! dearer far than life,
Thou precious balm, lovely sweet of smell,
Whose cordial drops once *spilt* by some rash hand,

Not all the owner's care, nor the repenting toll
Of the rude *spiller*, can collect.

SEWEL.

Herod acted the part of a great mourner for the deceased Aristobulus, *shedding* abundance of tears.

FAIRBANK.

may have the *power* to read or leave it alone; but he cannot dispose of his person without *authority*. In what concerns others, we must act by their *authority*, if we wish to act conscientiously; when the secrets of another are confided to us, we have the *power* to divulge them, but not the *authority*, unless it be given by him who entrusted them.

Instructors are invested by the parents with *authority* over their children; and parents receive their *authority* from nature, that is, the law of God; this paternal *authority*, according to the Christian system, extends to the education, but not to the destruction of their offspring. The Heathens, however, claimed and exerted a *power* over the lives of their children. By my superior *strength* I may be enabled to exert a *power* over a man, so as to control his action; of his own accord he gives me *authority* to dispose of his property; so in literature, men of established reputation, of classical merit, and known veracity, are quoted as *authorities* in support of any position.

Power is indefinite as to degree; one may have little or much *power*: *dominion* is a positive degree of *power*. A monarch's *power* may be limited by various circumstances; a despot exercises *dominion* over all his subjects, high and low. One is not said to get a *power* over any object, but to get an object into one's *power*: on the other hand, we get a *dominion* over an object; thus some men have a *dominion* over the consciences of others.

Hence thou shalt prove my might, and curse the hour

Thou stoodst a rival of imperial pow'r. **Pope.**

Power arising from *strength* is always in those who are governed, who are many; but *authority* arising from opinion is in those who govern, who are few. **Temple.**

And each of these must will, perceive, design,
And draw confus'dly in a diff'rent line,
Which then can claim *dominion* o'er the rest,
Or stamp the ruling passion in the breast.

Jersey.

POWERFUL, POTENT, MIGHTY.

POWERFUL, or full of *power*, is also the original meaning of **POTENT**; but **MIGHTY** signifies having *might*. *Powerful* is applicable to strength as well as *power*: a *powerful* man is one

who by his size and make can easily overpower another: and a *powerful* person is one who has much in his *power*; *potent* is used only in this latter sense, in which it expresses a larger extent of *power*: a *potent* monarch is much more than a *powerful* prince; *mighty* expresses a still higher degree of *power*; *might* is *power* unlimited by any consideration or circumstance; a giant is called *mighty* in the physical sense, and genius is said to be *mighty* which takes every thing within its grasp; the Supreme Being is entitled either *Omnipotent* or *Almighty*; but the latter term seems to convey the idea of boundless extent more forcibly than the former.

It is certain that the senses are more *powerful* as the reason is weaker. **Johnson.**

Now, flaming up the heavens, the *potent* sun
Melts into limpid air the high rais'd clouds.

Thomson.

He who lives by a *mighty* principle within,
Which the world about him neither sees nor understands,
He only ought to pass for godly.

Sourin.

PRACTICABLE, *v. Possible.*

PRACTICAL, *v. Possible.*

PRACTICE, *v. Custom.*

TO PRACTISE, *v. To exercise.*

TO PRAISE, **COMMEND**,
APPLAUD, **EXTOL**.

PRAISE comes from the German *preisen* to value, and our own word *price*, signifying to give a value to a thing.

COMMEND, in Latin *commendo*, compounded of *com* and *mando*, signifies to commit to the good opinion of others.

APPLAUD, *v. Applause.*

EXTOL, in Latin *extollo*, signifies to lift up very high.

All these terms denote the act of expressing approbation. The *praise* is the most general and indefinite; it may rise to a high degree, but it generally implies a lower degree: we *praise* a person generally; we *commend* him particularly: we *praise* him for his diligence, sobriety, and the like; we *commend* him for his performances, or for any particular instance of prudence or good conduct. To *applaud* is an ardent mode of *praising*; we *applaud* a person for

Torture him with thy softness,
Nor till thy prayers are granted, set him free.
OTWAY.

She takes petitions, and dispenses laws,
Hears and determines every private cause.
DANBY.

Thus spoke Ilioneus; the Trojan crew,
With cries and clamours, his request renew.
DANBY.

Arguments, entreaties, and promises, were
employed in order to sooth them (the followers
of Cortes). ROBERTSON.

Seldom or never is there much spoke, when-
ever any due comes to prefer a suit to another.
SOUTH.

PRECARIOUS, *v. Doubtful.*

PRECEDENCE, *v. Priority.*

PRECEDENT, *v. Example.*

PRECEDING, *v. Antecedent.*

PRECEPT, *v. Command.*

PRECEPT, *v. Doctrine.*

PRECEPT, *v. Maxim.*

PRECINCTS, *v. Border.*

PRECIOUS, *v. Valuable.*

PRECIPITANCY, *v. Rashness.*

PRECISE, *v. Accurate.*

PRECISION, *v. Justness.*

TO PRECLUDE, *v. To prevent.*

PRECURSOR, *v. Forerunner.*

PREDICAMENT, *v. Situation.*

TO PREDICT, *v. To foretel.*

PREDOMINANT, *v. Prevailing.*

PREEMINENCE, *v. Priority.*

PREFACE, *v. Prelude.*

TO PREFER, *v. To choose.*

TO PREFER, *v. To encourage.*

PREFERABLE, *v. Eligible.*

PREFERENCE, *v. Priority.*

PREJUDICE, *v. Bias.*

PREJUDICE, *v. Disadvantage.*

PRELIMINARY, *v. Previous.*

PRELUDE, PREFACE.

PRELUDE, from the Latin *ludo*
to play, signifies the game that pre-
cedes; PREFACE, from the Latin
for to speak, signifies the speech that
precedes. The idea of a preparatory

introduction is included in both these
terms, but the former consists of ac-
tions; the latter of words: the throw-
ing of stones and breaking of windows
is the *prelude* on the part of a mob to
a general riot; an apology for one's
ill-behaviour is sometimes the *preface*
to soliciting a remission of punish-
ment. The *prelude* is mostly prepa-
ratory to that which is in itself actually
bad: the *preface* is mostly preparatory
to something supposed to be object-
ionable. Intemperance in liquor is
the *prelude* to every other extrava-
gance; when one wishes to insure
compliance with a request that may
possibly be unreasonable, it is neces-
sary to pave the way by some suitable
preface.

At this time there was a general peace all
over the world, which was a proper *prelude* for
usurping in his coming who was the prince of
peace. PRINCE.

As no delay
Of *prefaces* brooking through his zeal of right.
MILTON.

PREMEDITATION, *v. Fore-
thought.*

TO PREMISE, PRESUME.

PREMISE, from *pre* and *mitto*, sig-
nifies set down beforehand; PRE-
SUME, from *sumo* to take, signifies to
take before hand. Both these terms
are employed in regard to our previous
assertions or admissions of any circum-
stance; the former is used for what
is theoretical or belongs to opinions;
the latter is used for what is practical
or belongs to facts: we *premise* that
the existence of a Deity is unquestio-
nable when we argue respecting his
attributes; we *presume* that a person
has a firm belief in divine revelation
when we exhort him to follow the pre-
cepts of the Gospel. No argument
can be pursued until we have *premised*
those points upon which both parties
are to agree: we must be careful not
to *presume* upon more than what we
are fully authorized to take for certain.

Here we must first *premise* what it is to enter
into temptation. SOUTH.

In the long iambic metre, it does not appear
that Chaucer ever composed at all; for I *pre-
sume* no one can imagine that he was the author
of Gamelyn. TITMUS.

TO PREPARE, *v. To fit.*

PREPARATORY, *v. Previous.*

The evils naturally consequent upon a prevailing temptation are intolerable. SOUTH.

Whate'er thou shalt ordain, thou ruling pow'r,
Unknown and sudden be the dreadful hour.

ROWE.

Nor can a man independently upon the overruling influence of God's blessing, care and call himself one penny richer. SOUTH.

The doctrine of not owning a foreigner to be a king was held and taught by the Pharisees, a predominant sect of the Jews. PRIDEAUX.

TO PREVAIL UPON, *v. To persuade.*

PREVALENT, *v. Prevailing.*

TO PREVARICATE, *v. To evade.*

TO PREVENT, *v. To hinder.*

TO PREVENT, ANTICIPATE.

To PREVENT is literally to come beforehand, and ANTICIPATE to take beforehand: the former is employed for actual occurrences; the latter as much for calculations as for actions: *prevent* is the act of one being towards another; *anticipate* is the act of a being either towards himself or another. God is said to *prevent* us, if he interposes with his grace to divert our purposes towards that which is right; we *anticipate* the happiness which we are to enjoy in future; we *anticipate* what a person is going to say by saying the same thing before him. The term *prevent*, when taken in this its strict and literal sense, is employed only as the act of the Divine Being; *anticipate*, on the contrary, is taken only as the act of human beings towards each other. These words may, however, be farther allied to each other, when under the term *prevention* in its vulgar acceptation is included the idea of hindering another in his proceedings; in which case to *anticipate* is a species of *prevention*; that is, to *prevent* another from doing a thing by doing it one's self.

But I do think it most cowardly and vile,
For fear of what might fall, so to prevent
The time of life. SHAKESPEARE.

He that has anticipated the conversation of a wit will wonder to what prejudice he owes his reputation. JOHNSON.

TO PREVENT, OBVIATE, PRECLUDE.

To PREVENT (*v. To hinder*) is

here as in the former case the generic term, the others are specific. What one *prevents* does not happen at all: what one OBVIATES ceases to happen in future: we *prevent* those evils which we know will come to pass if not *prevented*: we *obviate* those evils which we have already felt; that is, we *prevent* their repetition. Crimes and calamities are *prevented*; difficulties, objections, inconveniences, and troubles, are *obviated*. When crowds collect in vast numbers in any small spot, it is not easy to *prevent* mischief: wise precautions may be adopted to *obviate* the inconvenience which necessarily attends a great crowd.

Prevent and *obviate* are the acts of either conscious or unconscious agents: PRECLUDE is the act of unconscious agents only: one *prevents* or *obviates* a thing by the use of means, or else the things themselves *prevent* and *obviate*, as when we say, that a person *prevents* another from coming, or illness *prevents* him from coming: a person *obviates* a difficulty by a contrivance, a certain arrangement or change *obviates* every difficulty. We intentionally *prevent* a person from doing that which we disapprove of; his circumstances *preclude* him from enjoying certain privileges. *Prevent* respects that which is either good or bad; *obviate* respects that which is bad always; *preclude* respects that which is good or desirable: ill health *prevents* a person from pursuing his business; employment *prevents* a young person from falling into bad practices; admonition often *obviates* the necessity of punishments; want of learning or of a regular education often *precludes* a man from many of the political advantages which he might otherwise enjoy.

Ev'ry disease of age we may prevent,
Like those of youth, by being diligent. DENHAM.

The imputation of folly, if it is true, must be suffered without hope; but that of immorality may be *obviated* by removing the cause.

HAWKSWORTH.

Has not man an inheritance to which all may return, who are not so foolish as to continue the pursuit after pleasure till every hope is *precluded*.

HAWKSWORTH.

PREVIOUS, *v. Antecedent.*

THE PRELIMINARY

THE PRELIMINARY

PREL, a. *Busy*.
PREL, a. *Cost*.
PREL, a. *Value*.

PREL, VANITY, CONCERN

PREL is in all probability a word with the word *prel*, and *prel* is a word which is used in a sense which is not the same as the word *prel* in the word *prel*. It is a word which is used in a sense which is not the same as the word *prel* in the word *prel*.

VANITY, in Latin words, for *van* and *vanus*, is compounded of *van* and *vanus*, signifying *empty* or *emptiness*.

CONCERN, a. *Concern*.

The meaning of one's self in the possession of any property is *concern* to those terms, but they differ either in regard to the object or the manner of the action. *Pride* is the term of most extensive import of application, and *concern* is a qualification not only that of the other two terms, but likewise *concern* to itself.

Pride is applicable to every object, good or bad, high or low, small or great; *vanity* is applicable only to small objects: *pride* is therefore good or bad; *vanity* is always bad, it is always emptiness or nothingness. A man is proud who values himself on the possession of his literary or scientific talent, on his wealth, on his rank, on his power, on his acquisitions, or his superiority over his competitors; he is vain of his person, his dress, his walk, or any thing that is frivolous. *Pride* is the inherent quality in man; and while it rests on noble objects, it is his noblest characteristic; *vanity* is the distortion of one's nature flowing from a vicious constitution or education: *pride* shows itself variously according to the nature of the object on which it is fixed; a noble *pride* seeks to display itself in all that can command the respect or admiration of mankind; the *pride* of wealth, of power, or of other adventitious properties, commonly displays itself in an unseemly deportment to-

THE PRELIMINARY

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The step by which a temptation approaches to the crime is a *prel* growing familiarity of the mind with the sin which a man is tempted to. *South*.
I have discussed the initial preliminaries so often, that I can repeat the forms in which judgments are settled and preliminary secured. *Johnson*.
Archy is in the practice of holding the spectators in suspense by a *prel* alliance in his child prison. *Cambridge*.

THE PRELIMINARY

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wards others; *vanity* shows itself only by its eagerness to catch the notice of others.

Pride (says Blair) makes us esteem ourselves; *vanity* makes us desire the esteem of others. But if *pride* is, as I have before observed, self-esteem, or, which is nearly the same thing, self-valuation, it cannot properly be said to make us esteem ourselves. Of *vanity* I have already said that it makes one anxious for the notice and applause of others; but I cannot with Dr. Blair say that it makes one want the esteem of others, because esteem is too substantial a quality to be sought for by the *vain*. Besides, that what Dr. Blair seems to assign as a leading and characteristic ground of distinction between *pride* and *vanity* is only an incidental property. A man is said to be *vain* of his clothes, if he gives indications that he values himself upon them as a ground of distinction; although he should not expressly seek to display himself to others.

Conceit is that species of self-valuation that respects one's talents only; it is so far therefore closely allied to *pride*; but a man is said to be *proud* of that which he really has, but to be *conceited* of that which he really has not: a man may be *proud* to an excess of merits which he actually possesses; but when he is *conceited* his merits are all in his own *conceit*; the latter is therefore obviously founded on falsehood altogether.

Vanity makes men ridiculous, *pride* odious, and ambition terrible. STEELE.

'Tis an old maxim in the schools,
That *vanity's* the food of fools. SWIFT.

The self *conceit* of the young is the great source of those dangers to which they are exposed. BLAIR.

PRIDE, HAUGHTINESS, LOFTINESS, DIGNITY.

PRIDE is employed principally as respects the temper of the mind; the other terms are employed either as respects the sentiment of the mind, or the external behaviour.

Pride is here as before (*v. Pride*), a generic term: HAUGHTINESS (*v. Haughty*), LOFTINESS (*v. High*), DIGNITY (*v. Honor*), are but modes of *pride*. *Pride*, inasmuch

as it consists purely of self esteem, is a positive sentiment which one may entertain independent of other persons: it lies in the inmost recesses of the human heart, and mingles itself insensibly with our affections and passions; it is our companion by night and by day; in public or in private; it goes with a man wherever he goes, and stays with him where he stays; it is a never failing source of satisfaction and self-complacency under every circumstance and in every situation of human life. *Haughtiness* is that mode of *pride* which springs out of one's comparison of one's self with others: the *haughty* man dwells on the inferiority of others; the *proud* man in the strict sense dwells on his own perfections. *Loftiness* is a mode of *pride* which raises the spirit above objects supposed to be inferior; it does not set man so much above others as above himself, or that which concerns himself. *Dignity* is a mode of *pride* which exalts the whole man, it is the entire consciousness of what is becoming himself and due to himself.

Pride assumes such a variety of shapes, and puts on such an infinity of disguises, that it is not easy always to recognize it at the first glance; but an insight into human nature will suffice to convince us that it is the spring of all human actions. Whether we see a man professing humility and self-abasement, or a singular degree of self-debasement, or any degree of self-exaltation, we may rest assured that his own *pride* or conscious self-importance is not wounded by any such measures; but that in all cases he is equally stimulated with the desire of giving himself in the eyes of others that degree of importance to which in his own eyes he is entitled. *Haughtiness* is an unbending species or mode of *pride* which does not stoop to any artifices to obtain gratification; but compels others to give it what it fancies to be its due. *Loftiness* and *dignity* are equally remote from any subtle pliancy, but they are in no less degree exempt from that unamiable characteristic in *haughtiness* which makes a man bear with oppressive sway upon others. A *lofty* spirit and a *dignity* of character preserve a man from yielding to the contamination of

let his territory be ever so inconsiderable; Germany is divided into a number of small states which are governed by petty *princes*. Every one reigning by himself in a state of some considerable magnitude, and having an independent authority over his subjects, is a *monarch*: kings and emperors therefore are all *monarchs*. Every *monarch* is a *sovereign* whose extent of dominion and number of subjects rises above the ordinary level; he is a *potentate* if his influence either in the cabinet or the field extends very considerably over the affairs of other nations. Although we know that *princes* are but men, yet in estimating their characters men are apt to expect more of them than what is human. It is the great concern of every *monarch* who wishes for the welfare of his subjects to choose good counsellors: whoever has approved himself a faithful subject may approach his *sovereign* with a steady confidence in having done his duty: the *potentates* of the earth may sometimes be intoxicated with their power and their triumphs, but in general they have too many mementos of their common infirmity, to forget that they are but mortal men.

Of all the *princes* who had swayed the Mexican sceptre, Montezuma was the most haughty.

ROBERTSON.

The Mexican people were warlike and enterprising, the authority of the *monarch* unbounded.

ROBERTSON.

The Peruvians yielded a blind submission to their *sovereigns*.

ROBERTSON.

How mean must the most exalted *potentate* upon earth appear to that eye which takes in innumerable orders of spirits.

ADDISON.

PRINCIPAL, *v.* Chief.

PRINCIPALLY, *v.* Especially.

PRINCIPLE, *v.* Doctrine.

PRINCIPLE, MOTIVE.

THE PRINCIPLE (*v.* Doctrine) may sometimes be the MOTIVE; but often there is a *principle* where there is no *motive*, and there is a *motive* where there is no *principle*. The *principle* lies in conscious and unconscious agents; the *motive* only in conscious agents: all nature is guided by certain *principles*; its movements go forward upon certain *principles*: man is put

into action by certain *motives*; the *principle* is the prime *moving* cause of every thing that is set in motion; the *motive* is the prime *moving* cause that sets the human machine into action. The *principle* in its restricted sense comes still nearer to the *motive*, when it refers to the opinions which we form: the *principle* in this case is that idea which we form of things, so as to regulate our conduct; the *motive* is that idea which simply impels to action; the former is therefore something permanent, and grounded upon the exercise of our reasoning powers; the latter is momentary, and arises simply from our capacity of thinking: bad *principles* lead a man into a bad course of life; bad *motives* lead him to the commission of actions bad or good.

The best legislators have been satisfied with the establishment of some sure, solid, and ruling *principle* in government.

BURKE.

The danger of betraying our weakness to our servants, and the impossibility of concealing it from them, may be justly considered as one *motive* to a regular life.

JOHNSON.

PRINT, *v.* Mark.

PRINT, *v.* Picture.

PRIOR, *v.* Antecedent.

PRIORITY, PRECEDENCE,
PRE-EMINENCE, PREFERENCE.

PRIORITY denotes the abstract quality of being before others: PRECEDENCE, from *præ* and *cedo*, signifies the state of going before: PRE-EMINENCE signifies being more eminent or elevated than others: PREFERENCE signifies being put before others. *Priority* respects simply the order of succession, and is applied to objects either in a state of motion or rest; *precedence* signifies *priority* in going, and depends upon a right or privilege; *pre-eminence* signifies *priority* in being, and depends upon merit; *preference* signifies *priority* in placing, and depends upon favor. The *priority* is applicable rather to the thing than the person; it is not that which is sought for, but that which is to be had: age frequently gives *priority* where every other claim is wanting. The immoderate desire for *precedence* is often nothing but a childish vanity; it is a distinction that flows out of rank or

ject which it is desirable to have; *prerogative* is confined to the case of making one's election, or exercising any special power; *exemption* is applicable to cases in which one is exempted from any tribute, or payment; *immunity*, from the Latin *munus* an office, is peculiarly applicable to cases in which one is freed from a service: all chartered towns or corporations have *privileges*, *exemptions*, and *immunities*: it is the *privilege* of the city of London to shut its gates against the king.

As the aged depart from the dignity, so they forfeit the *privileges* of grey hairs. BLAIR.

By the worst of usurpations, an usurpation on the *prerogatives* of nature, you attempt to force (tailors and carpenters into the state).

BURKE.

Neither nobility nor clergy (in France) enjoyed any *exemption* from the duty on consumable commodities. BURKE.

You claim an *immunity* from evil which belongs not to the lot of man. BLAIR.

PRIVILEGE, *v. Right.*

PRIZE, *v. Capture.*

TO PRIZE, *v. To value.*

PROBABILITY, *v. Chance.*

PROBITY, *v. Honesty.*

TO PROCEED, *v. To advance.*

TO PROCEED, *v. To arise.*

PROCEEDING, PROCESS,
PROGRESS.

THE manner of performing actions for the attainment of a given end is the common idea comprehended in these terms. PROCEEDING is the most general, as it simply expresses the general idea of the manner of going on; the rest are specific terms, denoting some particularity in the action, object, or circumstance. The *proceeding* is said commonly of such things as happen in the ordinary way of doing business; PROCESS is said of such things as are done by rule: the former is considered in a moral point of view; the latter in a scientific or technical point of view: the free-masons have bound themselves together by a law of secrecy not to reveal some part of their *proceedings*; the *process* by which paper is made has undergone considerable improvements since its first invention.

The *proceeding* and PROGRESS both refer to the moral actions of men; but the *proceeding* simply denotes the act of going on, or doing something; the *progress* denotes an approximation to the end: the *proceeding* may be only a partial action, comprehending both the beginning and the end; but the *progress* is applied to that which requires time, and a regular succession of action, to bring it to a completion: that is a *proceeding* in which every man is tried in a court of law; that is a *progress* which one makes in learning, by the addition to one's knowledge: hence we do not talk of the *proceeding* of life, but of the *progress* of life.

Devotion bestows that enlargement of heart in the service of God, which is the greatest principle both of perseverance and *progress* in virtue. BLAIR.

Saturnian Juno now, with double care,
Attends the fatal *process* of the war. DRYDEN.

What could be more fair, than to lay open to an enemy all that you wished to obtain, and to desire him to imitate your ingenuous *proceeding*? BURKE.

PROCEEDING, TRANSACTION.

PROCEEDING signifies literally the thing that *proceeds*; and *transaction* the thing *transacted*: the former is, therefore, of something that is going forward; the latter of something that is already done: we are witnesses to the whole *proceeding*; we inquire into the whole *transaction*. The *proceeding* is said of every event or circumstance which goes forward through the agency of men; the *transaction* only comprehends those matters which have been deliberately *transacted* or brought to a conclusion: in this sense we use the word *proceeding* in application to an affray in the street; and the word *transaction* to some commercial negotiation that has been carried on between certain persons. The *proceeding* marks the manner of *proceeding*; as when we speak of the *proceedings* in a court of law: the *transaction* marks the business *transacted*; as the *transactions* on the Exchange. A *proceeding* may be characterized as disgraceful; a *transaction* as iniquitous.

The *proceedings* of a council of old men in an American tribe, we are told, were no less

amount or aggregate result from physical or mental labor: thus, whatever the husbandman reaps from the cultivation of his land is termed the *produce* of his labor; whatever results from any public subscription or collection is, in like manner, the *produce*: the *product* is employed only in regard to the mental operation of figures, as the *product* from multiplication.

Nature also, as if desirous that so bright a *production* of her skill should be set in the fairest light, had bestowed on king Alfred every bodily accomplishment. HUMER.

A storm of hail, I am informed, has destroyed all the *produce* of my estate in Tuscany, MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

I cannot help thinking the Arabian tales the *product* of some woman's imagination. ATTERBURY.

PRODUCTION, PERFORMANCE,
WORK.

WHEN we speak of any thing as resulting from any specified operation, we term it a PRODUCTION; as the *production* of an author, signifying what he has *produced* by the effort of his mind: Homer's Iliad is esteemed as one of the finest *productions* of the imagination. When we speak of any thing as executed or *performed* by some person we term it a PERFORMANCE, as a drawing or a painting is denominated the *performance* of a particular artist. The term *production* cannot be employed without specifying or referring to the source from which it is *produced*, or the means by which it is *produced*; as the *production* of art, the *production* of the inventive faculty, the *production* of the mind, &c.: the *performance* cannot be spoken of without referring to the individual by whom it has been *performed*; hence we speak of this or that person's *performance*. When we wish to specify any thing that results from WORK or labor, it is termed a *work*: in this manner we either speak of the *work* of one's hands, or a *work* of the imagination, a *work* of time, a *work* of magnitude. The *production* results from a complicated operation; the *performance* consists of simple action; the *work* springs from active exertion: Shakspeare's plays are termed *productions*, as they respect the source from which they came,

namely, his genius; they might be called his *performances*, as far as respected the *performance* or completion of some task or specific undertaking; they would be called his *works*, as far as respected the labor which he bestowed upon them. The composition of a book is properly a *production*, when it is original matter; the sketching of a landscape, or drawing a plan, is a *performance*; the compilation of a history is a *work*.

Nature, in her *productions* slow, aspires
By just degrees to reach perfection's height. SOMERVILLE.

The *performances* of Pope were burnt by those whom he had, perhaps, selected as most likely to publish them. JOHNSON.

Yet there are some *works* which the author must consign unpublished to posterity. JOHNSON.

PROFANE, *v.* Irreligious.

TO PROFESS, DECLARE.

PROFESS, in Latin *professus*, participle of *profiteor*, compounded of *pro* and *fateor* to speak, signifies to set forth, or present to public view.

DECLARE, *v.* To declare.

An exposure of one's thoughts or opinions is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but they differ in the manner of the action, as well as the object: one *professes* by words or by actions; one *declares* only by words: a man *professes* to believe that on which he acts; but he *declares* his belief of it either with his lips or in his writings. The *profession* may be general and partial, it may amount to little more than an intimation: the *declaration* is positive and explicit; it leaves no one in doubt: a *profession* may, therefore, sometimes be hypocritical; he who *professes* may wish to imply that which is not real: a *declaration* must be either directly true or false; he who *declares* expressly commits himself upon his veracity. One *professes* either as respects single actions, or a regular course of conduct; one *declares* either passing thoughts or settled principles. A person *professes* to have walked to a certain distance; to have taken a certain route, and the like: a Christian *professes* to follow the doctrine and precepts of Christianity; a person *declares* that the

pour forth in great plenty; **PROFUSENESS** is taken from the same, in relation to conscious agents, who likewise pour forth in great plenty: the term *profusion*, therefore, is put for plenty itself, and the term *profuseness* as a characteristic of persons in the sense of extravagance.

At the hospitable board of the rich, there will naturally be a *profusion* of every thing which can gratify the appetite; when men see an unusual degree of *profusion*, they are apt to indulge themselves in *profuseness*.

Ye glitt'ring towns with wealth and splendor crown'd,
Ye fields where summer spreads *profusion* round,
For me your tributary stores combine.

GOLDENRITH.

I was convinced that the liberality of my young companions was only *profuseness*.

JOHNSON.

PROGENITORS, v. Forefathers.

PROGENY, v. Offspring.

PROGNOSTIC, v. Omen.

TO PROGNOSTICATE, v. To foretel.

PROGRESS, v. Proceeding.

PROGRESS, PROGRESSION, ADVANCE, ADVANCEMENT.

A FORWARD motion is designated by these terms: but the former, **PROGRESS** and **PROGRESSION**, simply imply this sort of motion; however **ADVANCE** and **ADVANCEMENT** also imply an approximation to some object: we may make a *progress* in that which has no specific termination, as a *progress* in learning, which may cease only with life; but the *advance* is only made to some limited point or object in view; as an *advance* in wealth or honor, which may find a termination within the life.

Progress and *advance* are said of that which has been passed over; but *progression* and *advancement* may be said of that which one is passing: the *progress* is made, or the person is in *advance*; he is in the act of *progression* or *advancement*: a child makes a *progress* in learning by daily attention; the *progression* from one stage of learning to another is not always perceptible; it is not always possible

to overtake one who is in *advance*; sometimes a person's *advancement* is retarded by circumstances that are altogether contingent: the first step in any destructive course still prepares for the second, and the second for the third, after which there is no stop, but the *progress* is infinite.

I wish it were in my power to give a regular history of the *progress* which our ancestors have made in this species of versification. TYRWHITT.

And better thence again, and better still,
In infinite *progression*. THOMSON.

The most successful students make their *advances* in knowledge by short flights. JOHNSON.

I have lived to see the fierce *advancement*, the sudden turn, and the abrupt period, of three or four enormous friendships. POPE.

PROGRESS, PROFICIENCY, IMPROVEMENT.

PROGRESS (*v. Proceeding*) is a generic term, the rest are specific; **PROFICIENCY**, from the Latin *proficio*, compounded of *pro* and *facio*, signifies a profited state, that is to say, a *progress* already made; and **IMPROVEMENT**, from the verb, signifies an improved condition, that is, *progress* in that which *improves*. The *progress* here, as in the former paragraph, marks the step or motion onward, and the two others the point already reached; but the *progress* is applied either in the proper or improper sense, that is, either to those travelling forward, or to those going on stepwise in any work; *proficiency* is applied, in the improper sense, to the ground gained in an art, and *improvement* to what is gained in science or arts: when idle people set about any work, it is difficult to perceive that they make any *progress* in it from time to time; those who have a thorough taste for either music or drawing will make a *proficiency* in them which is astonishing to those who are unacquainted with the circumstances; the *improvement* of the mind can never be so effectually and easily obtained as in the period of childhood.

Solon, the sage, his *progress* never ceas'd,
But still his learning with his days increas'd.

DEUNAN.

When the lad was about nineteen, his uncle desired to see him, that he might know what *proficiency* he had made. HAWKSWORTH.

The metrical part of our poetry, in the time of Chaucer, was capable of more *improvement*.

TYRWHITT.

made only by *words*, the *word* is often put for either, or for both, as the case requires: he who breaks his *word* in small matters cannot be trusted when he gives his *word* in matters of consequence.

An acre of performance is worth the whole world of promise. HOWEL.

The engagements I had to Dr. Swift, were such as the actual services he had done me, in relation to the subscription for Homer, obliged me to. POPE.

Æneas was our prince, a juster lord,
Or nobler warrior, never drew a sword;
Observant of the right, religious of his word. DRYDEN.

TO PROMOTE, *v.* To encourage.

PROMPT, *v.* Diligent.

PROMPT, *v.* Ready.

TO PROMULGATE, *v.* To publish.

PRONENESS, *v.* Inclination.

TO PRONOUNCE, *v.* To utter.

PROOF, *v.* Argument.

PROOF, *v.* Evidence.

PROOF, *v.* Experience.

PROP, *v.* Staff.

TO PROPAGATE, *v.* To spread.

PROPENSITY, *v.* Inclination.

PROPER, *v.* Right.

PROPERTY, *v.* Goods.

PROPERTY, *v.* Quality.

PROPITIOUS, *v.* Auspicious.

PROPITIOUS, *v.* Favorable.

TO PROPHECY, *v.* To foretel.

PROPORTION, *v.* Rate.

PROPORTION, *v.* Symmetry.

PROPORTIONATE, COMMENSURATE, ADEQUATE.

PROPORTIONATE, from the Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*, signifies having a *portion* suitable to, or in agreement with, some other object.

COMMENSURATE, from the Latin *commensus* or *commetior*, signifies measuring in accordance with some other thing, being suitable in measure to something else.

ADEQUATE, in Latin *adequatus*, participle of *adæquo*, signifies made level with some other body.

Proportionate is here a term of general use; the others are particular terms, employed in a similar sense, in regard to particular objects: that is *proportionate* which rises as a thing rises, and falls as a thing falls; that is *commensurate* which is made to rise to the same measure or degree; that is *adequate* which is made to come up to the height of another thing. *Proportionate* is employed either in the proper or improper sense: in all recipes and prescriptions of every kind *proportionate* quantities must always be taken; when the task increases in difficulty and complication, a *proportionate* degree of labor and talent must be employed upon it. *Commensurate* and *adequate* are employed only in the moral sense; the former in regard to matters of distribution, the latter in regard to the equalizing of powers: a person's recompence should in some measure be *commensurate* with his labor and deserts: a person's resources should be *adequate* to the work he is engaged in.

All envy is *proportionate* to desire.

JOHNSON.

Where the matter is not *commensurate* to the words all speaking is but tautology. SOUTH.

Outward actions are not *adequate* expressions of our virtues. ADDISON.

PROPOSAL, PROPOSITION.

PROPOSAL comes from *proposui*, in the sense of offer: PROPOSITION comes from *proponere*, in the sense of setting down in a distinct form of words. We make a *proposal* to a person to enter into partnership with him; we make a *proposition* to one who is at variance with us, to settle the difference by arbitration.

The *proposal* relates altogether to matters of personal and private interest; the *proposition* is sometimes of an abstract nature: *proposals* are made for the sale or purchase of particular articles, for the establishment of any mercantile concern, for the erection of any place or institution, and the like; *propositions* are advanced either for or against certain matters of opinion: the *proposal* is to be accepted; the *proposition* is to be admitted.

I have *proposed* a visit to her friend Lady Campbell, and my Anna seemed to receive the *proposal* with pleasure. SIR WM. JOYNSON.

PROCURE, *v.* To get.

FURNISH, in French *fournier*.

SUPPLY, in French *supplier*, Latin *suppleo* from *sub* and *pleo*, signifies to fill up a deficiency, or make up what is wanting.

Provide and *procure* are both actions that have a special reference to the future; *furnish* and *supply* are employed for that which is of immediate concern: one *provides* a dinner in the contemplation that some persons are coming to partake of it; one *procures* help in the contemplation that it may be wanted; we *furnish* a room, as we find it necessary for the present purpose; one *supplies* a family with any article of domestic use. Calculation is necessary in *providing*; one does not wish to *provide* too much or too little: labor and management are requisite in *procuring*; when the thing is not always at hand, or not easily come at, one must exercise one's strength or ingenuity to *procure* it: judgement is requisite in *furnishing*; what one *furnishes* ought to be selected with concern to the circumstances of the individual who *furnishes*: care and attention are wanted in *supplying*; we must be careful to know what a person really wants, in order to *supply* him to his satisfaction. One *provides* against all contingencies; one *procures* all necessaries; one *furnishes* all comforts; one *supplies* all deficiencies. *Provide* and *procure* are the acts of persons only; *furnish* and *supply* are the acts of unconscious agents: one's garden and orchard may be said to *furnish* us with delicacies; the earth *supplies* us with food. So in the improper application: the daily occurrences of a great city *furnish* materials for a newspaper; a newspaper, to an Englishman, *supplies* almost every other want.

A rude hand may build walls, form roofs and lay floors, and *provide* all that warmth and security require. JOHNSON.

Such dress as may enable the body to endure the different seasons, the most unenlightened nations have been able to *procure*. JOHNSON.

Your ideas are new, and borrowed from a mountainous country, the only one that can *furnish* truly picturesque scenery. GRAY.

And clouds, dissolv'd, the thirsty ground *supply*. DRYDEN.

PROVIDENCE, PRUDENCE.

PROVIDENCE and PRUDENCE are both derived from the verb to *provide*; but the former expresses the particular act of providing; the latter the habit of providing. The former is applied both to animals and men; the latter is employed only as a characteristic of men. We may admire the *providence* of the ant in laying up a store for the winter; the *prudence* of a parent is displayed in his concern for the future settlement of his child. It is *provident* in a person to adopt measures of escape for himself, in certain situations of peculiar danger; it is *prudent* to be always prepared for all contingencies.

In Albion's isle, when glorious Edgar reign'd,
He, wisely *provident*, from her white cliffs
Launch'd half her forests. SONNET.

Prudence operates on life, in the same manner as rules on composition; it produces vigilance rather than elevation. JOHNSON.

PROVIDENT, *v.* Careful.

PROVISION, *v.* Fare.

TO PROVOKE, *v.* To aggravate.

TO PROVOKE, *v.* To awaken.

TO PROVOKE, *v.* To excite.

PRUDENCE, *v.* Judgment.

PRUDENCE, *v.* Providence.

PRUDENCE, *v.* Wisdom.

PRUDENT, PRUDENTIAL.

PRUDENT (*v.* Judgment) characterizes the person or the thing; PRUDENTIAL characterizes only the thing. *Prudent* signifies having *prudence*; *prudential*, according to rules of *prudence*, or as respects *prudence*. The *prudent* is opposed to the *imprudent* and inconsiderate; the *prudential* is opposed to the voluntary: the counsel is *prudent* which accords with the principles of *prudence*; the reason or motive is *prudential*, as flowing out of circumstances of *prudence* or necessity. Every one is called upon at certain times to adopt *prudent* measures; those who are obliged to consult their means in the management of their expenses, must act upon *prudential* motives.

Then earth and ocean various forms *disclose*.
DRYDEN.

TO PULL, *v. To draw.*

PUNCTUAL, *v. Exact.*

PUNISHMENT, *v. Correction.*

TO PURCHASE, *v. To buy.*

PURE, *v. Clean.*

TO PURPOSE, *v. To design.*

TO PURPOSE, PROPOSE.

WE PURPOSE (*v. To design*) that which is near at hand, or immediately to be set about; we PROPOSE that which is more distant: the former requires the setting before one's mind, the latter requires deliberation and plan. We *purpose* many things which we never think worth while doing: but we ought not to *propose* any thing to ourselves, which is not of too much importance to be lightly adopted or rejected. We *purpose* to go to town on a certain day; we *propose* to spend our time in a particular study.

When listening Phillomela deigns
 To let them joy, and *purposes* in thought
 State, to make her night excel their day.
THOMSON.

There are but two plans on which any man
 can *propose* to conduct himself through the
 dangers and distresses of human life. BLAIR.

PURPOSE, *v. Sake.*

TO PURSUE, *v. To continue.*

TO PURSUE, *v. To follow.*

TO PUT, PLACE, LAY, SET.

PUT is in all probability contracted from *positus*, participle of *pono* to *place*.

PLACE, *v. To place.*

LAY, in Saxon *legan*, German *legen*, Latin *loco*, and Greek *τιθεμαι*, signifies to cause to lie; and SET, in German *setzen*, Latin *sisto*, from *sto* to stand, signifies to cause to stand. *Put* is the most general of all these terms; *place*, *lay*, and *set*, are but modes of *putting*; one *puts*, but the way of *putting* it is not defined; we may *put* a thing into one's room, one's desk, one's pocket, and the like; but to *place* is to *put* in a specific manner, and for a specific purpose; one *places* a book on a shelf as a fixed *place* for it, and in a position most suitable to it. To *lay* and *set* are still more specific

than *place*; the former being applied only to such things as can be made to lie; and *set* only to such as can be made to stand: a book may be said to be *laid* on the table when placed in a position; and *set* on a shelf when *placed* on one end: we *lay* ourselves down on the ground; we *set* a trunk upon the ground.

The lab'rer cuts
 Young slips, and in the soil securely *puts*.
DRYDEN.

Then youths and virgins, twice as many, join
 To *place* the dishes, and to serve the wine.
DRYDEN.

Here some design a mole, while others there
 Lay deep foundations for a theatre. DRYDEN.

TO PUTRIFY, *v. To rot.*

Q.

TO QUAKE, *v. To shake.*

QUALIFICATION, ACCOMPLISHMENT.

THE QUALIFICATION (*v. Competent*) serves the purpose of utility; the ACCOMPLISHMENT serves to adorn: by the first we are enabled to make ourselves useful; by the second we are enabled to make ourselves agreeable.

The *qualifications* of a man must be considered who has an office to perform; the *accomplishments* of a man are to be considered who has only pleasure to pursue. A readiness with one's pen, and a facility at accounts, are necessary *qualifications* either for a school or a counting-house; drawing is one of the most agreeable and suitable *accomplishments* that can be given to a young person.

The companion of an evening, and the companion for life, require very different *qualifications*.
JOHNSON.

Where nature bestows genius, education will give *accomplishments*.
CUMBERLAND.

QUALIFIED, *v. Competent.*

TO QUALIFY, *v. To fit.*

TO QUALIFY, TEMPER, HUMOR.

QUALIFY, *v. Competent.*

TEMPER, from *tempero*, is to regulate the temperament.

HUMOR from *humor*, is to suit to the *humor*.

Things are *qualified* according to

QUARREL, AFFRAY, OR FRAY.

QUARREL, v. Difference.

AFFRAY or **FRAY**, from *frico* to rub, signifies the collision of the passions.

A *quarrel* is indefinite, both as to the cause and the manner in which it is conducted; an *affray* is a particular kind of *quarrel*: a *quarrel* may subsist between two persons from a private difference; an *affray* always takes place between many upon some public occasion: a *quarrel* may be carried on merely by words; an *affray* is commonly conducted by acts of violence: many angry words pass in a *quarrel* between too hasty people; many are wounded, if not killed in *affrays*, when opposite parties meet.

The *quarrel* between my friends did not run so high as I find your accounts have made it.

STERLE.

The provost of Edinburgh, his son, and several citizens of distinction, were killed in the *fray*.

ROBERTSON.

QUARTER, v. District.

QUERY, v. Question.

TO QUESTION, v. To ask.

QUESTION, v. Doubt.

QUESTION, QUERY.

QUESTION, v. To ask.

QUERY is but a variation of *quare*, from the verb *quero* to seek or inquire.

Questions and *queries* are both put for the sake of obtaining an answer; but the former may be for a reasonable or unreasonable cause; a *query* is mostly a rational *question*: idlers may put *questions* from mere curiosity; learned men put *queries* for the sake of information.

QUICKNESS, SWIFTNESS, FLEETNESS, CELERITY, RAPIDITY, VELOCITY.

THESE terms are all applied to the motion of bodies, of which **QUICKNESS**, from *quick* and *wake*, denotes the general and simple idea which characterizes all the rest. *Quickness* is near akin to *life*, and is directly opposed to *slowness*. **SWIFTNESS**, in all probability from the German *schweifen* to roam; and **FLEETNESS**, from *fly*; express higher de-

grees of *quickness*. **CELERITY**, probably from *celer* a horse; **VELOCITY**, from *volo* to fly; and **RAPIDITY**, from *rapio* to seize or hurry along, differ more in application than in degree. *Quick* and *swift* are applicable to any objects; men are *quick* in moving, *swift* in running: dogs hear *quickly*, and run *swiftly*; a mill goes *quickly* or *swiftly* round, according to the force of the wind: *fleetness* is the peculiar characteristic of winds or horses; a horse is *fleet* in the race, and is sometimes described to be as *fleet* as the winds: that which we wish to characterize as particularly *quick* in our ordinary operations, we say is done with *celerity*; in this manner our thoughts pass with *celerity* from one object to another: those things are said to move with *rapidity* which seem to hurry every thing away with them; a river or stream moves with *rapidity*; time goes on with a *rapid* flight: *velocity* signifies the *swiftness* of flight, which is a motion that exceeds all others in *swiftness*: hence, we speak of the *velocity* of a ball shot from a cannon, or of a celestial body moving in its orbit; sometimes these words, *rapidity* and *velocity*, are applied in the improper sense by way of emphasis to the very *swift* movements of other bodies: in this manner the wheel of a carriage is said to move *rapidly*; and the flight of an animal or the progress of a vessel before the wind, is compared to the flight of a bird in point of *velocity*.

Impatience of labour seizes those who are most distinguished for *quickness* of apprehension.

JENNISON.

Above the bounding billows *swift* they flew,
Till now the Grecian camp appear'd in view.

Pope.

For fear, though *fleet*er than the wind,
Believes 'tis always left behind.

BOTLER.

By moving the eye we gather up with great *celerity* the several parts of an object, so as to form one piece.

BURKE.

Mean time the radiant sun, to mortal sight
Descending *swift*, roll'd down the rapid light.

Pope.

Lightning is productive of grandeur which it chiefly owes to the *velocity* of its motion.

BURKE.

TO QUIET, v. To appease.

QUIET, v. Ease.

QUIET, v. Peace.

TO QUIT, v. To leave.

quantity which one consumes: a *ravenous* person is loath to wait for the dressing of his food; he consumes it without any preparation: a *voracious* person not only eats in haste, but he consumes great quantities, and continues to do so for a long time. Abstinence from food, for an unusual length, will make any healthy creature *ravenous*; habitual intemperance in eating, or a diseased appetite, will produce *voracity*.

A display of our wealth before robbers is not the way to restrain their boldness, or to lessen their rapacity. BURN.

Again the holy fires on altars burn,
And once again the ravenous birds return. DRYDEN.

Ere you remark another's sin,
Bid thy own conscience look within;
Control thy more voracious bill,
Nor for a breakfast nations kill. GAY.

RAPIDITY, *v.* Quickness.

RAPINE, PLUNDER, PILLAGE.

THE idea of property taken from another contrary to his consent is included in all these terms: but the **RAPINE** includes most violence; **PLUNDER** includes most removal or carrying away; **PILLAGE** most search and scrutiny after. A soldier who makes a sudden incursion into an enemy's country, and carries away whatever comes within his reach, is guilty of *rapine*: he goes into a house full of property and carries away much *plunder*; he enters with the rest of the army into a town, and stripping it of every thing that was to be found, goes away loaded with *pillage*; mischief and bloodshed attend *rapine*; loss attends *plunder*; distress and ruin follow wherever there has been *pillage*.

Upon the banks
Of Tweed, slow winding thro' the vale, the seat
Of war and rapine once. SOMERVILLE.

Ship-money was pitched upon as fit to be formed by excise and taxes, and the burden of the subjects took off by *plunderings* and sequestrations. SOUTH.

Although the Eretrians for a time stood resolutely to the defence of their city, it was given up by treachery on the seventh day, and *pillaged* and destroyed in a most barbarous manner by the Persians. CUMBERLAND.

RAPTURE, *v.* Ecstasy.

RARE, SCARCE, SINGULAR.

RARE, in Latin *rarus*, comes from the Greek *ραιρος* *rare*.

SCARCE, in Dutch *schaers* sparing, comes from *scheren* to cut or clip, signifying cut close.

SINGULAR, *v.* Particular.

Rare and *scarce* both respect number or quantity, which admits of expansion or diminution: *rare* is a thinned number, a diminished quantity; *scarce* is a short quantity.

Rare is applied to matters of convenience or luxury; *scarce* to matters of utility or necessity: that which is *rare* becomes valuable, and fetches a high price; that which is *scarce* becomes precious, and the loss of it is seriously felt. The best of every thing is in its nature *rare*; there will never be a superfluity of such things; there are, however, some things, as particularly curious plants, or particular animals, which, owing to circumstances, are always *rare*: that which is most in use, will, in certain cases, be *scarce*; when the supply of an article fails, and the demand for it continues, it naturally becomes *scarce*. An aloe in blossom is a *rarity*, for nature has prescribed such limits to its growth as to give but very few of such flowers: the paintings of Raphael, and the former distinguished painters, are daily becoming more *scarce*, because time will diminish their quantity, although not their value.

What is *rare* will often be *singular*, and what is *singular* will often, on that account, be *rare*; but they are not necessarily applied to the same object: fewness is the idea common to both; but *rare* is said of that of which there might be more; but *singular* is applied to that which is single, or nearly single, in its kind. The *rare* is that which is always sought for; the *singular* is not always that which one esteems: a thing is *rare* which is difficult to be obtained; a thing is *singular* for its peculiar qualities, good or bad. Indian plants are many of them *rare* in England, because the climate will not agree with them; the sensitive plant is *singular*, as its quality of yielding to

RATE, *v. Value.*

RATIO, *v. Rate.*

RATIONAL, *v. Reasonable.*

RAVAGE, DESOLATION,
DEVASTATION.

RAVAGE comes from the Latin *rapio*, and the Greek $\rho\alpha\pi\iota\zeta$, signifying a seizing or tearing away.

DESOLATION, from *solus* alone, signifies made solitary or reduced to solitude.

DEVASTATION, in Latin *devastatio*, from *devasto* to lay waste, signifies reducing to a waste or desert.

Ravage expresses less than either *desolation* or *devastation*: a breaking, tearing, or destroying, is implied in the word *ravage*; but the *desolation* goes to the entire unpeopling a land, and the *devastation* to the entire clearing away of every vestige of cultivation. Torrents, flames, and tempests, *ravage*; war, plague, and famine, *desolate*; armies of barbarians, who inundate a country, carry *devastation* with them wherever they go. * Nothing resists *ravages*, they are rapid and terrible; nothing arrests *desolation*, it is cruel and unpitying; *devastation* spares nothing, it is ferocious and indefatigable. *Ravages* spread alarm and terror; *desolation*, grief and despair; *devastation*, dread and horror.

Ravage is employed likewise in the moral application; *desolation* and *devastation* only in the proper application to countries. Disease makes its *ravages* on beauty; death makes its *ravages* among men in a more terrible degree at one time than at another.

Beasts of prey retire, that all night long,
Urg'd by necessity, had rang'd the dark,
As if their conscious *ravage* shunn'd the light,
Asham'd. THOMSON.

And thy bow's the tyrant's hand is seen,
And *desolation* saddens all thy green.
GOLDENITZ.

How much the strength of the Roman republic is impaired, and what dreadful *devastation* has gone forth into all its provinces!

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

TO RAVAGE, *v. To overspread.*

RAVENOUS, *v. Rapacious.*

* Vide Roubaud: "Ravager, desoler, devastar, saccager."

RAY, BEAM.

RAY (*v. Gleam*) is indefinite in its meaning; it may be said either of a large or small quantity of light: BEAM (*v. Gleam*) is something positive; it can be said only of that which is considerable. We can speak of *rays* either of the sun, or the stars, or any other luminous body; but we speak of the *beams* of the sun or the moon. The *rays* of the sun break through the clouds; the *beams* of the sun are scorching at noon-day.

A room can scarcely be so shut up, that a single *ray* of light shall not penetrate through the crevices; the sea, in a calm moon-light night, presents a beautiful spectacle, with the moon's *beams* playing on its waves.

The stars emit a shivered ray. THOMSON.

The modest virtues mingle in her eyes,
Still on the ground dejected, darting all
Their humid beams into the blooming flowers.
THOMSON.

RAY, *v. Gleam.*

TO RAZE, *v. To demolish.*

TO REACH, STRETCH, EXTEND.

REACH, through the medium of the northern languages, as also the Latin *rego* in the word *porrigo*, and the Greek $\rho\epsilon\gamma\omega$, comes from the Hebrew *rekang* to draw out, and *arek* the length.

STRETCH is but an intensive of *reach*.

EXTEND, *v. To extend.*

The idea of drawing out in a line is common to these terms, but they differ in the mode and circumstances of the action. To *reach* and to *stretch* is employed only for drawing out in a straight line, that is, lengthwise; *extend* may be employed to express the drawing out in all directions. In this sense a wall is said to *reach* a certain number of yards; a neck of land is said to *stretch* into the sea; a wood *extends* many miles over a country. As the act of persons, in the proper sense, they differ still more widely; *reach* and *stretch* signify drawing to a given point, and for a given end; *extend* has no such collateral meaning. We *reach* in order to take hold of something; we *stretch* in order

to surmount some object: a person *reaches* with his arm in order to get down a book; he *stretches* his neck in order to see over another person: in both cases we might be said simply to *extend* the arm or the neck, where the collateral circumstance is not to be expressed.

In the improper application, they have a similar distinction: to *reach* is applied to the movements which one makes to a certain end, and is equivalent to arriving at, or attaining. A traveller strives to *reach* his journey's end as quickly as possible; an ambitious man aims at *reaching* the summit of human power or honor. To *stretch* is applied to the direction which one gives to another object, so as to bring it to a certain point; a ruler *stretches* his power or authority to its utmost limits. To *extend* retains its original unqualified meaning; as when we speak of *extending* the meaning or application of a word, of *extending* one's bounty or charity, *extending* one's sphere of action, and the like.

The whole power of cunning is privative; to say nothing, and to do nothing, is the utmost of its reach. JOHNSON.

Plains immense
Lie stretch'd below interminable meads. THOMSON.

Our life is short, but to *extend* that span
To vast eternity is virtue's work. SHAKESPEARE.

READY, *v. Easy.*

READY, APT, PROMPT.

READY, *v. Easy.*

APT, in Latin *aptus*, signifies literally fitness.

PROMPT, *v. Expedition.*

Ready is in general applied to that which has been intentionally prepared for a given purpose; *promptness* and *aptness* are species of *readiness*, which lie in the personal endowments or disposition: hence we speak of things being *ready* for a journey; persons being *apt* to learn, or *prompt* to obey or to reply. *Ready*, when applied to persons, characterizes the talent; as a *ready* wit: *apt* characterizes their habits; as *apt* to judge by appearance, or *apt* to decide hastily: *prompt* characterizes more commonly the particular action, and denotes the will-

ingness of the agent, and the quickness with which he performs the action; as *prompt* in executing a command, or *prompt* to listen to what is said.

The god himself with ready trident stands,
And opens the deep, and spreads the moving
sands. DAYTON.

Let not the fervent tongue,
Prompt to deceive, with adulation smooth,
Gain on your purposes'd will. THOMSON.

Poverty is apt to betray a man into envy,
riches into arrogance. ARISTOTEL.

REAL, *v. Actual.*

REAL, *v. Intrinsic.*

TO REALIZE, *v. To fulfil.*

REALM, *v. State.*

REASON, *v. Argument.*

REASON, *v. Cause.*

REASON, *v. Consideration.*

REASON, *v. Sake.*

REASONABLE, *v. Fair.*

REASONABLE, RATIONAL,

ARE both derived from the same Latin word *ratio* reason, which, from *ratus* and *reor* to think, signifies the thinking faculty.

REASONABLE signifies accordant with reason; RATIONAL signifies having reason in it: the former is more commonly applied in the sense of right reason, propriety, or fairness; the latter is employed in the original sense of the word *reason*: hence we term a man *reasonable* who acts according to the principles of right reason; and a being *rational*, who is possessed of the *rational* or *reasoning* faculty, in distinction from the brutes. It is to be lamented that there are much fewer *reasonable* than there are *rational* creatures.

Human nature is the same in all reasonable creatures. ARISTOTEL.

The evidence which is afforded for a future state is sufficient for a rational ground of conduct. BLAKE.

REBELLION, *v. Contumacy.*

REBELLION, *v. Insurrection.*

TO REBOUND, REVERBERATE,

RECOIL.

To REBOUND is to bound or

spring back : a ball *rebounds*. To REVERBERATE is to *verberate* or beat back : a sound *reverberates* when it echoes. To RECOIL is to *coil* or whirl back : a snake *recoils*. The former two are rarely used in an improper application ; but we may say of *recoil*, that a man's schemes will *recoil* on his own head.

Honour is but the reflection of a man's own actions shining bright in the face of all about him, and from thence *rebounding* upon himself.

SOUTH.

You seemed to *reverberate* upon me with the beams of the sun.

HOWEL.

Who in deep mines for hidden knowledge toils,
Like guns o'ercharg'd, breaks, misses, or *recoils*,

DENHAM.

TO REBUFF, *v.* To refuse.

TO REBUKE, *v.* To check.

TO RECAL, *v.* To abjure.

TO RECANT, *v.* To abjure.

TO RECAPITULATE, *v.* To repeat.

TO RECEDE, RETREAT, RETIRE,
WITHDRAW, SECEDE.

To RECEDE is to go back ; to RETREAT is to draw back : the former is a simple action, suited to one's convenience ; the latter is a particular action, dictated by necessity : we *recede* by a direct backward movement ; we *retreat* by an indirect backward movement : we *recede* a few steps in order to observe an object more distinctly ; we *retreat* from the position we have taken, in order to escape danger : whoever can advance can *recede* ; but in general those only *retreat* whose advance is not free : *receding* is the act of every one ; *retreating* is peculiarly the act of soldiers, or those who make hostile movements. To RETIRE and WITHDRAW originally signify the same as *retreat*, that is, draw back or off ; but they agree in application mostly with *recede* : to *recede* is to go back from a given spot ; but to *retire* and *withdraw* have respect to the place or the presence of the persons : we may *recede* on an open plain ; but we *retire* or *withdraw* from a room, or from some company. In this application *withdraw* is the more familiar term : *retire* may likewise be used for an army ; but it denotes a much more leisurely action

than *retreat* : a general *retreats*, by compulsion, from an enemy ; but he may *retire* from an enemy's country when there is no enemy present.

Recede, *retire*, and *withdraw*, are also used in a moral application ; SECEDE is used only in this sense : a person *recedes* from his engagement, which is seldom justifiable ; he *retires* from business, or *withdraws* from a society. To *secede* is a public act : men *secede* from a religious or political body : *withdraw* is a private act ; they *withdraw* themselves as individual members from any society.

We were soon brought to the necessity of *receding* from our imagined equality with our cousins.

JOHNSON.

Retirement from the world's cares and pleasures has been often recommended as useful to repentance.

JOHNSON.

A temptation may *withdraw* for a while, and return again.

SOUTH.

How certain is our ruin, unless we sometimes *retreat* from this pestilential region (the world of pleasure).

BLAIR.

Platistratus and his sons maintained their usurpations during a period of sixty-eight years, including those of Platistratus' *secessions* from Athens.

CUMBERLAND.

RECEIPT, RECEPTION.

RECEIPT comes from *receive*, in its application to inanimate objects, which are taken into possession.

RECEPTION comes from the same verb, in the sense of treating persons at their first arrival : in the commercial intercourse of men, the *receipt* of goods or money must be acknowledged in writing ; in the friendly intercourse of men, their *reception* of each other will be polite or cold, according to the sentiments entertained towards the individual.

If a man will keep but of even hand, his ordinary expences ought to be but to half of his *receipts*.

BACON.

I thank you and Mrs. Pope for my kind *reception*.

ATTENBURY.

TO RECEIVE, ACCEPT.

THE idea of taking, from the Latin *cipio*, is common to these words ; but to RECEIVE is to take back ; to ACCEPT is to take to one's self : the former is an act of right, we *receive* what is our own ; the latter is an act of courtesy, we *accept* what is offered another. To *receive* simply excludes the idea of refusal ; to *accept* includes

been just received : princes *recognise* certain principles, which have been admitted by previous consent ; they *acknowledge* the justice of claims which are preferred before them.

When conscience threatens punishment to secret crimes, it manifestly *recognizes* a Supreme Governor from whom nothing is hidden.

BLAIR.

I call it atheism by establishment, when any state, as such, shall not *acknowledge* the existence of God, as the moral governor of the world.

BURKE.

TO RECOIL, *v. To rebound.*

RECOLLECTION, *v. Memory.*

RECOMPENSE, *v. Compensation.*

RECOMPENSE, *v. Gratuity.*

TO RECONCILE, *v. To conciliate.*

TO RECORD, *v. To enrol.*

RECORD, REGISTER, ARCHIVE.

RECORD is taken for the thing *recorded* ; REGISTER, either for the thing *registered*, or the place in which it is *registered* ; ARCHIVE, mostly for the place, and sometimes for the thing : the *records* are either historical details, or short notices ; the *registers* are but short notices of particular and local circumstances ; the *archives* are always connected with the state : every place of antiquity has its *records* of the different circumstances which have been connected with its rise and progress, and the various changes which it has experienced ; in public *registers* we find accounts of families, and of their various connexions and fluctuations ; in the *archives* we find all legal deeds and instruments which involve the interests of the nation, both in its internal and external economy.

TO RECOUNT, *v. To relate.*

TO RECOVER, RETRIEVE,
REPAIR, RECRUIT.

RECOVER is to get again under one's cover or protection.

RETRIEVE, from the French *trouver* to find, is to get again.

REPAIR, in French *reparer*, Latin *reparo*, from *paro* to get, signifies likewise to get again, or make good as it was before.

RECRUIT, in French *recru*, from *cro* and the Latin *creco* to grow, sig-

nifies to grow again, or come fresh again.

Recover is the most general term, and applies to objects in general ; *retrieve*, *repair*, and the others, are only partial applications : we *recover* things either by our own means or by casualties ; we *retrieve* and *repair* by our own efforts only : we *recover* that which has been taken, or that which has been any way lost ; we *retrieve* that which we have lost ; we *repair* that which has been injured ; we *recruit* that which has been diminished : we *recover* property from those who wish to deprive us of it ; we *retrieve* our misfortunes, or our lost reputation ; we *repair* the mischief which has been done to our property ; we *recruit* the strength which has been exhausted : we do not seek after that which we think *irrecoverable* ; we give that up which is *irretrievable* ; we lament over that which is *irreparable* ; our power of *recruiting* depends upon circumstances ; he who makes a moderate use of his resources, may in general easily *recruit* himself when they are gone.

The serious and impartial retrospect of our conduct is indisputably necessary to the confirmation or *recovery* of our virtue. JOHNSON.

Why may not the soul receive
New organs, since ev'n art can these *retrieve* ? JENYNS.

Your men shall be receiv'd, your fleet *repair'd*. DRYDEN.

With greens and flow'rs *recruit* their empty
hives. DRYDEN.

RECOVERY, RESTORATION.

RECOVERY is one's own act ; RESTORATION is the act of another : we *recover* the thing we have lost, when it comes again into our possession ; but it is *restored* to us by another : a king *recovers* his crown by force of arms, from the hands of a usurper ; his crown is *restored* to him by the will of his people : the *recovery* of property is good fortune ; the *restoration* of property an act of justice.

Both are employed likewise in regard to one's health : but the former simply designates the regaining of the health ; the latter refers to the instrument by which it is brought about : the *recovery* of his health is of the first importance to ev

a moral quality, the former is much stronger than the latter: a man is said to be *reduced* to an abject condition; but to be *lowered* in the estimation of others, to be *reduced* to a state of slavery, to be *lowered* in his own eyes.

The regular metres then in use may be *reduced*, I think, to four. TYRWHITT.

It would be a matter of astonishment to me, that any critic should be found proof against the beauties of Agamemnon as to *lower* its author to a comparison with Sophocles or Euripides.

CUMBERLAND.

REDUNDANCY, *v. Excess.*

TO REEL, *v. To stagger.*

TO REFER, *v. To allude.*

TO REFER, RELATE, RESPECT, REGARD.

REFER, from the Latin *re* and *ferro*, signifies literally to bring back; and RELATE, from the participle *latus* of the same verb, signifies brought back: the former is, therefore, transitive, and the latter intransitive. One *refers* a person to a thing; one thing *refers*, that is, *refers* a person, to another thing: one thing *relates*, that is, is *related*, to another. To *refer* is an arbitrary act, it depends upon the will of an individual; we may *refer* a person to any part of a volume, or to any work we please: to *relate* is a conditional act, it depends on the nature of things; nothing *relates* to another without some point of accordance between the two; orthography *relates* to grammar, that is, by being a part of the grammatical science. Hence it arises that *refer*, when employed for things, is commonly said of circumstances that carry the memory to events or circumstances; *relate* is said of things that have a natural connexion: the religious festivals and ceremonies of the Roman Catholics have all a *reference* to some events that happened in the early periods of Christianity; the notes and observations at the end of a book *relate* to what has been inserted in the text.

Refer and *relate* carry us back to that which may be very distant; but RESPECT and REGARD (*v. To esteem*) turn our views to that which is near. The object of the action *refer* and *relate* is indirectly acted

upon, and consequently stands in the oblique case: we *refer* to an object; a thing *relates* to an object: but the object of the action *respect* and *regard* is directly acted upon, therefore it stands in the accusative or objective case: we *respect* or *regard* a thing, not to a thing. Whatever *respects* or *regards* a thing has a moral influence over it; but the former is more commonly employed than the latter: it is the duty of the magistrates to take into consideration whatever *respects* the good order of the community: what *relates* to a thing is often more intimately connected than what *respects*; and, on the contrary, what *respects* comprehends in it more than what *relates*. To *relate* is to *respect*; but to *respect* is not always to *relate*: the former includes every species of affinity or accordance; the latter only that which flows out of the properties and circumstances of things: when a number of objects are brought together, which fitly associate, and properly *relate* the one to the other, they form a grand whole, as in the case of any scientific work which is digested into a scheme; when all the incidental circumstances which *respect* either moral principles or moral conduct are properly weighed, they will enable one to form a just judgement.

Respect is said of objects in general; *regard* mostly of that which enters into the feeling: laws *respect* the general welfare of the community; the due administration of the laws *regards* the happiness of the individual.

Our Saviour's words (in his sermon on the mount) all *refer* to the Pharisees' way of speaking.

SOUTH.

Homer artfully interweaves, in the several succeeding parts of his poem, an account of every thing material which *relates* to his princes.

ADDISON.

Religion is a pleasure to the mind, as *respects* practice.

SOUTH.

What I have said *regards* only the vain part of the sex.

ADDISON.

REFINED, *v. Polite.*

REFINEMENT, *v. Cultivation.*

TO REFLECT, *v. To consider.*

TO REFLECT, *v. To think.*

REFLECTION, *v. Insimulation.*

TO REFORM, *v. To amend.*

TO REGARD, *v.* To attend to.

REGARD, *v.* Care.

TO REGARD, *v.* To esteem.

TO REGARD, *v.* To refer.

REGARDFUL, *v.* Mindful.

REGARDLESS, *v.* Indifferent.

REGIMEN, *v.* Food.

REGION, *v.* District.

TO REGISTER, *v.* To enrol.

REGISTER, *v.* List.

REGISTER, *v.* Record.

TO REGRET, *v.* To complain.

TO REGULATE, *v.* To direct.

TO REGULATE, *v.* To govern.

TO REHARSE, *v.* To repeat.

REIGN, *v.* Empire.

TO REJECT, *v.* To refuse.

REJOINDER, *v.* Answer.

TO RELATE, *v.* To refer.

TO RELATE, RECOUNT,
DESCRIBE.

RELATE, in Latin *relatus*, participle of *referro*, signifies to bring that to the notice of others which has before been brought to our own notice.

RECOUNT is properly to count again, or count over again.

DESCRIBE, from the Latin *scribo* to write, is literally to write down.

The idea of giving an account of events or circumstances is common to all these terms, which differ in the object and circumstances of the action.

Relate is said generally of all events, both of those which concern others as well as ourselves; *recount* is said only of those which concern ourselves: those who *relate* all they hear often *relate* that which never happened; it is a gratification to an old soldier to *recount* all the transactions in which he bore a part during the military career of his early youth. We *relate* events that have happened at any period of time immediate or remote; we *recount* mostly those things which have been long passed: in *recounting*, the memory reverts to past scenes, and counts over all that has deeply interested the

mind. Travellers are pleased to *relate* to their friends whatever they have seen remarkable in other countries; the *recounting* of our adventures in distant regions of the globe has a peculiar interest for all who hear them. We may *relate* either by writing or by word of mouth; we *recount* only by word of mouth: writers of travels sometimes give themselves a latitude in *relating* more than they have either heard or seen; he who *recounts* the exploits of heroism, which he has either witnessed or performed, will always meet with a delighted audience.

Relate and *recount* are said of that only which passes: *describe* is said of that which exists: we *relate* the particulars of our journey; and we *describe* the country we pass through. Personal adventure is always the subject of a *relation*; the quality and condition of things are those of the *description*. We *relate* what happened on meeting a friend; we *describe* the dress of the parties, or the ceremonies which are usual on particular occasions.

O Muse! the causes and the crimes *relate*,
What goddess was provok'd, and whence her
hate. DRYDEN.

To recount Almighty works
What words or tongue of seraph can suffice?
MILTON.

In *describing* a rough torrent or deluge, the
numbers should run easy and flowing. FORD.

RELATED, *v.* Connected.

RELATION, RECITAL, NARRATION.

RELATION, from the verb *relate*, denotes the act of *relating*.

RECITAL, from *recite*, denotes the act of *reciting*.

NARRATIVE, from *narrate*, denotes the thing *narrated*. *Relation* is here, as in the former paragraph (*v.* To *relate*), the general, and the others particular terms. *Relation* applies to every object which is related whether of a public or private, a national or an individual nature; history is the *relation* of national events; biography is the *relation* of particular lives: *recital* is the *relation* or repetition of actual or existing circumstances; we listen to the *recital* of misfortunes, distresses, and the like. The *relation* may concern matters of indifference: the *recital* is

remains: RELICS, from the Latin *relinquo* to leave, signifies what is left. The former is a term of general and familiar application; the latter is specific. What *remains* after the use or consumption of any thing is termed the *remains*; what is left of any thing after a lapse of years is the *relic* or *relics*. There are *remains* of buildings mostly after a conflagration; there are *relics* of antiquity in most monasteries and old churches.

Remains are of value, or not, according to the circumstances of the cases; *relics* always derive a value from the person to whom they were supposed originally to belong. The *remains* of a person, that is, what corporeally *remains* of a person, after the extinction of life, will be respected by his friend; a bit of a garment that belonged, or was supposed to belong, to some saint, will be a precious *relic* in the eyes of a superstitious Roman Catholic. All nations have agreed to respect the *remains* of the dead; religion, under most forms, has given a sacredness to *relics* in the eyes of its most zealous votaries; the veneration of genius, or the devotedness of friendship, has in like manner transferred itself, from the individual himself, to some object which has been his property or in his possession, and thus fabricated for itself *relics* equally precious.

Upon these friendly shores, and flow'ry plains,
Which hide Anchises and his blest *remains*.

DRYDEN.

All those arts, rarities, and inventions, which the ingenious pursue, and all admire, are but the *reliques* of an intellect defaced with sin and time.

SOUTH.

REMARK, OBSERVATION, COMMENT, NOTE, ANNOTATION, COMMENTARY.

REMARK (*v. To notice*); and OBSERVATION (*v. To notice*); and COMMENT, in Latin *commentum*, from *comminiscor* to call to mind; are either spoken or written: NOTE, ANNOTATION (*v. Note*); COMMENTARY a variation of *comment*; are always written. *Remark* and *observation* admitting of the same distinction in both cases, have been sufficiently explained in the article referred to: *comment* is a species of *remark* which often loses in good

nature what it gains in seriousness; it is mostly applied to particular persons or cases, and more commonly employed as a vehicle of censure than of commendation; public speakers and public performers are exposed to all the *comments* which the vanity, the envy, and ill nature of self-constituted critics can suggest; but when not employed in personal cases, it serves for explanation: the other terms are used in this sense only, but with certain modifications; the *note* is most general, and serves to call the attention to as well as illustrate particular passages in the text: *annotations* and *commentaries* are more minute; the former being that which is added by way of appendage; the latter being employed in a general form; as the *annotations* of the Greek scholiasts, and the *commentaries* on the sacred writings.

Spence in his *remarks* on Pope's *Odyssey*, produces what he thinks an unconquerable quotation from Dryden's preface to the *Æneid*, in favor of translating an epic poem into blank verse.

JOHNSON.

If the critic has published nothing but rules and observations on criticism, I then consider whether there be a propriety and elegance in his thoughts and words.

ANSTON.

Sublime or low, unbended or intense,
The sound is still a comment to the sense.

ROSCOMMON.

The history of the notes (to Pope's *Homer*) has never been traced.

JOHNSON.

I love a critic who mixes the rules of life with *annotations* upon writers.

STEELE.

Memoirs or memorials are of two kinds, whereof the one may be termed *commentaries*, the other registers.

BACON.

REMARKABLE, *v. Extraordinary*.

TO REMARK, *v. To notice*.

TO REMEDY, *v. To cure*.

REMEDY, *v. Cure*.

REMEMBRANCE, *v. Memory*.

REMEMBRANCE, *v. Monument*.

REMINISCENCE, *v. Memory*.

REMISS, *v. Negligent*.

TO REMIT, *v. To forgive*.

TO REMIT, *v. To relax*.

REMNANT, *v. Rest*.

REMORSE, *v. Repentance*.

amiss. CONTRITION, from *con-tero* to rub together, or bruise as it were with sorrow; COMPUNCTION, from *compungo* to prick thoroughly; and REMORSE, from *remordeo* to have a gnawing pain; all express modes of *penitence* differing in degree and circumstance. *Repentance* refers more to the change of one's mind with regard to an object, and is properly confined to the time when this change takes place; we therefore, strictly speaking, *repent* of a thing but once; we may, however, have *penitence* for the same thing all our lives. *Repentance* may be felt for trivial matters; we may *repent* of going or not going, speaking or not speaking: *penitence* refers only to serious matters; we are *penitent* only for our sins. Errors of judgement will always be attended with *repentance* in a mind that is striving to do right; there is no human being so perfect but that, in the sight of God, he will have occasion to be *penitent* for many acts of commission and omission.

Repentance may be felt for errors which concern only ourselves, or at most offences against our fellow-creatures; *penitence*, and the other terms, are applicable only to offences against the moral and Divine law, that law which is engraven on the heart of every man. We may *repent* of not having made a bargain that we afterwards find would have been advantageous, or we may *repent* of having done any injury to our neighbour; but our *penitence* is awakened when we reflect on our unworthiness or sinfulness in the sight of our Maker. This *penitence* is a general sentiment, which belongs to all men as offending creatures; but *contrition*, *compunction*, and *remorse*, are awakened by reflecting on particular offences: *contrition* is a continued and severe sorrow, appropriate to one who has been in a continued state of peculiar sinfulness: *compunction* is rather an occasional but sharp sorrow, provoked by a single offence, or a moment's reflection; *remorse* may be temporary, but it is a still sharper pain awakened by some particular offence of peculiar magnitude and atrocity. The prodigal son

was a *contrite* sinner; the brethren of Joseph felt great *compunction* when they were carried back with their sacks to Egypt; David was struck with *remorse* for the murder of Uriah.

These four terms depend not so much on the measure of guilt, as on the sensibility of the offender. Whoever reflects most deeply on the enormity of sin will be most sensible of *penitence* when he sees his own liability to offend. In those who have most offended, and are come to a sense of their own condition, *penitence* will rise to deep *contrition*. There is no man so hardened that he will not some time or other feel *compunction* for the crimes he has committed. He who has the liveliest sense of the Divine goodness, will feel keen *remorse* whenever he reflects on any thing that he has done, by which he fears to have forfeited the favor of so good a Being.

This is the sinner's hard lot, that the same thing which makes him need *repentance* makes him also in danger of not obtaining it. SCOT. Heaven may forgive a crime to *penitence*, For heaven can judge if *penitence* be true.

DRYDEN.

Contrition, though it may melt, ought not sink, or overpower the heart of a Christian.

BLAIR.

All men, even the most depraved, are subject more or less to *compunctions* of conscience.

BLAIR.

The heart,
Pierc'd with a sharp *remorse* for guilt, disclaims
The costly poverty of becatombs,
And offers the best sacrifice itself. JEFFRY.

REPETITION, TAUTOLOGY.

REPETITION is to TAUTOLOGY as the genus to the species: the latter being as a species of vicious *repetition*. There may be frequent *repetitions* which are warranted by necessity or convenience; but *tautology* is that which nowise adds to either the sense or the sound. A *repetition* may, or may not, consist of literally the same words; but *tautology*, from the Greek *ταυτος* the same, and *λογος* the word, supposes such a sameness in the verbiage, as renders the signification the same. In the liturgy of the Church of England there are some *repetitions*, which add to the solemnity of the worship; in most extemporary prayers there is much *tautology*, that

destroys the religious effect of the whole.

That is truly and really tautology, where the same thing is repeated, though under never so much variety of expression. SOUTH.

TO REPINE, *v.* To complain.

TO REPLY, *v.* To answer.

REPORT, *v.* Fame.

REPOSE, *v.* Ease.

TO REPOSE, *v.* To recline.

REPREHENSION, REPROOF.

PERSONAL blame or censure is implied by both these terms, but the former is much milder than the latter. By REPREHENSION the personal independence is not so sensibly affected as in the case of REPROOF: people of all ages and stations whose conduct is exposed to the investigation of others are liable to *reprehension*; but children only or such as are in a subordinate capacity are exposed to *reproof*. The *reprehension* amounts to little more than passing an unfavourable sentence upon the conduct of another: *reproof* adds to this an unfriendly address to the offender. The master of a school may be exposed to the *reprehension* of the parents for any supposed impropriety: his scholars are subject to his frequent *reproof*.

When a man feels the *reprehension* of a friend, seconded by his own heart, he is easily heated into resentment. JOHNSON.

There is an oblique way of *reproof* which takes off from the sharpness of it. STEELE.

REPRESENTATION, *v.* Show.

TO REPRESS, RESTRAIN,
SUPPRESS.

To REPRESS is to press back or down: to RESTRAIN is to strain back or down: the former is the general, the latter the specific term: we always *repress* when we *restrain*, but not *vice versâ*. *Repress* is used mostly for pressing down, so as to keep that inward which wants to make its appearance: *restrain* is an habitual *repression* by which it is kept in a state of lowness: a person is said to *repress* his feelings when he does not give them vent either by his words or actions; he is said to *restrain* his feelings when he never lets them rise be-

yond a certain pitch: good morals as well as good manners call upon us to *repress* every unseemly expression of joy in the company of those who are not in a condition to partake of our joy; it is prudence as well as virtue to *restrain* our appetites by an habitual forbearance, that they may not gain the ascendancy. One cannot too quickly *repress* a rising spirit of resistance in any community large or small; one cannot too early *restrain* the irregularities of childhood. The innocent vivacity of youth should not be *repressed*; but their wildness and intemperance ought to be *restrained*.

Philosophy has often attempted to *repress* solace by asserting that all conditions are levelled by death. JOHNSON.

He that would keep the power of sin from running out into act, must *restrain* it from coming with the object. SOUTH.

To *repress* is simply to keep down or to keep from rising within oneself. To SUPPRESS is to keep under or to keep from appearing in public. A judicious parent *represses* every tumultuous passion in a child; a judicious commander *suppresses* a rebellion by a timely and resolute exercise of authority. Hence the term *repress* is used only for the feelings or the movements of the mind: but *suppress* may be employed for that which is external. We *repress* violence; *suppress* publications, or information.

Her forwardness was *repressed* with a frown by her mother or aunt. JOHNSON.

With him Palemon kept the watch at night,
In whose sad bosom many a sigh *suppress*
Some painful secret of the soul confest.

FALCONER.

REPRIEVE, RESPITE.

REPRIEVE comes in all probability from the French *repris*, participle of *reprendre*, and the Latin *reprehendo*, signifying to take back or take off that which has been laid on.

RESPITE, in all probability is changed from *respiratus*, participle of *respiro*, signifying to breathe again.

The idea of a release from any pressure or burden is common to these terms; but the *reprieve* is that which is granted; the *respite* sometimes comes to us in the course of things: we gain a *reprieve* from any punish-

ment or trouble which threatens us; we gain a *respite* from any labor or weight that presses upon us. A criminal gains a *reprieve* when the punishment of death is commuted for that of transportation; a debtor may be said to obtain a *reprieve* when, with a prison before his eyes, he gets such indulgence from his creditors as sets him free: there is frequently no *respite* for persons in a subordinate station, when they fall into the hands of a hard task master; Sisyphus is feigned by the poets to have been condemned to the toil of perpetually rolling a stone up a hill as fast as it rolled back, from which toil he had no *respite*.

All that I ask is but a short *reprieve*,
Till I forget to love and learn to grieve,
Some pause and *respite* only I require,
Till with my tears I shall have quench'd my fire.
DENHAM.

TO REPRIMAND, *v.* To check.

REPRISAL, *v.* Retaliation.

TO REPROACH, *v.* To blame.

REPROACH, *v.* Discredit.

REPROACH, CONTUMELY,
OBLOQUY.

REPROACH, *v.* To blame.

CONTUMELY, from *contumeo*, that is, *contra tumeo*, signifies to swell up against.

OBLOQUY, from *ob* and *loquor*, signifies speaking against or to the disparagement of.

The idea of contemptuous or angry treatment of others is common to all these terms; but *reproach* is the general, *contumely* and *obloquy* are the particular terms. *Reproach* is either deserved or undeserved; the name of Paritan is applied as a term of *reproach* to such as affect greater purity than others; the name of Christian is a name of *reproach* in Turkey: *contumely* is always undeserved; it is the insolent swelling of a worthless person against merit in distress; our Saviour was exposed to the *contumely* of the Jews: *obloquy* is always supposed to be deserved; it is applicable to those whose conduct has rendered them objects of general censure, and whose name therefore has almost become a *reproach*. A man who uses his power

only to oppress those who are connected with him will naturally and deservedly bring upon himself much *obloquy*.

Has foul *reproach* a privilege from heav'n?

Pope.

The royal captives followed in the train,
amidst the horrid yells, and frantick dances, and
infamous *contumelies*, of the furies of hell.

BURKE.

How many men of honor are exposed from
party spirit to public *obloquy* and *reproach*?

ADAMSON.

REPROACHFUL, ABUSIVE,
SCURRILOUS.

REPROACHFUL or full of *reproach* (*v.* *Reproach*).

ABUSIVE, or full of *abuse* (*v.* *Abuse*).

SCURRILOUS, in Latin *scurrilis*, from *scurra*, signifies like a buffoon or saucy jester.

Reproachful, when applied to the person, signifies full of *reproaches*; when to the thing, deserving of *reproach*: *abusive* is only applied to the person, signifying after the manner of *abuse*: *scurrilous* is employed as an epithet either for persons or things, signifying using *scurrility*, or after the manner of *scurrility*. The conduct of a person is *reproachful* in as much as it provokes or is entitled to the *reproaches* of others; the language of a person is *reproachful* when it abounds in *reproaches*, or partakes of the nature of a *reproach*: a person is *abusive* who indulges himself in *abuse* or *abusive* language: and he is *scurrilous* who adopts *scurrility* or *scurrilous* language.

When applied to the same object, whether to the person or to the thing, they rise in sense: the *reproachful* is less than the *abusive*, and this than the *scurrilous*: the *reproachful* is sometimes warranted by the provocation; but the *abusive* and *scurrilous* are always unwarrantable: *reproachful* language may be, and generally is consistent with decency and propriety of speech; *abusive* and *scurrilous* language are outrages against the laws of good breeding, if not of morality. A parent may sometimes find it necessary to address an unruly son in *reproachful* terms; or one friend may adopt a *reproachful* tone to another; none

its peculiar faculty, the memory; certain substances are said to *retain* the colour with which they have been dyed.

Augustus caused most of the prophetic books to be burnt, as spurious, *reserving* only those which bore the name of some of the sybils for their authors. PRIDEAUX.

The beauties of Homer are difficult to be lost, and those of Virgil to be *retained*. JOHNSON.

TO RESIDE, *v. To abide.*

RESIDUE, *v. Rest.*

TO RESIGN, *v. To abandon.*

TO RESIGN, *v. To give up.*

RESIGNATION, *v. Patience.*

TO RESIST, *v. To oppose.*

TO RESOLVE, *v. To determine.*

TO RESOLVE, *v. To solve.*

RESOLUTE, *v. Decided.*

RESOLUTION, *v. Courage.*

TO RESORT TO, *v. To frequent.*

RESOURCE, *v. Expedient.*

TO RESPECT, *v. To esteem.*

TO RESPECT, *v. To honor.*

TO RESPECT, *v. To refer.*

RESPECTFUL, *v. Dutiful.*

RESPITE, *v. Interval.*

RESPITE, *v. Reprieve.*

RESPONSE, *v. Answer.*

RESPONSIBLE, *v. Answerable.*

REST, *v. Cessation.*

TO REST, *v. To found.*

REST, *v. Ease.*

REST, REMAINDER, REMNANT, RESIDUE.

REST evidently comes from the Latin *resto*, in this case, though not in the former (*v. Ease*), signifying what stands or remains back.

REMAINDER literally signifies what remains after the first part is gone. REMNANT is but a variation of *remainder*.

RESIDUE, from *reside*, signifies likewise what keeps back.

All these terms express that part which is separated from the other and left distinct: *rest* is the most general, both in sense and application; the

others have a more specific meaning and use: the *rest* may be either that which is left behind by itself or that which is set apart as a distinct portion: the *remainder*, *remnant*, and *residue*, are the quantities which remain when the other parts are gone. The *rest* is said of any part, large or small; but the *remainder* commonly regards the smaller part which has been left after the greater part has been taken. A person may be said to sell some and give away the *rest*: when a number of hearty persons sit down to a meal, the *remainder* of the provisions, after all have been satisfied, will not be considerable. *Rest* is applied either to persons or things; *remainder* only to things: some were of that opinion, but the *rest* did not agree to it: the *remainder* of the paper was not worth preserving. *Remnant*, from *remanens* in Latin, is a species of *remainder*, applicable only to cloth or whatever remains unsold out of whole pieces: as a *remnant* of cotton, linen, and the like. *Residue* is another species of *remainder*, employed in less familiar matters; the *remainder* is applied to that which remains after a consumption or removal has taken place: the *residue* is applied to that which remains after a division has taken place; hence we speak of the *remainder* of the corn, the *remainder* of the books, and the like: but the *residue* of the property, the *residue* of the effects, and the like.

A last farewell!

For since a last must come, the *rest* are vain,
Like gasps in death, which but prolong our pain.

DRYDEN.

Whatever you take from amusements or indolence will be repaid you an hundred fold for all the *remainder* of your days.

EARL OF CHATHAM.

For this, far distant from the Latian coast,
She drove the *remnant* of the Trojan host.

DRYDEN.

The rising deluge is not stopp'd with dams,
But wisely managed, its divided strength
Is sluiced in channels, and securely drained;
And while its force is spent, and unsupply'd,
The *residue* with mounds may be restrain'd.

SHAKESPEARE.

TO REST, *v. To stand.*

RESTITUTION, *v. Restoration.*

RESTORATION, RESTITUTION,

REPARATION, AMENDS.

RESTORATION is employed in

moral objects, as an ungrateful person *repays* kindnesses with reproaches.

When both the chiefs are sander'd from the
fight,
Then to the lawful king restore his right.

DRYDEN.

The swain
Receives his easy food from nature's hand,
And just returns of cultivated land. DRYDEN.

Cæsar, whom fraught with eastern spoils,
Our heav'n, the just reward of human toils,
Securely shall repay with rites divine. DRYDEN.

TO RESTRAIN, *v. To coerce.*

TO RESTRAIN, *v. To repress.*

TO RESTRAIN, RESTRICT.

RESTRAIN (*v. Coerce*) and RESTRICT are but variations from the same verb; but they have acquired a distinct acceptation: the former applies to the desires, as well as the outward conduct; the latter only to the outward conduct. A person *restrains* his inordinate appetite; or he is *restrained* by others from doing mischief: he is *restricted* in the use of his money. *Restrain* is an act of power; but *restrict* is an act of authority or law: the will or the actions of a child are *restrained* by the parent; but a patient is *restricted* in his diet by a physician, or any body of people may be *restricted* by laws.

Tully, whose powerful eloquence a while
Restrain'd the rapid fate of rushing Rome.

THOMSON.

Though the Egyptians used flesh for food, yet
they were under greater *restrictions* in this particular, than most other nations. JAMES.

RESTRAINT, *v. Constraint.*

TO RESTRICT, *v. To restrain.*

RESULT, *v. Consequence.*

TO RETAIN, *v. To hold.*

TO RETAIN, *v. To reserve.*

RETALIATION, REPRISAL.

RETALIATION from *retaliate*, in Latin *retaliatum*, participle of *retalio*, compounded of *re* and *talis* such, signifies such again, or like for like. REPRISAL, in French *reprisal* from *repris* and *repandre*, in Latin *reprehendo* to take again, signifies to take in return for what has been taken. The idea of making another suffer in return for the suffering he has occasioned is common to these terms; but the former is employed in ordinary

cases; the latter mostly in regard to a state of warfare, or to active hostilities. A trick practised upon another in return for a trick is a *retaliation*; but a *reprisal* always extends to the capture of something from another, in return for what has been taken. When neighbours fall out, the incivilities and spite of the one are too often *retaliated* by like acts of incivility and spite on the part of the other: when one nation commences hostilities against another by taking any thing away violently, it produces *reprisals* on the part of the other. *Retaliation* is very frequently employed in the good sense for what passes innocently between friends: *reprisal* has always an unfavourable sense. Goldsmith's poem, entitled the *Retaliation*, was written for the purpose of *retaliating* on his friends the humour they had practised upon him; when the quarrels of individuals break through the restraints of the law and lead to acts of violence on each others property, *reprisals* are made alternately by both parties.

Therefore I pray let me enjoy your friendship
in that fair proportion, that I desire to return unto
you by way of correspondence and *retaliation*.
HOWEL.

Go publish o'er the plain,
How mighty a proselyte you gain!
How noble a *reprisal* on the great! SWIFT.

TO RETARD, *v. To delay.*

TO RETARD, HINDER.

RETARD, from the Latin *tardus* slow, signifies to make slow.

HINDER, *v. To hinder.*

To *retard* is applied to the movements of any object forward; to *hinder* is applied to the person moving or acting: we *retard* or make slow the progress of any scheme towards completion; we *hinder* or keep back the person who is completing the scheme: we *retard* a thing therefore often by *hindering* the person; but we frequently *hinder* a person without expressly *retarding*, and on the contrary the thing is *retarded* without the person being *hindered*. The publication of a work is sometimes *retarded* by the *hinderances* which an author meets with in bringing it to a conclusion; but a work may be *retarded* through the idleness of printers and a variety

to the present ; it is a *view* only of that which is.

We take a *review* of what we have *viewed* in order to get a more correct insight into it ; we take a *survey* of a thing in all its parts in order to get a comprehensive *view* of it, in order to examine it in all its bearings. A general occasionally takes a *review* of all his army ; he takes a *survey* of the fortress which he is going to besiege or attack.

Believe me, my Lord, I look upon you as a spirit entered into another life, where you ought to despise all little views and mean *retrospects*.

POPE'S LETTERS TO ATTERBURY.

The *retrospect* of life is seldom wholly unattended by uneasiness and shame. It too much resembles the *review* which a traveller takes from some eminence of a barren country.

BLAIR.

Every man accustomed to take a *survey* of his own notions, will, by a slight *retrospection*, be able to discover that his mind has undergone many revolutions.

JOHNSON.

TO RETURN, *v. To restore.*

TO RETURN, *v. To revert.*

TO REVEAL, *v. To publish.*

TO REVENGE, *v. To avenge.*

REVENGEFUL, *v. Vindictive.*

TO REVERBERATE, *v. To rebound.*

TO REVERE, *v. To adore.*

TO REVERENCE, *v. To adore.*

TO REVERENCE, *v. To awe.*

TO REVERENCE, *v. To honor.*

REVERIE, *v. Dream.*

TO REVERSE, *v. To overthrow.*

TO REVERT, RETURN.

REVERT is the Latin, and RETURN the English word ; the former is used however only in few cases, and the latter in general cases : they are allied to each other. In the moral application to matters of discussion, a speaker *reverts* to what has already passed on a preceding day ; he *returns* after a digression to the thread of his discourse : we may always *revert* to something different, though more or less connected with that which we are discussing ; we always *return* to that which we have left : we turn to something by *reverting* ; we continue the same thing by *returning*.

Whatever lies or legendary tales
May taint my spotless deeds, the guilt, the
shame,

Will back revert on the inventor's head.

SHIRLEY.

One day, the soul supine with ease and fulness
Revels secure, and fondly tells herself
The hour of evil can return no more.

HOWE.

REVIEW, *v. Retrospect.*

REVIEW, *v. Revisal.*

TO REVILE, VILIFY.

REVILE, from the Latin *vilis*, signifies to reflect upon a person, or retort upon them that which is vile : to VILIFY, signifies to make a thing vile, that is, to set it forth as vile.

To *revile* is a personal act, it is addressed directly to the object of offence, and is addressed for the purpose of making the person vile in his own eyes : to *vilify* is an indirect attack which serves to make the object appear vile in the eyes of others. *Revile* is said only of persons, for persons only are *reviled* ; but *vilify* is said mostly of things, for things are often *vilified*. To *revile* is contrary to all Christian duty ; it is commonly resorted to by the most worthless, and practised upon the most worthy : to *vilify* is seldom justifiable ; for we cannot *vilify* without using improper language ; it is seldom resorted to but for the gratification of ill nature.

But chief he gloried with licentious stile,
To lash the great, and monarchs to revile.

Pope.

There is nobody so weak of invention that
cannot make some little stories to *vilify* his
enemy.

ADDISON.

REVISAL, REVISION, REVIEW.

REVISAL, REVISION, and REVIEW, all come from the Latin *video* to see, and signify looking back upon a thing or looking at it again : the *revisal* and *revision* are however mostly employed in regard to what is written ; *review* is employed for things in general. The *revisal* of a book is the work of the author, for the purposes of correction : the *review* of a book is the work of the critic, for the purpose of estimating its value. *Revisal* and *revision* differ neither in sense nor application, unless that the former is more frequently employed abstractedly from

term peculiarly applicable to the fluctuating condition of things which flow in in quantities, or flow away in equally great quantities. Hence we do not say that a man is *opulent*, but that he is *affluent* in his circumstances. *Wealth* and *opulence* are applied to individuals, or communities; *affluence* is applicable only to an individual.

The *wealth* of a nation must be procured by the industry of the inhabitants; the *opulence* of a town may arise from some local circumstance in its favor, as its favorable situation for trade and the like; he who lives in *affluence* is apt to forget the uncertain tenure by which he holds his *riches*; we speak of *riches* as to their effects upon men's minds and manners; it is not every one who knows how to use them. We speak of *wealth* as it raises a man in the scale of society; the *wealthy* merchant is an important member of the community: we speak of *opulence* as it indicates the flourishing state of the individual; an *opulent* man shows unquestionable marks of his *opulence* around him: we speak of *affluence* to characterize the abundance of the individual; we show our *affluence* by the style of our living.

Riches are apt to betray a man into arrogance.

ADDISON.

His best companions innocence and health,
And his best *riches* ignorance of *wealth*.

GOLDSMITH.

Along the lawn where scatter'd hamlets rose,
Unwieldy *wealth* and cumb'rous pomp repose.

GOLDSMITH.

Prosperity is often an equivocal word denoting merely *affluence* of possession.

BLAIR.

Our Saviour did not choose for himself an easy and *opulent* condition.

BLAIR.

TO RIDICULE, *v.* To laugh at.

TO RIDICULE, *v.* To deride.

RIDICULE, SATIRE, IRONY,
SARCASM.

RIDICULE, *v.* To deride.

SATIRE, in Latin *satyr*, probably from *sat* and *ira* abounding in anger.

IRONY, in Greek *σιρηνια*, signifies dissimulation.

SARCASM, from the Greek *σαρκομας*, and *σαρκιζω*, from *σαρξ* flesh, signifies biting or nipping *satire*, so as it were to tear the flesh.

Ridicule has simple laughter in it;

satire has a mixture of ill nature or severity: the former is employed in matters of a shameless or trifling nature; but *satire* is employed either in personal or grave matters: *irony* is disguised *satire*; an *ironist* seems to praise that which he really means to condemn; *sarcasm* is bitter and personal *satire*; all the others may be successfully and properly employed to expose folly and vice; but *sarcasm*, which is the indulgence only of personal resentment, is never justifiable.

Nothing is a greater mark of a degenerate and vicious age than the common *ridicule* which passes on this state of life.

ADDISON.

A man resents with more bitterness a *satire* upon his abilities than his practice.

HAWKSWORTH.

The severity of this *sarcasm* stung me with intolerable rage.

HAWKSWORTH.

When Regan (in King Lear) counsels him to ask her sister forgiveness, he falls on his knees and asks her with a striking kind of *irony* how such supplicating language as this becometh him.

JOHNSON.

RIDICULOUS, *v.* Laughable.

RIGHT, *v.* Straight.

RIGHT, JUST, PROPER.

RIGHT, in German *recht*, Latin *rectus*, signifies upright, not leaning to one side or the other, standing as it ought.

JUST, in Latin *justus*, from *jus* law, signifies according to a rule of right.

FIT, *v.* Fit.

PROPER, in Latin *proprius*, signifies belonging to a given rule.

Right is here the general term; the others express modes of *right*. The *right* and wrong are defined by the written will of God, or are written in our hearts according to the original constitutions of our nature; the *just* and *unjust* are determined by the written laws of men: the *fit* and *proper* are determined by the established principles of civil society.

Between the right and the wrong there are no gradations: a thing cannot be more *right* or more wrong; whatever is *right* is not wrong, and whatever is wrong is not *right*: the *just* and *unjust*, *proper* and *improper*, *fit* and *unfit*, on the contrary, have various shades and degrees that are not so easily definable by any forms of speech or written rules.

A thousand bards thy rights show,
And with rebellious arm pretend
An equal privilege to descend. SWIFT.

RIGHTEOUS, *v. Godly.*

RIGID, *v. Austere.*

RIGOROUS, *v. Austere.*

RIM, *v. Border.*

RIND, *v. Skin.*

RIPE, MATURE.

RIPE is the English, MATURE the Latin word; the former has a universal application both proper and improper; the latter has mostly an improper application. The idea of completion in growth is simply designated by the former term; the idea of moral perfection as far at least as it is attainable is marked by the latter: fruit is *ripe* when it requires no more sustenance from the parent stock; a judgement is *mature* which requires no more time and knowledge to render it perfect or fitted for exercise: in the same manner a project may be said to be *ripe* for execution, or a people *ripe* for revolt; and on the contrary reflection may be said to be *mature* to which sufficiency of time has been given, and age may be said to be *mature* which has attained the highest pitch of perfection. *Ripeness* is however not always a good quality; but *maturity* is always a perfection: the *ripeness* of some fruit diminishes the excellence of its flavor: there are some fruits which have no flavor until they come to *maturity*.

So to his crown, she him restor'd againe,
In which he dyde, made ripe for death by old. SPENSER.

Th' Athenian sage revolving in his mind
This weakness, blindness, madness of mankind,
Foretold that in maturer days, tho' late
When time should ripen the decrees of fate,
Some god would light us. JENYNS.

TO RISE, *v. To arise.*

RISE, *v. Origin.*

TO RISE, ISSUE, EMERGE.

To RISE, *v. To arise.*

ISSUE, *v. To arise.*

EMERGE, *v. Emergency.*

To *rise* may either refer to open or enclosed spaces; *issue* and *emerge* have both a reference to some confined body: a thing may either *rise* in a body, without a body, or

out of a body; but they *issue* and *emerge* out of a body. A thing may either *rise* in a plain or a wood; it *issues* out of a wood: it may either *rise* in water or out of the water; it *emerges* from the water; that which *ris*es out of a thing comes into view by becoming higher: in this manner an air balloon might *rise* out of a wood; but that which *issues* comes out in a line with the object; horsemen *issue* from a wood; that which *issues* comes from the very depths of it, and comes as it were out as a part of it; but that which *emerges* proceeds from the thing in which it has been, as it were, concealed. Hence in the moral application, a person is said to *rise* in life without a reference to his former condition; but he *emerges* from obscurity: colour *ris*es in the face; but words *issue* from the mouth.

Ye mists and exhalations that now *rise*,
In honour to the world's great author *ris*e.

MILTON.

Does not the earth quit scores with all the
elements in the noble fruits and productions that
issue from it? SEVEN.

Let earth dissolve, you ponderous orbs descend,
And grind us into dust, the soul is safe,
The man *emerges*. YOUNG.

TO RISK, *v. To hazard.*

RITE, *v. Form.*

RIVALRY, *v. Competition.*

ROAD, *v. Route.*

TO ROAM, *v. To wander.*

ROBBERY, *v. Depredation.*

ROBUST, *v. Strong.*

ROLL, *v. List.*

ROMANCE, *v. Fable.*

ROOM, *v. Space.*

TO ROT, PUTREFY, CORRUPT.

THE dissolution of bodies by an internal process is implied by all these terms: but the first two are applied to natural bodies only; the last to all bodies natural and moral. ROT is the strongest of all these terms; it denotes the last stage in the progress of dissolution: PUTREFY expresses the progress towards rottenness; and CORRUPTION the commencement. After fruit has arrived at its maturity, or proper state of ripeness, it *rots*: meat which is kept too long *putrefies*: there is a

the Hebrew *rup*; it is the generic term, expressing simply the act of moving bodies when in contact with each other: to CHAFE, from the French *chauffer*, and the Latin *calfacere* to make hot, signifies to *rub* until a thing is heated: to FRET, like the word *fritter*, comes from the Latin *frio* to *rub* or crumble, signifying to wear away by *rubbing*: to GALL, from the noun *gall*, signifies to make as bitter or painful as *gall*, that is, to wound by *rubbing*. Things are *rubbed* sometimes for purposes of convenience; but they are *chafed*, *fretted*, and *galled*, injuriously: the skin is liable to *chafe* from any violence; leather will *fret* from the motion of a carriage; when the skin is once broken, animals will become *galled* by a continuance of the friction. These terms are likewise used in the moral sense, to denote the actions of things on the mind, where the distinction is clearly kept up: we meet with *rubs* from the opposing sentiments of others; the angry humours are *chafed*; the mind is *fretted* and made sore by the frequent repetition of small troubles and vexations; the pride is *galled* by humiliations and severe degradations.

A boy educated at home meets with continual *rubs* and disappointments (when he comes into the world). BEATTIE.

Accoutred as we were, we both plung'd in
The troubled Tiber, *chafing* with the shores. SHAKESPEARE.

And full of indignation *frets*,
That women should be such coquettes. SWIFT.
Thus every poet in his kind
Is bit by him that comes behind,
Who tho' too little to be seen,
Can tease and *gall*, and give the spleen. SWIFT.

Foul cank'ring rust the hidden treasure *frets*,
But gold that's put to use more gold begets. SHAKESPEARE.

RUDE, *v.* Coarse.

RUDE, *v.* Impertinent.

RUEFUL, *v.* Piteous.

RUGGED, *v.* Abrupt.

RUIN, *v.* Bane.

RUIN, *v.* Destruction.

RUIN, *v.* Fall.

RULE, *v.* Guide.

TO RULE, *v.* To govern.

RULE, *v.* Maxim.

RULE, *v.* Order.

RULING, *v.* Prevailing.

RUMOR, *v.* Fame.

RUPTURE, FRACTURE, FRACTION.

RUPTURE, from *rumpo* to break or burst, and FRACTURE or FRACTION, from *frango* to break, denote different kinds of breaking, according to the objects to which the action is applied. Soft substances may suffer a *rupture*; as the *rupture* of a blood vessel: hard substances a *fracture*; as the *fracture* of a bone. *Rupture* and *fraction*, though not *fracture*, are used in an improper application; as the *rupture* of a treaty, or the *fraction* of a unit into parts.

To be an enemy, and once to have been a friend, does it not embitter the *rupture*? SOUTH.

And o'er the high pil'd hills of *fractur'd* earth,
Wide dash'd the waves. THOMSON.

RURAL, RUSTIC.

ALTHOUGH both these terms, from the Latin *rus* country, signify belonging to the country; yet the former is used in a good, and the latter in a bad or an indifferent sense. RURAL applies to all country objects, except man; it is, therefore, always connected with the charms of nature: RUSTIC applies only to persons, or what is personal, in the country, and is, therefore, always associated with the want of culture. *Rural* scenery is always interesting; but the *rustic* manners of the peasants have frequently too much that is uncultivated and rude in them to be agreeable: a *rural* habitation may be fitted for persons in a higher station; but a *rustic* cottage is adapted only for the poorer inhabitants of the country.

E'en now, methinks, as pondering here I stand,
I see the *rural* virtues leave the land. GOLDSMITH.

The freedom and laxity of a *rustic* life produces remarkable particularities of conduct. JOHNSON.

RUSTIC, *v.* Countryman.

RUSTIC, *v.* Rural.

S.

SACRAMENT, *v. Lord's Supper.*SACRED, *v. Holy.*SAD, *v. Dull.*SAD, *v. Mournful.*

SAFE, SECURE.

SAFE, in Latin *salvus*, comes from the Hebrew *sala*.SECURE, *v. Certain.*

Safety implies exemption from harm, or the danger of harm; *secure*, the exemption from danger: a person may be *safe* or *saved* in the midst of a fire, if he be untouched by the fire; but he is, in such a case, the reverse of *secure*. In the sense of exemption from danger, *safety* expresses much less than *security*: we may be *safe* without using any particular measures; but none can reckon on any degree of *security* without great precaution: a person may be very *safe* on the top of a coach, in the day time; but if he wish to *secure* himself, at night, from falling off, he must be fastened.

It cannot be *safe* for any man to walk upon a precipice, and to be always on the very border of destruction.

SOUTH.

No man can rationally account himself *secure*, unless he could command all the chances of the world.

SOUTH.

SAGACITY, *v. Penetration.*

SAGE, SAGACIOUS, SAPIENT.

SAGE and SAGACIOUS are variations from the Latin *sagar* and *sagio*, probably from the Persian *sag* a dog, it being the peculiar property of a dog.

SAPIENT is in Latin *sapiens*, from *sapio*, which is either from the Greek σοφός; wise, or, in the sense of tasting, from the Hebrew *sephak* the lip.

The first of these terms has a good sense, in application to men, to denote the faculty of discerning immediately, which is the fruit of experience, and very similar to that *sagacity* in brutes which instinctively perceives the truth of a thing without the deductions of reason; *sapient*, which has very different meanings in the original, is now employed only in regard to animals which are trained up to particular

arts; its use is therefore mostly burlesque.

So strange they will appear, but so it happen'd,
That these most sage Academicians met
In solemn consultation—on a cabbage.

CUMBERLAND.

Sagacious all to trace the smallest game,
And bold to seize the greatest.

YOUNG.

SAILOR, *v. Seaman.*SAKE, ACCOUNT, REASON,
PURPOSE, END.

THESE terms, all employed adverbially, modify or connect propositions: hence, one says, for his SAKE, on his ACCOUNT, for this REASON, for this PURPOSE, and to this END.

Sake, which comes from the word to seek, is mostly said of persons; what is done for a person's *sake* is the same as because of his seeking or at his desire; one may, however, say in regard to things, for the *sake* of good order, implying what good order requires: *account* is indifferently employed for persons or things; what is done on a person's *account* is done in his behalf, and for his interest; what is done on *account* of indisposition is done in consequence of it, the indisposition being the cause: *reason*, *purpose*, and *end*, are applied to things only: we speak of the *reason* as the thing that justifies: we explain why we do a thing when we say we do it for this or that *reason*: we speak of the *purpose* and the *end* by way of explaining the nature of the thing: the propriety of measures cannot be known unless we know the *purpose* for which they were done; nor will a prudent person be satisfied to follow any course, unless he knows to what *end* it will lead.

SALUBRIOUS, *v. Healthy.*SALUTARY, *v. Healthy.*TO SALUTE, *v. To accost.*SALUTE, SALUTATION, GREET-
ING.

SALUTE, and SALUTATION, from the Latin *salus*, signifies literally wishing health to a person.

GREETING, comes from the German *grüssen* to kiss or salute.

Salute respects the thing, and *salutation* the person giving the *salute*:

a *salute* may consist either of a word or an action; *salutations* pass from one friend to another: the *salute* may be either direct or indirect; the *salutation* is always direct and personal: guns are fired by way of a *salute*; bows are given in the way of a *salutation*; *greeting* is a familiar kind of *salutation*, which may be given vocally or in writing.

Strabo tells us he saw the statue of Memnon, which, according to the poets, *saluted* the morning sun, every day, at its first rising, with a harmonious sound.
PRIDEAUX.

Josephus makes mention of a Manaken, who had the spirit of prophecy, and one time meeting with Herod among his schoolfellows, *greeted* him with this *salutation*, 'Hail, King of the Jews.'
PRIDEAUX.

Not only those I nam'd I there shall greet,
But my own gallant, virtuous Cato meet.
DENHAM.

TO SANCTION, *v. To Countenance.*

SANCTITY, *v. Holiness.*

SANE, *v. Sound.*

SANGUINARY, BLOODY, BLOOD-THIRSTY.

SANGUINARY, from *sanguis*, is employed both in the sense of BLOODY or having *blood*; BLOOD-THIRSTY, or the thirsting after *blood*: *sanguinary*, in the first case, relates only to *blood* shed, as a *sanguinary* engagement, or a *sanguinary* conflict; *bloody* is used in the familiar application, to denote the simple presence of *blood*, as a *bloody* coat, or a *bloody* sword.

In the second case, *sanguinary* is employed to characterize the tempers of persons only; *blood-thirsty* to characterize the tempers of persons or animals: the French revolution has given us many specimens how *sanguinary* men may become who are abandoned to their own furious passions; tygers are by nature the most *blood-thirsty* of all creatures.

They have seen the French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch with more fury than ever any people has been known to rise against the most illegal usurper or the most sanguinary tyrant.
BURKE.

And from the wound,
Black bloody drops distill'd upon the ground.
DRYDEN.

The Peruvians fought not like the Mexicans, to glut blood-thirsty divinities with human sacrifices.
ROBERTSON.

SAP, UNDERMINE.

SAP signifies the juice which springs from the root of a tree; hence to *sap* signifies to come at the root of any thing by digging: to UNDERMINE signifies to form a mine under the ground, or under whatever is upon the ground: we may *sap*, therefore, without *undermining*; and *undermine* without *sapping*: we may *sap* the foundation of a house without making any mine underneath; and in fortifications we may *undermine* either a mound, a ditch, or a wall, without striking immediately at the foundation: hence, in the moral application, to *sap* is a more direct and decisive mode of destruction; *undermine* is a gradual, and may be a partial action. Infidelity *saps* the morals of a nation; courtiers *undermine* one another's interests at court.

With morning drama,
A filthy custom which he caught from thee,
Clean from his former practice, now he *saps*
His youthful vigour.
CUMBERLAND.

To be a man of business is, in other words, to be a plague and spy, a treacherous supplanter and underminer of the peace of families.
SCOTT.

SARCASM, *v. Ridicule.*

TO SATIATE, *v. To satisfy.*

SATIRE, *v. Ridicule.*

SATIRE, *v. Wit.*

SATISFACTION, *v. Compensation.*

SATISFACTION, *v. Contentment.*

TO SATISFY, PLEASE, GRATIFY.

To SATISFY (*v. Contentment*) is rather to produce pleasure indirectly; to PLEASE (*v. Agreeable*) is to produce it directly: the former is negative, the latter positive pleasure: as every desire is accompanied with more or less pain, *satisfaction*, which is the removal of desire, is itself to a certain extent pleasure; but what *satisfies* is not always calculated to *please*; nor is that which *pleases*, that which will always *satisfy*: plain food *satisfies* a hungry person, but does not *please* him when he is not hungry; social enjoyments *please*, but they are very far from *satisfying* those who do not restrict their indulgencies. To GRATIFY is to *please* in a high degree, to produce a vivid pleasure: we may be

pleased with trifles : but we are commonly *gratified* with such things as act strongly either on the senses or the affections : an epicure is *gratified* with those delicacies which suit his taste ; an amateur in music will be *gratified* with hearing a piece of Handel's composition finely performed.

He who has run over the whole circle of earthly pleasures, will be forced to complain that either they were not pleasures or that pleasures was not satisfaction. SOUTH.

Did we consider that the mind of man is the man himself, we should think it the most unnatural sort of self-murder to sacrifice the sentiment of the soul to gratify the appetites of the body. STEELE.

TO SATISFY, SATIATE, GLUT,
CLOY.

TO SATISFY is to take enough ; SATIATE is a frequentative, formed from *satis* enough, signifying to have more than enough.

GLUT, in Latin *glutio*, from *gula* the throat, signifies to take down the throat. *Satisfaction* brings pleasure ; it is what nature demands ; and nature, therefore, makes a suitable return : *satiety* is attended with disgust ; it is what appetite demands ; but appetite is the corruption of nature, and produces nothing but evil : *glutting* is an act of intemperance ; it is what the inordinate appetite demands ; it greatly exceeds the former in degree both of the cause and the consequence : CLOYING is the consequence of *glutting*. Every healthy person *satisfies* himself with a regular portion of food ; children, if unrestrained, seek to *satisfiate* their appetites, and *cloy* themselves by their excesses ; brutes, or men debased into brutes, *glut* themselves with that which is agreeable to their appetites.

The first three terms are employed in a moral application ; the last only in a natural or proper sense : we *satisfy* desires in general, or any particular desire ; we *satisfiate* the appetite for pleasure ; one *gluts* the eyes or the ears by any thing that is horrid or painful.

The only thing that can give the mind any solid satisfaction is a certain complacency and repose in the good providence of God. HERRING.

'Twas not enough
By subtle fraud to snatch a single life.
Puny impiety ! whole kingdoms fell,
To taste the lust of power. PORTER.

If the understanding be detained by occupations less pleasing, it returns again to study with greater alacrity than when it is glutted with ideal pleasures. JOHNSON.

Religious pleasure is such a pleasure as can never cloy or overwork the mind. SCOTT.

SAUCY, *v.* *Impertinent.*

SAVAGE, *v.* *Cruel.*

SAVAGE, *v.* *Ferocious.*

TO SAVE, *v.* *To deliver.*

TO SAVE, *v.* *To keep.*

TO SAVE, SPARE, PRESERVE,
PROTECT.

TO SAVE is to make safe (*v.* *Safe*). SPARE, in German *sparen*, comes from the Latin *pareo*, and the Hebrew *parek* to free.

PRESERVE, compounded of *pre* and *servo* to keep, signifies to keep off.

PROTECT, *v.* *To defend.*

The idea of keeping free from evil is the common idea of all these terms, and the peculiar signification of the term *save* ; they differ either in the nature of the evil kept off, or the circumstances of the agent : we may be *saved* from every kind of evil ; but we are *spared* only from those which it is in the power of another to inflict : we may be *saved* from falling, or *spared* from an illness ; a criminal is *spared* from the punishment, or we may be *spared* by Divine Providence in the midst of some calamity : we may be *saved* and *spared* from any evils, large or small ; we are *preserved* and *protected* only from evils of magnitude : we may be *saved* either from the inclemency of the weather, or the fatal vicissitudes of life : we may be *spared* the pain of a disagreeable meeting, or we may be *spared* our lives ; we are *preserved* from ruin, or *protected* from oppression. To *save* and *spare* apply to evils that are actual and temporary ; *preserve* and *protect* to those which are possible or permanent : we may be *saved* from drowning, or we may *save* a thing instead of throwing it away ; or a person may be *spared* from the sentence of the law ; but we are *preserved* from the inclemency of the weather, or we *preserve* with care

that which is liable to injury, or *protected* from the attacks of robbers.

To *save* may be the effect of accident or design; to *spare* is always the effect of some design or connexion; to *preserve* and *protect* are the effect of a special exertion of power; the latter in a still higher degree than the former: we may be *preserved*, by ordinary means, from the evils of human life; but we are *protected* by the government, or by Divine Providence, from the active assaults of those who aim at doing us mischief.

Attilius sacrific'd himself to save
That faith which to his barb'rous foes he gave.
DENHAM.

Let Caesar spread his conquests far,
Less pleas'd to triumph than to spare. JOHNSON.

Cortes was extremely solicitous to *preserve*
the city of Mexico as much as possible from be-
ing destroyed. ROBERTSON.

How poor a thing is man, whom death itself
Cannot protect from injuries. RANDOLPH.

SAVING, *v. Oeconomical.*

TO SAUNTER, *v. To linger.*

SAVOR, *v. Taste.*

TO SAY, *v. To speak.*

SAYING, *v. Axiom.*

TO SCALE, *v. To arise.*

SCANDAL, *v. Discredit.*

SCANDALOUS, *v. Infamous.*

SCANTY, *v. Bare.*

SCARCE, *v. Rare.*

SCARCELY, *v. Hardly.*

SCARCITY, DEARTH.

SCARCITY (*v. Rare*) is a generic term to denote the circumstance of a thing being *scarce*.

DEARTH, which is the same as *dearness*, is a mode of *scarcity* applied in the literal sense to provisions mostly, as provisions are mostly dear when they are *scarce*; the word *dearth* therefore denotes *scarcity* in a high degree: whatever men want, and find it difficult to procure, they complain of its *scarcity*; when a country has the misfortune to be visited with a famine, it experiences the frightfullest of all *dearths*.

TO SCATTER, *v. To spread.*

SCENT, *v. Smell.*

SCHEME, *v. Design.*

SCHOLAR, DISCIPLE.

SCHOLAR and DISCIPLE are both applied to such as learn from others: but the former is said only of those who learn the rudiments of knowledge; the latter of one who acquires any art or science from the instruction of another: the *scholar* is opposed to the teacher; the *disciple* to the master: children are always *scholars*; adult persons may be *disciples*.

Scholars chiefly employ themselves in the study of words; *disciples*, as the *disciples* of our Saviour, in the study of things: we are the *scholars* of any one under whose care we are placed, or from whom we learn any thing, good or bad; we are the *disciples* only of distinguished persons, or such as communicate useful knowledge: children are sometimes too apt *scholars* in learning evil from one another; Plato, and many other *disciples* of Socrates, did great honor to the doctrines of their master.

The Romans confessed themselves the *scholars* of the Greeks. JOHNSON.

We are not the *disciples* of Voltaire. BURKE.

SCHOOL, ACADEMY.

THE Latin term *schola* signifies a loitering place, a place for desultory conversation or instruction, from the Greek σχολη leisure; hence it has been extended to any place where instruction is given, particularly that which is communicated to youth, which being an easy task to one who is familiar with this subject is considered as a relaxation rather than a labor.

ACADEMY derives its name from the Greek ακαδημία the name of a public place in Athens, where the philosopher Plato first gave his lectures, which afterwards became a place of resort for learned men; hence societies of learned men have since been termed *academies*.

The leading idea in the word SCHOOL is that of instruction given and doctrine received; in the word *academy* is that of association among those who have already learned: hence we speak in the literal sense of the *school*

The Jacobins desire a change, and they will have it if they can ; if they cannot have it by English cabal, they will make no sort of scruple to have it by the cabal of France. **BURKE.**

The lords of the congregation did not *hesitate* a moment whether they should employ their whole strength in one generous effort to rescue their religion and liberty from impending destruction. **ROBERTSON.**

It is the greatest absurdity to be *wavering* and unsettled without closing with that side which appears the most safe and probable. **ADDISON.**

SCRUPULOUS, *v. Conscientious.*

TO SCRUTINIZE, *v. To pry.*

SCRUTINY, *v. Examination.*

SCUM, *v. Dregs.*

SCURRILOUS, *v. Reproachful.*

SEAL, STAMP.

SEAL is a specific ; STAMP, a general term : there cannot be a *seal* without a *stamp* ; but there may be many *stamps* where there is no *seal*. The *seal*, in Latin *sigillum*, signifies a signet or little sign, consisting of any one's coat of arms, or any device ; the *stamp* is, in general, any impression whatever which has been made by *stamping*, that is, any impression which is not easily to be effaced. In the improper sense, the *seal* is the authority ; thus to set one's *seal* is the same as to authorize, and the *seal* of truth is any outward mark which characterizes it : but in the *stamp* is the impression by which we distinguish the thing ; thus a thing is said to bear the *stamp* of truth, of sincerity, of veracity, and the like.

Therefore, not long in force this charter stood,
Wanting that *seal*, it must be *seal'd* in blood.

DENHAM.

Wisdom for parts is madness for the whole.
This *stamps* the paradox, and gives us leave
To call the wisest weak.

YOUNG.

SEAMAN, WATERMAN, SAILOR, MARINER.

ALL these words denote persons occupied in navigation ; the SEAMAN, as the word implies, follows his business on the *sea* ; the WATERMAN is one who gets his livelihood on fresh water ; the SAILOR and the MARINER are both specific terms to designate the *seaman* : every *sailor* and *mariner* is a *seaman* ; al-

though every *seaman* is not a *sailor* or *mariner* : the former is one who is employed about the laborious part of the vessel ; the latter is one who traverses the ocean to and fro, who is attached to the water, and passes his life upon it.

Men of all ranks are denominated *seamen*, whether officers or men, whether in a merchantman or a king's ship : *sailor* is only used for the common men, or, in the sea phrase, for those before the mast, particularly in vessels of war ; hence our *sailors* and soldiers are spoken of as the defenders of our country : a *mariner* is an independent kind of *seaman* who manages his own vessel, and goes on an expedition on his own account ; fishermen, and those who trade along the coast, are in a particular manner distinguished by the name of *mariners*.

Thus the toss'd *seamen*, after boisterous storms,
Lands on his country's breast. **LAR.**

Many a lawyer who makes but an indifferent figure at the bar might have made a very elegant *waterman*. **SOUTH.**

Through storms and tempests so the *sailor* drives. **SHERLEY.**

Welcome to me, as to a sinking *mariner*
The lucky plank that bears him to the shore.

LAR.

SEARCH, *v. Examination.*

TO SEARCH, *v. To examine.*

SEASON, *v. Time.*

SEASONABLE, *v. Timely.*

TO SECEDE, *v. To recede.*

SECLUSION, *v. Privacy.*

TO SECOND, SUPPORT.

TO SECOND is to give the assistance of a *second* person ; to SUPPORT is to bear up on one's own shoulders. To *second* does not express so much as to *support* : we *second* only by our presence, or our word ; but we *support* by our influence and all the means that are in our power : we *second* a motion by a simple declaration of our assent to it ; we *support* a motion by the force of persuasion : so likewise we are said always to *second* a person's views when we give him openly our countenance by declaring our approbation of his measures ; and we are said to *support*

to the word *secret*, with this distinction, that what is *secret* is often not known to be *secret*; but that which is *mysterious* is so only in the eyes of others. Things are sometimes conducted with such *secrecy* that no one suspects what is passing until it is seen by its effects; an air of *mystery* is sometimes thrown over that which is in reality nothing when seen: hence *secrecy* is always taken in a good sense, since it is so great an essential in the transactions of men; but *mystery* is often employed in a bad sense; either for the affected concealment of that which is insignificant, or the purposed concealment of that which is bad: an expedition is said to be *secret*, but not *mysterious*; on the other hand, the disappearance of a person may be *mysterious*, but is not said to be *secret*.

Ye boys, who pluck the flow'rs and spoil the
spring,
Beware the secret snake that shoots a sting.

DRYDEN.

The blind laborious mole,
In winding mazes works her hidden hole.

DRYDEN.

Some men have an occult power of stealing on
the affections.

JOHNSON.

From his void embrace,
Mysterious heaven! That moment to the
ground,
A blackened corse, was struck the hideous
maid.

THOMSON.

Mem'ry confus'd, and interrupted thought,
Death's harbingers, lie latent in the draught.

PRIOR.

TO SECRETE, *v.* To conceal.

TO SECRETE ONE'S SELF, *v.*
To abscond.

SECULAR, TEMPORAL,
WORLDLY.

SECULAR, in Latin *secularis*, from *seculum* an age or division of time, signifies belonging to time, or this life.

TEMPORAL, in Latin *temporalis*, from *tempus* time, signifies lasting only for a time.

WORLDLY signifies after the manner of the *world*.

Secular is opposed to ecclesiastical, *temporal* and *worldly* are opposed to spiritual or eternal.

The idea of the *world*, or the outward objects and pursuits of the *world*, in distinction from that which is set

above the *world*, is implied in common by all the terms; but *secular* is an indifferent term, applicable to the allowed pursuits and concerns of men; *temporal* is used either in an indifferent or a bad sense; and *worldly* mostly in a bad sense, as contrasted with things of more value.

The office of a clergyman is ecclesiastical, but that of a schoolmaster is *secular*, which is frequently vested in the same hands; the upper house of parliament consists of lords spiritual and *temporal*; *worldly* interest has a more powerful sway upon the minds of the great bulk of mankind, than their spiritual interests: whoever enters into the holy office of the ministry with merely *secular* views of preferment, chooses a very unfit source of emolument; a too eager pursuit after *temporal* advantages and *temporal* pleasures is apt to draw the mind away from its regard to those which are eternal; *worldly* applause will weigh very light when set in the balance against the reproach of one's own conscience.

Some saw nothing in what has been done in France but a firm and temperate exertion of freedom, so consistent with morals and piety, as to make it deserving not only of the *secular* applause of dashing Machiavellian politicians, but to make it a fit theme for all the devout effusions of sacred eloquence.

BURKE.

The ultimate purpose of government is temporal, and that of religion is eternal happiness.

JOHNSON.

Worldly things are of such quality as to lessen upon dividing.

GROVE.

SECURE, *v.* Certain.

SECURE, *v.* Safe.

SECURITY, *v.* Deposit.

SECURITY, *v.* Fence.

SEDATE, *v.* Composed.

SEDIMENT, *v.* Dregs.

SEDITION, *v.* Insurrection.

SEDITIONOUS, *v.* Factious.

SEDITIONOUS, *v.* Tumultuous.

TO SEDUCE, *v.* To allure.

SEDULOUS, DILIGENT,
ASSIDUOUS.

SEDULOUS, from the Latin *sedulus* and *sedeo*, signifies sitting close to a thing.

DILIGENT, *v. Active, diligent.*

ASSIDUOUS, *v. Active, diligent.*

The idea of application is expressed by both these epithets, but *sedulous* is a particular, *diligent* is a general term: one is *sedulous* as a habit; one is *diligent* either habitually or occasionally: a *sedulous* scholar pursues his studies with a regular and close application; a scholar may be *diligent* at a certain period, though not invariably so. *Sedulity* seems to mark the very essential property of application, that is, adhering closely to an object; but *diligence* expresses one's attachment to a thing, as evinced by an eager pursuit of it: the former, therefore, bespeaks the steadiness of the character; the latter merely the turn of one's inclination: one is *sedulous* from a conviction of the importance of the thing; one may be *diligent* by fits and starts, according to the humour of the moment.

Assiduous and *sedulous* both express the quality of sitting close to a thing, but the former may, like *diligent*, be employed on a partial occasion; the latter is always permanent: we may be *assiduous* in our attentions to a person; but we are *sedulous* in the important concerns of life. *Sedulous* peculiarly respects the quiet employments of life; a teacher may be entitled *sedulous*: *diligent* respects the active employments; one is *diligent* at work: *assiduity* holds a middle rank; it may be employed equally for that which requires active exertion, or otherwise: we may be *assiduous* in the pursuits of literature, or we may be *assiduous* in our attendance upon a person, or the performance of any office.

One thing I would offer is that he would constantly and *sedulously* read Tully, which will incessantly work him into a good Latin style.

LOCKE.

I would recommend a *diligent* attendance on the courts of justice (to a student for the bar).

DUNNING.

And thus the patient dam *assiduously* sits,
Not to be tempted from her tender task.

THOMSON.

TO SEE, *v. To look.*

TO SEE, PERCEIVE, OBSERVE.

SEE, in the German *sehen*, Greek *εἶδεναι*, Hebrew *sakah* or *soah*, is a general term; it may be either a vo-

luntary or involuntary action: **PERCEIVE**, from the Latin *percipio* or *per* and *cipio* to take into the mind, is always a voluntary action; and **OBSERVE** (*v. To notice*) is an intentional action. The eye *sees* when the mind is absent; the mind and the eye *perceive* in conjunction: hence, we may say that a person *sees*, but does not *perceive*: we *observe* not merely by a simple act of the mind, but by its positive and fixed exertion. We *see* a thing without knowing what it is; we *perceive* a thing, and know what it is, but the impression passes away; we *observe* a thing, and afterwards retrace the image of it in our mind. We *see* a star when the eye is directed towards it; we *perceive* it move if we look at it attentively; we *observe* its position in different parts of the heavens. The blind cannot *see*, the absent cannot *perceive*, the dull cannot *observe*.

Seeing, as a corporeal action, is the act only of the eye; *perceiving* and *observing* are actions in which all the senses are concerned. We *see* colors, we *perceive* the state of the atmosphere, and *observe* its changes. *Seeing* sometimes extends farther in its application to the mind's operations, in which it has an indefinite sense; but *perceive* and *observe* have both a definite sense: we may *see* a thing distinctly and clearly, or otherwise; we *perceive* it always with a certain degree of distinctness; and *observe* it with a positive degree of minuteness: we *see* the truth of a remark; we *perceive* the force of an objection; we *observe* the reluctance of a person. It is farther to be *observed*, however, that when *see* expresses a mental operation, it expresses what is purely mental; *perceive* and *observe* are applied to such objects as are seen by the senses as well as the mind.

See is either employed as a corporeal or incorporeal action; *perceive* and *observe* are obviously a junction of the corporeal and incorporeal. We *see* the light with our eyes, or we *see* the truth of a proposition with our mind's eye; but we *perceive* the difference of climate, or we *perceive* the difference in the comfort of our situation; we *observe* the motions of the heavenly bodies.

There plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight. MILTON.

Sated at length, ere long I might perceive
Strange alteration in me. MILTON.

Every part of your last letter glowed with
that warmth of friendship which, though it was
by no means new to me, I could not but observe
with peculiar satisfaction.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

TO SEEM, APPEAR.

THE idea of coming to the view is expressed by both these terms; but the word SEEM rises upon that of APPEAR. *Seem*, from the Latin *similis* like, signifies literally to *appear* like, and is therefore a species of *appearance*, which from the Latin *appareo* or *pareo*, and the Greek *παριστοι* to be present, signifies to be present, or before the eye. Every object may *appear*; but nothing *seems*, except that which the mind admits to *appear* in any given form. To *seem* requires some reflection and comparison of objects in the mind one with another; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to matters that may be different from what they *appear*, or of an indeterminate kind: that the sun *seems* to move, is a conclusion which we draw from the exercise of our senses, and comparing this case with others of a similar nature; it is only by a farther research into the operations of nature that we discover this to be false. To *appear*, on the contrary, is the express act of the things themselves on us; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to such objects as make an impression on us: to *appear* is the same as to present itself: the stars *appear* in the firmament, but we do not say that they *seem*; the sun *appears* dark through the clouds.

They are equally applicable to moral as well as natural objects with the above-mentioned distinction. *Seem* is said of that which is dubious, contingent, or future; *appear*, of that which is actual, positive, and past. A thing *seems* strange which we are led to conclude as strange from what we see of it; a thing *appears* clear when we have a clear conception of it: a plan *seems* practicable or impracticable; an author *appears* to understand his subject, or the contrary. It *seems* as

if all efforts to reform the bulk of mankind will be found inefficient; it *appears* from the long catalogue of vices which are still very prevalent, that little progress has hitherto been made in the work of reformation.

Lash'd into foam, the fierce conflicting brine
Seems o'er a thousand raging waves to burn.

THOMSON.

O heav'nly poet! Such thy verse *appears*,
So sweet, so charming to my ravish'd ears.

DRYDEN.

TO SEIZE, *v.* To lay hold of.

SEIZURE, *v.* Capture.

TO SELECT, *v.* To choose.

SELF CONCEIT, *v.* Self will.

SELF SUFFICIENCY, *v.* Self-will.

SELF WILL, SELF CONCEIT,
SELF SUFFICIENCY.

SELF WILL signifies the will in one's self: SELF CONCEIT, the *conceit* of one's self: SELF SUFFICIENCY, the *sufficiency* in one's self. As characteristics they come very near to each other, but that depravity of the will which refuses to submit to every control either within or without is born with a person, and is among the earliest indications of character; in some it is less predominant than in others, but if not early checked, it is that defect in our natures which will always prevail; *self-conceit* is a vicious habit of the mind which is superinduced on the original character; it is that which determines in matters of judgement; a *self-willed* person thinks nothing of right or wrong: whatever the impulse of the moment suggests, is the motive to action: the *self-conceited* person is always much concerned about right and wrong, but it is only that which he conceits to be right and wrong; *self-sufficiency* is a species of *self-conceit* applied to action; as a *self-conceited* person thinks of no opinion but his own; a *self-sufficient* person refuses the assistance of every one in whatever he is called upon to do.

To wilful men

The injuries that they themselves procur'd,
Must be their school masters. SHAKESPEARE.

judgement has once been matured by age, it remains unimproveable by time or circumstance.

When employed as epithets, the terms *sensible* and *judicious* serve still more clearly to distinguish the two primitives. A writer or a speaker are said to be *sensible*; a friend, or an adviser, to be *judicious*. The *sense* displays itself in the conversation or the communication of one's ideas; the *judgement* in the propriety of one's actions. A *sensible* man may be an entertaining companion, but a *judicious* man in any post of command is an inestimable treasure. *Sensible* remarks are always calculated to please and interest *sensible* people; *judicious* measures have a sterling value in themselves, that is, appreciated according to the importance of the object. Hence, it is obvious that to be *sensible* is a desirable thing, but to be *judicious* is an indispensable requisite.

The fox, in deeper cunning vers'd,
The beauties of her mind rehears'd,
And talk'd of knowledge, taste, and sense,
To which the fair have vast pretence, MOORE.

Your observations are so *judicious*, I wish
you had not been so sparing of them.

SIR W. JOHNS.

SENSE, *v.* Signification.

SENSIBILITY, *v.* Feeling.

SENSIBLE, *v.* To feel.

SENSIBLE, SENSITIVE,
SENTIENT.

ALL these epithets, which are derived from the same source (*v.* To feel), have obviously a great sameness of meaning, though not of application. SENSIBLE and SENSITIVE both denote the capacity of being moved to feeling: SENTIENT implies the very act of feeling. *Sensible* expresses either a habit of the body and mind, or only a particular state referring to some particular object; a person may be *sensible* of things in general, or *sensible* of cold, or *sensible* of injuries or *sensible* of the kindnesses which he has received from an individual. *Sensitive* signifies always an habitual or permanent quality; it is the characteristic of objects; a *sensitive* creature implies one whose sense is by distinc-

tion quickly to be acted upon: a *sensitive* plant is a peculiar species of plants, marked for the property of having *sense* or being *sensible* of the touch.

Sensible and *sensitive* have always a reference to external objects; but *sentient* expresses simply the possession of feeling, or the power of feeling, and excludes the idea of the cause. Hence, the terms *sensible* and *sensitive* are applied only to persons or corporeal objects; but *sentient* is likewise applicable to spirits; *sentient* beings may include angels as well as men.

And with affection wondrous *sensible*,
He wrung Bassanio's hand, and so they parted.

SHAKESPEARE.

Those creatures live more alone whose food,
and therefore prey, is upon other *sensitive*
creatures.

TEMPLE.

SENSIBLE, PERCEPTIBLE.

THESE epithets are here applied not to the persons capable of being impressed, but to the objects capable of impressing: in this case SENSIBLE (*v.* To feel) applies to that which acts on the senses merely; PERCEPTIBLE (*v.* To see), to that which acts on the senses in conjunction with the mind. All corporeal objects are naturally termed *sensible*, inasmuch as they are *sensible* to the eye, the ear, the nose, the touch, and the taste; particular things are *perceptible*, inasmuch as they are to be *perceived* or recognized by the mind. Sometimes *sensible* signifies discernible by means of the senses, as when we speak of a *sensible* difference in the atmosphere, and in this case it comes nearer to the meaning of *perceptible*; but the latter always refers more to the operation of the mind than the former: the difference between colours is said to be scarcely *perceptible* when they approach very near to each other; so likewise the growth of a body is said not to be *perceptible* when it cannot be marked from one time to another by the difference of taste.

I have suffered a *sensible* loss, if that word is strong enough to express the misfortune which has deprived me of so excellent a man.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CECILIO.

What must have been the state into which the Assembly has brought your affairs, that the re-

to be thrown away which is esteemed as worthless; we may be *condemned* to hear the prating of a loquacious body; we may be *doomed* to spend our lives in penury and wretchedness. *Sentence*, particularly when employed as a noun, may even be favourable to the interests of a person; *condemn* is always prejudicial, either to his interest, his comfort, or his reputation; *doom* is always destructive of his happiness, it is that which always runs most counter to the wishes of an individual. It is of importance for an author, that a critic should pronounce a favorable *sentence* on his works; immoral writers are justly *condemned* to oblivion or perpetual infamy; they are sometimes *doomed* to hear their own names pronounced only with execration.

A *sentence* and *condemnation* is always the act of some person or conscious agent; *doom* is sometimes the fruit of circumstances. Tarquin the Proud was *sentenced* by the Roman people to be banished from Rome; Regulus was *condemned* to the most cruel death by the Carthaginians; many writers have been *doomed* to pass their lives in obscurity and want, whose works have acquired for them lasting honors after their death.

At the end of the tenth book, the poet joins this beautiful circumstance, that they offered up their penitential prayers on the very place where their judge appeared to them when he pronounced their *sentence*. ANDERSON.

Liberty (Thomson's 'Liberty') called in vain upon her votaries to read her praises, her praises were *condemned* to harbor spiders, and gather dust. JOHNSON.

Even the abridger, compiler, and translator, though their labours cannot be ranked with those of the diurnal biographer, yet must not be rashly *doomed* to annihilation. JOHNSON.

SENTENTIOUS, SENTIMENTAL.

SENTENTIOUS signifies having or abounding in *sentences* or judgments: SENTIMENTAL, having *sentiment* (*v. Opinion*). Books and authors are termed *sententious*; but travellers, society, intercourse, correspondence, and the like, are characterized as *sentimental*. Moralists like Dr. Johnson are termed *sententious*, whose works and conversation abound in moral *sentences*; novelists and romance writers, like Mrs. Radcliffe, are pro-

perly *sentimental*. *Sententious* books always serve for improvement; *sentimental* works, unless they are of a superior order, are in general hurtful.

His (Mr. Ferguson's) love of Montesquieu and Tacitus has led him into a manner of writing too short-winded and *sententious*. GRAY.

In books, whether moral or amusing, there are no passages more captivating than those delicate strokes of *sentimental* morality which refer our actions to the determination of feeling.

MACKENZIE.

SENTIENT, *v. Sensible*.

SENTIMENT, *v. Opinion*.

SENTIMENT, SENSATION, PERCEPTION.

SENTIMENT and SENSATION are obviously derived from the same source (*v. To feel*).

PERCEPTION, from *perceive* (*v. To see*), expresses the act of *perceiving*, or the impressions produced by *perceiving*.

The impressions which objects make upon the person are designated by all these terms; but the *sentiment* has its seat in the heart, the *sensation* is confined to the senses, and the *perception* rests in the understanding. *Sentiments* are lively, *sensations* are grateful, *perceptions* are clear.

Gratitude is a *sentiment* the most pleasing to the human mind; the *sensation* produced by the action of electricity on the frame is generally unpleasant; a nice *perception* of objects is one of the first requisites for perfection in any art. * The *sentiment* extends to the manners, and renders us alive to the happiness or misery of others as well as our own: the *sensation* is purely physical; it makes us alive only to the effects of external objects on our physical organs: *perceptions* carry us into the district of science; they give us an interest in all the surrounding objects as intellectual observers. A man of spirit or courage receives marks of honour, or affronts, with very different *sentiments* from the poltroon: he who bounds his happiness by the present fleeting existence must be careful to remove every painful *sensation*: we judge of objects as complex or simple, according to the num-

* Abbé Girard: "Sentiment, sensation, perception."

form a *series*, but they need simply to follow in order to form a *course*; thus a *series* of events respects those which flow out of each other, a *course* of events, on the contrary, respects those which happen unconnectedly within a certain space: so in like manner, the numbers of a book, which serve to form a whole, are a *series*; and a number of lectures following each other at a given time are a *course*: hence, likewise the technical phrase infinite *series* in algebra.

SERIES, *v.* Succession.

SERIOUS, *v.* Eager.

SERIOUS, *v.* Grave.

SERVANT, DOMESTIC, MENIAL,
DRUDGE.

In the term SERVANT is included the idea of the service performed: in the term DOMESTIC, from *domus*, is included the idea of one belonging to the house or family: in the word MENIAL, from *manus* the hand, is included the idea of labor; and the term DRUDGE, that of *drudgery*. We hire a *servant* at a certain rate, and for a particular service; we are attached to our *domestics* according to their assiduity and attention to our wishes; we employ as a *menial*, one who is unfit for a higher employment; and a *drudge* in any labour, however hard and disagreeable.

A servant dwells remote from all knowledge of his lord's purposes. SCOTT.

Montezuma was attended by his own domestics, and served with his usual state. ROBERTSON.

Some were his (Charles) own menial servants, and ate bread at his table before they lifted up their heel against him. SCOTT.

He who will be vastly rich must resolve to be a drudge all his days. SCOTT.

SERVICE, *v.* Advantage.

SERVICE, *v.* Avail.

SERVICE, *v.* Benefit.

SERVITUDE, SLAVERY,
BONDAGE.

SERVITUDE expresses less than SLAVERY, and this less than BONDAGE.

Servitude, from *servio*, conveys simply the idea of performing a service,

without specifying the principle upon which it is performed. Among the Romans *servus* signified a slave, because all who served were literally slaves, the power over the person being almost unlimited. The mild influence of Christianity has corrected men's notions with regard to their rights, as well as their duties, and established *servitude* on the just principle of a mutual compact, without any infraction on that most precious of all human gifts, personal liberty. *Slavery*, which marks a condition incompatible with the existence of this invaluable endowment, is a term odious to the Christian ear; it had its origin in the grossest state of society; the word being derived from the German *slave*, Greek *σκλάβος*, or *Sclavonians*, a fierce and intrepid people, who made a long stand against the Germans, and, being at last defeated, were made *slaves*. *Slavery*, therefore, includes not only *servitude*, but also the odious circumstance of the entire subjection of one individual to another; a condition which deprives him of every privilege belonging to a free agent, and a rational creature, which forcibly bends the will and affections of the one to the humor of the other, and converts a thinking being into a mere senseless tool in the hands of its owner. *Slavery* unfortunately remains, though barbarism has ceased. Christianity has taught men their true end and destination; but it has not yet been able to extinguish that inordinate love of dominion, which is an innate propensity in the human breast. There are those who take the name of Christians, and yet cling to the practice of making their fellow creatures an article of commerce. Some delude themselves with the idea that they can ameliorate the condition of those over whom they have usurped this unlicensed power; but they forget that he who begins to be a *slave* ceases to be a man; that *slavery* is the extinction of our nobler part; and the abuse even of that part in us which we have in common with the brutes.

Bondage, from to *bind*, denotes the state of being *bound*, that is, *slavery* in its most aggravated form, in which, to the loss of personal liberty, is

There to as cold and dreary as a snake,
That seem'd to tremble evermore and quake.
SPENSER.

TO SHAKE, AGITATE, TOSS.

SHAKE, *v. To shake.*

AGITATE, in Latin *agito*, is a frequentative of *ago* to drive, that is, to drive different ways.

TOSS is probably contracted from *torsi*, perfect of *torqueo*.

A motion more or less violent is signified by all these terms, which differ both in the manner and the cause of the motion. *Shake* is indefinite, it may differ in degree as to the violence; to *agitate* and *toss* rise in sense upon the word *shake*: a breeze *shakes* a leaf, a storm *agitates* the sea, and the waves *toss* a vessel to and fro: large and small bodies may be *shaken*; large bodies are *agitated*: a handkerchief may be *shaken*; the earth is *agitated* by an earthquake. What is *shaken* and *agitated* is not removed from its place; but what is *tossed* is thrown from place to place. A house may frequently be *shaken*, while the foundation remains good; the waters are most *agitated* while they remain within their bounds; but a ball is *tossed* from hand to hand.

To *shake* and *toss* are the acts either of persons or things; to *agitate* is the act of things, when taken in the active sense. A person *shakes* the hand of another, or the motion of a carriage *shakes* persons in general, and *agitates* those who are weak in frame: a child *tosses* his food about, or the violent motion of a vessel *tosses* every thing about which is in it. To *shake* arises from external or internal causes; we may be *shaken* by others, or *shake* ourselves from cold: to *agitate* and *toss* arise always from some external action, direct or indirect; the body may be *agitated* by violent concussion from without, or from the action of perturbed feelings; the body may be *tossed* by various circumstances, and the mind may be *tossed* to and fro by the violent action of the passions. Hence the propriety of using the terms in the moral application. The resolution is *shaken*, as the tree is by the wind; the mind is *agitated* like trou-

bled waters; a person is *tossed* to and fro in the ocean of life, as the vessel is *tossed* by the waves.

An unwholesome blast of air, a cold, or a surfeit, may *shake* in pieces a man's hardy fabrick.
SOUTH.

We all must have observed that a speaker *agitated* with passion, or an actor, who is indeed strictly an imitator, are perpetually changing the tone and pitch of their voice, as the sense of their words varies.
SIR WM. JONES.

Toss'd all the day in rapid circles round,
Breathless I fell.
POPE.

SHALLOW, *v. Superficial.*

SHAME, *v. Dishonor.*

SHAMELESS, *v. Immodest.*

TO SHAPE, *v. To form.*

TO SHARE, *v. To divide.*

SHARE, *v. Part.*

TO SHARE, *v. To partake.*

SHARP, ACUTE, KEEN.

SHARP, in German, &c. *scharp*, comes from *scheren* to cut.

ACUTE, *v. Acute.*

KEEN, *v. Acute.*

The general property expressed by these epithets is that of *sharpness* or an ability to cut. The term *sharp* is generic and indefinite; the two others are modes of *sharpness* differing in the circumstance or the degree: the *acute* is not only more than *sharp* in the common sense, but signifies also *sharp* pointed: a knife may be *sharp*; but a needle is properly *acute*. Things are *sharp* that have either a long or a pointed edge; but the *keen* is applicable only to the long edge; and that in the highest degree of *sharpness*: a common knife may be *sharp*; but a razor or a lancet are properly said to be *keen*. These terms preserve the same distinction in their figurative use. Every pain is *sharp* which may resemble that which is produced by cutting; it is *acute* when it resembles that produced by piercing deep: words are said to be *sharp* which have any power in them to wound; they are *keen* when they cut deep and wide.

Be sure you avoid as much as you can to enquire after those that have been *sharp* in their judgements towards me. EARL OF STRAFFORD.

Wisdom's eye

Acute for what? To spy more mischief. YOUNG.

To this great end keen instinct stings him on.

YOUNG.

TO SHED, *v.* *To pour.*

SHELTER, *v.* *Asylum.*

TO SHELTER, *v.* *To cover.*

SHELTER, *v.* *Harbor.*

TO SHINE, GLITTER, GLARE,
SPARKLE, RADIATE.

SHINE, in Saxon *schinean*, German *scheinen*, is in all probability connected with the words *show*, *see*, &c.

GLITTER and GLARE are variations from the German *gleissen*, *glänzen*, &c. which have a similar meaning.

To SPARKLE signifies to produce sparks, and *spark* is in Saxon *spearce*, low German and Dutch *spark*.

To RADIATE is to produce rays, from the Latin *radius* a ray.

The emission of light is the common idea conveyed by these terms. To *shine* expresses simply this general idea: *glitter* and the other verbs include some collateral ideas in their signification.

To *shine* is a steady emission of light; to *glitter* is an unsteady emission of light, occasioned by the reflection on transparent or bright bodies: the sun and moon *shines* whenever they make their appearance; but a set of diamonds *glitter* by the irregular reflection of the light on them; or the brazen spire of a steeple *glitters* when the sun in the morning *shines* upon it.

Shine specifies no degree of light, it may be barely sufficient to render itself visible, or it may be a very strong degree of light: *glare* on the contrary denotes the highest possible degree of light: the sun frequently *glares*, when it *shines* only at intervals; and all naked light, the strength of which is diminished by any shade, will produce a *glare*.

To *shine* is to emit light in a full stream; but to *sparkle* is to emit it in small portions; and to *radiate* is to emit it in long lines. The fire *sparkles* in the burning of wood; or the light of the sun *sparkles* when it strikes on knobs or small points: the sun *radiates* when it seems to emit its light in rays.

This glorious morning star was not the tran-

sitory light of a comet which *shines* and *glares* for a while, and then presently vanishes into nothing.

SORTA.

Yet something *shines* more glorious in his word,
His mercy this.

WALLER.

The happiness of success *glittering* before him withdraws his attention from the atrociousness of the guilt.

JOHNSON.

Against the capitol I met a lion,
Who *glar'd* upon me, and went surly by
Without annoying me.

SWANSTRAEL.

His eyes so sparkled with a lively flame.

DAYKE.

Now had the sun withdrawn his radiant light.

DAYKE.

SHOCK, CONCUSSION.

SHOCK denotes a violent *shake* or agitation; CONCUSSION, a shaking together. The *shock* is often instantaneous, but does not necessarily extend beyond the act of the moment; the *concussion* is permanent in its consequences, it tends to derange the system. Hence the different application of the terms: the *shock* may affect either the body or the mind; the *concussion* affects properly only the body, or corporeal objects: a violent and sudden blow produces a *shock* at the moment it is given; but it does not always produce a *concussion*: the violence of a fall will, however, sometimes produce a *concussion* in the brain, which in future affects the intellects. Sudden news of an exceedingly painful nature will often produce a *shock* on the mind; but time mostly serves to wear away the effect which has been produced.

SHOCKING, *v.* *Formidable.*

TO SHOOT, DART.

To SHOOT and DART, in the proper sense, are clearly distinguished from each other, as expressing different modes of sending bodies to a distance from a given point. From the circumstances of the actions arise their different application to other objects in the improper sense; as that which proceeds by *shooting* goes unexpectedly, and with great rapidity, forth from a body; so, in the figurative sense, a plant *shoots* up that comes so unexpectedly as not to be seen; a star is said to *shoot* in the sky, which seems to move in a *shooting* manner, from one place to another: a *dart*,

on the other hand, or that which is *parted*, moves through the air visibly, and with less rapidity: hence the quick movements of persons or animals are described by the word *durt*; a soldier *darts* forward to meet his antagonist, a hart *durts* past any one in order to make her escape.

SHORT, BRIEF, CONCISE,
SUCCINCT, SUMMARY.

SHORT, in French *court*, German *kurz*, Latin *curtus*, Greek *κορτος*.

BRIEF, in Latin *brevis*, in Greek *βραχυς*.

CONCISE, in Latin *consisus*, signifies cut into a small body.

SUCCINCT, in Latin *succinctus*, participle of *succingo*, signifies brought within a small compass.

SUMMARY, *v.* *Abridgement*.

Short is the generic, the rest are specific terms: every thing which admits of dimensions may be *short*, as opposed to the long, that is, either naturally or artificially; the rest are species of artificial *shortness*, or that which is the work of art: hence it is that material, as well as spiritual, objects may be termed *short*; but the *brief*, *concise*, *succinct*, and *summary*, are intellectual or spiritual only. We may term a stick, a letter, or a discourse, *short*; but we speak of *brevity* only in regard to the mode of speech; *conciseness* and *succinctness* as to the matter of speech; *summary* as to the mode either of speaking or action: the *brief* is opposed to the prolix; the *concise* and *succinct* to the diffuse; the *summary* to the circumstantial or ceremonious. It is a matter of comparatively little importance whether a man's life be long or *short*; but it deeply concerns him that every moment be well spent. *Brevity* of expression ought to be consulted by speakers, even more than by writers; *conciseness* is of peculiar advantage in the formation of rules for young persons; and *succinctness* is a requisite in every writer, who has extensive materials to digest; a *summary* mode of proceeding may have the advantage of saving time, but it has the disadvantage of incorrectness, and often of injustice.

The widest excursions of the mind are made by *short* flights frequently repeated. JOHNSON.

Premeditation of thought, and brevity of expression, are the great ingredients of that reverence that is required to a pious and acceptable prayer. SOUTH.

Aristotle has a dry *conciseness*, that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents. GRAY.

Let all your precepts be *succinct* and clear,
That ready wits may comprehend them soon.

ROSCOMMON.

Nor spend their time to show their reading.

She'd have a *summary* proceeding. SWIFT.

SHOW, *v.* *Magnificence*.

TO SHOW, POINT OUT, MARK,
INDICATE.

SHOW, in German *schauen*, &c. Greek *θεωω*, comes from the Hebrew *shauh* to look upon.

To POINT OUT is to fix a *point* upon a thing.

MARK, *v.* *Mark*, *impression*.

INDICATE, *v.* *Mark*, *sign*.

Show is here the general term, and the others specific: the common idea included in the signification of them all is that of making a thing visible to another. To *show* is an indefinite term; one *shows* by simply setting a thing before the eyes of another: to *point out* is specific; it is to *show* some particular *point* by a direct and immediate application to it: we *show* a person a book, when we put it into his hands; but we *point out* the beauties of its contents by making a *point* upon them, or accompanying the action with some particular movement, which shall direct the attention of the observer in a specific manner. Many things, therefore, may be *shown* which cannot be *pointed out*: a person *shows* himself, but he does not *point* himself out; towns, houses, gardens, and the like, are *shown*; but single things of any description are *pointed out*.

To *show* and *point out* are personal acts, which are addressed from one individual to another; but to *mark* is an indirect means of making a thing visible or observable: a person may *mark* something in the absence of others, by which he intends to distinguish it from all others: thus a tradesman *marks* the prices and names of the articles which he sets forth in his shop. We *show* by holding in one's hand; we *point out* with the finger; we *mark* with a pen or pencil. To *show* and *mark* are the acts either of

SHOW, EXHIBITION, REPRESENTATION, SIGHT, SPECTACLE.

SHOW signifies the thing shown (*v. To show*); EXHIBITION signifies the thing exhibited (*v. To show*); REPRESENTATION, the thing *represented*; SIGHT, the thing to be seen; and SPECTACLE, from the Latin *specto*, stands for the thing to be beheld.

Show is here, as in the former article, the most general term. Every thing set forth to view is *shown*; and if set forth for the amusement of others, it is a *show*. This is the common idea included in the terms *exhibition* and *representation*: but *show* is a term of vulgar meaning and application; the others have a higher use and signification. The *show* consists of that which merely pleases the eye; it is not a matter either of taste or act, but merely of curiosity: *exhibition*, on the contrary, presents some effort of talent or some work of genius; and *representation* sets forth the image or imitation of some thing by the power of art: hence we speak of a *show* of wild beasts; an *exhibition* of paintings; and a theatrical *representation*. The conjuror makes a *show* of his tricks at a fair to the wonder of the gazing multitude; the artist makes an *exhibition* of his works; *representations* of men and manners are given on the stage: *shows* are necessary to keep the populace in good humour; *exhibitions* are necessary for the encouragement of genius; *representations* are proper for the amusement of the cultivated, and the refinement of society. The *show*, *exhibition*, and *representation* are presented by some one to the view of others; the *sight* and *spectacle* present themselves to view. *Sight*, like *show*, is a vulgar term; and *spectacle* the nobler term. Whatever is to be seen to excite notice is a *sight*, in which general sense it would comprehend every *show*, but in its particular sense it includes only that which casually offers itself to view: a *spectacle*, on the contrary, is that species of *sight* which has something in it to interest either the heart or the head of the observer: processions, reviews, sports, and the like, are *sights*; but battles, bull-fights, or public games of any descrip-

tion are *spectacles*, which interest, but shock the feelings.

Charm'd with the wonders of the *show*,
On ev'ry side, above, below,
She now of this or that enquires,
What least was understood admires. GAY.

Copley's picture of Lord Chatham's death is an *exhibition* of itself. BHATTIN.

There are many virtues which in their own nature are incapable of any outward *representation*. ADDISON.

Their various arms afford a pleasing *sight*. DRYDEN.

The weary Britons, whose warrable youth,
Was by Maximilian lately ledd away,
Were to those pagans made an open pray,
And daily *spectacle* of sad decay. SPENSER.

SHOW, OUTSIDE, APPEARANCE, SEMBLANCE.

WHERE there is SHOW (*v. To show*) there must be OUTSIDE and APPEARANCE; but there may be the last without the former. The *show* always denotes an action, and refers to some person as agent; but the *outside* may be merely the passive quality of some thing. We speak, therefore, of a thing as mere *show*; to signify that what is shown is all that exists; and in this sense it may be termed mere *outside*, as consisting only of what is on the *outside*. In describing a house, however, we speak of its *outside*, and not of its *show*; as also of the *outside* of a book, and not of the *show*. *Appearance* denotes an action as well as *show*; but the former is the act of an unconscious agent, the latter of one that is conscious and voluntary: the *appearance* presents itself to the view; the *show* is purposely presented to view. A person makes a *show* so as to be seen by others; his *appearance* is that which *shows* itself in him. To look only to *show*, or be concerned for *show* only, signifies to be concerned for that only which will attract notice; to look only to the *outside* signifies to be concerned only for that which may be seen in a thing, to the disregard of that which is not seen: to look only to *appearances* signifies the same as the former, except that *outside* is said in the proper sense of that which literally strikes the eye; but *appearances* extend to the conduct, and whatever may effect the reputation.

SEMBLANCE or SEEMING (*v.*

To seem) always conveys the idea of an unreal *appearance*, or at least is contrasted with that which is real; he who only wears the *semblance* of friendship would be ill deserving the confidence of a friend.

You'll find the friendship of the world is *shown*,
Mere outward *show*. SAVAGE.

The greater part of men behold nothing more
than the rotation of human affairs. This is only
the *outside* of things. BLAIR.

Every accusation against persons of rank was
heard with pleasure (by James I. of Scotland).
Every *appearance* of guilt was examined with
rigor. ROBERTSON.

But man, the wildest beast of prey,
Wears friendship's *semblance* to betray. MOORE.

SHOW, PARADE, OSTENTATION.

THESE terms are synonymous when they imply abstract actions: *SHOW* is here, as in the preceding article, taken in the vulgar sense; *OSTENTATION* and *PARADE* include the idea of something particular: a man makes a *show* of his equipage, furniture, and the like, by which he strikes the eye of the vulgar, and seeks to impress them with an idea of his wealth and superior rank; this is often the paltry refuge of weak minds to conceal their nothingness: a man makes a *parade* with his wealth, his knowledge, his charities, and the like, by which he endeavours to give weight and dignity to himself, proportioned to the solemnity of his proceedings: the *show* is, therefore, but a simple setting forth to view; but the *parade* requires art, it is forced effort to attract notice by the number and extent of the ceremonies. The *show* and *parade* are confined to the act of *showing*, or the means which are employed to *show*; but the *ostentation* necessarily includes the purpose for which the display is made: he who does a thing so as to be seen and applauded by others, does it from *ostentation*, particularly in application to acts of charity, or of public subscription, in which a man strives to impress others with the extent of his wealth by the liberality of his gift.

Great in themselves
They smile superior of eternal *show*.
SOMERVILLE.

It was not in the mere *parade* of royalty that
the Mexican potentates exhibited their power.
ROBERTSON.

We are dazzled with the splendor of titles, the
ostentation of learning, and the noise of victories.
SPECTATOR.

SHOWY, GAUDY, GAY.

SHOWY, having or being full of *show* (*v. Show, outside*), is mostly an epithet of dispraise; that which is *showy* has seldom any thing to deserve notice beyond that which catches the eye: *GAUDY*, from the Latin *gaudeo* to rejoice, signifies literally full of joy; and is applied figuratively to the exterior of objects, but with the annexed bad idea of being striking to an excess: *GAY*, on the contrary, which is only a contraction of *gaudy*, is used in the same sense as an epithet of praise. Some things may be *showy*, and in their nature properly so; thus the tail of a peacock is *showy*: artificial objects may likewise be *showy*, but they will not be preferred by persons of taste: that which is *gaudy* is always artificial, and is always chosen by the vain, the vulgar, and the ignorant; a maid servant will bedizen herself with *gaudy*-coloured ribbons. That which is *gay* is either nature itself, or nature imitated in the best manner: spring is a *gay* season, and flowers are its *gayest* accompaniments.

The *gaudy*, babbling, and remorseful day
Is crept into the bosom of the sea. SHAKESPEARE.

Jocund day
Upon the mountain tops sits *gayly* dress'd.
SHAKESPEARE.

SHREWD, *v. Acute.*

TO SHRIEK, *v. To cry.*

TO SHRINK, *v. To spring.*

TO SHUDDER, *v. To shake.*

TO SHUN, *v. To avoid.*

TO SHUT, *v. To close.*

SICK, SICKLY, DISEASED, MORBID.

SICK denotes a partial state; *SICKLY* a permanent state of the body, a proneness to be *sick*: he who is *sick* may be made well; but he who is *sickly* is seldom really well: all persons are liable to be *sick*, though few have the misfortune to be *sickly*: a person may be *sick* from the effect of cold, violent exercise, and the like; but he is *sickly* only from constitution.

Sickly expresses a permanent state of indisposition; but **DISEASED** expresses a violent state of derangement without specifying its duration; it may be for a time only, or for a permanency: the person, or his constitution, is *sickly*; the person, or his frame, or particular parts, as his lungs, his inside, his brain, and the like, may be *diseased*. *Sick*, *sickly*, and *diseased*, may all be used in a moral application; **MORBID** is used in no other. *Sick* denotes a partial state, as before, namely, a state of disgust, and is always associated with the object of the *sickness*; we are *sick* of turbulent enjoyments, and seek for tranquillity: *sickly* and *morbid* are applied to the habitual state of the feelings or character; a *sickly* sentimentality, a *morbid* sensibility: *diseased* is applied in general to individuals or communities, to persons or to things; a person's mind is in a *diseased* state when it is under the influence of corrupt passions or principles; society is in a *diseased* state when it is overgrown with wealth and luxury.

For aught I see they are as *sick* that surfeit with too much, as they that starve with nothing.
SHAKESPEARE.

Both Homer and Virgil were of a very delicate and *sickly* constitution.
WALSH.

For a mind *diseased* with vain longings after unattainable advantages, no medicine can be prescribed.
JOHNSON.

Whilst the distempers of a relaxed fibre prognosticate all the *morbid* force of convulsion in the body of the state, the steadiness of the physician is overpowered by the very aspect of the *disease*.
BURKE.

SICKLY, v. Sick.

**SICKNESS, ILLNESS,
INDISPOSITION.**

SICKNESS denotes the state of being *sick* (v. *Sick*): **ILLNESS** that of being *ill* (v. *Evil*): **INDISPOSITION** that of being not well disposed. *Sickness* denotes the state generally or particularly; *illness* denotes it particularly: we speak of *sickness* as opposed to good health; in *sickness* or in health; but of the *illness* of a particular person: when *sickness* is said of the individual, it designates a protracted state; a person may be said to have much *sickness* in his family.

* Vide Girard: "Signe, signal."

Illness denotes only a particular or partial *sickness*: a person is said to have had an *illness* at this or that time, in this or that place, for this or that period. *Indisposition* is a slight *illness*, such an one as is capable of deranging him either in his enjoyments or in his business; colds are the ordinary causes of *indisposition*.

Sickness is a sort of early old age; it teaches us a diffidence in our earthly state.
POPE.

This is the first letter that I have ventured upon, which will be written, I fear, vacillanti-bus literis; as Tully says, Tyro's Letters were after his recovery from an *illness*.
ATTENBURY.

It is not, as you conceive, an *indisposition* of body, but the mind's disease.
FORD.

SIGHT, v. Show.

SIGN, v. Mark.

SIGN, SIGNAL.

SIGN and **SIGNAL** are both derived from the same source (v. *Mark*, *sign*), and the latter is but a species of the former.*

The *sign* enables us to recognize an object; it is therefore sometimes natural: *signal* serves to give warning; it is always arbitrary.

The movements which are visible in the countenance are commonly the *signs* of what passes in the heart; The beat of the drum is the *signal* for soldiers to repair to their post.

We converse with those who are present by *signs*; we make ourselves understood by those who are at a distance by means of *signals*.

The nod that ratifies the will divine,
The faithful fix'd irrevocable *sign*,
This seals thy suit.
POPE.

Then first the trembling earth the *signal* gave,
And flashing fires enlighten all the cave.
DRYDEN.

SIGNAL, v. Sign.

SIGNAL, MEMORABLE.

SIGNAL signifies serving as a sign. **MEMORABLE** signifies worthy to be remembered.

They both express the idea of extraordinary, or being distinguished from every thing: whatever is *signal* deserves to be stamped on the mind, and to serve as a sign of some property or characteristic; whatever is *memorable* impresses upon the memory, and refuses

full *import* of every term which he has occasion to make use of. The different *senses* which words admit of is a great source of ambiguity and confusion with illiterate people.

Signification and *import* are said mostly of single words only; *sense* is said of words either in connection with each other, or as belonging to some class: thus we speak of the *signification* of the word house, of the *import* of the term love; but the *sense* of the sentence, the *sense* of the author; the employment of words in a technical, moral, or physical *sense*.

A lie consists in this, that it is a false *signification* knowingly and voluntarily used. SOUTH.

To draw near to God is an expression of awful and mysterious *import*. BLAIR.

There are two *senses* in which we may be said to draw near, in such a degree as mortality admits, to God. BLAIR.

When beyond her expectation I hit upon her meaning, I can perceive a sudden cloud of disappointment spread over her face. JOHNSON.

TO SIGNIFY, *v.* To denote.

TO SIGNIFY, *v.* To express.

TO SIGNIFY, IMPLY.

SIGNIFY, *v.* To express.

IMPLY, from the Latin *implico* to fold in, signifies to fold or involve an idea in any object.

These terms may be employed either as respects actions or words. In the first case *signify* is the act of the person making known by means of a sign, as we *signify* our approbation by a look: *imply* marks the value or force of the action; our assent is *implied* in our silence. When applied to words or marks, *signify* denotes the positive and established act of the thing; *imply* is its relative act: a word *signifies* whatever it is made literally to stand for; it *implies* that which it stands for figuratively or morally. The term house *signifies* that which is constructed for a dwelling; the term residence *implies* something superior to a house. A cross, thus, +, *signifies* addition in arithmetic or algebra; a long stroke, thus, —, with a break in the text of a work, *implies* that the whole sentence is not completed. It frequently happens that words which *signify* nothing particular

* Vide Abbé Roussot: "Silencieux, taciturne."

in themselves, may be made to *imply* a great deal by the tone, the manner, and the connection.

Words *signify* not immediately and primarily things themselves, but the conceptions of the mind concerning things. SOUTH.

Pleasure *implies* a proportion and agreement to the respective states and conditions of men. SOUTH.

TO SIGNIFY, AVAIL.

SIGNIFY (*v.* To signify) is here employed with regard to events of life, and their relative importance. AVAIL (*v.* To avail) is never used otherwise. That which a thing *signifies* is what it contains; if it *signifies* nothing, it contains nothing, and is worth nothing; if it *signifies* much, it contains much, or is worth much. That which *avails* produces; if it *avails* nothing it produces nothing, is of no use; if it *avails* much, it produces or is worth much.

We consider the end as to its *signification*, and the means as to their *avail*. Although it is of little or no *signification* to a man what becomes of his remains, yet no one can be reconciled to the idea of leaving them to be exposed to contempt; words are but too often of little *avail* to curb the unruly wills of children.

As for wonders, what *signifieth* telling us of them? CUMBERLAND.

What *avails* a parcel of statutes against gaming, when they who make them conspire together for the infraction of them. CUMBERLAND.

SILENCE, TACITURNITY.

*THE Latins have the two verbs *sileo* and *taceo*: the former of which is interpreted by some to signify to cease to speak; and the latter not to begin to speak: others maintain the direct contrary. According to the present use of the words, SILENCE expresses less than TACITURNITY: the *silent* man does not speak; the *taciturn* man will not speak at all. The Latins designated the most profound *silence* by the epithet of *taciturna silentia*.

Silence is either occasional or habitual; it may arise from circumstances or character: *taciturnity* is mostly habitual, and springs from disposition. A loquacious man may be *silent* if he has no one to speak to

a *comparison* between large things and small, although there can be no good *simile*.

There are also several noble *similes* and allusions in the first book of *Paradise Lost*.

ADDISON.

Such as have a natural bent to solitude (to carry on the former *similitude*) are like waters which may be forced into fountains.

POPE.

Your image of worshipping once a year in a certain place, in imitation of the Jews, is but a *comparison*, and *simile non est idem*.

JOHNSON.

SIMILITUDE, *v.* *Likeness*.

SIMILITUDE, *v.* *Simile*.

SIMPLE, SINGLE, SINGULAR.

SIMPLE, in Latin *simplex* or *sine plice* without a fold, is opposed to the complex which has many folds, or to the compound which has several parts involved or connected with each other. SINGLE and SINGULAR (*v.* *One*) are opposed, one to double, and the other to multifarious. We may speak of a *simple* circumstance as independent of any thing; of a *single* instance or circumstance as unaccompanied by any other: and a *singular* instance as one that rarely has its like. In the moral application to the person, *simplicity*, as far as it is opposed to duplicity in the heart, can never be excessive; but when it lies in the head, so that it cannot penetrate the folds and doublings of other persons, it is a fault. *Singleness* of heart and intention is that species of *simplicity* which is altogether to be admired; *singularity* may be either good or bad according to circumstances; to be *singular* in virtue is to be truly good; but to be *singular* in manner is affectation which is at variance with genuine *simplicity*, if not directly opposed to it.

Nothing extraneous must cleave to the eye in the act of seeing; its bare object must be as naked as truth, as *simple* and unmixed as sincerity.

SOUTH.

Mankind with other animals compare,
Single how weak, and impotent they are.

JENYNS.

From the union of the crowns to the Revolution in 1688, Scotland was placed in a political situation the most *singular* and most unhappy.

ROBERTSON.

SIMPLE, SILLY, FOOLISH.

SIMPLE, *v.* *Simple*.

SILLY is but a variation of *simple*.

FOOLISH signifies like a *fool* (*v.* *Fool*).

The *simple*, when applied to the understanding, implies such a contracted power as is incapable of combination; *silly* and *foolish* rise in sense upon the former, signifying either the perversion or the total deficiency of understanding: the behaviour of a person may be *silly*, who from any excess of feeling loses his sense of propriety; the conduct of a person will be *foolish* who has not judgement to direct himself. Country people may be *simple* owing to their want of knowledge; children will be *silly* in company if they have too much liberty given to them; there are some persons who never acquire wisdom enough to prevent them from committing *foolish* errors.

And had the *simple* natives

Oberr'd his sage advice,

Their wealth and fame some years ago

Had reach'd above the skies.

SWIFT.

Two gods a *silly* woman have undone.

DRYDEN.

Virgil justly thought it a *foolish* figure for a grave man to be overtaken by death, while he was weighing the cadence of words and measuring verses.

WALSH.

SIN, *v.* *Crime*.

SINCERE, *v.* *Candid*.

SINCERE, *v.* *Hearty*.

SINCERE, HONEST, TRUE,
PLAIN.

SINCERE (*v.* *Candid*) is here the most comprehensive term: HONEST (*v.* *Honesty*), TRUE, and PLAIN (*v.* *Even*), are but modes of *sincerity*.

Sincerity is a fundamental characteristic of the person; a man is *sincere* from the conviction of his mind: *honesty* is the expression of the feeling, it is the dictate of the heart; we look for a *sincere* friend and an *honest* companion: *truth* is a characteristic of *sincerity*, for a *sincere* friend is a *true* friend; but *sincere* is a permanent quality in the character; and *true* may be an occasional one: we cannot be *sincere* without being *true*, but we may be *true* without being *sincere*.

In like manner a *sincere* man must be *plain*: since *plainness* consists in an unvarnished style; the *sincere* man will always adopt that mode of speech which expresses his sentiments most

tion as respects the painting, cleaning, and exterior, altogether; it is in a bad *state*, as respects the beams, plaister, roof, and interior structure, altogether. The hand of a watch is in a different *situation* every hour; the watch itself may be in a bad *condition* if the wheels are clogged with dirt; but in a good *state* if the works are altogether sound and fit for service.

The man who has a character of his own is little changed by varying his *situation*.

Mrs. MONTAGUE.

It is indeed not easy to prescribe a successful manner of approach to the distressed or necessities, whose *condition* subjects every kind of behaviour equally to misfortune. JOHNSON.

Patience itself is one virtue by which we are prepared for that *state* in which evil shall be no more. JOHNSON.

Situation and *condition* are either permanent or temporary. The **PREDICAMENT**, from the Latin *predico* to assert or declare, signifies to commit one's self by an assertion; and when applied to circumstances, it expresses a temporary embarrassed *situation* occasioned by an act of one's own: hence we always speak of bringing ourselves into a *predicament*. **PLIGHT**, contracted from the Latin *plicatus*, participle of *plico* to fold, signifies any circumstance in which one is disagreeably entangled; and **CASE** (*v. Case*) signifies any thing which may befall us, or into which we fall mostly, though not necessarily contrary to our inclination. Those two latter terms therefore denote species of a temporary *condition*; for they both express that which happens to the object itself, without reference to any other. A person is in an unpleasant *situation* who is shut up in a stage coach with disagreeable company. He is in an awkward *predicament* when in attempting to please one friend he displeases another. He may be in a wretched *plight* if he is overturned in a stage at night, and at a distance from any habitation. He will be in evil *case* if he is compelled to put up with a spare and poor diet.

Satan beheld their *plight*,
And to his mates thus in derision call'd.

MILTON.

The offender's life lies in the mercy
Of the duke only 'gainst all other voice,
In which *predicament* I say thou stand'st.

SHAKESPEARE.

Our case is like that of a traveller upon the Alps, who should fancy that the top of the next hill must end his journey, because it terminates his prospect.

ADDISON.

SIZE, MAGNITUDE, GREATNESS, BULK.

SIZE, from the Latin *cisus* and *cædo* to cut, signifies that which is cut or framed according to a certain proportion.

MAGNITUDE, from the Latin *magnitudo*, answers literally to the English word **GREATNESS**.

BULK, *v. Bulky*.

Size is a general term including all manner of dimension or measurement; *magnitude* is employed in science or in an abstract sense to denote some specific measurement; *greatness* is an unscientific term applied in the same sense to objects in general: *size* is indefinite, it never characterizes any thing either as large or small; but *magnitude* and *greatness* always suppose something *great*; and *bulk* denotes a considerable degree of *greatness*: things which are diminutive in *size* will often have an extraordinary degree of beauty, or some other adventitious perfection to compensate the deficiency; astronomers have classed the stars according to their different *magnitudes*; *greatness* is considered by Burke as one source of the sublime; *bulk* is that species of *greatness* which destroys the symmetry, and consequently the beauty, of objects.

Soon grows the pigmy to gigantic *size*.

DRYDEN.

Then form'd the moon,
Globose, and every *magnitude* of stars.

MILTON.

Awe is the first sentiment that rises in the mind at the view of God's *greatness*. BLAIR.

His huge *bulk* on sev'n high volumes roll'd.

DRYDEN.

TO SKETCH, *v. To delineate*.

SKETCH, OUTLINES.

THE **SKETCH** may form a whole; the **OUTLINES** are but a part: the *sketch* may comprehend the *outlines*, and some of the particulars: the *outlines*, as the term bespeaks, comprehends only that which is on the exterior surface: the *sketch*, in drawing, may serve as a landscape, as it presents some of the features of a coun-

try; but the *outlines* serve only as bounding lines, within which the *sketch* may be formed. So in the moral application we speak of the *sketches* of countries, characters, manners, and the like, which serve as a description; but of the *outlines* of a plan, of a work, a project, and the like, which serve as a basis on which the subordinate parts are to be formed: barbarous nations present us with rude *sketches* of nature; an abridgement is little more than the *outlines* of a larger work.

In few, to close the whole,
The moral muse has shadow'd out a *sketch*
Of most our weakness needs believe or do.

YOUNG.

This is the *outline* of the fable (King Lear).

JOHNSON.

SKILFUL, v. *Clever*.

SKIN, HIDE, PEELE, RIND.

SKIN, which is in German *schin*, Swedish *skinn*, Danish *skind*, probably comes from the Greek *σκηνο*, a tent or covering.

HIDE, in Saxon *hyd*, German *haut*, low German *huth*, Latin *cutis*, comes from the Greek *κρυπτειν* to *hide*, cover.

PEEL, in German *jell*, &c. Latin *pellis* a skin, in Greek *φελλιν* or *φλοιον*; bark, comes from *φλαω* to burst or crack, because the bark is easily broken.

RIND is in all probability changed from round, signifying that which goes round and envelops.

Skin is the term in most general use, it is applicable both to human creatures and to animals; *hide* is used only for the *skins* of large animals: we speak of the *skins* of birds or insects; but of the *hides* of oxen or horses, and other animals, which are to be separated from the body and converted into leather. *Skin* is equally applied to the inanimate and the animate world; but *peel* and *rind* belong only to inanimate objects: the *skin* is generally said of that which is interior, in distinction from the exterior which is the *peel*: an orange has both its *peel* and its thin *skin* underneath; an apple, a pear, and the like, has a *peel*. The *peel* is a soft substance on the outside; the *rind* is generally interior,

and of a harder substance: in regard to a stick, we speak of its *peel* and its inner *skin*; in regard to a tree, we speak of its bark and its *rind*: hence, likewise, the term *rind* is applied to cheese, and other incrustated substances that envelop bodies.

SLACK, LOOSE.

SLACK, in Saxon *slaec*, low German *slack*, French *lache*, Latin *laxus*, and LOOSE, in *Saxon *laes*, both come from the Hebrew *halatz* to make free or loose; they differ more in application than in sense: they are both opposed to that which is close bound; but *slack* is said only of that which is tied, or that with which any thing is tied; but *loose* is said of any substances, the parts of which do not adhere closely: a rope is *slack* in opposition to the tight rope, which is stretched to its full extent; and in general cords or strings are said to be *slack* which fail in the requisite degree of tightness; but they are said to be *loose* in an indefinite manner, without conveying any collateral idea: thus the string of an instrument is denominated *slack* rather than *loose*; on the other hand, *loose* is said of many bodies to which the word *slack* cannot be applied: a garment is *loose*, but not *slack*; the leg of a table is *loose*, but not *slack*. In the moral application, that which admits of extension lengthways is denominated *slack*; and that which fails in consistency and close adherence is *loose*: trade is in general *slack*, or the sale of a particular article, is *slack*; but an engagement is *loose*, and principles are *loose*.

From his *slack* hand the garland wreath'd for
Eve

Down dropt.

MILTON.

Nor fear that he who sits so *loose* to life,
Should too much shun its labors and its strife.

DEAN.

TO SLANDER, v. *To asperse*.

TO SLANT, SLOPE.

SLANT is probably a variation of *leant*, and SLOPE of *slip*, expressive of a sideward movement or direction: they are the same in sense, but different in application: *slant* is said of small bodies only; *slope* is said indifferently of all bodies, large and

small: a book may be made to *slant* by lying in part on another book, a desk, a table; or a piece of ground is said to *slope*.

As late the clouds,
Justling or push'd with winds, rude in their
shock,
Fire the *slant* lightning. MILTON.
Its uplands *sloping* deck the mountain's side.
GOLDSMITH.

SLAVERY, *v. Servitude.*

SLAUGHTER, *v. Carnage.*

TO SLAUGHTER, *v. To kill.*

TO SLAY, *v. To kill.*

TO SLEEP, SLUMBER, DOZE,
DROWZE, NAP.

SLEEP, in Saxon *slapan*, low German *slap*, German *schlaf*, is supposed to come from the low German *slap* or *slack* slack, because *sleep* denotes an entire relaxation of the physical frame.

SLUMBER, in Saxon *slumerun*, &c. is but an intensive verb of *schlumen*, which is a variation from the preceding *sleep*, *slapan*, &c.

DOZE, in low German *dusen*, is in all probability a variation from the French *dors*, and the Latin *dormio* to *sleep*, which was anciently *dermio*, and comes from the Greek *δερμα* a skin, because people lay on skins when they *slept*.

DROWZE is a variation of *doze*.

NAP is in all probability a variation of *nob* and *nod*.

Sleep is the general term, which designates in an indefinite manner that state of the body to which all animated beings are subject at certain seasons in the course of nature; to *slumber* is to *sleep* lightly and softly; to *doze* is to incline to *sleep* or to begin *sleeping*; to *nap* is to *sleep* for a time: every one who is not indisposed *sleeps* during the night; those who are accustomed to wake at a certain hour of the morning commonly *slumber* only after that time; there are many who, though they cannot *sleep* in a carriage, will yet be obliged to *doze* if they travel in the night; in hot climates the middle of the day is commonly chosen for a *nap*.

SLEEPY, DROWSY, LETHARGIC.

SLEEPY (*v. To sleep*) expresses

either a temporary or a permanent state; DROWSY, which comes from the low German *drusen*, and is a variation of *doze* (*v. To sleep*), expresses mostly a temporary state; LETHARGIC, from *lethargy*, in Latin *lethargia*, Greek *ληθαργία*, compounded of *λεθη* forgetfulness, and *αργος* swift, signifying a proneness to forgetfulness or *sleep*, describes a permanent or habitual state.

Sleepy, as a temporary state, expresses also what is natural or seasonable; *drowsiness* expresses an inclination to *sleep* at unseasonable hours: it is natural to be *sleepy* at the hour when we are accustomed to retire to rest; it is common to be *drowsy* when sitting still after dinner. *Sleepiness*, as a permanent state, is an infirmity to which some persons are subject constitutionally; *lethargy* is a disease with which people, otherwise the most wakeful, may be occasionally attacked.

SLENDER, *v. Thin.*

TO SLIDE, *v. To slip.*

SLIGHT, *v. Cursory.*

SLIGHT, *v. Thin.*

TO SLIGHT, *v. To disregard.*

SLIM, *v. Thin.*

TO SLIP, SLIDE, GLIDE.

SLIP is in low German *slipan*, Latin *labor* to slip, and *libo* to pour, which comes from the Greek *λεπομαι* to pour down as water does, and the Hebrew *salap* to turn aside.

SLIDE is a variation of *slip*, and GLIDE of *slide*.

To *slip* is an involuntary, and *slide* a voluntary motion: those who go on the ice in fear will *slip*; boys *slide* on the ice by way of amusement. To *slip* and *slide* are lateral movements of the feet; but to *glide* is the movement of the whole body, and just that easy motion which is made by *slipping*, *sliding*, *flying*, or *swimming*: a person *glides* along the surface of the ice when he *slides*; a vessel *glides* along through the water. In the moral and figurative application, a person *slips* who commits unintentional errors; he *slides* into a course of life, who wittingly, and yet without difficulty, falls into the practice and habits which

ODOR, in Latin *odor*, comes from *oleo*, in Greek *ὀσμεν* to smell.

PERFUME, compounded of *per* or *pro* and *fumo* or *fumus* a smoke or vapor, that is, the vapor that issues forth.

FRAGRANCE, in Latin *fragrantia*, comes from *fragro*, anciently *frago*, that is, to *perfume* or *smell* like the *fraga* or strawberries.

Smell and *scent* are said either of that which receives, or that which gives the *smell*; the *odor*, the *perfume*, and *fragrance*, of that which communicates the *smell*. In the first case, *smell* is said generally of all living things without distinction; *scent* is said only of such animals as have this peculiar faculty of tracing objects by their *smell*: some persons have a much quicker *smell* than others, and some have an acuter *smell* of particular objects than they have of things in general; dogs are remarkable for their quickness of *scent*, by which they can trace their masters and other objects at an immense distance; other animals are gifted with this faculty to a surprising degree, which serves them as a means of defence against their enemies.

In the second case *smell* is compared with *odor*, *perfume*, and *fragrance*, either as respects the objects communicating the *smell*, or the nature of the *smell* which is communicated. *Smell* is indefinite in its sense, and universal in its application; *odor*, *perfume*, and *fragrance*, are species of *smell*: every object is said to *smell* which acts on the olfactory nerves; flowers, fruits, woods, earth, water, and the like, have a *smell*; but the *odor* is said of that which is artificial; the *perfume* and *fragrance* of that which is natural: the burning of things produces an *odor*; the *perfume* and *fragrance* arises from flowers or sweet *smelling* herbs, spices, and the like. The *smell* and *odor* do not specify the exact nature of that which issues from bodies; they may both be either pleasant or unpleasant; but *smell*, if taken in certain connexions, signifies a bad *smell*, and *odor* signifies that which is sweet: meat which is kept too long will have a *smell*, that is of course a bad *smell*; the *odors* from a sacrifice are accept-

able, that is, the sweet *odors* ascend to heaven. *Perfume* is properly a wide spreading *smell*, and when taken without any epithet signifies a pleasant *smell*; *fragrance* never signifies any thing but what is good, it is the sweetest and most powerful *perfume*: the *perfume* from the flowers and shrubs is as grateful to one sense as their colors and conformation are to the other; the *fragrance* from groves of myrtle and orange-trees surpasses the beauty of their fruits or foliage.

Then curses his conspiring feet, whose scent
Betrays that safety which their swiftness lent.

DRAKE.

So flowers are gathered to adorn a grave,
To lose their freshness among bones and rotten-
ness,

And have their odours stifled in the dust.

ROWE.

At last a soft and solemn breathing sound
Rose like a steam of rich distill'd *perfumes*.

MILTON.

Soft vernal *fragrance* clothes the flow'ring earth.

MASON.

SMOOTH, *v.* *Even*.

TO SMOTHER, *v.* *To stifle*.

TO SMOTHER, *v.* *To suffocate*.

TO SNATCH, *v.* *To lay hold of*.

TO SNEER, *v.* *To scoff*.

TO SOAK, DRENCH, STEEP.

SOAK is a variation of suck.

DRENCH is a variation of drink.

STEEP, in Saxon *steapan*, &c. from the Hebrew *satep*, signifies to overflow or overwhelm.

The idea of communicating or receiving a liquid is common to these terms. We *soak* things in water when we wish to soften them; animals are *drenched* with liquid as a medicinal operation. A person's things are *soaked* in rain, when the water has penetrated every thread; he himself is *drenched* in the rain when it has penetrated as it were his very body; *drench* therefore in this case only expresses the idea of *soak* in a stronger manner. To *steep* is a species of *soaking* employed as an artificial process; to *soak* is however a permanent action by which hard things are rendered soft; to *steep* is a temporary action by which soft bodies become penetrated with a liquid: thus salt meat requires to be *soaked*; fruits are *steeped* in brandy.

Good sense teaches us the necessity of conforming to the rules of the *society* to which we belong : good breeding prescribes to us to render ourselves agreeable to the *company* of which we form a part.

When expressing the abstract action of associating, *society* is even more general and indefinite than before ; it expresses that which is common to mankind ; and *company* that which is peculiar to individuals. The love of *society* is inherent in our nature ; it is weakened or destroyed only by the vice of our constitution, or the derangement of our system : every one naturally likes the *company* of his own friends and connections in preference to that of strangers. *Society* is a permanent and habitual act ; *company* is only a particular act suited to the occasion : it behoves us to shun the *society* of those from whom we can learn no good, although we may sometimes be obliged to be in their *company*. The *society* of intelligent men is desirable for those who are entering life ; the *company* of facetious men is agreeable in travelling.

Unhappy he, who from the first of joys,
Society, cut off, is left alone
Amid this world of death. THOMSON.

Company, though it may relieve a man from his melancholy, cannot secure him from his conscience. SOUTH.

SOFT, MILD, GENTLE, MEEK.

SOFT, in Saxon *soft*, German *sant*, comes most probably from the Saxon *sib*, Gothic *sef*, Hebrew *subbath* rest.

MILD, in Saxon *milde*, German *milde*, &c. Latin *mollis*, Greek *μιλις*, comes from *μιλισσω* to soothe with *soft* words, and *μιλι* honey.

GENTLE, *v.* Gentle.

MEEK, like the Latin *mitis*, may in all probability come from the Greek *μειν* to make less, signifying to make one's self small, to be humble.

Soft and *mild* are employed both in the proper and the improper application ; *meek* only in the moral application : *soft* is opposed to the hard ; *mild* to the sharp or strong.

All bodies are said to be *soft* which yield easily to the touch or pressure, as a *soft* bed, the *soft* earth, *soft* fruit ; some bodies are said to be

mild which act weakly, but pleasantly, on the taste, as *mild* fruit, or a *mild* cheese ; or on the feelings, as *mild* weather.

In the improper application, *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, may be applied to that which acts weakly upon others, or is easily acted upon by others ; *meek* is said of that only which is acted upon easily by others : in this sense they are all employed as epithets, to designate either the person, or that which is personal.

In the sense of acting weakly, but pleasantly, on others, *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, are applied to the same personal properties, but with a slight distinction in the sense : the voice of a person is either *soft* or *mild* ; it is naturally *soft*, it is purposely made *mild* : a *soft* voice strikes agreeably upon the ear ; a *mild* voice, when assumed by those who have authority, dispels all fears in the minds of inferiors. A person moves either *softly* or *gently*, but in the first case he moves with but little noise, in the second he moves with a slow pace. It is necessary to go *softly* in the chamber of the sick, that they may not be disturbed ; it is necessary for a sick person to move *gently*, when he first attempts to go abroad after his confinement.

To tread *softly* is an art which is acquired from the dancing-master ; to go *gently* is a voluntary act : we may go a *gentle* or a quick pace at pleasure. Words are either *soft*, *mild*, or *gentle* : a *soft* word falls lightly upon the person to whom it is addressed ; it does not excite any angry sentiment ; the proverb says, " A *soft* answer turneth away wrath." A reproof is *mild* when it falls easily from the lips of one who has power to oppress and wound the feelings ; a censure, an admonition, or a hint, is *gentle*, which bears indirectly on the offender, and does not expose the whole of his infirmity to view : a kind father always tries the efficacy of *mild* reproofs ; a prudent friend will always try to correct our errors by *gentle* remonstrances.

In like manner we say that punishments are *mild* which inflict but a small portion of pain ; they are opposed to those which are severe :

gives trouble to a certain extent, but it is not always unreasonable: there may be cases in which we may yield to the *solicitations* of friends, to do that which we have no objection to be obliged to do: but *importunity* is that *solicitation* which never ceases to apply for that which it is not agreeable to give. We may sometimes be urgent in our *solicitations* of a friend to accept some proffered honor; the *solicitation* however, in this case, although it may even be troublesome, yet it is sweetened by the motive of the action: the *importunity* of beggars is often a politic means of extorting money from the passenger.

Although the devil cannot compel a man to sin, yet he can follow a man with continual *solicitations*. SOUTH.

The torment of expectation is not easily to be borne, when the heart has no rival engagements to withdraw it from the *importunities* of desire. JOHNSON.

SOLICITUDE, *v. Care.*

SOLID, *v. Firm.*

SOLID, *v. Hard.*

SOLID, *v. Substantial.*

SOLITARY, *v. Alone.*

SOLITARY, SOLE, ONLY, SINGLE.

SOLITARY and SOLE are both derived from *solus* alone or whole.

ONLY, that is onely, signifies the quality of unity.

SINGLE is an abbreviation of singular (*v. Simple*).

All these terms are more or less opposed to several or many. *Solitary* and *sole* signify one left by itself; the former mostly in application to particular sensible objects, the latter in regard mostly to moral objects: a *solitary* shrub expresses not only one shrub, but one that has been left to itself: the *sole* cause or reason signifies that reason or cause which stands unsupported by any thing else. *Only* does not include the idea of desertion or deprivation, but it comprehends that of want or deficiency: he who has *only* one shilling in his pocket means to imply, that he wants more or ought to have more. *Single* signifies simply one or more detached from others, without conveying any other collateral idea: a *single* sheet of

paper may be sometimes more convenient than a double one; a *single* shilling may be all that is necessary for the present purpose: there may be *single* ones, as well as a *single* one; but the other terms exclude the idea of there being any thing else. A *solitary* act of generosity is not sufficient to characterize a man as generous: with most criminals the *sole* ground of their defence rests upon their not having learnt to know and do better: harsh language and severe looks are not the *only* means of correcting the faults of others: *single* instances of extraordinary talents now and then present themselves in the course of an age.

In the adverbial form, *solely*, *only*, and *singly* are employed with a similar distinction. The disasters which attend an unsuccessful military enterprise is seldom to be attributed *solely* to the incapacity of the general: there are many circumstances both in the natural and moral world which are to be accounted for *only* by admitting a providence as presented to us in Divine revelation: there are many things which men could not effect *singly* that might be effected by them conjointly.

The cattle in the fields and meadows green,
Those rare and *solitary*, these in flocks. MILTON.

All things are but insipid to a man in comparison of that one, which is the *sole* minion of his fancy. SOUTH.

Thy fear
Will save us trial, what the least can do,
Single against the wicked. MILTON.

SOLITARY, DESERT, DESOLATE.

SOLITARY, *v. Alone.*

DESERT is the same as *deserted*.

DESOLATE, in Latin *desolatus*, signifies made *solitary*.

All these epithets are applied to places, but with different modifications of the common idea of solitude which belongs to them. The *solitary* simply denotes the absence of all beings of the same kind: thus a place is *solitary* to a man, where there is no human being but himself; and it is *solitary* to a brute, when there are no brutes with which it can hold society. *Desert* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary* by being shunned, from its unfitness as a place of resi-

The ass, approaching next, confess'd
That in his heart he lov'd a jest;
One fault he hath, is *sorry* for't,
His ears are half a foot too short.

SWIFT.

The mimic ape began to chatter,
How evil tongues his name bespatter;
He saw, and he was *grieved* to see't,
His *zeal* was sometimes indiscreet.

SWIFT.

No man is *hurt*, at least few are so, by
hearing his neighbour esteemed a worthy man.

BLAIR.

SORT, *v.* *Kind*.SOVEREIGN, *v.* *Prince*.

SOUL, MIND.

THESE terms, or the equivalents to them, have been employed by all civilized nations to designate that part of human nature which is distinct from matter. The SOUL, however, from the German *seele*, &c. and the Greek *ζαν* to live, like the *anima* of the Latin, which comes from the Greek *ανιμο*; wind or breath, is represented to our minds by the subtlest or most ethereal of sensible objects, namely, breath or spirit, and denotes properly the quickening or vital principle. MIND, on the contrary, from the Greek *μενς*, which signifies strength, is that sort of power which is closely allied to, and in a great measure dependant upon, corporeal organization: the former is, therefore, the immortal, and the latter the mortal, part of us; the former connects us with angels, the latter with brutes: in the former we distinguish consciousness and will, which is possessed by no other created being that we know of; in the latter we distinguish nothing but the power of receiving impressions from external objects, which we call ideas, and which we have in common with the brutes. There are minute philosophers, who, from their extreme anxiety after truth, deny that we possess any thing more than what this poor composition of flesh and blood can give us; and yet, methinks, sound philosophy would teach us that we ought to prove the truth of one position, before we assert the falsehood of its opposite; and consequently that if we deny that we have any thing but what is material in us, we ought first to prove that the material is sufficient to produce the reasoning faculty of man. Now it is upon this

very impossibility of finding any thing in matter as an adequate cause for the production of the *soul*, that it is conceived to be an entirely distinct principle. If we had only the mind, that is, an aggregate of ideas or sensible images, such as is possessed by the brutes, it would be no difficulty to conceive of this as purely material, since the act of receiving images is but a passive act, suited to the inactive property of matter: but when the *soul* turns in upon itself, and creates for itself by abstraction, combination, and deduction, a world of new objects, it proves itself to be the most active of all principles in the universe; it then positively acts upon matter instead of being acted upon by it. But not to lose sight of the distinction drawn between the words *soul* and *mind*, I simply wish to show that the vulgar and the philosophical use of these terms altogether accord, and are both founded on the true nature of things; namely, that the word *soul* is taken for the active and living principle, and *mind* is considered as the storehouse or receiver: so likewise when we say that a person is the *soul* of the society in which he acts; or that we treasure any thing in the *mind*, it makes an impression on the *mind*.

Man's *soul* in a perpetual motion flows,
And to no outward cause that motion owes.

DENHAM.

In bashful coyness, or in maiden pride,
The soft return conceal'd, save when it stole
In side-long glances from her downcast eyes,
Or from her swelling *soul* in stifled sighs.

THOMSON.

Even from the body's purity, the *mind*
Receives a secret sympathetic aid.

THOMSON.

SOUND, SANE, HEALTHY.

SOUND and SANE, in Latin *sanus*, comes probably from *sanguis* the blood, because in that lies the seat of health or sickness.

HEALTHY, *v.* *Healthy*.

Sound is extended in its application to all things that are in the state in which they ought to be, so as to preserve their vitality; thus, animals and vegetables are said to be *sound* when in the former there is nothing amiss in their breath, and in the latter in their root. By a figurative application wood and other things may be said to be *sound* when they are entirely free

right or wrong : a dumb man cannot *speaking* ; a fool cannot *say* any thing that is worth hearing : we *speaking* languages, we *speaking* sense or nonsense, we *speaking* intelligibly or unintelligibly ; but we *say* what we think at the time. In an extended sense, *speaking* may refer as much to sense as to sound ; but then it applies only to general cases, and *say* to particular and passing circumstances of life : it is a great abuse of the gift of speech not to *speaking* the truth ; it is very culpable in a person to *say* that he will do a thing and not to do it.

To *say* and *tell* are both the ordinary actions of men in their daily intercourse ; but *say* is very partial, it may comprehend single unconnected sentences, or even single words : we may *say* yes or no ; but we *tell* that which is connected, and which forms more or less of a narrative. To *say* is to communicate that which passes in our own minds, to express our ideas and feelings as they rise ; to *tell* is to communicate events or circumstances respecting ourselves or others : it is not good to let children *say* foolish things for the sake of talking ; it is still worse for them to be encouraged in *telling* every thing they hear : when every one is allowed to *say* what he likes and what he thinks, there will commonly be more *speakers* than hearers ; those who accustom themselves to *tell* long stories impose a tax upon others, which is not repaid by the pleasure of their company.

Men's reputations depend upon what others *say* of them ; reports are spread by means of one man *telling* another.

He that questioneth much shall learn much, and content much, for he shall give occasion to those whom he asketh to please themselves in *speaking*. BACON.

Any, Yorke (for sure, if any, thou canst *tell*),
What virtue is, who practise it so well.

JENYNS.

TO SPEAK, TALK, CONVERSE, DISCOURSE.

SPEAK, *v.* To *speaking*.

TALK is but a variation of *tell* (*v.* To *speaking*).

CONVERSE, *v.* Conversation.

DISCOURSE, in Latin *discursus*,

expresses properly an examining or deliberating upon.

The idea of communicating with, or communicating to, another, by means of signs, is common in the signification of all these terms : to *speaking* is an indefinite term, specifying no circumstance of the action ; we may *speaking* only one word or many ; but we *talk* for a continuance : we *speaking* from various motives ; we *talk* for pleasure ; we *converse* for improvement, or intellectual gratification : we *speaking* with or to a person ; we *talk* commonly to others ; we *converse* with others. *Speaking* a language is quite distinct from writing ; public *speaking* has at all times been cultivated with great care, but particularly under popular governments : *talking* is mostly the pastime of the idle and the empty ; those who think least *talk* most : *conversation* is the rational employment of social beings, who seek by an interchange of sentiment to purify the affections, and improve the understanding.

Conversation is the act of many together ; *talk* and *discourse* may be the act of one addressing himself to others : the *conversation* loses its value when it ceases to be general ; the *talk* has seldom any value but what the *talker* attaches to it ; the *discourse* derives its value from the nature of the subject, as well as the character of the *speaker* : *conversation* is adapted for mixed companies ; children *talk* to their parents, or to their companions ; parents and teachers *discourse* with young people on moral duties.

Falsehood is a *speaking* against our thoughts.

SOURN.

Talkers are commonly vain, and credulous withal ; for he that *talketh* what he knoweth, will also *talk* what he knoweth not. BACON.

Go, therefore, half this day, as friend with friend,
Converse with Adam. MILTON.

Let thy *discourse* be such, that thou mayst give
Profit to others, or from them receive.

DENHAM.

TO SPEAK, *v.* To utter.

SPECIAL, SPECIFIC, PARTICULAR.

SPECIAL, in Latin *specialis*, signifies belonging to the species ; PAR-

TICULAR, belonging to a particle or small part; **SPECIFIC**, in Latin *specificus*, from *species* a species, and *faceo* to make, signifies making a species. The *special* is that which comes under the general; the *particular* is that which comes under the *special*: hence we speak of a *special* rule; but a *particular* case. The *particular* and *specific* are both applied to the properties of individuals; but *particular* is said of the contingent circumstances of things, *specific* of their inherent properties; every plant has something *particular* in itself different from others, it is either longer or shorter, weaker or stronger; but its *specific* property is that which it has in common with its species: *particular* is, therefore, the term adapted to loose discourse; *specific* is a scientific term which describes things minutely.

The same may be said of *particularize* and *specify*: we *particularize* for the sake of information; we *specify* for the sake of instruction: in describing a man's person and dress we *particularize* if we mention every thing singly which can be said upon it; in delineating a plan it is necessary to *specify* time, place, distance, materials, and every thing else which may be connected with the carrying it into execution.

God claims it as a *special* part of his prerogative to have the entire disposal of riches. SOUTH.

Every state has a *particular* principle of happiness, and this principle may in each be carried to a mischievous excess. GOLDSMITH.

The imputation of being a fool is a thing which mankind, of all others, is the most impatient of, it being a blot upon the prime and *specific* perfection of human nature. SOUTH.

SPECIES, *v.* *Kind*.

SPECIFIC, *v.* *Special*.

SPECIMEN, *v.* *Copy*.

SPECIOUS, *v.* *Colorable*.

SPECK, *v.* *Blemish*.

SPECTACLE, *v.* *Show*.

SPECTATOR, *v.* *Looker on*.

SPECTRE, *v.* *Vision*.

SPECULATION, *v.* *Theory*.

SPEECH, *v.* *Address*.

SPEECH, *v.* *Language*.

SPEECHLESS, *v.* *Silent*.

TO SPEED, *v.* *To hasten*.

TO SPEND, EXHAUST, DRAIN.

SPEND, contracted from *expend*, in Latin *expendo* to pay away, signifies to give from oneself.

EXHAUST, from the Latin *exaurio* to draw out, signifies to draw out all that there is.

DRAIN, a variation of draw, signifies to draw dry.

The idea of taking from the substance of any thing is common to these terms; but to *spend* is to deprive it in a less degree than to *exhaust*, and that in a less degree than to *drain*: every one who exerts himself in that degree *spends* his strength; if the exertions are violent he *exhausts* himself; a country which is *drained* of men is supposed to have no more left. To *spend* may be applied to that which is external or inherent in a body; *exhaust* to that which is inherent; *drain* to that which is external of the body in which it is contained: we may speak of *spending* our wealth, our resources, our time, and the like; but of *exhausting* our strength, our vigor, our voice, and the like; of *draining*, in the proper application, a vessel of its liquid, or, in the improper application, *draining* a treasury of its contents: hence arises this farther distinction, that to *spend* and to *exhaust* may tend, more or less, to the injury of a body; but to *drain* may be to its advantage. In as much as what is *spent* or *exhausted* may be more or less essential to the soundness of a body, it cannot be parted with without diminishing its value, or even destroying its existence; as when a fortune is *spent* it is gone, or when a person's strength is *exhausted* he is no longer able to move: on the other hand, to *drain*, though a more complete evacuation, is not always injurious, but sometimes even useful to a body; as when the land is *drained* of a superabundance of water.

Your tears for such a death in vain you *spend*,
Which straight in immortality shall end.

DEKANE.

Many of our provisions for ease or happiness are *exhausted* by the present day. JOHNSON.

Teaching is not a flow of words nor the *draining* of an hour-glass. SOUTH.

TO SPEND OR EXPEND, WASTE,
DISSIPATE, SQUANDER.

SPEND and EXPEND are variations from the Latin *expendo*; but *spend* implies simply to turn to some purpose, or make use of; to *expend* carries with it likewise the idea of exhausting; and WASTE, moreover, comprehends the idea of exhausting to no good purpose: we *spend* money when we purchase any thing with it; we *expend* it when we lay it out in large quantities, so as essentially to diminish its quantity: individuals *spend* what they have; government *expends* vast sums in conducting the affairs of a nation; all persons *waste* their property, who have not sufficient discretion to use it well: we *spend* our time, or our lives, in any employment; we *expend* our strength and faculties upon some arduous undertaking; we *waste* our time and talents in trifles.

DISSIPATE, in Latin *dissipatus*, from *dissipo*, that is, *dis* and *cipo*, in Greek *σῑφω* to scatter, signifies to scatter different ways, that is, to *waste* by throwing away in all directions: SQUANDER, which is a variation of *wander*, signifies to make to run wide apart. Both these terms, therefore, denote modes of *wasting*; but the former seems peculiarly applicable to that which is *wasted* in detail upon different objects, and by a distraction of the mind; the latter respects rather the act of *wasting* in the gross, in large quantities, by planless profusion: young men are apt to *dissipate* their property in pleasures; the open, generous, and thoughtless, are apt to *squander* their property.

Then having *spent* the last remains of light,
They give their bodies due repose at night.

DRYDEN.

What numbers, guiltless of their own disease,
Are snatch'd by sudden death, or waste by slow
degrees?

JENYNS.

He pitted man, and much he pitted those
Whom falsely smiling fate has cur'd with means
To *dissipate* their days in quest of joy.

ARMSTRONG.

To how many temptations are all, but especially the young and gay, exposed to *squander* their whole time amidst the circles of levity.

BLAIR.

SPHERE, *v.* Circle.

TO SPILL, *v.* To pour.

SPIRIT, *v.* Animation.

SPIRITED, *v.* Spirituous.

SPIRITUAL, *v.* Incorporeal.

SPIRITUAL, *v.* Spirituous.

SPIRITUOUS, SPIRITED, SPIRITUAL, GHOSTLY.

SPIRITUOUS signifies having *spirit* as a physical property, after the manner of *spirituous* liquors: SPIRITED is applicable to the animal *spirits* of either men or brutes; a person or a horse may be *spirited*: SPIRITUAL and GHOSTLY signify belonging generally to the *spirit* or *ghost*, in distinction from what is corporeal. *Spiritual* applies either to the beings or the objects which engage the attention; angels are *spiritual* agents; death, immortality, and all religious subjects, are denominated *spiritual*: *ghostly* is seldom used but in a religious sense for a *spiritual* agent; the devil is called our *ghostly* enemy.

SPITE, *v.* Malice.

SPLENDOR, *v.* Brightness.

SPLENDOR, *v.* Magnificence.

SPLENETIC, *v.* Gloomy.

TO SPLIT, *v.* To break.

SPOIL, *v.* Booty.

SPONTANEOUSLY, *v.* Willingly.

SPORT, *v.* Amusement.

TO SPORT, *v.* To jest.

SPORT, *v.* Play.

SPORTIVE, *v.* Lively.

SPOT, *v.* Blemish.

TO SPOUT, *v.* To spurl.

SPRAIN, *v.* Strain.

SPREAD, SCATTER, DISPERSE.

SPREAD, *v.* To spread.

SCATTER, like *shatter*, is a frequentative of *shake* (*v.* To shake).

DISPERSE, *v.* To dispel.

Spread applies equally to divisible or indivisible bodies; we *spread* our money on the table, or we may *spread* a cloth on the table: but *scatter* is applicable to divisible bodies only; we *scatter* corn on the ground. To *spread* may be an act of design or otherwise, but mostly the former; as

as to make them converts: what is *disseminated* is supposed to be sown in different parts; thus principles are *disseminated* among youth.

Love would betwixt the rich and needy stand,
And spread heaven's bounty with an equal hand.
WALLER.

Our God, when heaven and earth he did create,
Form'd man, who should of both participate:
If our lives' motions theirs must imitate,
Our knowledge, like our blood, must circulate.
DENHAM.

He shall extend his propagated sway
Beyond the solar year, without the starry way.
DRYDEN.

Nature seems to have taken care to *disseminate* her blessings among the different regions of the world.
ANDERSON.

SPRIGHTLY, *v. Cheerful.*

SPRIGHTLY, *v. Lively.*

TO SPRING, *v. To arise.*

SPRING, FOUNTAIN, SOURCE.

THE SPRING denotes that which *springs*; the word, therefore, carries us back to the point from which the water issues. FOUNTAIN, in Latin *fons* from *fundo* to pour out, signifies the *spring* which is visible on the earth: and SOURCE (*v. Origin*) is said of that which is not only visible, but runs along the earth. *Springs* are to be found by digging a sufficient depth in all parts of the earth: in mountainous countries, and also in the East, we read of *fountains* which form themselves, and supply the surrounding parts with refreshing streams: the *sources* of rivers are always to be traced to some mountain.

These terms are all used in a figurative sense: in the Bible the gospel is depicted as a *spring* of living waters; the eye as a *fountain* of tears. In the general acceptation the *source* is taken for the channel through which any event comes to pass, the primary cause of its happening: a war is the *source* of many evils to a country; an imprudent step in the outset of life is oftentimes the *source* of ruin to a young person.

The heart of the citizen is a perennial *spring* of energy to the state.
BURKE.

Eternal king! the author of all being,
Fountain of light, thyself invisible. MILTON.

These are thy blessings, industry! rough power!
Yet the kind *source* of every gentle art.
THOMSON.

TO SPRING, START, STARTLE,
SHRINK.

SPRING, *v. To spring.*

START is in all probability an intensive of *stir*.

STARTLE is a frequentative of *start*.

SHRINK is probably an intensive of *sink*, signifying to sink into itself.

The idea of a sudden motion is expressed by all these terms, but the circumstances and mode differ in all; *spring* is indefinite in these respects, and is therefore the most general term. To *spring* and *start* may be either voluntary or involuntary movements, but the former is mostly voluntary, and the latter involuntary; a person *springs* out of bed, or one animal *springs* upon another; a person or animal *starts* from a certain point to begin running, or *starts* with fright from one side to the other. To *startle* is always an involuntary action; a horse *starts* by suddenly flying from the point on which he stands; but if he *startles* he seems to fly back on himself and stops his course: to *spring* and *start* therefore always carry a person farther from a given point; but *startle* and *shrink* are movements within oneself: *startling* is a sudden convulsion of the frame which makes a person stand in hesitation whether to proceed or not; *shrinking* is a contraction of the frame within itself; any sudden and unexpected sound makes a person *startle*; the approach of any frightful object makes him *shrink* back: *spring* and *start* are employed only in the proper sense of corporeal movements; *startle* and *shrink* are employed in regard to the movements of the mind as well as the body.

Death wounds to cure; we fall, we rise, we reign,

Spring from our fetters, and fasten in the skies.
YOUNG.

A shape within the wat'ry gleam appear'd,
Bending to look on me: I *started* back,
It *started* back. MILTON.

'Tis listening fear and dumb amazement,
When to the *startled* eye the sudden glance
Appears far south, eruptive through the cloud.
THOMSON.

There is a horror in the scene of a ravaged country which makes nature *shrink* back at the reflection.
HERBERT.

liquid receives equally from design or accident; the water *spouts* out from a pipe which is denominated a *spout*, or it will *spurt* out from any cavity in the earth, or in a rock which may resemble a *spout*; a person may likewise *spout* water in a stream from his mouth. Hence the figurative application of these terms; any sudden conceit which compels a person to an eccentric action is a *spurt*, particularly if it springs from ill humour or caprice; a female will sometimes take a *spurt* and treat her intimate friends very coldly, either from a fancied offence or a fancied superiority; to *spout*, on the other hand, is to send forth a stream of words in imitation of the stream of liquid, and is applied to those who affect to turn speakers, in whom there is commonly more sound than sense.

Far from the parent stream it boils again
Fresh into day, and all the glittering bill
Is bright with *spouting* rills. THOMSON.

SPY, *v. Emissary.*

TO SQUANDER, *v. To spend.*

SQUEAMISH, *v. Fastidious.*

TO SQUEEZE, *v. To break.*

TO SQUEEZE, *v. To press.*

STABILITY, *v. Constancy.*

STABLE, *v. Firm.*

STAFF, STAY, PROP, SUPPORT.

FROM STAFF in the literal sense (*v. Staff*) comes *staff* in the figurative application: any thing may be denominated a *staff* which holds up after the manner, particularly as it respects persons; bread is said to be the *staff* of life; one person may serve as a *staff* to another. The *staff* serves in a state of motion; the STAY and PROP are employed for objects in a state of rest: the *stay* makes a thing *stay* for the time being, it keeps it from falling; it is equally applied to persons and things; we may be a *stay* to a person who is falling by letting his body rest against us; in the same manner buttresses against a wall, and shores against a building serve the purpose of *stays* while they are repairing. For the same reason that part of the female's dress which serves as a *stay* to the body is denominated *stays*;

the *prop* keeps a thing up for a permanency; every pillar on which a building rests is a *prop*; whatever therefore requires to be raised from the ground and kept in that state may be set upon *props*; between the *stay* and the *prop* there is this obvious distinction, that as the *stay* does not receive the whole weight, it is put so as to receive it indirectly, by leaning against the object; but the *prop*, for a contrary reason, is put upright underneath the object so as to receive the weight directly: the derivation of this word *prop*, from the Dutch *proppe* a plug, and the German *pfropfey* a cork, does not seem to account very clearly for its present use in English.

Stay and *prop* may be figuratively extended in their application with the same distinction in their sense; a crust of bread may serve as a *stay* to the stomach; a person's money may serve as a *prop* for the credit of another. SUPPORT is altogether taken in the moral and abstract sense: whatever *supports*, that is, bears the weight of an object, is a *support*, whether in a state of motion like a *staff*, or in a state of rest like a *stay*; whether to bear the weight in part like a *stay* or altogether like a *prop*, it is still a *support*: but the term is likewise employed on all occasions in which the other terms are not admissible. Whatever *supports* existence, whether directly or indirectly, is a *support*: food is the *support* of the animal body; labor or any particular employment is likewise one's *support*, or the indirect means of gaining the *support*; hope is the *support* of the mind under the most trying circumstances; religion, as the foundation of all our hopes, is the best and surest *support* under affliction.

Let shame and confusion then cover me if I do
not abhor the intolerable anxiety I well under-
stand to wait inseparably upon that *staff* of going
about beguilefully to supplant any man.

LORD WENTWORTH.

Whate'er thy many fingers can entwine,
Proves thy *support* and all its strength is thine,
Tho' nature gave not legs, it gave the hands,
By which thy *prop* thy prouder cedar stands.

DENNIS.

If hope precarious, and of things when gain'd
(Of little moment and as little *stay*,
Can sweeten toils, and dangers into joys,
What then that hope which nothing can defeat?
YOUNG.

TO STAND, STOP, REST, STAGNATE.

To STAND, in German *stehen*, &c. Latin *sto*, Greek *στημι* to stand, Hebrew *sut* to settle.

STOP, in Saxon *stoppan*, &c. conveys the ideas of pressing, thickening, like the Latin *stipa*, and the Greek *σπίλον*; whence it has been made in English to express immoveability.

REST, *v. Ease*.

STAGNATED, in Latin *stagnatus*, participle of *stagnare*, comes from *stagnum* a pool, and that either from *sto* to stand, because waters stand perpetually in a pool, or from the Greek *στανναι* an inclosure, because a pool is an inclosure for waters.

The absence of motion is expressed by all these terms; *stand* is the most general of all the terms; to *stand* is simply not to move; to *stop* is to cease to move: we *stand* either for want of inclination or power to move; but we *stop* from a disinclination to go on: to *rest* is to *stop* from an express dislike to motion; we may *stop* for purposes of convenience, or because we have no farther to go, but we *rest* from fatigue; to *stagnate* is only a species of *standing* as respects liquids; water may both *stand* and *stagnate*; but the former is a temporary, the latter a permanent *stand*: water *stands* in a puddle, but it *stagnates* in a pond or in any confined space.

All these terms admit of an extended application; business *stands* still, or there is a *stand* to business; a mercantile house *stops*, or *stops* payment; an affair *rests* undecided, or *rests* in the hands of a person; trade *stagnates*. *Stand*, *stop*, and *rest*, are likewise employed transitively, but with a wide distinction in the sense; to *stand* in this case is to set one's self up to resist; as to *stand* the trial, to *stand* the test: to *stop* has the sense of hinder; as to *stop* a person who is going on, that is, to make him *stop*: to *rest* is to make a thing *rest* or *lean*; a person *rests* his argument upon the supposed innocence of another.

Whither can we run,
Where make a stand? DAYDEN.

I am afraid should I put a *stop* now to this design, now that it is so near being completed, I shall find it difficult to resume it.

MELMOTH'S PARTY.

Who rests of immortality assur'd
Is safe, whatever ills are here endur'd.

JANIN.

This inundation of strangers, which used to be confined to the summer, will *stagnate* all the winter.

GIBSON.

STANDARD, *v. Criterion*.

TO STARE, *v. To Gaze*.

TO START, *v. To spring*.

TO STARTLE, *v. To spring*.

STATELY, *v. Magisterial*.

STATE, *v. Situation*.

STATE, REALM,
COMMONWEALTH.

THE STATE is that consolidated part of a nation in which lies its power and greatness.

The REALM, from *royaume* a kingdom, is any state whose government is monarchical.

The COMMONWEALTH is the grand body of a nation, consisting both of the government and people, which forms the *commonwealth*, *welfare*, or *wealth*.

The ruling idea in the sense and application of the word *state* is that of government in its most abstract sense; affairs of *state* may either respect the internal regulations of a country, or it may respect the arrangements of different *states* with each other. The term *realm* is employed for the nation at large, but confined to such nations as are monarchical and aristocratical; peers of the *realm* sit in the English parliament by their own right. The term *commonwealth* refers rather to the aggregate body of men, and their possession, rather than to the government of a country: it is the business of the minister to consult the interests of the *commonwealth*.

The term *state* is indefinitely applied to all communities, large or small, living under any form of government: a petty principality in Germany, and the whole German or Russian empire, are alike termed *states*. *Realm* is a term of dignity in regard to a nation; France, Germany, England, Russia, are, therefore, with most propriety termed *realms*, when spoken of either in regard to themselves or in general.

joy which an occurrence produces in his mind.

In regard to outward circumstances, we say that a book is *suppressed* by the authority of government; that vice is *suppressed* by the exertions of those who have power: an affair is *smothered* so that it shall not become generally known, or that the fire is *smothered* under the embers.

Art, brainless art! our furious charioteer,
(For nature's voice *unlistened* would recall)
Drives headlong to the precipice of death.

YOUNG.

They foresaw the violence with which this indignation would burst out after being so long suppressed.

ROBERTSON.

And generous principles not being kept up and cherished, but *smothered* in sensual delights, God suffers them to sink into low and inglorious satisfaction.

SOUTH.

TO STIFLE, *v.* To suffocate.

STIGMA, *v.* Mark.

TO STIMULATE, *v.* To encourage.

TO STILL, *v.* To appease.

STIPEND, *v.* Allowance.

TO STIR, MOVE.

STIR, in German *storen*, old German *stiren* or *steren*, Latin *stirbo*, Greek *τυρβη* or *βορβη* trouble or tumult.

MOVE, *v.* Motion.

Stir is here a specific, *move* a generic term; to *stir* is to *move* so as to disturb the rest and composure either of the body or mind; hence the term *stir* is employed to designate an improper or unauthorized motion; children are not allowed to *stir* from their seats in school hours; a soldier must not *stir* from the post which he has to defend; atrocious criminals or persons raving mad are bound hand and foot, that they may not *stir*.

At first the groves are scarcely seen to *stir*.

THOMSON.

I've read that things inanimate have *mov'd*,
And as with living souls have been inform'd,
By magic numbers and persuasive sounds.

CONGRÈVE.

TO STIR UP, *v.* To awaken.

STOCK, STORE.

STOCK, from *stick*, *stoke*, *stow*, and *stuff*, signifies any quantity laid up.

STORE, in Welch *stor*, comes from the Hebrew *satar* to hide.

The ideas of wealth and stability

being naturally allied, it is not surprising that *stock*, which expresses the latter idea, should also be put for the former, particularly as the abundance here referred to serves as a foundation in the same manner as *stock* in the literal sense does to a tree.

Store likewise implies a quantity; but agreeable to the derivation of the word, it implies an accumulated quantity. Any quantity of materials which is in hand may serve as a *stock* for a given purpose; thus a few shillings with some persons may be their *stock* in trade: any quantity of materials brought together for a given purpose may serve as a *store*; thus the industrious ant collects a *store* of grain for the winter: we judge of a man's substantial property by the *stock* of goods which he has on hand; we judge of a man's disposeable property by the *store* which he has. The *stock* is that which must increase of itself; it is the source and foundation of industry: the *store* is that which we must add to occasionally; it is that from which we draw in time of need. By the *stock* we gain riches; by the *store* we guard against want: the *stock* requires skill and judgement to make the proper application; the *store* requires foresight and management to make it against the proper season. It is necessary for one who has a large trade to have a large *stock*; and for him who has no prospect of supply to have a large *store*.

The same distinction subsists between these words in their moral application; he who wishes to speak a foreign language must have a *stock* of familiar words; *stores* of learning are frequently lost to the world for want of means and opportunity to bring them forth to public view.

As *stock*, to *stock* and to *store* both signify to provide; but the former is a provision for the present use, and the latter for some future purpose: a tradesman *stocks* himself with such articles as are most saleable; a fortress or a ship is *stored*: a person *stocks* himself with patience, or *stores* his memory with knowledge.

It will not suffice to rally all one's little utmost into one discourse, which can constitute a divine. Any man would then quickly be drained; and his short *stock* would serve but for one meeting in ordinary converse; therefore there must be

store, plenty, and a treasure, but he turn back to divide.
Scorn.

- STOP, *v.* Cessation.
TO STOP, *v.* To check.
TO STOP, *v.* To hinder.
TO STOP, *v.* To stand.
STORE, *v.* Stock.
STORM, *v.* Breeze.
STORY, *v.* Anecdote.

STORY, TALE.

- STORY, *v.* Anecdote.
TALE, *v.* Fable.

The story is either an actual fact, or something feigned; the tale is always feigned: stories are circulated respecting the accidents and occurrences which happen to persons in the same place; tales of distress are told by many merely to excite compassion. When both are taken for that which is fictitious, the story is either an untruth, or falsifying of some fact, or it is altogether an invention; the tale is always an invention. As an untruth, the story is commonly told by children; and as a fiction, the story is commonly made for children: the tale is of deeper invention, formed by men of mature understanding, and adapted to men of mature years.

Minstrel the village rooves up the tree,
While well attested, and as well believed,
Heard solemn, goes the goblin story round.
Treason.

He makes that pow'r to trembling nations known,
But rarely this, not for each vulgar end,
As superstitious, idle tales pretend. - JENNIS.

STOUT, *v.* Corpulent.

STRAIN, SPRAIN, STRESS, FORCE.

STRAIN and SPRAIN are without doubt variations of the same word, namely, the Latin *stringo* to pull tight, or to stretch; they have now, however, a distinct application; to strain is to extend beyond its ordinary length by some extraordinary effort; to sprain is to strain so as to put out of its place, or extend to an injurious length: the ankle and the wrist are liable to be sprained by a contusion; the back and other parts of the body may be strained by over exertion.

STRAIN.

STRAIN and STRESS are kindred words, as being both variations of stretch and string; but they differ now very considerably in their application: figuratively we speak of straining a nerve, or straining a point, express making great exertions, even beyond our ordinary powers; and usually we speak of laying a stress upon any particular measure or mode of action, signifying to give a thing importance: the strain (*v.* Stress) may be put in which we express may be put in altering may proceed or invective lays a strain of distinguishing them from others. To strain is properly a species of FORCING; we may force in a variety of ways, that is, by the exercise of force upon different bodies, and in different directions; but to strain is to exercise force by stretching or prolonging bodies; thus to strain a cord is to pull it to its full extent; but we may speak of forcing any hard substance in, or forcing it out, or forcing it through, or forcing it from a body: a door or a lock may be forced by violently breaking them; but a door or a lock may be strained by putting the hinges or the spring out of its place. So likewise, a person may be said to force himself to speak, when by a violent exertion he gives utterance to his words; but he strains his throat or his voice when he exercises the force on the throat or lungs so as to extend them. Force and stress as nouns are in like manner comparable when they are applied to the mode of utterance: we must use a certain force in the pronunciation of every word; this therefore is indefinite and general; but the stress is that particular and strong degree of force which is exerted in the pronunciation of certain words.

There was then (before the fall) no poring,
no struggling with memory, no straining for invention.
Scorn.

Was ever any see observed to come out of a
fever fit for his study, or indeed for any thing
requiring stress.
Scorn.

Oppose not rage, while rage is in its force.
Smatterham.

STRAIN, *v.* Stress.STRAIGHT, ~~RIGHT~~, DIRECT.

STRAIGHT, from the Latin *strictus*, participle of *stringo* to tighten or bind, signifies confined, that is, turning neither to the right nor left. *Straight* is applied, therefore, in its proper sense to corporeal objects; a path is *straight*, because it is kept within a shorter space than if it were curved. RIGHT and DIRECT, from the Latin *rectus*, regulated or made as it ought, are said of that which is made by the force of the understanding, or by an actual effort, what one wishes it to be: hence, the mathematician speaks of a *right* line, as the line which lies most justly between two points, and has been made the basis of mathematical figures; and the moralist speaks of the *right* opinion, as that which has been formed by the best rule of the understanding; and, on the same ground, we speak of a *direct* answer, as that which has been framed so as to bring soonest and easiest to the point desired.

Truth is the shortest and nearest way to our end, carrying us thither in a *straight* line.

TILLOTSON.

Then from pole to pole

He views in breadth, and without longer pause,
Down *right* into the world's first region throws
His sight precipitant.

MILTON.

Hence around the head

Of wandering swain, the white-wing'd plover
wheels

Her sounding flight, and then *directly* on
In long excursion, skims the level lawn.

THOMSON.

STRAIT, NARROW.

STRAIT, in Latin *strictus*, participle of *stringo* to bind close, signifies bound tight, that is, brought into a small compass: NARROW, which is a variation of near, expresses a mode of nearness or closeness. *Strait* is a particular term; *narrow* is general: *straitness* is an artificial mode of *narrowness*; a coat is *strait* which is made to compress a body within a small compass: *narrow* is either the artificial or the natural property of a body; as a *narrow* ribbon, or a *narrow* leaf.

That which is *strait* is so by the means of other bodies; that which is so of itself, as a piece of water confined close on each side by land, is called a

strait: whatever is bounded by sides that are near each other is *narrow*; thus a piece of land whose prolonged sides are at a small distance from each other is *narrow*.

The same distinction applies to these terms in their moral use: a person in *straitened* circumstances is kept, by means of his circumstances, from launching into expenses; a person who is in *narrow* circumstances is represented as having but a small extent of property.

A faithless heart, how despicably small,
Too *strait* aught great or generous to receive.

YOUNG.

No narrow faith

He had to pass.

MILTON.

STRANGE, *v.* Particular.

STRANGER, FOREIGNER, ALIEN.

STRANGER, in French *étranger*, Latin *extraneus* or *extra*, in Greek *εξ*, signifies out of, that is, out of another country: FOREIGNER, from *foris* abroad, and ALIEN, from *alius* another, have obviously the same original meaning; they have, however, deviated in their acceptations. *Stranger* is a general term, and applies to one not known, or not an inhabitant, whether of the same or another country; *foreigner* is applied only to *strangers* of another country; and *alien* is a technical term applied to *foreigners* as subjects or residents, in distinction from natural born subjects. Ulysses, after his return from the Trojan war, was a *stranger* in his own house; the French are *foreigners* in England, and the English in France; neither can enjoy, as *aliens*, the same privileges in a *foreign* country as they do in their own: the laws of hospitality require us to treat *strangers* with more ceremony than we do members of the same family, or very intimate friends; the lower orders of the English are apt to treat *foreigners* with an undeserved contempt; every *alien* is obliged, in time of war, to have a licence for residing in England.

From *stranger* and *alien* come the verbs to *estrangle* and *alienate*, which are extended in their meaning and application; the former signifying to make the understanding or mind of a person *strange* to an object,

ments. *Strenuous* supporters of any opinion are always strongly convinced of the truth of that which they support, and warmly impressed with a sense of its importance; but the *bold* supporter of an opinion may be impelled rather with the desire of showing his *boldness* than maintaining his point.

While the good weather continued, I strolled about the country, and made many *strenuous* attempts to run away from this odious giddiness.

BRATTLE.

Fortune befriends the bold.

DRYDEN.

STRESS, *v.* Strain.

STRESS, STRAIN, EMPHASIS, ACCENT.

STRESS, *v.* Strain.

STRAIN, *v.* Strain.

EMPHASIS, from the Greek *phaino* to appear, signifies making to appear. ACCENT, in Latin *accentus*, from *canere* to sing, signifies to emit the tone or tone of the voice.

Stress and *strain* are general both in sense and application; the former still more than the latter: *emphasis* and *accent* are modes of the *stress*. *Stress* is applicable to all bodies, the powers of which may be tried by exertion; as the *stress* upon a rope, upon a shaft of carriage, a wheel or spring in a machine: the *strain* is an excessive *stress*, by which a thing is thrown out of its course; there may be a *strain* in most cases where there is a *stress*: but *stress* and *strain* are to be compared with *emphasis* and *accent*, particularly in the exertion of the voice, in which case the *stress* is a strong and special exertion of the voice, on one word, or one part of a word, so as to distinguish it from another; but the *strain* is the undue exertion of the voice beyond its usual pitch, in the utterance of one or more words: we lay a *stress* for the convenience of others; but when we *strain* the voice it is as much to the annoyance of others as it is hurtful to ourselves. The *stress* may consist in an elevation of voice, or a prolonged utterance; the *emphasis* is that species of *stress* which is employed to distinguish one word or syllable from another: the *stress* may be accidental; but the *emphasis* is an intentional *stress*: ignorant people

and children are often led to lay the *stress* on little and unimportant words in a sentence; speakers sometimes find it convenient to mark particular words, to which they attach a value, by the *emphasis* with which they utter them. The *stress* may be casual or regular, on words or syllables; the *accent* is that kind of regulated *stress* which is laid on one syllable to distinguish it from another: there are many words in our own language, such as subject, object, present, and the like, where, to distinguish the verb from the noun, the *accent* falls on the last syllable for the former, and on the first syllable for the latter.

Singing differs from vociferation in this, that it consists in a certain harmony; nor is it performed with so much *straining* of the voice.

JOHNSON.

Those English syllables which *triple* long ones receive a peculiar *stress* of voice from their acute or circumflex *accent*, as in quickly, dōwry.

FOSTER.

The correctness and harmony of English verse depends entirely upon its being composed of a certain number of syllables, and its having the *accents* of those syllables properly placed.

TYNWHITT.

In reference to the use of words, these terms may admit of a farther distinction; for we may lay a *stress* or *emphasis* on a particular point of our reasoning, in the first case, by enlarging upon it longer than on other points; or, in the second case, by the use of stronger expressions or epithets. The *strain* or *accent* may be employed to designate the tone or manner in which we express ourselves, that is, the spirit of our discourse: in familiar language, we talk of a person's proceeding in a *strain* of panegyric, or of censure; but, in poetry, persons are said to pour forth their complaints in *tender accents*.

Such a mighty *stress*, so irrationally laid upon two slight, empty words ('self-consciousness' and 'mutual consciousness') have they made any thing, but the author himself (Sherlock on the Trinty), better understood? SOUTH.

The idle, who are neither wise for this world nor the next, are *emphatically* called, by Doctor Tillotson, "Fools at large." SPECTATOR.

An assured hope of future glory raises him to a pursuit of a more than ordinary *strain* of duty and perfection.

SOUTH.

For thee my tuneful accents will I raise.

DRYDEN.

TO STRETCH, *v.* To reach.

STRICT, SEVERE.

STRICT, from *strictus* bound or confined, characterizes the thing which binds or keeps in control: **SEVERE** (*v. Austere*) characterizes in the proper sense the disposition of the person to inflict pain, and in an extended application the thing which inflicts pain. The *strict* is, therefore, taken always in the good sense; the *severe* is good or bad, according to circumstances: he who has authority over others must be *strict* in enforcing obedience, in keeping good order, and a proper attention to their duties; but it is possible to be very *severe* in punishing those who are under us, and yet very lax in all matters that our duty demands of us.

Ignorant men, who bow'd beneath the force—
Of strict discipline, severely wise,
All bump position. TOMSON.

STIRFE, *v. Contention.*

STRIPE, *v. Discord.*

TO STRIKE, *v. To beat.*

TO STRIP, *v. To bereave.*

TO STRIVE, *v. To contend.*

STROKE, *v. Blow.*

TO STROLL, *v. To wander.*

STRICTURE, *v. Reprimand.*

STRONG, *v. Cogent.*

STRONG, FIRM, ROBUST,
STURDY.

STRONG is in all probability a variation of *strict*, which is in German *steng*, because strength is altogether derived from the close contexture of bodies.

ROBUST, in Latin *robustus*, from *robur*, signifies literally having the strength of oak.

STURDY, like the word *stout*, steady (*v. Firm*), comes in all probability from *stehen* to stand, signifying capable of standing.

Strong is here the generic term; the others are specific, or specify strength under different circumstances; *robust* is a positive and high degree of strength, arising from a peculiar bodily make; *sturdy* indicates not only strength of body but also of mind: a man may be *strong* from the strength

of his constitution, from the power which is inherent in his frame; but a *robust* man has strength both from the size and texture of his body, he has a bone and nerve which is endowed with great power. A little man may be *strong*, although not *robust*; a tall, stout man, in full health, may be termed *robust*.

A man may be *strong* in one part of his body and not in another; he may be *stronger* at one time, from particular circumstances, than he is at another; but a *robust* man is *strong* in his whole body; and as he is *robust* by nature, he will cease to be so only from disease.

Sturdiness lies both in the make of the body and in the habit of the mind; a *sturdy* assistance, must be slender but; with a habit, it imparts.

Every object is termed *strong* which is the reverse of weak; persons only are termed *robust* who have every bodily requisite to make them more than ordinarily *strong*; persons only are *sturdy* whose habit of life qualifies them both for action and for endurance.

If thou hast strength, thou hast that strength
bestow'd. POPE.

The huntsman ever gay, robust, and bold,
Defies the noxious vapour. BONNEVILLE.

Beneath their sturdy strokes the billows roar.
DAYTON.

STRUCTURE, *v. Edifice.*

STUBBORN, *v. Obstinate.*

STUDY, *v. Attention.*

STUPID, DULL.

STUPID, in Latin *stupidus*, from *stupes* to be amazed or bewildered, expresses an amazement which is equivalent to a deprivation of understanding: **DULL**, through the medium of the German *toll* and Swedish *stollig*, comes from the Latin *stultus* simple or foolish, and denotes a simple deficiency. *Stupidity* in its proper sense is natural to a man, although a particular circumstance may have a similar effect upon the understanding; he who is

questioned in the presence of others may appear very *stupid* in that which is otherwise very familiar to him. *Dull* is an incidental quality, arising principally from the state of the animal spirits: a writer may sometimes be *dull* who is otherwise vivacious and pointed; a person may be *dull* in a large circle while he is very lively in private intercourse.

A *stupid* butt is only fit for the conversation of ordinary people. ADDISON.

It is the great advantage of a trading nation that there are very few in it so *dull* and heavy who may not be placed in stations of life which may give them an opportunity of making their fortunes. ADDISON.

STURDY, *v.* *Strong.*

TO STUTTER, *v.* *To hesitate.*

STYLE, *v.* *Diction.*

SUAVITY, URBANITY.

SUAVITY is literally sweetness; and **URBANITY** the refinement of the city, in distinction from the country: in as much, therefore, as a polite education tends to soften the mind and the manners, it produces *suavity*; but *suavity* may sometimes arise from natural temper, and exist therefore without *urbanity*; although there cannot be *urbanity* without *suavity*. By the *suavity* of our manners we gain the love of those around us; by the *urbanity* of our manners we render ourselves agreeable companions; hence also arises another distinction that the term *suavity* may be applied to other things, as a voice, or the style; but *urbanity* to manners only.

The *suavity* of Menander's style might be more to Plutarch's taste than the irregular sublimity of Aristophanes. CUMBERLAND.

The virtue called *urbanity* by the moralists, or a courtly behaviour, consists in a desire to please the company. POPE.

TO SUBDUE, *v.* *To conquer.*

TO SUBDUE, *v.* *To overbear.*

TO SUBDUE, *v.* *To subject.*

SUBJECT, *v.* *Matter.*

SUBJECT, *v.* *Object.*

SUBJECT, LIABLE, EXPOSED, OBNOXIOUS.

SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectus*, par-

ticiples of *subjicio* to cast under, signifies thrown underneath.

LIABLE, compounded of *lie* and *able*, signifies ready to lie near or lie under.

EXPOSED, in Latin *expositus*, participles of *expono*, compounded of *ex* and *pono*, signifies set out, set within the view or reach.

OBNOXIOUS, in Latin *obnoxius*, compounded of *ob* and *noxiam* mischief, signifies in the way of mischief.

All these terms are applied to those circumstances in human life by which we are affected independently of our own choice. Direct necessity is included in the term *subject*; whatever we are obliged to suffer, that we are *subject* to; we may apply remedies to remove the evil, but often in vain: *liable* conveys more the idea of casualties; we may suffer that which we are *liable* to, but we may also escape the evil if we are careful: *exposed* conveys the idea of a passive state into which we may be brought either through our own means or through the instrumentality of others; we are *exposed* to that which we are not in a condition to keep off from ourselves; it is frequently not in our power to guard against the evil: *obnoxious* conveys the idea of a state into which we have altogether brought ourselves; we may avoid bringing ourselves into the state, but we cannot avoid the consequences which will ensue from being thus involved. We are *subject* to disease, or *subject* to death; this is the irrevocable law of our nature: tender people are *liable* to catch cold; all persons are *liable* to make mistakes: a person is *exposed* to insults who provokes the anger of a low-bred man; a minister sometimes renders himself *obnoxious* to the people, that is, puts himself in the way of their animosity.

To *subject* and *expose*, as verbs, are taken in the same sense: a person *subjects* himself to impertinent freedoms by descending to indecent familiarities with his inferiors; he *exposes* himself to the derision of his equals by an affectation of superiority.

The devout man aspires after some principles of more perfect felicity which shall not be *subject* to change or decay. BLAIR.

The sinner is not only *liable* to that disappointment of success which so often frustrates all

Where there is no awe, there will be no sub-
jection. SOUTH.

O fav'rite virgin, that hast warm'd the breast,
Whose sov'reign dictates *subjugate* the east.

PRIOR.

Thy son (nor is th' appointed wason far,)
In Italy shall wage successful war,
Till, after every 'oe *subdu'd*, the sun
Thrice through the signs his annual race shall
run. DAYDEN.

TO SUBJOIN, *v. To affix.*

TO SUBJUGATE, *v. To Subject.*

SUBLIME, *v. Great.*

SUBMISSIVE, *v. To comply.*

SUBMISSIVE, *v. Humble.*

SUBMISSIVE, *v. Obedient.*

SUBMISSIVE, *v. Passive.*

TO SUBMIT, *v. To comply.*

SUBORDINATE, *v. Subject.*

TO SUBORN, *v. To forswear.*

SUBSERVIENT, *v. Subject.*

TO SUBSIDE, ABATE, INTERMIT.

SUBSIDE, from the Latin *sub* and *sedeo*, signifies to settle to the bottom.

ABATE, *v. Abate.*

INTERMIT, from the Latin *inter* and *mitto*, signifies to leave a space or interval between.

A settlement after agitation is the peculiar meaning of *subside*. That which has been put into commotion *subsides*; heavy particles *subside* in a fluid that is at rest, and tumults *subside*: a diminution of strength characterizes the meaning of *abate*; that which has been high in action may *abate*; the rain *abates* after it has been heavy; and a man's anger *abates*; alternate action and rest is implied in the word *intermit*; whatever is in action may sometimes cease from action; labor without *intermission* is out of the power of man.

It was not long before this joy *subsided* in the remembrance of that dignity from which I had fallen. HAWKSWORTH.

But first to heav'n thy due *debt* pay,
And annual gifts on Ceres' *day*,
When winter's rage *abates*.

DAYDEN.

Whether the time of *intermission* be spent in company or in solitude, the understanding is abstracted from the object of inquiry. JOHNSON.

TO SUBSIST, *v. To be.*

SUBSISTENCE, *v. Livelihood.*

SUBSTANTIAL, SOLID.

SUBSTANTIAL, signifies having a substance: SOLID, signifies having a firm *substance*. The *substantial* is opposed to that which is thin and has no consistency; the *solid* is opposed to liquid, or that which is of loose consistency. All objects which admit of being handled are in their nature *substantial*; those which are of so hard a texture as to require to be cut are *solid*. *Substantial* food is that which has a consistency in itself, and is capable of giving fulness to the empty stomach: *solid* food is meat in distinction from drink.

In the moral application an argument is said to be *substantial*, which has weight in itself; a reason is *solid* which has a high degree of *substantiality*.
Scorning its own native and *substantial* worth,

Scorns all meretricious ornaments. MILTON.

As the swoll columns of ascending smoke,
So *solid* swells thy grandeur, pigmy man.

YOUNG.

TO SUBSTITUTE, *v. To change.*

SUBTERFUGE, *v. Evasion.*

SUBTLE, *v. Cunning.*

TO SUBTRACT, *v. To deduct.*

TO SUBVERT, *v. To Overturn.*

TO SUCCEED, *v. To follow.*

SUCCESSFUL, *v. Fortunate.*

SUCCESSION, SERIES, ORDER.

SUCCESSION signifies the act or state of *succeeding* (*v. To follow*).

SERIES, *v. Series.*

ORDER, *v. To place.*

Succession is a matter of necessity or casualty: things *succeed* each other, or they are taken in *succession* either arbitrarily or by design: the *series* is a connected *succession*; the *order*, the *ordered* or arranged *succession*. We observe the *succession* of events as a matter of curiosity; we trace the *series* of events as a matter of intelligence; we follow the *order* which the historian has pursued as a matter of judgement: the *succession* may be slow or quick; the *series* may be long or short; the *order* may be correct or in-

correct. The present age has afforded a quick *succession* of events, and presented us with a *series* of atrocious attempts to disturb the peace of society in the name of liberty. The historian of these times needs only pursue the *order* which the events themselves point out.

We can conceive of time only by the *succession* of ideas one to another. HAWKSWORTH.

A number of distinct fables may contain all the topics of moral instruction; yet each must be remembered by a distinct effort of the mind, and will not recur in a *series*, because they have no connection with each other. HAWKSWORTH.

In all verse, however familiar and easy, the words are necessarily thrown out of the *order* in which they are commonly used. HAWKSWORTH.

SUCCESSIVE, ALTERNATE.

WHAT is SUCCESSIVE follows directly; what is ALTERNATE follows indirectly. A minister preaches *successively* who preaches every Sunday uninterruptedly at the same hour; but he preaches *alternately* if he preaches on one Sunday in the morning, and the other Sunday in the afternoon at the same place. The *successive* may be accidental or intentional; the *alternate* is always intentional: it may rain for three *successive* days, or a fair may be held for three *successive* days: trees are placed sometimes in *alternate* order, when every other tree is of the same size and kind.

Think of a hundred solitary streams peacefully gliding between *ascending* cliffs on one side and rich meadows on the other, gradually swelling into noble rivers, *successively* losing themselves in each other, and all at length terminating in the harbor of Plymouth. GIBBON.

Suffer me to point out one great essential towards acquiring facility in composition; viz. the writing *alternately* in different measures.

SEWARD.

SUCCINCT, *v.* Short.

TO SUCCOUR, *v.* To help.

TO SUFFER, *v.* To admit.

TO SUFFER, *v.* To let.

TO SUFFER, BEAR, ENDURE,
SUPPORT.

SUFFER, in Latin *suffero*, compounded of *sub* and *fero*, signifies bearing up or firm underneath.

BEAR, *v.* To bear.

ENDURE, in Latin *induro*, signifies to harden or be hardened.

SUPPORT, from the Latin *sub* and *porto*, signifies to carry up or to carry from underneath ourselves, or to receive the weight.

To *suffer* is a passive and involuntary act; it denotes simply the being a receiver of evil; it is therefore the condition of our being: to *bear* is positive and voluntary; it denotes the manner in which we receive the evil. "Man," says the Psalmist, "is born to suffering as the sparks fly upwards;" hence the necessity for us to learn to *bear* all the numerous and diversified evils to which we are obnoxious.

To *bear* is a single act of the resolution, and relates only to common ills; we *bear* disappointments and crosses: to *endure* is a continued and powerful act of the mind; we *endure* severe and lasting pains both of body and mind; we *endure* hunger and cold; we *endure* provocations and aggravations; it is a making ourselves by our own act insensible to external evils. The first object of education should be to accustom children to *bear* contradictions and crosses, that they may afterwards be enabled to *endure* every trial and misery.

To *bear* and *endure* signify to receive becomingly the weight of what befalls ourselves: to *support* signifies to *bear* either our own or another's evils; for we may either *support* ourselves, or be supported by others: but in this latter case we *bear*, from the capacity which is within ourselves: but we *support* ourselves by foreign aid, that is, by the consolations of religion, the participation and condolence of friends, and the like. As the body may be early and gradually trained to *bear* cold, hunger, and pain, until it is enabled to *endure* even excruciating agonies; so may the mind be brought, from *bearing* the roughnesses of others' tempers with equanimity, or the unpleasantness which daily occur, with patience, to *endure* the utmost *grief* and provocation which human malice can invent: but whatever a person may *bear* or *endure* of personal inconvenience, there are *sufferings* arising from the wounded affections of the heart which by no

efforts of our own we shall be enabled to *support*: in such moments we feel the unspeakable value of religion, which puts us in possession of the means of *supporting* every sublunary pain.

The words *suffer* and *endure* are said only of persons and personal matters; to *bear* and *support* are said also of things, signifying to receive a weight: in this case they differ principally in the degree of weight received. To *bear* is said of any weight, large or small, and either of the whole or any part of the weight; *support* is said of a great weight and the whole weight. The beams or the foundation *bear* the weight of a house; but the pillars upon which it is raised, or against which it leans, *support* the weight.

Let a man be brought into some such severe and trying situation as fixes the attention of the public on his behaviour. The first question which we put concerning him is not, what does he *suffer*? but, how does he *bear* it? If we judge him to be composed and firm, resigned to providence, and *supported* by conscious integrity, his character rises, and his miseries lessen in our view. BLAIR.

How miserable his state who is condemned to *endure* at once the pangs of guilt and the vexations of calamity. BLAIR.

SUFFICIENT, *v. Enough.*

TO SUFFOCATE, STIFLE,
SMOTHER, CHOAK.

SUFFOCATE, in Latin *suffocatus*, participle of *suffoco*, compounded of *sub* and *fauz*, signifies to constrain or tighten the throat.

STIFLE is a frequentative of *stuff*, that is, to stuff excessively.

SMOTHER is a frequentative of *smoke*.

CHOAK is probably a variation of *cheek*, in Saxon *ceac*, because the halter is tied under the cheek bone of criminals.

These terms express the act of stopping the breath, but under various circumstances and by various means; *suffocation* is produced by every kind of means, external or internal, and is therefore the most general of these terms; *stifling* proceeds by internal means, that is, by the admission of foreign bodies into the passages which lead to the respiratory organs: we may

be *suffocated* by excluding the air externally, as by gagging, confining closely, or pressing violently: we may be *suffocated* or *stifled* by means of vapours, close air, or smoke. To *smother* is to *suffocate* by the exclusion of air externally, as by covering a person entirely with bed-clothes: to *choak* is a mode of *stifling* by means of large bodies, as a piece of food lodging in the throat or the larynx.

A *suffocating* wind the pilgrim smites
With instant death. THOMSON.

When my heart was ready with a sigh to cleave,
I have, with mighty anguish of my soul,
Just at the birth *stifled* this still born sigh.

SHAKESPEARE.

The love of jealous men breaks out furiously
(when the object of their loves is taken from them), and throws off all mixtures of suspicion which *choaked* and *smothered* it before.

ANDERSON.

SUFFRAGE, *v. Vote.*

TO SUGGEST, *v. To allude.*

TO SUGGEST, *v. To hint.*

SUGGESTION, *v. Dictate.*

TO SUIT, *v. To agree.*

TO SUIT, *v. To fit.*

SUIT, *v. Prayer.*

SUITABLE, *v. Becoming.*

SUITABLE, *v. Conformable.*

SUITABLE, *v. Convenient.*

SUITABLE, *v. Correspondent.*

SUITOR, *v. Lover.*

SULLEN, *v. Gloomy.*

TO SULLY, *v. To stain.*

SUMMARY, *v. Abridgement.*

SUMMARY, *v. Short.*

TO SUMMONS, *v. To call.*

TO SUMMON, *v. To cite.*

SUNDRY, *v. Different.*

SUPERFICIAL, SHALLOW,
FLIMSY.

THE SUPERFICIAL is that which lies only at the surface; it is therefore by implication the same as the SHALLOW, which has nothing underneath: *shallow* being a variation of *hollow* or empty. Hence a person may be called either *superficial* or *shallow*, to indicate

surrounded by other persons, or an object may be *surrounded* by inclosing it in every direction, and at every point; in this manner a garden is *surrounded* by a wall. To *encompass* is to *surround* in the latter sense, and applies to objects of a great or indefinite extent: the earth is *encompassed* by the air, which we term the atmosphere; towns are *encompassed* by walls. To *surround* is to go round an object of any form, whether square or circular, long or short; but to *environ* and to *encircle* carry with them the idea of forming a circle round an object; thus a town or a valley may be *enviored* by hills, a basin of water may be *encircled* by trees, or the head may be *encircled* by a wreath of flowers.

In an extended or moral sense we are said to be *surrounded* by objects which are in great numbers, and in different directions about us: thus a person living in a particular spot where he has many friends may say he is *surrounded* by his friends; so likewise a particular person may say that he is *surrounded* by dangers and difficulties: but in speaking of man in a general sense, we should rather say he is *encompassed* by dangers, which expresses in a much stronger manner our peculiarly exposed condition.

But not to the returns
Days, or the sweet approach of ev'n or morn,
But cloud instead, and ever-during dark
Surrounds me. MILTON.

Where Orpheus on his lyre laments his love,
With beasts *encompass'd*, and a dancing grove. DRYDEN.

Of fighting elements on all sides round
Environ'd. MILTON.

As in the hollow breast of Appennine,
Beneath the shelter of *encircling* hills,
A myrtle rises, far from human eye;
So flourish'd, blooming, and unseen by all,
The sweet Lavinia. THOMSON.

SURVEY, *v. Retrospect.*

SURVEY, *v. View.*

TO SURVIVE, *v. To outlive.*

SUSCEPTIBILITY, *v. Feeling.*

SUSPENSE, *v. Doubt.*

TO SUSTAIN, SUPPORT,
MAINTAIN.

SUSTAIN, compounded of *sus* or

sus and *teneo* to hold, signifies to hold or keep up.

SUPPORT, *v. To countenance.*

MAINTAIN, *v. To assert.*

The idea of exerting one's self to keep an object from sinking is common to all these terms, which vary either in the mode or the object of the action. To *sustain* and *support* are passive, and imply that we bear the weight of something pressing upon us; *maintain* is active, and implies that we exert ourselves so as to keep it from pressing upon us. We *sustain* a load; we *support* a burden; we *maintain* the contest. The principal difficulty in an engagement is often to *sustain* the first shock of the attack: a soldier has not merely to *support* the weight of his arms, but to *maintain* his post. What is *sustained* is often temporary; what is *supported* is mostly permanent: a loss or an injury is *sustained*; pain, distress, and misfortunes, are *supported*: *maintain*, on the other hand, is mostly something of importance or advantage; credit must always be *maintained*.

We must *sustain* a loss with tranquillity; we must *support* an affliction with equanimity; we must *maintain* our own honor, and that of the community to which we belong, by the rectitude of our conduct.

With labour spent, no longer can be wield
The heavy shield, or *sustain* the shield,
(O'erwhelm'd with darts. DRYDEN.

Let this *support* and comfort you, that you
are the father of ten children, among whom
there seems to be but one soul of love and
obedience. LYTTELTON.

As, compass'd with a wood of spears around,
The lordly lion still *maintains* his ground,
So Turnus fares. DRYDEN.

SUSTENANCE, *v. Livelihood.*

TO SWALLOW UP, *v. To absorb.*

SWAY, *v. Influence.*

TO SWELL, *v. To heave.*

SWIFTNESS, *v. Quickness.*

SYCOPHANT, *v. Flatterer.*

SYMMETRY, PROPORTION.

SYMMETRY, in Latin *symmetria*, Greek *συμμετρία* from *συν* and *μετρον*, signifies a measure that accords.

PROPORTION, in Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*,

signifies every portion or part according with the other or with the whole.

The signification of these terms is obviously the same, namely, a due admeasurement of the parts to each other and to the whole: but *symmetry* has now acquired but a partial application to the human body; and *proportion* is applied to everything which admits of dimensions and an adaptation of the parts: hence we speak of *symmetry* of feature; but *proportion* of limbs, the *proportion* of the head to the body.

Sensual delights in enlarged minds, give way to the sublimer pleasures of reason, which discover the causes and designs; the frame, connexion, and *symmetry* of things. **BERKELEY.**

The inventors of stuff hips had a better eye for due *proportion* than to add to a redundancy, because in some cases it was convenient to fill up a vacuum. **CUMBERLAND.**

SYMPATHY, COMPASSION, COMMISERATION, CONDOLENCE.

SYMPATHY, from the Greek *συμ* or *συν* with, and *παθος* feeling, has the literal meaning of fellow-feeling, that is, a kindred or like feeling, or feeling in company with another. **COMPASSION** (*v. Pity*); **COMMISERATION**, from the Latin *com* and *miseria* misery; **CONDOLENCE**, from the Latin *con* and *doleo* to grieve, signify a like suffering, or a suffering in company. Hence it is obvious that according to the derivation of the words, the *sympathy* may either be said of pleasure or pain, the rest only of that which is painful. *Sympathy* preserves its original meaning in its application, for we laugh or cry by *sympathy*; this may, however, be only a merely physical operation: but *compassion* is altogether a moral feeling, which makes us enter into the distresses of others: we may, therefore, *sympathize* with others, without essentially serving them; but if we feel *compassion*, we naturally turn our thoughts towards relieving them.

Compassion is awakened by those sufferings which are attributable to our misfortunes; *commiseration* is awakened by sufferings arising from our faults; *condolence* is awakened by the troubles of life. Poverty and want excite our *compassion*; we endeavour to relieve them: a poor cri-

minal suffering the penalty of the law excites our *commiseration*; we endeavour, if possible, to mitigate his punishment: the loss which a friend sustains produces *condolence*; we take the best means of testifying it to him. *Compassion* is the sentiment of one mortal towards another; *commiseration* is represented as the feeling which our wretchedness excites in the Supreme Being. *Compassion* may be awakened by persons in very unequal conditions of life: *condolence* supposes an entire equality; it excludes every thing but what flows out of the courtesy and good-will of one friend to another.

That mind and body often *sympathize*
Is plain; such is this union nature ties. **JENN.**
Then must we those who groan beneath the weight
Of age, disease, or want, *commiserate*?
'Mongst those whom honest lives can recommend,
Our justice more *compassion* should extend.
DEKAR.

Rather than all must suffer, some must die,
Yet nature must *condole* their misery. **DEKAR.**

SYMPTOM, *v. Mark.*

SYNOD, *v. Assembly.*

SYSTEM, METHOD.

SYSTEM, in Latin *systema*, Greek *συστημα* from *συν* or *συν* and *στημι* to stand together, signifies that which is put together so as to form a whole.

METHOD, in Latin *methodus* from the Greek *μετα* and *εδος* a way by which any thing is effected.

System expresses more than *method*, which is but a part of *system*: *system* is an arrangement of many single or individual objects, according to some given rule, so as to make them coalesce. *Method* is the manner of this arrangement, or the principle upon which this arrangement takes place. The *system*, however, applies to a complexity of objects; but arrangement, and consequently *method*, may be applied to every thing that is to be put into execution. All sciences must be reduced to *system*; and without *system* there is no science: all business requires *method*; and without *method* little can be done to any good purpose.

If a better *system*'s thine,
Impart it frankly, or make use of mine.

FRANC.

The great defect of the Seasons is the want of method, but for this I know not that there was any remedy.
JOHNSON.

T.

TACITURNITY, *v. Silence.*

TO TAKE, RECEIVE.

To TAKE, which in all probability comes from the Latin *tactum*, participle of *tango* to touch, is a general term; RECEIVE (*v. To receive*) is specific.

To take signifies to make one's own by coming in exclusive contact with it; to receive is to take under peculiar circumstances. We take either from things or persons; we receive from persons only: we take a book from the table; we receive a parcel which is sent us: we take either with or without the consent of the person; we receive it with his consent, or according to his wishes: a robber takes money when he can find it; a friend receives the gift of a friend.

Each takes his seat, and each receives his share.

POPE.

Thi seiz'd with shame, they wheel about and face,

Receive their foes, and raise a threat'ning cry,
The Tuscans take their turn to fear and fly.

DRYDEN.

TO TAKE HEED, *v. To guard against.*

TO TAKE HOLD OF, *v. To lay hold of.*

TO TAKE LEAVE, *v. To leave.*TO TAKE PAINS, *v. To labor.*TALE, *v. Fable.*TALE, *v. Story.*TALENT, *v. Faculty.*TALENT, *v. Gift.*TALENT, *v. Intellect.*TO TALK, *v. To speak.*TALKATIVE, LOQUACIOUS,
GARRULOUS.

TALKATIVE implies ready or prone to talk (*v. To speak*).

LOQUACIOUS, from *loquor* to speak or talk, has the same original meaning.

GARRULOUS, in Latin *garrulus*, from *garrio* to blab, signifies prone to tell or make known.

These reproachful epithets differ principally in the degree. To talk is allowable, and consequently it is not altogether so unbecoming to be occasionally talkative: but loquacity, which implies always an immoderate propensity to talk, is always bad, whether springing from affectation or an idle temper: and garrulity, which arises from the excessive desire of communicating, is a failing that is pardonable only in the aged, who have generally much to tell.

Every absurdity has a champion to defend it;
for error is always talkative. GOLDSMITH.

Thersites only clamour'd in the throng,
Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of tongue.

POPE.

Pleas'd with that social sweet garrulity,
The poor disbanded vet'ran's sole delight.

SOMERVILLE.

TALL, *v. High.*TAME, *v. Gentle.*TO TANTALIZE, *v. To aggravate.*TO TANTALIZE, *v. To tease.*TARDY, *v. Slow.*TO TARNISH, *v. To stain.*TO TARRY, *v. To linger.*TARTNESS, *v. Acrimony.*TASTE, *v. Palate.*TASTE, FLAVOR, RELISH,
SAVOR.

TASTE comes from the Teutonic *tasten* to touch lightly, and signifies either the organ which is easily affected, or the act of discriminating by a light touch of the organ, or the quality of the object which affects the organ; in this latter sense it is closely allied to the other terms.

FLAVOR most probably comes from the Latin *flo* to breathe, signifying the rarefied essence of bodies which affect the organ of taste.

RELISH is derived by Menshew from *relecher* to lick again, signifying that which pleases the palate so as to tempt to a renewal of the act of tasting.

SAVOR, in Latin *sapor* and *sapio*

terms, and applies to or implies whatever is paid by the people to the government, according to a certain estimate: the *customs* are a species of tax which are less specific than other *tares*, being regulated by *custom* rather than any definite law; the *customs* apply particularly to what was *customarily* given by merchants for the goods which they imported from abroad: the *duty* is a species of *tax* more positive and binding than the *custom*, being a specific estimate of what is *due* upon goods, according to their value; hence it is not only applied to goods that are imported, but also to many other articles inland: *toll* is that species of *tax* which serves for the repair of roads and havens.

The preceding terms refer to that which is levied by authority on the people; but they do not directly express the idea of levying or paying: **IMPOST**, on the contrary, signifies literally that which is imposed; and **TRIBUTE** that which is paid or yielded: the former, therefore, exclude that idea of coercion which is included in the latter. The *tax* is levied by the consent of many; the *impost* is imposed by the will of one; and the *tribute* is paid at the demand of one or a few: the *tax* serves for the support of the nation; the *impost* and the *tribute* serve to enrich a government. Conquerors lay heavy *imposts* upon the conquered countries; distant provinces pay a *tribute* to the princes to whom they owe allegiance. **CONTRIBUTION** signifies the *tribute* of many in unison, or for the same end; in this general sense it includes all the other terms; for *taxes* and *imposts* are alike paid by many for the same purpose; but as the predominant idea in *contribution* is that of common consent, it supposes a degree of freedom in the agent which is incompatible with the exercise of authority expressed by the other terms: hence the term is with more propriety applied to those cases in which men voluntarily unite in giving towards any particular object; as charitable *contributions*, or *contributions* in support of a war; but it may be taken in the general sense of a forced payment, as in speaking of military *contribution*.

TAX, RATE, ASSESSMENT.

TAX, agreeably to the above explanation (*v. Tar*), and **RATE**, from the Latin *ratus* and *reor* to think or estimate, both derive their principal meaning from the valuation or proportion according to which any sum is demanded from the people; but the *tax* is imposed directly by the government for public purposes, as the land *tax*, the window *tax*, and the like; and the *rate* is imposed indirectly for the local purposes of each parish, as the church *rates*, the poor *rates*, and the like. The *tax* and *rate* is a general rule or ratio, by which a certain sum is raised upon a given number of persons; the **ASSESSMENT** is the application of that rule to the individual.

The house-duty is a *tax* upon houses, according to their real or supposed value; the poor's *rate* is a *rate* laid on the individual likewise, according to the value of his house, or the supposed rent which he pays; the *assessment*, in both these, is the valuation of the house, which determines the sum to be paid by each individual: it is the business of the minister to make the *tax*; of the parish officers to make the *rate*; of the commissioners or *assessors* to make the *assessment*: the former has the public to consider; the latter the individual. An equitable *tax* must not bear harder upon one class of the community than another: an equitable *assessment* must not bear harder upon one inhabitant than another.

TO TEACH, *v. To inform.*

TO TEAR, *v. To break.*

TO TEASE, **VEX**, **TAUNT**, **TANTALIZE**, **TORMENT**.

TEASE is most probably a frequentative of *tear* and *tore*.

VEX, *v. To displease.*

TAUNT, is probably contracted from *tantalise*.

TANTALIZE, *v. To aggravate.*

TORMENT, from the Latin *tormentum* and *torqueo* to twist, signifies to give pain by twisting, or griping. The idea of acting upon others so as to produce a painful sentiment is common to all these terms; they differ

serves particularly for the assembly of the faithful. Nothing profane ought to enter the *temple* of the Lord: nothing ought to be permitted in our *churches* which does not contribute to the edification of Christians.

The mind and heart of man are the *temple* of the living God; it is there he wishes to be adored: the *church* is that place where, as a social being, he offers his vows to his Maker.

TEMPORAL, *v. Secular.*

TEMPORARY, TRANSIENT,
TRANSITORY, FLEETING.

TEMPORARY, from *tempus* time, characterizes that which is intended to last only for a time, in distinction from that which is permanent; offices depending upon a state of war are *temporary*, in distinction from those which are connected with internal policy. TRANSIENT, that is, passing, or in the act of passing, characterizes what in its nature exists only for the moment: a glance is *transient*. TRANSITORY, that is, apt to pass away, characterizes every thing in the world which is formed only to exist for a time, and then to pass away; thus our pleasures, and our pains, and our very being, are denominated *transitory*. FLEETING, which is derived from the verb to *fly* and *flight*, is but a stronger term to express the same idea as *transitory*.

By the force of superior principles the *temporary* prevalence of passions may be restrained.
JOHNSON.

Any sudden diversion of the spirits or the jostling in of a *transient* thought, is able to deface the little images of things (in the memory).
SOUTH.

Man is a *transitory* being. JOHNSON.

Thus when my *fleeting* days at last,
Unheeded, silently are past,
Calmly I shall resign my breath,
In life unknown, forgot in death. SPECTATOR.

TO TEMPT, *v. To allure.*

TO TEMPT, *v. To try.*

TENACIOUS, PERTINACIOUS.

To be TENACIOUS is to hold a thing close, to let it go with reluctance: to be PERTINACIOUS is to hold it out in spite of what can be advanced against it. A *tenacious* temper insists on trifles that are sup-

posed to affect his importance; a *pertinacious* temper insists on every thing which is apt to affect his opinions. *Tenacity* and *pertinacity* are both foibles, but the former is sometimes more excusable than the latter.

We may be *tenacious* of that which is good, as when a man is *tenacious* of whatever may affect his honor; but we cannot be *pertinacious* in any thing but our opinions, and that too in cases where they are least defensible. It commonly happens that people are most *tenacious* of being thought to possess that in which they are most deficient, and most *pertinacious* in maintaining that which is most absurd. A liar is *tenacious* of his reputation for truth: sophists, free-thinkers, and sceptics, are the most *pertinacious* objectors to whatever is established.

So *tenacious* are we of the old ecclesiastical modes, that very little alteration has been made in them since the fourteenth or fifteenth century; adhering to our old settled maxim, never entirely, nor at once, to depart from antiquity. BURKE.

The most *pertinacious* and vehement demonstrator may be wearied in time by continual negation. JOHNSON.

TENDENCY, DRIFT, SCOPE,
AIM.

TENDENCY, from to *tend*, denotes the property of *tending* towards a certain point, which is the characteristic of all these words, but this is applied only to things; and DRIFT, from the verb to *drize*; SCOPE, from the Greek *σκοπεῖν* to look; and AIM, from the verb to *aim* (*v. Aim*); all characterize the thoughts of a person looking forward into futurity, and directing his actions to a certain point. Hence we speak of the *tendency* of certain principles or practices, as being pernicious; the *drift* of a person's discourse; the *scope* which he gives himself either in treating of a subject, or in laying down a plan; or a person's *aim* to excel, or *aim* to supplant another, and the like. The *tendency* of most writings for the last five and twenty years has been to unhinge the minds of men: where a person wants the services of another, whom he dares not openly solicit, he will discover his wishes by the *drift* of his discourse: a man of a compre-

our minds the power which is exercised: the *territory* speaks of that which is in its nature bounded; the *dominions* may be said of that which is boundless. A petty prince has his *territory*; the monarch of a great empire has *dominions*.

It is the object of every ruler to guard his *territory* against the irruptions of an enemy; ambitious monarchs are always aiming to extend their *dominions*.

The conquered *territory* was divided among the Spanish invaders, according to rules which custom had introduced. ROBERTSON.

And while the heroic Pyrrhus shines in arms,
Our wide *dominions* shall the world o'er-run. TRAF.

TERROR, *v. Alarm.*

TESTAMENT, *v. Will.*

TO TESTIFY, *v. To express.*

TESTIMONY, *v. Evidence.*

THANKFULNESS, GRATITUDE.

THANKFULNESS, or a *fulness* of *thanks*, is the outward expression of a *grateful* feeling.

GRATITUDE, from the Latin *gratitudo*, is the feeling itself. Our *thankfulness* is measured by the number of our words; our *gratitude* is measured by the nature of our actions. A person appears very *thankful* at the time, who afterwards proves very *ungrateful*. *Thankfulness* is the beginning of *gratitude*: *gratitude* is the completion of *thankfulness*.

THEOLOGIAN, *v. Ecclesiastic.*

THEORY, SPECULATION.

THEORY, from the Greek *theoria* to behold, and SPECULATION, from the Latin *speculo* to behold, are both employed to express what is seen with the mind's eye. *Theory* is the fruit of reflection, it serves the purposes of science; the practice will be incomplete when the *theory* is false: *speculation* belongs more to the imagination; it has therefore less to do with realities, it is that which cannot be reduced to practice, and can therefore never be brought to the test of experience: hence it arises that *theory* is contrasted sometimes with the practice to designate its insufficiency to render a man complete; and *speculation* is put for that which is fanciful and unreal: a general

who is so only in *theory* will acquit himself miserably in the field; a religionist who is so only in *speculation* will make a wretched Christian.

True piety without censure lost
By *theories*, the practice past is lost. DENHAM.
You were the prime object of my *speculation*. HOWEL.

THEREFORE, CONSEQUENTLY,
ACCORDINGLY.

THEREFORE, that is, for this reason, marks a deduction: CONSEQUENTLY, that is, in consequence, marks a consequence: ACCORDINGLY, that is, according to something, implies an agreement or adaptation. *Therefore* is employed particularly in abstract reasoning; *consequently* is employed either in reasoning or in the narrative style; *accordingly* is used principally in the narrative style. Young persons are perpetually liable to fall into error through inexperience; they ought *therefore* the more willingly to submit themselves to the guidance of those who can direct them: the French nation is reduced to a state of moral anarchy; *consequently* nothing but time and good government can bring the people back to the use of their sober senses: every preparation was made, and every precaution was taken; *accordingly* at the fixed hour they proceeded to the place of destination.

If you cut off the top branches of a tree, it will not *therefore* cease to grow. HUGHES.

Reputation is power; *consequently* to despise is to weaken. SOUTH.

The pathetic, as Longinus observes, may animate the sublime; but is not essential to it. *Accordingly*, as he further remarks, we very often find that those who excel most in stirring up the passions, very often want the talent of writing in the sublime manner. ADDISON.

THICK, DENSE.

BETWEEN THICK and DENSE there is little other difference, than that the latter is employed to express that species of *thickness* which is philosophically considered as the property of the atmosphere in a certain condition; hence we speak of *thick* in regard to hard or soft bodies, as a *thick* board or *thick* cotton; solid or liquid, as a *thick* cheese or *thick* milk: but the term *dense* only in regard to the air in its various forms.

as a *dense* air, a *dense* vapour, a *dense* cloud.

I have discovered, by a long series of observations, that invention and elocution suffer great impediments from *dense* and impure vapours.

JOHNSON.

THIN, SLENDER, SLIGHT, SLIM.

THIN, in Saxon *thinne*, German *dünn*, Latin *tenuis*, from *tendo*, in Greek *τείνω* to extend or draw out, and the Hebrew *taken* to grind or reduce to powder.

SLENDER, SLIGHT, and SLIM, are all variations from the German *schlant*, which are connected with the words *slime* and *sling*, as also with the German *schlingen* to wind or wreath, and *schlange* a serpent, designating the property of length and smallness, which is adapted for bending or twisting. *Thin* is the generic term, the rest are specific: *thin* may be said of that which is small and short, as well as small and long; *slender* is always said of that which is small and long at the same time: a board is *thin* which wants solidity or substance; a poplar is *slender* because its tallness is disproportioned to its magnitude or the dimensions of its circumference. *Thinness* is sometimes a natural property; *slight* and *slim* are applied to that which is artificial: the leaves of trees are of a *thin* texture; a board may be made *slight* by continually planing; a paper box is very *slim*. *Thinness* is a good property sometimes; *thin* paper is frequently preferred to that which is thick: *slightness* and *slimness*, which is a greater degree of *slightness*, are always defects; that which is made *slight* is unfit to bear the stress that will be put upon it, that which is *slim* is altogether unfit for the purpose proposed; a carriage that is made *slight* is quickly broken, and always out of repair; paper is altogether too *slim* to serve the purpose of wood.

I have found dulness to quicken into sentiment in a *thin* ether.

JOHNSON.

Very *slender* differences will sometimes part those whom beneficence has united.

JOHNSON.

Friendship is often destroyed by a thousand secret and *slight* competitions.

JOHNSON.

TO THINK, REFLECT, PONDER, MUSE.

THINK, in Saxon *thincan*, German

denken, &c. comes from the Hebrew *dan* to direct, rule, or judge.

REFLECT, in Latin *reflecto*, signifies literally to bend back, that is, to bend the mind back on itself.

PONDER from *pondus* a weight, signifies to weigh.

MUSE, from *musa* a song, signifies to dwell upon with the imagination.

To *think* is a general and indefinite term; to *reflect* is a particular mode of *thinking*; to *ponder* and *muse* are different modes of reflecting, the former on grave matters, the latter on matters that interest either the affections or the imagination: we *think* whenever we receive or recall an idea to the mind; but we *reflect* only by recalling, not one only, but many ideas: we *think* if we only suffer the ideas to revolve in succession in the mind; but in *reflecting* we compare, combine, and judge of those ideas which thus pass in the mind: we *think*, therefore, of things past, as they are pleasurable or otherwise; we *reflect* upon them as they are applicable to our present condition: we may *think* on things past, present, or to come; we *reflect*, *ponder*, and *muse* mostly on that which is past or present. The man *thinks* on the days of his childhood, and wishes them back; the child *thinks* on the time when he shall be a man, and is impatient until it is come: the man *reflects* on his past follies, and tries to profit by experience; he *ponders* on any serious concern that affects his destiny, and *muses* on the happy events of his childhood.

No man was ever weary of *thinking*, much less of *thinking* that he had done well or virtuously.

SACRA.

Let men but *reflect* upon their own observation, and consider impartially with themselves how few in the world they have known made better by age.

SACRA.

I stood on the brink of hell, and look'd awhile
Pond'ring his voyage.

MILTON.

I was sitting on a sofa one evening, after I had been caressed by Amurath, and my imagination kindled as I mused.

HAWKSWORTH.

TO THINK, SUPPOSE, IMAGINE, BELIEVE, DEEM.

To THINK is here, as in the preceding article, the generic term. It expresses, in common with the other terms, the act of having a particular

idea in the mind; but it is indefinite as to the mode and the object of the action. To *think* may be the act of the understanding, or merely of the *imagination*: to *SUPPOSE* and *IMAGINE* are rather the acts of the *imagination* than of the understanding. To *think*, that is, to have any thought or opinion upon a subject, requires reflection; it is the work of time: to *suppose* and *imagine* may be the acts of the moment. We *think* a thing right or wrong; we *suppose* it to be true or false; we *imagine* it to be real or unreal. To *think* is employed promiscuously in regard to all objects, whether actually existing or not; to *suppose* applies to those which are uncertain or precarious; *imagine*, to those which are unreal. *Think* and *imagine* are said of that which affects the senses immediately; *suppose* is only said of that which occupies the mind. We *think* that we hear a noise as soon as the sound catches our attention; in certain states of the body or mind we *imagine* we hear noises which were never made: we *think* that a person will come to-day, because he has informed us that he intends to do so; we *suppose* that he will come to-day, at a certain hour, because he came at the same hour yesterday.

When applied to the events and circumstances of life, to *think* may be applied to any time, past, present, or to come, or where no time is expressed; to *suppose* is more aptly applied to a future time; and *imagine* to a past or present time. We *think* that a person has done a thing, is doing it, or will do it; we *suppose* that he will do it; we *imagine* that he has done it, or is doing it. A person *thinks* that he will die; *imagines* that he is in a dangerous way; we *think* that the weather will be *fine* to-day; we *suppose* that the affair will be decided.

In regard to moral points, in which case the word *DEEM* may be compared with the others; to *think* is a conclusion drawn from certain premises. I *think* that a man has acted wrong: to *suppose* is to take up an idea arbitrarily or at pleasure; we argue upon a *supposed* case, merely

for the sake of argument: to *imagine* is to take up an idea by accident, or without any connection with the truth or reality; we *imagine* that a person is offended with us, without being able to assign a single reason for the idea; *imaginary* evils are even more numerous than those which are real: to *deem* is to form a conclusion; things are *deemed* hurtful or otherwise in consequence of observation.

To *think* and *believe* are both opposite to knowing or perceiving; but *think* is a more partial action than *believe*: we *think* as the thing strikes us at the time; we *believe* from a settled deduction: hence it expresses much less to say that I *think* a person speaks the truth, than that I *believe* that he speaks the truth.

I *think* from what I can recollect that such and such ~~were~~ the words, is a vague mode of speech, not admissible in a court of law as positive evidence: the natural question which follows upon this is, do you firmly *believe* it? to which whoever can answer in the affirmative, with the appearance of sincerity, must be admitted as a testimony. Hence it arises that the word can only be employed in matters that require but little thought in order to come to a conclusion; and *believe* is applicable to things that must be admitted only on substantial evidence. We are at liberty to say that I *think*, or I *believe* that the account is made out right; but, we must say, that I *believe*, not *think*, that the Bible is the word of God.

If to conceive how any thing can be
From shape extracted, and locality,
Is hard: what *think* you of the Dotty? JENYNS.

It is absurd to *suppose* that while the relations, in which we stand to our fellow creatures, naturally call forth certain sentiments and affections, there should be none to correspond to the first and greatest of all beings. BLAIR.

How ridiculous must it be to *imagine* that the clergy of England favour popery, when they cannot be clergymen without renouncing it. BEVERIDGE.

For they can conquer who *believe* they can. DRYDEN.

An empty house is by the players *deemed* the most dreadful sign of popular disapprobation. HAWKSWORTH.

THOUGHT, *v.* *Idea*.

comprehended between the rising and setting, or setting and rising, of the sun; the *period* of a year comprehends the space which the earth requires for its annual revolution. So, in an extended and moral application, we have stated *periods* in our life for particular things: during the *period* of infancy a child is in a state of total dependance on its parents; a *period* of apprenticeship has been appointed for youth to learn different trades. The AGE is a species of *period* comprehending the life of a man, and consequently referring to what is done by men living within that *period*: hence we speak of the different *ages* that have existed since the commencement of the world, and characterise this or that *age* by the particular degrees of vice or virtue, genius, and the like, for which it is distinguished. The DATE is that *period* of *time* which is reckoned from the *date* or commencement of a thing to the *time* that it is spoken of: hence we speak of a thing as being of a long or a short *date*. *ÆRA*, in Latin *æra*, probably from *æs* brass, signifying coin with which one computes; and *EPOCHÆ*, from the Greek *ἐποχή*, from *ἐπαύω* to stop, signifying a resting place; both refer to points of *time* rendered remarkable by events: but the former is more commonly employed in the literal sense for points of computation in chronology, as the Christian *era*; the latter is indefinitely employed for any *period* distinguished by remarkable events; the grand rebellion is an *epochæ* in the history of England.

There is a *time* when we should not only number our days, but our hours. YOUNG.

But the last *period*, and the fatal hour,
Of Troy is come. DENHAM.

The story of Haman only shows us what human nature has too generally appeared to be in every *age*. BLAIR.

Plantations have one advantage in them which is not to be found in most other works, as they give a pleasure of a more lasting *date*. ADDISON.

That *period* of the Athenian history which is included within the *æra* of Pisistratus, and the death of Menander the comic poet, may justly be styled the literary *age* of Greece. CUMBERLAND.

The institution of this library (by Pisistratus) forms a signal *epochæ* in the annals of literature. CUMBERLAND.

TIMELY, SEASONABLE.

THE same distinction exists between the epithets TIMELY and SEASONABLE. The former signifies within the *time*, that is, before the *time* is past; the latter according to the season or what the season requires. A *timely* notice prevents that which would otherwise happen; a *seasonable* hint seldom fails of its effect, because it is *seasonable*. We must not expect to have a *timely* notice, but must be prepared to die at any *time*; an admonition to one who is on a sick bed is very *seasonable*, when given by a minister or a friend. The opposites of these terms are *untimely* or *ill-timed* and *unseasonable*: the *untimely* is directly opposed to the *timely*, signifying before the *time* appointed; as an *untimely* death: ~~that~~ the *ill-timed* is indirectly opposed, signifying in the wrong *time*; as an *ill-timed* remark.

It imports all men, especially bad men, to think on the judgment, that by a *timely* repentance they may prevent the woeful effects of it. SOUTH.

What you call a bold, is not only the kindest, but the most *seasonable* proposal you could have made. LOCKE.

TIMES PAST, *v.* Formerly.

TIMESERVING, TEMPORISING.

TIMESERVING and TEMPORISING, are both applied to the conduct of one who adapts himself servilely to the *time* and season; but a *timeserver* is rather active, and a *temporizer* passive. A *timeserver* avows those opinions which will serve his purpose: the *temporizer* forbears to avow those which are likely for the *time* being to hurt him. The former acts from a desire of gain, the latter from a fear of loss. *Timeservers* are of all parties, as they come in the way: *temporizers* are of no party, as occasion requires. Sycophant courtiers must always be *timeservers*; ministers of state are frequently *temporizers*.

Ward had complied during the late *times*, and held in by taking the covenant: so he was hated by the high men as a *timeserver*. BURKE.

Feeble and *temporising* measures will always be the result, when men assemble to deliberate in a situation where they ought to act.

ROBERTSON.

TIMID, *v.* Afraid.

TORMENT.

“MOROSE, v. Afraid.
TINGE, v. Color.
TINT, v. Color.
TO TIRED, v. To weary.
TIRESOME, v. Wearisome.
TITLE, v. Name.
TOLL, v. Work.
TOKEN, v. Mark.
TO TOLERATE, v. To admit.
TOLL, v. Tax.
TOMB, v. Grave.
TO NE, v. Sound.
TONGUE, v. Language.
TOOL, v. Instrument.
TO TORMENT, v. To tease.

TORMENT, TORTURE.

TORMENT (*v. To tease*), and **TORTURE**, both come from *torqueo* to twist, and express the agony which arises from a violent twisting or gripping of any part; but the latter, which is more immediately derived from the verb, expresses much greater violence and consequent pain than the former. The *torture* is the excess of *torment*. We may be *tormented* by a variety of indirect means; but we are *tortured* only by the direct means of the rack, or similar instrument. The *torment* may be permanent: the *torture* is only for a time, or on certain occasions. It is related in history that a person was once *tormented* to death, by a violent and incessant beating of drums in his prison: the Indians practise every species of *torture* upon their prisoners. A guilty conscience may *torment* a man all his life: the horrors of an awakened conscience are a *torture* to one who is on his death bed.

Yet in his empire o'er thy subject breast,
 His flames and torments only are express.

PRIDE.

To a wild wicket or a wanton air,
 Offence and torture to a sober ear.

PRIDE.

TORPID, v. Numb.
TORTURE, v. Torment.
TOSS, v. To shake.
TOSS, v. Gross.

TRADE.

TOTAL, v. Whole.
TO TOTTER, v. To
TOUCH, v. Contact
TOUR, v. Circuit.
TOUR, v. Excursion
TO TRACE, v. To d
TRACE, v. Mark.
TRACK, v. Mark.
TRACT, v. Essay.
TRACTABLE, v. Di
TRADE, v. Business

TRADE, COMMERCE, DEALING.

TRADE, in Italian *tracto* to treat, signifies
 tion of business.

COMMERCE, v. Int

TRAFFIC, in French
 lian *traffico*, compound
trans and *facio*, signifies
 from one to another.

DEALING, from the
 in German *theilen* to di
 to get together in parts a
 certain ratio, or at a give

The leading idea in
 of carrying on business
 of gain; the rest are but modes of
trade: *commerce* is a mode of *trade*
 by exchange: *traffic* is a sort of per-
 sonal *trade*, a sending from hand to
 hand; *dealing* is a bargaining or cal-
 culating kind of *trade*. *Trade* is
 either on a large or small scale; *com-*
merce is always on a large scale: we
 may *trade* retail or wholesale; we
 always carry on *commerce* by whole-
 sale: *trade* is either within or with-
 out the country; *commerce* is always
 between different countries: there
 may be a *trade* between two towns;
 but there is a *commerce* between Eng-
 land and America, between France
 and Germany: hence it arises that
 the general term *trade* is of inferior
 import when compared with *commerce*.
 The *commerce* of a country, in the
 abstract and general sense, conveys
 more to our mind, and is a more
 noble expression, than the *trade* of
 the country, as the merchant ranks
 higher than the *tradesman*, and a *com-*
mmercial house than a *trading concern*.

The *trade* may be altogether domestic, and betwixt neighbours; the *traffic* is that which goes forward betwixt persons at a distance: in this manner there may be a great *traffic* betwixt the towns or cities, as betwixt London and the capitals of the distant counties. The *trade* may consist simply in buying and selling according to a stated valuation; the *trading* is carried on in matters that admit of a variation: hence we speak of *dealers* in wool, in corn, seeds, and the like, who buy up portions of these goods, more or less, according to the state of the market.

These terms will also admit of an extended application: hence we speak of the risk of *trade*, the narrowness of a *trading* spirit; the *commerce* of the world, a licit or illicit *commerce*; to make a *traffic* of honors, of principles, of places, and the like; *plain-dealing* or *under-hand-dealing*.

Trade, without enlarging the British territory, has given us a kind of additional empire.

ADDISON.

Nature abhors
And drives thee out from the society
And commerce of mankind for breach of faith.

SOUTHERN.

The line of Ninus this poor comfort brings,
We sell their dust, and traffick for their kings.

DRYDEN.

TRAFFIC, *v.* *Trade*.

TRAIN, *v.* *Procession*.

TRAITOROUS, *v.* *Treacherous*.

TRANQUILLITY, *v.* *Peace*.

TO TRANSACT, *v.* *To negotiate*.

TRANSACTION, *v.* *Proceeding*.

TO TRANSCEND, *v.* *To exceed*.

TO TRANSCRIBE, *v.* *To copy*.

TO TRANSFIGURE, TRANSFORM,
METAMORPHOSE.

TRANSFIGURE is to make to pass over into another figure; TRANSFORM and METAMORPHOSE is to put into another form: the former being said only of spiritual beings, and particularly in reference to our Saviour; the other two terms being applied to that which has a corporeal form.

Transformation is commonly ap-

plied to that which changes its outward form; in this manner harlequin *transforms* himself into all kinds of shapes and likenesses. *Metamorphosis* is applied to the form internal as well as external, that is, to the whole nature; in this manner Ovid describes, among others, the *metamorphoses* of Narcissus into a flower, and Daphne into a laurel: with the same idea we may speak of a rustic being *metamorphosed*, by the force of art, into a fine gentleman.

We have of this gentleman a piece of the *transfiguration*, which I think is held a work second to none in the world.

STEELE.

A lady's shift may be *metamorphosed* into billets-doux, and come into her possession a second time.

ADDISON.

Can a good intention, or rather a very wicked one so mis-called, *transform* perjury and hypocrisy into merit and perfection?

SOUTH.

TO TRANSFORM, *v.* *To transfigure*.

TO TRANSGRESS, *v.* *To infringe*.

TRANSGRESSION, *v.* *Offence*.

TRANSIENT, *v.* *Temporary*.

TRANSITORY, *v.* *Temporary*.

TRANSPARENT, *v.* *Pellucid*.

TO TRANSPORT, *v.* *To bear*.

TRANSPORT, *v.* *Ecstasy*.

TRAVEL, *v.* *Journey*.

TREACHEROUS, *v.* *Faithless*.

TREACHEROUS, *v.* *Insidious*.

TREACHEROUS, TRAITOROUS,
TREASONABLE.

THESE epithets are all applied to one who betrays his trust; but TREACHEROUS (*v.* *Faithless*) respects a man's private relations; TRAITOROUS, his public relation to his prince and his country: he is a *treacherous* friend, and a *traitorous* subject. We may be *treacherous* to our enemies as well as our friends, for nothing can lessen the obligation to preserve the fidelity of promise; we may be *traitorous* to our country by abstaining to lend the aid which is in our power, for nothing but death can do away the obligation which we owe to it by the law of nature. *Traitorous* and

has a proper degree of modesty can make his first appearance in public without feeling a *tremor*: *trepidation* may be either occasional or habitual, but oftener the latter, since it arises rather from the weakness of the mind than the strength of the cause.

And with unmanly *tremblings* shook the car.

Pope.

The ferocious insolence of Cromwel, the ragged brutality of Harrison, and the general *trepidation* of fear and wickedness (in the rebel parliament), would make a picture of unexampled variety.

Johnson.

Laughter is a vent of any sudden joy that strikes upon the mind, which, being too volatile and strong, breaks out in this *tremor* of the voice.

Steele.

Trembling and *tremulous* are applied as epithets, either to persons or things: a *trembling* voice evinces *trepidation* of mind, a *tremulous* voice evinces a *tremor* of mind: notes in music are sometimes *trembling*; the motion of the leaves is *tremulous*.

And read the *trembling* unsuspecting prey.

Pope.

As thus th' effulgence *tremulous* I drank,

With cherish'd gaze.

Thomson.

TREMENDOUS, *v.* Fearful.

TREMOR, *v.* Agitation.

TREMOR, *v.* Trembling.

TREPIDATION, *v.* Agitation.

TREPIDATION, *v.* Trembling.

TRESPASS, *v.* Offence.

TRIAL, *v.* Attempt.

TRIAL, *v.* Experience.

TRIBUTE, *v.* Tax.

TRICK, *v.* Artifice.

TO TRICK, *v.* To cheat.

TRIFLING, TRIVIAL, PETTY,

FRIVOLOUS, FUTILE.

TRIFLING, TRIVIAL, both come from *trivium*, a common place of resort where three roads meet, signifying common.

PETTY is in French *petit* little, in Latin *putus* a boy or minion, and the Hebrew *pethi* foolish.

FRIVOLOUS, in Latin *frivulus*, comes in all probability from *frio* to crumble into dust, signifying reduced to nothing.

FUTILE, in Latin *futilis*, from

futio to pour out, signifies cast away as worthless.

All these epithets characterize an object as of little or no value: *trifling* and *trivial* differ only in degree; the latter denoting a still lower degree of value than the former. What is *trifling* or *trivial* is that which does not require any consideration, and may be easily passed over as forgotten: *trifling* objections can never weigh against solid reason; *trivial* remarks only expose the shallowness of the remarker: what is *petty* is beneath our consideration, it ought to be disregarded and held cheap; it would be a *petty* consideration for a minister of state to look to the small savings of a private family: what is *frivolous* and *futile* is disgraceful for any one to consider; the former in relation to all the objects of our pursuit or attachment, the latter only in regard to matters of reasoning, dress is a *frivolous* occupation when it forms the chief business of a rational being; the objections of free-thinkers against revealed religion are as *futile* as they are mischievous.

We exceed the ancients in doggerel humour, burlesque, and all the *trivial* arts of ridicule.

Adams.

There is scarcely any man without some favorite trifle which he values above greater attainments; some desire of *petty* praise which he cannot patiently suffer to be frustrated.

Johnson.

It is an endless and *frivolous* pursuit to act by any other rule than the care of satisfying our own minds.

Steele.

Out of a multiplicity of criticisms by various hands many are sure to be *futile*.

Cowper.

TRIVIAL, *v.* Trifling.

TROOP, COMPANY.

In a military sense the TROOP is among the horse what COMPANY is among the foot; but this is only a partial acceptance of the terms. *Troop*, in French *troupe*, Spanish *tropa*, Latin *turba*, signifies an indiscriminate multitude; *company* (*v.* To accompany) is any number joined together, and bearing each other *company*: hence we speak of a *troop* of hunters, a *company* of players; a *troop* of horsemen, a *company* of travellers.

TO TROUBLE, *v.* To afflict.

we may *tempt* him to depart from his duty : it is necessary to *try* the fidelity of a servant before you place confidence in him ; it is wicked to *tempt* any one to do that which we should think wrong to do ourselves : our strength is *tried* by frequent experiments ; we are *tempted*, by the weakness of our principles, to give way to the violence of our passions.

League all your forces then, ye pow'rs above,
Join all, and try the omnipotence of Jove. POPE.
Still the old sting remain'd, and men began,
To *tempt* the serpent, as he *tempted* man.

DENHAM.

TO TUMBLE, *v. To fall.*

TUMID, *v. Turgid.*

TUMULT, *v. Bustle.*

TUMULTUARY, *v. Tumultuous.*

TUMULTUOUS, TUMULTUARY.

TUMULTUOUS signifies having tumult ; TUMULTUARY, disposed for tumult : the former is applied to objects in general ; the latter to persons only : in *tumultuous* meetings the voice of reason is the last thing that is heard ; it is the natural tendency of large and promiscuous assemblies to become *tumultuary*.

But, O ! beyond description happiest he
Who ne'er must roll on life's *tumultuous* sea.

PRIOR.

With *tumultuary*, but irresistible violence,
the Scotch insurgents fell upon the churches in
that city (Perth). ROBERTSON.

TUMULTUOUS, TURBULENT,

SEDITIONOUS, MUTINOUS.

TUMULTUOUS (*v. Bustle*) describes the disposition to make a noise ; those who attend the play-houses, particularly of the lower orders, are frequently *tumultuous* : TURBULENT marks a hostile spirit of resistance to authority ; when prisoners are dissatisfied they are frequently *turbulent* : SEDITIONOUS marks a spirit of resistance to government ; during the French revolution the people were often disposed to be *seditionous* : MUTINOUS marks a spirit of resistance against officers either in the army or navy ; a general will not fail to quell the first risings of a *mutinous* spirit. Electioneering mobs are always *tumultuous* ; the young and

the ignorant are so averse to control that they are easily led by the example of an individual to be *turbulent* ; among the Romans the people were in the habits of holding *seditionous* meetings, and sometimes the soldiery would be *mutinous*.

TURBULENT, *v. Tumultuous.*

TURGID, TUMID, BOMBASTIC.

TURGID and TUMID both signify swoln, but they differ in their application : *turgid* belongs to diction, as a *turgid* style ; *tumid* is applicable to the water and other objects, as the *tumid* waves. BOMBASTIC, from *bombastic* a kind of cotton, signifies puffed up like cotton, and is, like *turgid*, applicable to words ; but the *bombastic* includes the sentiments expressed : *turgidity* is confined mostly to the mode of expression. A writer is *turgid*, who expresses a simple thought in lofty language : a person is *bombastic* who deals in large words and introduces high sentiments in common discourse.

TO TURN, BEND, TWIST,
DISTORT, WRING, WREST,
WRENCH.

TURN, in French *tourner*, comes from the Greek *τρομα* to turn, and *τρομος* a turner's wheel.

BEND, *v. Bend.*

TWIST, in Saxon *getwisan*, German *zweyen* to double, comes from *zwey* two.

DISTORT, in Latin *distortus*, participle of *distorqueo*, compounded of *dis* and *torqueo*, signifies to turn violently aside.

To *turn* signifies in general to put a thing out of its place in an uneven line ; to *bend*, and the rest, are species of *turning* : we *turn* a thing by moving it from one point to another ; thus we *turn* the earth over : to *bend* is simply to change its direction ; thus a stick is *bent* : to *twist* is to *bend* it many times, to make many *turns* : to *distort* is to *turn* or *bend* out of the right course ; thus the face is *distorted* in convulsions. To WRING is to twist with violence ; thus the linen which has been wetted is *wrung* : to WREST or WRENCH is to separate

LITY (*v. Faithful*) is *unbelief* as respects Divine revelation; **INCREDULITY** is *unbelief* in ordinary matters. *Unbelief* is taken in an indefinite and negative sense; it is the want of *belief* in any particular thing that may or may not be *believed*: *infidelity* is a more active state of mind; it supposes a violent and total rejection of that which ought to be *believed*: *incredulity* is also an active state of mind, in which we oppose a *belief* to matters that may be rejected. *Unbelief* does not of itself convey any reproachful meaning; it depends upon the thing *disbelieved*: *infidelity* is taken in the worst sense for a blind and senseless perversity in refusing belief: *incredulity* is often a mark of wisdom. The Jews are *unbelievers* in the mission of our Saviour; the Turks are *infidels*, inasmuch as they do not believe in the Bible; Deists and Atheists are likewise *infidels*, inasmuch as they set themselves up against Divine revelation; well-informed people are always *incredulous* of stories respecting ghosts and apparitions.

One gets by heart a catalogue of title-pages and editions; and immediately, to become conspicuous, declares that he is an *unbeliever*.

ANDERSON.

Belief and profession will speak a Christian but very faintly, when thy conversation proclaims thee an *infidel*.

SOUTH.

The youth hears all the predictions of the aged with obstinate *incredulity*.

JOHNSON.

UNBLEMISHED, *v. Blameless*.

UNBODIED, *v. Incorporeal*.

UNBOUNDED, *v. Boundless*.

UNCEASINGLY, *v. Incessantly*.

UNCERTAIN, *v. Doubtful*.

UNCONCERNED, *v. Indifferent*.

UNCONQUERABLE, *v. Invincible*.

TO UNCOVER, DISCOVER.

To **UNCOVER**, like **DISCOVER**, implies to take off the covering; but the former refers mostly to an artificial, material, and occasional covering; the latter to a natural, moral, and habitual covering: plants are *uncovered*, that they may receive the benefit of the air; they are *discovered* to gratify the researches of the botanist.

UNCOVERED, *v. Bare*.

UNDAUNTED, *v. Bold*.

UNDENIABLE, *v. Indubitable*.

UNDER, BELOW, BENEATH.

UNDER, like *hind* in *behind*, and the German *unter*, *hinter*, &c. are all connected with the preposition *in* implying the relation of enclosure.

BELOW denotes the state of being low; and **BENEATH** from the German *nieder*, and the Greek *κατω* or *εμφαν* downwards, has the same original signification. It is evident, therefore, from the above, that the preposition *under* denotes any situation of retirement or concealment; *below*, any situation of inferiority or lowness; and *beneath*, the same, only in a still greater degree. We are covered or sheltered by that which we stand *under*; we excel or rise above that which is *below* us; we look down upon that which is *beneath* us: we live *under* the protection of government; the sun disappears when it is *below* the horizon; we are apt to tread upon that which is altogether *beneath* us.

The Jewish writers in their chronological computations often shoot *under* or over the truth at their pleasure.

PRIDEAUX.

All sublunary comforts imitate the changeableness, as well as feel the influence of the planet they are *under*.

SOUTH.

Our minds are here and there, *below*, above; Nothing that's mortal can so quickly move.

DENNHAM.

How can any thing better be expected than rust and canker when men will rather dig their treasure from *beneath* than fetch it from above.

SOUTH.

TO UNDERSTAND, v. To conceive.

UNDERSTANDING, INTELLECT, INTELLIGENCE.

UNDERSTANDING (*v. To conceive*), being the Saxon word, is employed to describe a familiar and easy operation of the mind in forming distinct ideas of things. **INTELLECT** (*v. Intellect*) is employed to mark the same operation in regard to higher and more abstruse objects. The *understanding* applies to the first exercise of the rational powers: it is therefore aptly said of children and savages that they employ their *understandings* on

lated circumstantially : what has been entangled in any mystery or confusion is *unravelled* : in this manner a mysterious transaction is *unravelled*, if any circumstance is fully accounted for : what has been wrapped up so as to be entirely shut out from view is *developed* ; in this manner the plot of a play or novel, or the talent of a person, is *developed*.

And to the sage-instructing eye *unfold*
The various twine of light.

THOMSON.

You must be sure to *unravel* all your designs
to a jealous man.

ADDISON.

The character of Tiberius is extremely difficult to *develop*.

CUMBERLAND.

UNGOVERNABLE, *v.* *Unruly*.

UNHAPPY, MISERABLE,
WRETCHED.

UNHAPPY is literally not to be happy ; this is the negative condition of many who might be happy if they pleased. MISERABLE from *miserere* to pity, is to deserve pity ; that is to be positively and extremely *unhappy* : this is the lot only of a comparatively few : WRETCHED, from our word *wreck*, the Saxon *wrecca* an exile, and the like, signifies cast away or abandoned ; that is, particularly *miserable*, which is the lot of still fewer. As happiness lies properly in the mind, *unhappy* is taken in the proper sense, with regard to the state of the feelings ; but is figuratively extended to the outward circumstances which occasion the painful feelings ; we lead an *unhappy* life, or are in an *unhappy* condition : as that which excites the compassion of others must be external, and the state of abandonment must of itself be an outward state, *miserable* and *wretched* are properly applied to the outward circumstances which cause the pain, and improperly to the pain which is occasioned. We can measure the force of these words, that is to say the degree of *unhappiness* which they express, only by the circumstance which causes the *unhappiness*. An *unhappy* man is indefinite ; as we may be *unhappy* from slight circumstances, or from those which are important ; a child may be said to be *unhappy* at the loss of a plaything ; a man is *unhappy* who leads a vicious life : *miserable* and *wretched* are more

limited in their application ; a child cannot be either *miserable* or *wretched* ; and he who is so, has some serious cause either in his own mind or in his circumstances to make him so : a man is *miserable* who is tormented by his conscience ; a mother will be *wretched* who sees her child violently torn from her.

The same distinction holds good when taken to designate the outward circumstances themselves : he is an *unhappy* man whom nobody likes, and who likes nobody ; every criminal suffering the punishment of his offences is an *unhappy* man. The condition of the poor is particularly *miserable* in countries which are not blessed with the abundance that England enjoys. Philoctetes, abandoned by the Greeks in the island of Lemnos, a prey to the most poignant grief and the horrors of indigence and solitude, was a *wretched* man.

Unhappy is only applicable to that which respects the happiness of man ; but *miserable* and *wretched* may be said of that which is mean and worthless in its nature : a writer may be either *miserable* or *wretched* according to the lowness of the measure at which he is rated ; so likewise any performance may be *miserable* or *wretched* ; a house may be *miserable* or *wretched*, and the like.

Such is the fate *unhappy* women find,
And such the curse intail'd upon our kind.

ROWE.

These *miseries* are more than may be borne.

SHAKESPEARE.

'Tis murther, discontent, distrust,
That makes you *wretched*.

GAY.

UNIFORM, *v.* *Equal*.

UNIMPORTANT, INSIGNIFICANT,
IMMATERIAL, INCONSIDERABLE.

THE want of *importance*, of *consideration*, of *signification*, and of matter or substance, is expressed by these terms. They differ therefore principally according to the meaning of the primitives ; but they are so closely allied that they may be employed sometimes indifferently. The UNIMPORTANT regards the consequences of our actions ; it is *unimportant* whether we use this or that word in certain cases : INCONSIDER-

unruly respects that which is to be ruled or turned at the instant, and is applicable therefore to the management of children: *ungovernable* respects that which is to be put into a regular course, and is applicable therefore either to the management of children or the direction of those who are above the state of childhood; a child is *unruly* in his actions, and *ungovernable* in his conduct. Hence REFRACTORY, from the Latin *refringo* to break open, marks the disposition to break every thing down before it: it is the excess of the *unruly* with regard to children: the *unruly* is however negative; but the *refractory* is positive: an *unruly* child objects to be ruled; a *refractory* child sets up a positive resistance to all rule: an *unruly* child may be altogether silent and passive; a *refractory* child always commits himself by some act of intemperance in word or deed: he is *unruly* if in any degree he gives trouble in the *ruling*; he is *refractory* if he refuses altogether to be ruled.

How hardly is the restive *unruly* will of man first tamed and broke to duty. SOUTH.

I conceive (replied Nicholas) I stand here before you, my most equitable judges, for no worse a crime than cudgelling my *refractory* mule.

CUMMERLAND.

Hear'ns, how unlike their Belgic sires of old!
Rough, poor, content, *ungovernably* bold.

GOLDSMITH.

UNSEARCHABLE, INSCRUTABLE.

THESE terms are both applied to the Almighty, but not altogether indifferently; for that which is UNSEARCHABLE is not set at so great a distance from us, as that which is INSCRUTABLE: for that which is *searched* is in common concerns easier to be found than that which requires a *scrutiny*. The ways of God are all to us finite creatures more or less *unsearchable*; but the mysterious plans of Providence as frequently evinced in the affairs of men are altogether *inscrutable*.

Things else by me *unsearchable*, now heard
With wonder. MILTON.

To expect that the intricacies of science will be pierced by a careless glance, is to expect a particular privilege; but to suppose that the maze is *inscrutable* to diligence, is to enchain the mind in voluntary shackles. JENSON.

UNSETTLED, *v.* Undetermined.UNSPEAKABLE, INEFFABLE,
UNUTTERABLE, INEXPRESSIBLE.

UNSPEAKABLE and INEFFABLE, from the Latin *for* to speak, have precisely the same meaning; but the *unspeakable* is said of objects in general, particularly of that which is above human conception, and surpasses the power of language to describe; as the *unspeakable* goodness of God: INEFFABLE is said of such objects as cannot be painted in words with adequate force; as the *ineffable* sweetness of a person's look: UNUTTERABLE and INEXPRESSIBLE are extended in their signification to that which is incommunicable by signs from one being to another; thus grief is *unutterable* which it is not in the power of the sufferer by any sounds to bring home to the feelings of another; grief is *inexpressible* which is not to be expressed by looks, or words, or any signs. *Unutterable* is therefore applied only to the individual who wishes to give *utterance*: *inexpressible* may be said of that which is to be *expressed* concerning others: our own pains are *unutterable*; the sweetness of a person's countenance is *inexpressible*.

The vast difference of God's nature from ours makes the difference between them so *unspeakably* great. SOUTH.

The influences of the Divine nature enliven the mind with *ineffable* joys. SOUTH.

Nature breeds,
Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, *unutterable*. MILTON.

The evil which lies lurking under a temptation is intolerable and *inexpressible*. SOUTH.

UNSPOTTED, *v.* Blameless.UNSTEADY, *v.* Undetermined.UNTOWARD, *v.* Awkward.UNTRUTH, FALSEHOOD,
FALSITY, LIE.

UNTRUTH is an *untrue* saying; FALSEHOOD and LIE are *false* sayings: *untruth* of itself reflects no disgrace on the agent; it may be unintentional or not: a *falsehood* and a *lie* are intentional *false* sayings, differing only in degree as the guilt of the offender: a *falsehood* is not always

UTILITY, *v. Advantage.*

TO UTTER, *v. To express.*

TO UTTER, SPEAK,
ARTICULATE, PRONOUNCE.

UTTER, from *out*, signifies to put out; that is, to send forth a sound: this therefore is a more general term than SPEAK, which is to *utter* an intelligible sound. We may *utter* a groan; we *speak* words only, or that which is intended to serve as words. To *speak* therefore is only a species of *utterance*; a dumb man has *utterance*, but not *speech*.

ARTICULATE and PRONOUNCE are modes of *speaking*; to *articulate*, from *articulum* a joint, is to *speak* the distinct letter or syllables of words; which is the first effort of a child beginning to *speak*. It is of great importance to make a child *articulate* every letter when he first begins to *speak* or read. To *pronounce*, from the Latin *pronuncio* to speak out loud, is a formal mode of *speaking*.

A child must first *articulate* the letters and the syllables, then he *pronounces* or sets forth the whole word; this is necessary before he can *speak* to be understood.

At each word that my destruction utter'd
My heart recoil'd. OTWAY.

Waller had a graceful way of *speaking*.

CLARENDON.

The torments of disease can sometimes only be signified by groans or sobs, or *inarticulate* ejaculations. JOHNSON.

Speak the speech I pray you, as I *pronounced* it to you. SHAKESPEARE.

V.

VACANCY, VACUITY, INANITY.

VACANCY and VACUITY both denote the space unoccupied, or the abstract quality of being unoccupied. INANITY, from the Latin *inanis*, denotes the abstract quality of emptiness, or of not containing any thing: hence the former terms *vacancy* and *vacuity* are used in an indifferent sense; *inanity* always in a bad sense: there may be a *vacancy* in the seat, or a *vacancy* in the mind, or a *vacancy* in life, which we may or may not fill up as we please; but *inanity* of character

denotes the want of the essentials that constitute a character.

There are *vacuities* in the happiest life, which it is not in the power of the world to fill. BLAIR.

When I look up and behold the heavens, it makes me scorn the world and the pleasures thereof, considering the vanity of these and the *inanity* of the other. HOWEL.

VACANT, *v. Empty.*

VACANT, *v. Idle.*

VACUITY, *v. Vacancy.*

VAGUE, *v. Loose.*

VAIN, *v. Idle.*

VAIN, INEFFECTUAL,
FRUITLESS.

VAIN, *v. Idle.*

INEFFECTUAL, that is, not *effectual* (*v. Effective*).

FRUITLESS, that is, without *fruit*, signifies not producing the desired fruit of one's labour.

These epithets are all applied to our endeavours; but the term *vain* is the most general and indefinite; the other terms are particular and definite. What we aim at, as well as what we strive for, may be *vain*; but *ineffectual* and *fruitless* refer only to the end of our labours. When the object aimed at is general in its import, it is common to term the endeavour *vain* when it cannot attain this object; it is *vain* to attempt to reform a person's character until he is convinced that he stands in need of reformation: when the means employed are inadequate for the attainment of the particular end, it is usual to call the endeavour *ineffectual*; cool arguments will be *ineffectual* in convincing any one inflamed with a particular passion: when labor is specifically employed for the attainment of a particular object, it is usual to term it *fruitless* if it fail: peace-makers will often find themselves in this condition, that their labors will be rendered *fruitless* by the violent passions of angry opponents.

Nature aloud calls out for balmy rest,
But all in *vain*. GENTLEMAN.

After many *fruitless* overtures, the Inca, despairing of any cordial union with a Spaniard, attacked him by surprise with a numerous body, ROBERTSON.

tents; we *prize* books only for their contents, in which sense *prize* is a much stronger term than value; we also *prize* men for their usefulness to society; we *esteem* their moral characters.

The *prize*, the beauteous *prize*, I will resign,
So dearly *valu'd*, and so justly mine. POPE.

Nothing makes women *esteemed* by the opposite sex more than chastity; whether it be that we always *prize* those most who are hardest to come at, or that nothing besides chastity, with its collateral attendants, fidelity and constancy, gives a man a property in the person he loves.

ADDISON.

VANITY, *v. Pride.*

TO VANQUISH, *v. To conquer.*

VARIABLE, *v. Changeable.*

VARIATION, *v. Change.*

VARIATION, VARIETY.

VARIATION denotes the act of *varying* (*v. To change*): VARIETY denotes the quality of *varying*, or the thing *varied*. The astronomer observes the *variations* in the heavens; the philosopher observes the *variations* in the climate from year to year. *Variety* is pleasing to all persons, but to none so much as the young and the fickle: there is an infinite *variety* in every species of objects animate or inanimate.

The idea of *variation* (as a constituent in beauty), without attending so accurately to the manner of *variation*, has led Mr. Hogarth to consider angular figures as beautiful. BURKE.

As to the colours usually found in beautiful bodies, it may be difficult to ascertain them, because in the several parts of nature there is an infinite *variety*. BURKE.

VARIETY, *v. Difference.*

VARIETY, *v. Variation.*

VARIOUS, *v. Different.*

TO VARNISH, *v. To gloss.*

TO VARY, *v. To change.*

TO VARY, *v. To differ.*

VAST, *v. Enormous.*

VEHEMENT, *v. Violent.*

VEIL, *v. Cloak.*

VELOCITY, *v. Quickness.*

VENAL, MERCENARY.

VENAL, from the Latin *venalis*, sig-

nifies saleable or ready to be sold, which, applied as it commonly is to persons, is a much stronger term than MERCENARY (*v. Mercenary*). A *venal* man gives up all principle for interest; a *mercenary* man seeks his interest without regard to principle: *venal* writers are such as write in favor of the cause that can promote them to riches or honors; a servant is commonly a *mercenary* who only does the service according as he is paid: those who are loudest in their professions of political purity are the best subjects for a minister to make *venal*; a *mercenary* spirit is engendered in the minds of those who devote themselves exclusively to trade.

The minister, well pleas'd at small expense,
To silence so much rude impertinence,
With squeeze and whisper yields to his demands,
And on the *venal* list enroll'd he stands.

JENYNS.

For their assistance they repair to the northern
steel, and bring in an unnatural, *mercenary*
crew. SOUTH.

TO VENERATE, *v. To adore.*

VENIAL, PARDONABLE.

VENIAL, from the Latin *venia* pardon or indulgence, is applied to what may be tolerated without express disparagement to the individual, or direct censure; but the PARDONABLE is that which may only escape severe censure, but cannot be allowed: garrulity is a *venial* offence in old age; levity in youth is *pardonable* in single instances.

Whilst the clergy are employed in extirpating
mortal sins, I should be glad to rally the world
out of indecencies and *venial* transgressions.

CUMBERLAND.

The weaknesses of Elizabeth were not confined to that period of life when they are more *pardonable*. ROBERTSON.

VENOM, *v. Poison.*

VENTURE, *v. Hazard.*

VERACITY, *v. Truth.*

VERBAL, VOCAL, ORAL.

VERBAL, from *verbum* a word, signifies after the manner of a spoken word; ORAL, from *os* a mouth, signifies by word of mouth; and VOCAL, from *vox* the voice, signifies by the voice: the two former of these words are used to distinguish the speaking from writ-

Fools *view* but part, and not the whole survey,
 So crowd existence all into a day, JENYNS.
 No land so rude but looks beyond the tomb
 For future prospects in a world to come. JENYNS.

VIEW, PROSPECT, LANDSCAPE.

VIEW and PROSPECT (*v. View, prospect*), though applied here to external objects of the sense, have a similar distinction as in the preceding article. The *view* is not only that which may be seen, but that which is actually seen; the *prospect* is that which may be seen: that ceases, therefore, to be a *view*, which has not an immediate agent to *view*; although a *prospect* exists continually, whether seen or not: hence we speak of our *view* being intercepted, but not our *prospect* intercepted; a confined or bounded *view*, but a lively or dreary *prospect*. *View* is an indefinite term; it may be said either of a number of objects, or of a single object, of a whole, or of a part: *prospect* is said only of an aggregate number of objects: we may have a *view* of a town, of a number of scattered houses, of a single house, or of the spire of a steeple; but the *prospect* comprehends that which comes within the range of the eye. The *view* may be said of that which is seen directly or indirectly; the *prospect* is said only of the thing in nature which directly presents itself to the eye; hence a drawing of an object may be termed a *view*, although not a *prospect*. *View* is confined to no particular objects; *prospect* mostly respects rural objects; and LANDSCAPE respects no others. *Landscape, landship, or landshape*, denote any portion of country which is in a particular form: hence the *landscape* is a species of *prospect*. A *prospect* may be wide, and comprehend an assemblage of objects both of nature and art; but a *landscape* is narrow, and lies within the compass of the naked eye: hence it is also that *landscape* may be taken also for the drawing of a *landscape*, and consequently for a species of *view*: the taking of *views* or *landscapes* is the last exercise of the learner in drawing.

Thus was this place
 A happy rural seat of various *views*. MILTON.

New skies and seas their *prospect* only bound. DRYDEN.
 So lovely seem'd
 That *landscape*, and of pure now purer air
 Meets his approach. MILTON.

VIGILANT, *v. Wakeful.*VIGOR, *v. Energy.*VILE, *v. Base.*TO VILIFY, *v. To revile.*TO VINDICATE, *v. To assert.*TO VINDICATE, *v. To avenge.*TO VINDICATE, *v. To defend.*TO VIOLATE, *v. To infringe.*VIOLENCE, *v. Force.*VIOLENT, FURIOUS, BOISTEROUS,
 VEHEMENT, IMPETUOUS.VIOLENT signifies having force (*v. Force*).FURIOUS signifies having *fury* (*v. Anger*).BOISTEROUS in all probability comes from *bestir*, signifying ready to *bestir* or come into motion.VEHEMENT, in Latin *vehemens*, compounded of *veho* and *mens*, signifies carried away by the mind or the force of passion.IMPETUOUS signifies having an *impetus*.

Violent is here the most general, including the idea of force or violence, which is common to them all; it is as general in its application as in its meaning. When *violent* and *furious* are applied to the same objects, the latter expresses a higher degree of the former: thus a *furious* temper is *violent* to an excessive degree; a *furious* whirlwind is *violent* beyond measure. *Violent* and *boisterous* are likewise applied to the same objects; but the *boisterous* refers only to the *violence* of the motion or noise: hence we say that a wind is *violent*, inasmuch as it acts with great force upon all bodies; it is *boisterous*, inasmuch as it causes the great motion of bodies: a *violent* person deals in *violence* of every kind; a *boisterous* person is full of *violent* action.

Violent, vehement, and impetuous, are all applied to persons, or that which is personal: a man is *violent*

VIVACIOUS, *v. Lively.*

VIVACITY, *v. Animation.*

VIVID, *v. Clear.*

VOCABULARY, *v. Dictionary.*

VOCAL, *v. Verbal.*

VOICE, *v. Vote.*

VOID, *v. Empty.*

VOLATILITY, *v. Lightness.*

VOLUNTARILY, *v. Willingly.*

VOLUPTUARY, *v. Sensualist.*

VORACIOUS, *v. Ravenous.*

VOTE, SUFFRAGE, VOICE.

VOTE, in Latin *votum* from *voveo* to vow, is very probably from *vox* a voice, signifying the voice that is raised in supplication to heaven.

SUFFRAGE, in Latin *suffragium*, is in all probability compounded of *sub* and *frango* to break out or declare for a thing.

The VOICE is here figuratively taken for the voice that is raised in favor of a thing.

The *vote* is the wish itself, whether expressed or not; a person has a *vote*, that is, the power of wishing: but the *suffrage* and the *voice* are the wish that is expressed; a person gives his *suffrage* or his *voice*.

The *vote* is the settled and fixed wish, it is that by which the most important concerns in life are determined: the *suffrage* is the *vote* given only in particular cases; the *voice* is a partial or occasional wish, expressed only in matters of minor importance.

The *vote* and *voice* are given either for or against a person or thing; the *suffrage* is commonly given in favor of a person: in all public assemblies the majority of *votes* decide the question; members of Parliament are chosen by the *suffrages* of the people; in the execution of a will every executor has a *voice* in all that is transacted.

The popular vote

Inclines here to continue.

MILTON.

Reputation is commonly lost, because it never was deserved; and was conferred at first, not by the *suffrage* of criticism, but by the fondness of friendship.

JOHNSON.

That something's ours when we from life depart,
This all conceive, all feel it at the heart:
The wise of learn'd antiquity proclaim
This truth; the public voice declares the same.

JENYNS.

TO VOUCH, *v. To affirm.*

VOYAGE, *v. Journey.*

VULGAR, *v. Common.*

W.

WAGES, *v. Allowance.*

TO WAIT FOR, *v. To wait.*

TO WAIT ON, *v. To attend.*

WAKEFUL, WATCHFUL, VIGILANT.

WE may be WAKEFUL without being WATCHFUL; but we cannot be *watchful* without being *wakeful*.

Wakeful is an affair of the body, and depends upon the temperament; *watchful* is an affair of the will, and depends upon the determination: some persons are more *wakeful* than they wish to be; few are as *watchful* as they ought to be.

VIGILANCE, from the Latin *vigil*, and the Greek *αγαλλο; αγαλλισν* to be on the alert, expresses a high degree of *watchfulness*: a sentinel is *watchful* who on ordinary occasions keeps good *watch*; but it is necessary for him, on extraordinary occasions, to be *vigilant*, in order to detect whatever may pass.

We are *watchful* only in the proper sense of *watching*; but we may be *vigilant* in detecting moral as well as natural evils.

Music shall wake her that hath power to charm,
Pale sickness, and avert the stings of pain:
Can raise or quell our passions, and becalm
In sweet oblivion the too *wakeful* sense.

FENTON.

He who remembers what has fallen out, will
be *watchful* against what may happen.

SOUTH.

Let a man strictly observe the first hints and
whispers of good and evil that pass in his heart;
this will keep conscience quick and *vigilant*.

SOUTH.

WALK, *v. Carriage.*

WAN, *v. Pale.*

TO WANDER, *v. To deviate.*

has; for then he *lacks* that which alone can make him happy, which is contentment.

To be rich is to have more than is desired, and more than is wanted. JOHNSON.

The old from such affairs are only freed,
Which vig'rous youth and strength of body need. DENHAM.

See the mind of beastly man!
That hath so soon forgot the excellence
Of his creation, when he life began,
That now he chooseth with vile difference
To be a beast and lacke intelligence. SPENSER.

WARE, *v. Commodity.*

WARLIKE, *v. Martial.*

WARMTH, *v. Fire.*

WARNING, *v. Admonition.*

TO WARRANT, *v. To guarantee.*

WARY, *v. Cautious.*

TO WASTE, *v. To spend.*

TO WATCH, *v. To guard.*

TO WATCH, *v. To observe.*

WATCHFUL, *v. Wakeful.*

WATERMAN, *v. Seaman.*

WATERMAN, BOATMAN, FERRY-
MAN.

THESE three terms are employed for persons who are engaged with boats; but the WATERMAN is specifically applied to such whose business it is to let out their boats and themselves for a given time; the BOATMAN may only use a boat occasionally for the transfer of goods; a FERRYMAN uses a boat only for the conveyance of persons or goods across a particular river or piece of water.

WAVE, BILLOW, SURGE,
BREAKER.

WAVE, from the Saxon *waegen*, and German *wiegen* to weigh or rock, is applied to water in an undulating state; it is, therefore, the generic term, and the rest are specific terms: those *waves* which swell more than ordinarily are termed BILLOWS, which is derived from *bulge* or *bilge*, and German *balg*, the paunch or belly: those *waves* which rise higher than usual, are termed SURGES, from the Latin *surgo* to rise: those *waves* which dash

against the shore, or against vessels, with more than ordinary force, are termed BREAKERS.

The wave behind impels the wave before. POPE.
I saw him beat the *billows* under him,
And ride upon their backs. SHAKESPEARE.

He flies aloft, and with impetuous roar
Pursues the foaming *surges* to the shore. DRYDEN.

Now on the mountain *waves* on high they ride,
Then downward plunge beneath th' involving
tide,

Till one who seems in agony to strive,
The whirling *breakers* heave on shore alive. FALCONER.

TO WAVER, *v. To fluctuate.*

WAVERING, *v. Undetermined.*

WAY, MANNER, METHOD, MODE,
COURSE, MEANS.

ALL these words denote the steps which are pursued from the beginning to the completion of any work. The WAY is both general and indefinite; it is either taken by accident or chosen by design: the MANNER and METHOD are species of the *way* chosen by design; the former in regard to orders. Whoever attempts to do that which is strange to him, will at first do it in an awkward *way*; the *manner* of conferring a favor is often more than the favor itself; experience supplies men in the end with a suitable *method* of carrying on their business. The *method* is said of that which requires contrivance; the MODE, of that which requires practice and habitual attention; the former being applied to matters of art, and the latter to mechanical actions: the master has a good *method* of teaching to write; the scholar has a good or bad *mode* of holding his pen. The COURSE and the MEANS are the *way* which we pursue in our moral conduct: the *course* is the *course* of measures which are adopted to produce a certain result; the *means* collectively for the *course* which lead to a certain end: in order to obtain legal redress, we must pursue a certain *course* in law; law is one *means* of gaining redress, but we do wisely, if we can, to adopt the safer and pleasanter *means* of persuasion and cool remonstrance.

The *ways* of heaven are dark and intricate.

ADDISON.

My mind is taken up in a more melancholy
manner. ATTENBURY.

Men are willing to try all methods of recon-
ciling guilt and quiet. JOHNSON.

Modes of speech, which owe their prevalence
to modish folly, die away with their inventors.
JOHNSON.

All your sophisters cannot produce any thing
better adapted to preserve a rational and manly
freedom than the course that we have pursued.
BURKE.

The most wonderful things are brought about
in many instances by means the most absurd and
ridiculous. BURKE.

WEAK, FEEBLE, INFIRM.

WEAK, in Saxon *wace*, Dutch
wack, German *schwack*, is in all pro-
bability an intensive of *weich* soft,
which comes from *weichen* to yield,
and this from *wegen* to move.

FEEBLE, probably contracted from
failable.

INFIRM, v. *Debility*.

The Saxon term *weak* is here, as it
usually is, the familiar and universal
term; *feeble* is suited to a more po-
lished style; *infirm* is only a species
of the *weak*: we may be *weak* in
body or mind; but we are commonly
feeble and *infirm* only in the body:
we may be *weak* from disease, or
weak by nature, it equally conveys the
gross idea of a defect; but the term
feeble and *infirm* are qualified expres-
sions for *weakness*: a child is *feeble*
from its infancy; an old man is *feeble*
from age; the latter may likewise be
infirm in consequence of sickness.
We pity the *weak*, but their *weakness*
often gives us pain; we assist the *fee-
ble* when they attempt to walk; we
support the *infirm* when they are un-
able to stand. The same distinction
exists between *weak* and *feeble* in the
moral use of the words: a *weak* at-
tempt to excuse a person conveys a
reproachful meaning; but the *feeble*
efforts which we make to defend an-
other may be praise-worthy, although
feeble.

You, gallant Vernon! saw
The miserable scene; you pitying saw;
To infant *weakness* rush the warrior's arm.

THOMSON.

Command th' assistance of a friend,
But *feeble* are the succours I can send. DRYDEN.

At my age, and under my *infirmities*, I can
have no relief but those with which religion fur-
nishes me. ATTENBURY.

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WEARISOME, TIRESOME,
TEDIOUS.

WEARISOME (*v. To weary*) is the general and indefinite term; TIRESOME (*v. To weary*); and TEDIOUS, causing *tedium*, a specific form of *wearisomeness*: common things may cause *weariness*; that which acts painfully is either *tiresome* or *tedious*; but in different degrees the repetition of the same sounds will grow *tiresome*; long waiting in anxious suspense is *tedious*: there is more of that which is physical in the *tiresome*, and mental in the *tedious*.

All weariness presupposes weakness, and consequently every long, importune, *wearisome* petition, is truly and properly a force upon him that is pursued with it. SOUTH.

Far happier were the meanest peasant's lot,
Than to be plac'd on high, in anxious pride,
The purple drudge and slave of *tiresome* state. WEST.

Happy the mortal man who now, at last,
Has through this doleful vale of misery past,
Who to his destin'd stage has carried on
The *tedious* load, and laid his burden down. PRIOR.

TO WEARY, TIRE, JADE,
HARASS.

To WEARY is a frequentative of *wear*, that is, to *wear* out the strength.

To TIRE, from the French *tirer* and the Latin *traho* to draw, signifies to *draw* out the strength.

To JADE is the same as to *goad*.

HARASS, *v. Distress*.

Long exertion *wearies*; a little exertion will *tire* a child or a weak man; forced exertions *jade*; painful exertions, or exertions coupled with painful circumstances, *harass*: the horse is *jaded* who is forced on beyond his strength; the soldier is *harassed* who marches in perpetual fear of an attack from the enemy. We are *waried* with thinking when it gives us pain to think any longer; we are *tired* of our employment when it ceases to give us pleasure; we are *jaded* by incessant attention to business; we are *harassed* by perpetual complaints which we cannot redress.

All pleasures that affect the body must needs *weary*. SOUTH.

Every morsel to a satisfied hunger is only a new labour to a *tired* digestion. SOUTH.

I recall the time (and am glad it is over) when about this hour (six in the morning) I

used to be going to bed surfeited with pleasure, or *jaded* with business. BOLINGBROKE.

Bankrupt nobility, a factious, giddy, and Divided Senate, a *harass'd* commonalty, Is all the strength of Venice. OTWAY.

WEDDING, *v. Marriage*.

WEDLOCK, *v. Marriage*.

TO WEEP, *v. To cry*.

WEIGHT, *v. Importance*.

WEIGHT, HEAVINESS, GRAVITY.

WEIGHT, from *to weigh*, is that which a thing *weighs*.

HEAVINESS, from *heavy* and *heave*, signifies the abstract quality of the *heavy*, or difficult to heave.

GRAVITY, from the Latin *gravis*, likewise denotes the same abstract quality.

Weight is indefinite; whatever may be *weighed* has a *weight*, whether large or small: *heaviness* and *gravity* are the property of bodies having a great *weight*. *Weight* is only opposed to that which has or is supposed to have no *weight*, that is, what is incorporeal or immaterial; for we may speak of the *weight* of the lightest conceivable bodies, as the *weight* of a feather: *heaviness* is opposed to lightness; the *heaviness* of lead is opposed to the lightness of a feather.

The *weight* lies absolutely in the thing; the *heaviness* is relatively considered with respect to the person: we estimate the *weight* of things according to a certain measure; we estimate the *heaviness* of things by our feelings.

Gravity is that species of *weight*, which is scientifically considered as inherent in certain bodies; the term is therefore properly scientific.

WEIGHT, BURDEN, LOAD.

WEIGHT, *v. Weight*.

BURDEN, from *bear*, signifies the thing borne.

LOAD, in German *laden*, is supposed by Adelung to admit of a derivation from different sources; but he does not suppose that which appears to me the most natural, namely, from *lay*, which becomes in our preterite *laid*, particularly since in low German and Dutch *laden*, to *load*, is contracted into *laeyen*, and the literal meaning of *load* is to lay on or in.

The term *weight* is here considered in common with the other terms, in the sense of a positive *weight*, as respects the persons or things by which it is allied to the word *burden*: the *weight* is said either of persons or things; the *burden* more commonly respects persons; the *load* may be said of either: a person may sink under the *weight* that rests upon him; a platform may break down from the *weight* upon it; a person sinks under his *burden* or *load*; a cart breaks down from the *load*. The *weight* is abstractedly taken for what is without reference to the cause of its being there; *burden* and *load* have respect to the person or thing by which they are produced: accident produces the *weight*; a person takes a *burden* upon himself, or has it imposed upon him; the *load* is always laid on: it is not proper to carry any *weight* that exceeds our strength; those who bear the *burden* expect to reap the fruit of their labor; he who carries *loads* must be contented to take such as are given him.

In the moral application, these terms mark the pain which is produced by a pressure; but the *weight* and *load* rather describe the positive severity of the pressure; the *burden* respects the temper and inclinations of the sufferer; the *load* is in this case a very great *weight*: a minister of state has a *weight* on his mind at all times, from the heavy responsibility which attaches to his station; one who labors under strong apprehensions or dread of an evil has a *load* on his mind; any sort of employment is a *burden* to one who wishes to be idle; and time unemployed is a *burden* to him who wishes to be always in action.

With what oppressive *weight* will sickness, disappointment, or old age, fall upon the spirits of that man who is a stranger to God? BLAIR.

I understood not that a grateful mind
By owing owes not, but still pays at once;
Indebted and discharg'd: what *burden* then?
MILTON.

His barns are stor'd,
And groaning saddles bend beneath their load.
SOMERVILLE.

WEIGHTY, *v.* Heavy.

WELL-BEING, WELFARE, PROSPERITY, HAPPINESS.

WELL-BRING may be said of

* Vide Girard: "Entire, complet."

one or many, but more of a body; the *well-being* of society depends upon a due subordination of the different ranks of which it is composed. WELFARE, or *faring well*, from the German *fahren* to go, respects the good condition of an individual; a parent is naturally anxious for the *welfare* of his child.

Well-being and *welfare* consist of such things as more immediately affect the existence: PROSPERITY, which comprehends both *well-being* and *welfare*, includes likewise all that can add to the enjoyments of man. The *prosperity* of a state, or of an individual, therefore, consists in the increase of wealth, power, honors, and the like; as outward circumstances more or less affect the HAPPINESS of man: *happiness* is, therefore, often substituted for *prosperity*; but it must never be forgotten that *happiness* properly lies only in the mind, and that consequently *prosperity* may exist without *happiness*; but *happiness*, at least as far as respects a body of men, cannot exist without some portion of *prosperity*.

Have free-thinkers been authors of any innovations that conduce to the *well-being* of mankind?
BARNETT.

For his own sake no duty he can ask,
The common *welfare* is our only task. JAMES.

Religion affords to good men peculiar security in the enjoyment of their *prosperity*. BLAIR.

WELCOME, *v.* Acceptable.

WELFARE, *v.* Well-being.

TO WHEEDLE, *v.* To coax.

WHIMSICAL, *v.* Fanciful.

TO WHIRL, *v.* To turn.

WHOLE, *v.* All.

WHOLE, ENTIRE, COMPLETE,
TOTAL, INTEGRAL.

* WHOLE excludes subtraction; ENTIRE excludes division; COMPLETE excludes deficiency: a *whole* orange has had nothing taken from it; an *entire* orange is not yet cut; and a *complete* orange is grown to its full size: it is possible, therefore, for a thing to be *whole* and not *entire*; and to be both, and yet not *complete*: an orange cut into parts is *whole* while all

the parts remain together, but it is not *entire* : hence we speak of a *whole* house, an *entire* set, and a *complete* book. The *wholeness* or integrity of a thing is destroyed at one's pleasure ; the *completeness* depends upon circumstances.

TOTAL denotes the aggregate of the parts ; *whole* the junction of all the parts : the former is, therefore, employed more in the moral sense to convey the idea of extent, and the latter mostly in the proper sense : hence we speak of the *total* destruction of the *whole* city, or of some particular houses : the *total* amount of expenses ; the *whole* expense of the war. *Whole* and *total* may in this manner be employed to denote things as well as qualities : in regard to material substances *wholes* are always opposed to the parts of which they are composed ; the *total* is the collected sum of the parts ; and the INTEGRAL is the same as the *integral* number.

The first four may likewise be employed as adverbs ; but *wholly* is a more familiar term than *totally* in expressing the idea of extent ; *entirely* is the same as undividedly ; *completely* is the same as perfectly, without any thing wanting : we are *wholly* or *totally* ignorant of the affair ; we are *entirely* at the disposal or service of another ; we are *completely* at variance in our accounts.

And all so forming an harmonious whole.

THOMSON.

The *entire* conquest of the passions is so difficult a work, that they who despair of it should think of a less difficult task, and only attempt to regulate them.

STEELE.

And oft, when unobserv'd,
Steal from the barn a straw, till soft and warm,
Clean and complete, their habitation grows.

THOMSON.

Nothing under a *total* thorough change in the convert will suffice.

SOUTH.

WHOLESOME, *v. Healthy.*

WICKED, *v. Bad.*

WICKED, UNJUST, INQUITOUS.

WICKED (*v. Bad*) is here the generic term ; INQUITOUS, from *iniquus* unjust, signifies that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the law of right betwixt man and man ; NEFARIOUS, from the Latin *nefas*

wicked or abominable, is that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the most sacred obligation. The term *wicked*, being indefinite, is commonly applied in a milder sense than *iniquitous* ; and *iniquitous* than *nefarious* : it is *wicked* to deprive another of his property, unlawfully, under any circumstances ; but it is *iniquitous* if it be done by fraud and circumvention ; and *nefarious* if it involves any breach of trust : any undue influence over another, in the making of his will, to the detriment of the rightful heir, is *iniquitous* ; any underhand dealing of a servant to defraud his master is *nefarious*.

In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice ;
And oft 'tis seen, the *wicked* prize itself
Buys out the law.

SHAKESPEARE.

Lucullus found that the province of Pontus had fallen under great disorders and oppressions from the *iniquity* of usurers and publicans.

PAIDEAUX.

WIDE, *v. Large.*

TO WILL, WISH.

THE WILL is that faculty of the soul which is the most prompt and decisive ; it immediately impels to action : the WISH is but a gentle motion of the soul towards a thing. We can *will* nothing but what we can effect ; we may *wish* for many things which lie above our reach. The *will* must be under the entire control of reason, or it will lead a person into every mischief : the *wishes* ought to be under the direction of reason ; or otherwise they may greatly disturb the happiness.

A good inclination is but the first rude draught of virtue ; but the finishing strokes are from the *will*.

SOUTH.

The *wishing* of a thing is not properly the *willing* of it ; it imports no more than an idle, unoperative, complacency in, and desire of, the object.

SOUTH.

WILLINGLY, VOLUNTARILY,
SPONTANEOUSLY.

To do a thing WILLINGLY is to do it with a good will ; to do a thing VOLUNTARILY is to do it of one's own accord : the former respects one's *willingness* to comply with the wishes of another ; we do what is asked of us, it is a mark of good nature : the latter respects our freedom from fo-

reign influence; we do that which we like to do; it is a mark of our sincerity. It is pleasant to see a child do his task *willingly*; it is pleasant to see a man *voluntarily* engage in any service of public good. SPONTANEOUSLY is but a mode of the *voluntary*, applied, however, more commonly to inanimate objects than to the will of persons: the ground produces *spontaneously*, which produces without culture; and words flow *spontaneously*, which require no effort on the part of the speaker to produce them. If, however, applied to the will, it bespeaks in a stronger degree the totally unbiassed state of the agent's mind, the *spontaneous* effusions of the heart are more than the *voluntary* services of benevolence. The *willing* is opposed to the *unwilling*, the *voluntary* to the *mechanical* or *involuntary*, the *spontaneous* to the *reluctant* or the *artificial*.

Food not of angels, yet accepted so,
As that more *willingly* than couldst not seem,
At heav'n's high feasts I have fed. MITTON.

Thoughts are only criminal when they are
First chosen, and then *voluntarily* continued.

Of these bene uncontroll'd and lawless rove,
But to some destin'd and *spontaneous* move. JOHNSON.

WILY, *v. Cunning.*

TO WIN, *v. To acquire.*

TO WIND, *v. To turn.*

WISDOM, PRUDENCE.

WISDOM (*v. Wit*) consists in speculative knowledge; PRUDENCE (*v. Prudent*) in that which is practical: the former knows what is past; the latter by foresight knows what is to come: many *wise* men are remarkable for their want of *prudence*; and those who are remarkable for *prudence* have frequently no other knowledge of which they can boast.

Two things speak much the wisdom of a nation: good laws, and a *prudent* management of them. STILLINGFLEET.

TO WISH, *v. To desire.*

TO WISH, *v. To will.*

WIT, *v. Ingenuity.*

WIT, HUMOUR, SATIRE, IRONY,
BURLISQUE.

WIT, like wisdom, according to its

original,
bes know
its mean
the mind
is perce
wit, as a
faculty,
as it w
forced s
experien
study a
ing; bu
that wh
deep th
are in v
effort.
which
person.
humor,
liant th
vein;
equable
this de
has giv
cimens
best hu
humor
practic
bably f
anger,

are per
wit; th
at the
covert
LESQ
than di
assemb
cordan
the m
burlesq
wit t
pasting t

Is a true
Yet all t
For sure
Applying
What Ar
Of logic
Here and
Unhelp

There
of thoug
Amour
that he

The
excite th
peru.

In writings of *humour*, figures are sometimes used of so delicate a nature, that it shall often happen that some people will see things in a direct contrary sense to what the author, and the majority of the readers understand them: to such the most innocent *irony* may appear *irreligion*. CAMBRIDGE.

One kind of *burlesque* represents mean persons in the accoutrements of heroes. ADDISON.

WITNESS, *v. Deponent*.

TO WITHDRAW, *v. To recede*.

TO WITHSTAND, *v. To oppose*.

WITHOUT, *v. Unless*.

WITHOUT INTERMISSION, *v. Incessantly*.

WOEFUL, *v. Piteous*.

WONDER, ADMIRE, SURPRIZE, ASTONISH, AMAZE.

WONDER, in German *wundern*, &c. is in all probability a variation of *wander*; because *wonder* throws the minds off its bias.

ADMIRE, from the Latin *miror*, and the Hebrew *marah* to look at, signifies looking at attentively.

SURPRIZE, compounded of *sur* and *prize*, or the Latin *prehendo*, signifies to take on a sudden.

ASTONISH, from the Latin *attonitus*, and *tonitru* thunder, signifies to strike as it were with the overpowering noise of thunder.

AMAZE signifies to be in a *maze*, so as not to be able to collect one's self.

That particular feeling which any thing unusual produces on our minds is expressed by all these terms, but under various modifications. *Wonder* is the most indefinite in its signification or application, but it is still the least vivid sentiment of all: it amounts to little more than a pausing of the mind, a suspension of the thinking faculty, an incapacity to fix on a discernible point in an object that rouses our curiosity: it is that state which all must experience at times, but none so much as those who are ignorant: they *wonder* at every thing because they know nothing. *Admiration* is *wonder* mixed with esteem or veneration: the *admirer* suspends his thoughts, not from the vacancy but the fulness of his mind: he is rivetted to an object which for a time absorbs his faculties: nothing but

what is great and good excites *admiration*, and none but cultivated minds are susceptible of it: an ignorant person cannot *admire*, because he cannot appreciate the value of any thing. *Surprise* and *astonishment* both arise from that which happens unexpectedly; they are species of *wonder* differing in degree, and produced only by the events of life: the *surprise*, as its derivation implies, takes us unawares; we are *surprised* if that does not happen which we calculate upon, as the absence of a friend whom we looked for; or we are *surprised* if that happens which we did not calculate upon; thus we are *surprised* to see a friend returned whom we supposed was on his journey: *astonishment* may be awakened by similar events which are more unexpected and more unaccountable: thus we are *astonished* to find a friend at our house whom we had every reason to suppose was many hundred miles off; or we are *astonished* to hear that a person has got safely through a road which we conceived to be absolutely impassable.

Surprise may for a moment startle; *astonishment* may stupefy and cause an entire suspension of the faculties; but *amazement* has also a mixture of perturbation. We may be *surprised* and *astonished* at things in which we have no particular interest: we are mostly *amazed* at that which immediately concerns us. We may be *surprised* agreeably or otherwise; we may be *astonished* at that which is agreeable, although *astonishment* is not itself a pleasure; but we are *amazed* at that which happens contrary to our inclination. We are agreeably *surprised* to see our friends: we are *astonished* how we ever got through the difficulty: we are *amazed* at the sudden and unexpected events which have come upon us to our ruin. A man of experience will not have much to *wonder* at, for his observation will supply him with corresponding examples of whatever passes: a wise man will have but momentary *surprises*; as he has estimated the uncertainty of human life, few things of importance will happen contrary to his expectations: a generous mind will be *astonished* at gross instances of perfidy in others: there is no mind that

WORK, LABOR, TOIL,
DRUDGERY.

WORK, in Saxon *weorc*, Greek *εργον*, Hebrew *areg*.

LABOR, *v. To labor.*

TOIL, probably connected with *till*.

DRUDGERY, *v. Servant.*

Work is the general term, as including that which calls for the exertion of our strength: *labor* differs from it in degree of exertion required; it is hard *work*: *toil* expresses a still higher degree of painful exertion: *drudgery* implies a mean and degrading *work*. Every member of society must *work* for his support, who is not in independent circumstances: the poor are obliged to *labor* for their daily subsistence; some are compelled to *toil* incessantly for the pittance which they earn: the *drudgery* falls to the lot of those who are the lowest in society. A man wishes to complete his *work*; he is desirous of resting from his *labor*; he seeks for a respite from his *toil*; he submits to do the *drudgery*.

The hireling thus,
With labour drudges out the painful day.
Rowe.

WORK, *v. Production.*

WORK, OPERATION.

WORK (*v. Work*) is simple exertion: OPERATION is a combined exertion.

The *work* may be purely mechanical; the *operation* has mostly a method: the day-labourer performs his *work* by the use of his hands only; a medical man performs an *operation* by the exercise of his skill.

Some deadly draught, some enemy to life,
Boils in my bowels, and works out my soul.
Dryden.

Sometimes a passion seems to operate,
Almost in contradiction to itself.
Shirley.

WORKMAN, *v. Artificer.*

WORLDLY, *v. Secular.*

TO WORSHIP, *v. To adore.*

WORTH, *v. To deserve.*

WORTH, *v. Value.*

WORTHLESS, *v. Unworthy.*

TO WRANGLE, *v. To jangle.*

WRATH, *v. Anger.*

TO WRENCH, *v. To turn.*

TO WREST, *v. To turn.*

WRETCHED, *v. Unhappy.*

TO WRING, *v. To turn.*

WRITER, PENMAN, SCRIBE.

WRITER is an indefinite term, every one who *writes* is called a *writer*; but none are PENMEN but such as are expert at their pen. Many who profess to teach *writing* are themselves but sorry *writers*: the best *penmen* are not always the best teachers of *writing*. The SCRIBE is one who *writes* for the purpose of copying; he is therefore an official *writer*.

WRITER, AUTHOR.

WRITER refers us to the act of *writing*; AUTHOR to the act of *inventing*. There are therefore many *writers*, who are not *authors*; but there is no *author* of books who may not be termed a *writer*: compilers and contributors to periodical works are *writers*, but not *authors*. Poets and historians are termed *authors*, but not *writers*.

TO WRITHE, *v. To turn.*

WRONG, *v. Injury.*

Y.

YET, *v. However.*

TO YIELD, *v. To afford.*

TO YIELD, *v. To bear.*

TO YIELD, *v. To comply.*

YIELDING, *v. Compliant.*

TO YIELD, *v. To give up.*

YOUTHFUL, JUVENILE,
PUERILE.

YOUTHFUL signifies full of *youth*, or in the complete state of *youth*: JUVENILE, from the Latin *juvenis*, signifies the same; but PUERILE from *puer* a boy, signifies literally *boyish*. Hence the first two terms are taken in an indifferent sense; but the latter in a bad sense, or at least always in the sense of what is suit-

able to a boy only: thus we speak of *youthful* vigor, *youthful* employments, *juvenile* performances, *juvenile* years, and the like: but *puerile* objections, *puerile* conduct, and the like. Sometimes *juvenile* is taken in the bad sense when speaking of *youth* in contrast with men, as *juvenile* tricks; but *puerile* is a much stronger term of reproach, and marks the absence of manhood in those who ought to be men. We expect nothing from a

youth but what is *juvenile*; we are surprized and dissatisfied to see what is *puerile* in a man.

Chorusus then, with *youthful* hopes beguill'd,
Swain with success, and of a daring mind,
This new invention fatally design'd. DAYDEN.

Raw *juvenile* writers imagine that, by pouring forth figures often, they render their compositions warm and animated. BLAIR.

After the common course of *puerile* studies, he was put an apprentice to a brewer. JOHNSON.

THE END.

